Unit 9: Work and Training Guidelines

Objectives

At the end of this unit, you will

Be aware of the following

- Guidelines in use of criticism with Middle East friends
- Arab planning process
- Arab tendency to value idealism over a realistic appraisal
- Perspectives of many Arabs toward competition, comparisons, and the decision making process.

Identify

- Bakhshish
- Rules of Saudi Arabian hospitality
- Practical vs. aesthetic differences in Arabic/American thought patterns

Realize

- Importance of getting to know Arab counterparts
- Differing American/Saudi Arabian perceptions to work
- Tendency to exaggeration in Middle East discourse
- Differing American/Arab perspectives on gifts, bonuses and business transactions
- Importance of establishing friendship and using cultural etiquette when engaging in planning with Arab associates
9: Work and Training Guidelines

To many Arabs, the person they are dealing with is more important in essence than the mission or task. Impress the Arab through quiet strength and politeness. Be patient and never tackle the job at hand without adequate greetings and seeing to the other person’s comfort.

In any situation in which an individual Arab is not meeting the standards set by an instructor, the following must be remembered:

- No criticism should occur in front of others.
- Loss of temper will have the opposite effect from whatever is wanted.
- The substandard performance should be discussed rather than the student’s personality. Individual dignity is of prime importance and must always be respected.
- Turn any serious problem over to another Arab to handle.
- If you have the option, train officers and enlisted men separately. An enlisted man scoring ahead of the officers in class standing means a loss of face and status for the officers concerned. Use competition to motivate trainees.

Most Arabs must know your social, professional, and academic background and age before he talks to you. He would like to know, because it matters in his world, how much influence and to what people you and your family are connected to—personal references. Do you know people in the Department of State? Officials in his country? Only after he has this information and has some time to judge you personally, will he settle down to direct business and then conduct it at times more quickly than we would for he feels he knows the important things.
This means that on arrival you MUST take time to let the Arabs you will be working with get to know you. This IS business, not just chit-chat as in the States.

The following is an example of the differences in conducting business:

American: “I dropped by to discuss an idea with you.”
Arab: “Your presence (unqualified) is welcome. Please join me in having tea.”
American: “Thank you, more tea would be fine. As I was saying, this project...”
Arab: “You’re enjoying your tea? We have plenty more, please...”

Many Arabs cannot afford to misjudge you. If you leak confidences when you drink, if you make “remarks” to other Americans about him or Arabs...any traits like this, you could hurt his career, his family, and his trust in you. If he misjudges you, his whole family could suffer and his position. So, naturally he will apply his learned rules to you before he settles down to sharp business bargaining.

Time and Scheduling

a. Meetings  Saudi military officers and defense officials consider themselves to be professionals, although their conduct of business differs greatly from American practice. The Arab notion of time is subjective, and thus
there is little regard for punctuality at officer calls and
other such assemblies. Meetings are often delayed a half
hour or more, pending the arrival of key participants. The
official who convenes the meeting may have refreshments
brought to the attendees as they arrive, or he may wait until
shortly after the meeting starts.

In any case, there is strict adherence to the rule of
hospitality. Saudis usually serve hot sweetened tea,
although they sometimes offer coffee, soft drinks, or camel’s
milk. Any American present is expected to drink whatever
refreshment is offered as he is likewise expected to endure
whatever delay results from the tardiness of others. For the
sake of rapport, it is best to accustom oneself to such
practice.

Even once refreshments are served, there are still
likely to be interruptions—again largely because of the
subjective mind-set of the Arabs. For them, the meeting
cannot impose its agenda over theirs.

It is not uncommon for one of the
participants to stop discussions while
he takes routine phone calls, releases
messages, or signs orders, vouchers, or
correspondence brought by orderlies.
With time, the attaché may come to
expect such behavior. Even so, he will
still have to cope with other nuances of
conducting business in Saudi Arabia.
Patience is mandatory.

b. Planning  In most of the Arab world the planning
process is done differently. Projects are shaped in the
actual situation where they will be, not shaped months and
years ahead of time on paper. Commitments beyond a week or
so are not as firm as we would consider them. The Muslim
religion prohibits tampering with the future and also does
not bind its followers to any contract which circumstances
force them to agree to and which is unfavorable. As soon as
possible they are obligated to break unfavorable agreements.
Thus, a 99-year contract does not have the firmness it would
in our own system.
When we plan, we tend to follow a certain pattern. When the need to make a decision occurs, the decision-maker coordinates with his staff and with experts. Once the decision is made, preparation begins on paper with schedules and phases, the precise dates being important to us. If the date of 1 June begins the implementation date, we expect to start then and no later—but earlier may be good. Then on 1 June the pieces are in place and minor adjustments are made. Precision in time and measurements is important here.

When many Arabs make decisions, little action is taken until somewhere around the specified date, about a week or so before—if circumstances still seem good. The planning we do on paper they do in the situation. After the machinery comes the situation is observed and if another piece is needed it is ordered then, if experts, trainers, or staff are needed they are then requested.

In the actual situation the operation is formed and shaped. Actually, if the starting date were earlier than for an American approach, the finish date might well end up the same.

Adjustment is required when coping with tendencies toward passivity. The attaché will inevitably observe Saudis who constantly assert their eagerness to press on with new programs or ventures, yet at the same time procrastinate in implementing them.

From the Western perspective, there appears to be too much talk and too little action. Americans who work as advisors or contractors may react to such impasses by taking matters into their own hands.
Linguists cannot normally influence events this way, but they may at least feel impelled to berate the person(s) involved. Neither reaction is good for rapport, since both threaten the native sense of dignity. The situation demands patience and belief that "things will get done"—albeit, by some hidden schedule.

The Arabs’ tendency toward subjectivity complements their preference for idealism over realism, and that pattern is further manifested in the abstraction of words from intent and meaning. As Patai has noted, "the verbal utterance, which expresses such mental functions as feelings, aspirations, ideals, wishes, and thoughts, is quite divorced from the level of action." Thus, when a plan or proposal is well-stated, it is deemed "perfect" for that reason, regardless of whether it is complete or feasible. Implementation, or action, more directly involves the world of reality, which with all its uncertainty, unpleasantry, and disorder, daunts the Arab mind. The attaché will find that Saudis often seem reluctant to implement plans, regardless of their supposed importance. The same syndrome is reflected in situations of conflict, whereby Arabs convey threats in very explicitly and dramatic terms, even though they lack means and desire to follow through.

Both patterns have their advantages and weaknesses, but in the Arab world you will find yourself working their way. Anticipating this can save a great deal of frustration as well as avoiding major capital losses.

c. Potential for Hidden Agendas  The attaché may find himself in meetings where discussions progress quite well but then break down for no apparent reason. In such cases, the underlying, hidden reason could be clan rivalry, conflict of interest, or expectation of monetary kickbacks (when procurement is involved). As Saudis are very reticent
and respectful of each other’s private concerns, they will not surface such issues at the meeting. Instead, they will suspend all deliberations until private matters can be resolved. In situations which involve “side deals,” the attaché should neither criticize nor attempt to obstruct them. He may wish, however, to note for future reference the persons, offices, and agencies involved.

d. Exaggeration in Discourse
Adept from hidden agendas, the attaché has to be wary of exaggeration, especially when quantities are concerned. “An impending purchase of a hundred new APCS” may in reality amount to fifty or less. “The availability of one thousand recruits” may realistically equate to a few hundred. In making such statements, Saudis do not normally intend to deceive.

They merely wish to convey a relative degree of magnitude—albeit a very subjective one. In other words, the accrual number, if known, is irrelevant to them unless they are signing contracts, official orders, or requisitions.

e. Indifference to Official Duties  Another difficult aspect of conducting business in Saudi Arabia is the lax attitude toward work. Because of their determinist mind-set, Many Arabs usually cannot see that certain matters require urgent attention. At the subconscious level, man’s doings do not matter much in the divinely ordained scheme of things. Moreover, their subjectivism sometimes prevents them from seeing the relevance of events, i.e., as affecting the military’s image, strategic alliances, or other national interests. One consequence is that requests for clearances (for joint exercises or ship visits) are placed in stacks of routine correspondence which get processed rather slowly.
Saudi military and civil service personnel do not work a compulsory eight hour day, nor do they work toward any stated or implicit standards of efficiency. Lower ranking functionaries do not usually hold themselves accountable. In their view, full responsibility rests with the man-in-charge—the commander, commandant, or director.

If he wants something done expeditiously, he will make his desires known. Such attitudes and behavior are likely to frustrate anyone seeking to ensure timely compliance with official requests.

When operations are on-going, the attaché may notice a serious lack of cooperation on the part of organizations which answer to the same authority. In such situations the problem is, once again, often due to traditional clan rivalry; although the principals involved will probably be reluctant to admit it. The attaché may judge that loyalties are misplaced. However, the fact remains that in many cases loyalty to the clan overrides loyalty to the service (or state). Any resultant problems are best left to the higher authorities of the Kingdom. The attaché would do well just to avoid the ill effects of clan rivalry in his personal relations. The mere show of kindness or attention to one associate might suffice to antagonize another, if their respective kin groups happen to be bitter rivals. After this initial "affront," it would be difficult for the attaché to make amends. Unfortunately, the traditional rivalries are not matters of public record. One learns of them through inadvertent mistakes or "shop talk."

As with traditional rivalries, the inveterate pecking order of Saudi society also determines attitudes in the work place. An individual who consistently excels in his job may never receive recognition or reward if he belongs to a tribe of inferior status.

Praise is reserved for the members of noble tribes or families. It is not necessarily associated with personal achievement. For Americans, who generally value merit above status, Saudi practices may seem unfair.
Even so, there is not much one can do about them. Efforts to commend or to have someone commended will not be well received if they contravene native norms.

f. Patron-Client Associations

Friendly associations between persons who are not relatives usually amount to patron-client relationships. One of the parties has wealth or influence; the other has commercial contacts, technical skill, managerial competence, or some other talent of value. Such associations are induced by mutual interest; they are sustained by mutual dependence.

In certain cases, the patron will treat his clients almost as members of his family. He will provide them accommodations near his own dwelling and pay their travel expenses as they accompany him on trips. Many Lebanese and Palestinian émigrés have thus become part of the entourage of certain Saudi princes. Such sustenance of clients may appear to be extreme generosity. However, self interest is also involved—at least subconsciously. Historically, the conventional generosity of most Arabs derives not from humanitarianism, but rather from desire to strengthen the family or kin group. The generosity of one party becomes the indebtedness of another, and indebtedness can ultimately affect loyalty.

Because of his official status and temporary stay in the Kingdom, the attaché has very little, if any, potential as a client. He may therefore find that Saudis are reluctant to be “friends.” In contrast, some American businessmen have become clients of sorts of Saudi princes and other important men.
g. Coping with Less Familiar Thought Processes

(1) Problems  Life in the United States is made up of "problems" for which "solutions" can be found. It's implied that every problem has its solution. Also, that every situation has a "problem" or "no problem" status.

A situation in the Arab World is either satisfactory (i.e., there is no highly unique emergency) or it is unsatisfactory. God, Allah, has predetermined the outcome of all things. Thereby, attempting to solve or change a situation is futile.

The term "problem" applies to math or engineering contexts and its American uses are confusing when no "problem" is perceived by others.

American: "Your plan looks good. I don’t see any problems there..."
Arab: "Problems?"
American: "We would be glad to take care of this problem for you."
Arab: "There is no problem that I see."
American: "The biggest problem seems to be..."
Arab: "Problem?"

(2) Competition and Comparison  Americans tend to assume that others understand competition and that it motivates them also.

In the Arab World, competition is not learned as a reason for doing something nor as a logical kind of motivation.
American: "We post grades weekly and find it useful in getting the students to do well."
Arab: "Why is posting grades useful?" (Sometimes it's seen as publicizing faults or publicly criticizing.)
American: "We'll test the students and then select from those with high scores."
Arab: "Why should a student do well on a test if he isn't selected? Once he is, he must do well. But before?"
American: "If we did that, we will have more people at the demonstration than the Army did at theirs."
Arab: "What does it matter what the Army did?"
American: "When the other villagers see what this one does..."
Arab: "Why should it matter to them?"
American: "This wing is falling behind the others in its projects..."
Arab: "The other wings have their projects, we have ours."

Americans judge things and ideas by comparing them. It is a concept partly tied to competition. Many Arabs see what someone else is doing as irrelevant. The comparison the American assumes is meaningful, is meaningless to a large percentage of Arabs.

American: "Some of the courses here are similar to what we have in Texas."
Arab: "Oh?" (or "And?")
American: "The work isn't going as fast here as it has in some places where we've done this job."
Arab: "The work is slow?"
American: "I'm happy to be here. It's nicer than my last assignment."
Arab: "Oh. You like it here, yes."
American: "It will be one of the better airfields in your country—not as good as the one in the next province, but better than most."
Arab: "But it will be good?"
American: "By plane we made the trip a lot faster than we could by car."
Arab: "Ah, you say the trip was fast?"
(3) Decision Making Process

Americans tend to believe that collective wisdom is superior to one person’s wisdom. People should have a voice. The American concept is unintelligible to many Arabs. Leaders and elders have wisdom. What an American may see as disagreement, may be failure to understand.

American: "We shall have to find out what the trainees want in recreational facilities..."
Arab: "They will be happy with what they get."
American: "We'll talk with the village leaders and people about which program they want and need..."
Arab: "It is a big program, yes." (Let the alien concept go by, for why would one ask the people. The government just tells them.)
American: "The project should be explained to the people."
Arab: "Why? The elders will know what is in the plan when the project begins. How can anyone know what is needed until they see the plan the leaders have decided upon?"

Americans usually weigh the consequences of different courses of action, then select the one that seems "best."

Many Arabs tend to decide by what is traditionally proper, by obligations to friends or kinfolk, by fitting decisions to theory, or grouping like things. As a result, several choices may seem equal.

American: "I'll have to get more information to decide the pros and cons of each choice. Then we can decide which way is best."
Arab: "Do we need this data, as you say? Let us do now what is the proper way to do this."
American: "I'm trying to decide if we should teach emergency first aid or a navigation course first."
Arab: "You say you are a navigator? Then navigation is what you should teach."
American: "We need the data I've listed to make a decision."
Arab: "You need all this information to decide?"
American: "If we use the briefing room when the general visits, more people can hear him. But the conference room is more luxurious and private. What do you prefer?"
Arab: "As a general, he will, of course, use the conference room."

Most Arabs believe that several ways can be equally good. Arabs don't assume that objective evaluation decides. Also, just because a method is chosen, does not always mean it can be done. Ways of doing often are perceived as "proper" and "improper" with more than one of each kind.

American: "Is there any other way this can be done?" (Seeking options)
Arab: "Other way? You do not like this way?"
American: "Which is the best procedure?"
Arab: "Best? Oh, who knows this?"
American: "Can you help me find the best way for the squadron to do it?"
Arab: "The squadron should have good plans."
American: "I have three plans I've drafted. Which do you think might be best?"
Arab: "Other people have good plans, yes. We will have our plan. It will be good also, yes."
American: "Which day would you prefer?"
Arab: "Any day will be good. Monday, Tuesday, any day."
American: “I’ll prepare several recommendations and you can choose one.”
Arab: “Yes, yes. But you will recommend one.”

(4) Practical vs. Aesthetic Qualities

Americans value the practical or “useful” parts of an experience or event over the aesthetic, both in ideas and things, while Arabs value the aesthetic equally, sometimes more than, the usefulness of an idea or thing.

American: “Our library has a good film file, many books, and there are classes. Have you seen it?”
Arab: “It is a beautiful building. Very pleasant.”
American: “If we cut down some of the trees, we can put the runway straight through. Do it fast.”
Arab: “You say cut down trees? These are old trees.”
American: “It would be more practical to put the building…”
Arab: “That would look nice.”

In America, we teach our children to observe parts and to compare those parts from one thing to another. For instance, on an intelligence test, the child who matches the table to the chair is rated higher (which rewards analytical thinking). This kind of thinking seems crucial to technology.

Many Arab children, however, who match the second chair to the first, are down-graded in our system for not noticing that the first chair and the table are each missing a leg. There is no fairness in this test, it simply shows what kind of thinking is happening for matching two chairs as belonging together is not wrong…but neither is it analytical.

Experience with training programs involving Arab students learning to fly tends to support the belief that Arab thinking, before detailed exposure and learning of technology, is not analytical.
Students learning to fly the most basic trainer and then transferring to the next step up in trainer aircraft do not tend to transfer their knowledge. The first plane is learned as a whole unit. Instructors who assume they are applying the learning to the new aircraft have found this does not happen and therefore review all the basic points again before proceeding.

We assume that once you learn the basic function or rules regarding an aircraft wing, it will generally apply to all aircraft. This is a learned transfer and simply must be taught when foreign students are unaware of it.

Also, regardless of the project, you will be working with people using a second or third language, which automatically slows the pace. An Arabs visual patterns are right to left, the opposite of ours. Arabs are also generally a people who have not grown up with technical skills from childhood, despite a natural aptitude for these skills. All of this will probably quintuple the time factor.

h. Instructors and Teaching Lest an instructor or teacher be thought too proud, too much above oneself, we have a humble reply, “I don’t know but I’ll find out.” Many Arabs will misinterpret this reply to the point that the student or trainee or requestor will no longer grant you status. This may be tied to looking at the whole rather than the part. Either you are an expert—or you are not.
What do we do then? If you do not know something you do not publicly admit it, but rather say something like, "I'll show you where to get that information." "I have a meeting shortly, will you return this afternoon." Whether or not the person guesses you do not know, the important point is to keep up appearances if you are to continue to be effective in the Arab system. Avoid applying our rules to their way of life and losing out. Experts know everything, not slices.

Our answer to the question, "Do you understand?" stresses accuracy; if we do not understand, we say so. In the Arab world, naturally, "appearances" have more priority than accuracy, so the answer, should you ask the question, will always be, "yes." Sometimes when an Arab becomes used to our ways in this country, he may say he does not, but normally it is rude to say so.

To admit not understanding carries two implications: first, you did not explain properly, which puts you down in public; and second, that he is not competent which hurts his appearances.

We have no hesitation in saying a flat "no" to someone when they ask us if we can do something and there is a definite rule saying we cannot.

In much of the Arab world a flat "no" is a signal you wish to end the relationship. The Arab way of saying "no" is to say, "I'll see what I can do," (no matter how impossible the task may be). After several queries, if the answer is still "I'm checking," or the like, it means...no. But it also means I am still your friend, I tried.

Americans tend to value on-the-spot learning over other ways while most Arabs tend to value learning from books, meditation, and study as equal or above simply having seen things.
American: “We can have one of our men who’s been to Vietnam lecture your cadets.”
Arab: “Yes. We would like to hear someone with a good knowledge of the war.” (Meaning more than just having been there.)
American: “He can talk with the students about his ideas. They’ll hear for themselves how...”
Arab: “The students, of course, can study the ideas.”
American: “We’ll visit each base and see what is needed.”
Arab: “We have good reports.”
American: “We’ll show the trainees so they can see for themselves...”
Arab: “Tell them what will happen. It is enough.”
American: “I’ve read about your country, but now that I’m here, I can see for myself.” (Implies reading has a lower value than seeing.)
Arab: “You have studied our country a great deal, yes.”

i. Gifts and Bonuses

When invited to a Saudi social function, the guest is not expected to bring any gift. Indeed, he should not, for that might detract from the host’s efforts to enhance his own dignity through generosity. In cases where the attaché has been asked to procure something, he should deliver it in relative privacy, likewise for an unsolicited gift. It would be best to give something of practical use or amusement.

Traditionally, the government pays bonuses at Ramadan, and it would be appropriate to present some monetary gift to Muslim household employees at this time of year. (Sometimes, a bonus of one month’s salary is divided and paid at each of the two major holidays). The payment of bonuses correlates with the payment of annual poor tax, which is obligatory for Muslims.

Much of the Arab World is notorious for the custom of bakhshish—the offering and taking of “bribes” in business transactions. This practice, which in its largest dimension involves multi-million dollar governmental contracts, is more subtle in Saudi Arabia than in other Arab countries.
Nonetheless, it does exist there—even at very high levels within the government. The attaché, although he is normally not concerned with contracting, will very likely become aware of the custom of bakhshish.

j. Importance of Amicability  Once a request is submitted, there is usually nothing to be gained from official follow-up calls.

| Saudis in general are more impressed by your treatment of them than by your status or position. Politeness (by Saudi standards) will likely lead to success. If a Saudi likes you, he is more inclined to act on your request. |

An attaché, even a very amicable one, cannot possibly make friends with everyone in the various offices where he has business. However, he should attempt to establish good rapport with at least one person in each—ideally, the director. If not him, then a subordinate supervisor, action officer, or even a clerk. Sometimes, the lower ranking personnel are more reliable than their overseers. In any case, the attaché should not overlook such potentially valuable contacts.

"Get it right the first time."

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Review Quiz: Work and Training Guidelines

True/False  Place a T or an F in the blank provided.

1. _____ Most Arabs believe that several different ways to do something may be equally as good.

2. _____ For many Arabs, when a plan or proposal is well-stated, it is “perfect,” regardless of whether it can be completed or is even possible.

3. _____ For most Arabs, the person is much more important than the mission or task.

4. _____ A compulsory eight hour work day is the norm for most Saudi Arabian officials.

5. _____ Many Arabs make decisions by carefully weighing different courses of action, then selecting what is “best.”

6. _____ For some Saudi officials, the payment of bonuses equates with the payment of an annual poor tax.

7. _____ “Bakhshish” refers to the Arabic custom of friends tapping each other on the back to show affection.

8. _____ Often in the Arab world a flat “no” is a signal to end a relationship.

9. _____ A traditional response by an Arab instructor is “I don’t know but I’ll find out.”

10. _____ Most Saudi Arabians are more impressed by your status and position than by your treatment of them.
"Combat is the most traumatic human event. It strips away an individual’s veneer, exposing their true character. If a character flaw exists--it will appear in combat--guaranteed...Success in combat--and in life--has always demanded a depth of character. Those who can reach deep inside themselves--and draw upon an inner strength, fortified by strong values, always carry the day against those of lesser character."

General Charles C. Krulak