Purpose

- Provide unclassified insights into the good and bad of joint operational fires during OIF (MCO) from 1st BCD perspective
- Identify lessons learned for the Army and Joint fires community
• Background
• The Good
• The Bad with recommendations to improve…
  – Service and joint C4I functionality
  – Training Army leaders to function more effectively in joint/ operational fires environment
  – The role/ capability of Battlefield Coordination Detachments
• Conclusion
Background

• BCD “101” (-)
• CFACC’s 5 “Fights”
• Theater Air-Ground System (TAGS)
• Air Force Operational distances
• Complex Airspace
• KI CAS CONOP
• REPRESENT THE ARMY FORCES (ARFOR) COMMANDER IN THE JOINT/COMBINED AIR OPERATIONS CENTER (JAOC/CAOC).

• FACILITATE THE SYNCHRONIZATION OF AIR OPERATIONS WITH ARMY GROUND OPERATIONS THROUGH THE COORDINATION OF AIR SUPPORT AND THE EXCHANGE OF OPERATIONAL AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.
BATTLEFIELD COORDINATION
DETACHMENTS

1st BCD, FT BRAGG, NC
SWA, CONTINGENCIES,
CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM,
JFCOM, ETC

19th BCD, RAMSTEIN, GE
EUCOM

3rd BCD, OSAN, ROK
KOREA

2ND BCD (RC), HURLBURT
PACOM

1st BCD, FT BRAGG, NC
SWA, CONTINGENCIES,
CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM,
JFCOM, ETC
BCD ORGANIZATION

- COL, FA Commander
- Combined Arms Staff
- Mile-wide / Inch Deep

HQ Element

32D AAMDC provided the ADA Liaison

- PLANS SECT
- OPNS SECT
- INTELL SECT
- ADA SECT
- AIRSPACE MGMT SECT
- AIRLIFT SECT

16 x Officers
2 x Warrant Officers
22 x Enlisted
40 Total PAX

Augmented with 2 Marines and 2 UK officers for OIF
Strategic Targets

Counter TBM in West

Support JSOTF-N (Green line)

Counter Air

Support CFLCC (Counterland)

CFACC’S 5 “Fights”

• Apportionment
• WOE
• DMPI Sortie Equivalents
• Allocation

TF-20?
Theater Air Ground System (partial)
Complex Airspace (ACO M)

- UAV Blanket
- Driveways
- Aerial Refueling
- CAS Areas
- U2 Track
- Kuwait ATC Zone
- EP-3, P-3 SIGINT Track
- ATACMS PAH
Complex Airspace (ACO Y- LOW LEVEL)

- INTERCORPS BNDRY
- FSCL
- ATACMS PAH
- LSA BUSHMASTER CLASS D
- MAINT TEST FLT ROZ
- HELO ROUTES
- SOF HELO AERIAL REFUEL AREA
- CFLCC WEST BNDRY

MEF SECTOR
KI CAS CONOP Issues

- Theater TTP - not doctrine
- Airspace, FSCM and or Target
- Need to add to TTP to better use C4I
- Need to improve C4I to leverage
  - KB COP and in AFATDS
  - Rapid dissemination to the ground and the cockpit
- Good TTP for mobile targeting—implications for our ASR system
“There were episodes in the fight when operational maneuver caused the enemy to react; when the enemy reacted it allowed us to employ joint fires against him which, in turn, allowed our operational maneuver to be more successful.

Our joint fires were very effective. We had CAS in abundance.

First, the Army should give the Air Force credit for being as good as it is. We’ve got the best Air Force in the world.

We’ve got to put a joint context in virtually all our training.”

LTG Wallace, CDR, V Corps, FA Magazine
Visibility of Army operations to the joint force

- Aviation and ATACMS on ATO
- Airspace in ACO
- Frequency coordination (Counterfire Radars)
- Fratricide avoidance in spins
- Impact of Blue Force Tracker (BFT)
Mutual operational support between the Air and Land

- Air Component provided Land FOM, shaping and CAS
- Each component provided enablers to the other
  - ISR
  - C2
  - SEAD / DEAD
  - Personnel Recovery
- Land Component integrated air effects into targeting plan (EFSTs)
- Land provided direct and indirect SEAD- enabled Air maneuver
- “Mother of all storms” JDAM “Fest”
- Coordinated FSCL and Battlespace (Killbox CONOP)
The Bad:
Service and Joint C4I interfaces

- Too many partially redundant systems
- Battlefield Damage Assessment (BDA)
- AFATDS- TBMCS Interface
Too many partially redundant systems

<table>
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<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>PLANS Internal</th>
<th>IWS (V. 2.5.1)</th>
<th>MIRC (chat)</th>
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<td>Interim Targeting Solution</td>
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21 PAX per shift:

43 computer boxes

SIPR/ NIPR/ JWIC

4 “Chats”

4 “COPS”

Default: Excel and PPT!
• Lack of Pilot Reporting and BDA hampered Targeting Processes
  – CFLCC (and CFACC) lacked knowledge of what targets were hit and what the effects on the target were (Level 1 BDA)
  – Pilot Reports not provided as planes came off target
  – MISREPS several days old
• Standardized language needed in PIREPs so report is clearly understood
• BDA challenges in effects based operations
BDA Recommendations

- Discipline the system: reports and format
- Process needs to be in place to standardize PIREPS and communication flow
- System needs to be devised to transmit WSV rapidly to intel centers for BDA analysis.
- Accurate MISREPS and Phase I BDA provided NLT 12 Hours after strike.
- Automate phase I BDA by ordnance “death calls”
- Rethink range of Battlefield Damage Indicators that with phase I BDA could provide better phase II BDA (functional assessment
Without ASR #
ARMY Visibility
of CFACC effort LOST

NO FEED BACK
w/o
ATO CHANGE

A USMTF TEXT COPY OF ATO and ACO
MESSAGE CAN BE PUSHED
BUT INADEQUATE VIEW/ DISPLAY TOOLS
AFATDS-TBMCS
Recommendations

• IMMEDIATE:
  – Build an ASR REQ NO. capability in all mission types in TBMCS
  – Increase ability to write all ASR mission types to MIDB
  – Add a target location field to the MIDB that supports targeting vice intel
  – Automate the data entry for ITS/ GAT requirements

• NEAR TERM
  – The requirement between all systems should be to transfer data via relational databases- XML?
  – Require all systems in the targeting process to conform to standardized data base construction rules to allow ease of data transfer between systems
  – All defined and appropriate data points need to transfer when data packages are transported between systems. If needed, provide filtering capability to filter data viewed by specific users
Improve Collective training

- Robust and Dynamic
- Support Complete Targeting Cycle
- Realistic Effects
- Train as we Fight
- Better M&S
- Standardize theater SOPs
- Higher Fidelity
- Stimulate real-world C4I

- BLUE FLAGS
- BCTP WFX
- “DIRT” CTCs
- Joint Exercises
• Improve USAFAS and CGSC curriculum
  – ATO planning cycle and how the Army can interact and integrate successfully
  – Understand how the Air Force generates combat power
    • Concept of flow
    • Impact of carriers, air refueling, low density high demand assets
    • Concept of Air Force C2 and controlling agencies
    • Once resourced, air is flexible in location, less so in time

• Leverage existing AF Schools for personnel slated for Division and higher operations/ plans staff
  – JATOPC: Div and higher FECC folks, AV BDE staff, BCD
  – JSSC: Army O5/ O6- D/A CDR, AV BDE CDR, Div / Corps G3
  – JFACC Course: ADC (O)/ (M), DIV CDR
• Rethink mobile targeting process
  – Effects based not sortie or bomb based
  – Top Down vice Bottom-up
  – CAS may be less efficient but more effective
  – Resource targeting effects in geographic areas (killboxes) during ATO development
    • ISR
    • airspace
    • C2 plan
    • Delivery system
    • Logistic support
    • BDA
  – Decide the target during ATO execution
Importance of the BCD

- Located at the nexus of land and air
- Helps bridge the seams
- More important to support for smaller, modular land force
- Enhances “plug and play” into joint force
BCD Pre-OIF Challenges

- Impact of OEF
- Manning / end strength
- Turn-over
- Army vs. Air Force ramp-up
- IMPACT of multiple CENTAF CAOCs
Enhance BCD Capability

- Track BCD “graduates” - Fix ASI
- Proponent?
- More BCDs?
- Training: JATOPC FTU?,
- 131A not coded For 5U ASI?
- Man w/ “Right” People
- Training & System Support: Fund AJAST
Summary

- Background
- The Good
- The Bad with recommendations to improve...
  - Service and joint C4I functionality
  - Training Army leaders to function more effectively in joint/operational fires environment
  - The role/capability of Battlefield Coordination Detachments

QUESTIONS?
Joint Operational Fires

A 1st BCD Perspective from
Operation Iraqi Freedom

Field Artillery and Joint Fires Conference
October 2003