

**THE FUTURE ROLES OF U.S. MILITARY POWER
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS**

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FOREWORD

As the daily headlines attest, the Department of Defense is in the midst of a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Charged by Congress, the Department of Defense is examining a broad range of issues concerning U.S. military policy and strategy (*inter alia*, future national defense strategy, the force structure necessary to implement that strategy, the affects of technology on force structure, and the anticipated roles and missions of the Reserve Components in executing the defense strategy) that will have far-reaching consequences for the United States. Before these crucial issues are addressed, however, a more fundamental question needs to be explored: what does the United States want its military to do? In other words, what are the future roles of the U.S. military? Only after this issue has been answered can the Department of Defense turn to the other important issues posed by Congress.

In the pages that follow, Dr. William T. Johnsen tackles this question. In brief, he concludes that the U.S. military will continue to perform its traditional roles: deterrence, reassurance, compellence, and support to the nation. The method and manner of carrying out those roles, however, will change; in some cases substantially. The implications of these adapted roles will be considerable. More importantly, Dr. Johnsen also examines the emerging role of preventive defense and its potentially profound consequences for the U.S. military.

The debates carried out within and about the QDR will shape the security policy of the United States well into the 21st Century. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this contribution to the ongoing dialogue.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1991 and currently serves as an Associate Research Professor of National Security Affairs. He has also held the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies of the U.S. Army War College since 1994. An infantry officer before retiring from the U.S. Army, Dr. Johnsen served in a variety of troop leading, command and staff assignments in the 25th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry Division (Light). He also served as Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an Arms Control Analyst in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Dr. Johnsen holds a B.S. degree from the U.S. Military Academy, an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Duke University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has authored or coauthored numerous Strategic Studies Institute studies, as well as articles in a variety of policy journals, that focus on U.S. and European security issues.

KEY JUDGMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States will remain globally engaged and will continue to play a leading role in international affairs.

Despite improvements in the international security environment, military power will remain vital for safeguarding U.S. national interests.

Military power, however, will have to be more closely integrated and synchronized with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.

The U.S. Armed Forces will continue to perform the key roles of deterrence, compellence, reassurance, and providing support to the nation. But the manner of carrying out these roles will change:

- Deterrence

- Nuclear deterrence will remain an essential element of U.S. policy.

- Conventional deterrence, however, will increase in importance. Because of the nature of risks to be deterred, ground forces may assume a larger role than has been the case in the recent past.

- Compellence

- Defining compellence as "fight and win the nation's wars" will be too narrow a construct for the 21st century.

- Coercive diplomacy will take on added significance.

- But a number of cautions apply:

- Coercive diplomacy is difficult to effect successfully, and depends on the synchronization of all instruments of national power. It requires clearly articulated and understood demands, continuous assessment, and patience. The demandant must possess a willingness, frequently prolonged, to compel and the object of the coercion must be willing to acquiesce. Marshalling all these requirements is difficult.

- A high risk exists, particularly for the world's remaining superpower, that the military instrument will be used excessively. This not only can dull the instrument, but can lead to inappropriate use of military power.

- Reassurance of friends and allies (and, occasionally

adversaries) will remain a significant military role. Under a strategy of engagement and enlargement (or an evolutionary successor), reassurance undoubtedly will be extended to promote the growth of democracy and market economies in areas of the world key to U.S. national interests. Reassurance will continue to be accomplished through a combination of forward stationing of forces, rotation of units to key areas of the world, exercises, and military-to-military contacts.

- Support to the nation will continue to be a key role for the U.S. Armed Forces. However, an external dimension of support to the nation will take on increasing importance, as military power is used to complement other policy initiatives and to shape the international security environment.

The newly articulated, but not necessarily new, concept of preventive defense will assume a larger role for the U.S. military.

- Preventive defense moves the United States from a deter-defend strategy to a three-tiered strategy that seeks to prevent the emergence of threats to U.S. national interests, deters risks that might arise, and compels adversaries, if required.

- The intent of preventive defense is to shape the international security environment in a manner that promotes as well as protects U.S. national interests. It is unique in its approach of using the Department of Defense (DoD) as the lead agent in preventive defense activities.

Criticism of elements of preventive defense ranges across a wide spectrum: the United States should not be and cannot afford to be the "world's policeman"; preventive defense missions are not traditional for the U.S. military; the military instrument of national power could be used at the expense of other, more appropriate instruments; and preventive defense operations will erode warfighting skills, hurt readiness, and, ultimately, leave the U.S. military vulnerable.

While elements of these critiques have merit, neither individually nor collectively do they have sufficient force to overturn increased reliance on preventive defense. To the contrary, the potentially high strategic return on investment argues for emphasizing preventive defense.

Implications of increased reliance on preventive defense at the national strategy level:

- Political leaders must forge a national consensus on the role of preventive defense.

- All instruments of national power must be blended and applied to the specific circumstances at hand.

- The use of military power must not be restricted to a "last resort."

- Because strategic requirements exceed available resources, priorities will have to be established.

- National leaders must have a clear vision of not just what the United States *can* do, but what the United States is *willing* to do.

- Policymakers must clearly define, and more importantly clearly articulate to the American public, U.S. interests and how preventive defense can promote and protect those interests.

- Officials must assess how much emphasis can be placed on preventive defense versus deterrence and compellence.

- The American public and its elected representatives in Congress must be persuaded to fund programs that provide long-term benefit, without necessarily seeing short-term results. This must be accomplished in a time of shrinking budgets, when Americans will undoubtedly question such expenditures. Nonetheless, these steps, however difficult, offer a cost effective alternative to later military intervention.

Implications of greater dependence on preventive defense at the national military level:

- Despite the importance of preventive defense, deterrence and compellence will remain the primary roles of U.S. military forces.

- Nevertheless, greater resources should be applied to preventive defense measures.

- The DoD must develop a global engagement plan that integrates the regional plans of the Combatant Commanders-in-Chief.

- The U.S. military can expect greater participation with allies, partners, friends, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations. These groups may have to be incorporated into the DoD and interagency planning processes. Such increased cooperation will not be without difficulty, but the benefits will outweigh the costs.

- The greatest implications are likely to occur in the area

of force structure:

- For the foreseeable future, geo-strategic conditions argue for maintaining a compellence capability sufficient to fight and win two Major Theaters of War (MTWs).

- That said, if the seeds of preventive defense are to grow, they must be planted soon.

- In determining the appropriate balance between preventive defense, deterrence, and compellence missions, future forces cannot be optimized for either warfighting or preventive defense missions.

- Larger numbers of ground forces may be required than currently anticipated to meet these varied demands.

- The U.S. Armed Forces should be structured to be able to:

- Respond to a broad spectrum of conflict from terrorism to high intensity warfare.

- Operate effectively across the full range of military operations.

- Possess sufficient flexibility to adapt to changes in the international security environment, fluctuating fiscal resources, and alternative strategic concepts, while keeping risks within acceptable limits.

- Provide a suitable balance among the capabilities necessary to prevent threats, deter and compel, and render support to the nation.

- Be able to operate with allies and with coalition partners.

- DoD may have to break the budget paradigm that has existed roughly since the end of World War II. Specifically, the Army-- which has borne and can be expected to bear the brunt of preventive defense operations--may have to receive a larger share of DoD funds than heretofore has been the case.

Implications for the Army resulting from a greater reliance on preventive defense:

- Doctrine and training development and execution will have to take greater account of preventive defense missions.

- Anticipated strategic conditions indicate a need to maintain a broad range of combat, combat support (CS), and combat

service support (CSS) units. High demand, low density CS and CSS units (e.g., civil affairs, military police, engineers, aviation, psychological operations, and all forms of logistics) may require increased numbers within the force structure. Additionally, increased numbers of Special Operations Forces (SOF) may be required.

- The expected international security environment and increasing budget constraints argue against optimizing Army forces for warfighting or for role specialization for preventive defense tasks.

- The most fundamental implications will concern the allocation of roles within the Total Army, and the eventual mix of Active and Reserve Component units. Three potential options include:

- Option 1: Maintain an evolutionary course. This alternative continues current force structures and mix, but works on the margins to reduce OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO stress.

- Option 2: The Active Component retains primary responsibility for deterrence and, if necessary, fighting and winning two MTWs. The Reserve Components would have primary responsibility for preventive defense missions.

- Option 3: The Active Component would retain primary responsibility for deterrence, fighting and winning one MTW, and for conducting preventive defense tasks. The Reserve Components would have primary responsibility for deterring and, if necessary, fighting and winning a second MTW.

- No alternative is ideal; each has pitfalls. All will likely cause sharp short-term pain for the Army. But, the long-term gain for the nation could be significant.

- To meet the anticipated demands of the future security environment will require the Army to possess the following capabilities:

- The ability to participate effectively in the joint arena and interagency policy development process. This implies that the Army must have the necessary personnel in appropriate positions with the requisite knowledge and skills for effective participation in these fora. This includes not only the Army Staff, but also Army personnel on the Joint Staff, within the interagency process, and on the staffs of the unified commands.

- A force structure and force design that provides sufficient numbers of forces to operate across a broad spectrum of conflict in peacetime, crisis, and war; to perform effectively

throughout the range of military operations; and to perform successfully at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare.

- A forward presence in key regions of the globe that contributes to prevent, deter, compel, and reassure missions.

- Forces must be capable of integrating into multinational force structures--established organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, or ad hoc organizations that may or may not be organized around the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force (C/JTF) concept. Units must be able to interface with nongovernmental organizations/private volunteer organizations (NGOs/PVOs) in a manner that supports the missions of all organizations.

- Units able to perform preventive defense missions, as well as traditional missions. Forces must be able to transition between roles quickly with minimum of retraining and restructuring if the Army expects to meet the rapidly shifting demands of the future international security environment.

- Sufficient numbers of forces to meet anticipated preventive defense requirements, while maintaining the ability to fight and win two MTWs as envisaged under the National Military Strategy. These forces must also be able to conduct multiple concurrent peace operations, as well as rotate forces involved in protracted peace operations.

- These requirements argue for:

- Adequate numbers of specialized CS and CSS units and personnel (e.g., engineers, military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, and aviation) to avoid overstressing limited resources.

- CS and CSS force structure capable of supporting sustained preventive defense operations, while concurrently supporting a limited lesser regional contingency.

- Sufficient CS and CSS capacity to transfer forces from preventive defense operations to full scale combat operations, while supporting the movement of forces to an MTW.

THE FUTURE ROLES OF U.S. MILITARY POWER AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The massive geo-political shifts of the last decade have generated considerable discussion over future U.S. national defense policy and strategy. But this debate has not yielded consensus on key issues, such as the degree of U.S. involvement in global affairs or the policies and strategy that will guide U.S. efforts. This vacuum has complicated decisions concerning the role of the U.S. military as an instrument of national power.

Difficulties in outlining the future roles of U.S. military power have been exacerbated because much of the recent dialogue over U.S. defense policy has focused on how large an armed force the United States can afford given anticipated budget constraints.¹ Increasingly, these debates center on whether the United States can continue to finance the military capabilities necessary to fight and win in two nearly simultaneous Major Theaters of War (MTWs) or whether it should adopt a less demanding criterion that conforms to anticipated funding levels.²

While such debates may be helpful in sizing and shaping forces from a "warfighting" perspective, they beg the larger strategic question: what does the country want its military to do? Specifically, what are to be the future roles of military power in support of U.S. national security policy? Only after this question has been answered can planners logically derive the missions and tasks that the U.S. Armed Forces may be called upon to perform.

Examining the larger issue of the future roles of U.S. military power first requires establishing the appropriate context. To this end, this monograph first briefly examines the probable U.S. role in the emerging international security environment. With that context established, the report addresses the future roles of U.S. military power and explores the potential implications at the national strategy and national military strategy level, and for the Army. The study closes with conclusions.

THE U.S. ROLE IN THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The absence of a global threat to U.S. interests has reduced discernible and quantifiable risks considerably. Nevertheless, the number of lesser, but still important, issues that have emerged from the shadows of superpower competition have not eased U.S. strategic difficulties. New challenges to U.S. national interests also have erupted from the tectonic shifts in the geo-strategic landscape.

Competing strategic visions of the future further complicate achieving consensus on the U.S. international role in the 21st century. Futurists Alvin and Heidi Toffler offer a world divided into three economically competing tiers, based largely on the ability to utilize information.³ Noted scholar Samuel Huntington warns instead of "The Clash of Civilizations" along cultural fault lines.⁴ Journalist Robert Kaplan pessimistically posits a two-tiered system: a developed world largely at odds with a developing world racked by disintegrating states, corruption, and omnipresent violence.⁵

Which, if any, of these outcomes will materialize and what challenges they might hold for U.S. national interests cannot and need not be forecast with certainty.⁶ Several conclusions are still possible nonetheless. First, although the world no longer faces imminent nuclear holocaust, lesser--but still significant--dangers abound. The experience of the recent and distant past, indicates that vital and important U.S. national interests will be challenged to a degree that may require a military response. Six times in this century the United States has been engaged in a major war that has required the projection of significant military power beyond the shores of the United States.⁷ If these trends continue, and there is no evidence to support the contrary conclusion, the United States can expect to engage in a major conflict within the next 20 years.

At the same time, the United States will face an unknown number of lesser, but still important challenges to its national interests that could necessitate military responses.⁸ Given the potential instabilities throughout the world and global U.S. interests, future candidates for similar operations in the future are numerous.⁹

How the United States will respond to the challenges of the international security environment of the 21st century could fall under four general categories:¹⁰

- Isolation
- Unilateralism
- Multilateralism
- Engagement

Each of these options is contentious. While the merits and demerits of each case are interesting, a detailed individual explanation is not necessary and a brief assessment of the likelihood of each alternative will suffice. In the first instance, national interests will not allow the United States to

retreat into splendid isolation and watch events go by. The United States will continue to have interests in every region of the globe that will have to be secured. Moreover, despite the occasional call to withdraw to fortress America, a broad national consensus exists that the United States cannot turn its back on the world.¹¹

Nor will the United States be able to rely on unilateralism. In this case, the United States would remain significantly engaged in global affairs, but would largely maintain a unilateral capability to secure and promote its interests. While superficially appealing, especially to opponents of isolationism or multilateralism, this option would be prohibitively expensive. These high costs could lead to three possible--and equally unattractive--alternatives. On the one hand, the United States could be forced to scale back commitments to only those that it could afford to undertake. On the other hand, attempting to meet all commitments could result in U.S. strategic requirements exceeding strategic capacity, leading to what historian Paul Kennedy calls "imperial overstretch."¹² Or, the United States might build up a large national security apparatus, leading to a garrison state.

The third alternative, loosely termed multilateralism, would rely primarily on international collective security organizations (e.g., the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE]) and agencies (such as the International Atomic Energy Agency), and close cooperation with allies and friends to secure U.S. interests. Congressional leadership and the American public have reacted strongly against overreliance on such a policy because it requires limiting freedom of action to achieve allied or coalition consensus.¹³ As a result, a policy of multilateralism to guide the future U.S. global role is unlikely, despite the advantages combined resources bring to security problems.

Engagement, the fourth option, encompasses the selective use of unilateral initiative, cooperation with allies or coalition partners, collaboration with multilateral organizations (international, governmental, nongovernmental, or private bodies), or a combination thereof to promote and protect U.S. national interests. Given the foregoing discussion, a United States that remains engaged in international affairs remains the most likely role. This conclusion stems from more than simply eliminating the other alternatives. Engagement conforms most closely to U.S. experience in the last half century, has broad public appeal, and can garner some support from elements who advocate the other options.¹⁴ Whether the level of engagement will be at, below, or above current levels remains to be seen.¹⁵ Most likely, levels will vary over time, depending on international circumstances, the national mood, and policies of specific

administrations. Equally, the scale of engagement will depend on the balance among the degree of national interest involved, U.S. unilateral capability, and reliance on allies and partners.

A last point on this issue warrants emphasis. Regardless of the eventual U.S. role in world affairs, each alternative requires the capability to wield military power to promote and protect U.S. national interests. Certainly, the national policy selected will influence significantly how military power might be used. But the central question is not whether military power will have a role, but what roles will it play?

THE FUTURE ROLES OF U.S. MILITARY POWER

Before embarking on the discussion of the future roles of military power, two key conventions used throughout the monograph require brief elaboration. First, the application of military power concerns conflict writ large, not simply war. Conflict is a broader term that ranges from non-violent competition (e.g., economic rivalry, diplomatic friction, ideological antagonisms) through general nuclear war.

This comprehensive construct is more useful for several important reasons. While Clausewitz, the preeminent German military philosopher, defined war as "an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will," that definition is too narrow for current circumstances.¹⁶ The U.S. military also uses violence short of war to achieve or ensure U.S. national interests. For instance, few today would construe a single act (e.g., bombing of Libya in 1986 or launching Tomahawk cruise missiles against Iraq in 1996) or even a brief intervention (Grenada or Panama) as war. An act of war, yes--but not war in the classic sense. Moreover, if current trends continue, "grey areas" such as large-scale criminal activity and violence, terrorism, failed states, insurrection, and intrastate conflict that do not conform to the traditional definition of war are likely to increase. Finally, U.S. Armed Forces also carry out numerous peacetime engagement, deterrence, and conflict prevention activities that fall outside the realm of war.¹⁷ Thus, in a more modern construct, military power (sometimes with other instruments of national power) may be applied across the spectrum of conflict to promote and protect U.S. national interests. See Figure 1.

Second, military power derives from military forces and military force. The two terms are complementary, not synonymous. Military forces are the personnel, elements, and units (e.g., Army divisions, Navy ships, Air Force squadrons, and Marine amphibious units) that make up the Armed Forces of the United States. Military force, on the other hand, involves the use or threat of violence to achieve a desired end state or to compel an adversary to adopt a desired behavior. Thus, one can employ




Figure 1. Military Spectrum of Conflict.

military forces without applying military force: e.g., domestic support operations (fire-fighting, counter-drug cooperation), military-to-military contacts, and nation assistance. While this may appear a semantical splitting of very fine hairs, it is an important distinction that offers a more encompassing definition of military power that better reflects the future requirements likely to face the U.S. military.

Turning to the future roles of U.S. military power, the traditional roles of deterrence, compellence, reassurance, and support to the nation certainly will remain relevant for the foreseeable future.¹⁸ Additionally, preventive defense is emerging as another role for the U.S. Armed Forces.¹⁹ How to balance these long-standing roles with the emerging role of preventive defense is the operative question. To understand how this balance might evolve, it will be necessary to examine briefly the customary roles and discuss changes or new nuances in their application due to the altered geo-strategic circumstances. Similarly, the basis and intent of preventive defense bear examination. The potential implications of preventive defense also require investigation.

Deterrence. Deterrence, generally well-understood to mean persuading an opponent not to undertake a particular action because the potential costs and risks outweigh the perceived

gain, will remain a key mainstay of U.S. national policy.²⁰ But deterrence may take on a different form than in the recent past and require some changes in the military contribution to that role. For instance, the absence of superpower competition may diminish the heretofore dominant role of nuclear weapons within deterrence policy.²¹ The emergence of rogue states or non-state actors that may have access to nuclear devices or material and that do not share the long-standing and highly developed culture of deterrence which emerged during the Cold War may further complicate issues. Equally disturbing is the rise of states, transnational organizations, criminal groups, and terrorists that may come into the possession of chemical or biological agents. Because such groups might harbor the perception that there is little or no likelihood that they may face effective retribution in kind or because they might be indifferent to such punishment, they may be difficult to deter through threat of nuclear retaliation.²²

As a result, conventional forces are likely to play a larger deterrent role than in the recent past. If, as expected, the United States retains an activist policy of intervening in areas to ensure stability, then the number of potential "deterrees" may be fairly substantial.²³ Second, the risks posed by potential adversaries will fall across a broader range of the conflict spectrum than was the case with the relatively limited requirements of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. Third, deterrence depends on communication--messages clearly sent and understood. But cross-cultural communications, which undoubtedly will increase, can be exceptionally difficult.²⁴ Fourth, because many of the states and actors that the United States may wish to deter do not possess nuclear weapons, a U.S. nuclear retaliation would likely appear disproportionate to the world community and, therefore, is unlikely to be credible. Because of the rising importance of conventional deterrence, policymakers will have to devote increased attention to designing credible deterrent mechanisms, such as coalitions and alliances, force presence and deployments, and enforced sanctions and embargoes.²⁵

Compellence. As noted in 1966 by political scientist and policy practitioner Thomas Schelling, compellence involves the use or threat of force to get an adversary to do what you want.²⁶ The ability to compel an adversary to conform to U.S. national will, usually translated as fighting and winning the nation's wars, undoubtedly will remain the ultimate duty of the U.S. Armed Forces. Moreover, because no other branch or element of the private sector can assume this responsibility, fighting and winning the nation's wars will remain the military's core function. Because this form of compellence is generally well-understood, it needs no elaboration here.

Compellence, however, is a term with broader connotations that must be taken into consideration in light of the changes in the international security environment. For example, compellence includes the application of forces as punishment, the limited use of force to achieve goals, and the threat of force to obtain desired objectives. The most important of these nuances may be what Stanford University professors Gordon Craig and Alexander George term coercive diplomacy. In this case, policymakers apply, individually or in concert, the military, diplomatic, and economic instruments of national power to "persuade" another actor to adopt a particular course of action.²⁷

Coercive diplomacy is not new; indeed, it has been used throughout recorded history. Even in the Cold War, when the risks of escalation to superpower nuclear confrontation tended to circumscribe coercive diplomacy, policymakers had to make difficult choices against the backdrop of the communist threat and the possibility of escalation. The decreased potential for nuclear confrontation, however, may reduce the encumbrances on the use of military power and could lead to coercive diplomacy assuming a larger role in future U.S. policy.²⁸

Such a course of action may be enticing, particularly from the viewpoint of the world's leading military power. But coercive diplomacy is not without shortcomings. As Craig and George emphasize, coercive diplomacy is a delicate tool that requires common ground rules, deft handling, clearly articulated *and understood* demands, continuous reassessment, and, usually, patience.²⁹ Satisfying these demanding criteria is neither easy nor, at times, possible.

Moreover, coercive diplomacy works only so long as the demanding party remains willing to coerce. This can be problematic, particularly for the United States which has not always been willing to sustain an adversary's "pain" for sufficient time or intensity for persuasion to be effective.³⁰ At the same time, once coercion ends, the party can revert back to its original behavior. Coercion also frequently depends upon the cooperation of others to ensure that the subject of coercion is denied effective alternatives. This oftentimes is difficult to effect, as the example of nations circumventing the U.N. embargo of Iraq or U.S. economic sanctions against Iran demonstrates. Lastly, an opponent must be capable of being persuaded. Again, experience indicates that certain regimes and groups are less influenced by such an approach.³¹

Coercive diplomacy usually demands a blend of the instruments of national power that are context sensitive, are appropriate to achieve the national objectives involved at the lowest possible cost, and within an acceptable level of risk. But because coercive diplomacy, especially that which relies on

diplomatic and economic instruments, frequently requires considerable time to achieve its full effects, such an approach may not fit U.S. national temperament. Public impatience, coupled with clear U.S. military superiority may result in military power becoming the predominant tool.³²

Extensive reliance on military power presents a number of potential pitfalls for U.S. policy, however. On the one hand, military power may not be the appropriate instrument for a particular case. Worse still, as famed financier and presidential adviser Bernard Baruch once cautioned, "If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail."³³ In short, if military power becomes the preferred instrument, eventually it will be used inappropriately. At best, this may hinder achieving U.S. national objectives. At worst, it could result in failed policy and place U.S. interests at risk. Costs, whether in terms of resources, wear and tear on the force, erosion of public support, or diversion of military forces from more appropriate responsibilities, can be prohibitive. Despite being the world's premier military power, therefore, the United States cannot afford to overly rely on military power.

Extensive dependence on military power could have two additional significant repercussions. On the one hand, it could lead to the creation of hostile coalitions due to a fear of U.S. military prowess and a perceived proclivity to force. On the other hand, frictions generated by a lack of agreement among U.S. friends and allies on the appropriate use of force could undermine existing coalitions and alliances

Despite these cautions, compellence will remain a critical function for the U. S. military for the foreseeable future. But, as always has been the case, officials will have to be careful in how and when the power to compel is applied.

Reassurance. Reassurance, according to historian and strategist Sir Michael Howard, who coined the term, "... provides a general sense of security that is not specific to any threat or scenario."³⁴ But the purpose of reassurance is not simply to keep U.S.allies and friends contented. Reassurance serves U.S. national interests by advancing U.S. values and beliefs; promoting regional stability; improving cooperation among allies, partners, friends, and, occasionally, adversaries; reducing the perceived need for military competition; and cultivating good will toward the United States. All of these elements (and more) contribute to an improved international security environment that ultimately benefits the United States.

A brief historical example illustrates the points above. The stationing of U.S. forces in Germany and Japan during the Cold

War reassured those nations, as well as their neighbors, that the United States was committed to their security in the face of communist threat. At the same time, U.S. forces in those countries reassured U.S. allies and friends in both regions that the growth of German and Japanese armed forces would not pose a threat to their immediate neighbors.³⁵ These circumstances contributed to the unprecedented economic growth and cooperation in Europe and Asia that has greatly benefitted the United States.

In the volatile aftermath of the Cold War, reassuring allies, friends, and even actual or potential adversaries can continue to reap benefits for the United States. Indeed, under a strategy of engagement and enlargement (or an evolutionary successor), the requirement for reassurance undoubtedly will be extended to promote the growth of democracy and market economies in areas of the world key to U.S. national interests. Reassurance will continue to be accomplished through a combination of forward stationing of forces, rotation of units to key areas of the world, exercises, and military-to-military contacts. The eventual blend of these initiatives may exert considerable influence on the size and structure of U.S. Armed Forces.

Support to the Nation. Support to the nation has two dimensions. First, the U.S. military and, especially the Army, historically have provided considerable domestic support.³⁶ While the early years of the 21st century will pose challenges different from the 19th and early 20th centuries, the U.S. military will remain engaged in domestic support operations. Missions could vary from traditional disaster relief and support of civil authorities to combating international crime, drug trafficking, and terrorism; to contributing to border and refugee control; to assisting in the rebuilding of national infrastructure; to responding to ecological disasters; even to supporting the delivery of health care to underserved segments of U.S. society.

Second, support will be focused externally to complement other policy initiatives or to respond to non-military crises. External support frequently will be in the form of disaster relief (where the military possesses the capabilities to respond rapidly and effectively to a natural or man-made disaster), or providing capabilities beyond those available to the host nation. This may take the form of humanitarian assistance (such as Bangladesh) or humanitarian intervention (Somalia in 1991 and Rwanda in 1994). Increasingly in the future security environment, military forces also may be called upon to promote stability in regions of the world important to U.S. national interests. As a result, the U.S. Armed Forces can expect increased contributions to the already significant levels of peacetime engagement activities: peacekeeping or other peace operations (e.g., support

to diplomacy, peace making, peace building, and preventive diplomacy³⁷), nation assistance, military-to-military contacts, and security assistance.³⁸

A note of caution on support operations is in order. Domestic and external support operations are important to U.S. interests at home and abroad. All too frequently, however, support missions receive little visibility--either in terms of public recognition or financial underpinning--until a particular event (e.g, hurricanes, floods, or fires) highlights the requirement. This is not to argue that such missions deserve special funding or additional force structures. But, if these operations are to be conducted routinely (as appears to be the case),³⁹ officials must take into account the costs--fiscal, wear and tear on personnel and equipment, and lost training opportunities--that such operations always incur, and treat such operations in an integrated rather than ad hoc manner.

Preventive Defense. In a series of reports, speeches and articles, former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and other Department of Defense (DoD) officials have laid the groundwork for a shift in defense strategy that moves from reliance on deterring and defeating threats to U.S. interests to a three-tiered strategy that adds the element of preventive defense.⁴⁰ In brief, the evolving strategic concept first seeks to prevent threats from emerging; to deter threats that do arise; and compel adversaries to yield if deterrence fails. As Dr. Perry describes the concept,

As preventive medicine creates conditions that make disease less likely and surgery unnecessary, preventive defense creates conditions that support peace, making war less likely and deterrence unnecessary.⁴¹

This new concept strives to use the hard-won U.S. strategic initiative to shape the international security environment in a manner that promotes and protects U.S. national interests. As described by Dr. Perry, preventive defense is premised on:

- The United States remaining a global power.
- Reducing nuclear dangers.
- Eliminating other weapons of mass destruction.
- Promoting democracy and open market economies.
- The U.S. defense establishment having a key role in the process.⁴²

Because preventive defense has only recently been articulated and continues to evolve, it has not been subjected to detailed analysis. Thus, claims of potential benefits (which this author is inclined to support) have not yet been borne out by experience. Time, analysis, and assessment of a body of relevant evidence will be required before definitive judgments can be reached. Nonetheless, past criticism of key elements of preventive defense has surfaced and should be addressed in assessing whether the United States should embrace this strategic concept.

While the first three elements of preventive defense are well-established and have generated little discussion, the premise that the DoD will play a key role in promoting democracy and open market economies is much more controversial. The major criticism argues that the United States should not assume the role of "world policeman," intervening in every global trouble spot.⁴³ The fear is that the pace of interventions will accelerate, while defense budgets continue to contract. This could lead the United States to overcommit its armed forces, eroding the effectiveness of the current force and jeopardizing the military's ability to deter threats, and, if necessary, defend U.S. national interests. Additionally, some argue, the costs of interventions or other preventive defense operations might preclude necessary modernization investments. This would leave the armed forces unprepared for the demands of the 21st century.⁴⁴

Although this argument has merit, policymakers can take steps to preclude such an outcome. For example, the Clinton administration responded to criticism of U.S. involvement in peace operations (perhaps the most contentious form of intervention) in Somalia and Haiti by publishing "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations" (also known as Presidential Decision Directive [PDD]-25) (May 1994). PDD-25 set clear criteria under which the United States would engage in multilateral peace operations, and called for specific reforms in U.N. peace operations procedures.⁴⁵ Future presidential administrations and congressional leaders undoubtedly will devote careful attention to revising the criteria contained in PDD-25 or in establishing new ones.

Criticisms of potential resource-cost mismatch also miss the mark. First, such an argument assumes that sufficient fiscal resources will not be made available. This outcome is not inevitable. The American public has long sustained considerable defense spending in pursuit of national objectives. More cogent may be the requirement that the American public and its elected representatives believe they are getting an adequate return on their defense investment.⁴⁶ Second, if preventive defense works, there will be less need for deterrence and defense expenditures,

and defense budgets may be able to remain static or decline over time without jeopardizing national interests. Granted, preventive defense may not work as well as the aspirations some advocates have for it. Nonetheless, in this period of greatly reduced threats, the risks of implementing this concept may be justified by the potential return on investment.

Other critics note that preventive defense missions are not "traditional" missions for the U.S. military.⁴⁷ Such an argument is circular. First, such an approach fails to account for how current missions became "traditional." Second, this argues that the U.S. military should be intolerant of change--which is unsustainable. Third, preventive defense subsumes many activities which fall under the classic roles of compellence, deterrence, reassurance, or support to the nation that the U.S. military has long performed.⁴⁸ Fourth, preventive defense is traditional in the sense that it closely integrates defense resources in support of overall U.S. foreign policy. The United States always has engaged in preventive defense type activities;⁴⁹ it was only the exigencies of the Cold War that forced the United States to place greater stress on deterrence and compellence. With the absence of superpower confrontation, however, this strategic concept can be explored anew.

Preventive defense is innovative in its emphasis on shaping the international security environment and relying less on deterrence and compellence. And, it is novel in its use of the military to capitalize on opportunities to promote, as well as protect, U.S. national interests. These approaches depart, somewhat, from past practice and have generated some unease, especially within Congress, about whether such a role is appropriate for the U.S. military.⁵⁰ Certainly, a danger exists that the military could be used too often in lieu of diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments, but assessing the risks of employing policy instruments is a responsibility inherent in national strategic leadership. Indeed, policymakers faced similar difficulties throughout the Cold War and steered a stable course. Critics, therefore, should take care to separate the new from the simply unfamiliar. In a new era, moreover, where the United States seeks to shape a stable international system, it makes little sense to withhold, a priori, one of the nation's most effective instruments from a large class of policy initiatives.

Criticism of preventive defense also appears to presume that members of the U.S. Armed Forces lack the requisite flexibility to shift from preventive defense to warfighting missions and back again. This assumption flies in the face of recent and past experience.⁵¹ During and, more frequently, since the Cold War, the U.S. Armed Forces have undertaken numerous, diverse operations, exhibiting a great degree of flexibility in the process. For example, military-to-military contacts (either through the

Partnership for Peace program, combined exercises, mobile training teams, or liaison programs); nation assistance (especially within Central America); humanitarian assistance (Latin America and Africa, in particular); security assistance (world-wide); peacekeeping (e.g., the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai, participation in numerous U.N. observer missions); preventive deployments (such as Macedonia); sanctions enforcement (the former Yugoslavia, Iraq); and peace enforcement operations (e.g., Haiti and Bosnia). See Figure 2.

Other critics charge that participating in preventive defense missions will erode individual and collective warfighting skills, hurt recruiting and retention, reduce readiness, and, perhaps, leave the United States vulnerable.⁵² This critique suffers from a number of shortcomings. First, while it bears watching there is no compelling evidence, yet, that such operations have significantly degraded the combat capabilities of participating units, much less the remainder of the force which continues to deter and remains positioned to compel, when required.⁵³ Granted the pace of deployments in U.S. Army, Europe or in high demand specialized units (e.g., PATRIOT air defense systems) takes a toll on unit stability,⁵⁴ but the regional stability that these missions obviously have fostered contributes to U.S. national interests. Second, critics rely on historical example of the cycles of U.S. unpreparedness.⁵⁵ But such cycles are not inevitable. Humans are capable of learning from the past and applying those insights to the future. DoD leaders are acutely aware of past failures and are wary of repeating such mistakes. Third, while the Army is having some difficulty meeting its recruiting goals, the reasons appear to be more economically and demographically based than connected with preventive defense missions.⁵⁶ U.S. Army Europe, perhaps the most committed organization, is meeting or exceeding its reenlistment goals.⁵⁷

Despite best efforts, preventive defense measures will not always succeed. But, absent preventive defense, crises are more likely, and action, probably more costly action, would be required anyway. Even if preventive defense occasionally fails, decisionmakers should have the advantage of more timely assessments to ensure that disastrous results do not ensue. None of the objections have sufficient force of argument to overturn increased reliance on preventive defense--especially given the potential for a high return on a limited security investment.

IMPLICATIONS OF GREATER EMPHASIS ON PREVENTIVE DEFENSE

Advocacy of preventive defense does not imply that the concept is without consequences for the U.S. military. Indeed, they could be profound; particularly as officials strive to strike an effective balance among the preventive defense, deter, and compel roles. Because the full outlines of preventive defense




Figure 2. Operational Pace, 1991-97.

have not been sketched out, the discussion that follows should be viewed as a first step in understanding the fuller implications of a greater reliance on preventive defense. The analysis focuses on three specific levels: national strategy, national military strategy, and the Army.

Implications at the National Strategy Level.

While evolutionary changes in the national security strategy likely will occur as a result of increased stress on preventive defense, major changes are doubtful. Under the strategy paradigm, policymakers strive to balance objectives (ends), implementing concepts (ways), and resources (means). Because of the enduring nature of national interests, ends (national interests and objectives) usually do not change significantly. Means also tend to remain consistent, although the allocation of resources to the various instruments of national power may vary over time.⁵⁸ Similarly, current and anticipated conditions argue against significant changes in the balance of existing strategic concepts: enhancing our security, promoting prosperity at home, and promoting democracy.⁵⁹ Thus, while minor adjustments may occur, the general outlines of national security strategy are likely to remain similar to today.⁶⁰ Discussion of the implications at the national strategy level, therefore, will focus primarily on achieving consensus on future action, cooperating within the interagency process, ensuring an appropriate mix of the instruments of national power, and establishing national security priorities deserve special attention.

For preventive defense to be successful, a national consensus on its role will have to be crafted. This first must occur within the Executive Branch, where the sometimes differing views of key cabinet members must be reconciled.⁶¹ Only then can the administration hope to build bipartisan support within Congress, that eventually can be expanded to include the American public.

The successful implementation of preventive defense also will require a high degree of cooperation among key bureaucratic actors in Washington. While simple to state, such coordination will be difficult to effect due to poor current levels of cooperation, differing bureaucratic cultures, and the increasing pace of events. One small, but potentially important, contribution to improved interagency cooperation would be for Executive Departments to adopt, or at least be familiar with, joint doctrine for interagency operations.⁶² Another option with possible high payoff would be to expand the emerging Interagency

Training for Complex Contingencies initiative which addresses operations with political, military, humanitarian and developmental, and security implications.⁶³

Effectively implementing preventive defense also will depend on an appropriate blend of the instruments of national power applied to fit the circumstances at hand. While aggregate national power stems from a variety of elements,⁶⁴ that power can be channeled only through specific policy options or instruments: economic, diplomatic, informational, and military.⁶⁵ The application of these instruments cannot be viewed in isolation. Individually and collectively, these instruments are highly interdependent and must be treated as a synergistic whole. They also have a crucial psychological dimension which further intertwines them. Thus, "cookie-cutter" solutions for applying the instruments of national power are not appropriate. Each issue is unique and successful policy options generally will employ a blend of the various instruments that maximizes individual and collective strengths and minimizes vulnerabilities.

While easily said, such balance and finesse is usually hard to ensure in the harsh light of demanding reality and will depend upon close collaboration with allies and friends around the globe. It will also hinge, especially in the near term, on increased cooperation from former adversaries.⁶⁶ Such cooperation flows from good diplomacy.⁶⁷ For preventive defense to function most competently also will require effective intelligence gathering and analysis, timely political decisionmaking, adequate funding, and perseverance. Finally, analysts must lay the foundation for preventive defense *now*. They must identify potential fracture zones or hot spots, ethnic rifts, or intra- or inter-state conflict; develop and assess potential policy options; conduct risk analyses; and assess high payoff opportunities. Individually, each of these conditions can be difficult to achieve. In concert, they may be particularly difficult to effect; especially in times of reduced threat perception that may diminish the incentive to trade short-term expense for long-term gain.

Preventive defense also will require greater patience. This will not be easy. Diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of power generally take time and continued refinement to realize results. In comparison, the military option looks enticing: it is responsive, does what it is told, and offers the illusion of a "quick fix" (or at least quicker than the other instruments of power). And, events of the last 50 years have conditioned policymakers to rely heavily on the military arm. Impatience may drive decisionmakers to seek a more rapid resolution through the application of military power.

But, as indicated earlier, success in the future security

environment is more likely to hinge on the ability to integrate all instruments of national power than on a unidimensional strategy (which rarely succeeds). Overreliance on the military runs the risk of using an inappropriate instrument, debilitating the military, lessening public and congressional support for such operations, and inhibiting achievement of desired ends.⁶⁸ Avoiding the seduction of using military power will require many hard decisions concerning the use of force vice a more appropriate blend with the other instruments of power.

On the other hand, the United States cannot afford to view military power only as the instrument of last resort. Military power in many cases has much greater utility when used sooner rather than later, or after other instruments have failed. If the military option is deferred too long, a particular crisis may deteriorate to the point that military power may be unable to salvage a situation within acceptable levels of cost.⁶⁹ Military power, therefore, should be applied in conjunction with other instruments of power in a comprehensive and complementary manner that offers the greatest chance of success at least cost (in either lives or treasure). This will obviously complicate the decisionmaking calculus, and increase the complexity of governmental policy development and execution. But this challenge offers the opportunity to shape events much more effectively than by relying on force as a last resort.

Lastly, the United States does not have the resources to do everything, everywhere, every time. Priorities for U.S. action must be established. Obviously, promoting stability in the former Soviet Union, particularly Ukraine and Russia, is in U.S. national interests. Stability in the emerging democracies of Central Europe also is a major concern. Without doubt, preventive defense measures that complement diplomatic and economic initiatives and contribute to a comprehensive peace in the Middle East must rank high. Undertakings that strive to prevent further conflict in Asia, especially the Persian Gulf and Korean Peninsula merit special consideration. Given the growing economic importance of the Americas, greater emphasis may have to be devoted to promoting stability in the Western Hemisphere.

In sum, the application of national power, and especially the military instrument, will remain an art, not a science. In developing policy options to implement preventive defense, therefore, policymakers must carefully integrate all instruments of national power. These tools cannot be artificially divorced, and officials must seek the synergistic application of appropriate instruments. However, sufficient time must be granted for these initiatives to work. This may require longer lead times for the interagency process to work the issues, mold consensus, and develop policy options. This presupposes early detection of potential hot spots or crises and effective organizations and

channels of communication that can surface such issues expeditiously. At the same time, each application will require continuous assessment and revision as changing conditions demand.⁷⁰

The challenges presented above are significant, but they can be overcome. It will take hard work, time, and considerable patience, but potential payoffs--in terms of improved security for the United States and the promotion and protection of U.S. national interests--are high. To achieve these dividends will require a number of actions:

- National leaders must have a clear vision of not just what the United States *can* do, but what the United States is *willing* to do.
- Policymakers must clearly define, and more importantly clearly articulate to the American public, U.S. interests and how preventive defense can promote and protect those interests.
- Officials must assess how much emphasis can be placed on preventive defense versus deterrence and compellence.
- The American public and its elected representatives in Congress must be persuaded to fund programs that provide long-term benefit, without necessarily seeing short-term results. This must be accomplished in a time of shrinking budgets, when Americans will undoubtedly question such expenditures. Nonetheless, these steps, however difficult, offer a cost effective alternative to later military intervention.

Implications at the National Military Level.⁷¹

The national military strategy may be subject to more significant change.⁷² These changes flow from the dynamics of the strategy paradigm. If, as indicated above, the national security strategy remains largely fixed, and there is continuing pressure to reduce defense budgets, then strategic concepts should be expected to adapt to the changing international security environment and budget priorities.

A greater emphasis on preventive defense could have considerable consequences across a broad range of topics at the national military level. To keep the discussion within reasonable bounds, this monograph examines the implications inherent in: establishing priorities among anticipated roles for the U.S. Armed Forces, increased participation in multinational operations, greater interaction with nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations, doctrinal issues, resource allocation, and force structure.

Establishing Priorities. The number, variety, and frequency of missions will undoubtedly increase under a shift to greater stress on preventive defense. New missions, such as confronting international organized crime, punishing terrorists and their sponsors, or border control could significantly challenge the U.S. Armed Forces. Counter- and anti-proliferation activities, massive environmental clean-up or restoration, and increased domestic support also would place considerable demands on military capabilities.

More familiar, but still relatively new, missions could assume greater importance. Counter-drug operations, refugee control, peace operations, humanitarian assistance, stability and support operations, and security assistance on a larger scale than practiced to date would further stress military forces. Certainly, such missions could promote and protect U.S. national interests, but they would come at a cost.

Despite the increased importance of preventive defense operations, the U.S. military will still face the requirement to deter and, if necessary, compel, potential adversaries. Balancing these competing activities has always presented challenges, but increasingly constrained defense budgets will complicate the task. Clear priorities will be necessary. In the near term, deterrence and compellence must remain the primary focus of the U.S. Armed Forces. Nonetheless, increased resources should be applied to preventive defense operation to shape the international environment in ways that promote and protect U.S. national interests while decreasing the long-term need for deterrence and compellence forces. Over time, and only as conditions warrant, policymakers can determine if further shifts in emphasis are in order.

Planning for Preventive Defense. Long-term planning for implementing preventive defense measures is possible. Regional Combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) have regional engagement plans or are in the midst of creating them.⁷³ These plans address the long-term objectives, concepts, and resources that will be applied to promote and protect U.S. national interests in a particular region. While the regional plans provide an excellent starting point, the DoD needs to create a master global engagement plan that integrates and synchronizes the efforts of the regional CINCs to ensure the effective promotion and protection of U.S. national interests worldwide.⁷⁴ Only in this manner can priorities be clearly established and resources allocated to provide the most effective return on investment.

In the short term, planning frequently will have to be accomplished in an ambiguous environment. Crises will arrive

quickly, requiring rapid responses, often in the absence of complete U.S. political guidance or consensus among potential coalition partners. Developing concepts and plans will be possible only if analysts within the DoD, the Joint Staff, the Services, and the Combatant Commands possess a detailed working knowledge of the various regions; their history, culture, and ethnic composition; the ethnic lines that divide a particular society; and the issues that may lead to inter- or intra-state conflict. Without such specific information, plans and efforts to implement them could be ineffective, or exacerbate an already volatile situation.

Participating in Multinational Efforts. To keep costs down and to increase the effectiveness of its efforts, the United States frequently will participate in multinational efforts to prevent conditions that could lead to the outbreak of conflict or threats to U.S. national interests. This undoubtedly will require the United States to continue a close association with the United Nations, as well as numerous regional security and economic organizations.⁷⁵

To overcome the complexities inherent in collaborating with such multilateral organizations, the United States should press for reforms in organizations in which it holds membership. Where possible, the United States should also continue to insist that regional defense or collective security organizations of which it is a member (such as NATO and the Organization of American States [OAS]) continue to be the lead element in operations requiring the employment of military power. Common doctrine, standard operating procedures and techniques, as well as interoperability and a well-established command and control architecture offer significant advantages in the planning, coordination, and execution of operations. Lastly, the United States also should encourage reform within organizations to which it does not belong, but which it shares interests and can influence (e.g., Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS]).

U.S. cooperation within such international bodies is not, however, without its drawbacks. Establishing and sustaining consensus among coalition partners, whether at the political or military level, is rarely easy. Moreover, the degree of complexity grows geometrically as the number of coalition partners increases, as each member frequently has vastly differing national interests and views on actions that might be undertaken.⁷⁶ On a more practical level, this may require the United States to hammer out differences in peace operations doctrine, command and control procedures, and logistical arrangements with a wide range of organizations and countries well in advance of anticipated operations.

Despite these difficulties, it is important to keep in mind that these groups generally serve U.S. national interests. Indeed, in many cases, the United States played a leading role in creating these bodies and has used them to U.S. advantage in the past. It can do so in the future, as well.

The altered security environment may require some changes, however, in the U.S. approach to these organizations. For instance, the United States may have to adopt a new style of leadership in such bodies. Specifically, the United States must seek greater cooperation with allies and partners. In some cases, the United States may have to exert strong leadership. But in most cases, building a genuine consensus based on shared interests will be more effective than forcing the U.S. view on others.⁷⁷ This also implies greater U.S. effort towards understanding and accommodating the concerns and interests of partners. Such an approach may complicate U.S. policymaking in the short term, but in the long term it will contribute to more effective participation in multinational organizations that can support or complement U.S. interests.

At the same time, the United States can encourage friends and allies to shoulder a reasonable portion of future preventive defense activities. While the United States can expect to reap substantial benefits from such burden-sharing (reduced fiscal costs, decreased casualties, greater strategic focus), it will place demands on diplomatic resources. Officials must acknowledge that the United States is not the only nation interested in promoting stability and recognize the many efforts already underway.⁷⁸ The United States also must anticipate and manage inevitable "burdensharing" frictions such as those that plagued NATO in the 1970s-1980s. Additionally, allies and partners will have interests and policies that do not conform to U.S. objectives. Policymakers must be alert to such possibilities and closely coordinate initiatives to ensure maximum convergence--or, at least minimum divergence--of U.S. and other nations' aims. All of this will require greater diplomatic efforts than if the United States pursued a more unilateral approach.

Allies and partners assuming a larger share of preventive defense activities will reduce, but not eliminate requests for U.S. participation. A U.S. presence will still bring increased prestige and effects to multilateral efforts. Moreover, many allies and friends who can be expected to carry out preventive defense activities are notably deficient in logistics, intelligence, and communications capabilities, and they lack the strategic mobility to deploy the few units available for operations. Considerable U.S. logistical and other support may still be required to perform such tasks.

These difficulties notwithstanding, the United States should

pursue greater participation by allies and partners in preventive defense activities. Potential benefits from cost reductions to the United States are obvious. More importantly, the increased focus and attention devoted to preventive defense, frequently by highly capable nations, will promote stability in key regions of the world and help shape the international security environment to mutual benefit.

Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)/Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs). Nor will cooperative efforts be limited to other governments or militaries. Given the nature of preventive defense missions in which U.S. forces might be engaged, they will have to coordinate efforts with NGOs and PVOs, which frequently bring expectations and perceptions to a cooperative effort that differ from those of the U.S. military.⁷⁹ While this may sometimes strain working relations, these organizations need each other and all must be prepared to work for the common ends they share.

The U.S. military can reduce tensions somewhat by emphasizing that U.S. forces are present to assist and support the NGOs/PVOs, not to lead or command them. Commanders should underscore the complementary nature of their organizations, and promote teamwork that contributes to mission accomplishment by all parties.⁸⁰ Indeed, the U.S. military must recognize that NGOs and PVOs can assume a considerable portion of humanitarian assistance missions, freeing military forces to focus on other tasks and conclude the military deployment much earlier.

Such close cooperation will require U.S. military leaders to possess an increased awareness of the types and numbers of these organizations. They must continue to develop the means (such as the highly successful Civil Military Operations Center [CMOC] concept) that enable NGOs/PVOs to meet their own missions within the context of military operations.⁸¹ To those ends, the military must build upon the wealth of experience gained in recent years (northern Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia) from participation with NGOs/PVOs. This information must be codified and distributed throughout the military to educate and prepare elements of the force without experience in such operations.⁸² Efforts such as those of the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute should be expanded at the DoD level to take advantage of existing experience and communicate valuable insights about NGOs/PVOs.⁸³ Lastly, and again building on the Army's Peacekeeping Institute, the DoD needs to support outreach initiatives that build linkages and understanding between it and civilian organizations.

Doctrine. In this decade, joint doctrine for the conduct of preventive defense operations has grown considerably in volume and sophistication.⁸⁴ A number of other important publications are under development.⁸⁵ Despite this commendable effort, gaps in

current doctrine will have to be filled. More time also will be required for doctrine to percolate through the entire joint and DoD community, be employed, assessed for viability, and revised to better fit operational realities. Doctrine also must be understood and coordinated throughout the interagency process, as well as with NGOs and PVOs. This will be a continuous process conducted over a prolonged period.⁸⁶ Also, as joint doctrine matures, the U.S. Armed Forces must help develop unified and combined doctrine.⁸⁷

To assist in doctrinal development, the DoD Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) should be expanded to identify insights that affect the operational and strategic levels of warfare and operations other than war. Such judgments can then be used to improve planning, coordination, and execution of future roles, but particularly for preventive defense.

Force Structure. Some important caveats apply to a discussion of the potential implications of force redesign and structure. Defense planners cannot start from scratch.⁸⁸ While starting with a clean slate might be an intellectually appealing exercise, the realities inherent in overhauling any organization of the size and with the responsibilities of the DoD argue against a complete top to bottom restructuring. Moreover, many DoD functions are set by law. Combatant Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) and Services fulfill roles and missions also established under law. Budgets and long-term programs are always in the midst of execution. Contracts have been let and must be completed or the DoD will be subject to significant penalties. The effect on defense industries and also on the remainder of the economy would be considerable if those programs were suddenly aborted.

Nor can the military set aside its duties and responsibilities for the time that would be required to plan and execute a fundamental overhaul of the DoD. Lastly, and it may seem naive in an era when corporate downsizing is the vogue, a degree of loyalty is owed to the people who have spent their lives in service to the nation. Thus, as planners struggle with the best ways to structure the U.S. Armed Forces for the requirements of the 21st century, these realities and the degree of change that is possible within acceptable limits of risk must be kept in perspective.

For the foreseeable future, the baseline requirement for any force structure design must remain the capability to win two Major Theaters of War (MTWs). Current debates about "near simultaneity," "close succession," and competing scenarios notwithstanding, geo-strategic conditions strongly indicate that the United States could face significant regional competitors in geographically separated theaters of operations. Force structure

changes to accommodate greater emphasis on preventive defense, therefore, cannot degrade the military's ability to carry out its deter and compel roles.

That having been said, greater emphasis must be placed on preventive defense to take advantage of the current window of opportunity to shape the international security environment. No one is advocating a wholesale shift to preventive defense at the expense of the ability to deter and compel. Deterrence and compellence and preventive defense are complementary, not mutually exclusive concepts. As Dr. Perry frequently noted, preventive defense is the first line of defense to be backed up by deterrence and compellence if necessary.⁸⁹ The issue here is more a question of relative emphasis and a judgment of how limited resources can be applied to preventive defense within an acceptable level of risk.

Over time, the mix of capabilities and the priorities of the various roles can be adjusted to fit the conditions at the time. Should conditions improve, more assets can be devoted to preventive defense. If circumstances dictate, emphasis can shift back to deter and, if necessary, compel enemies. These competing demands will create tensions, no doubt, but they are neither insurmountable nor irreversible. They do call, however, for dynamic strategy and force planning processes. See Figure 3.




Figure 3. Balancing Preventive Defense, Deterrence, and Compellence.

This ability to shift as circumstances merit will require continuous evaluation to determine if the forces structured for the various roles remain appropriate for the anticipated conditions. This will require near-term and long-term assessments. If they are not performed routinely, the military may find itself suddenly short of the capabilities needed to meet the demands of the current and emerging international security environment. Or, conversely, the DoD may find itself with too much of a type of force structure that may not be the most effective for circumstances at the time.

Because of the near-term requirements to be prepared to fight and win two MTWs, many analysts have argued for a focus on warfighting capabilities.⁹⁰ And, some might assert that, like during the Cold War, forces designed to operate at the higher range of the spectrum in the post-Cold War era should be able to operate effectively along the lower end of the spectrum, as well. While that may have been the necessary view during the Cold War, when nearly all forces were focused on deterring and possibly fighting the Soviet Union, and perforce had to be considered

capable of responding to any smaller contingency,⁹¹ this may not be the case in the future.

The "lesser-included capabilities" rationale overlooks the possibility that the capabilities needed for effective preventive defense may not be subsumed within those optimized to deter and compel.⁹² Forces fine-tuned for warfighting--while very good at deterring, punishing, and compelling--may not be effective outside those roles. Equally, units capable of conducting high-speed, synchronized mechanized operations may not be suitable for conducting operations in an urban environment or counter-guerrilla operations. Nor are forces equipped with technologically sophisticated systems necessarily capable of developing close personal relationships or facilitating delicate negotiations between hostile factions.

Optimizing for warfighting (especially for mid- to high-intensity conventional warfare) also offers the opportunity for potential adversaries to pursue asymmetric strategies and warfighting concepts that circumvent U.S. capabilities. If the supposedly optimized force does not possess the capabilities and flexibility to respond to such challenges, U.S. interests may be placed at risk. Conversely, a well-balanced force, capable of responding to a wide scope of possible counters may convince potential opponents that they cannot bypass U.S. capabilities. Unsure of "winning" they may quit before they start.

On the other hand, defense planners cannot optimize a substantial portion of American forces to carry out preventive defense missions. The near-term security environment dictates that the United States maintain considerable capacity to deter and, if necessary, compel potential adversaries. Over time and as security conditions merit, it may be possible to design and designate more specialized units for the conduct of preventive defense missions (e.g., peacekeeping operations), but that time has not yet come.

A better approach to force structure is to develop multidimensional balance among the capabilities necessary to prevent the emergence of threats, deter threats that emerge, and compel adversaries. A similar balance also must be achieved among the Services, as well as among their components. To be able to shape the international security environment to promote, as well as protect, national interests, the U.S. Armed Forces will need to be able to:

- Respond to a broad spectrum of conflict spanning from terrorism to high intensity warfare.
- Operate effectively across the full range of military operations. (See Figure 4.)

Military Operations		General U.S. Goal	Examples
COMBAT	War	Fight & Win	Large-scale Combat Operations: Attack / Defend / Blockades
	NONCOMBAT Operations Other Than War	Deter War & Resolve Conflict	Peace Enforcement / Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) / Strikes / Raids / Show of Force / Counterterrorism / Peacekeeping / Counterinsurgency
		Promote Peace	Antiterrorism / Disaster Relief / Peacebuilding / Nation Assistance / Civil Support / Counterdrug / NEO

Source: Joint Publication 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, February 1, 1995, p. I-2.

Figure 4. Range of Military Operations.

- Possess sufficient flexibility to adapt to changes in the international security environment, fluctuating fiscal resources, and alternative strategic concepts, while keeping risks within acceptable limits.
- Provide a suitable balance among the capabilities necessary to prevent threats, deter and compel, and render support to the nation.
- Be able to operate with allies and with coalition partners.

Such balance and flexibility may require more forces than some anticipate, as well as significant adjustments within the U.S. Armed Forces. Specifically, a greater emphasis on preventive defense appears to correlate to an increased reliance on ground forces and the air and maritime elements which support them logistically. While the maritime services and the Air Force are

excellent instruments for hedging against risks and compelling an opponent, they may not be as effective at carrying out preventive defense operations. Planes overhead or ships off shore may do little to shape the security environment where an adversary refuses to be influenced by their presence.⁹³ The Army, as opposed to the other Services, is structured to work effectively within all three tiers of the emerging national military strategy.

Resource Allocation. As cuts in the defense budget since the end of the Cold War and the debates surrounding the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) indicate, resources are not likely to be available to fund all roles to levels that proponents would like. And, within a static or shrinking budget, that usually requires allocating funds to match priorities. A shift of emphasis toward preventive defense, therefore, will require a commensurate shift in resources to those Services and organizations that can best contribute to preventive defense objectives. This may require breaking the long-standing budget allocation paradigm that has existed since roughly World War II.⁹⁴ Specifically, the Army-- which has borne and can be expected to bear the brunt of preventive defense operations--may have to receive a larger share of DoD funds than heretofore has been the case. Such changes will not be easy in a time of diminishing resources, but must be made if the United States is to make preventive defense a reality. Only then can the United States best reap the benefits offered by the absence of a global threat and shape the international security environment in a manner that promotes and protects U.S. national interests.

Implications for the Army.

A greater emphasis on preventive defense obviously will have considerable consequences for the U.S. Army. While those implications will be many and varied, the discussion that follows will focus on a few key issues: doctrine, training, and force structure and mix. In the latter category, the discussion will address the types of units required for preventive defense missions; role specialization versus task organization and training; and factors influencing the Active/Reserve Component force structure mix. The implications of three potential options for allocating roles and force structure are explored in the last portion of this section.

Doctrine. U.S. engagement in preventive defense operations has implications for existing and emerging Army doctrine. The Army has made great strides in addressing the challenges posed by preventive defense tasks such as peace operations, humanitarian assistance, and domestic support.⁹⁵ And, the Army is developing doctrine to meet the demands of anticipated missions that may fall under preventive defense.⁹⁶ But the Army is exploring largely

uncharted, or at least unfamiliar, territory and these efforts are only a first step. As an institution, and as individuals, the Army needs to undertake a more thorough exploration of preventive defense, as well as its subordinate missions.

For example, the Army will find it profitable to reexamine the lessons distilled (perhaps forgotten, perhaps expunged from memory) from nearly four decades of experience in counter-insurgency warfare, foreign internal defense, and low-intensity conflict.⁹⁷ Undoubtedly, many of these lessons, some learned at tremendous cost, could be applied to future operations. Leaders and doctrine developers may also wish to reexamine and reassess the extensive writings on limited war of the 1950s-1960s to glean any insights that might be useful in planning for future endeavors. Doctrine developers also need to plumb the Reserve Component experience in humanitarian assistance operations, disaster relief, community action, and domestic support missions for insights that can be incorporated into doctrine for wider application within preventive defense.

The Army also should apply its current doctrine for planning combat operations to the planning and conduct of preventive defense operations. This is not as contradictory as it first appears. Preventive defense missions will need to be integrated into theater strategies and plans that link military operations to national strategy and policies and apply the operational art of employing military forces to achieve political ends.⁹⁸

Furthermore, planning for preventive defense operations should follow a process similar to planning for combat operations. Military commanders and their staffs still will need to perform a mission analysis; conduct a commander's and staff estimate of the situation; develop the commander's concept of operations and intent; prepare, approve, and distribute plans and orders; execute operations; and supervise. And, as with the planning and conduct of combat operations, iterative reassessments need to be conducted to ensure that concepts and plans continue to conform to policy and operational requirements. At the same time, military planners must expand the circle of contributors to the plan. Interagency deliberations and participants must be factored into the planning process. Allies and partners must be included. It also will become increasingly important to incorporate NGOs and PVOs in this phase. In short, the integration of all applicable instruments of national power and the rising numbers of organizations participating in preventive defense (as well as deter and compel) operations will demand a greatly expanded strategic and operational planning community.

Training. New conditions, missions, and doctrine also

dictate a reexamination of the training regimen necessary to support the anticipated future roles of the U.S. military. Because of the continued need to deter and the ultimate responsibility to compel, unit and individual training must still focus on those combat skills necessary to prevail upon the battlefield. The potential for some preventive defense operations (e.g., peacekeeping, peace enforcement, sanctions enforcement) to escalate rapidly into combat reinforces this requirement. While the Army has garnered considerable expertise in this arena, a few key issues deserve brief comment.

First, preventive defense operations (especially any enforcement operation) may require *combat skills different* from those needed to conduct highly mechanized operations. The Army must be alert to these differences and ensure that they are incorporated into unit and individual training. The inclusion of peace operations exercises at the Joint Readiness Training Center (Fort Polk, LA) and the Combat Maneuver Training Center (Hohenfels, FRG) are excellent examples of this trend, and need to be continued.⁹⁹

Second, planners and analysts need to assess the *specific training* designed to prepare units for the transition from a focus on combat to preventive defense operations. The U.S. Army's experience in preparing units for the Multinational Force and Observer (MFO) mission in the Sinai, participating in Partnership for Peace exercises, conducting humanitarian assistance operations, and enforcing the peace in Haiti and Bosnia-Herzegovina should serve as a firm foundation examining such issues.

Third, training plans that focus on maintaining--to the maximum extent possible given mission requirements--individual, crew, and collective combat skills need to be devised. In this case, the Army can capitalize on the recent assessments carried out in conjunction with the deployment of 1st Armored Division to Bosnia as part of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR.¹⁰⁰ Equally important, training concepts and plans to assist units in the transition from preventive defense operations to full warfighting capabilities need to be refined.¹⁰¹

Finally, the Army needs to think more about how to transition U.S. forces from national or U.S.-led coalition command to control by a multinational headquarters.¹⁰²

Leader development is a third key element. Because of the "gray" nature of many preventive defense missions and the difficulties inherent in multinational operations, U.S. Army personnel may have to accommodate themselves to political guidance less specific and rules of engagement more restrictive than they desire. This will affect all levels of decisionmaking

and will have wide-ranging effects. On one level, analysts and decisionmakers will require a more sophisticated understanding of the interagency process, within which they must be able to ask more probing questions of the Army's political masters. They must also participate effectively with the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commanders-in-Chief of the unified commands, multinational commanders and staffs, U.N. agencies and NGOs/PVOs. At ever lower levels, leaders in the field will require a greater degree of military and diplomatic sophistication. Privates and sergeants may be placed in positions requiring decisions or actions of strategic import. Junior officers almost certainly will make decisions that impinge on strategy and policy. Existing training and education programs, especially at the officer and noncommissioned officer basic and advanced courses, must be adjusted to accommodate these new conditions.

Force Mix and Structure. At present, key observers judge the current force structure as being the minimum necessary to carry out existing tasks.¹⁰³ Additional demands resulting from an increased emphasis on preventive defense could strain the force. Additionally, because ground forces best lend themselves to the conduct of preventive defense missions, the Army likely will assume the greatest burden of implementing the new strategic concept. The twin challenges of increased tasks and constrained defense spending will have significant influence on Army force structures needed to meet the demands of the 21st century.

This conclusion does not argue against a greater focus on preventive defense. To the contrary, this author is convinced that preventive defense offers significant opportunities to shape the international security environment in ways that promote and protect U.S. national interests, and that the United States should not pass up this rare opportunity. But that does not mean that preventive defense comes without costs or challenges. The intent here is to raise a number of issues to provide a better understanding of the challenges that will likely result from a shift toward greater emphasis on preventive defense.

In developing Army XXI and the Army After Next, the Army must examine a number of questions concerning preventive defense. For example, what types of units will be needed for effective preventive defense? Are existing units, after appropriate task organization and additional specialized training, sufficient to meet the demands of such operations? Or should the Army design or designate specific units for certain missions, such as peace operations? Where should units be located: in the Active or the Reserve Components? How might the Army allocate requirements and roles?

This list of questions is not all-inclusive and other issues

undoubtedly merit consideration. Nor will the analysis seeking answers to these questions be exhaustive. The intent is to raise the more salient first order issues requiring resolution in the near term if the Army is to effectively and efficiently execute future preventive defense missions.

Types of Units Needed for Preventive Defense? In brief, all current types of units could be required for preventive defense activities. Units can anticipate performing across a broad portion of the spectrum of conflict, as well as across much of the range of military operations. Given the nature of many preventive defense operations (for instance, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, mobile training teams, logistics, communications interoperability, peace operations), however, the preponderance of preventive defense missions may fall upon combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. Current experience indicates that units and personnel that have a dual military-civil application (e.g., military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, engineers, aviation, and all forms of logistical support) are in high demand. At the same time, increasing automation, personnel reductions, and consolidation of fewer and leaner units at higher echelons of command have resulted in CS and CSS units being caught between diminishing numbers and increasing demand for their services.¹⁰⁴

Increased participation in stability operations also may call for greater numbers of special operations forces (SOF) units. SOF personnel possess language skills, regional expertise, and knowledge of local customs and cultures. Such attributes can be invaluable in a wide variety of missions falling under the preventive defense umbrella. Moreover, they reinforce and complement skills needed to deter and compel. The utility of SOF in preventive defense and in warfighting argues for an assessment of whether increased numbers of SOF units would be advisable.¹⁰⁵

At the same time, and as indicated earlier, peace operations, particularly peace enforcement missions hold a high potential to evolve rapidly into operations requiring combat capabilities. Certainly, units engaged in preventive defense missions such as sanctions enforcement or peace enforcement may require the full array of combat, CS, and CSS capabilities. Additionally, combat capabilities may be required, if in a limited extent, to fight terrorism, drug trafficking, or international large scale crime. On the other end of the spectrum, highly specialized units, such as preventive medicine detachments, may be required.

The size of organizations participating in preventive defense activities could vary considerably. The higher reaches (large-scale peace operations, for example) could require the

greater portion of a corps.¹⁰⁶ Or, one or more brigades or a division-sized force may be needed to participate in multinational training exercises aimed at fostering transparency and promoting stability. Conversely, very small detachments from a wide variety of units could be employed in support of preventive defense activities (e.g., medical detachments, logistics teams, military-to-military liaison groups).

Current trends and anticipated geo-strategic conditions argue for maintaining a broad range of units in the force structure. The demands of preventive defense, however, may necessitate a greater numbers or availability of CS and CSS units than is currently the case. The Army will have to consider whether it should increase the numbers of these types of units in the active force to meet the anticipated demands of preventive defense.

Role Specialization Versus Task Organization. In an ideal environment, the Army would field sufficient numbers of units to meet the requirements of all potential roles. In the real world of constrained resources, however, the Army must decide whether to field units optimized for preventive defense missions (the usual suggestion is for peace operations) or to task organize existing units and provide those units with specialized training for a specific mission. For reasons discussed below, and given the broad capabilities that will be required in the future and the likely constrained fiscal environment, it appears unlikely that the U.S. Army will be able to field units tailored exclusively for the conduct of preventive defense missions.

Fielding optimized units has a superficial appeal. But a more detailed examination raises a number of formidable drawbacks to such an approach. Given the scope of potential missions, it would be impossible to field sufficient numbers of optimized units without cutting, perhaps significantly, the combat force structure needed to deter or compel potential opponents. Second, if a limited number of such units were created, those units would be subject to repeated deployment. The anticipated increases in the frequency and duration of preventive defense missions beyond the already high number raises the issue of retaining personnel assigned to such units. Lastly, units optimized for a particular preventive defense mission may lack the flexibility needed to transition to a different one, or, more importantly, they may be unable to undertake combat missions.

Reliance on task organized and specially trained current units is not without problems. The issues of the time and training required to transition from finely honed combat capabilities to the skills required for specific peacetime engagement activities, recovery time, and time to regain eroded

combat skills need considerable examination and assessment. Depending upon the unit and the mission, the amount of time could be relatively small. Some units are more multi-mission capable than others. An assault helicopter unit, for example, equipped and trained to deliver and support infantry on the battlefield is easily able to deliver supplies and evacuate casualties in a humanitarian relief operation. Similarly, engineers, communicators, logistics personnel, and military police, for example, may perform most individual and unit tasks very corresponding to their wartime ones.

The same cannot be said of large combat formations (e.g., an armored battalion equipped with M-1 tanks), however. Units configured for rapid mechanized movement and possessing massive fire power may not have the capabilities needed to conduct stability operations where success may depend more on building popular support for local institutions than on the destruction of adversaries. Moreover, given the current focus on mid-intensity conflict that relies heavily on technology and equipment, heavy armored and mechanized units may not possess adequate numbers of soldiers for many preventive defense missions, which tend to be personnel intensive.¹⁰⁷

At the same time, light infantry units, which have a greater "tooth-to-tail" ratio and larger numbers of personnel available for dismounted operations, do not possess sufficient transportation assets to meet the demands of peace operations. Furthermore, units involved in peace operations, where the peace is only tenuously maintained or where conflict can return with little or no notice, may require a considerable complement of armored vehicles and greater combat power than light infantry formations possess.

Despite these difficulties, it may still be possible to assemble the appropriate mix of units for a specific mission. This may dictate, however, drawing together units that do not have habitual working relationships which will require increased training time or reduced effectiveness if adequate preparation time is not available. It may also result in disrupting the organization and readiness of a number of divisions and other units to provide the requisite mix of armor, mechanized infantry, light infantry, SOF, engineers, etc. needed for the particular mission.

In sum, task organizing large combat formations for missions other than their deterrence and compellence roles and transitioning back again is no mean accomplishment and will require time and resources to effect. Additionally, opportunity costs lost while that unit is retraining or otherwise unavailable for combat operations have to be considered. Depending on the size of the residual force, the loss of deterrent value also must

be factored into the strategic calculus.

Conversely, a clearer delineation of roles can be effected between the Active and Reserve Components might diminish these adverse effects. This could reduce the requirement to transform large-scale Active Component combat units to preventive defense missions and then transition them back to full warfighting capability. Such an option also might reduce training requirements within all components by reducing the range of potential missions and allowing units to focus on the tasks they are more likely to perform.

Active and Reserve Component Mix. For nearly three decades, the Army has maximized its ready combat capability by emphasizing combat forces in the Active Component force structure, while placing much CS and CSS force structure that sustains corps, army, and theater level forces in the Reserve Components.¹⁰⁸ A greater stress on preventive defense, however, may require increased reliance on CS and CSS forces. Because Reserve Component CS and CSS units may not be readily accessible on a recurring basis, however, the Army may have to reassess its current allocation of force structure between the Active and Reserve Components. In examining the Active and Reserve Component mix, a number of points must be taken into consideration: response time; frequency, duration, and complexity of operations; and challenges to increased access to the Reserve Components for peacetime deployments.

Many overseas peacetime activities (e.g., disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, support to the nation abroad) arise quickly and require a rapid response. It is questionable whether most Reserve Component units could be mobilized, trained, and deployed within the time lines required by many operations. This may dictate that Active Component forces handle many of these short-notice missions. On the other hand, Active Component forces could provide quick reaction capability, to be relieved by Reserve Component forces as they become available to take over the task.

At the same time, increased reliance on the Reserve Components, especially the Army National Guard, for internal support to the nation tasks could free up Active Component forces for use in the overseas preventive defense missions. The Reserve Components are community-based force, they possess greater familiarity with local conditions and infrastructure, have established relations with state and regional disaster relief organizations, and have the legal basis to provide a wide range of activities.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, such units are trained to respond to such missions and may possess military skills that more directly apply to support to the nation tasks.¹¹⁰

More routine overseas peacetime engagement activities or tasks that offer considerable planning time (e.g., the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai, nation assistance in Central America, and long-standing military-to-military contact programs in Central and Eastern Europe) have been handled in part by the Reserve Components and the practice could be expanded.¹¹¹ For suitable missions (e.g., military-to-military contacts, nation assistance or security assistance), a number of Reserve Component units could be mobilized on a rotating basis to handle ongoing or anticipated missions during their annual training. Missions that do not lend themselves to rapid rotation (such as peacekeeping or peace enforcement) could still use Reserve Component personnel and units, but on a shorter rotation basis than is currently the norm (e.g., 6 months for the MFO mission in the Sinai or the initial policy of 12 months in Bosnia). This latter alternative attempts to balance mission requirements and costs with Reserve Component personnel's time away from their homes and jobs.

Either of these options, however, generates another problem: Reserve Component units on active duty incur costs roughly equivalent to their Active Component counterparts.¹¹² The supposed savings derived from Reserve Component forces, therefore, are not likely to materialize. Indeed, if significant mobilizations occur, funds to support activated Reserve units could cut into resources intended to increase the readiness of Active and Reserve Component forces, training, or research, development, and acquisition.

Like the Active Component, the Reserve Components will not possess infinite numbers of units or resources. Reserves may suffer from the same capability versus availability difficulties experienced in the Active force. Repetitive recall of Reserve Component personnel and units may create operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO) difficulties similar to those besetting portions of the Active Component. Moreover, repeated mobilizations and deployments of Reserve Component personnel may create other problems. For instance, how long will employers acquiesce to repeated deployments of workers? Can workers withstand the sometimes considerable pay cuts? Will self-employed USAR and USARNG personnel be able to perform their missions without financially crippling themselves?¹¹³ Disruptions in the civil life of Reserve Component personnel may hinder the ability to recruit personnel and sustain units in sufficient strength to accomplish missions tasked to them. While these questions cannot be answered precisely in advance, they illustrate some of the complexity large-scale Reserve Component employment entails.

The duration of missions also will affect the ability to

employ Reserve Component units and personnel. Legal limits exist on how many days of training can be required, as well as for how long personnel can be mobilized or on active duty for training. To extend these time limits will require legislative relief.¹¹⁴ Congress has shown little inclination to grant the Executive Branch greater latitude in calling up Reserve personnel.¹¹⁵ And, the constraints outlined above for frequency of operations will apply equally to missions of extended duration.

The complexity of a particular operation also should be factored into decisions on whether a mission should be assigned to a Reserve Component unit. Obviously, the more complex the mission, the greater the planning and preparation time that likely will be required. Similarly, more complex operations generally require more rigorous training which also will increase the time necessary to prepare a unit. Given the constraints outlined above, such additional time may not be available, or may come at too high a cost for the effective employment of Reserve Component units over a prolonged period.

Despite the limitations, increased reliance on the Reserve Components may become necessary to relieve the demands of OPTEMPO, especially if resource constraints drive further reductions in the Active Component. As a result, the Army must begin examining now the consequences of such a change.

Allocating Roles.¹¹⁶ A number of options are available for allocating the future preventive defense, deterrence, and compellence roles. For brevity, only three major alternatives will be examined here. None of these options provides an ideal solution to the difficulties that the Army faces as it prepares to meet the challenges of the future security environment. But the discussion offers a starting point for the debates necessary to shape the Army's future force structure.

Option 1. This conservative option largely maintains the current evolutionary course and relies on the approximate size and mix of current forces. In this case, the Active Component would be primarily responsible for the deter and compel missions, as well as for most preventive defense missions. The Reserve Components would provide support for deter and compel roles on an as-required or as-possible basis. The Reserve Components also would take on a greater portion of preventive defense missions than is presently the case. Nevertheless, the conduct of preventive defense missions would be limited to the Active and Reserve Component forces deemed to be available without placing unacceptable risks on being able to deter and compel. The Reserve Components also would shoulder primary responsibility for most support to the nation tasks.

While conservative, this option is not without its difficulties. Too heavy a reliance on maintaining a strong deter and compel capability may result in insufficient numbers of the appropriate types of units available to carry out effective preventive defense. This shortfall could result in underresourced missions or in missed opportunities to shape the geo-strategic environment in favor of the United States.

Unless accompanied by a change in Active Component force structures, this alternative runs the risk of stressing the Active Component, particularly those highly requested units (e.g., military police, engineers, logistics, and civil affairs) that deploy routinely on preventive defense missions. To eliminate this problem may require the Army to place more CS and CSS structure in the Active Component. In the near term, at least, this would likely require an increase in the size of the Active Component. Given current fiscal trends and the drumbeat for improving "tooth-to-tail" ratios, such an outcome is highly unlikely. To reduce the stress on CS and CSS units might require the extensive use of combat units to conduct preventive defense missions, which runs the risk of eroding the skills needed for credible deterrence and compellence.

Another possibility might be to transfer certain missions from the Active to the Reserve Components to free up personnel and tailor the Active Component force structure to carry out preventive defense missions more effectively. For example, the Army could shift some of its infrastructure support activities to the Reserve Components.¹¹⁷ Reserve Component units and personnel could assume greater responsibility for depot and general support level maintenance activities, thereby freeing Active Component personnel for other priorities.¹¹⁸

Outside contracting or the privatization of certain infrastructure or maintenance requirements is another alternative that merits consideration. This option, however, should be subjected to close scrutiny. First, it will be important to identify those tasks or functions that do not have to be performed by uniformed or DoD civilian personnel. Second, the DoD must ensure that potential contractors applying for such work actually possess the requisite capabilities to accomplish the tasks. Third, a thorough examination of potential long-term vice short-term costs must justify transferring these functions outside of DoD. Fourth, due thought must be given to what happens if DoD relinquishes a key capability to a contractor who eventually may not be able to perform the service within reasonable costs. Lastly, overcoming congressional reluctance to taking away business from government depots may be difficult.¹¹⁹

Option 2 would place primary responsibility for preventive defense operations with the Reserve Components. This alternative

would allow the Army to rely more heavily on the CS and CSS capabilities and units contained in the Reserve Components. Greater dependence on the Reserve Components for preventive defense, however, might require a considerable shift in how the Army National Guard and Army Reserve are structured. For example, to provide increased CS and CSS capabilities in the Reserve Components may require a broader reorganization and transformation of Army National Guard combat units than is currently anticipated.¹²⁰ It also would require some personnel programs and management that would allow for the effective flow of units and personnel into maintenance or other support type operations that could be accomplished through a rotating pool. Whether the Reserve Components will be willing to make additional transitions is open to question. Even if they should acquiesce, the previously mentioned difficulties--recruiting, retention, and civilian employment concerns--inherent in such an alternative would have to be surmounted.

Second, this option likely would require bringing larger numbers of Reserve Component personnel on active duty more frequently and for longer periods of time. Further study will be required to determine if such an option is a true economy measure. As mentioned earlier, there are resource costs inherent in the mobilization, train-up, and demobilization of Reserve Component personnel. Oftentimes, Active Component personnel are required to assist in the training process. This not only has fiscal costs, but it takes Active Component forces away from other missions. While this usually is not a significant problem, it could offer challenges in a future of constrained budgets and potentially reduced Active Component force structure.

If Reserve Component forces are to be employed more frequently and on shorter notice, it may be necessary to have a larger mix of Active Component and Reserve Component personnel in headquarters and staffs to provide for continuity of training and planning. This will require a cultural shift in the Active as well as the Reserve Components. The planned experiment of placing six National Guard enhanced readiness brigades under two mixed Active/Reserve division headquarters will offer significant insights into the utility of such efforts.¹²¹

Option 3 would assign the primary responsibility for fighting and winning one MTW, as well as the burden for most preventive defense activities, to the Active Component. The Reserve Component would be charged with supporting the first MTW on an as-required basis, and forming the primary deterrence and compellence force for a second MTW.

This alternative would provide the forces necessary for deterrence and compellence in the first MTW. It would reduce stress on the Active Component and circumvent many of the

challenges inherent in large-scale reliance on the Reserve Components for preventive defense. At first glance, such an approach also might require fielding fewer forces, especially if high-technology systems can compensate for reduced warfighting force structures.

However, preliminary analysis indicates that savings may not be as large as some might anticipate. For example, significant reductions in the Active Component force structure might not be feasible. At present, a large element of the Active Component (as well as the Reserve Components) is engaged daily in what is known as the Baseline Engagement Force.¹²² Furthermore, the Active Component already is committed significantly to operations--and key elements may be overcommitted.¹²³ Increased emphasis on preventive defense undoubtedly will lead to greater levels of commitment, and, hence, forces.

Nor can policymakers assume that by assigning responsibility for a second MTW to the Reserve Component that they can slash the Active Component by anything approaching 50 percent. Besides the Baseline Engagement Force requirement, current and potential commitments to preventive defense make it inconceivable that a five division Army would be able to address the demands of preventive defense and remain a credible deterrent force for even a single MTW. Further, in the near-term, a need exists for additional "hedging forces" within the Active Component to respond to unanticipated preventive defense missions or the emergence of one or more major regional competitors beyond those currently identified.

The most obvious question of this option's feasibility is whether the residual force can serve as an effective deterrent. For example, will a potential adversary perceive Active Component capabilities to be sufficient to fight and win an MTW, especially if a number of preventive defense operations are underway? Will the Reserve Component force provide a deterrent to a second MTW once the Active Component is committed to the first one, a number of lesser regional conflicts, multiple preventive defense missions, or a combination thereof? Assigning a second MTW to the Reserve Components also assumes adequate mobilization time (several months, at least) between conflicts. Would a second potential aggressor wait or strike before an effective defense was possible? Remembering that deterrence is largely in the mind of the beholder, this issue will become increasingly important should the Reserve Components assume responsibility for a second MTW.

None of the questions over force structure alternatives raised above can be answered with certainty at present. They require considerably more analysis and assessment than is possible herein. But they will have to be addressed with brutal

objectivity before decisions are made on the future force structures needed to implement the national security strategy.

Required Army Capabilities. The overall implications of greater emphasis on preventive defense measures will have subtle, yet substantial, consequences for the U.S. Army. These effects will reach well beyond the key issues discussed above and will influence every aspect of the Army as it enters the 21st century. How well the Army is prepared for the demands of the emerging security environment will depend on the Army's ability to fulfill its multiple, and at times competing, roles.

More specifically, meeting the challenges of preventive defense, while maintaining the capacity to deter, compel, and support the nation will require the U.S. Army to possess a number of capabilities. Many of these requirements are familiar. A few will appear to be new, but simply may be unfamiliar (e.g., stability operations, nation-building, peacemaking). Indeed, the first capability needed may be the ability to reacquaint with the unfamiliar. Additional capabilities should include:¹²⁴

- The ability to operate effectively in the joint and DoD arenas and in interagency policy development process. This implies that the Army must have the necessary personnel in appropriate positions with the requisite knowledge and skills for effective participation in these fora. This includes not only the Army Staff, but also Army personnel on the Joint Staff, within the interagency process, and on the staffs of the unified commands.

- A force structure and force design that provides sufficient numbers of forces to operate across a broad spectrum of conflict in peacetime, crisis, and war; to perform effectively throughout the range of military operations; and perform successfully at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of warfare.

- A forward presence in key regions of the globe that contributes to prevent, deter, compel, and reassure missions.

- Forces able to integrate into multinational force structures--established organizations such as the United Nations, NATO, or ad hoc organizations that may or may not be organized around the U.S. Combined Joint Task Force (C/JTF) concept.¹²⁵ Units must be able to interact with NGOs/PVOs in a manner that supports the missions of all organizations.

- Units able to perform preventive defense missions, as well as the traditional missions. Forces must be able to transition between roles quickly with minimum retraining and restructuring

if the Army expects to meet the rapidly shifting demands of the future international security environment.

- Sufficient numbers of forces to meet anticipated preventive defense requirements, while maintaining the ability to fight and win two MTWs as envisaged under the National Military Strategy.¹²⁶ Force levels must be adequate to conduct multiple concurrent peace operations, as well as rotate forces involved in protracted peace operations.

- These requirements argue for:

- Adequate numbers of specialized CS and CSS units and personnel (e.g., engineers, military police, civil affairs, psychological operations, and aviation) to avoid overstressing limited resources. Special operations forces also may need to be increased.

- CS and CSS force structure capable of supporting sustained preventive defense operations, while concurrently supporting a limited lesser regional contingency.

- Sufficient CS and CSS capacity to transfer forces from preventive defense operations to full-scale combat operations, while supporting the movement of forces to a MTW.

CONCLUSIONS

The reality is that the U.S. cannot walk away or abdicate [from international issues]: its choices matter too much. The U.S. needs to learn to think-- without high-minded illusions, more clearly and further ahead in the game about how to use its power to advance its interests and values in a realistic way.¹²⁷

The key question for the future, as it has always been in the past, revolves around how the United States effectively can wield that clout. Despite the dramatic changes in the international security environment, military power will continue to play a central role. But the United States can apply military power in new and different ways to shape the international security environment using methods that not only protect, but importantly, promote U.S. national interests. Greater reliance on the strategic concept of preventive defense is a profitable avenue to pursue.

A number of issues will have to be addressed to effect this expanded concept. First, consensus must be generated. Congress and the American public must be willing to underwrite the new military role in future policy. This requires a national debate on what the appropriate role of military power in U.S. security

policy should be to forge a national consensus on the issue. Such a debate will require greater clarity of strategic thought, and improved cooperation among the President, Congress, the military, and the remaining elements of the Executive Branch. This may be especially true concerning operations at the lower end of the conflict spectrum, where the interplay of political-military activities falls more heavily on the political side.

Increased reliance on preventive defense also will necessitate increased and more adept coordination within the Executive Branch--particularly in the interagency process, and improved collaboration with international organizations, and closer involvement with NGOs and PVOs. This may also require greater cooperative efforts between civil and military leaders within the DoD across the full range of national planning and execution: development of strategic ends, to contingency planning, to operational campaign planning.

The extent of cooperation may approach a degree rarely seen outside war time. As a result, military leaders and civil counterparts--in and out of government--must begin shaping cooperative relationships now so that they will be prepared to cooperate in the future. This means we must immediately stop thinking in a compartmentalized fashion, and begin forging the intellectual foundations that will contribute to future effectiveness.

Perhaps the most significant change that will occur in defining the future role of U.S. military power will be the realization that the function of the U.S. Armed Forces is not solely to "fight and win America's wars." This construct is too narrow for the expected conditions of the 21st century, and will unnecessarily constrain U.S. policymakers. Instead, the role of military power must shift to the more general concept of *promoting* and protecting U.S. national interests.¹²⁸ Granted, fighting and winning the nation's wars will remain the paramount responsibility of the U.S. Armed Forces, but the United States can ill afford to sit back and "wait for the big one" while it dies a bureaucratic death by a thousand budget cuts. Thus, preventive defense must be added to and carefully balanced among the existing roles of deterrence, compellence, reassurance, and support to the nation.

This new, or perhaps less familiar role, will place greater demands on the military. Not the least of these requirements will be increased numbers of commitments that will occur more routinely, often on little or no notice, and that frequently will be of extended duration. While the short-term pain for the military--especially the Army--could be sharp, the long-term gain for the nation could be significant.

ENDNOTES

1. Largely dictated by rising demands of domestic entitlement programs and a drive for a balanced budget. Paul Wolfowitz notes this point in his remarks to the CSBA Conference on "Defense Innovation: Meeting the Challenges of the Next Century," April 24, 1996, pp. 1ff.

2. For samples of the various positions, see Jeff Erlich and Philip Finnegan, "Senators Envision Renewed Military Strategy," *Defense News*, June 24-30, 1996, p. 1; Sheila Foote, "Top Administration Official Says Two-War Strategy Should Stay," *Defense Daily*, October 18, 1996, pp. 101-102; Senator John McCain, "Ready Tomorrow: Defending American Interests in the 21st Century," March 1996; Senator Charles S. Robb, "Be Ready for Two Desert Storms," *The Washington Post*, January 15, 1997, p. 19; Lawrence J. Korb, "More Than Ready for Two Desert Storms," *The Washington Post*, January 29, 1997, p. 21; Bill Gertz, "General Predicts High Priority for U.S. Peacekeeping," *The Washington Times*, January 8, 1997, p. 4; and Sean D. Naylor, "Two Wars, Two Opinions," *Army Times*, January 20, 1997, p. 3. For a defense of the Two MRC force sizing criteria, see Colonel M. Thomas Davis, "2 MRC or Not 2 MRC," *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1997, pp. 46-47.

3. Alvin Toffler, *The Third Wave*, New York: Morrow, 1980, and expanded in Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1993.

4. Huntington introduced this concept in "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993. He expanded his thoughts in *idem.*, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.

5. Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994. Kaplan extends the discussion and expands the geographic area of crisis in *idem.*, *The Ends of the Earth*, New York: Random House, 1996.

6. One need only review the events of the last decade for an indication of the degree of change possible. Strategist and legislative assistant Michael Mazarr cautions that given the chaotic nature of international politics and the changing nature of warfare, "Anything, quite simply, is possible." Michael Mazarr, *The Revolution in Military Affairs*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, June 1994, p. 8. Strategist Steven Metz surveys a number of these visions, and offers insights into potential implications for the U.S. military. See Steven Metz, *Strategic Horizons: Speculations on the Future Security Environment*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, March 7, 1997.

7. The Spanish American War, World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Kuwait.

8. Within the last 50 years, in particular, the United States has committed considerable military power to scores of contingency operations, as well as forward stationing of substantial forces in Europe, Asia, and, more recently, the Middle East.

9. Recent events underscore the likelihood of such challenges, as well as their increasing frequency: Beirut (1982, and 1983-84), Grenada, the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War, Panama, Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia, and continued operations to deter Iraqi aggression (1991-96).

10. For another set of categories and discussion, see Richard N. Haas, "Paradigm Lost," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 74, No. 1, January/February 1995, pp. 43-58. See also, Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, "Competing Visions for U.S. Grand Strategy," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter 1996/7, pp. 5-53, pp. 5ff.

11. Rarely is the call to isolation heard, however. See, for example, the reaction to then presidential candidate Pat Buchanan's call for economic and diplomatic isolationism in Lloyd Grove, "The Castle Storms Back: GOP Establishment Aims Its Crossbows at Pat Buchanan and His Hordes," *The Washington Post*, February 23, 1996. Moreover, the national security strategies published by either Democrat or Republican administrations (1987-1996) retain engagement in world affairs as a central element of U.S. policy. See also, recent initiatives within the Republican leadership of the House of Representatives to back key Clinton administration policies in Rowan Scarborough, "Armey Pushing Retreat on Security," *The Washington Times*, February 6, 1997, p. 1.

12. Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500-2000*, New York: Random House, 1987, p. 514-515. This argument is not new. Commentator Walter Lippmann made similar arguments in *The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy*, New York: Harper, 1947.

13. One need only recall the rhetoric against the U.N. in the wake of Somalia and Haiti, or the outcry that accompanied the early policies of the Clinton administration that resulted in a significant overhaul of U.S. policy toward multilateral operations. For the latter, see "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," (known more familiarly as [Presidential Decision Directive] PDD-25) May 4, 1994.

14. Indeed, engagement in international affairs has been a common thread contained in every legally mandated presidential report on national security that has been provided to Congress since 1987. Even a conservative think tank, such as the Heritage Foundation, recognizes that the United States must remain engaged in international affairs, even if it recommends "selective engagement." Kim R. Holmes and Thomas G. Moore, eds., *Restoring American Leadership" A U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy Blueprint*, Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1996, p. xii.

15. Given the criticism leveled at higher levels of engagement (See, e.g., Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 1, January/February 1996, pp. 16-32.), current or lower levels are likely.

16. Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, Book 1, Chapter 1, paragraph 2, p. 75.

17. *National Military Strategy of the United States of America* [hereafter *NMS*], Washington, DC: Government Printing Office [hereafter GPO], 1995, p. 8ff.

18. While these are separate and distinct terms, they are intertwined. For example, the forward presence of U.S. forces can simultaneously reassure an ally, while helping to deter a potential adversary. Similarly, a successful act of compellence can deter other potential adversaries, as well as reassure allies and friends. Thus, these separate but closely interconnected issues usually must be addressed in concert.

19. This concept has been emerging out of U.S. experiences over the last decade. Although not articulated as preventive defense until then Secretary of Defense William J. Perry's speech at Harvard University (Remarks at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 13, 1996), it already may be a de facto strategic concept. See, for example, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, March 1996, p. viii-ix; and Deputy Secretary of Defense John P. White, "Preventive Defense--Key to Contemporary Defense and Foreign Policy," *ROA National Security Report, The Officer*, September 1996. The most complete articulation is contained in William J. Perry, "Defense in an Age of Hope," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 6, November/December 1996, pp. 64-79. As my colleague Professor Douglas C. Lovelace points out, Doctor Perry may simply have been seeking to institutionalize what the United States has been doing since 1989 to shape the U.S. Armed Forces to better carry out the preventive defense role.

20. Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, *Force And Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 172. For an excellent discussion of this concept, see, *ibid.*, pp. 172-188. The issue of conventional deterrence is undergoing a reexamination in the post-Cold War era. See, e.g., Gary Guertner, "Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces," *Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 141-151. See also, Robert B. Haffa, Jr., "The Future of Deterrence in the New World Order," in *The Search for Strategy: Politics and Strategic Vision*, Westport, CN: Greenwood Press, 1993, pp. 147-165.

21. The United States must retain a credible nuclear deterrent. Long-standing concepts will retain utility, albeit with greatly reduced numbers of warheads and delivery systems.

22. The difficulty of tracing exactly those responsible for a terrorist or isolated act is well known. Equally, zealots of ideological or religious ilk may be indifferent to any potential retribution.

23. In testifying at her confirmation hearings, Secretary of State designate Madeleine K. Albright indicated little substantive change in current policies. See, Steven Erlanger, "Courtly Ritual Greets Albright on Capitol Hill," *The New York Times*, January 9, 1997, p. 1.

24. Steven Metz, "Deterring Conflict Short of War," *Strategic Review*, Vol. 22, No. 4, Fall 1994, pp. 44-51.

25. Deterrence theory existed long before the advent of nuclear weapons, but conventional deterrence theory has been overshadowed the last 50 years by nuclear weapons. For a discussion of renewed interest in conventional deterrence, see, e.g., Guertner, "Deterrence and Conventional Military Forces." See also, Haffa, "The Future of Deterrence in the New World Order."

26. For a discussion of compellence, its origins, and the nuances of the term, see Thomas C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, New Haven, CN: Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 69-92. Deterrence and compellence differ in that deterrence seeks to dissuade an actor from undertaking a particular action, while compellence seeks to "persuade" an actor to do what you want.

27. For instance, the threat or use of economic embargoes, boycotts, or withholding most favored nation status; diplomatic demarches; military raids, strikes, or punitive campaigns. For discussion of coercive diplomacy see Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, pp. 189-203. Craig and George use coercive diplomacy as a synonym for compellence. But compellence is a broader term

which includes not simply persuading an adversary to adopt a certain course of action, but also to compel an opponent to conform to U.S. national will. In this latter case, total defeat on the battlefield would be the ultimate expression of compellence. Such a construct, goes beyond the concept of "persuasion" that is the focus of Craig's and George's discussion.

28. Sanctions and embargoes against the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Iran, and the U.S. confrontation with North Korea over its nuclear program lend credence to such a conclusion.

29. The discussion in the next three paragraphs is taken from Craig and George, *Force and Statecraft*, pp. 189ff.

30. The U.S. experiences in Vietnam and Somalia are but two pertinent examples.

31. Again, the Vietnam example is most instructive. Others include North Korea, Iraq, and Iran. Narco-traffickers, Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad are examples of groups that appear resistant to coercion.

32. As former Secretary of State Warren Christopher has cautioned. "Foreign Aid Cuts Force U.S. to Use Military More, Christopher Says," *The Baltimore Sun*, October 26, 1996, p. 9.

33. Attributed.

34. Sir Michael Howard, "Lessons of the Cold War," *Survival*, Vol. 36, No. 4, Winter 1994-1995, p. 165.

35. Both of these arguments could be used as supporting rationale for NATO enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe.

36. For example, exploring the western frontier, serving as a constabulary force in newly settled regions, engineering railroads and inland waterways, constructing the Panama Canal, and conducting medical research.

37. U.S. Army. Field Manual (FM) 100-23, *Peace Operations*, Internet, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/pki/100-23>.

38. Peacetime engagement activities are drawn from *NMS*, pp. 8-13.

39. For example, countering drug trafficking, fighting forest fires, disaster relief operations such as Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, and Haitian refugee control at Guantanamo Bay and in Panama.

40. See, for example, Perry, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, pp. viii-ix; *idem.*, remarks at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 13, 1996; White, "Preventive Defense--Key to Contemporary Defense and Foreign Policy;" and Perry, "Defense in an Age of Hope," pp. 64-79.

41. Perry, "Defense in an Age of Hope," p. 65.

42. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-70.

43. A poll conducted in January 1996 indicated that 71 percent of those polled "...believe the United States plays the role of world policeman too frequently." "Yankees, Come Here," *U.S. News and World Report*, February 19, 1996, p. 63. This viewpoint apparently includes President Clinton and Secretary of Defense Cohen. See Michael Dobbs. "'Clinton Doctrine' on Use of U.S. Troops Visible in Bosnia, Africa Missions," *The Washington Post*, November 18, 1996, p. 1, 20; and Clifford Krauss, "Pentagon Chief Faces Critics In Arguing Military's Budget," *The New York Times*, February 13, 1997, p. B10, respectively.

44. See, e.g., Tony Capaccio, "For Fourth Year Running, Procurement Dollars Down," *Defense Week Special*, February 5, 1997.

45. The major outlines of the policies can be found in PDD-25.

46. A recent public opinion poll, for example, found that given the uncertain nature of the international security environment, there is no public pressure to reduce defense spending further. Chris Black, "Defense is Called Hard Cut: Support Cited for Military Spending," *The Boston Globe*, March 11, 1997, p. A8.

47. See, e.g., Rick Atkinson, "Warriors Without a War," *The Washington Post*, April 14, 1996, pp. A1, A22.

48. For example, forward presence contributes to reassurance, while forward forces can engage in preventive defense activities. Similarly, such forces contribute to deterrence. The no-fly zone over southern Iraq is an example of compellence which also helps reduce the level of threat to U.S. allies and partners in the Gulf region.

49. For example, security assistance operations, stability operations, international military education, and training programs. Granted, these programs contributed to reassurance and deterrence, but they also sought to provide stability within nations that would obviate the need for a U.S. physical presence

in a country or region to deter communist expansion.

50. For a sampling of criticism, see Ben Barber, "Senate Joins Battle on Control of Troops Abroad," *The Washington Times*, March 20, 1995, p. 1; Eric Schmitt, "Military's Growing Role in Relief Missions Prompts Concern," *The New York Times*, July 31, 1994, p. 3; Bill Gertz, "White House Retreats on Idea of U.N. Army," *The Washington Times*, March 8, 1994, p. 4; Daniel Williams and Ann Devroy, "U.S. Limits Peace-Keeping Role," *The Washington Post*, November 23, 1993, p. 60; Senator Trent Lott, "UN Must Not Direct US Troops," *The Christian Science Monitor*, November 16, 1993, p. 20; and Barton Gellman, "U.S. Reconsiders Putting GIs Under U.N.," *The Washington Post*, September 22, 1993, p. 1.

51. Perhaps the most cogent example is the shift from destroying the Iraqi Army in Kuwait to providing humanitarian assistance to Iraqi civilians in southern Iraq immediately upon conclusion of hostilities, or Operation PROVIDE COMFORT to protect Kurds in northern Iraq. For the first case, see General Robert H. Scales, *Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: CGSC Press, 1993, pp. 326-333. For the latter, see *ibid.*, pp. 340-353.

52. See, for instance, Mike O'Connor, "Does Keeping the Peace Spoil GIs for War?," *The New York Times*, December 13, 1996, p. 1, 3; Steven Komarow, "Smaller Forces, More Missions Add Up to GI Stress," *USA Today*, October 8, 1996, p. 10; Harry Summers, "Achilles Heel of Keeping the Peace," *The Washington Times*, October 17, 1996, p. 20; and Art Pines, "Deployments Take Toll on U.S. Military," *The Los Angeles Times*, March 19, 1995, p. 1.

53. For a range of opinions on the readiness of 1st Armored Division on its return from Bosnia, as well as other USAREUR preventive defense missions, see Sean D. Naylor, "Readiness Is In the Eye of the Beholder," *Army Times*, February 17, 1997, pp. 18, 20-21, and 30. Reports of a recent psychological survey of troops returning from Bosnia may result in increased scrutiny of the length of individual and unit deployments. See Chris Hedges, "Studying Bosnia's U.S. 'Prisoners of Peace,'" *The New York Times*, March 30, 1997, p. 11.

54. Naylor, "Readiness Is In the Eye of the Beholder," pp. 20, 21, and 30.

55. These critiques frequently come from inside the Army, the Service most affected by such fluctuations. See, e.g., The Honorable Michael P.W. Stone and General Carl E. Vuono, *Maintaining a Trained and Ready Force for the 1990s and Beyond: A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army in Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993*, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, February 15, 1991, p. 19, and *Army Focus 1992: The Army*

in Transformation, Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, September 1992, pp. 1-2. See also John C. Sparrow, *History of Personnel Demobilization in the United States Army*, Department of the Army Pamphlet 20-210, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, July 1952. Although dated, the post-Korea and post-Vietnam experiences conform to the general conclusions in the report. Cf. Marvin A. Kreidberg and Merton G. Henry, *History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775-1945*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, (1955), 1984.

56. Steven Komarow, "Army Hopes to Lure Recruits with Incentives," *USA Today*, January 17, 1997, p. 1. Also, as a result of the end of the personnel draw down, the Army's recruiting goal for 1997 jumped 22 percent over 1996 (89,700 vice 73,400). Andrew Compart, "As Recruiting Goals Increase, Quality of New Soldiers Drops," *Army Times*, February 24, 1997, p. 4.

57. George C. Wilson, "Joulwan: Six-month Tours for Bosnia," *Army Times*, January 27, 1997, p. 8.

58. Those differences can drive changes in strategic concepts (as will be discussed below).

59. NSS, pp. 11-12.

60. The consistency of national security strategy documents over the last decade supports such a conclusion. Cf., the respective documents of the Reagan, Bush, and Clinton administrations from 1987-1996.

61. For example, and perhaps the most important, the views of Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen on the use of military power. For Secretary Cohen's views see Thomas E. Ricks, "Cohen, Albright Confirmed for Posts; Defense Chief Shows Divergent Views," *The Wall Street Journal*, January 23, 1997, pp. 1, 18; "Cohen Establishing His Doctrine as Clinton and Congress Look On," *Jane's Defence Weekly*, February 5, 1997, p. 19. While the U.S. Representative to the U.N., Ms. Albright initially argued for "aggressive multilateralism," and was a strong advocate of U.S. air strikes against the Serbs early in the Bosnian conflict. See, e.g., Michael Dobbs and John M. Goshko, "Albright's Personal Odyssey Shaped Foreign Policy Beliefs," *The Washington Post*, December 6, 1996, A25, and Michael R. Gordon, "12 in State Dept. Ask Military Move Against Serbs," *The New York Times*, April 23, 1993, p. A1, A12, respectively.

62. Joint Publication (JP) 3.08, *Interagency Cooperation During Joint Operations*, 2 vols., October 9, 1996.

63. The initiative for "Interagency Training for Complex

Contingencies" stems from work undertaken in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategy and Requirements.

64. A convenient typology of those elements falls into two categories: natural and social. Natural determinants of power include geography, natural resources, and population, and can be identified easily. Contributing social factors--which are less readily quantified--consist of economic, political, diplomatic, psychological, and military power. These elements of national power are an amalgam consolidated from a variety of sources. Considerable debate exists on this subject and not all sources include all of the elements used in this monograph. Traditionally, political, economic, and military elements of national power have long been recognized. (See, e.g., Henry Kissinger, *Diplomacy*, New York: Simon and Shuster, 1995, p. 22.) B.H. Liddell Hart, the noted strategist, included diplomacy and morale as key elements (B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, New York: Signet, 1974, pp. 321-322). To this latter list, some would argue that information, or more appropriately the ability to acquire, interpret, assess, disseminate, and act upon information, may be emerging as a critical separate element of national power. (See, e.g., Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and William A. Odom, "America's Information Edge," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 2, March/April 1996, pp. 20-36.) For a discussion of the elements of national power and their interaction, see John Spanier and Robert L. Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, 9th ed., Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1996, pp. 131-148, and David Jablonsky, "National Power," *Parameters*, Vol. 27, No. 1, Spring 1997, pp. 34-54.

65. These instruments are taken from *NMS*, p. III-11. See, e.g., Spanier and Wendzel, *Games Nations Play*, pp. 293-384 for a discussion of these instruments and their employment. Consensus exists on economic, diplomatic, and military power. Whether information should be included is still a matter of debate that only time can resolve. The elements of national power, while containing similar terms, should not be confused with the instruments of national power. Like potential versus kinetic energy, elements and instruments differ considerably. While the elements provide the basis of national power, that power only can be channeled through specific instruments. While the difference may seem pedantic, it is not. Much confusion can be avoided if these differences are recognized and the terms are used precisely.

66. Bob Deans, "In Hostile Post-Cold War World, Pentagon Is Changing Its Ways," *Austin American-Statesman*, March 31, 1996, p. E9.

67. This may require an infusion of resources into the Department of State. As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright

recently remarked in testimony on Capitol Hill, "We cannot have world class diplomacy on the cheap." "Albright Seeks Increased Funding for Diplomacy," *Reuters Newsmedia*, February 12, 1997, Internet, <http://www.pointcast.com/>.

68. The U.S. experience in Vietnam is instructive about the extent of damage that can be done to the military and to U.S. society. This is not intended to conjure up the so-called "Vietnam Syndrome," but to point out the potential dangers--as the more recent experiences in Lebanon (1983) and Somalia (1993) reinforce.

69. For example, the situation in Somalia in 1992 through the present.

70. For a discussion of the absence of military strategic thinking, see Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics*, New York: MacMillan, 1973, pp. 479ff.

71. For the purposes of this report, this includes DoD and Joint Staff level.

72. In devising strategy, policymakers seek to balance objectives (ends), concepts (ways), and resources (means) within the context of the international security environment. Theoretically, a change in any of these variables would result in changes in the other two. But, as indicated earlier, national policies and objectives remain largely constant. Reduced resources, therefore, would undoubtedly drive changes in strategic concepts employed to achieve national security objectives. For a discussion of the ends, ways, and means paradigm, see Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *idem.*, ed., *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, March 12, 1993, pp. 3-16.

73. See, for example, *USEUCOM Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness*, February 1995, Internet, <http://199.56.154.3/library/sep/sep00.html>. For USPACOM and USSOUTHCOM, see William W. Mendel and Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., *Strategic Planning: The Combatant Command Process*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, March 1996 (draft), II: 18-21 and II: 26-30, respectively.

74. For an example of how such a plan should be developed, see Douglas C. Lovelace and Thomas-Durell Young, *U.S. Department of Defense Strategic Planning: The Missing Nexus*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1, 1995, pp. 27-30.

75. For instance, Association of South East Asian Nations

(ASEAN), Organization of American States (OAS), Organization for African Unity (OAU), NATO, and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

76. An obvious example is the crisis in the Balkans, where the United States, Britain, France, and Germany differed over whether to lift the arms embargo for Bosnia-Herzegovina; and Greece and Turkey have diametrically opposed national interests in the region.

77. For an example of difficulties encountered because of U.S. leadership style, see, e.g., Thomas W. Lippman, "Clinton Administration Revamps Plans for Trouble-Shooting All-African Force," *The Washington Post*, February 10, 1997, p. 28.

78. For example, German economic initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe, Turkish efforts in the Transcaucasus and Central Asia, Belgian and, especially, French efforts in Africa, OAS and individual Latin American states' action relating to peacekeeping operations on the Peru-Ecuador border, and multinational cooperation against drug trafficking are but a small number of initiatives.

79. If recent experience is any guide, U.S. military forces may be faced with dozens of such organizations.

80. Apparently, such efforts bore fruit during recent humanitarian assistance operations in Rwanda, where NGOs/PVOs and U.S. military personnel functioned amicably and in a synergistic fashion. "After Action Review on Humanitarian Assistance Operations in Rwanda," U.S. Army War College Peacekeeping Institute, October 21, 1994.

81. For a discussion of the CMOC experience in Operation SUPPORT HOPE (Rwanda, 1994) see After Action Review Operation SUPPORT HOPE 1994, Headquarters, U.S. European Command, no date, Chapter 6.

82. The Army's Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) is one organization performing this invaluable task. See the CALL home page at Internet, <http://call.army.mil:1100/call.html>.

83. For information on the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute see Internet, <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usacsl/pki/>.

84. See, the 3.07 series of Joint Publications (JP) concerning Military Operations Other than War. JP 3-07.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*, June 26, 1995; 3-07.2, *Anti-Terrorism*, June 25, 1993; 3-07.3, *Peace Operations*, April 29, 1994; and 3-07.4, *Counter-Drug Operations*, August 9, 1994.

85. JP 3-07.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)*; JP 3-07.6, *Humanitarian Assistance*; and JP 3-07.7, *Domestic Support Operations*.

86. These comments do not imply criticism of past or ongoing efforts, which are commendable. They only to point out that much additional work remains to be accomplished before an adequate body of doctrine exists to support the conduct of many preventive defense initiatives.

87. Unified action is "a broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and non-governmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands." Combined refers to "...operations between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies." Joint Publication 1-02, *DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Internet, <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/>.

88. In short, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff John Shalikashvili pointed out, existing structures, programs, and budgets do not allow planners to begin anew with some sort of force structure tabula rasa. Steven Komarow, "Shalikashvili Outlines Plans for Military's Future," *USA Today*, December 11, 1996, p. 9.

89. Perry, Remarks at the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, May 13, 1996; and *idem.*, "Defense in an Age of Hope."

90. Harry Summers, "Key Questions for the Military in 1997," *The Washington Times*, January 3, 1997, p. 17; *idem.*, "Understanding the Military 'What-Fors'," *The Washington Times*, January 16, 1997, p. 14; Fisher, Hillen, Moore, Phillips, and Spring, "Keeping America Safe and Strong," pp. 230-231.

91. Colonel James Dubik, "The New Logic: The U.S. Needs Capabilities-Based, Not Threat-Based, Military Forces," *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1997, pp. 42-45.

92. On the other hand, *Joint Vision 2010* points out that forces optimized for warfighting have been used successfully in peacetime engagement operations. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010*, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996, p. 17.

93. Two pertinent examples leap to mind. The first case is Bosnia where the 135,000-plus aircraft sorties of DENY FLIGHT, SHARP GUARD, and IFOR and the nearly 20,000 ship days of SHARP GUARD over 5 years appear to have exerted little influence on the

crisis. (Figures are derived from Fact Sheet, IFOR Air Component, December 2, 1996, Internet, [gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/yugo/ifai0212.96](http://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/yugo/ifai0212.96); Operation SHARP GUARD, October 1, 1996, [gopher://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/yugo/osg/011096](http://marvin.nc3a.nato.int:70/00/yugo/osg/011096), and Institute for Defense Analysis, *Lessons and Implications for the U.S. Air Operations in the Former Yugoslavia, 1992-1995*, July 1996, p. 13.) Similarly, after over 5 years of considerable air and sea presence in and around Iraq, Saddam Hussein remains in power and Iraq continues to threaten stability in the Persian Gulf.

94. Historically, over the last 35 years the Army's portion of the budget has remained largely static, averaging 26.5 percent. In the last 20 years (save FY91 which was an aberration [33.2 percent]), the Army has averaged 25.3 percent of the DoD budget. There has been little variance as well, with the Army garnering between 24.0 and 26.8 percent. Figures have been derived from information contained in the respective *Secretary of Defense Annual Reports to Congress*.

95. For peace operations, see, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, and Chapter 5, "Operations Other Than War" in FM 100-5, *Operations*, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 14, 1993. Lastly, FM 100-19, *Domestic Support Operations*, Washington, DC: Department of the Army, March 1, 1993.

96. For example, FM 100-20, *Stability and Support Operations*, draft.

97. Of course, civilian and military leaders must ensure that they do not try to "fight the last war," or that they do not "learn" the wrong lessons.

98. For an excellent example of such integration, see *USEUCOM Strategy of Engagement and Preparedness*, February 1995, Internet, <http://199.56.154.3/library/sep/sep00.html>.

99. For a discussion of training at Fort Polk and a brief overview of outstanding issues, see Bradley Graham, "New Twist for U.S. Troops: Peace Maneuvers," *The Washington Post*, August 15, 1994, p. 1. A longer, more detailed version of the article may be found in Military Newswire Service, August 16, 1994. For example, FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, raises this issue, but the subject needs a fuller examination based on more recent experience.

100. Captain Robert Murphy, Captain Fred Johnson, SFC Barry Tankersley, and SSG John Shaw, "Maintaining Warfighting Skills While Keeping the Peace in Bosnia," Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Fort Leavenworth, KS, n.d., INTERNET, <http://call.army.mil/call/nft/novdec96/sec1.html>.

101. FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, Appendix C, pp. C-5 to C-8.

102. Insights on how this might be achieved can be found in *Multinational Force Command Authorities Handbook: Proceedings of the CR-CAST Working Group on Command Authorities Required for a Multinational Force Commander*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1, 1995. See also *Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I (BHAAR I) Conference Report*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, January 1997, pp. 5-8, for highlights of recent issues that surfaced during the deployment phase of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOUR.

103. For instance, then Secretary of Defense Perry in one of his farewell press briefings indicated that U.S. force structure is at the minimum necessary to carry out its assigned tasks. Bradley Graham, "Perry Resists Cuts In Military Forces As His Tour Ends," *The Washington Post*, January 16, 1997, p. 12.

104. This difficulty may be exacerbated considerably if the U.S. military evolves toward what many are calling the revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Under RMA, increasing technology would be used to provide greater capabilities and effectiveness with fewer units and personnel. If this comes to pass, then there may be even fewer personnel and units available to perform preventive defense missions, unless steps are taken to provide requisite numbers and types of forces for preventive defense.

105. For ways that SOF can advance U.S. national interests in peace time engagement, see *SOF Vision 2020*, U.S. Special Operations Command, MacDill Air Force Base, FL, 1997, pp. 8-11.

106. The U.S. experience in Bosnia is enlightening in this regard. While the 1st Armored Division deployed to Bosnia, a significant portion of corps elements (e.g., logistics, intelligence, and signal) deployed to Hungary or other advance locations to provide necessary support. Because the U.S. Army is currently configured to conduct operations at the corps level, this is likely to be the case for the foreseeable future.

107. For example, a typical mechanized division contains roughly 17,000 soldiers. However, at most, that unit will be composed of 5 mechanized infantry battalions, each with roughly 850 soldiers, totaling approximately 4,250 personnel. Even within infantry battalions, however, not all personnel are combat infantrymen--mechanics, cooks, medics, etc., make up a considerable proportion. Assuming that every soldier in an infantry rifle or anti-armor company is present for duty as a rifleman, slightly less than 2,500 rifleman would be available for duty. Granted, other soldiers (e.g., engineers, air

defenders, etc.) could be employed in a dismounted role, but the numbers would still be substantially reduced from the division total of 17,000. Fewer soldiers would be available if an armored division was employed. Information taken from Student Text 101-1, *Organizational and Tactical Reference Data for the Army in the Field*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1986; and Student Text 101-3, *Selected Tables of Organization*, Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, June 1986.

108. This was also intended to ensure that the Army could not fight a prolonged conflict without mobilizing large numbers of Reserve Component personnel and units, thereby ensuring that the nation would have to mobilize and support a war. In doing so, military leaders hoped to avoid a repeat of Vietnam, where substantial numbers of reservists were not called to active duty. Louis Sorley, *Thunderbolt. From the Battle of the Bulge to Vietnam and Beyond: General Creighton Abrams and the Army of His Times*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992, pp. 363-365.

109. For example, the Active Component's ability to assist in law enforcement is limited under "Posse Comitatus." The National Guard is not similarly constrained.

110. Such as engineer, logistics, transportation, and aviation units that possess a dual civil-military capability.

111. For example, the recent Reserve Component contribution to the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai could evolve to a full time Reserve Component responsibility. Additionally, twelve U.S. states have established a state partnership program throughout Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Illinois and Poland, Pennsylvania and Lithuania, South Carolina and Albania, and Texas and the Czech Republic).

112. For example, pay and allowances for Reserve Component personnel on active duty are identical to Active Component personnel. The same holds for medical care, dental care, and leave eligibility. When train up, equipment upgrades, additional maintenance, and demobilization costs are factored into the equation, Reserve personnel costs could exceed those of the Active Component.

113. Reportedly two-thirds of the 250,000 Reserve Component personnel mobilized for Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM suffered debilitating financial losses. Kristen Patterson, "The Pain Behind the Income Insurance Fiasco," *Army Times*, January 20, 1997, p. 26.

114. Rotation of units within current mobilization limits may be an option. Before undertaking such an alternative,

planners need to examine if costs, rotational turbulence, and risks are acceptable.

115. For example, the DoD requested that Congress grant the Secretary of Defense the authority to call-up 25,000 Reserve Component personnel. Congress refused to grant that authority. U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 103rd Congress, Second Session, 1994, Vol. 5, *Legislative History: Public Laws 103-323 to 103-429*, St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co., 1995, pp. 2210 and 2283; and Department of Defense, "Desirability of Increased Authority to Access Reservists," Report to Congress, typescript, June 14, 1996, p. 5. Historically, mobilizing Reserve Component units and personnel has required a threat to U.S. national interests sufficiently large to justify the disruption that usually accompanies a Reserve Component call-up.

116. I am grateful to Colonel Richard H. Witherspoon for suggesting the construct used in this section.

117. See suggestions contained in "Leveraging America's Community-Based Force: What the Army National Guard Can Do for the U.S. Army," typescript, no date, pp. 9-17.

118. Such an option would require more detailed cost benefit analysis to determine its effectiveness, but on the surface it offers some promise.

119. Bradley Graham, "Privatizing Maintenance in the Military," *The Washington Post*, April 1, 1996, p. 7.

120. The Army National Guard is currently converting two of its eight combat divisions to CS and CSS units. Bradley Graham, "Revamped National Guard: No Cuts, But More Support Jobs," *The New York Times*, November 7, 1996, p. 3.

121. *Ibid.*

122. The Baseline Engagement Force includes defense of the United States, strategic operations, and manning, training, and maintaining the force.

123. See, e.g., O'Connor, "Does Keeping the Peace Spoil GIs for War?;" Komarow, "Smaller Forces, More Missions Add Up to GI Stress."

124. These points are not all inclusive. They also will require considerable elaboration before they can be implemented. The intent is to stimulate debate.

125. For a brief description of the CJTF concept, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, "NATO, CJTF, and

IFOR," *Strategic Comments*, Vol. 2, No. 5, June 1996. A more detailed explanation is in Charles L. Barry, "The NATO CJTF Command and Control Concept," in Thomas-Durell Young, ed., *Command in NATO After the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Considerations*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, forthcoming.

126. As stated in *NSS*, p. 14, and *NMS*, p. 16.

127. "Bad Choices for Bosnia," *The Wall Street Journal*, December 12, 1995, p. 20.

128. Remarkably, this approach conforms to the tasks laid out in the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States to "provide for the common defense *and* promote the general welfare. . . ." Emphasis added.

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