Unit 9: U.S. Relations--Russian Federation

Objectives

At the end of this unit, you will

Be aware of the following

- Complex, uncertain future existing in Russia today
- Necessity of patience in dealing with Russian Federation--balance+realism
- Some Russian people see U.S. involvement with the Russian Federation as a ruse to further fragment the nation
- Damaging clichés and perceptions of Russia
- Underlying tenets of U.S. foreign policy toward the Russian Federation
- Four dimensions--peace, democracy, prosperity, and global community--defining U.S. relations with Russian Federation

Identify

- Madeleine K. Albright, Stephen Sestanovich
- New Independent States (NIS)
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
- NATO/Russia Founding Act
- Military-to-military, Duma

Realize

- Ex-communists continue to run the Russian Federation
- Necessity of maintaining a balanced, unbiased, neither pessimistic nor optimistic mindset concerning Russia’s future
- U.S. rejection of Russian “sphere of influence” to NIS
unit 9: u.s. relations--russian federation

"the situation calls for a subtle policy that mixes toughness with understanding of russian sensitivities... immense patience and empathy are required in dealing with russia’s halting progress toward democracy; failure to display them only helps anti-western forces."

-- richard pipes, "is russia still an enemy?" foreign affairs, september/october 1997, pp. 77-78.

i. overview

1. an uncertain future  a complex situation exists in the russian federation today. russia no longer regards “any state to be its adversary.” yet, an unsettled and unfinished picture remains.

secretary of state madeleine k. albright uses the following story to dramatize russia’s plight.

“a train is going through siberia when it runs out of track. in lenin’s day, the leadership says: ‘our workers are strong and brave; they will keep building.’ stalin says: ‘no, they’re lazy; threaten to shoot them and then they will build.’ krushchev says: ‘russia is going forward, not backward, so we can use the rails we’ve passed over to finish the track ahead.’ brezhnev
saying: ‘It’s too much work; let’s close the blinds and pretend we’re moving.’ Gorbachev says: ‘Open the windows and let’s see what happens.’

Then President Yeltsin and the Russian people get the train going again. Except it’s moving fast and he keeps changing engineers. And now there are two tracks ahead. One looks tempting, for it goes downhill; but it leads to the abyss. Only the perilous track through the mountains will get Russia to its destination.”

Then, says the Secretary, “as you can guess, that’s an old story, [and] I made up the ending. [But] the Russians keep writing new ones themselves” (Address to the U.S.–Russian Business Council, Chicago, Illinois, 2 Oct 1998, p. 1).

2. Troubled Times One look at recent newspaper headlines, evening news accounts, or on-line world news updates informs us that the “Russian Federation is passing through a deep and protracted economic and social crisis, the end of which is far from sight” (Dr. Alexei G. Arbatov, Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee, Russian Federation, “The Russian Military in the 21st Century,” p.3).

Ex-communists continue to run the country. Mental habits, engrained over decades, persist. Isolationist trends clash with imperialist leanings. Bitter realities of battling for physical survival suppress nostalgic dreams of times past when Russia possessed power and influence second to none. Times are confusing.

3. U.S. Foreign Policy Perspective The following three approaches underscore much of our State Department’s policy involving the Russian Federation and the Newly Independent States.
a. Patient persistence  Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott addressed a November 1998 conference on "Russia at the end of the 20th Century."

Talbott told the Stanford University audience that a realistic approach, neither too optimistic or pessimistic, which relies on "strategic patience," is in order. "The policy that flows from realism is one of strategic patience and persistence. That means continuing engagement" (Public Diplomacy Query, 6 Nov. 1998, p. 1).

Madeleine Albright suggests a similar strategy. "A true and lasting transition to normalcy, democracy, and free markets in Russia is neither inevitable nor impossible. It is an open question, the subject of a continuing debate and struggle.

That has been true ever since this great but wounded nation [Russia] began to awake from its totalitarian nightmare and it will be true for years to come. That is why our policy must continue to be guided by patience, realism and perspective" (Address, 2 Oct 1998, p. 2).

b. Balance  Neither despondent pessimism nor ecstatic optimism regarding Russia's prospects are in order. Says Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, "More than other countries, Russia's future is in doubt, but that is not new...Gloom and doom are no more justified now than was euphoria a few short years ago. Yes, much of what is happening in Russia is obscure; yes, some of it is ominous. But this much is clear: the drama of Russia's transformation is not over; its ending is neither imminent nor foreordained; and the stakes, for us, are huge" (Address, 6 Nov 1998, p. 2).
c. Realism  A realistic appraisal of, and policy toward Russia involves the following.

(1) Recognizing complexity  Says Talbott, "The alternative to strategic pessimism is not so much optimism, which assumes a happy ending, as it is realism about the complexity of the challenges and the uncertainty Russia faces. That is a mindset that assumes nothing, that does not prejudge the future, that is ready for anything, not just the worst" (Address, 6 Nov. 1998, p. 13).

(2) Understanding Russian perceptions  "For many Russians, angst about their future is compounded by suspicion about the U.S.'s strategic intentions. The Russian press has carried numerous articles suggesting that under the guise of 'partnership,' the U.S. is pursuing a hidden agenda not only to keep Russia weak but to bring about its fragmentation" (Address, 6 Nov. 1998, p. 9).

(3) Avoiding negativity  The current American view of Russia too often is a cynical, "Mafia" characterized approach. Again says the Deputy Secretary of State, "The image of Russia in the mind of America is increasingly ugly. It has become a cliché of Hollywood to depict Russia not just as a fallen state but as a criminal one. Here are just a few examples: 'Crimson Tide,' 'The Jackal,' 'The Saint,' 'Goldeneye,' 'The Peacemaker,' 'Air Force One,' 'Ronin,' even 'Blues Brothers 2000.' In every one, Central Casting has provided as villains Russian mafiosi, renegade generals and former KGBnicks, usually trafficking in loose nukes and dirty money.

This image of feral Russia on the silver screen is mirrored in adventure comic books, on op-ed pages, in fire-and-brimstone statements on the floor of Congress and at conferences of academics and think-tank experts. According to a new conventional wisdom, 'smutnoye vremya'--the Time of Troubles--is Russia's natural state..." (Address, 6 Nov 1998).
Such thinking leaves no room for creative engagement. It harmfully stereotypes. And, only a self-fulfilling pessimism as the basis of foreign policy remains.

d. Underlying tenets  Former National Security Council director for Soviet affairs and current Stanford University professor Coit Blacker identifies the following three foundational principles which underlie U.S. foreign policy regarding the Russian Federation.

(1) Irreversible direction  The collapse of the former Soviet empire was a one time event, voluntarily done, and return to a pre-Russian Federation state will not occur.

(2) Linkage  No country in the area of the Newly Independent States can lay claim—either by history, custom or law—to the region. This tenet speaks to absolute rejection, by U.S. policy, to a "Russian sphere of influence" over its neighbors.

(3) Reform  Economic and political reform is the best way to bring about a healthy stability in the region. A high level of political interest and economic engagement on the part of U.S. officials is critical to bring permanence to the area.
II. U.S. Policy Toward Russia

"It is our job...to manage the aftermath of the Soviet Empire's disintegration, to help Russia integrate into the community of which we are a part, and eventually to help Russia thrive, not just muddle along. And that means remaining steady in defense of our principles, interests, and objectives. And it means standing with Russia as it moves forward--as long as it is moving on the right track."

-- Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, 2 Oct 1998

"...these are extremely ambitious goals."

--Ambassador-at-Large Stephen Sestanovich, 20 May 1998

In a prepared statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on European Affairs, 20 May 1998, Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States identified four dimensions--peace, democracy, prosperity and global community--which define our relations with Russia. In discussing each theme, this section draws from State Department Background Notes (Russia, August 1998), recent major State Department addresses, the Fiscal Year 1999 Congressional Presentation for Foreign Relations and current news accounts.

1. Peace

a. Agenda "We seek to reduce the threat to the United States and to international peace posed by weapons of mass destruction. Russia itself no longer threatens America the way it did for so many decades. Ensuring that the remnants of the Soviet military--
industrial complex do not threaten us or our allies remains a principal goal of U.S. policy” (Sestanovich, p. 2).

“...our most important priority in dealing with Russia is to protect the safety of the American people. That is an interest we pursue no matter who is up or down in the Kremlin or which direction Russia is headed” (Albright, p. 4).

b. Strategy  Specific approaches to implement the agenda of peace include the following.

(1) NATO/Russia Founding Act

“Russia signed the NATO Partnership for Peace initiative in June 1994. U.S. and Russian troops are serving together in the Implementation Force in Bosnia and its successor, the Stabilization Force. Building on these steps, NATO and Russia signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act on 27 May 1997, in Paris.

The act defines the terms of a fundamentally new and sustained relationship in which NATO and Russia will consult and coordinate regularly, and where appropriate, act jointly. Cooperation between NATO and Russia exists in scientific and technical fields” (Background Notes, p. 13).

(2) Military-to-military cooperation/nuclear arms

“The U.S. and Russia carried out a joint peacekeeping training exercise in Totskoye, Russia, in September 1994. Based on the 14 January 1994 agreement between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin, the two nations stopped targeting their strategic nuclear missiles at each other as of 30 May 1994” (Background Notes, p. 13).

(3) START II  “On 3 January 1993 the U.S. and Russia signed the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II).
This treaty would reduce overall deployments of strategic nuclear weapons on each side by more than two-thirds from current levels and will eliminate the most destabilizing strategic weapons--heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and all other deployed multiple-warhead ICBMs...The Russian Duma has not yet ratified START II” (Background Notes, p. 14).

“The Duma’s [Duma is the Russian Federation Parliament] delay in ratifying START II remains a source of frustration for us, and we hope that its action to postpone debate on ratification until September [1998] will be reconsidered” (Sestanovich, p. 4).

(4) Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) “Following ratification by Russia and the other New Independent States (NIS), the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty entered into force on 9 November 1992. This treaty establishes comprehensive limits on key categories of military equipment--tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters--and provides for the destruction of weaponry in excess of these limits” (Background Notes, p. 14).

(5) Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)

“...this type of assistance is provided to Russia...to aid in the dismantling of weapons of mass destruction and to prevent the proliferation of such weapons...

...The U.S. also is assisting Russia in the development of export controls, providing emergency
response equipment and training to enhance Russia’s ability to respond to accidents involving nuclear weapons, providing increased military-to-military contacts, and encouraging the conversion of Russian defense firms through the formation of joint ventures to produce products, including housing, for the civilian market” (Background Notes, p. 14). “...we are developing projects to eliminate Russia’s chemical weapons production capacity and 14% of Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile” (Sestanovich, p. 4).

(6) Law enforcement

(a) International crime "'Mafia' activities in Russia and much of the NIS seriously threaten the development of commercial business banking...we have established relationships to help U.S. agencies protect our citizens from crime in the NIS and the United States..."

A major emphasis of our assistance is geared toward strengthening law enforcement institutions in these countries to develop in-country capacity to combat crime” (FY 99 Foreign Relations, p. 630).

(b) Illegal drugs “Our efforts to assist the NIS in strengthening their border controls will complement strategies to prevent illegal and dangerous arms trafficking as well as help reduce the flow of narcotics” (FY 99 Foreign Relations, p. 630).

(7) Sensitive technology “We have been engaged almost constantly with the Russian Government to find ways of stopping leaks of sensitive technology [arms and nuclear, biological, and chemical weaponry development]” (Sestanovich, p. 4).

2. Democracy and Human Rights

a. Agenda “We support democracy and respect for human rights, including religious freedom. Just as
Americans supported those who yearned to be free of communism throughout the Cold War, so now we must stand up for Russia's new generation of democrats as they build a civil society.

A democratic Russia at peace with itself is more likely to be at peace with us and with the world” (Sestanovich, p. 2).

"...we must not treat Russia as a ward of the international community. Russia is too big, and too proud, for that. The policies we would like the Russian government to pursue have to be worked out democratically, with the support and understanding of the Russian people, or they are going to fail” (Albright, p. 8).

b. Strategy

(1) Patience “...we need to be patient with the workings of the democratic process in Russia. Under the best circumstances, there will be compromises between economic orthodoxy and political reality. After all, democracy is not ruled by economist-kings. It is a system that allows pragmatic politicians to build a consensus for policies that cause short-term pain.

It also means we should not start each day by taking a census of reformers in the Kremlin or hold our breath every time there is a leadership change. We should be interested in policies, not personalities..."
Russia’s transition to true freedom, stability and prosperity will take time, indeed it must to be lasting and genuine. Meanwhile, we need to defend our interests and speak clearly about the choices we hope Russia will make. And we must be ready to stick with this effort for the long haul” (Albright, p. 8).

(2) U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)  “USAID has the principal responsibility for implementing technical assistance to Russia and the other New Independent States.

USAID has devoted its assistance efforts to helping Russia develop democratic institutions and transform its state-controlled economy to one based on market principles” (Background Notes, p. 15).

(3) U.S. Information Agency (USIA)  “USIA public diplomacy is active in the areas of promoting the growth of a market economy, explaining and building support for U.S. foreign policy objectives, and building understanding of U.S. society and culture.

Professional and educational exchanges cover such diverse fields as journalism, public administration, local government, business management, education, political science, and civics education. More than 20,000 Russians have participated in USIA-funded exchanges over the past 5 years” (Background Notes, p. 16).

(4) Exchanges and non-governmental organizations  “These...people-to-people programs [are] designed to broaden the base of support in Russia for open society and rule of law. We will keep using some of the money available to us under the Freedom Support Act to bring local politicians, entrepreneurs and non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives to the U.S. on exchanges...
...and to continue to encourage Russia’s participation in the global network society through programs like our Internet Access and Training Program, which connects libraries, universities and schools across Russia with each other and with counterpart institutions around the world” (Talbott, p. 14).

3. Prosperity (Economics)

a. Agenda “We strongly support Russia’s continuing transition to a modern, market-based economy, coupled with Russia’s integration into the world economy.

A market economy is the essential complement to democracy and respect for fundamental human rights. It creates opportunities for those Russians who have put behind them the habits and outlook of the past. It provides opportunities for U.S. business to participate in Russia’s revolution as well” (Sestanovich, p. 2).

“...we also have an interest in standing by those Russians who are struggling to build a more open and prosperous society” (Albright, p. 6).

b. Strategy

(1) U.S.—Russia Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation “...nine working committees and several working groups...address issues in the fields of science and technology, business development, space, energy policy, environmental protection, health, defense conversion, capital markets, and agriculture” (Background Notes, p. 12).

(2) Trade and investment “At the March 1997 summit in Helsinki, Finland, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin...signed a joint ‘Economic Initiative’ aimed at stimulating Russian economic growth, deepening
bilateral economic ties, and accelerating Russian integration into the global economy and its primary multilateral organizations” (Background Notes, p. 13).

(3) U.S. assistance “To date [August 1998], the U.S. Government has provided a total of $4.8 billion in grant assistance to Russia...and is supporting more than $7.3 billion worth of financing and insurance. The annual level of economic and technical assistance for Russia has declined from a peak of $1.6 billion in 1994 to $130 million in 1998” (Background Notes, p. 15).

(4) U.S. Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) “Eximbank approved about $2.8 billion in loans, loan guarantees, and insurance for transactions in Russia from 1991 through September 1997” (Background Notes, p. 15).

(5) U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) “OPIC provides loans, loan guarantees, and commercial and political investment insurance to American companies investing in Russia. As of the end of FY 1997, OPIC had approved more than $3.2 billion in investment financing and insurance for 125 ventures” (Background Notes, p. 15).

(6) Commerce Department “American Business Centers are operating in [a variety of Russian cities] to help U.S. companies do business in Russia” (Background Notes, p. 16).

Secretary of State Albright comments on her appreciation for U.S. business people who are courageous enough to begin ventures in Russia.

“Let me acknowledge the many members of the U.S. business community who have had the guts to hang in there despite all the difficulties you have suffered and uncertainty you have faced. I thank you all for that” (Albright, p. 7).
4. Global Community

a. Agenda  “We seek a Russia cooperatively engaged with its neighbors and integrated into Euro-Atlantic and global communities. This is key to building a world based on equality among states rather than on confrontation and domination” (Sestanovich, p. 2).

b. Strategy

(1) Cooperative engagement
“Russia needs to project a preference for cooperation to its partners in trade and investment around the world. The confrontational policies that did Russia no lasting good even in the nuclear age are certainly not going to advance its interests in the information age” (Albright, p. 5).

(2) Territorial integrity of NIS  “Our goal since the end of the Cold War has been a democratic, undivided Europe that includes Russia and all of the New Independent States. To achieve this, we have promoted the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of these new states; encouraged their development as democratic, market-oriented countries adhering to the norms of responsible international behavior; and facilitated their integration into the Euro-Atlantic and global community of nations...It is critical for Russia to be integrated into broader world structures” (Sestanovich, p. 9).

(3) North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
“It is no secret to say that the United States and Russia have disagreed profoundly over NATO enlargement. To make sure that the expansion of NATO occurred in a Europe that is whole and free, we worked to forge a cooperative NATO relationship with Russia codified in the NATO-Russia Founding Act signed a year ago [27 May 1997] in Paris” (Sestanovich, p. 10).
Two issues involved in the enlargement of NATO include:

(a) Russian fear  On 9 July 1997, NATO invited three former Soviet bloc countries--Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary--to become members.

This expanding NATO creates fear in the minds of some members of the Russian Federation that an "iron ring" would surround them, threatening their sovereignty and influence. An antagonized Russia, fearful of this perceived new menace of the West, would continue arms expansion and a pattern of confrontation.

(b) Founding Act  The 27 May 1997 agreement between NATO and Russia seeks mutual cooperation and security between these two former antagonists. The agreement allows for consultation on security matters. Though Russia has no veto power, the Founding Act creates formal opportunity for Russia to voice concerns to the NATO community.

(4) Russian "sphere of influence"  "We absolutely reject the idea of a Russia sphere of influence. But while some in the Russian political spectrum accuse us of trying to dominate the region--and some neighbors claim that Russia is out to dominate them--the reality is that the region will benefit from a cooperative, constructive Russia that trades with its neighbors and that helps to resolve differences with and among countries" (Sestanovich, p. 10).
III. Military Considerations

Helpful to linguists is a brief overview of the current state of Russia's military and the approach of the United States Armed Forces toward Russia's military establishment. (For further information, see Unit 2--Historical Overview, and Unit 6--Gestures and Taboos).

1. Current realities

a. Eclipsed glory  Pavel K. Baev, a senior researcher at Oslo's International Peace Research Institute, writes, "In general, the Chechen War has greatly accelerated (though by no means caused) the erosion of Russia's military power..." ("Challenges and Options in the Caucasus and Central Asia," 22 April 1997, p. 8). Recent news accounts graphically portray the lack of housing, uncertain wages, and low morale within the Russian Armed Forces.

Dr. Graham Turbiville, Jr. of the Foreign Military Studies Office of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, presents a discouraging picture. "As 1995 approaches its mid-point, poorly paid, badly housed, and demoralized Russian military forces at home and abroad are deeply immersed in criminal activities conducted for personal and group profit.

Smuggling crimes of all types (particularly drug and arms trafficking), the massive diversion of equipment and materials, illegal business ventures, and coercion and criminal violence, all fall under the umbrella of military organized crime" (Mafia in Uniform, p. 8).

According to a former Russian colonel and military sociologist, "enlisted soldiers led a barracks life akin to that in a correctional labor camp, where rising crime rates, abuse of authority, and despair were part of the daily routine" (Mafia in Uniform, p. 29).
b. Embittered leadership  Dr. Richard Pipes, in his *Foreign Affairs* article entitled "Is Russia Still an Enemy?" discusses the vindictive bitterness felt by many Russian generals.

Wrote Dr. Pipes, anyone who spends just a limited time with these leaders "cannot but feel the intensity of their resentment against the West...they seethe with humiliation both personal and professional." Some seek, over time, to revamp the armed forces into "a military establishment so effective that its mere presence will guarantee Russia what they deem its rightful place among nations" (September/October 1997, pp. 72, 74).

c. Human rights  "Various abuses against military servicemen, including but not limited to the practice of "dedovshchina" (the violent hazing of new military recruits and border guards), continued unabated [in 1996], and may have increased in the past year. Press reports indicate that this mistreatment often includes extortion of money or material goods in the face of the threat of increased hazing or actual beatings.

Soldiers usually do not report hazing to officers due to fear of reprisals, since officers in some cases reportedly tolerate or even encourage such hazing as a means of controlling their units. There are also reports that officers use beatings to discipline soldiers whom they find to be 'inattentive to their duties.'

According to a June General Staff briefing, during 1996 there were 2,000 deaths of servicemen, 526 of which were suicides...The Mother's Rights Foundation...cites figures of 5,000 noncombat deaths linked to violence per year. The Mothers' Rights Foundation and the Soldiers' Mothers' Committee believe that many of those who reportedly committed suicide were driven so by violent hazing or abuse" (Russia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997, p. 7).
d. Future directions Some analysts see Russia’s armed forces as not being able to defend the nation from external threats while posing the frightening possibility of their being a source of internal instability and division (See Arbatov, p. 11).

Others see the current dismal state of combat readiness as an argument for Russia’s maintaining a strong nuclear arsenal. Says Alexander Lebed, retired Russian general and a leading candidate for president in the year 2000, “The only thing for which Russia is respected in the world...is our strategic rocket forces. And this asset must be preserved” (Army Times, 30 Nov 1998, p. 22).

2. U.S. Military Approach

a. Military-to-military activities

(1) Exchanges Beginning in July 1988, U.S. and Soviet counterparts began initial contact programs, exchanging data, personnel and doctrinal concepts.

(2) Defense cooperation In September 1993, both parties signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation. Though participation in Partnership for Peace (PfP) missions was deferred, many military-to-military activities within the context of the PfP framework did occur. Artic-Sarex 96 joined search and rescue operations from both countries and Canada. Information exchanges, contact team visits and high level security conferences are all part of these cooperative ventures.

b. Peacekeeper missions “In early September 1994, a US-Russian command and staff exercise code-named ‘Peacekeeper-94’ was held at the Totskoye training area in the Urals region of central Russia...Some 250 US troops and about 50 vehicles from the 3rd Infantry Division deployed by air from Germany to train with
elements of one of Russia's 'peacekeeping' divisions, the 27th Guards Motorized Rifle Division...The exercise envisioned joint peacekeeping efforts to control a conflict between two ethnic groups" (Turbiville, p 21).

Peacekeeper 95 at Ft. Riley, Kansas, and Peaceshield 96 at the Lviv (lah-VEE-oo/ehl-veev) Training Area in the Ukraine also saw active US and Russian participation. One brigade headquarters and two airborne battalions currently oversee a portion of the U.S. sector in Bosnia.

c. Strategic realities

(1) Peacekeeper conduct  In 1994 and 1995, some Western military officials raised concern over the behavior of Russian and Ukrainian peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia. Accusations ranged from black market activities, illegal smuggling, profiteering, and corruption to collaboration with local militias. Outside observers also noted unit cohesion and morale were at low levels (See Turbiville, p. 21).

(2) Russian threat

"Despite all its declarations that the United States, NATO, and other Western powers no longer constitute a threat to Russia, our [Russian Federation] military requirements, at least 50-60 percent of them, still revolve around contingency planning for a major war with the United States and NATO in the West and with the United States and Japan in the East. I can only assume that Western contingency planners regard Russia in much the same way" (Arbatov, pp. 8-9).
Vocabulary List: U.S. Relations--Russian Federation

Albright, Madeleine K.  United States Secretary of State, 1996–

Duma  (DOO-mah) Russian Parliament

Military-to-military  Joint peacekeeping exercises carried out between United States Armed Forces and those of other countries (often those of the NIS)

NATO/Russia Founding Act  27 May 1997 agreement between NATO and Russia which seeks mutual cooperation and security between both countries. Russia holds no veto power but does possess formal channels to address issues.

New Independent States  (NIS) Sovereign states formed from the former Soviet Union

Sestanovich, Stephen  Ambassador-at-Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State for the New Independent States
Part 1--Fill in the Blanks Fill in the blanks with the most correct word. Not all words listed will be used.

The current (Jan 1999) U.S. Secretary of State (1)___________ advocates a policy toward Russia characterized by (2)___________, realism and perspective.

According to Strobe Talbott, deputy Secretary of State, the image of Russia in the minds of too many Americans is increasingly (3)___________.

The (4)___________ of 27 May 1997 defines terms whereby NATO and Russia consult and coordinate regularly. Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (5)___________, would reduce overall deployments of strategic nukes. The most destabilizing strategic weapons---heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)---would also be (6)___________.

The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) establishes comprehensive limits on categories of (7)___________.
Leak of (8)_________ (arms and nuclear, biological and chemical weapon development) is a concern of U.S. foreign policy and Russia.

The U.S. Information Agency (USIA) promotes growth of (9)__________, garnering support for foreign policy objectives and understanding of U.S. society and culture.

A strategy advocating Russia's (10)__________ with her neighbors encourages participation in the broader global community.

market economy  sphere of influence
ugly             cooperative engagement
confrontation    military equipment
NATO-Russia Founding Act  stockpiled
eliminated       patience
armed forces personnel  (START II)
Madeleine K. Albright  Al Gore
sensitive technology  Warren Christopher
HOO-AH!

Part 2--Multiple Choice  Place the letter of the most correct response in the space provided.

1. ___ _________ continue, in many ways, to run the Russian Federation.

   a. The Mafia, hoods, and criminals
   b. Ex-communists
   c. Army and Navy officers
2. ____ U.S. foreign policy toward the Russian Federation calls for the necessity of patience, ________, and realism.
   a. confrontation
   b. espionage
   c. balance

3. ____ Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright summed up her attitude toward U.S. business ventures in the Russian Federation by saying
   a. thanks to business personnel for having the guts to hang in despite a difficult, uncertain environment.
   b. the more exports of U.S. goods---especially computers and automobiles---the better.
   c. business and foreign policy have no connection.

4. ____ In the Russian Federation Army, the ________ monitors abuse, violent hazing and other soldier issues.
   a. Soldiers’ Mothers’ Committee
   b. KGB
   c. NGO

5. ____ Russia fears expansion of NATO because
   a. the EURO monetary unit may devalue the ruble.
   b. a perceived “iron ring” surrounding Russia will limit their sovereignty and influence.
   c. of old memories of Mongol invaders and the Time of Troubles.

6. ____ Films such as “Crimson Tide,” “Goldeneye,” “the Jackal” and “Blues Brothers 2000” depict Russia as
   a. villainous with renegade generals, and trafficking in loose nukes and dirty money.
   b. a sophisticated, though troubled, leader in the New World Order.
   c. possessing the capacity to laugh at current difficulties yet maintain a course for societal improvement.

7. ____ What four dimensions define U.S. relations with the Russian Federation?
   b. Dollars, defense, diligence, and disarmament.
   c. Peace, democracy, prosperity and global community.
8. ____ An underlying tenet of U.S. foreign policy toward the Russian Federation is

   a. fear that a return to the pre-Russian Federation state is a real possibility.
   b. Russia is entitled to a legitimate "sphere of influence" over national neighbors in the region.
   c. economic and political reform is the best way to bring about healthy, required stability.

9. ____ The most important state department priority in dealing with the Russian Federation is

   a. protecting the safety of American people.
   b. enlisting joint participation in the MIR spacestation.
   c. encouraging new markets for U.S. goods and services.

10. ____ Concerning democracy and human rights as a strategy of U.S. foreign policy, Madeleine Albright advocates

   a. we should concern ourselves with personalities rather than policies as Russia works toward a democratic society.
   b. we must realize Russia’s transition to true freedom, stability and prosperity will take a long time.
   c. an optimistic, "Russia can transition swiftly to democracy" attitude is best.

"Remain calm during a crisis."
Sources Used in Unit 9: U.S. Relations--Russian Federation


"Commit yourself to excellence in all you do...face the challenge by giving it your best. If you’ve given your best, you can be happy with the result. If you know you can do better, improve for the next time and press on. And if you stumble along the way, take that as part of the learning process.”
General Charles C. Krulak