

**THE UNITED STATES
AND THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AFRICAN SECURITY:
The African Crisis Response
Initiative and Beyond**

**Dan Henk
and
Steven Metz**

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Comments also may be conveyed directly to the authors. Dr. Metz can be reached by calling (717) 245-3822, FAX (717) 245-3820, or by email at metzs@carlisle-emh2.army.mil. COL Henk can be reached by calling (717) 245-3292, FAX (717) 245-3530, or by email at henkd@carlisle-emh2.army.mil. Copies of this report may be obtained from the Publications and Production Office by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, DSN 242-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or via the Internet at rummelr@carlisle-emh2.army.mil

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FOREWORD

Traditionally, the U.S. military has not been heavily involved in Sub-Saharan Africa. Since the end of the Cold War, though, this has begun to change. U.S. forces have supported several humanitarian relief and evacuation operations associated with African conflicts. They have also conducted numerous “engagement” activities aimed at assisting African states and their militaries during the transition to democracy. But Africa remains a region where U.S. national security interests must be promoted with limited resources. This makes a sophisticated and coherent strategy vitally important.

Helping Africans develop a capability to avoid or solve their region's security problems has reemerged recently as an important goal of American strategy, and the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) is its centerpiece. Based on their testimony presented to the Africa Subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, this study by Dr. Steven Metz and Colonel Dan Henk of the U.S. Army War College examines the ACRI. Significantly, it does so by placing the ACRI in a wider, long-term strategic context.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this report as a contribution to ongoing debates over the appropriate role for the U.S. military in promoting American national interests in Sub-Saharan Africa.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

COLONEL DAN HENK is Director of African Studies at the U.S. Army War College. His military assignments have spanned tactical, operational, and strategic levels, and have included combat service in Vietnam and Grenada. An African Foreign Area Officer, he has served as Army attache in four African countries, and has lectured and conducted research throughout Sub-Saharan Africa. Colonel Henk earned a B.A. in history from the Citadel and an M.A. and Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Florida. His recent publications have addressed peace operations in Africa, information warfare, and U.S. policy in Africa.

DR. STEVEN METZ is the Henry R. Stimson Professor of Military Studies at the U.S. Army War College. He has been a research professor at the War College's Strategic Studies Institute since 1993. Before that, he taught at the Air War College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities. His recent reports from the Strategic Studies Institute include *Reform, Conflict, and Security in Zaire*, and *Armies and Democracy in the New Africa*. Dr. Metz has also written on Africa for journals such as *Comparative Strategy*, *Political Science Quarterly*, *Joint Force Quarterly*, *African Affairs*, and *Journal of Modern African Studies*, served as an advisor on U.S. policy in Africa to political organizations and campaigns, and testified before the House and Senate Africa subcommittees. He holds a B.A. and M.A. in international studies from the University of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in political science from the Johns Hopkins University.

SUMMARY

For at least the next decade, Africans will need help constructing the foundation of a regional security system and dealing with conflicts that occur along the way. The United States, which currently has as much influence in Africa as at any time in its history, is searching for ways to provide such assistance. The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) may be a solid first step in this direction, but only a first step. Other actions and programs must follow if Africans are to have the resources necessary for such a profound transformation. It is in the long-term national interest of the United States to shape this transformation. However, to do so, America must carefully coordinate political, economic, and military actions and exercise diplomatic skill, political sensitivity, and patience.

The African Security Environment.

In general, the African security environment is one in which traditional methods of analysis that stress nation-states and national interests must be modified. Nonstate factors, actors, and considerations are as important as national interests. Foreign policy and national security strategy in African states tend to be associated with a regime, group, or individual leader more than a nation as a whole. They are often designed to augment or preserve the power of an individual and his clients rather than promote what western scholars would see as true national interests. And a change of leadership sometimes brings a fundamental change in foreign policy and national security strategy. Personal ties and friendships as well as regional, ethnic, and religious considerations help define strategic interests, objectives, and partners.

Because African foreign policy and national security strategy, like African politics in general, are imbued with flexibility and personalization, they tend to be dominated by informal methods and procedures. Shifting coalitions

dominate rather than formal alliances. Consensus-building among the powerful—a traditional political technique in much of Africa—is an important part of the regional security system. This emphasis on individuals and consensus-building rather than the application of power resources through formal structures means that consultations are a vital element in the African regional security environment. Such consultations can occur in a variety of traditional and nontraditional fora. Any actor seeking to shape the environment must be adept at recognizing the available fora, organizing consultation, and building consensus.

American Interests in Africa.

The fact that there is not broad agreement on U.S. interests in Africa is a serious detriment to developing coherent, long-range national security strategy for the region. The result is a policy that often seems inconsistent and reactive. In fact, the United States does have substantial interests in Sub-Saharan Africa. These include:

- Regional Stability;
- Access;
- Information and Warning;
- Safety;
- A Region Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction;
- A Region Free of Sponsors or Havens for Transnational Threats;
- Comity and Cooperation;
- Freedom from Egregious Suffering;
- Humane, Managerially Competent, and Accountable Governance;
- Sustained Economic Development; and,
- Unthreatened Natural Environment.

The African Crisis Response Initiative.

Given the combination of frequent conflicts in Africa, the tendency of these conflicts to generate refugee problems and humanitarian disasters, the global leadership role and commitments of the United States, and the limits on U.S. interests, encouraging the growth of an organic African peace operations capability makes perfect sense.

In mid-1996 a looming crisis in the small nation of Burundi revived the idea and made it the centerpiece of American security policy in Africa. The African response was tepid. To Africans the new proposal lacked definition in critical features and the specifics of external support. African leaders were themselves puzzled (in some cases annoyed) by the lack of prior consultation and by American failure to recognize the growing role of subregional organizations. They were irritated by the apparent offer of participation to some African countries but not others.

Despite the less than overwhelming reception, the subregional continued to pursue the idea of an organic peacekeeping capability in Africa. In early 1997, an experienced Foreign Service Officer and former U.S. ambassador in Africa, Marshall McCallie, was assigned to lead an interagency working group (IWG) overseeing the project.

The IWG renewed consultation with African and European governments, listening to their concerns and soliciting moral and material support for the program. In deference to African sensitivities, the IWG changed the name of the project from African Crisis Response Force to African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The idea was that a force of some sort *might* be formed in the future, but the initial goals were more modest.

The IWG also had formulated a long-range approach and training plan, and crafted a relationship between the ACRI and the United Nations. The U.S. Congress provided \$15 million in ACRI funding for fiscal year 1997. By mid-1997 Washington had obtained commitments from seven African

countries to furnish a total of eight battalions for training. The U.S. Army Special Forces began instructing Ugandan and Senegalese units in the late summer of 1997.

Assessment of ACRI.

The existing version of the ACRI, which is limited to a military-to-military training program, has utility. It will impart tangible skills to those African soldiers and officers who undergo the training. The units trained will probably perform more effectively in peace operations than they would without the training. Interoperability—which is a key objective of the existing program—will help. As a result, it will be easier in the future to put together an African peacekeeping force on short notice which dovetails with ongoing U.N. reform of peacekeeping operations.

ACRI will also have a positive impact on civil-military relations in the host countries since much of the training concerns appropriate ways for those in uniform to deal with civilians. It will begin to create habits of cooperation, both between the American military and its African partners, and, hopefully, among African militaries. And, ACRI brings benefits to the U.S. Army Special Forces units involved by allowing them to practice their skills and advance their understanding of the African operational environment.

There are, though, significant limitations to the results which can be expected from ACRI. The training is perishable. Even more importantly, ACRI as currently construed does not fundamentally alter the African security environment or lead automatically to an organic African capability for peacekeeping. It does not deal with typical shortcomings in command and control, logistics, planning, and mobility. It does not augment the peacekeeping skills of police who play a vital role in such operations. It does not create structures to coordinate military and civilian efforts during peacekeeping operations. And it does not begin to build institutions to practice conflict avoidance or authorize and direct a peacekeeping operation when conflict avoidance fails.

These shortcomings are not due to a lack of understanding or vision on the part of ACRI's designers, but reflect the rigid political and budgetary parameters they face. But if ACRI does not grow beyond what it is today and if Africans themselves do not take further steps to develop peace operations capabilities, then while trained units of the African states which participate may be somewhat more effective, Africa as a region will still be forced to rely on the United Nations, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan to fund, organize, control, and support any future peacekeeping operations.

Conclusion and Recommendations.

To promote American interests in Africa, the United States should use ACRI as a first step in a long-term program to encourage and assist in the transformation of the African security environment into one where violence is less common and where most violence that does occur can be handled without massive outside involvement. A number of actors must participate in this, each with vital roles.

- Congress should:
 - sustain support for ACRI;
 - consider ending prohibitions on the use of American security assistance money to train police for peacekeeping roles; and,
 - help the American public understand that ACRI secures U.S. regional interests.
- The Department of State should:
 - continue to broaden ACRI;
 - enlarge participation among African democracies;
 - help Africa improve its conflict avoidance and conflict resolution capabilities; and,

- continue and increase efforts to coordinate official programs with initiatives by private organizations, universities, and international organizations.
- The Department of Defense and the U.S. military should:
 - consider expanding ACRI training to include support to civilian officials during natural disasters and pandemic disease as well as peacekeeping;
 - develop a program to augment the ability of Africans to plan, command, and control both humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations through wargames, staff exercises, and simulations;
 - move ahead on initiatives to help Africans create a pan-African staff college or the equivalent of the U.S. Department of Defense's Marshall Center;
 - consider supporting any African efforts to develop regional training centers;
 - plan actual combined exercises with troops from a range of African states; and,
 - consider greater involvement of Army National Guard units as ACRI develops.
- African leaders should:
 - sustain the positive political and economic trends of the past few years;
 - continue to reform their systems of civil-military relations;
 - recommit themselves to things like the paramount obligation of all states to provide maximum support for refugees and to eschew support for rebels or insurgents in neighboring states; and,

- improve the ability of the OAU and subregional organizations to prevent violence, resolve conflicts peacefully, and to organize and deploy peacekeeping forces when violence or natural disaster does occur.

Ultimately, Africans must assume the lead in transforming their security environment and must help the United States understand how it can support this given the extent of American global responsibilities. If the ACRI concept is to succeed, Africans must take ownership of it. This should be a key U.S. objective even if it means that ACRI's descendants are quite different in form than the original initiative. The United States must develop the maturity to accept that it will not control programs that grow from ACRI and must resist the temptation to withdraw support if Africans decide to approach regional problems differently than Washington would have preferred.

ACRI is a useful but limited program that seeks to help Africans improve their security options without making unrealistic demands on American resources. Even if it never expands beyond its current parameters, it will provide some benefits to Africans and support U.S. regional interests. But the true value of ACRI is as a first step in a broader strategy to transform the African security environment. Today, there are great opportunities to do this. Hopefully, the United States will develop a pattern of regional engagement based on three “Cs”—consultation, consensus, and cooperation—in order to capitalize on the opportunities it now has.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AFRICAN SECURITY: THE AFRICAN CRISIS RESPONSE INITIATIVE AND BEYOND

Introduction.

In recent months, Sub-Saharan Africa has seen a resurgence of cross-border interventionism.¹ This turn of events undermines regional security but, ironically, the potential for positive change may also be greater today than it has been for decades. An increasing number of nations are abandoning state-dominated economic models in favor of outward-looking, market-based systems.² In over 30 countries, pro-democracy movements have led to substantial reforms and the growth of democratic institutions, particularly a free press.³ At the same time, three things have provided Africans a golden opportunity to reshape their regional security environment: the end of the Cold War, majority rule and the emergence of South Africa as a regional leader, and the demise of many of the continent's old-style despots like Zaire's Mobutu.⁴ As Susan Rice, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, put it, "There is now more reason for optimism about Africa's future than at any time in recent memory."⁵

From this foundation Africans may be able to craft a new security system that includes an effective way to prevent conflicts or resolve them peacefully as well as a regional military and political capability to manage conflicts that cannot be prevented. This is, however, a long-term goal. For at least the next decade, Africans will need help constructing the foundation of a regional security system and dealing with conflicts that occur along the way. The United States, which currently has as much influence in Africa as at any time in its history, is searching for ways to provide such assistance. The African Crisis Response

Initiative (ACRI) may be a solid first step in this direction, but only a first step. Other actions and programs must follow if Africans are to have the resources necessary for such a profound transformation. It is in the long-term national interest of the United States to shape this transformation. However, to do so, America must carefully coordinate political, economic, and military actions and exercise diplomatic skill, political sensitivity, and patience.

The African Security Environment.

U.S. national security policy in Sub-Saharan Africa is shaped both by the nature of the African regional security environment and by American national interests. The security environment that has developed in Africa since decolonization is characterized by endemic, low-level violence. Traditional, state-on-state war is rare, but civil wars, insurgencies, and sectarian violence are common. Programs to alter Africa's security environment must begin with an understanding of the current system.

Actors. The regional security environment of Sub-Saharan Africa may be the most complex on earth, with a sometimes bewildering array of actors, shifting affiliations, and unique characteristics. Both states and non-state organizations are major actors. Nigeria, Ethiopia and South Africa are potentially the most powerful endogenous states due to size and, in the case of South Africa, level of development. For other African states, their political influence tends to reflect the charisma, reputation, and domestic power base of the national leader. Exogenous actors are also important in the African security system. Among the most important are the United States, France, and Great Britain. All exert influence through a variety of means, including trade preferences, economic aid, security assistance, and arms sales. France is particularly active in its former colonies and other French-speaking nations, while Britain plays a major role in several Commonwealth countries. Since the end of the Cold War, the emphasis of American policy has been on states attempting to build or sustain democracy, and on key subregional powers.

The relationship between France and the United States is especially important. When the two cooperate, they can shape African events. During the recent crises in Rwanda and Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo, Washington and Paris were unable to reconcile their positions. Many analysts—particularly in France—contend that Paris' association with the former regimes in Rwanda and Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo eroded French influence and increased the leverage of the United States.⁶ During the summer of 1997, France announced a 40 percent cutback in its military presence in Africa while Charles Josselin, French Secretary of State for Cooperation, called on other European nations to help balance U.S. influence in Africa.⁷ Predictably, some analysts attributed this shift in influence to a hidden U.S. agenda in central Africa rather than policy errors by France.⁸ Belgium, Portugal, Japan and the Scandinavian nations (who are major aid donors), India, China and some Arab states (particularly Egypt and Morocco) affect the African security environment through aid, advice, and training.⁹

Non-state actors play a larger role in Africa than in most other regions of the world. Many African states face internal separatist or rebel movements, most based on regional, ethnic or religious differences. In fact, conflict between states and sub-state political movements is the predominant source of armed violence in Africa. Many separatist and rebel movements have external sponsors, whether the governments of neighboring states, ethnic or religious kinsmen elsewhere, or states or movements outside Africa.

The United Nations and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) have long attempted to provide mechanisms for conflict resolution and have sometimes authorized humanitarian interventions or peace operations. U.N. regional interventions date to the post-independence crisis in the former Belgian Congo in the early 1960s. The OAU was founded in the same period, but has been weakened by schisms between African states and a structure which allocates nearly all power to summits of the heads of state of member nations. Personal and ideological animosities

nearly tore the OAU apart in the 1980s.¹⁰ The OAU's first attempt at peacekeeping in Chad in the early 1980s was widely viewed in Africa as an embarrassing failure.¹¹ Its best performance in peacekeeping was provision of a 40 man observer force in Burundi during the mid-1990s.

Even though the OAU has recovered from earlier failures, it remains reluctant to tackle the type of intrastate conflicts that predominate in Africa.¹² Recently, there have been attempts to improve the OAU's ability to engineer the peaceful resolution of conflicts and control peace support operations but this has intrinsic limits.¹³ The OAU is an organization of independent states and was founded, in part, to protect fragile, new sovereignties. Its charter did not envision intervention in internal struggles. This means that whenever a member state rejects humanitarian intervention or a peacekeeping force, no matter how much one is needed, the organization often will be paralyzed. Without opting for fundamental structural change, the OAU may succeed in small-scale, permissive peace operations when there is a consensus among the competing factions and members. It will not be able to organize peace enforcement operations or stop armed conflict between member states for some time.

Because of the shortcomings of the OAU, the United Nations, and, more recently, subregional organizations have played an important role in the African security environment. With the end of Cold War, the superpowers stopped using Africa as an arena for proxy conflict and, by refraining from paralyzing the U.N. Security Council with vetoes, allowed the organization to play a greater role in the resolution of African conflicts. Led by its second African secretary-general in a row, the United Nations is likely to continue its important function of mobilizing world attention to African problems.¹⁴ Over the mid-term, at least, any major peacekeeping or peace enforcement activities in Africa which involve outside support are likely to be U.N. operations or, at least, conducted with a clear U.N. mandate.

Subregional organizations have been a feature of Africa's political landscape for decades. Most began as mechanisms for economic cooperation. At present, the most active is the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). This was greatly reinvigorated after 1994 with the entry of South Africa, and reflects the relative economic strength of the southern Africa region. 1994 also marked a significant event in subregional security developments. In the wake of a coup in Lesotho, Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe, acting in the name of SADC, mobilized forces for a military intervention.¹⁵ Lesotho's competing factions took the point and resolved their differences. In 1996, SADC took a further step with the creation of a formal organ for defense, politics, and security.¹⁶

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is another economic organization that moved into the security arena with the dispatch of a multinational peacekeeping force to Liberia in 1990. This force, known as the ECOWAS Monitoring Group or "ECOMOG," illustrated some of the political difficulties inherent in peacekeeping by African forces. There are several reasons why ECOMOG may not be the best model for future African peace operations.¹⁷ Its peace enforcement capacity has proven limited. It failed to maintain neutrality toward the Liberian factions. ECOMOG also has been dominated by Nigeria, by far the most powerful participant, and thus is seen by some other African nations as simply cover for the spread of Nigerian influence.¹⁸ This led the United Nations, which largely deferred to ECOMOG in Liberia, to take a serious look at its efforts to "sub-contract" peacekeeping to regional or subregional organizations.¹⁹ But ECOMOG is, nonetheless, an important step in the evolving security role of subregional organizations.

Other international organizations influence the African security environment as well. Financial and monetary organizations like the World Bank, African Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund affect Africa's economic development which is, in turn, a vital component of stability. Austerity programs demanded by international

financial and monetary organizations, or decisions to deny assistance in lieu of reforms, can destabilize African states and stoke insecurity. Foreign or multinational corporations can play similar roles.

Transnational or international humanitarian relief organizations (HROs) and foreign missionary groups also play important roles in Africa, particularly in the alleviation of some of the suffering that results from conflict and violence. The international media, in conjunction with HROs, helps mobilize world public opinion for involvement in the resolution of African crises and the amelioration of human disasters. Neither the humanitarian organizations nor the media have an unambiguously positive effect on regional stability, sometimes adding fuel to conflicts rather than dampening them.²⁰ Still, their cooperation could significantly benefit a coherent conflict resolution effort.

Architecture. The configuration of the African security system reflects its array of actors. The old, Cold War divisions of Africa into pro-Soviet, Western-leaning, and purely nonaligned is, of course, obsolete. Older configurations based on language (Lusophone, Anglophone, and Francophone), geographic subregions (Western, Southern, Central, and Eastern), and religion (Muslim versus non-Muslim) are still important depending on the particular issue. In the future, the African security environment may be configured differently. There are several feasible alternatives. One is a constellation of subregional systems with, perhaps, Nigeria dominant in the west, South Africa in the south, and Ethiopia in the central area. It is also conceivable that Africa may split along political lines with democratic/free market states in some sort of loose grouping. Under such conditions it is remotely possible to imagine a cabal of authoritarian states, perhaps led by Nigeria, configured against African democracies led by South Africa. Other configurations are possible.

Personality plays a major role in shaping African security affairs. Often, interstate cooperation or antagonisms reflect relations between individual heads of state rather than depersonalized national interests. Nowhere is

that clearer than in the recent war in Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo, as many African leaders seized the opportunity to strike at Mobutu in revenge for his support of their enemies in the past. Uganda's Yoweri Museveni, Rwanda's Paul Kagame, and Angola's Jose Dos Santos (among others) played important roles in the war that ended the Mobutu era. During the initial stages of the war, Kenya's President Daniel Arap Moi attempted to mediate an end to the conflict by consulting with regional states. Apparently because of personal animosities, he deliberately excluded rebel leader Kabila, which virtually guaranteed the failure of his efforts.

The African security environment is shaped by the comparative weakness of the states which compose it. In fact, Sub-Saharan Africa is probably the place where the nation-state's "roots are shallowest."²¹ This has many effects. For instance, there is widespread rhetorical support for territorial integrity and the inviolability of the borders inherited at the time of independence. Yet most African borders are permeable, with only sporadic or weak control of the flow of people and goods from country to country. This blurs the distinction between what would normally be external and internal security matters. In fact, most African conflicts are predominantly internal, but have a strong external dimension. Violence often pits an insurgent or secessionist movement against the central government or, increasingly, ethnic militias against governments or other groups. Most of these conflicts generate substantial refugee flows. Refugees often seek sanctuary in neighboring states, thus turning internal violence into an international problem. Antagonists realize that refugees can overwhelm or distract opponents and focus international attention so they sometimes deliberately create or exacerbate refugee problems. Under such conditions, food and medical care become weapons. Those who control it have power; those who do not are weak.

External sponsors also tend to be important in African conflicts. Rebels usually seek arms, money, training, and political support from ethnic kinsmen, expatriate

countrymen in developed countries, ideological allies, or the regimes of neighboring states. States often do the same thing, frequently turning to sources outside Africa. Since the end of the Cold War, these external supporters have usually been European nations or the United States, but other states occasionally dabble in African conflicts. Even in the wake of the Cold War, Mobutu received French and Israeli military assistance and there were reports that his armed forces were resupplied by North Korea and China during the spring of 1997.²² At times, African governments hire foreign mercenaries. While this phenomenon first emerged in the chaos following decolonization, it continues today.²³ Mobutu reportedly hired French, Belgians, white South Africans, former members of the British Special Air Service, Israelis, Croats, Serbs, and Ukrainians during his fight with Kabila's rebels.²⁴ A Belgian named Christian Tavenier, an old hand among the white mercenaries who worked in Africa, was reportedly in command of the mercenary force.²⁵ Iran and China have supported the Sudanese government in its ongoing war against rebels in southern Sudan. Elsewhere the governments of Sierra Leone and Angola have contracted with Executive Outcomes, a firm composed mainly of former South African soldiers, to help with counterinsurgency and military training.²⁶ Because external sponsors are important to both government and antigovernment forces in Africa, attracting such support tends to be a deliberate part of their strategies. Sometimes this is done by offering inducements such as increased access to raw materials or political influence. Sometimes it is done by negative means such as threatening to cut off access to refugees if international intervention is not forthcoming.

The comparative weaknesses of African states affect their militaries. Budgets are often inadequate to support existing forces and downsizing is fraught with the potential for turmoil or even coups. Officers in some armies must engage in outside business to attain an acceptable middle-class lifestyle. In an even broader sense, African militaries tend to reflect one of the significant weaknesses of the state: an inability to build consensus on the nature of the security

threat faced by the nation, then to construct and sustain a security establishment designed specifically to deal with that threat. Current troop strength often reflects historical circumstances rather than present danger. Most African militaries trace their origins to either colonial security and police forces or victorious rebel armies. This, in combination with the lack of external enemies, tends to focus their attention internally. Many are formally charged with protecting internal security. As a result, a high proportion of African militaries are more concerned with bandits, political dissidents, and smugglers than foreign invasion.

Although there are exceptions, Africans often regard their militaries as tools of a regime rather than servants of the people. In some countries, one region or ethnic group dominates the military. As a result, the relationship between armed forces and society can be characterized by suspicion, mistrust, or outright fear. This is compounded in some cases by security services that prey on the population as a form of subsistence and, in others, by the willingness of the regime to use military forces in a coercive internal security role. Since Africa has a long history of military intervention in politics, civilian regimes often distrust their armed forces, deliberately keeping them weak or divided as insurance against coups. With the recent movement toward democracy, a number of African states have begun to reform their system of civil-military relations, but much work remains to be done.²⁷

Many African militaries are rich in peacekeeping experience and leadership talent.²⁸ Their senior leaders often have studied in western staff or war colleges. Yet African militaries reflect the relative poverty of their states. Budgets rarely are sufficient for adequate living standards for military personnel, to acquire and maintain equipment, or undergo realistic, large-unit training. Militaries in Sub-Saharan Africa are particularly weak at maintenance of complex equipment, strategic mobility, advanced command, control, and intelligence, airpower, or naval power. Outside South Africa and, perhaps, Nigeria or Ghana, few African states are capable of long-range power

projection, mobilization, or sustained, intense military operations.²⁹

Processes. In the colonial era and its immediate aftermath, many of Africa's intellectuals subscribed to a philosophy known as "Pan Africanism." Ghana's influential founding president, Kwame Nkrumah, spoke eloquently of continent-wide unity.³⁰ This proved an impossible vision. Africa has suffered as much from inter-state conflict as any region, but the veneer of cooperation persists. With a few exceptions such as Somalia's 1977 invasion of Ethiopia, Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1978, Zaire's invasion of Angola in 1975, and the strategy of regional destabilization practiced by South Africa during the apartheid era, African states have not wanted to be seen using overt military force against their neighbors. The result is reliance on indirect aggression and proxy violence. At various times this phenomenon has been associated with wars of decolonization and national liberation (e.g., support to the South West Africa People's Organization by Angola, support to the Zimbabwe African People's Union by Zambia, and support to the African National Congress by Tanzania and Zambia), with ideological conflict (e.g., South Africa's support to the Mozambique National Resistance and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola), and, today, with religious, ethnic, and personal conflict (e.g., aid to the Zairian rebels from Uganda, Rwanda, Angola, and others, Burkina's apparent early sponsorship of Liberian warlord Charles Taylor, and support to the Sudanese People's Liberation Army by neighboring states).

In general, the African security environment is one in which traditional methods of analysis that stress nation-states and national interests must be modified. Non-state factors, actors, and considerations are as important as national interests. Foreign policy and national security strategy in African states tend to be associated with a regime, group, or individual leader more than a nation as a whole. They are often designed to augment or preserve the power of an individual and his clients rather than promote what western scholars would see as true national interests.

And a change of leadership sometimes brings a fundamental change in foreign policy and national security strategy. Personal ties and friendships as well as regional, ethnic, and religious considerations help define strategic interests, objectives, and partners.

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American Interests in Africa.

The second determinant of American policy in Africa is the nature and extent of U.S. national interests. The annual National Security Strategy provides an administration perspective on interests, although it never gets around to listing them as such. The 1997 version suggests that these include safety from transnational threats and weapons of mass destruction, an end to regional conflict, a stable region characterized by sustainable economic growth, and a region in which democracy and respect for human rights are increasingly evident.³¹ A 1995 document disseminated by the Department of Defense bluntly declares that the United States has “very little traditional strategic interest in Africa.”³² This is a remarkable assertion in light of the fact that the United States has committed military forces to at least 16 interventions in the region since 1990.³³

Some have argued that the United States has no vital interests in Sub-Saharan Africa and only two important interests: regional stability and access. Others would not accept such a narrow range. For example, a perceptive and experienced military physician, U.S. Army Colonel C. William Fox, argues that safety from “Hot-Zone disease” (like ebola) is a vital national interest, equivalent in importance to safety from attack by weapons of mass destruction.³⁴ Similarly, whether or not the discussion is specifically tied to Africa, many Americans would agree that safety from various “transnational” threats like terrorism and illegal narcotics is an important national interest.

The fact that there is not broad agreement on U.S. interests in Africa is a serious detriment to developing coherent, long-range national security strategy for the region. The result is a policy that often seems inconsistent and reactive. One noted scholar, Peter J. Schraeder, argues that “U.S. policymakers have tended to ignore the African continent until some sort of politico-military crisis grabs their attention.” He rightly observes that this produces “. . . policy that often becomes driven by events, as opposed to the more desirable outcome of policy shaping events.”³⁵ However, continuing U.S. regional involvements suggest at a minimum that many Americans agree there are interests worth pursuing in Africa, whether or not the interests are articulated in any official medium. Admittedly, the public commitment to these “interests” is sometimes media-driven and temporary.³⁶ The actions and pronouncements of U.S. policymakers suggest at least the 11 distinct regional interests discussed below. All are interrelated and at least somewhat codependent.

Regional Stability. In the Sub-Saharan African context, “stability” has the narrow sense of absence of significant interstate or intrastate violence. Manifestations of instability include conflict between warlords in “failed states” (such as the Liberia or Somalia of the 1990s), violent border disputes, interstate aggression (such as that committed by South Africa against its neighbors during the heyday of *apartheid*, or that committed by Libya against

Chad in the mid 1980s), civil wars such as those in Angola (1976-1994), Mozambique (1982-1994), Rwanda (1990-1994) and Sudan (1983-present), insurgencies (as in Rwanda in mid-1997 and those conducted up to the present by Tuareg groups in Niger and Mali), large scale banditry, or even oppressive regimes (like that of Nigeria in the mid 1990s) and other unsettled or violent circumstances which provoke large-scale flows of refugees.

State or subregional violence is a symptom of more fundamental problems, often traceable to inequitable access to the benefits of the state, dire poverty, weak civil societies, unrestrained ambitions of opportunists, lack of transparency and accountability in governance, ready availability of arms and similar sources. While interventions by external actors often can halt immediate outbreaks of violence, enduring stability requires the attenuation of the underlying problems. This generally is beyond the capability or interest of intervening military forces. One phenomenon in Africa which has grown out of the instability of the post-Cold War era is the appearance of private “security firms” which offer what once were considered to be mercenaries – military professionals with services for hire. Such services are equally available to duly constituted, democratic governments and to dictatorial autocrats and warlords.³⁷

Virtually all U.S. regional interests are threatened by breakdowns in regional or subregional stability. When instability results in well-publicized egregious suffering, it provokes almost irresistible domestic and international pressure for expensive interventions. It could be argued that stability is the basic U.S. interest in Africa, and that protection of all of the other interests hangs on this one. The United States has pursued this interest with diplomatic, economic, informational and military efforts.

Access. An important U.S. interest in Africa is access. There are several dimensions to this interest. One, clearly, is the military requirement for use of African ports, airfields, and other infrastructure to facilitate military contingency operations in Africa or elsewhere in the world.

Access includes unimpeded use of the sea lines of communication around the continent. Another dimension is access to African political decisionmakers. This would entail the ability of U.S. diplomats to communicate regularly with African government officials on issues of interest to the United States.³⁸

Still another dimension is economic access. This involves the ability of U.S. commercial enterprises to enter African markets, participate in African economic development, and acquire or process African resources, including oil and strategic minerals. Strictly speaking, the real issue here is access to African economic decisionmakers, whether in government and business communities or as consumers of goods and services, including access to African media so as to compete in the realm of African economic choices. Access includes a reasonable ability of American private sector groups, including, among others, American scholars and humanitarian organizations, to establish relations with African individuals and institutions.³⁹ It also involves the ability of American citizens to enjoy first-hand exposure to Africa's rich natural and cultural environments.

As a generalized category, "access" should be an inherent feature of relations between countries which share important cultural ties and common goals. It allows for information exchanges that help assuage normal suspicions and tensions. Though no country's individual interests will be exactly identical to those of another, mutual access facilitates resolution of disagreements over divergent interests.

Information and Warning. Though related to "access," another distinct U.S. interest is that of obtaining timely, reliable information about African trends, personalities, events and issues. Though perhaps obvious, it is important to note the difficulty of protecting U.S. interests from threats which are poorly understood or inadequately anticipated. This particularly is true in circumstances which may require expensive humanitarian or military interventions. However, it also is true of conditions which

offer commercial opportunities, and conditions that touch American concerns about the planetary environment.

One of the reasons why this interest is particularly important in Africa is the inherent difficulty in obtaining such information. The problem is compounded by several factors: authoritarian regimes which thrive on secrecy, communications difficulties in Africa, the small size of the regional U.S. diplomatic presence, the limited U.S. intelligence focus on the region, the often sporadic media attention to events in Africa, and even by the cultural differences between African and U.S. interlocutors. U.S. policymakers often have better information about regional events than that generally available to the public. The political will to intervene in complex humanitarian emergencies tends to occur only when media coverage exposes the suffering. Hence, this interest is protected only when both political decisionmakers and the public have access to reliable information.

The lack of timely and reliable information can lead to occurrences of humanitarian tragedies which might be averted or attenuated if recognized early enough. It may lead to lethally slow responses to such transnational threats as terrorism, narco-trafficking and pandemic diseases. It may result in irreparable damage to the African natural environment. It also puts U.S. policymakers at risk of manipulation by foreign groups, foreign leaders, unscrupulous entrepreneurs and even by the international and domestic nongovernmental organizations that respond to humanitarian crises.

Safety. It goes almost without saying that the United States will go to great lengths to secure or evacuate American citizens from situations of escalating disorder. The Clinton administration has characterized the safety of American citizens as a "vital" national interest.⁴⁰ In the late-1990s, the major threat to U.S. citizens in Africa generally is that resulting from instability, poverty and related violence, not from deliberate intentions of parties in the region to victimize Americans. The U.S. military has conducted at least eight noncombatant evacuations from

African countries since 1990, the largest number from any single continent.

A Region Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) include arms utilizing nuclear, radiological, chemical or biological agents to kill or incapacitate humans, or to render livestock, crops and water unfit for human consumption. Almost by definition, and with the memory of the nuclear terror of the Cold War, nonproliferation of such weapons is a vital national interest. The Clinton administration unambiguously asserts that “[w]eapons of mass destruction pose the greatest potential threat to global security.”⁴¹ Not surprisingly, the administration has strongly promoted, in Africa as elsewhere, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

To date, Sub-Saharan Africa has not been a significant venue for development or deployment of weapons of mass destruction. Save for South Africa, no country in the region is known to have possessed, or to have indicated a serious desire to possess, nuclear weapons.⁴² Only a handful of Sub-Saharan African countries are known to have chemical weapons. No country in the region is known to have a current interest in the development of biological weapons.

Unfortunately, technology at the end of the 20th century is sufficiently advanced that some forms of WMD could be developed surreptitiously and relatively rapidly anywhere in the world. Such weapons may be attractive to a future leader of a “rogue state” in Sub-Saharan Africa. The remoteness of certain areas of the world probably also provide the best protection against discovery, and could thus be attractive to terrorist groups or criminal organizations seeking locations for covert laboratories. In a sense, Africa could be the venue for the development of WMD by “Mother Nature.” As one of the world’s “hot-zones,” Central Africa seems to have been the site of origin for several virulent diseases—particularly hemorrhagic fevers—with potential to develop into pandemics of tremendous lethality. This is a threat not only to residents of the region, but to the American public as well. At the end of the 20th century, every area of the world—including

central Africa— is but a plane ride away from the population centers of the rest of the world.⁴³

A Region Free of Sponsors or Havens for Transnational Threats. Of considerable interest to the United States is that no African country create, sponsor or harbor the perpetrators of a range of transnational threats. In the world of the late 20th century, several threats in this category are not anchored in any one country, and they cross national borders with relative impunity. Transnational threats include the flows of refugees. They also include the pandemic diseases noted earlier. More insidious threats, however, are the activities of international crime syndicates (including drug cartels, narco-traffickers, sophisticated international “con artists,” and perpetrators of banking scams); operations by international terrorist groups; or simply the depredations against civil intercourse by technologically sophisticated vandals.⁴⁴ For example, the ever more automated, computerized world is increasingly at the mercy of terrorists or highwaymen on the “information superhighway.”⁴⁵

The United States seeks to have African governments participate as partners in the world-wide struggle against such threats. It also is in the U.S. national interest that African law-enforcement institutions have the resources and motivation to do so. The United States maintains relations at a very modest level with African law enforcement agencies, participating in international organizations such as Interpol and in various bilateral programs. One serious constraint to better cooperation is the fact that U.S. law severely constrains the provision of U.S. law-enforcement training to foreign military or police personnel.⁴⁶

Since the early 1990s, both the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation have established regional linkages designed to combat transnational threats.⁴⁷ In the mid 1980s, the Department of Justice implemented an innovative program, the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, very active in the Western Hemisphere, which has

offered training to several African countries (Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi). While these programs represent commendable efforts to advance U.S. interests while complying with U.S. law, they are very modest in view of the potential regional threat.

Comity and Cooperation. The United States would like African countries to participate as willing and capable partners in a wide variety of activities in Africa (and elsewhere around the world), including international efforts to attenuate complex humanitarian emergencies, promote regional economic development, and fight transnational threats. In Africa, the absence of comity and cooperation (either between African countries themselves or between African countries and the United States) would pose a significant barrier to pursuit of virtually all other U.S. interests.

Comity and cooperation among African countries are important to economic development and regional stability. One regional development which would advance this interest is the success of subregional economic organizations, like ECOWAS or SADC. The United States has endeavored to encourage such organizations through diplomatic efforts and limited funding. For a variety of reasons, this interest is difficult to achieve, requiring considerable, consistent effort. However, it always is important and could be particularly significant to the United States in circumstances of regional or world-wide crisis.

Freedom from Egregious Suffering. One of the inevitable results of the “information age” is rapid access by the media—and thus by the American public—to information about human tragedy everywhere in the world. Profound human suffering affronts the basic values of Americans, and almost inevitably provokes public calls for the U.S. Government to intervene. Though U.S. responses to such circumstances often are superficial and short-lived, they evoke a basic American instinct to be “our brother’s keeper.”⁴⁸ Intrinsic American values also are reflected in that dimension of U.S. foreign policy which (somewhat

selectively) attempts to promote international respect for human rights and an end to human rights abuses.

Much of the suffering encountered in Africa results not from human maliciousness but from naturally-occurring threats such as drought and disease. Hazards from the environment sometimes are compounded by inept or uncaring national authorities and by the all too obvious austerity of infrastructure in many African countries. The United States has committed resources to address all of these problems. It is worth noting, by way of example, that an extraordinary (and little known) drought relief effort coordinated by the U.S. Agency for International Development in 1991 and 1992 prevented widespread starvation in southern Africa. While this interest is strongly anchored in American values, it has a very pragmatic aspect. A region characterized by continuing, profound humanitarian tragedy is unlikely to be stable or safe for American citizens.⁴⁹

Humane, Managerially Competent, and Accountable Governance. Some Americans (including policymakers in the current administration) strongly believe that the United States should promote a more or less “western” model of participatory democracy throughout the world.⁵⁰ This is based on a notion that democratic institutions tend to respect human rights and that democracies are less likely to resort to conflict in attempts to solve their foreign and domestic problems. It also is based on the view expressed in the 1997 National Security Strategy that “. . .democracies have proved more peaceful, stable and reliable partners and more likely to pursue sound economic policies.”⁵¹

Americans debate the propriety of advocating specific forms of governance for other countries,⁵² and by no means are all agreed that it is an essential interest of the United States that African countries adopt western-style democratic institutions. However, most U.S. policymakers probably would agree that it is in the interest of the United States that African governments share similar values in regard to respect for human rights, rule of law,

management of infrastructure and resources, and accountability of government to the society being served.

Generally, Americans would agree that certain democratic institutions, such as a free press and an independent judiciary, are important in assuring accountability of government to those governed. Another important part of this American ideal of governance is that the national security services—particularly the military establishment—be under the firm control of civil authorities. These interests derive from basic American values, and support other interests, including “regional stability,” “economic development,” and “freedom from egregious suffering.”

Sustained Economic Development. There is little debate over the fact that many of Africa's problems derive from poverty and inequitable access to the limited goods and benefits of African states. Ironically, many African countries (including some of those most racked by internal tensions) are very rich in natural resources. Little analysis is required to conclude that significant economic progress could alleviate many of the region's most profound problems, including those that threaten various U.S. regional interests, a conclusion reflected in the 1997 National Security Strategy.⁵³ The administration also has called attention to the potential of Sub-Saharan Africa as a largely untapped market for U.S. products. The clear implication is that economic development in Africa could bear tangibly and directly on U.S. economic well-being as well as its own.

Unthreatened Natural Environment. Unfortunately, economic development in Africa probably will conflict with another U.S. interest: that of an “unthreatened natural environment.” Uncontrolled development that results in widespread environmental degradation is neither in Africa's long-term best interest nor that of the rest of the planet. Because of the intense internal and external pressures for rapid improvement of economic conditions, and the heavy dependence of some African countries on extractive industries, regional decisionmakers may

encounter almost irresistible pressure to downplay the importance of protecting the environment in national development strategies. The pall of airborne industrial effluents over Lubumbashi (Democratic Republic of the Congo) and parts of the Rand (in South Africa) bear visible testimony to this dilemma.

Africa's natural environment is threatened by many things at the end of the 20th century, a situation true of other parts of the developing world as well. Rain forests are threatened by uncontrolled development and harvesting, other woodlands by increasing demands for fuel. Rapidly increasing populations of humans and livestock stress fragile ecologies, resulting in unwise cultivation of marginal soils and overgrazing of fragile savanna lands. Urbanization and increasing human populations result in contaminated water sources. Industrial waste and urban effluents often are discarded into the atmosphere, soil or rivers without much regard for effect of toxic materials on humans, plants or animals. Increasing human populations result in less and less habitat for wild animals and plant life, resulting in loss of biodiversity. Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Chester Crocker has called attention to the "[i]nterplay between Africa's demographic, climatic, geological and conflict trends." Crocker argues that this interconnection requires serious research and that resolution demands U.S. interest and leadership. He argues that American health and well-being are at stake in these "African" issues.⁵⁴

Not all threats to Africa's natural environment originate in Africa. By egregious and irresponsible overfishing, commercial fishing fleets from Europe and Asia may have permanently damaged the once lucrative fishing grounds off much of the African coast. Demand for products like rhinoceros horn and ivory in Asia, Europe, and the Americas has encouraged poaching. Asian cartels willingly pay vast sums of money to African poachers for rhinoceros horn, resulting in the likely extinction of that animal in the African wild. Some African governments even have been willing to allow disposal in their countries of highly toxic

wastes as a result of bribes from corporations in the developed countries (including American ones). Many of Africa's environmental problems are planetary problems that require planetary solutions.

Africa still has a magnificent natural environment which is an invaluable heritage of all mankind. Preservation of the environment is important to long-term, sustainable economic development in Africa. African biodiversity is important to world scientific research, possibly holding keys to human medical dilemmas. African flora may be important to regional—and possible worldwide—weather patterns. It is very much in the interest of the developed world to assist Africans in responsible stewardship of the African natural environment.⁵⁵ The United States has pursued this interest with diplomatic efforts bilaterally and in multinational fora. Some of the U.S. aid funding and military assistance funding for programs in African countries has been targeted at environmental objectives.

The African Crisis Response Initiative.

Without major change, conflict will remain common in Sub-Saharan Africa. American interests in the region suggest that the United States should encourage such change but can only devote limited resources—whether money or manpower—to the task. American strategy must stress support and encouragement, seeking the greatest possible impact from all programs, efforts, and initiatives designed to ameliorate existing crises and prevent or deter future ones. Given this, the primary objectives of current U.S. policy in Africa are conflict resolution and peaceful change, alleviation of suffering and hunger, encouragement of democracy, and promotion of sustainable development through market-based reforms.⁵⁶ The Department of Defense has focused on conflict prevention, management, and resolution. This is done by playing “the role of catalyst, technical adviser, and honest broker,” and by supporting “the nascent effort of Africans to take the lead in resolving conflicts and peacekeeping efforts in the region.”⁵⁷

Given the combination of frequent conflicts in Africa, the tendency of these conflicts to generate refugee problems and humanitarian disasters, the global leadership role and commitments of the United States, and the limits on U.S. interests, encouraging the growth of an organic African peace operations capability makes perfect sense. A number of individuals claim credit for the idea of an indigenous African peacekeeping force but it took specific form in late 1995 when U.S. policymakers began searching for a solution to a looming crisis in the small nation of Burundi. Discussions on the issue continued through 1996. Then, at the request of the National Security Council, a Joint Staff proposal for an African crisis response force was presented to National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in August 1996 and quickly approved.

In mid-September, Deputy National Security Advisor Nancy Soderburg went to Europe and Assistant Secretary of State George Moose visited Africa to solicit support for the idea. Other officials briefed the Organization of African Unity and the United Nations. Unfortunately, the proposal had been crafted on such short notice that many essential details were left undefined. However, the administration used an October 1996 regional visit by Secretary of State Warren Christopher to announce the initiative with minimal advance warning to U.S. diplomats in the region and to African governments.

The African response was tepid.⁵⁸ This skepticism grew from historical experience. African leaders have seen a number of U.S. programs announced with great fanfare which soon died for lack of continuing interest, funding or due to unanticipated difficulties. It was clear to Africans that the new proposal lacked definition in critical features such as relations to other international bodies (like the United Nations), mandate, command and control relationships, and the specifics of external support. African leaders were themselves puzzled (in some cases annoyed) by the lack of prior consultation and by American failure to recognize the growing role of subregional organizations like the Southern Africa Development Council (SADC) and

ECOWAS in conflict resolution. They were irritated by the apparent offer of participation to some African countries but not others.

America's European allies reacted in different ways to the proposal. They, too, were less than impressed by the sudden, rather imperious announcement of the initiative.⁵⁹ The French, leery of growing American influence in Africa, already had plans for a peacekeeping force in Francophone Africa. The British were working with several African military establishments on peace operations, particularly those in Ghana and Zimbabwe. Neither Paris nor London thus greeted the new American proposal with much initial enthusiasm.

Despite the less than overwhelming reception, the administration continued to pursue the idea of an organic peacekeeping capability in Africa. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, in congressional testimony, vowed that the United States "will give priority to our proposal for the African Crisis Response Force."⁶⁰ In early 1997, an experienced Foreign Service Officer and former U.S. ambassador in Africa, Marshall McCallie, was assigned to lead an interagency working group (IWG) overseeing the project. In deference to African sensitivities, the Inter-agency Working Group changed the name of the project from African Crisis Response Force to Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The idea was that a force of some sort *might* be formed in the future, but the initial goals were more modest.

The IWG quickly renewed consultation with African and European governments, listening to their concerns and soliciting moral and material support for the program.⁶¹ By mid-1997, this had resulted in a cooperative agreement with the British and French for a joint approach to peacekeeping training in Africa, substantial support from other European countries, and the backing of Japan. During a May 1997 meeting, for instance, France, Great Britain, and the United States agreed on joint initiatives to train African armies for peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations and Organization of African Unity.⁶²

At a July 1997 meeting, the "P3" (Permanent 3) countries—France, Great Britain, and the United States—agreed to establish an African Peacekeeping Group and a Coordination Group, open to all African and donor countries, which would sustain political support and monitor the progress of plans to augment Africa's peacekeeping capacity.⁶³

The Working Group also had formulated a long-range approach and training plan, and crafted a relationship between the ACRI and the United Nations. U.S. diplomats at the United Nations had obtained international acceptance of the notion that ACRI training would help create African forces available for the U.N. standby force list—a reform initiative of the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations.⁶⁴ The U.S. Congress provided \$15 million in ACRI funding for fiscal year 1997. Clinton administration officials were confident that they were seeing increasing signs of African interest and support for the ACRI.

By mid-1997 Washington had obtained commitments from seven African countries to furnish a total of eight battalions and a brigade headquarters for training.⁶⁵ The Department of Defense was to provide the training with emphasis on commonality of communications, basic soldiering skills, and specific military activities required in peacekeeping. The objective was interoperability which would allow African forces to more easily blend with each other and with contingents from the United States and Western Europe during future peacekeeping operations. The training was designed to provide a U.N. standard in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief practices. The U.S. Army Special Forces began instructing Ugandan, Senegalese, and Malawian units in mid-1997.⁶⁶

Still, some Africans remain ambivalent about ACRI. Military officers in several African countries seem interested and cautiously optimistic but others continue to regard ACRI as a patronizing attempt by outsiders to define Africa's problems and dictate solutions. Nigeria has been particularly disparaging.⁶⁷ In mid-1997 some African

officers doubted the reliability of American promises of material and logistic support for an African peace operations force.⁶⁸ Two messages often emerged from discussions with Africans. First, they are uncomfortable about any large-scale peace operations not under the aegis of the United Nations. (In mid-1997, African military and government officials still were generally unaware of the successful U.S. effort to craft a U.N. linkage for ACRI). African concern is easy to understand. U.N. peace operations in Africa have been better supported logistically than those containing regional actors alone.⁶⁹ Also, to Africans, the United Nations carries a greater legitimacy than any subregional or regional organization. Africans believe that the wider international involvement in peace operations represented by the United Nations would obviate regional chauvinism and suspicions. A second message is the importance of allowing Africans to devise their own conflict resolution processes without constant badgering. This message (though conveyed politely by African interlocutors) could be more bluntly expressed as follows: "If you really want to help, let us take the initiative. When we need help from our friends, we will request it. But let us determine what that assistance should be."

In general, ACRI shows how the United States usually reacts to African problems. The original idea had its genesis among mid-level government officials with a reasonably clear understanding of America's regional interests and a notion of how to go about building an African peacekeeping force. However, they were unable to sell the project to senior policymakers until a crisis seemed to require a short-notice option. At that point, the African Crisis Response Force appeared to be a logical solution to a difficult problem. Although it had been discussed for months among mid-level staff, it was adopted as official policy without the extensive consultation and vetting appropriate to a major initiative. The timing and manner of its announcement thus left little doubt overseas that this was a sudden American reaction to crisis.

Assessment of ACRI.

Despite the circumstances of its introduction, ACRI was one way of pursuing desirable objectives such as regional stability, safety of American citizens, and regional comity and cooperation. It may even have been one of the best ways of doing so. With careful prior coordination and consultation in a non-crisis environment, Africans and Europeans may have seen it as a commendable American effort to provide visionary leadership. But by waiting for a crisis and grasping for a quick solution, the administration complicated the task of building support for ACRI.

For it to succeed now, ACRI's managers must continue to demonstrate considerable sophistication. They must overcome its reputation in some quarters as an unpalatable, unworkable outsider's notion, and must convince skeptical African leaders that the project will have long-term support without unacceptable strings. They must carefully encourage African ownership of the project without allowing the project to be captured by an African hegemon. Finally, in deference to continuing African sensitivities, the administration must stress the role of the United Nations and resist any temptation to trumpet ACRI as an American foreign policy "triumph."

Overall, the existing version of the ACRI, which is limited to a military-to-military training program, has utility. It will impart tangible skills to those African soldiers and officers who undergo the training. The units trained will probably perform more effectively in peace operations than they would without the training. Interoperability—which is a key objective of the existing program—will help. As a result, it will be easier in the future to put together an African peacekeeping force on short notice which dovetails with ongoing U.N. reform of peacekeeping operations. ACRI will also have a positive impact on civil-military relations in the host countries since much of the training concerns appropriate ways for those in uniform to deal with civilians. It will begin to create habits of cooperation, both between the American military and its African partners, and,

hopefully, among African militaries. As the development of the European Community demonstrated, regional integration must begin with habits of cooperation on tangible issues. And, ACRI brings benefits to the U.S. Army Special Forces units involved by allowing them to practice their skills and advance their understanding of the African operational environment. It is very effective training for the foreign internal defense mission, which involves training friendly armed forces among other tasks, assigned to Special Forces groups who participate.

There are, though, significant limitations to the results which can be expected from ACRI. The training is perishable. Some of the African soldiers who undergo it will leave the military in fairly short order. Even those who stay will require continuous, recurring refresher training, whether by the United States, some other nation, or their own military. In fact, the United State currently plans for trainers to go back every three or four months.⁷⁰ Even more important, ACRI as currently construed does not fundamentally alter the African security environment or lead automatically to an organic African capability for peacekeeping. It does not deal with typical shortcomings in command and control, logistics, planning, and mobility. It does not augment the peacekeeping skills of police who play a vital role in such operations.⁷¹

As part of ACRI training, African militaries are introduced to the concept of Civil-Military Operations Centers which the United States has found extremely valuable in coordinating the activities of military forces and humanitarian relief organizations during peacekeeping. It does not, however, create or address structures to coordinate military operations and the political and diplomatic efforts that form the heart of peacekeeping. Ideas such as a "civilian secretariat"—to include civilian police—that would accompany any headquarters that deployed with an African peacekeeping force are thus vital. Finally, ACRI does not begin to build institutions to practice conflict avoidance or authorize and direct a peacekeeping operation when conflict avoidance fails.

These shortcomings are not due to a lack of understanding or vision on the part of ACRI's designers, but reflect the rigid political and budgetary parameters they face. But if ACRI does not grow beyond what it is today and if Africans themselves do not take further steps to develop peace operations capabilities, the trained units of the African states which participate may be somewhat more effective, but Africa as a region will still be forced to rely on the United Nations, the United States, Western Europe, and Japan to fund, organize, control, and support any future peacekeeping operations. As Mark Malan of the South African Institute for Security Studies puts it, "Perhaps the greatest flaw in the whole ACRI concept is the failure to establish a credible linkage between capacity-building and capacity utilisation."⁷²

It is important to note that even the current, limited version of ACRI has risks and pitfalls. It does increase American involvement in the region and hence will give both the American public and Africans a sense of greater U.S. commitment. The United States may be pressured to provide support and transportation for the units it has trained during future crises. A refusal or tardy response could be a public relations disaster, dimming future cooperative military efforts in regional peace operations. Potentially, at least, the United States could face criticism if a unit or some individuals that it trained commits human rights violations or undertakes a coup. To again quote Mark Malan,

No matter who is doing the training and with what intentions, once it has been provided, there is no effective way of controlling the way that the equipment provided and skills which have been taught are used . . . "⁷³

ACRI will not be universally popular in Africa. Opposition politicians in African states which are receiving training as well as the governments of states that are excluded from the program will be critical, often accusing Washington of using ACRI to gather military intelligence or to advance other exclusive U.S. interests. (The Ugandan

parliament, for instance, demanded an explanation from the government as U.S. Special Forces prepared to deploy to Uganda, but ultimately seemed satisfied with the government's explanation).⁷⁴

Charges that ACRI is designed to give the United States a military foot in Africa's door may also come from other quarters, especially France which often does not see eye-to-eye with the United States on Africa policy. Again, such criticism does not imply that ACRI should be abandoned, but rather that the United States must anticipate it and stress consultation and transparency in its Africa strategy. It must remain clear that Americans are in support of African and international efforts to transform the African security environment, not imposing solutions made in Washington.

Conclusion and Recommendations.

To promote American interests in Africa, the United States should use ACRI as a first step in a long-term program to encourage and assist in the transformation of the African security environment into one where violence is less common and where most violence that does occur can be dealt with without massive outside involvement. A number of actors must participate in this, each with vital roles.

The Role of Congress. Congress must sustain support for ACRI. Regular funding at a relatively modest level would be far superior to providing a large amount one year and then cutting it back the next. ACRI will raise the expectations of Africans concerning U.S. involvement in their region. A precipitous cut-off of the program at some future date would thus have serious diplomatic repercussions. Phrased differently, starting ACRI and then ending it or downsizing it for domestic political or economic reasons rather than because of anything the African states do (or fail to do) would erode American influence more than not starting the program at all. To facilitate long-term planning on the part of those who lead ACRI, providing a specific budget line for it would probably be a good idea (if the Secretary of State

agrees). If ACRI expands or evolves into a broader program, Congress must provide additional funds. The military services cannot be expected to support an expanded ACRI out of existing training and operational budgets.

Congress should also consider ending prohibitions on the use of American security assistance money to train police for peacekeeping roles and consider providing such funds. The goal in any peacekeeping operation is to return to a normal situation as rapidly as possible. This means that civilian police rather than soldiers should bear the greatest responsibility for order and stability. But this places great demands on police forces. Some countries do not have a tradition of separate law enforcement and security forces. Few African police forces are adequately trained, equipped, and supplied for peacekeeping. If the objective is to free Africa from dependence on extensive outside involvement in peace operations, the United States, along with its friends and allies throughout the developed world, should help build police forces with specific training in peacekeeping. Congress can help pave the way for this.

Congress—or at least key members interested in Africa—must also help the American public understand that ACRI secures U.S. regional interests. The public must comprehend the importance of ACRI and other programs designed to help the transformation of the African security system, but should not be given unrealistic expectations. Even with a greatly expanded variant of ACRI, conflicts will still occur in Africa. And, for at least a decade, these will require assistance from outsiders—including the United States. But without ACRI and other programs designed to build on it, Africa will be even more conflict-ridden and African leaders will find it very difficult to engineer the transformation of their region's security environment. The administration must play the greatest role in communicating this to the American public, but Congress can assist.

The Role of the Department of State. One of the most important tasks for the State Department is to broaden ACRI. Efforts to link ACRI with ongoing reform in U.N. peacekeeping is an excellent initiative, and should be

supported. The State Department must also further solidify the P3 support group. France and Great Britain have been involved in augmenting Africa's peacekeeping capability longer than the United States. Coordinating their efforts with ACRI and developing an effective overarching structure is crucial. The Department of State must also pay careful attention to solidifying the links between ACRI and the Organization of African Unity.⁷⁵ And ACRI must be better linked to the security programs of subregional organizations, particularly SADC.

For ACRI to succeed, the Department of State must also enlarge participation among African democracies. Deep suspicion of ACRI persists throughout Africa. By patient diplomacy and by making sure that ACRI evolves in a way that fits with African political and cultural realities, the Department of State can help alleviate such suspicion. Gaining the support of South Africa is particularly important for ACRI's future. Real transformation of the African security system probably will require leadership from Pretoria. So far, South Africa has supported the principle of strengthening Africa's organic capability at peacekeeping, but has not become a full participant in ACRI. In fact, there has been debate within South Africa over that nation's role in regional peacekeeping.⁷⁶ In November 1996, though, this appeared to have ended as President Nelson Mandela, who had previously resisted military intervention outside southern Africa, officially stated his willingness to send troops to Zaire during that nation's civil war.⁷⁷ Mandela was also crucial in the negotiations which ended the war in Zaire. Given Pretoria's potential power, this is a hopeful sign so long as such activism can avoid intimidating South Africa's smaller neighbors.

The U.S. Department of State can play a vital role in helping Africa improve its conflict avoidance and conflict resolution capabilities. Preventing violence is infinitely preferable to armed peacekeeping. This implies that the United States should devote at least as much effort and money to conflict avoidance and resolution as to

peacekeeping. Clearly the State Department must direct any official U.S. efforts in this direction and help Africans construct procedures and institutions to do this. The OAU Crisis Management Center, while it does not yet have a record of prominent success, does have potential. It has received U.S. support and should continue to do so.⁷⁸

The State Department should also continue and increase efforts to coordinate official programs with the bevy of initiatives by private organizations, universities, and international organizations, particularly in Europe and North America. These provide important fora for information consultations among mid-level African officials and may eventually help the development of indigenous African humanitarian relief organizations. Institutions like the Durban-based African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), the African Leadership Forum, and the Ghanaian Centre for Conflict Resolution have great promise and warrant support from the United States.⁷⁹

The Role of the Department of Defense and the U.S. Military. The U.S. Department of Defense and the U.S. military will also play crucial roles in any programs designed to move beyond the current, limited version of ACRI. For instance, DOD and the military might consider expanding ACRI training to include support to civilian officials during natural disasters and pandemic disease as well as peacekeeping. The next step should be a program to augment the ability of Africans to plan, command, and control both humanitarian relief and peacekeeping operations. No African country currently has the capability to deploy a headquarters for a multi-brigade operation in any but the most peaceful environments.⁸⁰ Developing such capability could begin with a regular series of wargames, staff exercises, and simulations involving a range of African participants (both military and civilian) as well as Americans and Europeans. American facilities such as the Army's Battle Command Training Program, simulation programs run by private corporations, and the Army's Center for Strategic Leadership at Carlisle Barracks could

provide the appropriate venue for this. Regular staff talks and conferences involving Africans, Europeans, and Americans could pave the way. African countries generally lack the funds to support such conferences, so their external partners should be willing to pick up the tab.

Even better, the United States, in conjunction with its European allies, could institutionalize communication by helping Africans create a pan-African staff college or the equivalent of the U.S. Department of Defense's Marshall Center.⁸¹ Such a school would provide opportunities for greatly increased understanding and cooperation among African military leaders, and could augment the International Military Education and Training programs that bring a number of African officers to American schools every year. This would, in turn, facilitate planning and coordination of any future operations, especially if the school included civilians from defense ministries, the police, and other organizations involved in peacekeeping. In addition, the Department of Defense should consider supporting any African efforts to develop regional training centers. South Africa is particularly active on this.

The U.S. Department of Defense and military should also plan actual combined peacekeeping exercises with troops from a range of African states as well as Europe, the United States, and any other nation that wanted to participate. African units, for instance, could attend peacekeeping training programs at the U.S. Army's Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk. After a few U.S.-led, designed, and planned combined exercises in Africa itself, the United States should shift to providing support for combined exercises planned, designed, and led by Africans themselves. Eventually, something like the Joint Readiness Training Center might be built in Africa. If so, it should receive strong U.S. encouragement and material support.

There have been several promising developments in African efforts to augment regional cooperation on peacekeeping outside the ACRI framework. One was an exercise held in Zimbabwe in April 1997. This was an initial

outgrowth of the decision by SADC to charge Zimbabwe with responsibility for subregional peace operations training.⁸² The exercise took place at Nyanga, a military maneuver training facility in Zimbabwe's eastern highlands. Termed *Blue Hungwe*, it included military contingents from Zimbabwe, Botswana, Tanzania, Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho, South Africa and Mozambique (as well as observers from Zambia and police participants from Angola).⁸³ The exercise was directed by Zimbabwean Major General Mike Nyambuya, an internationally respected authority on peace operations. The *Blue Hungwe* scenario was designed to test command-and-control and interoperability at battalion level in a realistic "peacekeeping" environment. Two U.S. officials attended the exercise as observers. Participants and observers gave the exercise very high praise, remarking on the realism, organizational competence and ability to "work through" problems. Also evident was the potential of *Blue Hungwe* as a testbed for subregional peace operations. The Zimbabweans themselves clearly were pleased by the commendations of observers. They believe that *Blue Hungwe* could be the first of a series of subregional exercises, possibly held annually in different southern African countries.⁸⁴

A similar exercise is scheduled in Senegal for late February 1998. Currently designated *Guidi Makha*, this exercise may include small numbers of participants from the United States and Great Britain in addition to the French and Senegalese hosts. Observers from a number of states will attend. The United States should actively support such African-led and designed programs to improve regional cooperation in peacekeeping even if we have little control over them. A key form of support could be funding for transporting the "players" from African countries to exercise sites.

The next step would be to begin augmenting the ability of African militaries to provide their own logistics, mobility, and intelligence support. This is a more expensive proposition. In recent years, African military forces have

met some success in peacekeeping operations performed without outside assistance in Liberia and the Central African Republic.⁸⁵ They could develop the capacity to plan, lead, and control even more complex peacekeeping operations within 5 years if given appropriate assistance. It will be at least 10 years before most African militaries could deploy and sustain peacekeeping forces for extended periods of time far beyond their national borders without assistance.

Finally, the Department of Defense should consider greater involvement of Army National Guard units as ACRI develops. Army Special Forces are precisely the right units to provide the sort of training offered now, but because Guard units have extensive experience in support to civilian authorities, they might be appropriate to use in the future. This particular strength of the Army National Guard is translatable into the sorts of things African militaries would have to do during a peacekeeping operation. An African version of the National Guard partnerships with specific nations that have proven successful in Eastern Europe would warrant consideration. This linkage between the U.S. Army National Guard and African militaries could be particularly productive if African militaries begin to expand their role in disaster assistance.

The Role of African Leaders. The ultimate success or failure of ACRI and of the transformation of the African security environment lies squarely on the shoulders of African leaders. To make this work, they must sustain the positive political and economic trends of the past few years. ACRI and any programs that follow it must be limited to democracies, so it is incumbent on African leaders to continue progress in this direction. African leaders should continue to reform their systems of civil-military relations in order to develop armed forces which fully subscribe to the concept of civilian control. This requires reasonably corruption-free and effective civilian governance which respects human rights. It would also require development of a body of defense professionals who can exercise civilian oversight over the military.

African leaders should recommit themselves to things like the paramount obligation of all states to provide maximum support for refugees and to eschew support for rebels or insurgents in neighboring states. The 1996-97 war in Zaire/Democratic Republic of the Congo and the 1997 violence in the Congo Republic showed that armed insurrection with the help of neighbors is still “the preferred means of political change” in Sub-Saharan Africa.⁸⁶ If African leaders do not abandon this practice, any regional peacekeeping force will simply be a stopgap, rushing from one disaster to the other. African leaders must also improve the ability of the OAU and subregional organizations to prevent violence, resolve conflicts peacefully, and to organize and deploy peacekeeping forces when violence or natural disaster does occur. And, they should pursue regular discussions of security issues at the subminister level in order to move beyond the personalization of foreign and national security policy.

Ultimately, though, this list is notional. Africans must assume the lead in transforming their security environment and must help the United States understand how it can support this given the extent of American global responsibilities. If the ACRI concept is to succeed, Africans must take ownership of it. This should be a key U.S. objective even if it means that ACRI's descendants are quite different in form than the original initiative. The United States must develop the maturity to accept that it will not control programs that grow from ACRI and must resist the temptation to withdraw support if Africans decide to approach regional problems differently than Washington would have preferred.

ACRI, then, is a useful but limited program that seeks to help Africans improve their security options without making unrealistic demands on American resources. Even if it never expands beyond its current parameters, it will provide some benefits to Africans and support U.S. regional

interests. But the true value of ACRI is as a first step in a broader strategy to transform the African security environment. Today, there are great opportunities to do this. Hopefully, the United States will develop a pattern of regional engagement based on three “Cs”—consultation, consensus, and cooperation—in order to capitalize on the opportunities it now has.

ENDNOTES

1. James Rupert, “Angolan Incursion Reflects New Interventionist Posture in Africa,” *Washington Post*, October 21, 1997, p. A14; and Howard French, “New Rules in Africa: Borders Aren’t Sacred,” *New York Times*, October 18, 1997, pp. A1 and A7.

2. Nicholas D. Kristoff, “Why Africa Can Thrive Like Asia,” *New York Times*, May 24, 1997 (electronic edition); “Sub-Saharan Africa Turning Economic Corner,” *Washington Post*, February 26, 1997, p. A15.

3. “Democratic Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa,” fact sheet released by the U.S. Department of State, Bureau of African Affairs, October 4, 1996; Ozoemenam Mbachu, “Democracy in Africa: A Theoretical Overview,” *Coexistence*, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 1994, p. 147.

4. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, for instance, contends that Mobutu’s demise opens the way for stability and integration in Central Africa. See Colette Braeckman, “Museveni: The Key Man of Africa,” *Le Soir* (Brussels), September 23, 1997, p. 9, reprinted in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Daily Report FBIS-AFR-97-267*.

5. Quoted in Charles W. Corey, “U.S.–African Relations at ‘Pivotal Point,’ Rice Says,” *United States Information Service Washington File*, October 22, 1997.

6. For instance, Michele Maringues, “Analysis,” *Le Monde* (Paris), June 11, 1997, p. 4, reprinted in *FBIS-WEU-97-113*; and, “Cooperation Minister: France Lost Ground to U.S. in Africa,” AFP (Paris) broadcast of August 29, 1997, transcript in *FBIS-WEU-97-241*.

7. Jacques Isnard, “France Overhauling African Military Setup,” *Le Monde* (Paris), July 21, 1997, p. 2, reprinted in *FBIS-WEU-97-203*; and, “European Partners Urged to Fight U.S. Influence in Africa,” AFP (Paris) broadcast, July 4, 1997, reprinted in *FBIS-WEU-97-185*.

8. For instance, Patrick Sabatier, "Strategic Motives Seen Behind Clinton's Africa Initiative," *Liberation* (Paris), June 19, 1997, p. 9, reprinted in *FBIS-WEU-97-170*.

9. On Japan's growing role, see "Eastward Ho!" *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 36, No. 24, December 1, 1995, pp. 1-3.

10. See Azzedine Layachi, "The OAU and Western Sahara: A Case Study," in Yassin El-Ayouty, ed., *The Organization of African Unity after Thirty Years*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1994.

11. 'funmi Olonisakin, "African 'Homemade' Peacekeeping Initiatives," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Spring 1997, pp. 350-356.

12. James O.C. Jonah, "The OAU: Peace Keeping and Conflict Resolution," in El-Ayouty, ed., *The Organization of African Unity after Thirty Years*, pp. 9-12; and, I. William Zartman, "African Regional Security and Changing Patterns of Relations," in Edmond J. Keller and Donald Rothchild, eds., *Africa in the New International Order: Rethinking State Sovereignty and Regional Security*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996, pp. 53-55.

13. See Cedric de Coning, "The Role of the OAU in Conflict Management in Africa," in Mark Malan, ed., *Conflict Management, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding: Lessons for Africa from a Seminar Past*, Halfway House, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 1997, pp. 14-26.

14. Berhanykun Andemicael, "OAU-UN Relations in a Changing World," in El-Ayouty, ed., *The Organization of African Unity after Thirty Years*, p. 137.

15. See Khabele Matlosa, "The Recent Political Crisis in Lesotho," *Africa Insight*, Vol. 24, No. 4, 1994, pp. 225-229; and, Francis K. Makoa, "Political Instability in Post-Military Lesotho: The Crisis of the Basotho Nation-State?" *African Security Review*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1996, pp. 13-20.

16. See Jakkie Cilliers, "The SADC Organ for Defence, Politics, and Security," *Institute for Defence Policy Papers*, No. 10, October 1996.

17. See Max A. Sesay, "Collective Security or Collective Disaster?: Regional Peacekeeping in West Africa," *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 1995, pp. 205-222; and Earl Conteh-Morgan, "Conflict and Militarization in Africa: Past Trends and New Scenarios," *Conflict Quarterly*, Vol. 13, No. 1, Winter 1993, pp. 39-40.

18. Olonisakin, "African 'Homemade' Peacekeeping Initiatives," pp. 356-365.

19. Clement E. Adibe, "The Liberian Conflict and the ECOWAS-UN Partnership," *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1997, pp. 471-488.

20. John Pomfret, "Aid Groups Help Needy and Greedy," *The Washington Post*, September 23, 1997, p. A1.

21. "Unmaking and Remaking the State," *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 36, No. 1, January 6, 1995, p. 1.

22. Zaire Watch News Briefs (electronic edition), April 11, 1997.

23. For historical background, see Anthony Mockler, *The New Mercenaries*, New York: Paragon House, 1985.

24. Donald G. McNeil Jr., "Pocketing the Wages of War," *New York Times*, February 16, 1997 (electronic edition); Howard W. French, "In Zaire's Unconventional War, Serbs Train Refugees for Combat," *New York Times*, February 12, 1997 (electronic edition); AFP (Paris), broadcast of January 24, 1997, transcript in *FBIS-AFR-97-016*; AFP (Paris), broadcast of January 21, 1997, transcript in *FBIS-AFR-97-014*; Stephen Laufer, "Further on Expansion of Mercenary Group," *Business Day* (Johannesburg), January 17, 1997 (electronic edition); Serge Dumont, "Kinshasa Said To Have Recruited Israeli Mercenaries," *Le Soir* (Brussels), February 5, 1997, p. 7, reprinted in *FBIS-AFR-97-024*; James C. McKinley Jr., "Mercenary Who Came to Zaire and Left a Bloody Trail," *New York Times*, March 19, 1997 (electronic edition); Milan Radonjic, "Our Pilot Killed in Zaire," *Gradjanin* (Belgrade), April 8, 1997, p. 10, reprinted in *FBIS-EEU-97-100*; Zoran Petrovic Pirocanac, "More Than 1,000 Serb Republic Army Combatants—Mercenaries in Zaire," *Blic* (Belgrade), February 22-23, 1997, p. 6, reprinted in *FBIS-EEU-97-038*; "Mercenary Force Reportedly Sent to Zaire," *The Star* (Johannesburg), December 2, 1996, p. 1, reprinted in *FBIS-AFR-96-233*; and, Khareen Pech and James Tomlins, "Former SADF Soldiers Said Joining White Legion in Zaire," *The Sunday Independent* (Johannesburg), January 12, 1997, p. 5, reprinted in *FBIS-AFR-97-008*.

25. AFP (Paris), broadcast of January 24, 1997, transcript in *FBIS-AFR-97-016*.

26. Elizabeth Rubin, "An Army of One's Own," *Harper's Magazine*, February 1997, pp. 44-55; "Soldiers For Sale," *Time*, May 26, 1997 (electronic download); Edward O'Loughlin, "SA Mercenaries Conquer Africa," *Weekly Mail and Guardian*, August 4, 1995 (electronic download); Khareen Pech, "Too Late For the Mercenaries," *Electronic*

Mail and Guardian (Johannesburg), May 30, 1997; and, "South African Firm Withdrawing Angola Mercenaries," Reuters electronic newswire, December 11, 1995.

27. See Kent Hughes Butts and Steven Metz, *Armies and Democracies in the New Africa: Lessons from Nigeria and South Africa*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996.

28. Rich Orth, "African Operational Experiences in Peacekeeping," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 7, No. 3, Winter 1996, pp. 308-323.

29. South Africa, Nigeria, and Ghana have commercial airlines and ocean-going fleets which could be used for military lift. Nigeria has employed commercial shipping to transport its military forces into and out of Liberia during the course of its ECOMOG involvement.

30. See Kwame Nkrumah, *Africa Must Unite*, New York: International, 1970. Like Simon Bolivar, who earlier had hoped that independence would lead to political unity in South America, Nkrumah died in exile, having seen all chances of unification fade into bickering and outright hostility between African states.

31. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, The White House, May 1997, p. 28. The *National Military Strategy* reflects the same basic perspective when it identifies "four principal dangers" to the United States in the international environment: regional instability, weapons of mass destruction, transnational dangers (like crime, drugs, refugees, diseases) and dangers to democracy and reform.

32. *United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense Office of International Security Affairs, August 1995, p. 3.

33. These include Operation *Sharp Edge* (noncombatant evacuation from Liberia); Operation *Eastern Exit* (noncombatant evacuation from Somalia); Operation *Quick Lift* (noncombatant evacuation from Zaire); an unnamed noncombatant evacuation from Sierra Leone; Operation *Provide Transition* (election support in Angola); Operation *Restore Hope* (humanitarian operations in Somalia); Operation *Provide Relief* (humanitarian operations in Somalia); Operation *Distant Runner* (noncombatant evacuation from Rwanda); Operation *Support Hope* (humanitarian operations in Rwanda); Operation *United Shield* (support to U.N. withdrawal from Somalia); Operation *Quick Response* (noncombatant evacuation from Central African Republic); Operation *Assured Response* (noncombatant evacuation from Liberia); Operation *Guardian Assistance* (humanitarian operations in central Africa); Operation *Guardian Retrieval* (preparation for noncombatant evacuation from Zaire); Operation *Noble Obelisk* (noncombatant

evacuation from Sierra Leone); and Operation *Assured Lift* (operations in support of ECOMOG deployment in Liberia).

34. C. William Fox, *Military Medical Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa: The DoD "Point of the Spear" for a New Century*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997.

35. Peter J. Schraeder, *United States Foreign Policy Toward Africa: Incrementalism, Crisis and Change*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 2.

36. This was anecdotally illustrated by an administration official in a 1996 "off-the-record" discussion who, when asked to specify U.S. interests in Africa, cynically responded by asking: "Where is (CNN correspondent) Christianne Amanpour reporting from today?"

37. See, for example, "Have Gun, Will Prop Up Regime," *U.S. News & World Report*, January 20, 1997, pp. 46-48; Herman J. Cohen, "Conflict Management in Africa," *CSIS Africa Notes*, Number 181, February 1996; and Herb Howe, "South Africa's 9-1-1 Force," *Armed Forces Journal International*, November 1996, pp. 38-39.

38. Important but less visible circumstances in which the U.S. desires access include a west African site for emergency space shuttle landings (in cases where a Florida launch requires an emergency abort) and locations for Voice of America radio transmitters.

39. The importance of this dimension of access should not be overlooked. A very important contributor to the demise of the Haile Selassie government in Ethiopia in the mid 1970s was the Emperor's refusal to acknowledge the incapacity of the Ethiopian government to attenuate the suffering caused by drought in the early 1970s. The

Ethiopian Government refused external humanitarian aid, resulting in substantial unnecessary suffering and death.

40. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, p. 9.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

42. South Africa possessed a very limited arsenal of air-deliverable tactical nuclear weapons until the early 1990s, when the weapons were dismantled on orders of the de Klerk government ("South Africa: A Nuclear Nightmare," *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 35, No. 3, February 4, 1994, pp. 1-3). Interestingly, U.S. officials have heard African leaders (particularly Nigerians) express regret at this South African action. The Nigerians argued that possession of nuclear weapons by at least one African country would give the continent more international clout. (COL Henk, interview with Lieutenant Colonel (retired) Anthony D. Marley, U.S. Army, August 12, 1997.)

43. Fox, *Military Medical Operations in Sub-Saharan Africa*

44. In this category, it is worth recalling that the perpetrators of the 1994 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City had their ideological origins in a particularly virulent form of fundamentalist Islam centered in Sudan. During the COL Henk's research in Africa in mid-1997, a former senior Kenyan police official stated that Kenyan authorities had found and destroyed several fields of cultivated poppies in recent years. While Africa does not seem, at this time, to be a significant center for production of narcotics, Africans (particularly from Nigeria) have been heavily involved in the transport of narcotics from the Far East to Western Europe and North America.

45. To date, Africa has not been the venue for major cyberspace crime, but criminal groups (or individuals) in a number of African countries have the technology and possibly the motive for such assaults. See Dan Henk, "Susceptibility of African Societies to Information Warfare," 1996, an unpublished report furnished to the U.S. Air Force Institute for National Security Studies.

46. Sec. 660, Prohibiting Police Training, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. The prohibition stems from congressional concern in the 1960s and 1970s that U.S.-trained foreign police were implicated in human rights abuses.

47. See Christian Caryl, "The Very Long Arm of American Law," *U.S. News & World Report*, July 7, 1997, pp. 49-50.

48. For example, Mortimer Zuckerman argues that "we have a stake in human rights in every country of the world, but American policy has

been most successful when we have brought that interest in balance with other objectives. . . ." ("Realism about China," *U.S. News & World Report*, June 9, 1997, p. 104.) For a useful discussion of the ramifications of this interest, see David Tucker, "Engaging in Humanitarian Operations: Parameters for the Arguments," in Robert B. Oakley and David Tucker, *Two Perspectives on Interventions and Humanitarian Operations*, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997, pp. 25-46.

49. American responses to this interest are by no means restricted to the public sector. A variety of charities, missionary groups and other private humanitarian and voluntary organizations, active in Africa and elsewhere, depend upon the generosity of the American public. Such organizations often secure the national interest more consistently and coherently over time than the U.S. public sector.

50. The 1997 National Security Strategy characterizes "promoting democracy" as a "core objective" (p. 19.) However, the administration's policy of "Democratic Enlargement" has more of a "geoeconomic" than "geopolitical" foundation—with free trade at the center. See Douglas Brinkley, "Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine," *Foreign Policy*, No. 106, Spring 1997, pp. 11-27.

51. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, p. 28.

52. Citizens of foreign countries often comment on this objective of U.S. foreign policy. Some find it indicates American *naïvete*, others argue that it smacks of cultural imperialism. Some, of course, find it appropriate and desirable.

53. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, p. 28.

54. Chester A. Crocker, "Why Africa is Important," *Foreign Service Journal*, June 1995, pp. 24-33.

55. This interest was well-articulated by former Secretary of State Warren Christopher in a 1996 speech at Stanford. Christopher argued that the United States "must also lead in safeguarding the global environment on which. . . prosperity and peace ultimately depend."

56. "U.S. Policy for a New Era in Sub-Saharan Africa," statement released by the U.S. Department of State Bureau of African Affairs, October 2, 1996. The Clinton administration recently announced a number of trade measures to encourage further free-market reforms. See Alison Mitchell, "Clinton Proposes Incentives for Free Market in Africa," *New York Times*, June 18, 1997 (electronic edition); and, Fact Sheet: Clinton Strategy for Economic Growth in Africa, *USIS Washington File*, June 17, 1997 (electronic download).

57. *United States Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa* p. 5.

58. See, for instance, "OAU Cool on U.S. Idea of an African Force," Panafrican News Agency electronic newswire, October 14, 1996; Paul Ejime, "Lagos Not Impressed by U.S. Proposal for an African Force," Panafrican News Agency electronic newswire, October 16, 1996; Radio Nigeria (Lagos) broadcast of October 29, 1996, transcript in *FBIS-AFR-96-211*; editorial in *The Star* (Johannesburg), October 10, 1996, reprinted in *FBIS-AFR-96-198*; and SAPA (Johannesburg) broadcast of February 11, 1997, transcript in *FBIS-AFR-97-028*.

59. Lionel Williams, "E.U. Supports South African Stand on African Peace Force," Panafrican News Agency electronic newswire, October 15, 1996.

60. Robert Fullerton, "Albright Testifies on Foreign Affairs Budget," *USIS Washington File*, February 11, 1997 (electronic download).

61. Ambassador Marshall McCallie on-the-record briefing at the U.S. State Department, July 28, 1997.

62. Jacques Isnard, "France Refloats Its Idea of an Interafrican Force," *Le Monde* (Paris), June 25, 1997, p. 3, reprinted in *FBIS-WEU-97-182*; and, Pierre Prier, "Change in U.S. Position on African Intervention Force Noted," *Le Figaro* (Paris), June 24, 1997, p. 3, reprinted in *FBIS-WEU-97-175*.

63. Unpublished "P3 Information Paper," July 18, 1997, received from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.

64. Colonel Dan Henk, interview with Colonel Richard Roan (USMC), military member of the staff of the U.S. mission to the U.N., New York, October 2, 1997.

65. The countries which agreed to commit forces to ACRI were Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, Tunisia and Uganda. Ethiopia offered two battalions, the other countries one each.

66. See, for instance, James Rupert, "U.S. Troops Teach Peacekeeping to Africans," *Washington Post*, September 26, 1997, p. A16; "Next Series of ACRI Peacekeeping Training Under Way," DOD news release of September 17, 1997; Judith Matloff, "A Recipe for Peace: U.S. Know-How, Local Troops," *The Christian Science Monitor*, August 26, 1997, p.1; and Thomas W. Lippman, "U.S. Ready to Train African Peacekeepers," *The Washington Post*, June 30, 1997, p. A16.

67. See, for instance, the commentary by Mayaki Abdullahi on Radio Nigeria (Lagos), August 4, 1997, transcript in *FBIS-AFR-97-216*, and September 18, 1997, transcript in *FBIS-AFR-97-262*.

68. This suspicion has some basis in fact. Zimbabweans still recall unfulfilled and forgotten promises made by the United States to solicit their participation in the U.S.-led operation in Somalia in early 1993 (UNITAF). When the Zambians committed a force to the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Angola in 1995, Zambia requested U.S. airlift into southeastern Angola and was ignored. (Zambia eventually deployed its forces by land through northern Namibia, a considerable logistics feat given the distance of the move and the war-damaged infrastructure of southern Angola.)

69. This is not to say that the U.N. support is trouble-free. Officers in one African country involved in several peace operations over the past 5 years complained of the long delay after deployment before U.N. reimbursements were paid. This required resourcing "out of hide" in the interim, a considerable problem for a cash-strapped African military.

70. Ambassador Marshall McCallie, comments on "Africa Journal," a television program broadcast to Africa by the United States Information Agency, September 25, 1997, transcript from *USIS Washington File* (electronic download).

71. U.S. law severely limited the kind of law enforcement training that can be offered to foreign police forces.

72. Mark Malan, "US Response to Africa Crises: An Overview and Preliminary Analysis of the ACRI," *Institute for Security Studies Papers*, No. 24, August 1997, p. 5.

73. *Ibid.*

74. AFP (Paris), broadcast of July 30, 1997, transcript in *FBIS-AFR-97-212*.

75. McCallie briefing, July 28, 1997.

76. See Jakkie Cilliers, "From Destabilization to Peacekeeping in Southern Africa: The Potential Role of South Africa," *Africa Insight*, Vol. 26, No. 4, 1996, pp. 339-346; and, Jakkie Cilliers and Mark Malan, "A Regional Peacekeeping Role for South Africa: Pressures, Problems and Prognosis," *African Security Review*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1996, pp. 21-31.

77. Lionel Williams, "South Africa Willing To Send Troops To Zaire," Panafican News Agency electronic newswire, November 12, 1996.

78. President Clinton, remarks before the White House Conference on Africa, Washington, DC, June 27, 1994, electronic download from the U.S. Department of State.

79. For information on ACCORD, see <http://www.accord.org./news.htm>.

80. William D. Bajusz and Kevin P. O'Prey, "An All-African Peace Force: An Immediate Option or Long-Term Goal for the Region?" *Strategic Forum*, No. 86, October 1996, p. 4.

81. An initiative to do this is under review by the U.S. European Command and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Several significant obstacles, including funding, location, and general acceptance by regional decisionmakers, must be resolved before substantial progress can occur.

82. Plans for the exercise actually were hatched at a regional conference held in Harare (Zimbabwe) in January 1995, co-hosted by Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom, which addressed the issues of preparation and training for African peace operations forces. The United States and other European countries sent observers to this conference, which was attended by delegates from all over Africa.

83. The *shiri ye hungwe* or "bird of the Hungwe [clan]" is a highly stylized stone depiction of a fish eagle found in the stone ruins of Great Zimbabwe. This image has been adopted as a national symbol of Zimbabwe. For a discussion of the exercise itself, see Major George Thiart, "Africa's eagle of hope has landed," *Salut*, June 1997, pp. 12-17.

84. Dan Henk, interviews with Zimbabwean military officers, June 1997.

85. James Rupert, "Africans Taking Over Peacekeeping Role on Their Continent," *Washington Post*, October 6, 1997, p. A15.

86. Howard W. French, "Brazzaville and Oil Port Are Taken by Rebels," *New York Times*, October 16, 1997 (electronic edition). See also French, "New Rules in Africa" and Rupert, "Angolan Incursion Reflects New Interventionists Posture in Africa."

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Commandant**

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

**Director
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**Authors
Colonel Dan Henk
Dr. Steven Metz**

**Director of Publications and Production
Ms. Marianne P. Cowling**

**Publications Assistant
Ms. Rita A. Rummel**

**Composition
Mrs. Mary Jane Semple**

**Cover Artist
Mr. James E. Kistler**