Operation OUTREACH

Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

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FOREWORD

This newsletter represents the efforts of two teams from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) that deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan as part of Operation OUTREACH. A team from the JRTC Intelligence Division, headed by LTC Bob Chamberlain, with Major Dan Pinnel of the Fire Support Division, deployed to Iraq, Qatar, Afghanistan, and Kuwait from 31 May to 13 June 2003.

The JRTC observers collected and documented observations that included lessons learned/tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP). The areas observed centered on general intelligence topics, human intelligence (HUMINT) operations, unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) operations, and general fire support operations, to include targeting. This collection effort provides immediate feedback to units engaged in combat for Operations ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF), as well as incorporating TTP and lessons learned into future rotations. CALL military analysts contributed doctrine, organizations, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF) implications concerning lessons learned/TTP for each issue/observation.

LAWRENCE H. SAUL
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Director, Center for Army Lessons Learned
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The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication of this periodical is necessary in the transaction of the public business as required by law of the Department.

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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both are intended.

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Center for Army Lessons Learned

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The Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) Intelligence and Fire Support Team, comprised of LTC Bob Chamberlain, MAJ Dan Pinnel, CPT Mike Liverpool, and SSG Norris Whitford, viewed various topics while in the CENTCOM area of responsibility. From 31 May to 13 June 2003, they visited numerous units and locations throughout Iraq, Afghanistan, Qatar, and Kuwait.

The team found many items to cover, but mainly focused on intelligence- and fire support-related issues: *Intelligence (General), Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Operations, Targeting (aspects from both intelligence and fire support), Fire Support, and Random Observations.*

Following is a compilation of their observations.
Issue: Iraq — Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Operations.

Observation: “The vacuum through a straw.” UAVs provided vast amounts of intelligence during high-intensity operations but were limited during stability operations.

Discussion: During the initial phases of OIF, the UAV was the “drug of choice.” It brought a unique set of capabilities to the military intelligence (MI) arsenal. With well-trained operators, raw combat data was used to acquire and target the enemy. The system was responsive and productive in high-intensity combat, with enemy maneuver formations and prepared defenses easily identified. While high-intensity maneuver battles occurred, the UAV flew preprogrammed flights or was dynamically re-tasked over short distances. Oddly enough, with all of its previous success, the UAV had participated little in subsequent operations such as Operations SIDEWINDER and SCORPION.

During stability operations and support operations (SOSO), the UAV becomes much less capable. Small enemy forces over large geographic areas degrade the system’s ability to cover numerous named areas of interest (NAI). Its slow flight speed and relative small peripheral vision limits its ability to see small units in large areas, especially in urban environments. The UAV was high maintenance in operational terms of updating priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), specific information requirements (SIRs), specific orders and requests (SORs), and instructions. Collection managers seemed to be overwhelmed keeping up with these tasks and getting the UAV at the right place at the right time to support maneuver commanders. An operator, in effect, had to get lucky to have the system fly near a reported enemy location. If not, by the time the system left the departure airfield to the target, the event would have been most
likely be over. The UAV simply cannot fly fast enough to move to the sound of the guns. The
daily mortar and rocket attacks on bases and convoys became virtually undetectable to the
UAVs. Planners and collection managers could have the UAVs fly the convoy routes but with
the number of friendly convoys, civilian traffic and the limited amount of operational UAVs,
luck would be the deciding factor.

Dissemination of UAV data was a problem. The UAV Company, the Corps analysis and control
element (ACE), and Kuwait were the only elements to have UAV video feeds. It is almost
impossible for a maneuver unit that is fighting or on the move to receive critical, time sensitive
information from the UAV.

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** *Detailed planning becomes paramount for UAV missions during
stability operations. Pattern analysis is the key in developing targeted areas for surveillance
by the UAV. Re-look the allocation of the Remote Viewing Terminal (RVT). The RVT in
Kuwait could be used in a general-support (GS) role to help one of the brigades in the fight.*

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:** *(Training,)* Emphasize integration and synchronization
of UAV assets with applicable battlefield operating systems (BOSs) to assist in target
identification during the planning phase of the Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP).

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**Issue: Iraq — UAV, Modified Table of Organization (MTOE).**

**Observation:** The current MTOE did not allow for the optimal use of the system.

**Discussion:** The HUNTER UAV Company had no internal analysis capability. Operators were
trained to interpret the images from the system but they have no ability to analyze the
information. Thus, the information was transmitted to an analysis and control element where
analysis was conducted. The operators at the UAV Company received little feedback on their
interpretation of the imagery, other than updated collection plans. The current MTOE also makes
split-based operations difficult when jumping forward in support of maneuver operations.

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** *UAV units are bound to airfields and cannot be moved to the analysis
unit (this unit’s analysis facility was in Baghdad). Either an analysis element will have to be
assigned to UAV organizations, collocate an analysis facility to the airfield, or a better
communications architecture with greater bandwidth will be necessary.*

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and
Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:** *(Organizations, Training, Leadership and
Education,)* Conduct an analysis of the roles and functions of the current MTOE. If no
additional personnel are available in the Army personnel inventory to plus up the MTOE to
create an internal analysis capability, examine the possibility of repositioning personnel in
required/authorized positions. If changes are made to the MTOE, then also update Army
education and training in operational units in the field to reflect these changes.
**Issue: Iraq — UAV, Frequency De-Confliction.**

**Observation:** The HUNTER UAV system sat idle in theater for the first 30 days waiting on operational frequencies.

**Discussion:** This was an ongoing issue. Operational frequency problems have plagued the UAV from fielding new systems, training of current systems, and real-world operations such as OIF. As the Army continues to develop UAVs, frequency de-confliction will occur at each level of command. Every country or region (such as the European Union) assigns frequencies and sets their own regulations. The flight coordination center (FCC) had established ours, but there was no effective method in place to determine and de-conflict our frequencies when we deploy.

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** As high technology systems are fielded, staffs need to examine mission analysis constraints and limitations to include the electronic spectrum. Frequency de-confliction must be addressed before the deployment.

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:** (Training.) Frequency de-confliction should be included as part of the MDMP process during mission analysis. Units must plan across the BOS spectrum to ensure frequencies support mission requirements.

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**Issue: Iraq — Intelligence, Collection Management at the Division and Corps Levels.**

**Observation:** Disjointed collection planning: Poor collection management is a recurring trend at the combat training centers (CTCs)), so it is not surprising that this trend was observed during real-world operations. In many units, the collection manager was a junior officer who has had no formal training.

**Discussion:** In many cases, the officer had only a general understanding of the collection management process and a very limited understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the assets that he was tasking. The collection managers could understand generic PIR, but failed to develop Specific Intelligence Requirements (SIRs), those questions that the tasked assets specifically answer. As a result, collection plans were disjointed. SIRs for the UAV, signal intelligence (SIGINT), human intelligence (HUMINT), and long-range surveillance (LRS) were at times, poorly written. A glaring example of this was that the UAV was tasked to find buried aircraft and to monitor a safe house for groups of people. These highlight both a misunderstanding of the capacities of the collector and the process of tasking a system. Most assets had poor SIRs assigned to them, which caused the asset team leader to guess what was the collection manager’s intent. Other collection control measures that were usually ignored or forgotten were the latest time of value and start-stop times.

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Lessons Learned/TTP: *Well-written SIRs will help prevent assets from being improperly utilized.*

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:** *(Training,)* SIRs are an integral part of the IPB process. Collection assets must be well-managed and used in the proper manner according to doctrine. If SIRs are not well written, it has a ripple effect, skewering not only the IPB process, but also hindering MDMP overall.

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**Issue: Iraq — Digital Connectivity.**

**Observation:** No standard exists for the intelligence officer when using digital equipment.

**Discussion:** Many units received new versions of software immediately prior to or during deployment. We would not give a qualified M-249 gunner an M-4 right before deploying, yet every echelon from battalion to higher had operators who described the confusion of getting new and unfamiliar software without the training before deployment. In some cases, these versions of the new program were completely different. To compound this issue, intelligence soldiers at different command levels were using different programs to handle the same information. One intelligence report could be transmitted from the All-Source Analysis System (ASAS) to the Automated Deep Operations Command System (ADOCS) at theater to the Maneuver Control System (MCS) at brigade and battalion. In many cases, operators had multiple laptops that they had to monitor, and data had to be manually inputted from one system to another. Intelligence soldiers’ use of other than ASAS was driven by their need to be able to communicate with the targeteers and commanders. The strength of ASAS is in its ability to collate and query its database. When intelligence soldiers use other systems, we lose that ability. The problem was compounded as you moved to echelons above division. At theater, without the ability to query, the operator had to search reams of information; at battalion there was frustration, but no real loss. Add to this the movement of data from system to system and trying to import operational graphics to aid in a common operating picture between levels of command and within staffs. Between manually inputting data and graphic control measures, the chance for human error increased dramatically.

Lessons Learned/TTP: *The Army must set a standard for digital connectivity and train soldiers prior to implementing the programs. Why have updated versions of the system when soldiers are unable to operate it and other adjacent units are unable to access the information?*

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:** *(Doctrine, Training, Leadership and Education,)* Doctrinal standards need to be established for digital connectivity. Soldiers must be educated on the standards in an institutional setting (i.e., Army schools), and operational units in the field must train on the new standards after they have been set.
**Issue: Iraq – The All-Source Analysis System (ASAS).**

**Observation:** The productivity of ASAS was generally limited to division and echelons above division (EAD).

**Discussion:** Generally, the ASAS was useful at division and EAD. There continued to be a disparity between what brigade and battalion knew and what division and higher knew (common operational picture). One of the supporting issues was higher not cleaning up external database coordination (EDC) and lower echelons having to clean up all the double reporting. Another issue was the bandwidth at light units and maneuver battalions and brigades. This became extremely challenging when these units could not set up their signal assets for any long period of time because of maneuver or contacts. The issue of multiple systems (Maneuver Control System (MCS), Air Defense Operations Center System (ADOCS), Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below System (FBCB2), Blue Force Tracker) caused the small battalion and brigade staffs to expend much of their limited manpower to converting data from one system to the other. It was not uncommon for intelligence soldiers (S2 section) to monitor seven systems during a battle. (1. FM, 2. ASAS, 3. MCS (light), 4. FBCB2, 5. Digital Non-Secure Voice Terminal (DNVT), 6. Secure Telephone Unit (STU) III, and 7. Tactical Satellite (TACSAT) or High Frequency (HF)).

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** As seen at the CTCs, the ASAS has little value or worth at the maneuver battalion level. Battalion and brigade S2s seem to have some success using the FBCB2.

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:** (Training.) Lower echelons can be quickly overwhelmed with “information overflow” because of more limited communication networks that they have to work with compared to higher headquarters, as is the case with the ASAS capabilities. Until more communication systems are fielded to lower levels, units must adapt to the capabilities that they currently possess.

**Issue: Iraq/Afghanistan — Are Junior Military Intelligence Soldiers Prepared for Tactical Roles?**

**Observation:** Why do commanders in the field think that junior intelligence officers and soldiers are not prepared to take on tactical intelligence roles? Comments from military intelligence and maneuver commanders were that junior military intelligence (MI) officers and 96Bs should have been better prepared for tactical assignments. The trend that we observed during OIF and OEF was that lieutenants, who have been serving in units for 6-8 months, and E-1 thru E-4 96Bs did not appear to be prepared for tactical assignments. Captains serving as battalion S2s generally possessed the skill needed to be an S2, but lacked any advanced analytical capabilities.
Discussion: These are some of the issues that we observed on junior MI soldiers from OIF and OEF (the officers referred to are lieutenants and the 96Bs, E-1 thru E-4):

- **Officers**: Did not understand the targeting process and were unable to produce the products to support the targeting process. Most of the officers understood the concept of intelligence support to targeting...at the division and corps levels. During interviews with many officers, they stated that they were never taught targeting at the battalion and brigade levels.

- **Officers and 96Bs**: Weak intelligence briefing skills. If the primary (S2, senior intelligence analyst) was unable to brief, commanders usually forwent the intelligence portion of the brief.

- **Officers and 96Bs**: Very little to no analytical skills. This is also a trend that we have observed at the CTCs for the past 10 years.

- **Officers and 96Bs**: Did not understand their role in the MDMP. This was extremely evident during the COA development and the wargaming process.

- **Officers and 96Bs**: Unable to develop the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) plan and lacked the fundamentals of collection management. Did not understand the asset capabilities and limitations.

- **96Bs**: Only understood the basic fundamentals of ASAS. Basically, they could perform limited data entry. This might not have had an adverse effect on operations considering that ASAS did not function well below division level.

- **Officers and 96Bs**: Lacked common tactical skills such as operating communications systems.

Lessons Learned/TTP: The Intelligence Center and School at Fort Huachuca, AZ, believes that they prepare soldiers to support tactical commanders. The soldier might leave the school with the fundamentals of tactical intelligence, but who is responsible for that soldier’s continuing intelligence education? The G2s? The MI battalion commanders? The maneuver commanders? It appears that no one takes ownership of this matter. One recommendation is to strengthen the foundation of the junior intelligence soldier’s education. In the late 90s, the Intelligence Officer’s Advanced Course was a block of instruction titles “Brigade Operations and Intelligence.” Junior majors and senior captains still talk about this class today, crediting it with giving them the tools that they needed to succeed in the tactical world. By teaching this block of instruction during MIOBC and 96B advanced individual training (AIT), the soldier could possibly depart Huachuca at a higher level of proficiency, which gives him a better chance of succeeding if there is a lack of concurrent training.

Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training, Leadership and Education.) Army schools (MI and FA in particular) must emphasize the importance of MDMP and the targeting process at the tactical/operational level (brigade and below). The ASAS process must be instilled to students in the institutional environment (school), so that our young officers and soldiers can apply what they have learned in training and real-world operations more effectively.
Issue: Iraq — HUMINT Asset Management.

Observation: There were 69 tactical human intelligence teams (THTs) operating in Iraq, with mission requirements for at least 15 more teams. With this many teams operating in country, the expectation of the HUMINT Operations Cell (HOC) was to receive at least 120 information intelligence reports (IIRs) daily.

Discussion: On the average, the HOC received 30 reports daily. The lack of reports was not because of the lack of activity, but because of the lack of guidance and focus provided by the HOC. The HOC should be providing mission focus to the operational management teams (OMTs), who then provide guidance and focus to the THTs. The HOC, OMTs, and THTs operated off different PIRs, which were not developed into SIR/SOR, and many of the teams conducted unconventional missions that did not support the HUMINT effort.

Lessons Learned/TTP: The lack of HUMINT focus for the THTs is a common problem we observed at the JRTC. A trend throughout the Army is to man the THTs with senior warrant officers, while manning the HOC and OMTs with junior warrant officers and NCOs. More senior and experienced operators should conduct HUMINT management and analysis.

Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training, Leadership.) Emphasize the importance of HUMINT in training. Recommend more senior operators be placed in charge of HUMINT management and analysis to enhance mission effectiveness.
Issue: Iraq — HUMINT Communications.

Observation: Compatibility and connectivity between HUMINT communications systems hindered operations in Iraq.

Discussion: Connectivity between the terminals was nonexistent, and had an adverse effect on HUMINT mission capabilities and productivity. The communication systems were designed to link HUMINT elements together with time-sensitive and perishable information, as well as create databases for this information. Because these systems did not work, the computers provided with the HUMINT communications software were used solely as stand-alone laptop computers, with information being processed as Word and Access documents. Additionally, the HUMINT communication systems were not compatible with other systems throughout the Joint force, limiting the exchange of information with HUMINT assets throughout the theater.

Lessons Learned/TTP: The units are making do by using the system’s computers as stand-alones and passing information using Word and Access programs.

Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:

- **Training.** Units must continue to apply adaptability and flexibility with the assets they have to effectively accomplish missions.
- **Material.** Field communications packages that are compatible across Joint forces. There is no viable reason for developing single system communications systems. On the contrary, there is every reason for making sure such communications systems can be networked with others.

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Issue: Afghanistan — HUMINT Communications.

Observation: Communications between THTs and the OMT in the Kandahar region of Afghanistan were challenged during the best of times. The systems were not reliable and provided no connectivity between other HUMINT assets in theater.

Discussion: Because of the geographic location of some teams operating in the Kandahar region, the only way they could provide the OMT or higher headquarters with intelligence was to travel to Kandahar Airfield (KAF) and physically provide hard copy of all reports. This presented a problem with perishable information because the teams could only travel to KAF every 3 to 5 days. As in Iraq, the HUMINT communication systems were used as stand-alone computers, and FM and cell phone connectivity was sporadic. Another adverse effect of poor communications was that the teams did not have access to the source databases, nor did they have access to intelligence collected by other HUMINT agencies in country.

Lessons Learned/TTP: Recommend satellite telephones for all THTs.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training, Materiel.) During planning phase of MDMP (mission analysis), ensure that capabilities and limitations of communication equipment are adequately examined to support all contingencies. Distribute existing assets to maximize capabilities (while overcoming, or at least minimizing limitations) such as issuing satellite phones to units and personnel who are in remote locations that must maintain contact with other units over long distances. Doctrine states that intelligence drives maneuver; in an intelligence-driven SOSO, absolutely no unit should have priority over intelligence collection—especially HUMINT.

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Issue: Iraq/Afghanistan — HUMINT Capabilities.

Observation: Commanders, at every echelon, were generally not certain how HUMINT assets could best support their operations.

Discussion: HUMINT teams and MI commanders who were frustrated at the misuse of HUMINT assets by maneuver commanders approached this subject to us. The MI personnel believed that combat arms officers did not understand the management and capabilities of HUMINT assets, especially when teams were tasked in the direct support (DS) role, and that it was the “Big Army’s” job to teach them.

Lessons Learned/TTP: The MI personnel were correct that many HUMINT assets are poorly utilized as a result of a lack of understanding of the mission on the part of the supported commander and staff. Mismanagement of HUMINT assets in the DS role is, more often than not, a result of poorly trained or weak HUMINT team leaders. It is the HUMINT team’s responsibility to ensure the supported commander knows his capabilities and limitations and how best he can support his mission. This is one of the most common reoccurring trends that we see at the JRTC. Frequently, the HUMINT team leader relies on the supported unit’s S2 to ensure the commander and staff understands their mission and responsibility. What makes this S2 the expert?

Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training, Leadership.) Units must attempt to effectively use DS HUMINT assets to maximize their capabilities in training. Leaders must properly train HUMINT team leaders and soldiers.

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Issue: Iraq — Intelligence, HUMINT.

Observation: Some HUMINT teams were initially given the command relationship of general support reinforcing (GS-R) from Corps.
**Discussion:** Team leaders were ineffective at warding off divisions that, in reality, eventually became DS. THT employment is not taught to tactical intelligence officers (35D) and most S2s have trouble with the employment issue. Many THTs end up attached to units conducting non-doctrinal missions, and, in many cases, THTs actually augmented four-man stacks during building raids (they were usually the number two man, who statistically is the person who gets shot).

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** *THTs rely on the rapport they generate with the local population and the ability to collect information. Putting them on a door kicker team ruins that rapport and there would be no advantage to them collecting information. Being on a door kicker team can be fun, but with critical shortages of HUMINT military occupational specialties (MOSs) throughout the Army, especially in Iraq, it would be more beneficial to have them performing their mission after the site takedown.*

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:** *(Training, Leadership.)* Soldiers must be used in roles for which they have been educated and trained. Mal-utilization of personnel can hamper mission effectiveness.

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**Issue:** Iraq/Afghanistan – Interpreters.

**Observation:** The lack of competent interpreters throughout the theater impeded operations. When interpreters were integrated into operations, they were not used to their full capability.

**Discussion:** Bottom line, the U.S. Army does not have a fraction of the linguists required to operate in the Central Command (CENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). We have to rely on contract linguists for Dari, Pashtun, and the numerous dialects of Arabic. This develops into a big problem, because, not only do you have to have fluent linguists, but you also have to obtain one that can comprehend military terms and operations. In most cases, the interpreters also need some degree of physical stamina to support military operations in a field environment. Laugh if you will, but many of the linguists with which I conversed were convenience store workers and cab drivers, most over the age of 40. None had any previous military experience. Most military linguists working in Iraq and Afghanistan only possess, on the average, a 2/2 Forces Command (FORSCOM) rating (which basically gives them the ability to tell the difference between a burro and a burrito).

The next problem with interpreters was asset utilization. With this limited asset, what is the priority for employment? Because of the limited number of interpreters, we observed that there was not much continuity in working with the same elements, or, in many cases, interpreters working to the point of burnout. They are mercenaries and are getting paid, but the tradeoff with long hours is that the quality of support is degraded.

There are TTP for working with interpreters. For most soldiers, the notion of working with a foreign-speaking civilian is a new and novel concept. Home-Station training with linguists is not
common, and rarely occurs at the CTCs. The most common mistake soldiers make while working with interpreters was that they speak directly to the interpreter and wait for him to translate rather than have eye contact and speak directly to the foreign national, with the interpreter speaking in the background. In many cultures, not speaking directly to a person shows a lack of respect and trust. Another observation is that the foreign national gives a 10-minute answer and the interpreter translates yes or no. Who knows what agenda the interpreter has? If the soldier isn’t keen enough to pick up on this, there could be problems with a common understanding of future situations.

Lessons Learned/TTP: *There are numerous recommendations, but only a few that we can influence in the near future.*

- **Have language training at Home Station.** The days of going to the “language lab” one day a week to read foreign comic books or interrogate your roommate are over. Immersion training is the key to success.
- **Incorporate interpreter scenarios at the CTCs, at least with HUMINT soldiers.** The interpreter scenario was attempted during the Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT) rotation at the JRTC.
- **Add an asset manager at the unit level, similar to a collection manager for interpreters.** We can no longer afford to send interpreters in “support” of units to buy chickens and soft drinks.

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:** *(Training,)* Recommend suggestions in above paragraph be adapted whenever possible.

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**Issue:** Afghanistan — Operational Management Team (OMT) Operations.

**Observation:** OMT operations in the Kandahar AO were not as productive as they could have been because of a lack of analytical feedback and operational focus, which is due in part to not conducting 24-hour operations and being manned by an inexperienced staff.

**Discussion:** Another disturbing trend that we have seen at the JRTC is that the OMTs that drive the THTs are not providing timely analysis, feedback, and guidance to teams in the field. Junior warrant officers and NCOs habitually man the OMTs. Afghanistan was no exception. The THTs in Kandahar became very frustrated because after working a source, preparing reports, and finally contacting the OMT after numerous attempts with sporadic communications, they found out that the OMT doesn’t report to work for another 5 hours. Then, the OMT conducted only minimal analysis on the information that the THTs submitted because, “We don’t have enough time during the day to conduct an analysis anyway.”

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** *The OMT is the direct link to the THTs. If the OMT is not available to conduct their duties during a 24-hour period, it will hinder THT operations. The OMT*
should provide minimal manning throughout the night, to at least receive and collect information, which would facilitate analysis when the primary shift arrived.

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.)** Units must continually emphasize the importance of the OMT relationship with THTs during training to enhance the collection of information, and facilitate information analysis.

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**Issue: Afghanistan — Intelligence Contingency Funds (ICFs).**

**Observation:** ICF operations ceased when there was a change in the ICF custodian.

**Discussion:** While we were in Afghanistan, the THTs did not have access to ICF, which hindered some missions. Some teams were getting by with handing out items from their incentive locker, but they too were in jeopardy of losing some sources due to no ICF. The reason behind this was totally bureaucratic. All funds were frozen to conduct a change of the ICF custodian. ICF that was already issued to the THTs was pulled back to account for it. The funds were already meticulously tracked at the THT level, which made it unnecessary to do this. So, when the custodian decided to pull the funds, he inadvertently stopped some HUMINT operations.

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** *We should replicate the use of ICF at the JRTC, and provide units with TTP on ICF use and management.*

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.)** Recommend the use of ICF at training centers; provide units with TTP on ICF use and management.

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**Issue: Iraq — Intelligence, Long-Range Surveillance (LRS).**

**Observation:** The “S” is for security. Of the 30 LRS teams available to Corps, only fractions were employed in a doctrinal manner.

**Discussion:** Unfortunately, as in Bosnia and the initial Kosovo mission, LRS teams were utilized as security detachments for headquarters elements (praetorian guard?) and as escorts for MI assets. If LRS elements were not attached to MI units, who would provide security for the MI assets?

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** *The mission planning timeline for LRS operations is lengthy and requires more detail and focus than conventional maneuver operations. Coupled with the increased speed and fluidity of the modern battlefield, collection managers become more challenged with LRS asset planning and management. Not that it can’t be done, LRS*
employment on the high intensity, mechanized battlefield, has to be flexible with a firm grasp of the maneuver plan. This failure to grasp the corps maneuver plan is why LRS assets were not fully utilized during OIF. LRS missions were planned, but the speed and success of the corps maneuver forces were not taken into consideration. So, by team insertion time, maneuver forces were already on top of the team’s objective. Mission scratched. With the constant mission scratches, LRS elements became security details; no planning, assets employed.

Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training, Leadership.) In the planning phase of MDMP (mission analysis), units must effectively incorporate available assets (integrate, synchronize) such as the LRS, according to doctrine to maximize mission accomplishment. Failure to employ available assets according to doctrine is a result of poor planning.
Targeting

Issue: Iraq — Targeting and Primary Intelligence Requirements (PIRs).

Observation: Our system of targeting 72 hours out was adversely affected by Iraqi maneuver.

Discussion: The issue is larger than just PIR. The rules of engagement (ROE), PIR, and the use of precision munitions all worked in concert to lessen the effectiveness of the 72-hour targeting cycle. The Iraqis maneuvered units forward to engage Allied forces in a leapfrog fashion. As these movements occurred, the staffs and commanders adjusted PIR and the targeting process. However, the speed that the Iraqi forces closed with each other caused them to move inside of our targeting cycle. Target folders used for Iraqi unit “A” 72 hours ago were no longer relevant at the 48 hours mark because of a change in their disposition and Iraqi unit “B” now became a priority. This caused confusion with collection managers, who had to change tasks to collectors, develop new PIR and produce new target folders. The problem now is that the commander does not have 72 hours before the new Iraqi unit “B” is within the direct fire range of the ground component. In reality, he might have 24 hours left. Units were unable to produce two complete target sets with grids due to constraints of time.

Lessons Learned/TTP: The U.S. Air Force requires a 72-hour window to prepare crews and equipment for missions. Seventy-two hours becomes too much of a time constraint, especially at the speed modern land forces move. With current intelligence systems able to pinpoint targets fast, a system or method has to be developed to eliminate the time constraints.
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:

- **Doctrine, Training.** Joint doctrine must be re-evaluated to address solution sets to overcome the current shortcomings of the lag time between target identification and the time it takes to deliver munitions on target. More joint training opportunities must be available to the U.S. Army and USAF units (such as the emerging Joint Training Center concept) to work on executing doctrinal concepts in a training environment prior to deploying to real-world operations.

- **Material.** Targeting, PIR development and handling must move beyond human handling systems to achieve the speed necessary. That means develop and field a Joint targeting hardware and software system that kicks out associated PIR automatically to sample available databases automatically and develop target folders. In other words, use available technology to streamline and eliminate collection management processes that are human centric, and provide inherently slow decision-making.

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**Issue: Iraq — Targeting, Rules of Engagement.**

**Observation:** Limited collateral damage requirements. At the start of OIF, a requirement was established not to target abandoned Iraqi vehicles. These abandoned vehicles made battle damage assessment (BDA) more difficult.

**Discussion:** Iraqis abandoning these vehicles, then later reoccupying them complicated the issue further. The idea behind the guidance was to have a base of vehicles to reform an Iraqi Army after the war. It is unclear whether these abandoned and reoccupied vehicles were engaged in later actions or were driven off and used for future missions against coalition troops.

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** *Precision fires allow for very selective targeting, but perhaps this was too selective for both the dangers the reoccupied vehicles posed and the increase in difficulty in determining BDA.*

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.)** BDA must be continually re-evaluated to ensure maximizing mission effectiveness.

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**Issue: Iraq — Targeting, Target Identification.**

**Observation:** Both Iraqi and allied rebel forces used similar equipment.

**Discussion:** This provided a unique challenge to BDA cells and maneuver units (shooters). The increased use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) helped improve the common operating picture for the campaign, but measures were not worked out so that electro-optical (EO) sensors, such as the UAV, could allow operators to distinguish between the two sets of vehicles.
**Lessons Learned/TTP:** *Direct and indirect fire control measures need to take allied vehicles into account as the United States continues to develop and field EO sensors and use them in targeting.*

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:** *(Doctrine.)* Joint and coalition doctrine must address fire control measures to ensure allied vehicles are identified to reduce the possibility of fratricide.

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**Issue: Iraq — Targeting, Special Operations Forces (SOF) Restricted Fire Area Disclosure.**

**Observation:** With the increased use of sensors during OIF, SOF were more visible to the conventional force commanders than in previous wars.

**Discussion:** There is a long-standing unwillingness for SOF and LRS to disclose their unit locations. This occurs because these units place a premium on operational security (OPSEC) and stealth to accomplish their missions. Unfortunately, the conventional ground and air commanders now have sensors that see further and with a higher degree of accuracy. In several cases, SOF units were “observed” either electronically or otherwise and their positions were unverifiable by SOF commanders for one reason or another. This caused commanders to slow the sensor to shooter link to try and confirm the observed units’ identity in the absence of direct and indirect fire control measures.

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** *As the conventional force continues to field more sophisticated and accurate sensors, the SOF community will have to develop methods for de-conflicting direct and indirect fire control measures. Conventional Army units operating at the JRTC with LRS have found a way to fix this problem by having liaison officers (LNOs) at the maneuver brigade and divisions.*

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:** *(Doctrine, Training.)* SOF/Conventional Force Integration is paramount in today’s COE, and in Operations OEF and OIF. The SOF community is currently working on producing and staffing through CALL a SOF/Conventional Force Integration Handbook. SOF trends are now being included at JRTC, beginning with the 2d and 3d Quarters, FY 03. Doctrine must be updated to reflect the current warfighting relationship between SOF and conventional forces.

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**Issue: Iraq — High Payoff Targets (HPTs).**

**Observation:** Proper designation of HPTs facilitates sensor and shooter mission success.
**Discussion:** While the targeting cycle suffered some issues, one positive issue was the designation of HPTs and the dissemination of HPTs to sensors and shooters. When the targeting process developed trouble, operators of sensors, such as the UAV, had enough guidance to keep them operational and reporting. By disseminating these HPTs to weapons systems (shooters), the operators then had enough guidance to aid them when they were confronted with numerous targets.

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** *Commanders must include HPTs as part of their guidance even if it is their intent to kill everything. More often than not, the system’s operator does not know what the HPTs or the priorities are.*

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:** (Training.) During MDMP (mission analysis), HPTs must be properly designated to better facilitate sensor and shooter mission success.

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**Issue: Afghanistan Counter-Mortar Predictive Analysis.**

**Observation:** The division applied both the predictive analysis concepts and a significant number of the predictive analysis tools taught at JRTC in their counter-mortar fights against Taliban/Al Qaeda attackers near the Pakistani border.

**Discussion:** The maneuver and fire support staffs and key leaders of 1/82 used the counter-fire lessons and concepts learned from their two rotations in locating, tracking, predicting, and attacking their indirect fire threat. The mortar threat against the main base camps near the large towns had subsided before the brigade’s arrival, and had migrated toward the outposts and patrols along the Pakistani border, and had actually subsided for several months because of effective operations by friendly warlords, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), and the Pakistanis. Dismounted, rocket, and mortar attacks of the patrol base on the border at Shkin in March/April 2003 prompted deployment of additional brigade ISR assets to the patrol base located there to include the Q-36 radar. The brigade applied predictive analysis to their SIGINT and radar acquisitions over a short period, and effectively applied suppressive maneuver and air patrols that forced the enemy to shift from accurate mortar fire at short range to much less accurate longer range rocket fire from less advantageous firing positions across the border. The presence of the Q-36 and several iterations of rapid, accurate patrol reaction to radar or SIGINT acquisitions is credited with the success. While politics associated with the border have complicated an effective lethal response to the rocket fire, the BDE has irrefutable, easily understood evidence of the violations for use in addressing the Pakistani government.

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** *Continue to use the counter-mortar fight as a key teaching point for maneuver, fires, and intelligence personnel at JRTC. Maintain a focus on predictive analysis in all of our counter-insurgency phase training.*
Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Emphasize the counter-mortar fight for maneuver, fires and intelligence personnel at the training centers. Maintain attention on predictive analysis in the counter-insurgency phase of training.

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Issue: Afghanistan — Use of Indirect Fires as an Information Operations (IO) Tool.

Observation: The Task Force (TF) periodically used indirect fires as an IO tool to influence village populations as part of the opening phase of cordon and search operations in villages dominated by anti-coalition forces, and populated by civilians hostile to coalition presence. During the establishment of the cordon, the battalion occasionally fired a battery three-volley (point-detonating fuse) fire mission at a one-kilometer standoff from the target village as a firepower demonstration. The intent of the demonstration was to influence the local population and any anti-coalition forces in the village to lay down arms and offer no resistance to the operation.

While there appears to have been no target audience analysis to determine the probable effectiveness of this tactic on any of the target villages, or post-operative assessment by target practice tracers (TPTs), the unit asserts that it had been effective in practice. They also assert that it has had the positive and unexpected effect of driving the terrorists from the villages and into the arms of the cordon forces prior to the commencement of search operations on more than one occasion as they have attempted to flee. This eased the search task and likely reduced casualties on all sides.

Discussion: When conducted as a result of quality analysis of short- and long-term impact of the action on the broader TF IO goal for that target village and province, and its military efficacy and utility at the time of execution, this can be a useful TTP. Clear understanding of our dominant military capabilities and futility of resistance to them by hostile populations and anti-coalition forces is an important IO end-state that supports achievement of the larger maneuver end-state. Application of this TTP as a blanket template without this detailed supporting analysis could prove extremely counterproductive to achieving the IO and maneuver end-states. A variation of this tactic was successfully executed during a recent SBCT rotation, but was not based on any analysis of efficacy or impact. The analytical process involved in the application of this TTP is the same ROE application, military necessity, IO planning process that should already be taking place in a well-planned SOSO. The same basic questions asked for prior use of lethal fires inside a populated area should be asked for this type of demonstration fires also.

Lessons Learned/TTP:

• If a mission rehearsal exercise (MRE) becomes a reality, consider integration of this as part of a recommended TTP during cordon and search operations.
• Discuss this TTP and supporting analysis as part of the leader training program (LTP). This discussion should be part of a larger discussion of indirect fires ROE application and IO planning and analysis.

Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Adapt TTP recommended in above paragraph.
Fire Support

Issue: Afghanistan — Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) - Coordinating Altitude, Indirect Fire De-confliction with USAF Aircraft.

Observation: The brigade (BDE) fire support officer (FSO) informed us that the close air support (CAS) special instructions (SPINS) for OEF set a de-facto coordination altitude for USAF aircraft area of responsibility (AOR)-wide of 10,000-ft MSL (Mean Sea Level). The combined arms operations center (CAOC) further directed (and CJTF supported) that this coordinating altitude equated to a Fire Support Coordination Measure (FSCM) for indirect fire assets. All fixed-wing operations below 10,000 MSL must be cleared through the appropriate maneuver headquarters; all indirect fires (including 60mm), which penetrate the 10,000-ft MSL line, must be cleared through the appropriate USAF element. If an enlisted terminal attack controller (ETAC) was present with the maneuver element firing the indirect, he essentially conducted a net call on the ultra high frequency (UHF) CAS frequency and cleared the trajectory and impact area of CAS directly with the pilots in the vicinity of his AO or his controlling tactical air control party (TACP) headquarters. If an ETAC was not present, the maneuver commander had to call to his battalion (BN) headquarters and have the TACP representative clear the fires with the USAF. Most operations were conducted between 7,000- and 12,000-MSL, therefore requiring better than 90 percent of the fire missions to be cleared through the USAF.

This TTP appears to have been adopted and approved during initial air and SOF operations prior to conventional force insertion, and prior to the presence of significant indirect fires assets.

CAS aircraft density was extremely low throughout the AOR, as were the density of fire missions. There were perhaps two CAS aircraft airborne at any given time in what equates to a three-state area in the United States.

The net impact on actual operations in Afghanistan was not clear (the unit was unable to offer an example where this TTP had impinged on operations), but the potential for significant operational impact is great.

Discussion: The establishment of a requirement to clear company/battalion/brigade fires through USAF channels is extremely problematic, and not supported by current doctrine. Given the density of aircraft, it is also unnecessary. The use of an arbitrary country-wide standard coordinating altitude based on MSL instead of Above Ground Level (AGL) is counter-intuitive and excessive in a country with as great an altitude variance as Afghanistan. Use of this TTP adds unnecessary coordination points into the clearance of fires procedures. It increases the probability of slow delivery of fires, which would increase risk and friction for ground operations.

Establishment of correct unit boundaries for operations, use of a 10,000-ft AGL coordinating altitude for fixed-wing aircraft, and lastly proper planning and use of informal Airspace Coordination Measures by fire support elements (FSEs) at battalion and company levels are the
proper solution. For Army purposes, this coordinating altitude restriction need only apply over Army-owned land (a small percentage of the country), thus freeing the USAF to operate at lower, more effective altitudes elsewhere.

Lessons Learned/TTP:

- *Do not adopt or replicate the current OEF CAS SPINS clearance of fires methodology.*
- *Mentor rotational leaders on the proper TTP for de-confliction of air and indirect fire.*
- *Recommend Fire Support (FS) Division and Air Warrior II examine the complete current OEF SPINS and offer recommendations back to the field on corrections and improvements.*

Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Adapt recommendations in above paragraph.

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**Issue: Afghanistan — 1) A2C2 - BDE Command and Control (C2) Aircraft Restricted Operations Zone (ROZ) Placement During Operations Prevents Delivery of Indirect Fire. 2) BDE C2 Aircraft Clearing all Fires in What were Fundamentally Company or Battalion Operations.**

**Observation:** Numerous maneuver and fires personnel from company through BDE level said that the command group’s TTP of placing the C2 aircraft directly over the top of a fight, with an attendant multi-kilometer ROZ had prevented them from planning or executing indirect fire or CAS in numerous operations. The company and battalion leaders involved in these operations stated that they fully desired to apply fires in most of these missions, but were prevented from doing so by the ROZ. When approached with the issue by senior leaders, the command group refused to alter the TTP, without explanation.

The vast majority of missions were company missions, planned (and theoretically) commanded and controlled by battalion. The BDE command group had apparently inserted itself in greater than an advisory/facilitative role in many of these operations, especially in the realm of call for fire and clearance of fires processing. The C2 aircraft was not present for all such missions, and when present, normally stays on station for the duration of the fuel load, not the mission duration. The significant engine/rotor noise, and static interference common to C2 aircraft resulted in significant delays (3-5 minutes) in requesting and clearing fires through the C2 aircraft on most operations. When the aircraft had been unavailable because of maintenance, or broken station due to refueling requirements mid-mission or crew rest, the battalions were permitted to control their own clearance and coordination from the ground, without incident.

**Discussion:** Placement of the ROZ and the additional level of C2 caused confusion, given the self-recognition by BLUFOR of the impact of this type of control methodology and A2C2 on their ability to deliver fires effectively.
Initial development of the ROZ TTP is representative of the lack of attention to detail, knowledge of A2C2 doctrine, and experience with fires/air operations we see nearly every rotation at JRTC. Only one of the last 18 rotations has generated an A2C2 plan, which it never enforced. The typical impact of this is many close calls in execution, and two to three helicopter fratricides per rotation. The TTP for A2C2 which permit aggressive simultaneous delivery of fires and aviation are simple and effective, but are almost never trained at Home Station to standard.

Employment of the brigade command team on a C2 aircraft as an additional C2 (emphasis on control) node on what is fundamentally a company mission is counterproductive unless it is providing some value-added service that the battalion is unable to provide for it. By all accounts, this was not the case with most of its operations in TF Devil. As in South Vietnam, the presence of senior leaders or staffs in a helicopter over a company fight is problematic. When they can serve as facilitators to help meet the needs of ground commanders and relieve some of the pressure, they are a welcome addition to any fight. Assisting in communications relay as needed, requesting additional headquarters assets, and providing additional SA are all welcome tasks an airborne platform can provide. Intervention in a fight by a commander and staff two times removed from an aerial platform whose placement inhibits a combined-arms fight is not.

Lessons Learned/TTP:

• Do not adopt either the C2 or A2C2 TTP demonstrated by the TF.
• We have already submitted a SOSO/counterinsurgency A2C2 article addressing correctives for this exact set of issues to the Field Artillery Journal and the Aviation magazine.
• Include A2C2 for SOSO/counterinsurgency as a block of instruction for maneuver and fires leaders at LTP.
• Continue to aggressively assess aviation assets when they clearly violate Risk Estimate Distances (REDs) and over-fly firing units in the force-on-force box.
• Continue to enhance the realism and combined-arms nature of the JRTC live-fire training scenario.

Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Adapt recommendations in above paragraph.

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Issue: Afghanistan (and Iraq) Communications and Coordination in SOSO When Subordinate Elements are Well Beyond Frequency Modulation (FM) and Landline Communications.

Observation: The average distance between bases of operation in the division sector was 90 kilometers. Line-of-sight radios were nearly useless in day-to day operations except for intra-platoon and intra-company operations. The brigade and battalion tactical operation centers (TOCs) depended on a limited number of satellite communication (SATCOM) radios, as well as
mobile subscriber equipment (MSE) enabled telephones and local area network (LAN) connections down to the battalion level. LAN-secure chat rooms became the default primary communications and coordination tool for the staffs. Most major staff sections, at each command level from the Combined Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) to the battalion maintains a “chat room” available to all Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPR) subscribers in which they post Significant Activities (SIGACTS) and perform coordination tasks. Each staff section maintained one computer with a semi-dedicated operator as their “radio-telephone operator (RTO)” computer, on which they open, in minimized form, the chat rooms they need to track to stay abreast of SIGACTs at their higher and lower headquarters, and related BOS. As with radio communications, there are required “stations” and a “net control station (NCS)” identified for each net. For example, the BDE FSEs RTO had at least four chat rooms open on his screen. They were the Battle Captain chat room, the CJTF Fires chat room, the CJTF air support operations center (ASOC) chat room, and the CJSOTF chat room. The BDE FSE was an active participant on the CJTF fires and division chat rooms, and an observer/coordinator on the ASOC and CJSOTF chat rooms. In addition, the CJTF and division chat rooms were used for clearance of fires across unit boundaries above the battalion level, or into the numerous CJTF-owned areas in support of the extremely long convoys and air-assault operations.

**Discussion:** With a trained, attentive RTO or battle captain observing and maintaining the system, this appears to be an effective TTP for moderate to low tempo SASO operations typified by the ongoing fight in OEF. SBCT had all of the tools in place to execute this TTP in support of its non-contiguous operations, but never executed.

**Lessons Learned/TTP:** *In the event of a rotation with significant non-contiguous play, recommend we offer the TTP to BLUFOR as an option to enhance its SA and execution capabilities when other means are unavailable. We may want to consider advising units to attempt this type of TTP during normal-distance rotations as a way of sharing non-critical information rapidly, accurately, and simply across the brigade. While clearance of fire in this manner is clearly undesirable in our scenario, reduced “translation” time and errors by RTOs is a clear side benefit.*

**Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications:** (Training.) Adapt recommendations in above paragraph.

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**Issue: Afghanistan — Company-level Combined Arms Firebase Operations.**

**Observation:** The division operated a combined-arms firebase at Shkin in one AOR that ran along the southeastern border with Pakistan. The firebase was situated at high altitude in what was essentially a blocking position along some key lines of drift for Taliban/Al Qaeda forces attempting to infiltrate from Pakistan. The position was initially a simple company patrol base, but was enhanced with 120mm mortars, a Q-36, and 4x105mm tubes in response to an increasing indirect fire and dismounted assault threat to the base itself and its dismounted patrols in Spring
2003. The battery (-) fired several missions as pre-planned suppression fires in support of platoon operations, and fired a successful mission in direct support of a platoon contact with a Chechen ambush party on the Pakistani border. The battery operated in a de-facto operational control (OPCON) status, with a very close relationship having developed between the battery and collocated company. All patrols had fire-plans, and were “followed” by a combination of mortar and artillery tubes laid on priority targets from start to finish. The Q-36 was oriented on a search azimuth to allow it to continue to collect on mortar and rocket firing points along the Pakistan border.

Discussion: The operation of combined patrol/fire-bases provides significant payoffs for both the maneuver and firing units. From a security standpoint, the depth of manpower, leadership, and experience in such a base pays huge dividends. Each unit gains from the other’s significant direct-fire firepower, and can commit more manpower to its primary indirect fire delivery or patrolling tasks on a normal basis because the load is shared between two fairly sizeable units. During short surge periods, when a larger percentage of one unit is required to perform a primary task, the other can easily cover the base force protection tasks. The close association between delivery unit and its “customer” adds significantly to the speed and quality of after-action review (AAR) feedback and TTP development between the two. Improved interface between the company mortars and the firing battery will yield improved fire direction and gunnery skills.

Lessons Learned/TTP:

• In the event of an AFOR MRE, urge the player unit to maintain the combined fire-base/patrol-base concept, and consider expanding the use of the TTP to other applicable locations. To do this, we will need to replicate (as near as possible) the great distances in the actual AOR to generate the requirement to place some firing units under the operational control of maneuver (i.e., base separation being much greater than the maximum range of the indirect fire systems).

• During the movement-to-contact (MTC) portion of standard rotations, we may want to advise BLUFOR to consider use of this concept for its synergistic effects when warranted by mission, enemy, terrain, troops, time available and civilians (METT-TC).

Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training,) Adapt recommendations in above paragraph.
Observation

Issue: Afghanistan – Civil Affairs (CA)/Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Team Mission Preparation and Execution ISO Kandahar Airfield (KAF) AOR Missions.

Observation: Several snapshot looks at the BDE’s CA/PSYOP mission execution in support of their KAF AOR revealed some issues. The BDE’s supporting CAT-B and TPD had no methodology for prebriefing and debriefing their teams which conduct missions in the KAF AOR, and had no habitually assigned teams for this AOR. The rotational nature of the tasking of teams, combined with a poor pre-mission preparation process, means that they have almost no SA. This lack of SA means that they re-ask the same questions over and over of the same persons, and establish a reputation as being incompetent or un-trusting.

When I spoke with one village leader after the CA/PSYOP teams had finished talking with him, he told me he assumed the Americans believed he was lying to them and had no trust in him because they constantly re-asked the same question, apparently looking for him to screw up. He said the impact of the discussion was to scare him, and it kept him from developing a rapport with them. Nothing ever resulted from discussions with the Americans because they always started over at square one. Poor SA and preparation kept the relationship from moving forward, or a strong rapport being built. This limited the amount of casual intelligence gained and real progress made.

Team preparation, mission planning, understanding of intent and ROE, relationship building, and message delivery skills all needed work. Interpreter usage was extremely poor. The CA NCO, who led the team’s efforts on the trip I accompanied, delivered the simple message of “We Americans are here only to provide a safe and secure environment. We can’t help with food, civic action projects, legal issues, or anything else of importance to you.” His tone and body English projected discomfort, and lack of will to become decisively engaged and establish a relationship, or to facilitate assistance for the village’s problems from those whose charter it was to address them.

Discussion: The brigade conducted a separate targeting process for the small AOR immediately surrounding its primary base at Kandahar Airfield. A co-opted war lord ran this portion of Afghanistan, and effectively secured the airfield from the outside and dominated this AOR. The village heads and other key communicators in the AOR answered to him. The threat was thus fairly low, and the primary intent of the low level IO campaign in these villages appeared to be intelligence collection in support of force protection for the airfield, although the task/purpose was not clearly stated anywhere. There was a brigade-targeting document used to task units to perform their IO patrols and visits, but it was generic in design, and of limited tactical value to the user. While, from a force protection standpoint, the criticality of the IO mission was minimal thanks to the support of the warlord, the unit was missing a significant opportunity to enhance its SA, and set the conditions to maintain popular support in the event removal or minimization of the warlord is necessary at some point in the future – not an unlikely event in the ethnic Pashtun south. They also lost the ability to positively impact the lives of the locals from a humanitarian standpoint, and set the conditions for long-term stability and support in the region.
Contributing to the situation was the fact that both CA and PSYOP elements were Reserve Component units who, based on detailed discussions with members of the teams, received only a marginally effective pre-deployment training and mission preparation both at their Home Station and at the Fort Bragg, North Carolina, mobilization site. Both teams were made up of extremely talented individuals, and had a great ethos, but lacked the realistic training necessary to perform at the “graduate” level. They were not funded at Home Station for critical language, bilateral (BILAT)/regional/cultural training that is common for active duty Civil Affairs and PSYOP Command (CAPOC) units. This critical training was not part of their post-mobilization training, which they described as classroom refresher training of AIT tasks with no regional focus or regionally relevant TTP. Simple situational training exercise (STX) lanes were offered which were poorly resourced and again, offered no regional focus or regionally relevant TTP. Teams were told that they would “learn the cultural stuff and TTP once they got there.”

Neither team had the benefit of a recent CTC rotation, and demonstrated shortcomings that we commonly see and correct through teach/coach/mentor JRTC. Both by their own admission and my observations, this had caused significant friction, and led to a less-than-optimal transition. This poor quality of mission preparation was inexcusable given that the operation was over a year and a half old, and the rotation plan for CAPOC was fairly well locked in.

Lessons Learned/TTP:

- **Maintain the high quality of training for CAPOC forces currently conducted by the JRTC Special Operations Training Detachment (SOTD)** – those who get it benefit massively.
- **Consider a SOTD outreach to CAPOC to assist them in creating an effective Home Station and mobilization station preparation program that addresses the true needs of the rotational units.**
- **Until the potential establishment of Afghanistan forces (AFOR) and Iraqi forces (IFOR) MREs, consider establishing a pre-deployment training and certification STX program at JRTC for deploying CA and PSYOP teams, resourced using OEF/OIF funds and manned with the assistance of CAPOC, to better prepare rotational CAPOC units for the challenges they face in those operations. We have the resources and expertise to best prepare these deserving units for these demanding missions.**

Doctrine, Organizations, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities (DOTMLPF) Implications: (Training.) Adapt recommendations in above paragraph.