

**THE FOG OF PEACE:
FINDING THE END-STATE OF HOSTILITIES**

Manfred K. Rotermond

November 1999

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Comments may be provided directly to the author at 1708 Crestwood Drive, Alexandria, VA 22302, via e-mail at maxr@erols.com or by calling (703) 931-4349. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummelr@awc.carlisle.army.mil

Most 1993, 1994, and all later Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) monographs are available on the SSI Homepage for electronic dissemination. SSI's Homepage address is: <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usassi/welcome.htm>

The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the research of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newsletter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please let us know by e-mail at outreach@awc.carlisle.army.mil or by calling (717) 245-3133.

ISBN 1-58487-009-5

CONTENTS

Foreword	v
1. Introduction	1
2. Context of Peace	7
3. Freedom, Power, and Progress	17
4. A Model of Societies	27
5. The Search for Peace	37
6. The Role of the Military in Pre- and Post-hostility Campaigns	47
7. Conclusion	53
About the Author	59

FOREWORD

The U.S. armed forces have engaged in a number of military operations other than war since the Vietnam War. The latest of these are Kosovo and East Timor. None of these conflicts has conformed to traditional wars. These conflicts are not the continuation of diplomacy by other means. Diplomacy and military action co-exist in the modern theater of war. Another type of involvement is that similar to the intervention in Macedonia—where foreign troops have been inserted to prevent the breakout of fighting. These types of conflicts do not contain the certainties that accompanied World Wars I and II. Here, success and failure are more ambiguous. It may be said that the end-state of hostilities may not have been achieved in any of these places. Macedonia remains at risk given the high level of ethnic tensions. None of these places is peaceful.

The author of this monograph provides us with a new way of thinking about peace and how to achieve it. Peace, he argues, arrives only when domestically centered progress is established in a post-conflict environment. The end of hostilities is only the end of the shooting. It is not the end of danger. It is not the end of the animosities or typically the conditions leading to the hostilities. As a result, the end of hostilities represents the beginning of a transition to peace—not peace itself.

The military role of intervening states and organizations (U.S., NATO, U.N.) continues after the end of hostilities. They must begin the transition to peace. Unconditional disarmament of all combatants is a military task. So, the author argues, is the beginning of the process whereby progress is instituted. He likens governance to riding a bicycle. Intervening states can set a rider on a bicycle on day one after the end of hostilities: elections accomplish this. They can even help the rider maintain balance. But successful governance will require the rider to pedal

independently. Only then is governance stable. Many factors can interfere with that stability. Pre-hostility leadership and combatants may claim the spoils of war—control of national government. Furthermore, if these forces are reconstituted as the police or similar entity, then moderate voices are likely not to be heard. After all, the former combatants are probably the most ideologically dedicated and organized among the local groups. Only the military can prevent this from happening.

Residents of the territory or country must be convinced to establish new lives at the local level before being allowed to establish or re-establish national institutions. Here is where much of the author's originality will be found. He argues that a peaceful society will, in fact, experience considerable conflict. It takes the form of competition among all sectors of the society: political, religious, civic, as well as marketplace competition. As in the United States, that competition will lead to new knowledge and greater freedom. The concrete expression of freedom is progress. From this process may come a new leadership not vested in continuing the earlier conflict. It is the only way to prevent old leadership from re-exerting itself.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study as a contribution to thinking about how the sources of freedom, progress, stability and peacemaking should factor into future conflict termination strategies.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Interim Director
Strategic Studies Institute

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Modern hostilities feature military action as an *adjunct* to diplomacy or as an *active tool* of diplomacy. The task of achieving peace after such hostilities is perhaps more difficult than it was in the past. Diplomatic considerations often place many players at both the war and peace tables, or at least in the room. Then there is the very question of what the constituents of peace may be. Experience teaches us that the end of hostilities is not peace. At the end of this monograph, I suggest that the peace achieved in Europe after World War II still has many fragile elements to it. My contention is that peace can come only after the salience of pre-hostility ideologies, desires, and tendencies has been minimized. This applies to both conventional wars and military operations other than war that bring intervention from the United States, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), United Nations (U.N.), or other groups.

As we move into the 21st century, this century appears to be telling us that the future, typical war will be more like the Somalian, Bosnian, or Kosovar conflicts than the World Wars of this century. Religious, cultural, or ethnic animosities are more likely to bring on war than the search for *Lebensraum* or resources. Troops may be sent into such conflicts to separate the combatants. But once separated, are the combatants then at peace? No.

What is peace? It is an internal state of nations or groups that are achieving progress and are maintaining normal, noncombatant relations with their neighbors, both internal and external. Peace requires rejection of the earlier path that led to the conflict requiring intervention. After war and after military operations other than war, the military's role is to point the combatant groups away from their original

path and toward more peaceful pursuits. They, like the Kosovars in Kosovo today, may act on the belief that control of a territory is now theirs after the intervening force has removed the oppressor. That may be a logical outcome of the end of hostilities, but it is not a good beginning for a lasting peace or nation-building. For peace to be lasting, nations and peoples must adopt new strategies to accomplish their goals.

The Post-Hostilities Context.

We can think of the people in the Balkans, the Horn of Africa, Central Africa, and maybe in the crescent under Russia as engaged in battles among two or more monopolies. The aim of politicians and then combatants is to eliminate anything that does not serve their own monopoly, be it ethnic, religious, or nationalistic. An intervening force may assist one monopoly to push aside the other monopoly. In the end, one monopoly is left standing. Should that monopoly take power and rule the territory or nation? I suggest that its leadership is not likely to be well-suited to the task. Once in power, I suspect that its strong prejudices will cause the leaders to ignore the practical needs of reconstruction and development. The leadership's power is based on having the conflict remain salient. Thus, the intervening force must reduce the power of this monopoly with as much vigor as they applied to the elimination of the aggressor monopoly. Substitution of one for the other will not contribute to the territory's development—a requirement if it is not to become a ward state.

The logic behind this argument is simple. The goal of intervention must always be greater than just the cessation of the shooting or the mere prevention of future fighting. The alternative, reestablishment of the previous conditions or maintenance of current conditions, implies that the intervention will never end. It was the previous conditions that led to fighting, or it is the current level of tensions that might lead to fighting. The goal, then, must be something

such as the movement of the society beyond the current antagonisms. That movement comes with progress—when the people exert control over their lives, rebuild their homes, enterprises, and places of worship.

The initial military task after the end of hostilities is disarmament of the combatants. Closely upon this task follows the hardest task the intervening forces must accomplish. That is convincing the “winning” combatants that they should not assume power in “their” territory or country. Control must stay with the intervenors. They must break up the monopoly that “won” the war; they must move the country toward progress.

Progress exists where development or nation-building is on-going. We can think about development as being driven either from the top-down (the Soviet monopolistic model) or from the bottom-up (the American market model). The former should remain discredited for a long time into the future. That is not to say that the model no longer is in use, however—it is employed all over the world. A country bound by a monopoly such as tradition, all-consuming (therefore monopolistic) hatreds or dictatorial government will develop slowly, if at all. All new knowledge must be fed into and through the monopoly before being applied to create something different. The latter model has produced the United States—the most stable, *yet ever changing*, country in the world. The reason is simply that many individuals, not a single organization or system of beliefs, can create and act on new knowledge. This type of development should be fostered whenever forces intervene in these modern types of conflicts. It is essential in a post-hostility environment.

By its very nature, bottom-up development resists control from above—that is its beauty when applied in an environment where monopolies are dominant. The development that occurs chips away at the salience of the monopoly. Thus, in a place like Kosovo where religion-based hatred is still monopolistic, forcing residents to focus on rebuilding their local lives—from local government to

businesses—will distract them to a degree from the past conflict. Once local life becomes reestablished, residents will see that some towns or areas are doing a better job of that than are others. This can and should foster competitive initiatives. Those individuals who succeed here will gain reputations that they can then use to rise in politics. The critical element in their rise is that their reputations and accomplishments will have been based on pragmatic and NOT ideological success. They are candidates to become the future leaders of their country.

Beginning the process of bottom-up nation-building is a military task. The remaining leadership will reject this approach and may even return to violence to maintain its prerogatives. Fighters will not want to return to civilian life, yet their skills and presence will be needed for the reconstruction of the society. Furthermore, they will have to be paid if they stay in uniform. The people, in general, may be leery of adopting the bottom-up approach to development since most societies around the world have a top-down orientation. Yet, it is small projects that aggregate into sustainable development—reconstruction of housing, local roads, building of a new power grid based on small generating plants, micro and small loans to reestablish businesses, and similarly scaled projects. Large-scale projects must be managed at the national level, difficult to achieve until stable government exists. Bottom-up designed projects build local knowledge, forestall a monopoly-oriented national government, and break up development projects into more controllable packages.

Figure 1 schematically lays out the transition from military to civilian (e.g., U.N.) command and then national resumption of government. The military is the only organization capable of initiating such development in a post-conflict environment. Civilian authority must negotiate disarmament while the military can demand it. Similarly, the military can demand that combatants go home and rebuild local life. The military can command and transport the goods and services needed to put the

combatants out of uniform and back to work. Preliminary order must be established before a civilian police force can function effectively. The intervening military must accomplish these objectives before transitioning control to a civilian force. They will then have the task of helping the people create a national government.




Figure 1. Schematic of transition from intervening (external) military control to national control after the cessation of hostilities.

Unity of command is maintained; the transfer is from external military to external civilian to national control. The election cycle is superimposed to show that development and the transfer of power should proceed from the bottom-up. There should be no role for the intervening powers after a national government has been selected.

Preventing Hostilities.

The tasks of a foreign military force sent in to prevent the onset or the spread of hostilities (e.g., Macedonia or Montenegro) are less active than in the post-hostilities context. Their largest function is as guarantors of the peace. They are there as part of a *diplomatic* national assistance package designed to convince and then assist the national authority to defuse long-standing ethnic, religious, or nationalistic tensions. Without the larger diplomatic package, all they can do is delay the onset of conflict. While there, they must gather and use intelligence and situational awareness to be able to respond sharply to any military

conflict that may arise. More critically, they are there as symbols to forestall conflict. The appropriate historical model for this type of operation is the role of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the federal marshals during the civil rights tensions in the American South during the 1960s. The intervening force's active presence enables the reduction of the cultural, governmental and other tendencies that brought on the tensions.

Diplomatic initiatives should convince the national government to integrate itself and to more closely equalize the opportunities among the cultures and groups that make up the country. If this is accomplished, then the intervening military force becomes a temporary adjunct of the local central government as they reform past practices that created the heightened state of tensions in the country. If this relationship does not develop, then the initial diplomatic package was either designed for failure or was not well implemented.

The following three chapters provide a rationale for the recommendations made above. They constitute a theoretical foundation for future nation-building initiatives. Freedom, progress, and stability are the central concepts of the theory that rest on a base of knowledge. The distribution of knowledge on governance in a country determines the availability of freedom and progress and gives it the degree of stability it possesses. The remainder of the monograph then takes these concepts and applies them to situations of military operations other than war.

CHAPTER 2

CONTEXT OF PEACE

Somalia. Haiti. Bosnia. Kosovo. The limited objectives of these campaigns differentiate these actions from most previous American military efforts. While not resembling the wars of the past, they are likely the precursors of military campaigns of the future: humanitarian campaigns. Intra-state, rather than inter-state, issues governed these campaigns. The cessation of hostilities in operations other than war, as in war, is just the beginning of foreign (U.S., NATO, U.N., others) involvement. What should be the objective of this military involvement? What is the measure of the end-state that permits military disengagement with confidence that a repeat of the military/humanitarian campaign will not be necessary? This monograph proposes a speculative, yet logical approach to resolving these questions.¹ The answers to these questions have implications for all of Europe, not just the Balkans.

In the above examples, and likely in future instances, the objectives for military intervention beyond the cessation of hostilities will be stability and progress. A return to the *status quo* that brought on the fighting obviously would be an insufficient outcome for peace. A truce, whether of the Korean variety or other form that does not resolve the war-causing issues, is also not a long-term solution.

Peace will have arrived when the shoemaker sells his blood-enemy a pair of shoes rather than kill him. That is a tall order. The history of the Balkans also suggests that this may be the only realistic definition of peace. Earlier attempts to contain the hatreds in this region have been failures. Since the time of the Ottoman Empire, the best outcomes for the people there have been a series of truces.

Such truces came with the Ottoman Empire, then the Habsburg Empire, and finally with Tito after World War II.

The notion of peace as neighbor selling neighbor a pair of shoes is evocative, but it is also rich in content. First, it does not say that buyer and seller become friends, or that they tolerate each other. It does say that they have reached a state where antagonism and self-interest have come into a rough balance. Thus in Kosovo, a major event will have transpired when Serb sells Kosovar a pair of shoes or Kosovar sells Serb a shirt. Each will have moved beyond that point where hatred for the other was a monopoly.

Monopolistic conflicts consume the Balkans and other areas in the world: Serb and Kosovar, Hutus and Tutsis, Northern Irish Catholic and Protestant, Arab and Jew in the Middle East, and so on. Present in each of these areas is a conflict of such intensity that selling shoes to each other is almost inconceivable. As discussed in the coming pages, the task is to diminish the saliency of the conflagration-sized conflicts by introducing many other more brushfire-sized conflicts. These are conflicts of learning about a larger world in the individual and competition among enterprises, where enterprises are churches, civic and other groups, not just business enterprises. The presence of a multitude of these smaller conflicts is the best indicator that a society is at peace internally.

The foreign military—American or those of other intervening states—has a definite role in achieving peace in the Balkans and in the other likely operations other than war over the next decades. A single intervention model, however, will not serve all of these campaigns. As covered below, the foreign military role may be a delicate quasi-diplomatic guarantor role, a short-term balanced police and logistician facilitating role or a long-term logistician-as-carrot and police-as-stick pro-consul role.

Scope and Conclusions.

To remove the fog of peace, we must expand the scope of the discussion on peace. Peace is not the absence of conflict; only the dead are not in conflict.

Having neighbor sell neighbor a pair of shoes implies a certain level of stability. Secondly, movement beyond the *status quo ante* or the post-hostilities truce requires a measure of progress. The social, spiritual, and economic life of the society must not only resume but also advance. Only then does peace become a viable descriptor of the environment. These three terms—stability, progress and peace—are highly interrelated, and are all based on the concept of freedom. Without freedom, enduring peace, stability, and progress are impossible. An outline of the monograph's themes follows in the next several paragraphs.

The first task is to provide a new definition for freedom. The existing definitions are misleading. Isaiah Berlin,² probably the most highly regarded 20th century thinker on the idea of freedom, says that we have come up with over 200 definitions of the term since the times of the Greeks and Romans. He suggests that there are two threads that permeate all of these definitions. The first of these is the notion of a constraint on government. The constraint gives us scope for activities free of external meddling. A good example of this is the American Constitution's use of the phrase: "The Congress shall make no law . . ." Here is an area where Congress should not enter. Colloquially, this is the freedom of "keeping government off my back." The problem with this definition comes out of the definition of the state: the monopoly on power. If the state has a monopoly on power, who is to keep it off the backs of the people, especially the less favored? The state having to restrain itself is a fatal problem for this definition. How can a definition requiring a restraint on government rely on the power of government to achieve its ends?

The second thread he identifies as freedom is that we should be able to make as much of ourselves as we can: "Be all you can be." The problem with this definition is that humans are social beings who have to live with one another. Thus, we are likely to step on each other when we try to self-actualize. To misquote Shakespeare: "The problem lies not in the stars, but in the reality that you, the reader, and I, the writer, cannot both be emperor of the world at the same time." Philosophers from Hegel through Friedrich Hayek³ have compounded the problem by postulating worlds where everyone could achieve their destinies while marching in the same direction. Lenin, Hitler, Mao, and Pol Pot have taken up this idea and forced their people to march in lock-step. The result, as we all know, has not been freedom.

The dichotomy Berlin raises, however, is a real part of our lives both domestically and internationally. Does freedom stem from individuality or conformity? Do we have more freedom when we can strike out on our own or when we have our friends defending our rear? My answer to these dilemmas is to say that we can strike out on our own when we know what we are doing. In other situations, we need friends to support us either because the problems to be solved are better solved by a group or the risks are such that a person would be a fool to venture out alone. These dilemmas will resolve themselves when we realize that the knowledge content of the two situations is very different.

The proposed definition uses knowledge as the foundation for freedom to get around these long-standing problems. This definition will become almost self-evident after an explanation of how freedom comes into being. My contention is that freedom is a product of knowledge being used in a permitted activity. Freedom then becomes that arc of horizon within which we can act.

The next step is to answer the question of what drives an increase in freedom. Freedom grows out of certain conflicts. The first of these conflicts is the product of learning by individuals.⁴ Hegel's resolution of the dialectical thesis and

antithesis into a synthesis is probably the best known model of learning through conflict, even if it is not known as such. The second form of conflict is marketplace competition. Enterprises seek to minimize the force of competition by differentiating themselves from each other. Both Hegel's synthesis and the differentiating "better idea" are new knowledge. When that knowledge is applied it becomes the basis for additional freedom. This discussion will lead to the *un*-surprising conclusion that monopolies are the greatest enemies of freedom. Monopolies can take many forms: from the individual who has a one-track mind to cultural, religious, and civic as well as the traditional business monopoly.

It is a short step from increasing freedom to a definition of stability. Stability exists when a society exhibits internal dynamism—when it creates and applies new knowledge. Essentially, a stable society uses knowledge to expand its bounds, its freedom. Homeostasis or the unmoving teeter-totter are not the models of stability. They represent a "stability" of balance or no movement. These concepts, applied to individuals or societies, would represent stasis, where knowledge is not being produced and freedom is not being expanded. The imbalance of stability comes from the many conflicts and competitive situations being resolved and replaced by further conflicts. A static society regresses as knowledge is lost—forgotten—and not replaced by new knowledge.

In short, a stable society participates in progress.⁵ The many conflicts that create stability also foster progress. Progress is the concrete side of freedom. It is the tangible product of those activities that result in freedom. New knowledge applied in an activity produces both freedom and progress.

The following step describes the different forms of stability a state may assume. It uses a geological metaphor to describe how these different types of states come to an end.

Countries such as the Soviet Union, North Korea and Castro's Cuba fall into the category of states where governance is a unitary monopoly. These are the states that often aspire to be utopias; ones that reject any external input to the governance process. Dictatorships want to limit knowledge of governance to the ruling elite. Left alone, such countries die by dissipation—much as a mountain of shale can turn into a pile of scree, small uncoordinated pieces.

The next group of states have multiple monopolies in governance, each governing a separate piece of turf. This group includes Tito's Yugoslavia, and then Bosnia and Macedonia. Also included here is Cuba after Castro *if the refugees go back*. Major constituencies maintain areas they control independently of the central government. The France of Louis XVI is the exemplar of a multi-monopoly state. The nobility, the Church, the bourgeoisie, and the farmers co-existed, with each group having significant control over its own activities. Like revolutionary France and Tito's Yugoslavia, these countries tend to suffer a violent earthquake when the bonds that keep the monopolies operating in parallel weaken and then disappear on the guillotine or in ethnic cleansing. The remaining groups attempt to impose their methods on the rest of the population after the center collapses.

The last group of states include just the United States and the England that has evolved over the past 50 years.⁶ These states have an adaptive kind of stability derived from an absence of monopolies in governance. Here it is as if the tectonic plates are in constant motion. The earth trembles constantly at a low level from the many small conflicts that permeate these societies. The constant competition among the entities slowly shifts the society without ever leading to a magnitude 8.0 earthquake. Religious denominations and even congregations compete with each other for members and with businesses when they need financing for new construction. Were the United States and England perfect examples of this kind—that is, without any monopolies and

near-monopolies—then everyone would be in constant competition with everyone else.

Peace is a concept that makes sense only against the backdrop of the typology of states developed here. The only enduring internal peace is the peace found in a monopoly-free environment. The peace and stability found in monopoly or multi-monopoly states is more akin to an imposed truce than enduring peace. The apparent peace in these states will either dissipate when government loses its legitimacy or suffer an earthquake of revolution when the center weakens.

The components of peace are freedom, stability and progress. Peace is not the absence of conflict, rather the dynamic state where many conflicts are ongoing—where learning and differentiation permit the setting aside of cataclysmic war for the day-to-day competition of making a better world; or at least, a better village.

This abstract conception of peace will form the foundation for a discussion of various countries. Thus, the first task in a Bosnia or Kosovo is to replace the overriding large, cataclysmic conflict of ethnic hatred with smaller business, religious and other non-fatal conflicts that lead to freedom, stability and progress. This is done at the local level, almost individual by individual. Preventing ethnic war in Macedonia or in other states where the killing has not yet started, on the other hand, poses a very different problem. Here the national government must take the lead role, much as the federal government took the lead in achieving racial integration in America.

The foreign-military role is very different in a state such as Macedonia not yet infected by ethnic killings than it is in Kosovo. The foreign troops in Macedonia can provide the population with a comfort level that permits integration to start and continue. Intelligence gathering and an occasional well-timed appearance may be all that is needed here for success. In Kosovo, the role differs if the goal is a multi-ethnic or uni-ethnic state. Reestablishment of a

multi-ethnic state is a long-term military problem. Involvement in a multi-ethnic or multi-clan environment will put more intervening troops at hazard as both the carrot of logistical support and the stick of military action will be required.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. Speculative is the right word for this monograph. In its main thrust, it takes a concept—freedom—from the realm of political science and reassigns it to the realm of psychology. Freedom has never been a major research topic in psychology. The author's advisor in graduate school wrote a chapter on freedom that was at best mildly received. The author continues to believe that the chapter was one of the two best works published by Ivan Steiner. This monograph is the product of 25 years' ruminations on the topic of freedom, always centered on Steiner's chapter. See Ivan D. Steiner, "Perceived Freedom" in Leonard Berkowitz, *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, Vol. 5, New York: Academic, 1972. The publication in 1998 of *On Democracy*, New Haven: Yale, by Robert A. Dahl, however, did much to reinforce the confidence of the author on the utility of this exercise. Dahl, who was required reading when the author was in his first year in college (1962), leaves the end of this latest work open. He describes democracy as practiced in various parts of the world but does not ever give democracy a concrete definition. Perhaps it has none. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy" in *Foreign Affairs*, November-December, 1997, by that journal's editor, is a good example of an attempt to put democracy back together again. Dahl's conclusion, that there are many different democracies, is the more effective without moving to the psychological dimension.

2. The literature on freedom is voluminous. Philosopher turned historian of ideas Isaiah Berlin spent much of his life studying this literature. His 1958 essay, "Two Concepts of Liberty," is regarded as a stunning recapitulation and synthesis of the literature. See the collection of his essays: *The Proper Study of Mankind*, New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1997.

3. Hayek and other recent advocates of capitalism confront the excesses of capitalism by arguing that it should take place in the context of a Judeo-Christian setting. See Friedrich Hayek, *The Constitution of Liberty*, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1960. Francis Fukuyama is more explicit in saying that democratic capitalism is the modern Hegelian utopia. See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*, London: Avon, 1993.

4. Conflict as the basis of learning is one of several learning theories extant in psychology. Sigmund Freud, Erik Erickson, and Jean Piaget use conflict in describing learning. For each of them, learning occurs when problems are resolved, not avoided. Others include different schools of behaviorism, observational learning and cognitive processing models. There is no research breaking down human learning into these categories. Evidence does suggest that the nonconflict models tend to account for the simpler kinds of learning situations only. As a result, a reasonable hypothesis is that the conflict models may account for the more complex types of learning governing higher order human processing. Hegel's dialectic falls within the conflict model of learning even though he or others have not explicitly termed the dialectic a learning paradigm. While he spoke of societies being subject to the dialectic, Piaget's model of individual learning uses a logic very similar to the dialectic. Certainly, Hegel does not allow societies to avoid the dialectic (a la Pavlov's dogs avoiding shocks); antithesis must confront thesis in the process of arriving at synthesis.

5. There is much discussion on whether societies are progressing on the basis of indigenous or borrowed knowledge. Japan and the Soviet Union have often been accused of living on borrowed knowledge. A country such as the United States with a vibrant research sector and a tradition of innovation is likely to experience a more consistent pattern of progress than will societies that "borrow" the basis of their progress. The source or basis of progress does matter.

6. The event that perhaps best marks the passing of the old order in England was the immediate post-war election in which the hero of World War II, Winston Churchill, was thrown out of office for not supporting medical and other rights for the "lower" classes, the fighters of World War II.

CHAPTER 3

FREEDOM, POWER, AND PROGRESS

The relationship among the words in the chapter title is the subject of this chapter. The soldier fights for freedom. Command projects power. Everyone aims for progress. In fact, as we will see below, the three concepts are very similar. Both freedom and power are the ability to act. Progress is the concrete measure of freedom and power.

Freedom—The Basis for Progress and Stability.

I propose a new definition for the concept of freedom. To begin, however, allow me to sketch out how freedom comes into being. Knowledge is the father to freedom; not natural law, the Rights of Man, or other nebulous and misty forebears.¹ Knowledge becomes freedom through a five-step process: *One*, the finding that freedom is a personal attribute; *Two*, that freedom is active; *Three*, that it is purposive; *Four*, that it requires success for its nurturance; and—perhaps most controversially—*Five*, that permission is an integral part of freedom. These five elements follow and build upon their predecessors.

*Element #1: Freedom is a personal attribute since all knowledge is personal.*² The content of any book or computer hard drive is only information. Only when we assemble information and put it to some purpose does information become knowledge. Freedom as a personal attribute contradicts the widely held position of political scientists and philosophers that freedom can exist even if individuals are not in a position to use it. Isaiah Berlin, whose 1958 monograph “Two Concepts of Liberty”³ is still the touchstone for most discussions on freedom, accepted the independent existence of freedom in all of his writings.

It is meaningless to say that freedom of speech exists if I am unable to communicate a thought. A freedom of travel is meaningless to a person without means, ability, or desire to travel. One may say to the Chinese that freedom of speech exists in the United States, but a more precise statement would be that Americans speak out—*they act*—without fear of retribution. If all Americans were docile followers, then they would not speak out and the protections offered by the Constitution would be irrelevant. All of this leaves aside, of course, the fact that constitutions with free speech clauses exist in many countries without protecting a word of speech.

Element #2: Freedom is active, manifesting itself in activity, not status. A dictionary typically says that having freedom and being free are equivalent statements. I would like to insert a difference necessary for an understanding of freedom. *Being free* is the status of not being shackled or not being confined. *Having freedom* is the ability to act. While for most purposes, it is necessary to be free before being able to act, the two are not the same. We are free because of the actions of others, but no agency can confer freedom on us. We achieve freedom through the act of learning and the consequent use of the new knowledge.

Freedom becomes manifest in action. In the simplest of terms, a person at rest may or may not be able to set a world record in the 100-meter dash: the proof is in the action.

Element #3: Purpose is an essential building block of freedom. While I maintain that freedom is active, I do not say that freedom is random. For the most part, learning occurs within goal directed activities; in problem-solving situations. Except in those limited circumstances where trial-and-error learning is meaningful, the actions that demonstrate freedom will be purposive. It is purpose that organizes our activities: Where we want to go determines what we actually do.

Element #4: Success nurtures the growth of freedom. Achievement defines freedom. Performance of an act establishes whether mastery of the act exists. That success


puts the activity in the actor's repertoire, allowing it to be used in the future. An excellent analogy of the need for success is the freedom created when the family teenager passes the long awaited driving exam. With that permit comes the capability, the freedom, to drive—parental permission and a car having been obtained. Without a permit, the teen is just a passenger without the freedom to decide where to go.

*Element #5: Permission is an integral part of freedom.*⁴ Libertarians may tell us that autonomy is freedom. What they ignore is the central social character of humans.⁵ For, if autonomy were freedom, then eventually we will have, *a la* Ayn Rand, a single surviving Atlas free to shrug over his conquered minions. Assuming that such an Übermensch or Superman were to come along, he or she necessarily would use the freedom of autonomy to subjugate the rest of humanity. Why? Ultimately, only one person can have the freedom to act autonomously. When more than one person does it, they are likely to step on one another. Sad as it may seem, most of us cannot fully self-actualize—become all that we can be—because of the social costs of so much selfish activity. Better for us to become what the society gives us permission to be.

Permission plays two roles relative to activity. The first and traditionally accepted role of permission is the moral sanctioning of an activity. Its second role is just as important, however. Here, it is a mechanism for passing information from society or parent to the individual or child. Thus, when a mother says to her son that he may ice skate on the frozen lake, she is also telling the child that the ice is safe for skating.

Figure 2 presents the elements of freedom. A quick perusal shows that this definition of freedom is pragmatic in nature. While not a part of the central thesis of this monograph, the definition has the robustness to encompass religious and ideological freedom as well as the active sense pursued here. Thus, highly religious, perhaps fundamental,

persons may take certain action based on their knowledge of God and the purpose of salvation, thereby deriving a sense of freedom often felt by the religiously fervent.



Governmental regulatory programs often play the above “mother” role in telling us that prescription drugs or the airlines are safe. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspects aircraft and airline procedures, in part, to convince us that they are safe, despite the occasional accident. We have neither the time nor the skill to inspect the plane, its log books, and the training of the crew as we race from city to city. The FAA does this for us. Our acceptance of this information exchange is evident in the fact that passenger loads hardly decline for an airline even after the airline may have suffered multiple crashes in a short period of time.⁶

Illegal or licentious behavior is unsanctioned behavior. As a rule, such behavior does not lead to or produce freedom. Committing murder (a criminal homicide) does not

contribute to any person's freedom—unless the guardians of the law are absent.

Creative activity is the one, normal exception to the need for permission as a precursor to activity. No one can tell the artist what to paint. The best we can do when confronted by creativity, is to not disallow it from proceeding.

In summary, then, freedom is created when knowledge is applied to a purpose in a permitted, or not disallowed, activity that leads to success. Except for some minor allowances, such as letting us learn from the failure of others, this is the only way freedom comes into being.⁷

Prosaically, freedom is the ability to do what we want to do. The more we do, the more we learn to do; which in turn, allows even more action. At each step in the process, we gain greater freedom. Thus, freedom becomes the individual's arc of horizon within which action is possible. Each person's horizon may be near or far, and broad or narrow in angle in the horizontal or vertical dimension. The boundaries of freedom, excepting the creative act that expands the bounds, are knowledge and permission—the personal and the social. The perfect Renaissance person, of course, has a horizon that is both very broad and deep—therefore having almost complete freedom.

Some Notes on Power, Having Freedom and Being Free, and the Role of Institutions.

The contention here is that use of knowledge leads to freedom. If so, how does this square with Bacon's famous dictum that knowledge is power? In practice, power and freedom are the same thing: the ability to accomplish. They differ in their contexts. That is, the ability to accomplish is power when the knowledge used is a monopoly. In contrast, action taken in freedom has widely held knowledge as its foundation. Power and freedom represent the end points along a continuum where knowledge varies with its degree of dispersion. Power increases in effect as knowledge

becomes more monopolistic. Conversely, freedom increases as knowledge becomes more widely dispersed.

If freedom follows from knowledge, then the source of freedom becomes the educational process. This poses a problem for a wide range of institutions, from the military to the American Constitution, that many see as the promoters, protectors, and guarantors of freedom. Two factors apply here. First is the distinction made above between “being free” and “having freedom.”

When Berlin and others in the Anglo-American tradition speak of freedom as the area wherein the individual is free to act independently, they are speaking about being free. Berlin named this concept “negative freedom” because its causation is a restraint on government. It does not necessarily follow from his formulation that people can or will act just because government stays off their backs. For example, the just-released prisoner will have few resources that are applicable in a greatly changed world outside of prison after 50 years of incarceration. He is free, but has little freedom because his knowledge stock—how to survive in prison—is not relevant or useful on the outside.

The distinction between being free and having freedom illuminates the role of the military in the life of the country. It exists to keep us free, an essential precursor to our having freedom.

The second factor is the role of institutions in freedom creation. Institutions from elections to the separation of powers are human creations, designed to achieve specific purposes. Thus, the Constitution delineates certain freedoms and not others. The Constitution protects only a few narrow slices of freedom—the slices for speech, religion, etc.—and essentially ignores the other areas or slices where Americans have the capability to act.

At best, institutions channel and protect certain freedoms; they create no freedom. The American Constitution is a governing document—a super law. As

such, it is not surprising that the Constitution directs the activities of both governmental entities and the people. Giving direction may be a freedom protecting act, but direction or command cannot create freedom. That would require forcing the horse to drink after leading him to the trough.

Increasing Freedom and Progress.

How does freedom increase; how is the collective horizon of a citizenry enlarged? The basis of the enlargement is new knowledge and the dispersion of existing knowledge. But what prompts the creation of new knowledge?

Conflict and competition are the engines of both knowledge creation and freedom. Individuals experience conflict when problem solving leads to the replacement of old information with the new. Competition leads enterprises to differentiate themselves from their competitors. They must develop the proverbial “better idea” to serve as the basis of the differentiation. Each bit of successful problem solving and differentiation increases the resources available for future action, thereby increasing the freedom of the actors.

When an actor uses new knowledge to create a new product, two things happen. First comes the freedom drawn from success. Second comes the widget from which the actor profits. This product represents progress.⁸ The use of new knowledge is the best measure of progress.⁹

The interesting part of the relationship between freedom and progress, however, lies in the negative instance: What happens when knowledge acquisition and progress cease? By analogy, the equipment begins to rust and eventually falls apart. Unused knowledge disappears, both at the level of the individual and the society.

Can a group or society decide to maintain and practice a certain stock of knowledge and freeze progress at a certain point? Many such attempts have existed in the United

States over the years. Small groups have decided to live by themselves, generally in communes, following a given set of rules. The problem is that no group can truly isolate itself from the rest of the society. The little give and take that remains eventually forces change or dissolution on the commune. This is not to say that successful communes have not existed and continue to do so. Two famous communes are Amana (Iowa) and Oneida (New York). They are no longer famous for being communes, but rather for the line of appliances and silverware they developed to bring resources into their communities.

Examples such as Amana suggest that small groups can maintain a utopian vision for a time with some accommodation to the outside world. Certainly one of the reasons they can be successful is that members can come and go into the larger society. Attempts to achieve utopian visions at a societal level have all suffered defeat.

A society-wide vision of utopia becomes hard to maintain, because history intervenes and passes it by. Country-wide utopian attempts have also been deadly, since death or the gulag are the only options for those who disagree with the ruling vision. The leaders of the revolution are not going to allow others to tell them that their holy vision is flawed. Only those dissidents able to escape the country's borders have a chance at normality. Thus, the Soviet workers' paradise was a well-defined dream at the time of the Russian Revolution. It became the ideal the Soviet Union would have to strive to achieve, even at the cost of many lives. Obviously, they did not make it. In the end, the leadership's effort to co-opt history and to control external developments created so many contradictions that the system could not stand. Hitler's and Pol Pot's utopias would have suffered similar fates if war had not intervened.¹⁰

The desire to proclaim an ideal, stop history and eliminate change will always be with us. Fortunately, unless someone attempts to create a world-wide utopia,

history and the march of new knowledge will interfere with those attempts. Since the creation of new knowledge is not likely to cease, neither is the growth of freedom. Progress, the consequence of utilizing that freedom, will follow naturally as long as we do not hinder it.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. See Fernand Braudel, *A History of Civilizations*, New York: Penguin, 1993. Over the course of this volume, Braudel traces the use of the term liberty from its Latin origins to the modern day. The term is used early on to generally connote privileges, and it is only after the French Revolution that it assumes its modern meaning of freedom. See his discussions on the times after plagues, times when there was more land than there were peasants to farm it. One consequence of the plagues is that the peasants of the 11th and 12th centuries had freedom (or really power) because they represented a scarce resource. The middle 19th century is the turning point after which freedom becomes a more concrete concept.

2. I take a pragmatic approach to the concept of knowledge. Knowledge is that which a group (two or more individuals) agrees to be true. In other words, knowledge and truth are socially determined. This is why one baseball team at each level from PeeWee to the Major Leagues can all be considered World Champions despite the reality that only one team can be the best. This definition is an expansion of Karl Popper's notion of truth as the result of the scientific process. Scientists accept as true or valid those results of experimentation where attempts at refutation have been unsuccessful. Given that Popper wrote at a time of great ideological ferment (1930s to 1950s), it is understandable why he limited truth to the results of the scientific method. Reality, however, is much broader. Ideology does drive much behavior. Religious people accept a given set of truths depending on their denomination, and within each congregation, accept certain "facts" as truths. Ideological and religious truths cannot be refuted, yet they "account" for much that is considered true in our lives. To permit truth to exist in religious, civic, musical, and other realms, I suggest that the scientific method is a social convention—which, in fact, it is. It is a social—an agreed upon—convention because scientists accept as true results which, in the future, they know will be refuted or supplanted: thus, Socrates' ether becomes our atmosphere. In this view, truth becomes the product of any accepted process that serves the need of a group or community. This is not to say that truth is relative. It merely reflects the reality that different communities have their own "truths." In our modern world, these truths quickly come into conflict. In simpler times, they co-existed in separated

realities. See Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, Princeton: Princeton University, 1972.

3. See Endnote 2, Chapter 2.

4. Morality is usually seen as the *external* societal counterweight to selfish autonomy or negative freedom. Here, pre-action moral judgment and information exchange are a part of the process of building freedom.

5. The writings of Richard A. Epstein are representative of the libertarian position. For me, his writing has the advantage of sharing an aversion to monopolies, a topic he gives considerable coverage in *Principles for a Free Society*, New York: Perseus Books, 1998.

6. Even a horrific event like the ValuJet crash in the Everglades led only to the recertification of the airline by the FAA and the subsequent renaming of the airline to AirTran. AirTran continues flying. A more established airline, USAir, had multiple crashes in the early 1990s without major long-term effects on its passenger loads. One would expect the consequences for these airlines to be much more negative without the FAA being there to reassure passengers after each accident.

7. In sketching the development of freedom in this monograph, I stay to the main branch of the process. We do learn from our own mistakes and those of others and build freedom on that learning. We also learn by observational learning, a relatively conflict-free process. But observational learning has never been shown to apply to more complex learning.

8. Robert Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress*, New York: Basic Books, 1980. In his foreword, Nisbet says that if the idea of progress dies in the West, then much else will die with it.

9. This sentence again illustrates my desire to remain on the main road in describing this freedom-peace model. Obviously, new knowledge can be used “wastefully” for old purposes. I hope readers do not become bogged down on such side roads in this short monograph.

10. See Lutz Niethammer, *Posthistoire: Has history come to an end?*, P. Camiller, trans., New York: Verso, 1992. This short volume provides excellent arguments for seeing all utopian dreams as failures in the making.

CHAPTER 4

A MODEL OF SOCIETIES

This chapter uses the distribution of knowledge on governance to define three types of societies that exist along a continuum. It extends from the society where everyone knows how to govern the country to the society, a dictatorship, where one person controls all knowledge of governance. Later, we will see that the location of a society along this continuum determines the strategies that will be successful when diplomatic or military intervention becomes necessary. The distinctions among countries discussed here may also become indices for the likelihood that interventions may be required in the future.


Freedom as the Source of Stability: The Adaptive Society.

New knowledge, once used to new effect, represents change and progress. As a result, for freedom to be the source of societal stability, stability must incorporate change. A static stability necessarily loses ground to others who continue changing and developing. More importantly, static stability loses ground to itself as the store of knowledge rusts and dissipates. Change, as a part of stability, makes sense if the change comes in small increments. Following the geological metaphor, tectonic plates that slide continuously past each other may cause a constant rumbling in the earth, but they will not cause great earthquakes. The contrast between the Soviet Union and the United States in this regard is illustrative. Lenin and Stalin tried to minimize change to their plans. *Perestroika* proved to Soviet citizens and the entire world that the “workers’ paradise” had been a false dream, made possible by the Russian ability to withstand deprivation. The United States has shifted direction and focus over time as it

adapted to changes in knowledge, world events and the myriad changes that have occurred over the last 200 years: It has remained stable.

The source of American stability is abstracted in Figure 3. It depicts knowledge of governance being widely dispersed and without fixed boundaries. The absence of boundaries is important. Many, if not most, Americans believe they could run government better than the current incumbents. Unfortunately for each of us with these beliefs, our beliefs are not held by a large enough group for us to take over the government. Any change we propose must first gather a coalition around it before it can be implemented. By the time we have put together a powerful enough coalition, our great ideas have been compromised almost into oblivion.

The reason for American adaptability lies not so much in its government, but rather the highly competitive nature of the society. Competitive clashes occur by the second. Members of industries compete to achieve market share. Across industries, salespersons, preachers, park superintendents, and others in the retail trade compete not only for the consumers' money, but also for their time. Each of these competitions, small as they are, push the country in their own ways. The sum result of all these little pushes is



movement in very small increments. That movement, the sum of all new knowledge and purpose put to the competitive test, represents the most reliable vision of national stability.

The element that separates the American illustration of stability from all others is that there is no one vision, force, or person controlling it. It is a stability sponsored, if it has a sponsor, by Adam Smith's "invisible hand,"¹ extended here not only over the economic marketplace, but also the public and religious marketplaces.²

Participation of a sufficiently large part of the population results in this kind of stability. Participants need to be both producers and consumers in all marketplaces. The resulting interaction keeps each competitive event relatively small. The nature of each competition cannot be cataclysmic—a company that depends on making one sale per year is in a cataclysmic competition. It is do or die. The cost of failure must not be so great that the associated people become pariahs for life. Second acts and even multiple acts must be possible to ensure early failure recognition. This opens enterprise to "creative destruction." The inclusion of minorities and women along with white males in economic, social, civic, and religious discourse can only increase the stability of the United States. This inclusiveness upsets traditional patterns of doing business. Tradition is a behavioral monopoly. Countries with more monopolistic tendencies, the highly traditional, have no mechanism for achieving change so effectively or with so much stability.

The above discussion fairly represents the third type of stability mentioned in the Introduction. The United States and then England are probably the best examples of countries exhibiting *adaptive stability*. Adaptively stable states have few to no monopolies influencing the governance of the country.

Since World War I, and especially after World War II, England has greatly increased its degree of inclusiveness.

More recently, England has limited the role of government in the economy. Furthermore, it has begun the process of devolving powers to Scotland, Wales, and soon to Northern Ireland. Each of these events represents an instance where the number of players, and therefore competition, is being increased.

Much is happening in England that makes it more *democratic*: however, its basic form of government is not democratic. England is an elected dictatorship. To begin with, national elections typically revolve around each party's nominee for prime minister. Yes, parliament is elected. Given the strength of party loyalty, however, its role is secondary to that of the prime minister. As Margaret Thatcher demonstrated, a prime minister can foster great changes independently of the parliament. Practically speaking, the Parliament is the only government in England, and the Prime Minister has absolute power *while in office*. That England continues to become more inclusive speaks to the possibility of having competing voices heard even in a semi-dictatorship.

The mark of countries with adaptive stability is the multiplicity of active participants in the society's governance. Few of them will be in government. They must have influence, in their small way, in directing the path of the country.³ In practical terms, a society becomes more stable and more adaptable as the number of people making decisions increases. Church attendance, purchase of products, support of charities, and membership in civic, voluntary, and even sports clubs—each in its own way—contributes to the governance of the country. To see the sprouting of soccer fields across the United States over the last 20 years is to see the effect on government of increasing membership in a particular kind of sport club.


What may break up the adaptive stability of a state such as the United States? I will return to this question later.

Monopoly Societies.

The opposite of adaptive stability is what I have termed *monopoly stability*. This is the case where governance is a single monopoly, and the owners of the monopoly reject external input. The scope for decisionmaking is very narrow, the country having a few leaders and many followers. The Soviet Union is the historic example of a monopoly society. It had an imposed stability since few were able to influence the direction of governance.

Cuba and China are also good examples of monopoly societies. The leaders of both countries have permitted change to occur when forced by circumstances to do it. Thus, both countries allow capitalists to provide those goods the socialist economy no longer can provide. The changes that have occurred have been in the economic realm. The realm of government remains as a strict monopoly. What happens when the two countries' leadership ages further and then fades away? The one thing the Soviet Union, Cuba and China have shared is elimination of all possible competing visions of governance. How many leaders do these countries have who could lead the country without the use of the gun? Current events in Russia suggest the answer may be very few. Thus, the initial expectation of the end game in these countries is a dissipation of power with a considerable interregnum until a new entity assumes power.

Figure 4 may be contrasted with Figure 3 to show a very different pattern for the dispersion of knowledge of governance between adaptive and monopoly societies. In a monopoly society, the leadership or dictator closely holds all such knowledge, eliminating any person or group that might want to share or take some of the leadership's power. Consequently, when the central power weakens or disappears due to death or other causes, power coalitions must first be created before a new central power emerges. This takes time, opening the society to a period of chaos. That chaos may lead to the need for external intervention when nonconclusive fighting breaks out.



China may be an exception to this rule in that in opening its economy, it has let in foreign investors and expertise. These investors, companies, and foreign staffs represent a major infusion of knowledge to the country. This knowledge affects the local level where the factories and offices with foreigners interact with the Chinese. Given the great size of China, the sophistication being gained at the city level does not necessarily diffuse outward or even upward. The need to adapt to economic freedoms and foreign influence, however, opens up the possibility that political power may shift from the center in Beijing to the affected cities. It is not unreasonable to see the growth of at least four major power centers in China: Beijing, Taipei, Shanghai, and Hong Kong. A further possibility, of course, would be the development of a fifth power center in the western, less-Han, part of China. Such a transformation obviously is not a foregone conclusion, but the current flows of knowledge in China suggest that this is an outcome with real potential.

Given the current circumstances in Cuba, the expected outcome of the death of the current leadership should be dissipation, much as is happening in the former Soviet Union. The presence of so many refugees just 90 miles away in Miami, however, changes the scenario somewhat. If the refugees do not return to Cuba and bring their American


experience with them, then dissipation is the immediate consequence of the center's losing control.

If the refugees do return instantly, and do so in great numbers, then major conflict could arise. There will be strong competition to see which group can take over the national government. Civil war is not an unreasonable expectation if the number of returnees and their competing visions for the Cuban future are both high.

Multi-Monopoly Societies.

The intermediate case between *adaptive* and *monopoly societies* is the *multi-monopoly society*. Here the central authority does not attempt to maintain a comprehensive monopoly. It allows the major sectors of the society essentially to rule themselves, so that each has its own monopoly. Louis XVI allowed the Church, the bourgeoisie, and the landed farmers to manage their own affairs as long as these did not interfere with the prerogatives of the king. Similarly, in Macedonia the dominant ethnic groups have lives that do not intersect very much. Each of these groups maintains its own schools, villages, and even government. This reflects the typical pattern of governance that has existed in the Balkans, at least since the Ottoman Empire.

Figure 5 dwells on the characteristic of countries with multi-monopoly stability whereby parallel and separate means of governance co-exist. Such societies exist in a middle ground between adaptive and monopoly societies. Groups know how to manage the state, or believe they do, from their experience in managing their own affairs. Contending powers are ready to try to fill the vacuum when the center weakens and fails. This is not to say that the collapse of the center is an instant event; it takes time. When it happens, however, the consequences are very dire, with much loss of life: revolution in France and ethnic cleansing in post-Tito Yugoslavia.



Reality is that states fall along a continuum rather than just in the three categories discussed above. What differentiates states along this continuum is the number of separate monopolies with internal governance responsibilities.

It is possible to envision the adaptively stable regime's demise taking either a monopolistic or multi-monopolistic form. First of all, the demise of such a state will occur much less frequently than is the case with the other forms of states. The reason is that the center, or national government, is relatively a much weaker institution here than it is in the other two cases. Thus, transitions in government are less momentous for the country than when one dictator replaces another one. The transition fight—by election or other means—may be expensive. It is not likely, however, to produce the many deaths of a putsch, civil war, or revolution. Furthermore, as the number of constituencies in a state increases, the power of each group necessarily falls. This makes it less likely that any one group can grab power; there are just too many contenders. The contenders in a monopolistic or multi-monopolistic state are fewer, but they start the battle being closer to the goal—they have always been close to the center of government.

Given that, how may an adaptive state die? It could allow a monopoly to arise and thereby become rejective. This

seems far fetched in the United States, but not impossible. If one does *not* look too closely at the calls for the United States to become a “Christian nation,” one could make the case for a monopolistic fundamentalist government arising here. After all, 30-40 percent of the population claims to be fundamentalist. That should be a strong base. National elections, however, have shown that this is not a monolithic block. Should the possibility actually arise that the fundamentalists might assume power, very rapidly one would see the monolithic block reduced to contending sets of beliefs. This is reasonable since there are many denominations or wings of denominations that consider themselves to be fundamentalist and yet have enough differences among themselves to not coalesce into one denomination.⁴

Alternatively, another possibility would be the intensification of “identity” politics in the country. Over time this might lead to the formation of communities with their own rulemaking authority. Again, this possibility does not have a high probability, but it suggests a way that the country could move toward the multi-monopoly model. India may be the ultimate expression of identity politics. India may even obtain some stability from the combination of its government having a short and weak reach into the groups and the large number of linguistic, religious, and caste divisions in the country. These groups interact with each other only minimally.

Differentiation of states into this multi-monopoly, monopoly, and adaptive typology differs from other means of categorizing states. Whether a government is elected, has various institutions, or passes other procedural tests, does not matter. The relevant dimension is how knowledge is used in governance. Is the knowledge of governance held exclusively? Is it shared among defined groups that manage their own affairs (a part of the state)? Or, is it dispersed throughout the population so that many forces, most outside government, direct governance? One way that this methodology is valuable is that it permits putting England

strongly in the freedom camp without having to use uncomfortable words to get around its semi-dictatorial structure. At the other extreme, it is clear the governments of some of the former Soviet states are maintaining their dictatorial ways despite the adoption of elections and other democratic fixtures. Once fully operationalized, this knowledge-based means of analyzing governance should be the basis of more reliable indices of where, and what type of, problems may arise around the world.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. Adam Smith, *An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. This oft-quoted work deserves a close reading. The society he describes as being under the control of the invisible hand is that of the small shopkeeper in 18th century England. He does not rule out the use of government controls where necessary.

2. The idea of multiple marketplaces is drawn from Richard J. Neuhaus, *The Naked Public Square*, Chicago: Eerdmans, 1984. Rev. Neuhaus argues that religion has been improperly removed from the public (i.e., civic) square. Another interpretation is that religion has always been there, but given the highly competitive nature of religion in the United States, the effect is that no single voice can predominate. Thus, although many denominations argue for prayer in the schools, a similar number argue for church-state separation on this issue.

3. A very current example of how companies affect national governance is the case of HMOs and the health insurance business, in general. Through their decisions to pay for certain procedures and not others, these companies are taking on police powers, powers generally left to the states. Conceptually, there is not much difference between a state saying "We will incarcerate you if you do that," and an insurance company saying "We will not pay if you have that procedure."

4. The issue of the effect fundamental religions have on states needs further study. The utopian character of fundamental Christianity is well-accepted. In the utopian manner, fundamentalists believe in a sequenced history, with the "troubles" yet to come; they see themselves as the chosen to go to Heaven; and they describe the rest of the population as unworthy of going to Heaven. See Karen Armstrong, *A History of God*, New York: Knopf, 1993.

CHAPTER 5

THE SEARCH FOR PEACE

Most wars have a common psychological characteristic. The participants have a high degree of certainty about their mission. That certainty translates into the absence of existential conflict within the participants. So, war is a condition where there is a high level of external (inter-group) conflict and a low level of intra-individual conflict. Serb and Kosovar—man, woman, and child—had clear visions and missions they supported fervently. The war then proceeded from bases that constituted impenetrable monopolies. The end of active hostilities brought an end to the external conflict. What remains is the internal certainty that combatants took to war. The dissipation of that certainty—perhaps among all combatants—is a necessary part of moving from the cessation of hostilities to the beginning of peace.

As said earlier, peace is not established after hostilities until the combatants would rather sell each other shoes than kill each other. This has not happened in the Balkans since the rise of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, it may be appropriate to speak of a continuous state of war existing in the Balkans for hundreds of years, broken up only by a few externally imposed truces. The resolution of this type of conflict does not come quickly, and the current danger is the establishment of just another externally imposed truce. That truce can end suddenly after the removal of external military forces.

The key to a lasting peace in the Balkans is the imposition of new, less lethal conflicts in the minds of the contending populations. These are the conflicts of learning and competition.

The real end-state of hostilities exists in situations where interests become so heterogeneous that no perspective can put together enough members to force the rest to do something. Peace rests on a pattern of wide-ranging interactions.

An example taken from the American context demonstrates the effect multiple and contradictory beliefs can have on behavior. Many special-identity Yellow Pages directories have come on the market over the past few years. Proponents have published Christian, Black, Hispanic, and probably other Yellow Pages. Anecdotally, these seem to have disappeared. The suggested reason for their demise might be the conflict they pose for merchants and business people: "Am I a seller of shoes or an ethnic/gender-based seller of shoes?" Both are legitimate business models, but the first offers the greater promise of success. While they may have wanted to contribute to the growth of businesses run by people like themselves, the urge to claim the entire marketplace won when these directories lost support.

American history governs this logic. Wheat-growing state governments have always been much more interested in having their farmers sell grain to communist governments than has the national government. The state's well-being depends on the farmer getting a good price for the wheat. As a result, grain belt politicians have usually been the last persons arguing for embargoes or other policies limiting grain sales.

Military operations other than war involve unique strategies based on local circumstances. Bosnia and Kosovo, where the killing has been intense, require ethnic separation before any other intervention can become meaningful. In this type of situation, the presence of the intervening force says to the residents that they should build new lives while the force keeps their enemies at bay. The challenge in nation-building under these conditions is to create a stable, progressive state with a foundation of knowledge-based freedom that becomes integrated with its

neighbors—eventually even with its enemies. The task is to create and foster the growth of competition in endeavors that were never competitive in the past. A more accomplishment-oriented ethos should replace nationalistic fervor. These strategies fit most easily in the economic and civic marketplaces.

An example from the civic marketplace illustrating this phenomenon would be an attempt to reduce nationalism in Kosovo. Nationalism and other ideologies survive best when taken on a grand scale, without the need to balance them with reality. This example attempts to insert that reality check. Kosovo, as this is being written right after the end of the bombing, is a clean slate—little remains of the past government and institutions. One possible U.N. strategy might be to create local-level governments with defined responsibilities *and* appropriate resources (taxing authority). Local government, given a chance to develop before a “national” government develops, should be an effective counter-weight to the nationalism that might dominate the national government.

Local politics is the politics of fixing potholes. It is easy for constituents to determine if the job is being done. Thus, not only is local government a counter-weight to national government through the division of responsibilities, it also becomes an excellent pragmatic training ground for national service. The building of local governments in this type of situation illustrates the bottom-up approach needed to move beyond the permanent truce this area has suffered for decades.

An example from the economic marketplace might come out of the re-establishment of power plants in the state. Competition would be served if one or a few large power plants were replaced with many smaller ones forming at least several power companies. Just the increase in the number of power companies or authorities spread out around the country would make power less of a national and more of a local issue. Each region, area, or neighborhood

could assume “ownership” of its plant. The losses in scale of efficiency would be made up, technically, by the greater redundancy among the plants and, politically, by the lowered likelihood that the national government would usurp the power grid. Its many “owners” are more likely to defend such a grid than the impersonal grid that brings power from far away.

Macedonia, on the other hand, still offers the possibility of achieving a reduction in tensions through internal integration. In this case, action must flow from the top down. In a sense, the strategy for keeping a Macedonia together is almost the opposite of that for a Kosovo. Here the task is to foster interaction among the groups, to change perceptions, and to meld a stronger whole from the previously isolated pieces. The appropriate strategies will flow downward from the central government as it creates opportunities for interaction among the ethnic groups.

American experience in racial integration is relevant here. The Federal Government led the effort to achieve integration—of course, under pressure if not duress. It was federal laws and police power that opened doors for minorities and women. So it must be in Macedonia where the government itself must become multi-ethnic to set the example for the ethnic communities.

The Need for a New Concept to Define Peace.

If freedom involves conflict, then peace must as well. It seems to be an inescapable consequence. It is also a contentious statement. Many Europeans, for example, argue that the competitive spirit that permeates this country is unnecessary and undesirable: Why have 35 brands of tooth paste when a person uses only one? The same complaint is raised about the messiness and expense of American politics. Referring back to the earlier discussion about utopias, the response to such criticism is to ask: Who should make the decision as to which brands to allow into the market and how a candidate should run the campaign?

When a person or institution makes these decisions, as opposed to a marketplace, rigidities insinuate themselves into the fabric of the society. The more that happens, the less the country is adaptable to future change.

Another charge that may be made against the monograph's arguments is that they are a restatement of pluralism. The concept of pluralism has two meanings.¹ The first of these is the idea that a diversity of groups is a good thing for societies. The diversity of a country such as Switzerland with its independent language-specific Cantons falls into this type of pluralism. However, the purpose here is the opposite of interaction. The Cantons maintain their independence as a means of preserving cultural heritage.

The second meaning of pluralism comes from the doctrine that the common good includes both majority and minority positions. This is where the idea of tolerance enters pluralism. It may be a cynical thing to say, but the most appropriate suggestion here is that few majorities exhibit more tolerance than they absolutely must demonstrate. One might ask the members of the American Republican and Democratic parties how tolerant of each other they are. Their answers probably would not be on the pleasant side of tolerant. How tolerant of each other are American members of different denominations? An indicator might be that many denominations believe that *only* their members will go to Heaven. Pluralism in all its guises is a straightforward proposition. It speaks to a multiplicity of perspectives, not their interaction and the consequences of the interaction. Conflict is not an essential ingredient in pluralism.²

The internal conflict proposed here is real; it leads to a balancing of costs and benefits, and in general, slows down decisionmaking. A considered, balanced decision is more likely to be a moderate decision than its counterpart. If all people experienced such decisionmaking, then war would

certainly become a less likely means of settling national or ethnic differences.

Unfortunately, not a few people want to complicate their lives to the degree necessary to internalize this argument. Certainly, the United States survives with many adherents to single issues, from advocates of a machine gun in every closet to the protectors of the snail darter. The element that keeps these forces in check is their multiplicity. For every advocate of a position, there is another person or group advocating its opposite. This leads to competition of a rather high order. Groups are able to win battles but not wars; in fact, their wars never end. The overall environment that exists in these wars is that none of the combatants can put the final nail in the coffin of their opponents and therefore, rarely try. At the same time, they do not become drinking friends or necessarily tolerate each other. That is as it should be if stability and progress are the goal.

A Descriptor for Freedom-Fostering Societies: Plurascity.

We need a descriptor for the multiplicity of conflicts that exist in a peaceful, stable and progressive state. Pluralism is not it. I have coined a term to describe such a society; the best example of which is the United States. The United States is a *plurascity*,³ not a perfect one but with more plurascitic characteristics than other countries. The word comes from the Latin, and means multiple knowledges. For conflict to be as widespread as it is here, knowledge must be widely distributed as well—the level of freedom must be high. Americans act on the knowledge they have; building businesses, associations, and for/against government designs. All of that activity, in widespread competition, keeps the tectonic plates of politics from becoming over stressed.

Because the level of freedom is high in the United States, the effectiveness of power must be correspondingly low. Every political action requires the creation of

coalitions—temporary monopolies—before an issue can be resolved. That is why issues are rarely resolved in this country—no one has the power to win the final battle of any argument.

Figure 6 shows the differences between pluralism and plurascity. We can think of India as an almost perfect example of pluralism. India is divided into hundreds of groups along the schisms of religion, caste, language, and economics. These groups are essentially self-governing and supporting. They co-exist. What conflict exists among them is likely to take the form of riots or temple burnings. Plurascitic conflict—Brahmin competing with untouchable—is absent. India will become a plurascity only when the boundaries between groups become more pervious to competition among individuals, enterprises and associations.

Pluralism	Plurascity
Doctrine that a diversity of groups is a good thing.	Condition where life's conflicts are internalized in the individual to moderate the intensity of group and societal conflicts.
Implementation:	
Federalism -- Adaptation to a given multiplicity for the sake of peace.	
Functional autonomy -- Adaptation to maintain group distinctions.	
Doctrine that the common good includes both majority and minority positions.	
Figure 6. The contrast between pluralism and plurascity.	
Plurascity required the conflict of competition, not just the cohabitation found in pluralism.	

It should be noted, however, that India does owe much of its stability to the existence of so many distinct groupings within its borders. At the same time, the presence of these independent groups guarantee that the central government of India will remain weak internally until the distinctions among the groups become blurred. It is hard to envision that

blurring coming about without the dissolution of the Indian state into smaller, more manageable units.

In summary, peace is rich in the brushfire-sized conflicts that never reach the status of conflagrations. It is not the absence of conflict. Plurascitic conflict exists within individuals—as when religious and economic arguments contend for supremacy in a salesperson. The conflict also exists among individuals and groups in the form of competition. In the latter form, the conflict will extend across multiple marketplaces. The combination of internal conflict and enterprise competition ensures that the major motivators of war—nationalism, sectarianism, acquisitiveness—are moderated by other forces. Plurascities will always hear the voices of caution, the voices pointing to the trade-offs, and the voices of self-interest when deciding whether to go to war.

Societies should become more internally stable as plurascitic conflicts spread through them with the breakdown of monopolies. Furthermore, the richer they become in plurascitic conflict, the more they will become the engines of their own progress. Instead of importing knowledge from more advanced states, a plurascity generates knowledge locally through competition. The example in support of these assertions is the history of the United States.

The United States has become a plurascity from its beginnings as 13 relatively homogeneous and monopolistic colonies. Government is split among three levels plus many special governmental districts, each competing for the tax dollar and in giving service. Religious denominations have spread across the country to the point that few areas are not served by more than one church, creating competition for both service and parishioners. Businesses have multiplied, virtually eliminating even at the local level the monopolies of old. The company town is gone, and the local bank has competition. This level of competition, and the growth in knowledge that competition brings, I suggest, is the reason

this country is as stable as it has been. Change has been constant and incremental. The big shocks that have brought other countries to their knees have been passing phenomena here. Governments have fallen in other countries as a consequence of financial and energy shocks that the United States has survived.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Ted Honderich, *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, New York: Oxford University, 1995.

2. The insufficiency of pluralism as a descriptor of democracy may be assumed from the fact that Robert Dahl, pluralism's most dedicated student, has moved on to the concept of poliarchy as a better descriptor. See Endnote 1, Chapter 1.

3. Plurascity may be compared to the competing factions John Madison discusses in *The Federalist Papers*, No. 10, New York: Mentor, 1961, p. 77. Both models subscribe to the idea that factions cannot be prevented from arising. Both argue that control of factions comes through having many factions that become counterweights to each other. Neither model restricts factions to a single sector of life. Madison, however, has his factions acting directly on government, lobbying for their positions. I see the process as being more indirect. Our participation in society, as part of a congregation, as a consumer and producer, in social and civic gatherings all have primary purposes that are typically not political. Our participation in an activity strengthens that activity, increasing its power in the marketplace and bringing it to the attention of government. Thus, we buy a computer with Microsoft software. Microsoft gains market share. Government sees a growing, prosperous company and is, therefore, less likely to interfere in that marketplace, unless of course the issue of monopolistic practice is raised. Ignoring the monopoly issue, the personal computer (PC) industry can get government assistance for export or other reasons without much of an effort. Fundamentalist and evangelical churches are getting more attention from government because these are the growing denominations. My point, in a nutshell, is that buying a computer or belonging to a congregation is ultimately a political action. It is an action that has a much greater effect on government than does any election. In some countries, it is also a dangerous action. Another point on Madison: Larry D. Kramer argues that *The Federalist*, No. 10 was largely ignored until this century. While we might see it as determinative on the structure of the young United States, evidence Kramer collects from the notes of the participants at the convention

indicates that when he was not ignored on these arguments, he was misquoted. See Larry D. Kramer, "Madison's Audience" in *Harvard Law Review*, January 1999.

CHAPTER 6

THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN PRE- AND POST-HOSTILITY CAMPAIGNS

The achievement of plurascity in any of the states discussed above is a difficult chore, but an achievable goal. The military of intervening states will have major roles in bringing warring factions to the truce table and from there to a stable and progressive future. If the history of previous wars and operations other than war, especially in the Balkans, teaches humanity anything, it should be that a cessation of hostilities on the battlefield is just the first step toward peace. The intervening military in the Balkans today and other areas of ethnic or nationalistic tension tomorrow, or anytime tin-pot dictators use their people as cannon fodder, will face differing situations when they arrive.

Post-Hostilities Intervention.

In a homogeneous, single-ethnic Kosovo, the post-hostilities task is nation-building. The occupation of Japan may be taken as the model for this type of operation. Demobilization is step one. Foreign aid agencies cannot do this. The second step is maintenance of order. Examples such as Haiti, where a civilian police force was introduced to perform this task, suggest that the military will be taking on this task for a longer duration than in the past. The third task, actual development of a new state, requires a military presence to prevent factional fighting among groups seeking to assume control of the country.

Earlier, reference was made to a strategy to prevent the re-arousal of nationalistic forces by concentrating development at the local level. The purpose for this is to allow development of governance that is more pragmatic

than the pre-hostilities governance. This assumes that a military governor has been put in place to manage the nation-building task. That manager needs to have a heavy club in the closet for moving former combatants into peaceful roles. That club is the military, on the ground, with a very obvious presence. The club does not have to be large, just flexible and available for instant action.

The club must be much larger and out on patrol in a multi-ethnic, post-hostilities Bosnia. In this type of situation the intervening military is the only force strong enough to keep ethnic warfare from re-igniting. This is a long-term task. Only after plurascitic conflict is well-established, when neighbor sells shoes to neighbor, can this military force claim a job well done.

In the simplest of terms, the transition from the cessation of hostilities to a stable peace must begin with an occupation by an external military force in both locations. The local people have no business setting up a national government—by election or otherwise—until the hatreds that spawned the initial fighting have had their salience reduced. In short, the KLA in Kosovo must be told that they did not win the war—the intervening military did that. Words with force attached must be used to turn combatants to the immediate tasks of reconstruction and reestablishment of local life. Once that is accomplished, and people again have something to lose, then the transition can take a more civilian character.

In both of the above scenarios the military logistics capability plays a major role. Only the military has in place the management capability to ensure that civilian populations will have shelter and food in the coming dangerous season—winter in Europe, or the dry/wet season elsewhere. The logistics arm becomes the carrot that balances the stick on the street or the closet in the campaign to move the local population beyond sectarian hatred.

Hatreds cannot be eliminated. How can one teach another who has lost family members to the slaughter by

the enemy to stop hating? One cannot. One can help the individual rebuild or build a life in the present by becoming re-engaged with society. That cannot be accomplished in a refugee camp with its many hours of idleness. If necessary, the occupying military power can organize and manage work groups to rebuild homes, infrastructure and institutions as part of the rehabilitation process.

So, the initial task in nation-building in a Kosovo, Haiti, and other situations where hatred or uncertainties are at high levels is to contain the hatred and then to make it less salient in the people's lives. There will never be a battalion of psychologists sent into such situations, even if there is a chance of them being successful. The task of containing hatred and then of beginning the task of turning it into positive energy is a military task. Danger is high and many, especially the wartime leadership, will not want to do so. Local development is one avenue where these energies can be turned.

Pre-Hostilities Intervention.

The situation in Macedonia represents a contrasting scenario to the post-hostilities examples of Bosnia and Kosovo. Here killing has not yet begun; the mission is prevention today and in the long run. Surprisingly, the model for preventing war in Macedonia may be NATO's role in Europe. NATO has had two missions in the past: one, to counter Soviet expansionism; and two, to unify Western Europe as a counter-weight to the Soviet Union. Soviet expansionism was halted, so one may say that NATO has been a success. Looking a little more closely on the ground might leave a different conclusion. The two major Western continental powers have certainly been at cross purposes as often as not in the history of NATO. France has gone it alone for much of the period since 1949. Only outside of NATO could it have an independent voice in world affairs. Germany, on the other hand, has been very unassertive in the alliance. Thus, it came as a shock when a suddenly

assertive Germany was the first country to recognize one of broken-off pieces of Yugoslavia, Croatia. This pattern suggests that western containment of the Soviet Union may have been due more to American and English steadfastness and the continuing occupation of Western Europe by the United States, than concerted NATO readiness.

Nevertheless, NATO is a good model for reduction of tensions in Macedonia in that encamped foreign troops can provide the various groups confidence that the killing will not start. In a sense, it is the same security NATO has given Europe *vis à vis* Germany. Military involvement is the only possible guarantee in such situations. On the nonmilitary front, Macedonia represents the same kind of an integration problem the United States faced in the 1940-70s in race relations. The national government must take the lead while the external powers support and advise it.

Europe struggles still to achieve political integration. Results to date are not as far reaching as the level of integration the United States has achieved in race relations. The European Union (EU), with the common currency, may be an answer.

While we worry about one corner of Europe today, the Balkans, we might consider that plurascitic behavior is not in abundance across all of Europe. It would seem that beginning with the French Revolution, Europe has been in an almost constant state of war with a few pauses. The commonality in all the wars fought in Europe during this period has been that one side or both were advocating a non-plurascitic solution to the world's problems. The French have been seeking an egalitarian utopia. German nationalism is a constant from the Franco-Prussian War, the War-to-End-All-Wars, and World War II. Rigidities or monopolies are common in Europe. Examples include large issues such as French stateism, where the far-away government controls all—including taking the country to war. They also include small issues such as German blue laws limiting when stores can be open or when a homeowner

can mow the lawn. From small to large, these rigidities—a little different in each state—make the unification of Europe a more than difficult project. Neither the German nor French want to give up their rigidities—cultural habits—in favor of those of the other.

The true end to the long-running German-French war will come with the rise of multinational combinations within Europe; at the level of business and civic mergers and in the biggest merger of them all, the EU. Unfortunately, the EU appears to be building bureaucratic monopolies to replace cultural and national monopolies/traditions. This contrasts sharply with the manner in which the United States came together. The colonies trusted each other so little that they initially gave the central government no power. Even today, the internal power of the central government in the United States is still far less than that of European governments. The comprehensive and stringent regulatory schema being assembled for the EU leaves little room for the application of new knowledge and the growth of freedom. The EU will not long survive, never mind flourish, if rigidities in governance remain in place.

The American occupation of Western Europe will not end soon given the more truce-like character of European governance and the lack of true peace.

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

I asked two questions at the beginning of the discussion of the Context of Peace. Now is the time to review whether the questions have been answered.

The first question was: What should be the objective of this military involvement? The answer to this question is simple, yet it has built-in complexity. It is simple in that everyone accepts the purpose of intervention as establishment of something beyond the *status quo ante*. The United States did not occupy Germany and Japan to return them to their imperialistic ways. Neither have the U.N., NATO or the United States intervened in places such as Haiti, Bosnia, or Kosovo to reestablish in power the preexisting governing elites. The goal has been to establish democracy.

Unfortunately, as Robert Dahl amply documents (see Endnote 1, Chapter 1), democracy is not a very well-defined term. Countries that are counted as democracies share few central values. Some countries elect dictators (Kazakhstan), while others allow leaders to become dictators (Peru). Still others, many parliamentary countries, elect Prime Ministers who are, in effect, temporary dictators (England). After World War II, the United States tried to impose democratic institutions and mores in Germany and Japan. By some measures, e.g., elections, we have been successful in doing so. By other measures, however, the result has been more equivocal. Much of the pre-war elite is still active in ruling these countries. Institutions such as Deutsche Bank, Krupps, and Mitsubishi continue to dominate these countries.

Such elites exist in all countries. If their influence is to be minimized, then intervention must be designed to break up

the monopolies that they represent. Holding elections in Bosnia so soon after the Dayton Accords were signed was probably not the way to achieve this end. The only group well enough organized to campaign in that election was the group involved in prosecuting the war against the Serbians. Their reason for existence is their high ideological commitment, not necessarily a plus for a post-hostilities government that should move beyond that conflict.

The need to overcome pre-intervention monopolies is a part of the question raised above and the second question on the determinants of a successful intervention. Given the weaknesses inherent in the concept of democracy, I have suggested the concept of plurascity as a replacement. The process of fostering a plurascity is much more straightforward than the process of installing democracy. There are two plurascitic catchphrases: eliminate monopolies and encourage competition. One initiative recommended for post-hostilities use in military operations other than war is the establishment of fully functioning local governments. Independent local government with its own sphere of influence is a rare thing in the world. Most countries have one government, the national government, that reaches all the way down to the local level. The beauty in setting up all these governments is that they can compare their performance against that of their neighbors: the beginning of competition. Furthermore, they can serve as a training ground for more pragmatic political leaders. Once these governments are functioning, then comes the time to think about regional or national governments.

Unfortunately, the elites that “won” the war—ignoring the effect of the intervening powers—will want to assume power right at the conclusion of hostilities. Preventing them from doing so is a military task that is a part of demobilization. Unlike civil administrations, the intervening military force has the power to accomplish this task without compromise.

The second question I asked was: What is the measure of the end-state that permits military disengagement with confidence that a repeat of the military/humanitarian campaign will not be necessary? All monopolies that are disabled as part of the occupation count as positives in this regard. Also to be counted as positives are the creation of competitive situations where none existed in the past (e.g., local vs. national government; independent smaller utility companies vs. one large state-owned utility). But is there an absolute endpoint to this process that guarantees the prevention of future conflicts?

Preventing the hostilities leadership from automatically becoming the post-conflict leadership without a contest is perhaps the best message the intervening force can send to the rest of the world. Potential conflicts may be forestalled if it is known that an intervening force will stay around long enough for the development of competition for leadership in the post-hostilities phase. The hostilities leadership will always have the credential that it “won” the war. Sufficient time must be allowed to pass to permit the struggle for leadership to once again become competitive. Others must have the opportunity to develop a resumé of accomplishments. Reestablishing local life in an area certainly would qualify as a strong credential.

The intervening force will go home sometime. If it leaves right after the end of hostilities, then the conflict will surely re-ignite. The initial military occupation should remain in place long enough to demobilize the combatants and to prevent establishment of a *de facto* national government. Once these tasks are accomplished, and the population has been turned to the task of reestablishing local life through reconstruction, then the occupation role may be transitioned to a civilian governor.

At a minimum, economic activity should resume before the transition to a national government. One element to be avoided, of course, is that newly installed government will

try to fill an economic vacuum with state or crony-run businesses.

The civilian governor can extend local government to the national level once local and national life has been established. If we are to assign any sanctity to elections, however, then the governor's tenure ends with the installation of a newly elected national government.

All this suggests that military disengagement can begin after local development is well underway; that is, when community level life has been reestablished, local government is functioning, and businesses and other community institutions have started operations. At this point in time, the people should have a sufficient investment in their new lives to minimize the probability that they will rearm and head for the hills.

The elements of plurascitic life will be visible now. Communities will be able to see how neighboring communities are handling reconstruction. Businesses may be one to a community but residents will be able to go to the next village if the local merchant is not responsive. Parents in one community will be able to assess the quality of schools by visiting the next town. In short, local level development or redevelopment will bring considerable information down to the level of the individual. That information becomes knowledge when acted upon. The actions, in turn, create freedom—the freedom of making decisions and accomplishing results.

Complete military disengagement depends on a number of factors. One of the most important is the quality of the civilian police force that is installed. Combat troops should not be removed until a police force has been demonstrated to be competent and effective. Engineering troops may need to remain throughout the external civilian government term to provide quality assurance as the infrastructure is replaced. A single concept that might encompass the point in time when military disengagement is warranted may be

the comfort of women in their ability to meet their families' needs.

Such a measure should indicate that the reconstructed environment is now rich enough in knowledge to permit comparisons among goods and services. That is also a measure of the degree of plurascity introduced into the environment.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

MANFRED K. ROTERMUND is engaged in federal government contract work through his company, Crossroads Research, Ltd. He currently supports several Department of Defense agencies in the area of information technology program management. In the past he has done both computer system development and policy analysis for a range of civilian and military agencies. He has taught psychology and research methods at the undergraduate and graduate level. After graduating from college, Mr. Rotermund spent 1967-69 in Laos teaching English at teacher training schools and a lycee. Thereafter, he obtained an M.S. in Social Psychology from the University of Massachusetts.

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

**Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.
Commandant**

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

**Interim Director
Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.**

**Author
Dr. Manfred K. Rothermund**

**Director of Publications and Production
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling**

**Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel**

**Composition
Mrs. Mary Jane Semple**

**Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler**