EU-Ukrainian Relations: Prospects and Possibilities

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Ukrainian aspirations towards EU membership are not matched by an understanding of what membership entails in the removal of economic, legal and institutional barriers. Nor does the EU help to foster a geopolitical and public climate in which this might be achieved. Steps are outlined whereby both sides can change this situation.

Introduction

Over the past several years, Ukraine has frequently affirmed that its foreign policy goal is to join ‘all European and Euro-Atlantic structures with priority given to the European Union’, but it was not until June 1998 that Ukraine officially stated its foreign and security policy goal of integration into the EU. Since this time Ukrainian officials have sought to convince their European counterparts that Ukraine should be anchored into the EU and be accorded associate membership status, with the aim of securing a free trade agreement in the short term, followed by eventual full membership. Although EU officials have since acknowledged Ukraine’s European aspirations and have underlined the importance attached to a ‘democratic, stable, open and economically successful Ukraine’, they have been reluctant to state officially that Ukraine would be welcome in the EU even if it met certain conditions, the so-called Copenhagen Criteria for membership.

But despite the fact that considerable progress has been achieved, relations between the EU and Ukraine continue to experience some difficulties. An understanding of the EU, its mechanisms and functions, and the costs and benefits of European integration is still limited in Ukraine. The EU is mostly viewed from a political perspective, while its nature as a complex economic mechanism is often neglected and underestimated. By the same token, the EU has yet to fully comprehend the domestic processes in Ukraine and the fundamental reasons behind its European drive. As a result of these factors, EU-Ukraine relations are still not broadly based and remain the prerogative of political elites. Thus, there is an urgent need to enhance cooperation between EU and Ukrainian constituencies including the members of parliament (European Parliament and the Verkhovna Rada), the private sector, regional and local governments, NGOs, scholars and researchers, the mass media, and the public at large.

But while the EU needs patience, it is imperative that Ukraine should give a new and dynamic impetus to domestic reforms and pursue such reforms aggressively. The laggardliness of Ukraine's implementation of reforms has tended to hinder its European choice, and thus has increased the likelihood that Ukraine will be treated as
an outsider to Western Europe and its institutions. Despite growing pressure for change, pro-reform and pro-European forces in Ukraine (among democratic parties, NGOs, scholars, small and medium-sized enterprises, etc) are still relatively weak, underorganized, and somewhat marginalized, while the leftist forces remain influential, as demonstrated by the recent sacking of Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk. This situation highlights the urgency for external support for Ukraine’s pro-reform and European aspirations.

This paper will consider the basis for EU-Ukraine cooperation on a legal, political, institutional, economic, and social level and will discuss the progress made so far as well as to show where there is room for improvement. I will also examine Ukraine’s participation in inter-European dialogue, the sources of Ukraine’s European drive, and the motivations for Ukraine’s desire to deepen its ties to the EU. This paper will consider such questions as: do Ukrainian elites have an overall plan for European integration (which goes beyond political declarations) as opposed to simply an end goal which is full integration into the EU? Is there a strategy in place (or being discussed) to achieve this goal or is it only an abstract idea based on an unclear understanding of what it takes to achieve EU membership? How do Ukrainian policymakers view the EU enlargement process? What are the real barriers to the deepening of EU-Ukraine cooperation? How favorably does Ukrainian society view this ‘European choice’? And what should be done in the short term to improve cross-institutional cooperation as well as to enhance understanding and knowledge of the EU among the public at large?

Why The European Union?

Ukraine has set integration into the EU as its strategic goal because this path is seen as the best way to promote its national interests, which are centered on the construction of a democratic and economically developed state and the strengthening of Ukraine’s international standing in foreign relations. Thus in ‘choosing’ the European path Ukraine is opting for a proven way to modernize the country, bridge existing technological gaps, create new jobs, attract foreign investment, and improve domestic producers’ competitiveness in EU and global markets.

Several arguments can be made in favour of supporting Ukraine’s European aspirations. Membership in the EU is viewed first and foremost as the ticket to greater political stability and economic prosperity. From an economic perspective, the EU constitutes a very large export market and is an excellent source of consumer goods and investment products for Ukraine. Trade with the EU is also a source of hard currency and helps to reduce dependency on barter trade between Ukraine and its eastern neighbours. Ukraine would also do well to increase cooperation with the EU to help to modernize its manufacturing sector. Ukraine also needs to facilitate its integration into the broader global market. Entry into the European market would be a means to enable Ukraine to compete with leading foreign producers and manufacturers and would also allow Ukraine access to know-how for the best practices for managing, developing and sustaining a socially-oriented market economy.

From a political perspective the benefits of Ukraine’s closer cooperation with the EU would include a more stable and democratic political system with developed and sustainable institutions and the rule of law with a transparent legislative process,
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respect for human rights, and an ingrained culture of democracy. European integration would also strengthen Ukraine’s national security and by extension, the individual security of the citizens of Ukraine as an increasingly integrated Europe rejects the use of force as a means to resolve problems. Additionally, Ukraine’s ‘return to Europe’ is also seen as the best hedge against Ukraine’s potential reabsorption into the Russian sphere of influence. Ukraine’s successful integration into Europe in this context is seen as a possible way to bring Russia closer to the EU and would, therefore, help to strengthen Ukraine-Russia relations.

Socially, Ukraine would benefit considerably from integration into the EU. The result would be a greatly increased standard of living and public welfare including a heightened sense of personal security, education, medical care, a cleaner environment, and access to public information. Very importantly, EU membership would also allow Ukrainian citizens to travel and seek employment within the European Community. Ukrainian companies would also naturally benefit greatly from the free movement of goods, capital, and services.

On the other hand, remaining on the outskirts of the EU integration process will turn Ukraine into an object, rather than a subject, of European policies with little economic or political leverage at its disposal. This could easily lead to a situation where Ukraine would become politically unstable, exacerbating the current economic crises, and thus moving Ukraine further from European institutions. However, without a solid record of Ukrainian reforms, it is difficult to see how the EU could press ahead with cultivating its relations with Ukraine on an economic level. Ukraine lacks the fundamental attributes of western-style economic and political institutions and from an EU perspective, this is the main reason why Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU has been fraught with difficulties.

Brzezinski vs Huntington: Two Schools Of Thought On Ukraine

Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington, two prominent analysts of international relations and European security, have advanced rather different schools of thought regarding Ukraine’s place in Europe. Brzezinski is a great supporter of the West’s strategic engagement with Ukraine as an independent state. He has argued that ‘it cannot be stressed strongly enough that without Ukraine, Russia ceases to be an empire, but with Ukraine suborned and then subordinated, Russia automatically becomes an empire.’ Sherman Garnett’s ‘keystone in the arch’ thesis falls in line with this mode of thinking. Moreover, Brzezinski argues that the stability along NATO’s new front line which now lies on Poland’s eastern border depends largely on the consolidation of Ukraine’s nation- and statehood, success in economic reforms, and on its ability to balance closer cooperation with NATO and the EU and economic and political relations with Russia.

A different line of thinking on Ukraine has been advanced by Samuel Huntington. Speaking in Kyiv on 18 October 1999, Huntington stressed that global politics is being configured along cultural and civilizational lines and thus, for the first time in history, global politics is truly multi-civilizational. Indeed Huntington argues that the ‘clash of civilizations’ is alive and well, and the global power structure resembles a ‘uni-multipolar system’ having four levels with: 1) the US as the only superpower, 2) Russia
and China as the major regional powers, 3) the UK and France as secondary regional powers, and 4) secondary regional states such as Ukraine, Japan, Australia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Pakistan, and India. This 'uni-multipolar system' has encouraged conflicts between Europe and the US, as exemplified by Europe's increasing resentment of its dependence on the US (in the introduction of the Euro as a rival to the Dollar, and by the EU's acquisition of a military capability. The implications for Ukraine are even more daunting. According to Huntington, the Iron Curtain has been replaced by a new line which is Western Christianity versus Muslim and Orthodox traditions. He points to Kosovo as a classic example of the clash of civilizations, and argues that a new security order based on civilizations is taking place in Europe where Russia will assume responsibility for stability among the Orthodox countries and states which are 'culturally part of the West' will eventually be integrated into European and Trans-Atlantic institutions. Huntington does not include Ukraine in the latter category, and labels Ukraine as non-Western, culturally divided, and situated on the 'break' between the Christian and Orthodox worlds. Ukraine cannot join the EU or NATO and is unequally situated, according to his 'great power divide', to play a central role in the stability and security of Central Eurasia.

After more than two generations of ideologically driven East-West conflict, it is not surprising that Western elites have often embraced images of an ethnically and culturally divided Ukraine, speculating that this situation would eventually lead to a spill-over of instability in the region. Although such simplistic images of Ukraine have diminished since 1994, Western states and institutions, particularly the EU, continue to view Ukraine as non-European, tied by culture and identity to Eurasia. Such an approach is problematic at a time when Ukraine's government is working to implement economic and administrative reforms with the goal of aligning itself closer to Europe and its institutions, particularly the EU.

While the US and NATO seem to back the Brzezinski argument, the EU tends to support the Huntington one. The US and NATO, more than the EU, recognize the importance of viewing Ukraine as separate from Russia and strategically central to European security, and they have encouraged Ukrainian elites to continue to strengthen the pro-West vector of the state's foreign policy. NATO's approach to eastward enlargement is thus reflected in the Partnership for Peace Programme (constructive, engaging, bilateral focus with NATO 'partner' states) while the EU’s approach to expansion is reflected in the Schengen Agreement (exclusive, protective, no reference to EU 'partners'). Further, the EU and Ukraine have been unable to reach an agreement which would help to soften the effect of a new dividing line in Europe when Ukraine's neighbours eventually join the EU, although a compromise has not been ruled out.

The Partnership & Cooperation Agreement: The Basis for Deepening Cooperation

Legal Agreements between the EC/EU and the Government of Ukraine (GOU) to date:

- 5 May 1993: Agreement between GOU and the European Community (EC) on Trade and Textile Products
12 September 1993: GOU and the EC Commission sign agreement on the Establishment and Privileges of Immunities

6 June 1994: GOU and EU Commission set up a Contact Group on Coal and Steel

14 June 1994: Partnership and Cooperation (PCA) Agreement between GOU and the European Communities and their member-states signed

15 July 1997: Agreement between the European Communities and their member-states and the GOU on trade in certain steel products

23 July 1999: Agreement for cooperation between the European Atomic Energy Community and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine in the field of controlled Nuclear Fusion, and similar agreement on Nuclear Safety

EU-Ukraine relations have a legal basis in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) signed in June 1994. This was the first PCA to be signed with a country of the FSU, although now there are agreements with ten other FSU countries. The PCA, which experienced a lengthy ratification procedure, did not enter into force until March 1998. The PCA was intended to establish a strong political relationship which would constitute a new link in the developing network of Ukraine’s connection with the EU and with the West in general. The activities under the PCA offer an opportunity for Ukraine and the EU to begin to harmonize their political and economic agendas. On the political side, the PCA established an institutional framework based on annual meetings at the Presidential and ministerial levels (the EU-Ukraine Summit and the Cooperation Council, which meet annually), senior official level or ministerial level (Cooperation Committee), and regular exchanges between the Ukrainian and European Parliaments (the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee). In addition, the European Commission also holds ‘bilateral’ meetings with Ukrainian counterparts as needed. Also, expert-level dialogue takes place periodically to discuss such issues as cooperation with the OSCE, proliferation, disarmament, conventional arms, and security policy. Further, at the working level six sub-committees have been created which include trade and investment; economic issues and statistics; energy, nuclear issues and the environment; customs, cross-border cooperation, illegal immigration, money laundering and drugs; transport, telecommunications, science, technology, training and education; and coal, steel, mining, and raw materials. These subcommittees are intended to meet at least once a year, but often convene more frequently.

On the economic side, the PCA marks an important step in helping to bring Ukraine in line with the legal framework of the single European market and the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The PCA contains a number of evolutionary clauses, including the prospect of a free trade area, and provides for wide-ranging cooperation in the industrial, commercial, scientific and administrative fields. The PCA also has provisions which govern goods, services, labour, and capital, and introduce legally binding requirements which carry considerable implications for the domestic legislation of Ukraine and the other partner countries.

The PCAs concluded between the EU and its partners were primarily intended to facilitate the development of free trade between them. The EU has concluded further Association Agreements, also called the ‘Europe Agreements’, with countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) which have applied for membership. In their preambles these Agreements recognize the fact that the ultimate objective of each of these countries is to become a full member of the EU, and that the Association Agreements
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are a vehicle which will help them to achieve this objective. Much of the text of the Europe Agreements is synonymous with the PCAs, but they differ with respect to trade matters as the former are preferential agreements geared toward the establishment of free trade areas for goods and services.

The PCAs can be seen as a kind of road map for assisting in the introduction of economic policies and trade-related policies in the fields of goods, services, labour, current payments, and capital movement, while moving in the direction of a market-based economy. Although the document is in many ways evolutionary, it is clear that the implementation of the PCA is a prior condition for the development of further trade relations between the parties. The PCA is thus a demanding legal instrument that is far-reaching into the realm of domestic policies and regulations, which for Ukraine represents a challenge in terms of adapting its legislative framework to conform to EU standards. It is most important to note that the PCA relies heavily on the determination of the Ukrainian government to effectively implement it as part and parcel of its own policies, not as an order reluctantly complied with. In addition, the PCA directly affects the business environment in Ukraine by limiting government intervention and promoting freedom of action for economic operators. The PCA in this regard promotes the development of a different type of company, one which is more sensitive to market conditions and is less influenced by governmental regulations.

Advancing Ukraine’s European Aspirations: Problems & Prospects

Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) declared in April 1998 that its immediate foreign policy goal was to gain associate member status of the EU. In June 1998 the Strategy for Ukraine’s Integration into the EU was adopted which fixed full membership in the EU as Ukraine’s long-term strategic goal. At the same time the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council (which was established under the PCA) met for the first time in Luxembourg and adopted the Joint PCA Work Programme consisting of 16 priorities for cooperation. The EU reaffirmed at the Vienna European Council Summit later that month that it attaches ‘fundamental importance’ to its partnership links with Ukraine and in this spirit decided to develop the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine (see below). The MFA had hoped that this document would be perhaps similar to the bilateral NATO-Ukraine Charter, providing a long-term perspective on closer relations between the EU and Ukraine, including the possibility of future membership. During 1998 and 1999 the MFA began an intensive campaign to secure associate membership status, but despite these efforts, Ukraine has still not been granted this, even though most other CEE states have already become EU associate members.

Although considerable progress has been made in the political sphere, on the whole relations between the EU and Ukraine have advanced rather slowly (particularly when compared to relations with NATO), and are faced with a number of practical problems as well as other serious challenges of a more general nature. First, there are several trade disputes that both curtail further growth bilaterally and lead to mutual accusations of misconduct. For example, the EU has accused Ukraine of not meeting WTO entry requirements, specifically of excessive certification procedures, discriminatory excise duties, unexpected increases in tariff rates, and other protectionist measures. Ukraine, in turn, has criticized the EU for imposing
restrictions and quotas on Ukrainian textiles and applying anti-dumping measures against Ukrainian chemicals and steel, thus practically closing the EU market to Ukrainian products. Second, EU financial assistance has been far from meeting the country's needs or expectations. We can compare 823 million Euros of TACIS money to Ukraine with 2,024 million Euros allotted to Poland from 1990-99 under the PHARE programme. Additionally, the EU TACIS programme (minus nuclear aid) is 40-50 million Euros ($39-49m) at present. In comparison, the USAID programme in Ukraine is $70 m plus another $37 m for nuclear safety. In addition, programmes funded by the US Departments of Defense and Energy and the State Department's non-proliferation programme add another $215-216 m, and exchange programmes account for another $24 m. Perhaps surprisingly, the EU’s trade with Ukraine accounts for only 10 per cent of its trade with Russia.

The development of Ukraine's relations with the EU is more difficult than those with NATO, for example, because of several other factors. First, some EU members are still not willing to view Ukraine as an independent entity separate to Russia, and are not willing to develop closer ties with Ukraine than with Russia despite the fact that Russia has not declared EU membership as its official goal while Ukraine has. Indeed, as Taras Kuzio argues, it is not even clear if the EU sees CIS countries such as Ukraine as part of 'Europe' because of their history and geographical size. (Ukraine, in this case, is the equivalent of Turkey in the eyes of the EU.) Consequently, it is difficult for them to see Ukraine as a future member of the EU if Russia is not invited to join. Second, Ukraine's efforts at economic and political reform have not been consistent and thus, Ukraine has not been viewed as a potential member of the EU. Third, Ukraine's integration with the EU would require extensive economic, legal, and social obligations, none of which are necessary for NATO integration. On the other hand, Ukraine's cooperation/integration with the EU is not controversial either domestically or externally (ie from Russia’s perspective), again in comparison with NATO. Thus, in many ways it is difficult to see why the Ukrainian executive has not until recently placed as much emphasis on trying to improve the state's standing with the EU as they have with NATO over the past several years.

Overall, mutual misunderstanding, disappointment, and even frustration on both sides have characterized EU-Ukraine relations. Each still has limited knowledge of the other and it is clear that the EU and Ukraine view the future of their relationship quite differently. While Ukraine has declared its intention to become an EU associate member and its ambition to become a full-member, the EU has not included Ukraine in either the ‘fast-track’ or ‘slow-track’ group of future members. The perception in Ukraine is that the EU applies double standards to Ukraine as the economies of some of the slow-track group were not as strong as Ukraine's (those of Albania and Macedonia, for example). This has led to the belief that the door to the EU is closed for Ukraine, whatever its performance might be, and that for the EU, 'Europe' ends where the Former Soviet Union (with the exception of the Baltic states) begins (Huntington's thesis above supports this argument). In addition, Ukraine's neighbours to the west, some soon to become members of the EU, will have to introduce stricter border regulations and visa requirements for their eastern neighbours. Most problematic in this respect is the effect it will have on Polish-Ukrainian relations, which have become the most promising and dynamic in the region. For the millions of Ukrainians visiting Poland each year, Polish economic achievements are the best indication of the need for continued reform in Ukraine. Imposing new restrictions on travel will have a negative
psychological effect on Ukrainians and ‘reform-minded’, European-oriented policymakers, and will effectively reinforce the presence of the East-West frontier.

**From PCA To Common Strategy**

However, some optimism should also be expressed because of the EU’s *Common Strategy on Ukraine* which was adopted in December 1999 at the Helsinki Council of Ministers Summit and modelled on the structure and main thrust of the EU’s Common Strategy on Russia (as adopted in June 1999 at the EU Summit in Cologne). The Common Strategy made one very important proclamation: it declared that the EU acknowledges Ukraine’s European aspirations and welcomes Ukraine's pro-European choice, but most importantly, the EU declared that the door for Ukraine was not closed. If there is substantial support among EU members for this approach, then this official statement is a very important tool that the Ukrainian government can use to continuously remind EU officials of their so-called ‘pledge’. However, the Common Strategy is a rather vague document which did not intend to take relations with Ukraine to a new qualitative level. Indeed, Ukraine was not invited to attend the Helsinki Summit as an observer, which clearly demonstrates that cross-institutional cooperation at the highest level could be improved.

The objectives of the Common Strategy are: 1) to support democracy and the economic transition process; 2) to ensure security and meet common challenges on the European continent; and 3) to support strengthened cooperation between the EU and Ukraine within the context of EU expansion. The document was intended to give a new impetus to the development of EU-Ukraine ties by calling for, among other things, the establishment of regular dialogue between EU institutions and Ukraine and between Ukraine and the Troika (the meeting of states which hold the present and future Presidencies of the Council of Ministers), the setting up of a European news network on Ukrainian television (*Euronews*), training courses on criminality and environmental issues, and the possibility of free trade once Ukraine has implemented all PCA requirements. As the PCA is rather limited in the sphere of justice and home affairs (JHA), the Common Strategy sought to address more of these concerns which are of high importance to both the EU and Ukraine (such as cross-border cooperation and drug trafficking). Also, an ‘Ombudswoman’ has now been appointed to facilitate Ukraine’s access to the EU to discuss a host of JHA issues, including the trafficking of women and ‘white slavery’ issues.

Very importantly, the Common Strategy has created conditions in which Ukraine could ‘align’ itself with EU foreign and security policy positions (eg EU policy toward the Middle East). But it is also imperative to note that this so-called alignment is at a unilateral level - in other words, it was not meant to be an institutional mechanism to invite Ukraine to align with EU common positions in a strict sense, but the Ukrainian MFA can do so if it chooses.

Overall, the Common Strategy was viewed by Ukrainian officials as somewhat disappointing. The central problem with the PCS from Ukraine’s perspective is that this document is viewed as one-sided and out-of-date. At the Helsinki Summit Ukrainian officials had hoped the PCS would be replaced by a new, ‘fairer’, and more realistic EU approach to Ukraine, but the Common Strategy fell short of explicitly...
stating that Ukraine would be welcome in the EU if it met the specified criteria, and as a result, in Ukraine’s eyes this document did not really energize the Ukraine-EU partnership, at least not to the level that Ukraine hoped for. The EU maintains that it is not in a position to endorse Ukraine’s objective of EU membership because neither Ukraine nor the Union itself is ready for such a step.

Economic problems have contributed greatly to the EU’s growing sense of ambivalence with Ukraine. In 1998 and 1999 the EU was increasingly disappointed with the slow pace of reforms, the inconsistency of its economic policy, and the state’s inability to comply with the PCA requirements. Although the EU continues to recognize the political importance of working with Ukraine to ensure its transition to democracy and a market economy, and nation-state building, the EU’s policy actions have not always reflected this recognition, which has led to a contradiction between political declarations and the development of a positive Ukraine policy. It should be pointed out, however, that on 11 October 2000 the EU Council of Ministers recognized Ukraine as a country with a market economy. This is important, first and foremost, for business circles who may wish to invest in Ukraine.

But while the Ukrainian government continues to look to the EU for definite positive signals (ie the prospect for integration), the EU claims it is not prepared to send such a signal at this time due to Ukraine’s failure to implement the PCA provisions effectively. Moreover, most EU officials, consciously or subconsciously, continue to link Ukraine with Russia. It had become evident by the late 1990s that the EU still lacks a clear vision on Ukraine. Thus, it may be concluded that the most significant obstacles to EU-Ukraine relations are not only economic and political but also psychological. The EU continues to view Ukraine as an outsider to Western Europe, as exemplified by the EU’s focus on identity issues with regard to Ukraine (does Ukraine see itself closer to Europe or to its slavic brethren?)

The EU’s Common Strategy was an overall disappointment for Ukraine in that it did not amount to much more than a collection of political declarations laced with statements of positive intentions. As one member of the European Commission explained, the Common Strategy will not revolutionize EU-Ukraine relations. No one is ready to talk membership. Such an option cannot be given to Ukraine at this time. The EU tends to react to external events - from COMECON, to the demise of the USSR, to the Bosnia and Kosovo Wars, and even to the earthquake in Turkey in 1999. The sad irony is that it may take a catastrophic event in Ukraine such as a social uprising or a natural disaster to capture the EU’s attention in a more constructive way.

Ukraine’s Response To The Common Strategy

In anticipation of the EU’s Common Strategy, on 12 July 1999 President Kuchma had signed a decree approving a Strategy to integrate Ukraine into the EU. This provides for three stages of integration covering the years 2000-2007. At the first stage, Ukraine aims to accede to the World Trade Organization; at the second stage, Ukraine will sign an agreement with the EU on setting up a free-trade area and join the EU as an associate member; and at the final stage, talks are to be held on joining the EU as a full member. Clearly, the goals are in place for Ukraine’s integration into the EU, but what about a plan to achieve those goals? And how will Ukraine implement such a
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plan? The PCA is not even mentioned in these stages and this clearly problematic because the EU justifies the deepening of its relations on Ukraine's inability to follow through with its political and economic commitments, particularly the implementation of the PCA provisions.

But Ukraine may have reason to believe that associate membership is not as far off as has been speculated. In May 2000 after a meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council in Portugal, Jaime Gama, the Portuguese Foreign Affairs Minister, stated that in time the PCA may be transformed into associate membership. This is the first time a clear link had been made between the implementation of the PCA and associate membership status. Ukrainian Prime Minister Yushchenko dubbed the session as 'the beginning of the implementation of Ukraine's Europe Programme' which is aimed at full membership in the EU. Further, Yushchenko argued that Ukraine’s European integration is a matter of time rather than choice and that the pace of this process largely depends on international financial institutions’ confidence in Ukraine.

In July 2000 the EU and Ukraine held talks, although no new policy orientations were produced. The committee meetings were dominated by trade-related issues in which the EU reportedly received little satisfaction from their complaints about Ukraine's trade restrictions that are inconsistent with PCA provisions. Both sides, however, called for greater access to each other’s markets but ultimately agreed to conduct a feasibility study on the creation of an EU-Ukraine free trade zone. In this regard, EU authorities emphasized the need for Ukraine to work harder towards WTO accession. The EU supports Ukraine's candidacy for WTO membership as a more 'realistic and pragmatic' approach to relations with the West and with the EU.

Former Ukrainian Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk suggested that the primary goals of Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU were the development of trade-economic relations, access to the European market, and the procurement of modern technologies. In the political sphere EU-Ukraine relations have developed rather well; however, Ukraine's economic difficulties have long curtailed progress in economic cooperation. The number of EU anti-dumping cases against Ukraine has significantly increased in recent years, thus limiting the export of Ukrainian commodities and especially industrial products.

The Ukrainian government has responded to the EU's call to begin the process of harmonizing and adapting its legislation to the laws of the EU, at least at face value. The spheres of legislation upon which Ukraine's closer economic relations with the EU depend are entrepreneurship, protection of competition and intellectual ownership rights, customs regulations, transport, communications, certification and standards. Ukraine intends to adapt its legislation in three stages. In the first stage, attention will be given to bringing the legal system in line with the requirements of the Declaration approved by the EU in 1993. The second stage will encourage Ukraine to orient its legislation and regulations in line with the EU. This would include the revision of Ukrainian laws in line with the PCA in preparation for the creation of a free trade zone between the EU and Ukraine, as well as obtaining associate member status in the EU. The level of ties set forth in the final stage, which is largely undetermined at present, will depend on whether Ukraine has achieved associate member status.
But according to EU officials, Ukraine tends to abolish one PCA incompatible law (for example, on foreign trade or taxation of foreign companies seeking to establish in Ukraine), only to reintroduce the same legislation under a different name shortly thereafter. The most striking case remains the February 1999 Ukrainian authorities' response to EU pressure to abolish a law on the practice of discriminatory registration and expertise fees for imported pharmaceutical products, only to put in place in May 1999 a new regulation having the same effect. Additionally, Ukraine is in breach of most PCA provisions on trade in goods. For example, there is the 1997 law on the stimulation of automobile production in Ukraine and the accompanying regulations on the secondhand car market (the Daewoo case), which are in breach of five separate PCA provisions. Obviously, if we look at Ukraine’s actions in terms of legal harmonization, the EU is not reassured that Ukraine is at all serious about integrating with the EU, and more importantly, Ukraine does not seem to realize what it takes to achieve full membership or even associate membership.

There is certainly reason to believe that Ukraine will continue to seek closer ties with the EU, despite these setbacks, because there is a clear consensus among prominent Ukrainian politicians to strengthen the state’s ties with the EU. This was exemplified in the Presidential election in October 1999. Even the leftist candidates did not appear to be against Ukraine's membership in the EU. For example, Oleksandr Moroz, head of the Socialist Party, stated that there would be no major changes in Ukraine's foreign policy orientation towards the EU (or NATO) if he were elected President. Communist leader Petro Symonenko also proclaimed that he would pursue a proactive policy supporting Ukraine's membership in all global and European associations if this improved the prestige of the state and strengthened Ukraine's economic potential. Progressive Socialist leader Natalya Vitrenko did not necessarily advocate EU membership for Ukraine, although she did state her intention to build relations with the international community based on principles of peace and respect for human rights. Although former Rada Chairman Oleksandr Tkachenko tended to favor economic ties with Russia and Belarus and was vague on the topic of Ukraine's membership in the EU, he did not speak outwardly against it. Naturally the centre and right candidates, such as Kuchma, Yevhen Marchuk, Henadii Udovenko, and Yurii Kostenko, unequivocally supported the development of Ukraine's partnership with the EU. Therefore, it can be argued that Ukraine has no internal barrier to joining the EU at least among the most prominent Ukrainian officials.

Moreover, as stated previously, EU membership for Ukraine is not provocative or controversial in Russia. Therefore, theoretically Ukraine has no external barrier that would impede the development of its multidimensional relations with the EU. So given this scenario, how can the slow pace of Ukraine’s integration into Europe over the past nine years be explained? It can perhaps be attributed to an amorphous and hesitant EU policy vis-a-vis Ukraine, which stems firstly, from Ukraine’s acute economic crises and failure to comply with the PCA requirements and secondly, from the unwillingness of EU officials to distinguish Ukraine from Russia, fearing that an independent policy for Ukraine might aggravate Moscow, thus curtailing the development of EU-Russia ties.
Ukraine & The EU: Different Approaches, Different Perspectives

It is certainly clear that the EU and Ukraine have some serious work ahead of them in order to help to harmonize their views on a multitude of issues. Understanding is particularly crucial for Ukrainian policy-makers. For example, Ukrainian officials still do not seem to fully understand the difference in status between two high-level documents. The NATO-Ukraine Charter is a *bilateral* document, whereas the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine is a *unilateral*, internal, or solely ‘EU’ document. However, given the MFA’s eagerness to develop ties with the EU and with NATO concurrently, it is not surprising that they have not made this distinction. Both high-level documents have basically the same effect in the Ukrainian MFA - they provide the impetus for going full-force in pushing for enhanced ties at a multitude of levels. According to EU officials, Ukraine is lucky to be consulted on the Common Strategy as this is EU business - it is a tool for enhancing the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and encourages the Commission and the member-states to speak with one voice on Ukraine. The EU Common Strategy is not meant to be a vehicle for Ukraine to negotiate with the EU. Constant Ukrainian pressure on the EU for associate membership has tended to create an atmosphere of ‘Ukraine fatigue’ similar to the atmosphere found at NATO Headquarters.

Additionally, as European integration is a very complicated process of domestic reform and adaptation of the national legislation to EU standards, it can be said that the EU on the whole is a process-oriented institution. Integration into the EU is a process that requires effort by the applicant. In paying most attention to the end result - that is full membership - I would argue that the Ukrainian government is goal-oriented in its approach to the EU: Ukraine’s elites often neglect or underestimate the commitments and obligations - legal, economic, political, and social - that stem from EU membership and its consequences for the country’s domestic situation.

Ukraine needs to go through all of the necessary stages so that it can reach the end of the process - that is, full integration. The process itself, which also includes EU involvement in Ukraine’s domestic affairs (something which the Ukrainian government has not wholly accepted), should help Ukraine to develop a more effective democracy and a stronger economy.

The more developed and successful Ukraine becomes and the more closely Ukrainian institutions resemble those in the EU, the more favourably the EU will view Ukraine as a legitimate candidate for membership. Still, to aspire to full membership is simply not enough, although it can be argued that Ukrainian elites are beginning to realize this fact. It is imperative to show a strong willingness and ability to implement the commitments agreed upon, particularly in the PCA. European integration should not only be a goal in itself; integration should be viewed as a tool by which to modernize the country, establish a regulatory framework, and ultimately to achieve a higher standard of living for the people.

Has The EU ‘Chosen’ Ukraine?

Ukraine’s integration into the EU cannot be one-sided. Unless the political will exists among EU member-states to press ahead with substantial deepening of political and
economic cooperation with Ukraine, it is rather pointless to overestimate Ukraine’s aspirations toward the EU. It cannot be stated with any degree of certainty at present that the EU does in fact view the enhancement of its ties with Ukraine as a priority. However, political dialogue with Ukraine at the highest level has been institutionalized.

At the Third EU-Ukraine Summit on 15 September 2000 in Paris, Ukraine unveiled a new programme of integration into the European Union. The decree was issued by Kuchma on 14 September, and signed literally on board the plane to France. Ukraine’s domestic development and its political and economic situation, the EU Common Strategy on Ukraine, formation of a common European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), EU expansion, the development of bilateral relations, and the role of the G-7 and the EU on the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear power station were all discussed at the Summit. During discussions of bilateral issues, considerable attention was given to the implementation of the PCA, especially in the framework of an improved political dialogue, as well as to the creation of a favourable investment climate in Ukraine, and the implementation of a memorandum on mutual understanding between the EU and Ukraine.

Additionally, in a joint statement issued at the conclusion of the Summit the two sides emphasized that it is in their interest to ‘maintain a stable and healthy partnership with Russia based on shared values, notably respect for human rights and basic freedoms. Some progress was also made on trade-related issues, in antidumping legislation and granting Ukraine the same treatment as Russia and China in antidumping proceedings.

Although Ukraine acknowledges that the EU has its own integrated legal system, the Ukrainian government has expressed its wish to retain its previous agreements, especially those on visas and customs regulations, with other EU aspirant states such as with neighbouring Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. As Kuchma stated, ‘We believe that with EU expansion, the interests of our state need to be taken into account. We need to avoid new barriers appearing between us and keep all the positive things that have been reached in relations between Ukraine and the EU. However, the issue of a free economic zone between the EU and Ukraine was not resolved at the Summit. Kuchma, nonetheless, confirmed that the EU is Ukraine’s strategic goal.

An official from the Ukrainian Mission to the EU in Brussels told the author this EU-Ukraine Summit was the best one yet, mostly because Kuchma was briefed in detail well in advance and as a result, he was confident, articulate, and effective in the discussions. In addition, EU officials reiterated that the two sides were on the same wavelength and in fact over the past six-eight months EU-Ukraine relations have steadily improved. The Ukrainian delegation accepted that in order to move forward, step one must be implementation of the PCA.

The Ukrainian side presented two memoranda to their EU counterparts - one on security cooperation (under CFSP political dialogue: ESDP, military cooperation with Poland, etc) and one on how best to combat organized crime. In addition, the Ukrainian side presented their ‘Programme of Ukraine’s Integration into the EU until the year 2007’, which was modelled on Poland’s programme on how to adopt the acquis communautaire. This document, which is nearly 300 pages in length, outlines
short (1-2 years), medium (3-5 years) and long (5+ years) term priorities to implement the provisions of the PCA. Also, and very importantly, this document holds the individual ministries in Ukraine accountable for the implementation of PCA regulations (ie Ministries of Economy and Energy and the Verkhovna Rada). In addition to this Programme on EU Integration, there is also a shorter, more easily digestable ‘Action Plan’ for PCA implementation which is approximately 10-20 pages and covers the scope of one year. Naturally, EU officials tend to favour these shorter, more concise documents to lengthy, ‘philosophical’ ones often submitted by the Ukrainian delegations.

Implementing Ukraine’s European Policy

Implementing Ukraine’s European choice will not be an easy undertaking in any sense. Ukraine’s accession to the EU requires its successful implementation of economic, political, and institutional reforms, and this process must be transparent to the EU and the West in general. Ukrainian legislation needs to be harmonized in a plethora of areas, and this should be done by adopting European laws as described in about 80,000 pages of obligatory EU legislation - the *acquis communautaire* - and by amending existing domestic legislation to conform to EU standards (without reintroducing new legislation which is incompatible with the PCA).

Integration into the EU must be more than a goal of the executive branch of government, or the MFA specifically. There should be an inter-agency body, particularly in the executive branch but also in the Rada, which would have the authority to effectively coordinate and develop Ukraine’s relations with the EU modelled on similar inter-agency committees in CEE countries. The Verkhovna Rada should consider giving greater impetus to its subcommittee on European integration. This body should coordinate directly with the European Parliament at various levels (working group, expert level) with the aim of tracking EU integration issues, bringing Ukrainian legislation in line with EU standards, and increasing the overall support for Ukraine’s accession to the EU within the Rada. Ukraine should also look to its neighbours for advice, particularly those further along the negotiating process with the EU (eg Poland and Hungary) as virtually every EU candidate state has addressed parliamentary division of labour in this manner.

However, implementing Ukraine’s 'European Choice' requires much more than political will. It requires a well-trained and knowledgeable cadre of civil servants at the national, regional and local levels. Training programmes should be introduced which would focus on educating civil servants on the European integration process and the benefits it would bring to Ukrainian society. An understanding of the legal, political, economic, institutional, and social aspects of the EU is still lacking in Ukraine today, even among the top ranking officials in the government. In addition, the implementation process should also include the publishing of a ‘White Paper’ on European integration. Such a document, accompanied by concrete reform programmes, would convey to EU authorities that Ukraine is serious about joining, or at least achieving associate member status in the short to medium term.

But European integration should not only be a priority among Ukrainian governmental officials; it should also be supported by society at large. For this to happen the
Ukrainian public must be informed and educated about the nature of the EU, how it functions and what benefits the EU brings to its citizens. To this end it is the responsibility of the Ukrainian government to initiate a proactive information campaign aimed at society at large in order to promote the broadening of contacts with EU member states. Perhaps there is a momentum developing here. For example, polls taken by the Ukrainian Centre for Economic and Political Research in spring 2000 indicated that 57% of Ukrainians want to be in the EU (with Western and Central Ukraine being the most supportive, from 58-69%).

It should be remembered that an applicant country requires a comprehensive and coherent plan of action to be accepted by the wider public. The process itself envisages harmonization of economic and legal systems, institution building, development of human resources, and a public information campaign which would provide citizens with a realistic picture of the pros and cons of European integration specific to Ukraine. A timetable and a target date are important components of this campaign. The EU’s Mission to Ukraine in Kyiv can help in this regard. The mission should take on a more proactive role in terms of education and promotion of EU activities and norms. In addition, the Internet can be seen as a facilitator of EU-Ukraine ties (at least for those who have access). Finally, and very importantly, the Ukrainian government should not only consider what benefits it can draw from the EU; it should also focus on what Ukraine could contribute to the EU as a whole.

In terms of practical steps the Ukrainian government should take, implementation of the PCA provisions must be a priority. Although the PCA provides for the establishment of a possible free-trade area, Ukraine must do many things, including joining the WTO, before negotiations can begin. ‘The dynamics of the Ukrainian European integration strategy’s implementation are not sufficient to fulfil tasks set by the Ukrainian President’, said Foreign Minister Tarasyuk after his meeting with Ukrainian ambassadors to Europe in August 2000. Tarasyuk believed that there were both objective and subjective reasons for this. Firstly, since is no actual timetable for the integration process at present, there is no sense in arguing that Ukraine is lagging behind in this process. Some of the models of a united Europe that are actively being discussed in various bodies of the EU to which Ukraine is eagerly striving do not always meet Ukrainian interests. Ukraine is clearly impeded by its unreadiness for European integration and inconsistency of its foreign policy (the so-called multi-vectoral foreign policy which has been followed since 1994).

Secondly, according to Tarasyuk, Ukrainian state bodies primarily declare intentions regarding their aims for the country’s EU integration; however, they have not yet made any substantial, credible, and sustainable moves in that direction. Poland, the Czech Republic, and the Baltics states, for example, which have clearly had some economic difficulties, have nonetheless managed to redirect their trade and investment cooperation to the West. Ukraine, on the other hand, has continued to point out that it will not go anywhere without Russia (although the main trade partner for Russia is the EU).
The Way Ahead

Integration into the EU is impossible without harmonization of legislation. According to one Rada deputy, the first steps Ukraine needs to take along these lines are to adopt a new tax code assuring transparent and reasonable taxation, to simplify the rules for foreign business establishment and operation, streamline custom procedures, to bring legislation on protection of intellectual property in line with European standards, and eliminate import and export limitations and restrictions.

From an EU perspective, Ukraine must take these steps as a matter of priority:

1. Move away from a policy of declaring its desire for EU membership to one of full implementation of the PCA
2. Take concrete and sustained steps in this direction and begin fulfilling the PCA provisions
3. Consult the EU regularly (as well as key member states) using the Action Plan/White Paper to highlight where practical action has been taken and how reform has progressed
4. Establish and energize working groups in the executive and legislative branches which will be compatible with their counterparts in the EU (such as a subcommittee in the Rada on European integration which would work directly with the European Parliament). Other expert groups should also be formed and given impetus (ie real decision making powers) to take advantage of the highly skilled Ukrainian society particularly in the scientific and technical spheres
5. Stimulate EU interest in Ukraine by attracting EU investment and inviting more visitors. Strict visa requirements for EU citizens to visit Ukraine do not help in widening knowledge about Ukraine (even if the EU has visa requirement for Ukrainian citizens, this policy need not be reciprocated).

But from a Ukrainian perspective, the EU should take the following actions:

1. Consider relations with Ukraine in a more positive light
2. Recognize that Ukraine’s failure to establish closer ties with the EU will only serve to strengthen the position of the opponents of reform in Ukraine (which incidentally is growing)
3. Accord Ukraine a positive signal (in the form of acknowledging Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations) in the near term as it begins to implement economic and institutional reforms
4. Continue to encourage Ukraine in inter-European forums to be pro-active about passing and implementing reform legislation. This would help Ukraine’s ‘image problem’ and also would undercut any EU arguments aimed at excluding Ukraine in an expanded vision of Europe.

Ukraine should also facilitate cooperation with the EU in terms of justice and home affairs, particularly fighting organized crime, illegal immigration, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Because Ukraine is concerned about the introduction of new visa regimes with its neighbours, border issues should be a central focus of EU-Ukraine cooperation. These working groups could perhaps be modeled on NATO-Ukraine committees designed to deal with specific areas of cooperation such as science and environment, technologies, political cooperation, and even defense-related cooperation.
as in the Joint Working Group on Defence Reform (JWGDR). Ukraine and the EU should endeavour to establish a good working relationship at the committee/working group/expert level with the goal of eventually streamlining responsibilities so that the representatives participating in these forums have the authority to make decisions, rather than deciding everything at the foreign minister or presidential levels.

At the centre of a newly invigorated EU-Ukraine cooperation effort should also be an increase in activities between the Rada and the European Parliament (if the leftist forces in the Rada are hampering reform efforts and thus Ukraine’s ‘return to Europe’, then the legislature is where the EU should be focusing attention). As mentioned above, the Rada has established a subcommittee on European (and CIS) integration; however, this body is not comparable to similar committees in other ‘aspirant’ countries. This is in part due to a lack of experience and insufficient contact with the European Parliament at an institutional and human level. Members of the European Parliament need to establish a working relationship with Rada deputies to bolster the European idea among Ukrainian parliamentarians. Significant effort has been made to educate the Ukrainian executive branch regarding the EU, but not enough attention has been given to the Ukrainian legislature.

Ukraine undoubtedly faces several fundamental problems in its cooperation with the EU. First and foremost, some EU member-states are under the influence of those who believe that Ukraine will never be a part of ‘Europe’. Ukraine’s authorities have expressed disillusion at Ukraine’s exclusion from the EU fast and slow track group of states joining the EU – the so-called Helsinki and Luxembourg groups. Ukrainian MFA officials believe this decision was based on political, not economic, criteria. The Ukrainian government wants to receive a positive geopolitical signal from the EU as the best hedge against Ukraine’s possible reabsorption into Russia’s economic and political sphere. Although the EU views enlargement as an open-ended process, Ukraine fears that time is running out and that the membership window may be permanently closed. The recent introduction of visa requirements for travel to the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia all too clearly help to justify Ukraine’s fears. Ukraine wants a ‘positive signal’, that ‘Ukraine would be welcome to join the European Union if it met the Copenhagen Criteria for membership’. This statement on an official level would send a clear signal that EU membership is based on economic criteria and PCA implementation in general and not on political, cultural, or other factors.

In addition, the Ukrainian government tends to look to the US to help to pry open the door of eventual EU membership. This could possibly be useful in four areas:

1. helping to develop internet access through the creation of an information society,
2. urging the EU to complete the financing of the construction of the Odessa pipeline,
3. pushing EU funding for EU-Ukrainian transport routes, and
4. promoting a place for Ukraine in the ESDP debate. (It is the author’s view that Ukraine should not actively pursue a role in ESDP, but rather should stress the importance of an independent Ukraine’s role in broader geostrategic issues that are of key importance to EU interlocutors.)
Conclusions

Ukraine’s integration into the European Union or Ukraine’s overall ‘European Choice’ is not based on a cost-benefit analysis. It is a political decision based on political motivations championed by the MFA. EU integration clearly does not have the full support of the Ukrainian executive and this is a problem on a domestic level that must be resolved before Ukraine can move closer to the EU. From an EU perspective the ball is in Ukraine’s court. It is up to Ukraine to fulfil its legal, economic, and political obligations in the PCA, otherwise EU officials can easily justify keeping Ukraine at arm’s length.

It has been argued in this paper that Ukrainian policymakers tend to pursue final solutions as opposed to the EU’s process solutions. A change in this approach is absolutely necessary for Ukraine to move closer to EU associate membership. Ukrainian elites clearly desire to pursue the end goal of full integration into the European Union. The problem is that as of yet there is no clear and coherent plan in place which would enable Ukraine to achieve this goal. There is only an idea which has generated some interest and discussion among Ukrainian officials, but this idea has not yet been able to stimulate the required level of economic and institutional reforms in Ukraine. In the absence of a clear signal from the EU, adversaries of Ukraine’s European integration have a greater opportunity both to hamper economic and political reforms and to slow down the process of Ukraine’s rapprochement with the EU.

It is important to emphasize that, despite some important progress, relations between the EU and Ukraine remain constrained by inadequate mutual knowledge and understanding. While Ukraine has yet to fully comprehend the nature and complexity of the European integration process, the EU also needs to deepen its understanding of Ukraine’s desire for European integration. Because the drive to join the EU does not come from society at large, one must assume that the desire to deepen Ukraine’s ties with the EU remains the prerogative of political elites, particularly the MFA. Therefore, there is an urgent need to expand and diversify Ukraine’s ties with the EU to include other governmental agencies (particularly the legislature), local and regional governments, the private sector, NGOs, mass media, scholars and researchers, and the public at large. To this end, European integration should not only be seen as a goal in itself - it should be a tool aimed at modernizing the country, establishing a proper regulatory framework, and achieving a higher standard of living for the people of Ukraine.

Ukraine is also coming to understand that its relations with the EU must develop within the broader framework of its relations with other key institutions, such as the WTO. The problem is that Ukraine has yet to rid itself of the negative legacy of legislative repudiation under which both domestic laws and international agreements are often blatantly ignored. In the end, however, what Ukraine needs is time. And, yet, it is this time factor which prolongs and reinforces Western, and particularly EU, perceptions of Ukraine as an outsider.
ENDNOTES


4 Remarks made by Samuel Huntington at the National Institute for Strategic Studies, Kyiv, Ukraine, 18 October 1999. The author was present at this conference.

5 Interview with an official from the EU Commission, Brussels, Belgium, 29 September 2000.

6 Russia, Moldova (which have taken effect), and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Krygyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Belarus (which have not yet taken effect).

7 As the PCA covers matters of Community, of national and of joint competence, it must be ratified not only by the three European Communities (The European Community, the European Coal and Steel Community, and the European Atomic Energy Community), but also by all of the member-states.

8 There are 5 expert level groups and one on the level of senior officials - the EU Troika - which meets twice per year.

9 ‘Relations between the EU and Ukraine’, Dr Fraser Cameron, paper presented at the Kennan Institute, Washington DC, 18 May 2000.


11 On 8-9 June during the first meeting of the EU-Ukraine Cooperation Council in Luxembourg came the first official appeal by the Ukrainian side for consideration for EU membership. Prime Minister Pustivoitenko stated in his opening remarks: ‘I would like to ask you to consider my statement as an official application of Ukraine for EU associate membership’; as explained to the author by a representative of Ukraine’s Mission to the EU, 6 November 2000.


13 Ukraine is not officially a member of the CIS, having never signed the CIS Charter. Yet Ukraine participates in CIS meetings, and is a member of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly (the legislature of the CIS).


15 Interview with Elizabeth Franey, Ukraine Desk Officer, European Commission, Brussels, Belgium, 29 September 2000.


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19 Interview with Klaus Schneider, Deputy Head of Unit for Relations with Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus, European Commission DG 1A, Brussels, Belgium, 12 October 1999.
24 Interview with Carl Hartzell, Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit for the Former Soviet Union, EU Council of Ministers, Brussels, Belgium, 29 September 2000.
25 ‘Foreign Minister on cooperation with EU’ (Interview with Borys Tarasyuk), Kiev Uryadovyy Kuryer, 22 July 1999, p3.
28 ‘Moroz issues election manifesto’, Kiev Holos Ukrayiny, 8 September 1999, p3.
29 ‘Presidential candidate Symonenko manifesto’, Kiev Holos Ukrayiny, 1 September 1999.
34 ‘President Kuchma says Ukraine-EU Summit constructive’, Kiev Ukrainian Television UT2, 15 September 2000.
35 Interview with a representative of Ukraine’s Mission to the EU and with Elizabeth Franey, Ukraine Desk Officer, European Commission, Brussels, 29 September 2000.
36 ‘Poll shows 57 % of Ukrainians want to be in the EU’, Kiev Ukrayina Moloda, 29 April 2000.
37 Foreign Minister proposes moves to improve integration into Europe’, Kiev Den, 30 August 2000.
38 Kuchma has characterized Ukraine’s multi-vectorial foreign policy as integration with the West, cooperation with Russia, and leadership in the region.
39 Dr Oleksandr Zadorozhnyi, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, comments made at the conference ‘The European Union and Ukraine: Consolidating Constituencies for Integration’, the East-West Institute, 1-2 October 1999, Kyiv, Ukraine.
40 Ireland is a good example in this regard since the US until recently required tourist visas for Irish citizens but Ireland did not reciprocate.
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