CHINA’S FUTURE INTENT:
RESPONSIBLE WORLD POWER OR INTERNATIONAL
ROGUE STATE

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense.
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Preface

This report addresses the future role of the People’s Republic of China (hereafter also referred to as “China”) in the emerging new world order. The collapse of the Soviet Union, the subsequent end of the Cold War bipolar world, and the downsizing of US and Russian nuclear arsenals in compliance with START I and START II all make room for China to rise to world power status. Some analysts believe China can be a legitimate actor in the next international system. Others argue that she may use her growing nuclear power to bully her way onto the international scene. This leads to the purpose of this paper: to analyze China’s future intent and determine if she will develop into a responsible world power or an international rogue state.

I would like to acknowledge the guidance and assistance I received from my research advisor, Major Robert H. Hendricks. He patiently steered me in the right direction and kept me from venturing off along too many tangents.
Abstract

This paper examines whether the People’s Republic of China (PRC) intends to become a responsible world power or an international rogue state in the post-Cold War global system. Based on my research, I believe China is striving to develop into a legitimate world power despite examples of questionable foreign policy. China’s arms sales and looming territorial disputes are causing global concerns. In addition, China’s numerous domestic problems could impact US national security interests. The US must therefore become actively involved with China by encouraging responsible technology transfers, peaceful settlements to regional disagreements, and multilateral assistance to China’s internal woes. Such actions will stabilize China’s rise in the new international system and thereby increase the security of the post-Cold War world.

This research effort is limited in scope due to time and length constraints. As a result, some ideas are mentioned only briefly in order to provide general background information to support the thesis. Additionally, I tried to conduct the research with an open mind and avoid writing from a “Western” perspective. The methodology included consulting numerous books, technical reports, and periodicals at the Air University Library. Various sources from the Air Command and Staff College curriculum were also used.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Recent global events place the People’s Republic of China in a prime position to play a major role in the emerging post-Cold War world. With the world’s largest population, a rapidly growing economy, one of the few remaining communist governments, and a modern nuclear arsenal, some analysts believe China may be emerging as the next major threat to US and world security. Others disagree, stating that China’s social, economic, political, and military programs are purely status-based and defensive in nature. Understanding China’s intentions is increasingly important in determining present and future US foreign policy.

The collapse of the Soviet Union, the subsequent end of the Cold War, and nuclear drawdowns by the US and Russia permit China to emerge as a prominent international actor. These events, coupled with China’s own nuclear upgrades, are discussed in the first chapter of this paper and provide sufficient cause for the US to be concerned with China’s rising world status.

After highlighting China’s imminent rise in the emerging international system, this paper looks at the history of Chinese military thinking which dates back some 4,000 years. The second chapter begins with China’s deep-rooted isolationism, pauses to discuss the Cold War era, and progresses through to the present. The common thread of the chapter
is that China has not been an imperialistic nation; she has preferred to remain insulated from the outside world. This reluctance to interact with other nations led to her adopting a defensive mentality in order to preserve her ideals and way of life. The purpose of this portion of the paper is to gain insight into China’s future intent by first examining her past.

This aim is taken one step further in the third chapter by investigating the history of Chinese nuclear thinking. Research shows that China’s 33-year nuclear history is characterized by the concept of deterrence rather than nuclear aggression. This leads to the conclusion that China’s isolationist thread continues to be evident in her desire to protect herself from external aggression.

Although China’s historical military and nuclear thinking indicate that her rise to world status should be non-threatening, the final chapter of this paper emphasizes the need for the US to remain cautiously engaged should China become an aggressor. Domestic problems such as overpopulation and political unrest, coupled with questionable foreign policy issues such as territorial disputes and liberal arms sales to confirmed rogue\(^1\) states, may have grave implications for US and global security. The challenge facing US policy makers is to devise a strategy for dealing with an up-and-coming China which will facilitate her peaceful ascent onto the international scene and ensure global security along the way.

Notes

\(^1\) *The American Heritage Dictionary* defines *rogue* as one who is dishonest, unprincipled, or mischievous. For the purpose of this research paper, *rogue* also refers to a state which is irresponsible in world affairs, disregards accepted international policy, or supports terrorist activities. Examples are Libya, Iraq, and North Korea.
Chapter 2

An Emerging China

China has the potential to emerge as a major world power in the coming years. Global developments stemming from the end of the Cold War allow China to enter onto the international scene. Furthermore, developments concerning the world’s nuclear arsenals are bolstering China’s position in that arena. Discussing the impacts of these global and nuclear developments shows that the China issue is an important one, indeed, and warrants close US attention to China’s rise to world status.

Impact of the Soviet Union’s Collapse and the End of the Cold War

The Cold War international system was dominated by the ideological conflict between the US and her democratic allies on one side and the Soviet Union and her communist allies on the other. The balance of power that existed between the two superpowers led to what Daniel S. Papp, Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute of Technology, terms a “bipolar” world. While most countries were allied with either the US or the Soviet Union, China was not. Cultural, religious, and ideological differences kept China from becoming close to either of the superpowers. In fact, she viewed them both as potential enemies.
The fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the bipolar world gives China the opportunity to play a major role in the developing international system. Evidence of China’s apparently increasing global status is presented in Papp’s discussion of the post-bipolar world. He proposes three options for what he calls the “New International Order” based on various national power parameters. Using his work as the foundation study for possible future world scenarios, it is important to note that in each of the three models, China is portrayed as a major contributor to the emerging international system.

Papp’s first model describes a unipolar world centered on the US and based primarily on military might as the most important aspect of national power. Although nuclear weapons are an important part of this military might, these weapons in and of themselves do not necessarily make a nation a great power. Other attributes, such as possessing the nearly exclusive ability to project large military forces anywhere on the earth, make the US the focus of global affairs in this first model. However China, with her growing and modernizing military capabilities, is one of the major sub-poles in this unipolar world.

Papp’s second model describes a regionalized world centered on three economic trading blocs: one in the US, a second in Europe, and the third in East Asia. He states that proponents of this model cite the European Community as proof that economics has indeed replaced military might as the new measure of national power. China, whose economy has been expanding at an annual average rate of more than nine percent since 1980, is also seen as a major player in this model in the East Asian economic bloc.

Papp’s third model suggests the next international system will evolve into a multipolar world. The major actors in this model are the US, Europe (specifically Great Britain, France, and Germany), Japan, and China. This perspective is based not only on military
and economic strength but also on other measures of national power. These “soft power” aspects include, but are not limited to, national beliefs, ideas, and culture. In addition to the four major actors listed above, numerous minor actors may occasionally rise to play significant roles in international affairs on a case-by-case basis. These minor actors may disrupt and destabilize the international system, as Iraq did in the Persian Gulf and as evidenced by the situation in the former Yugoslavia. The US will probably continue to play a role in the conflicts involving these minor actors, but we must not neglect our relationships with the major ones. Of these, China is the only country with which we are not allied, and therefore the one with which we may most likely come into conflict.

Even though all three of Papp’s models for the post-bipolar world paint a different picture of the next international system, they all have one thing in common: China will play a significant role in that system. The task for US leadership, now and in the future, is to determine what role China sees herself playing in this diffuse environment.

**Impact of US and Russian Nuclear Downsizing**

Besides the end of the Cold War, the downsizing of US and Russian nuclear arsenals also presents China with an opportunity to rise in world status. Bilateral compliance with the drawdowns outlined in the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) by the two nuclear superpowers leads to a relative increase in China’s nuclear strength. Further narrowing the nuclear gap are China’s own nuclear force modernization programs. Taken together, these trends open the door for China to become a major player among the world’s nuclear powers and, consequently, increase her prestige as a world power.
According to Mr. Alastair I. Johnston, a Faculty Associate with the Fairbank Center for East Asian Research, China sees nuclear weapons as a means to buy both “soft power” (international status and influence) and “hard power” (military respect). She also sees nuclear weapons as a means to achieve diplomatic recognition as the “true China,” drawing support away from Taiwan in favor of the People’s Republic of China. Furthermore, Dr. Samuel S. Kim, a senior research scholar at the East Asian Institute of Columbia University, says that China’s strategic analysts rationalize that, “Without sufficient military power…it will not be possible to successfully enact China’s national identity as a world power or to play a decisive role in global politics.” Dr. Kim continues by saying that, “The proposition that sufficient military power buys both deterrence and status reflects ... why China needs more and better high-tech weapons systems including nuclear weapons [emphasis added].” Statements like these explain why China sees a respectable nuclear capability as an avenue toward global status. The START reductions combined with her own modernization programs allow China to proceed along that avenue.

In the introduction to Strategic Views from the Second Tier: The Nuclear Weapons Policies of France, Britain, and China, editors John C. Hopkins and Weixing Hu state that, “In the past, strategic nuclear weapons of the second-tier nuclear powers [Great Britain, France, and China] together accounted for less than about ten percent of those of the US and perhaps seven percent of those of the Soviet Union.” They go on to speculate that, “Given the modernization and possible expansion of the programs of France, China, and Britain, and the implementation of START II by the US and Russia ... the second-tier states’ total nuclear forces could be fifty percent of each of the
superpowers’ forces after the year 2000.” In other words, the effect of US and Russian START reductions is further magnified by China’s own upgrade programs, which include advancements in her delivery vehicles as well as improvements to her nuclear weapons themselves.

China’s nuclear triad consists of aging and outdated air-, land-, and sea-based delivery systems. Improvements include upgrading her H-6 bomber, an obsolete version of the Soviet Tu-16, with the capability to launch cruise missiles. The impact of this program became even more important following the 1991 Gulf War, during which “the rapid development of antiaircraft weapons systems…made questionable the penetrability of any bomber…without very advanced avionics, Stealth [sic], and standoff weapons.” Upgrades to China’s land-based missiles include replacing the liquid-fueled variants with solid-propelled models, thereby significantly reducing response times from the current capability of one to three hours. Improvements under way in China’s nuclear submarine fleet include the production of a new class of nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) with an enhanced missile. All these modernization efforts are aimed at converting China’s nearly antiquated nuclear triad into a more capable one.

In addition to making advancements in her delivery vehicles, China is also seeking to increase the capabilities of her nuclear weapons. According to Jane’s Intelligence Review from March of last year, improvements in range, accuracy, survivability, and penetration are all important aspects of China’s modernization programs. Furthermore, “China is within reach of MIRVing [her] missiles. [Her] recent launching of three Motorola satellites on one launch vehicle shows how close [she] is to this goal.”
With the US and Russia on track to meet the START II limitations of 3,000 to 3,500 strategic nuclear warheads by the year 2003, China’s nuclear forces are looming ever larger on the horizon. Her subsequent increase in relative nuclear strength brought about by the START reductions, her resulting increase in actual nuclear strength due to her modernization programs, and her seemingly inevitable rise in Papp’s new international order all make China a force to be reckoned with. We must therefore determine China’s future intent, adjust our national security strategy accordingly, and be prepared to respond if required. To do so, we should begin by looking at the history of Chinese military thought in order to gain some insight into her possible motivations.

Notes

2Ibid., 50.
3Ibid., 207.
5Papp, 208.
6Ibid., 209.
9Ibid., 9.
10Ibid.
12Ibid., 4.
13Swaine, 208.
15Ibid., 187.
16Swaine, 207.
Notes

17 MIRV stands for Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicle.
Chapter 3

History of Chinese Military Thinking

China’s 4,000 year history is characterized by periods of civil harmony and upheaval, economic prosperity and poverty, and political stability and unrest. Despite this repeated internal turmoil, China’s external policy was one of solitude, distinctly more isolationist than imperialist. Even during the Cold War, when this isolationism gave way to reluctant interaction with the outside world, China was driven by her desire for security. Her search for a nuclear capability was a manifestation of that desire. Now in the post-Cold War era, China is making strides in military modernization, but her history and security concerns continue to impact her military thinking, thereby leading to China’s predominantly defensive posture.

Deep-Rooted Isolationism

China’s history is not one of an aggressive, imperialistic nation. On the contrary, the Chinese preferred isolationism as evidenced by their building the Great Wall. Construction began in 214 B.C. in order to protect themselves from invasion. It proved to be very effective: “In the first 100 years they were invaded only three times, and each time the attackers bribed a gate keep to let them in.”2 The fact that the Great Wall took
many centuries to complete and runs for a distance of nearly 1,500 miles suggests that this isolationist view was deeply imbedded in the Chinese people over many generations.

The tendency toward being a secluded nation may be traced back to China’s ancient philosophical and military writings. Confucius, arguably China’s greatest philosopher and educator, lived from 551 to 479 B.C. and emphasized the need for people to live in harmony.\(^3\) Even Sun Tzu,\(^4\) possibly China’s greatest ancient scholar of warfare, spoke in terms of war within a single society, within a framework of generally accepted rules, and with limited aims.\(^5\) Although he wrote extensively on how to defeat an enemy, Sun Tzu emphasized the defensive, protecting life and property from invasion, and stressed the importance of avoiding battle if at all possible.\(^6\) Thus, China’s ancient teachers did not advocate aggression, but they did realize the importance of protecting oneself from one’s enemies.

By putting these principles into action, China developed into a cautious, isolated nation reluctant to interact with the Western world. Only a few Europeans (e.g. Marco Polo) ventured to make the long, difficult overland journey. The discovery of a sea route around the southern tip of Africa eventually provided easier access to China, especially the eastern part of the country. However, the Chinese limited places where the Europeans could trade and placed restrictions on the actual goods that were available.\(^7\) When the British began marketing opium, Chinese efforts to prevent its import led to the Opium War of 1839-42. The British defeated the Chinese, took Hong Kong as a concession, and forced China to open more ports to trade. Other countries began to desire the same access to Chinese goods. This led to France, Germany, and even Russia taking large portions of Chinese territory. In the words of Henry Kissinger, “China became a
humiliated subject of European colonialism in the nineteenth century." Japan also demanded Chinese territorial concessions after defeating China in the first Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. Finally, the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria in 1937 and the ensuing eight-year war solidified China’s desire to turn inward and placed her firmly in a defensive stance.

All these factors influenced the way the Chinese viewed the world. They saw themselves as the militarily inferior “Middle Kingdom” surrounded by those who would conquer her save for her huge land mass and vast population. As a result, China turned to these assets as her best defense and relied heavily on them as a means of self-protection.

The Cold War Era and the Drive Toward Nuclear Status

The period following World War II witnessed China’s ancient isolationist nature give way to increased—yet reluctant—interaction with other countries. The advent of communism initially led to an alliance with the Soviet Union. The pact was short-lived, however, due to the Soviets’ refusal to share nuclear technology and a rekindling of ancient border disputes. The Sino-Soviet rift persuaded China to seek friendship with the US, but the resulting relationship was superficial at best. Lack of a strong ally, coupled with increasing fear of threats from neighboring countries such as India, encouraged China to further develop her defensive doctrine and seek a nuclear capability in order to ensure her security in the Cold War international system.

By the end of World War II, the communist forces within China had significantly grown in strength and numbers. The next four years were characterized by civil war and a power struggle between Mao Tse-tung’s Communist People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party. Shortly after the communists’ victory in 1949, the Soviet Union signed a treaty of friendship with the newly formed People’s Republic of China. The comradeship, however, was short-lived. One issue which hastened the split was the Soviets’ refusal to share nuclear technology with the Chinese. After the Soviet Union exploded her first atomic device in 1949, the Chinese eagerly sought to gain a prototype. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev denied this request, placing a strain on the relationship between the two countries.  

Another source of the Sino-Soviet rift was the Chinese border disputes dating back to the 1600s. Besides conflicts with the Soviet Union herself, China had long contested boundaries with India. When the Soviet Union backed India in just such a dispute in 1962, the Chinese decided to break relations with the Soviets and turned instead toward the West, hoping that bettering relations with the US would serve as a counterbalance against a worse enemy in the Soviet Union. This actually proved to be bittersweet for the US: although relations with China were beginning to normalize, the Chinese victory over India during the brief 1962 war spurred the latter to develop nuclear capabilities of her own. This in turn led China to more fervently seek those same capabilities.  

Faced with a large nuclear enemy, the Soviet Union, to the north and a potential nuclear enemy, India, to the west, China found it necessary to devise a military strategy based on her strongest attributes. Relying on her size and population, and realizing she was militarily weaker than her adversaries, China developed the concept of “People’s War” which sought to mobilize her masses against an invading enemy. The plan envisioned a strategic retreat that would lure the enemy deep into the Chinese heartland and then swallow him up in a sea of people. Mao believed manpower, not superior
weaponry, was the deciding factor in winning a war. In fact, “Mao’s concept of the superiority of manpower over weapons [later] relegated the use of nuclear weapons to a supporting role.”

The main point to emphasize in this discussion of Chinese Cold War military thinking is its defensive nature. Even border clashes with the Soviet Union and India can be considered defensive, especially since China did not follow up with attempts to overthrow the enemy governments or seize their territory. This supports the earlier conclusion that China’s history is not one of an aggressive state seeking to impose her will on other nations. Rather, China has been the victim of imperialist aggression and not the culprit.

**Current Chinese Thinking: Post-Cold War to the Present**

As the dust settled from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the eyes of the free world began to turn toward China. Today, military modernization programs, coupled with one of the world’s fastest growing economies, increase the interest in Chinese global intentions. There is legitimate concern as to what role China will play in the emerging international system. Are her intentions still of a defensive nature, or have her ambitions turned aggressive?

China *is* pursuing impressive military modernization programs, but they continue to be based on attempts to improve her world status and provide a viable defense of her homeland. Efforts to upgrade her logistics system and command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) infrastructure are merely indicative of China’s desire to keep pace with other potential and known world powers. In fact, according to a statement made by one Chinese official, China’s external security environment has “never
been more satisfactory since the founding of the Republic.” This implies that China feels less threatened in today’s international system than she did during the Cold War. In addition, China believes that future wars will be primarily low-intensity conflicts (LICs) rather than total wars. This perception of a reduced threat and relatively peaceful environment has led to a doctrinal shift away from a reliance on her massive population and toward an increased emphasis on professional armed forces.

An update in doctrine, along with the realization of the importance of Chinese economic centers, has also led to an update in strategy. “People’s War Under Modern Conditions” is tailored to protect those economic centers, especially the ones along the east coast where most of China’s economic power is located. The new strategy abandons the “strategic retreat” of old and stresses the need to prevent the enemy from occupying the coast. This requires protective lines of defense extending well forward of the economic centers, thus driving the need for modern naval, air, and ground forces.

Once again, it is important to point out the defensive emphasis of Chinese military thinking. With its origins dating back some 4,000 years, the Chinese philosophy on warfare is not aggressive in nature. Rather, China’s history is characterized by isolationism and not imperialism. China’s military modernization programs, as well as her desire to achieve nuclear status, are merely attempts to improve her global standing and provide a solid defense for her vast population. The next chapter presents a more in-depth look at China’s nuclear history and shows how this defensive mindset continues to drive her strategy.

Notes

Notes

3 Cooper, 268.
4 Note that Sun Tzu is also referred to as Sun Zi in various sources. Also note that there is debate as to whether “he” was actually a single person or merely the sum of various sources of military writing during the fourth century B.C.
7 Cooper, 269.
9 Cooper, 270.
10 Ibid., 271.
11 Kissinger, 25. See also Xue, 168.
12 Note that Mao Tse-tung is also referred to as Mao Zedong in various sources.
13 For a thorough discussion of the events leading up to Krushchev’s decision to halt nuclear assistance to China, see LtCmdr Elizabeth D. Olmo, China’s Nuclear Agenda and the Implications for United States Foreign Policy (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1993), 23-29.
14 Cooper, 272.
16 Olmo, 90.
17 Ibid., 92.
18 Kim, 11.
19 Hendricks, toolbook.
20 Ibid.
Chapter 4

History of Chinese Nuclear Strategy

Like China’s military doctrine, her nuclear strategy can also be linked to the writings of Sun Tzu. In his book, *The Art Of War*, Sun Tzu may have been the first to establish the concept of deterrence when he talked of “forcing the other party to resign to our will without fighting a battle.”¹ Gerard Chaliand’s translated excerpt further states that, “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.”² This concept of deterrence, with its origin dating back to Sun Tzu’s fourth century B.C. writings, has been the underlying philosophy throughout China’s 33-year nuclear history.

Mao Tse-tung’s Initial Nuclear Strategy

The period following the end of World War II and the communist victory in China found the newly formed People’s Republic of China deeply concerned with its inability to fend off the emerging superpowers. Both the US and Soviet Union possessed nuclear weapons and might interfere with the development of the fledgling nation. This led Mao Tse-tung to declare that, “If we are not to be bullied in the present-day world, we cannot do without the bomb.”³ US Navy Lieutenant Commander Elizabeth D. Olmo stated in her thesis submitted to the Naval Postgraduate School in 1993, “The political power and
implied military security attached to the development of a Chinese atom bomb was a major
factor in the newly emerging republic’s pursuit of a nuclear capability.  

In addition to the security issue, China sought to profit from the scientific and
industrial advances that accompanied the development of a nuclear weapon. China had
not benefited from the technological and economic advancements made during the
previous century’s Industrial Revolution since her rulers had discouraged contact with the
outside world. Her historic isolationism had left China painfully behind in these two key
areas. As a result, China did not possess the scientific and industrial base that was in place
during the US and Soviet nuclear development. Building an atomic bomb “provided one
way to organize, create, and finance that base.” 

Consequently, the development of a nuclear weapon became instrumental in China’s
quest to become a legitimate nation. Mao embraced the project as a way to build the
Middle Kingdom’s power and status. It is important to note, however, that he did not see
the bomb as an offensive weapon. In fact, in formulating “The Guidelines for Developing
Nuclear Weapons,” Mao emphasized deterrence when he established the conditions for
China’s nuclear weapons program during a conference held in the summer of 1958. The
highlights are listed below:

1. To develop nuclear weapons in order to warn China’s enemies against making war
   on her, not in order to make war on them.
2. The main reason for developing nuclear weapons is to defend peace.
3. Emphasis to be placed on developing nuclear warheads and long-range delivery
   vehicles. No desire to develop tactical nuclear weapons. 

Mao set an optimistic goal of developing a nuclear capability in ten years. This was
especially challenging since, as previously mentioned, the Chinese did not possess the
scientific and technological base enjoyed by the US and Soviet Union during their nuclear
development. Needless to say, the world took notice when, on 16 October 1964, the People’s Republic of China released the following statement:

China exploded an atomic bomb at 15:00 hours on October 16, 1964. This is a major achievement of the Chinese people in their struggle to strengthen their national defence [sic].

China is developing nuclear weapons not because [she] believes in their omnipotence nor because [she] plans to use them. On the contrary ... China’s aim is to break the nuclear monopoly of the nuclear powers and to eliminate nuclear weapons.

China is developing nuclear weapons for defence [sic] and for protecting the Chinese people from...threats to...a nuclear war.

The Chinese Government hereby solemnly declares that China will never at any time or under any circumstances be the first to use nuclear weapons.8

This statement, and the foregoing discussion, clearly shows the defensive intent of China’s initial nuclear strategy. According to Olmo, “It was not for aggressive purposes and was less for winning a war than to prevent a war against China.”9 This strategy of deterrence, established by Mao Tse-tung at the outset of China’s nuclear birth, is still the cornerstone of China’s modern security objectives and forms the basis for her current nuclear doctrine.

China’s Current Nuclear Doctrine

The post-Cold War era has seen a shift in Chinese nuclear doctrine away from purely strategic weapons to those of a more tactical nature. With the decrease in the US and Russian arsenals and the increase in the number of possible nuclear states (to include Pakistan, Israel, South Africa, Brazil, Argentina, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Syria, Algeria, and Libya),10 China’s long-range defensive concerns have now moved closer to home. According to Mr. Alastair Johnston, “Chinese strategists have developed a concept of
'limited deterrence’ [which] requires sufficient counterforce and countervalue tactical, theater, and strategic nuclear forces to deter the escalation of conventional or nuclear war.”\textsuperscript{11} Although this shift to a shorter-range tactical philosophy could cause concern, it should be noted that it is still based on deterrence. Following Mao Tse-tung’s death in 1976 and freed from the guidelines established during the 1958 convention on nuclear development, “A few brave souls in the various military organs [sic] wrote some general think pieces on the subject of nuclear strategy.”\textsuperscript{12} Influenced by Western nuclear literature, especially the “arguments about matching the opponent’s weaponry and having a range of nuclear options,”\textsuperscript{13} the Chinese began to pursue tactical weapons to complement their strategic capability. This tactical development gave China a “limited” nuclear strike option, providing her with “a credible nuclear deterrent and a retaliatory strike capability without escalating a war in the manner that a ballistic missile launch would.”\textsuperscript{14} Thus the 1980s saw China modify her force structure to include intercontinental and intermediate-range ballistic missiles. It is interesting to note, however, that this force structure only grew to approximately fifty warheads. Furthermore, Mr. Johnston points out that the Chinese believed “that a small number of warheads sufficient to inflict unacceptable damage on a handful of enemy cities constitutes a credible deterrent.”\textsuperscript{15} More recently, in late 1992 the 14th Party Congress adopted “comprehensive national strength” as the official party line for China’s national security strategy.\textsuperscript{16} This strategy emphasizes unilateral security and is a direct result of the end of the Cold War and the perceived move toward a multipolar international system. With increased global competition due to a larger number of international actors, China believes the road to
world power status is even more dependent on a strong military. According to Dr. Kim, China sees “military power as the most important component of the comprehensive national strength [and views it] as indispensable for China to [gain her] status as a leading world power and to defend against any threats…to Chinese sovereignty.”\(^{17}\) Despite US and Russian nuclear cutbacks, Mr. Johnston adds that, “Non-nuclear but ‘nuclear-oriented’ states will continue their efforts to develop nuclear weapons, and improve their status and bargaining power in regional politics.”\(^{18}\) With China essentially surrounded by nuclear Russia and two of these “nuclear-oriented” states (India and Pakistan), and with no major allies, her strategy of comprehensive national strength emphasizing self-security comes as no surprise.

The preceding discussion of China’s nuclear strategy highlights the fact that it is founded on deterrence and driven by security concerns. Mao Tse-tung’s fear of being bullied and his desire for a technologically mature China drove him to aggressively pursue nuclear development. The recent shift toward tactical capabilities is merely a response to new security issues. According to Olmo, “Concerns that China is bent on achieving nuclear superiority and is intent on global supremacy…are incompatible with China’s strategic historical characteristics.”\(^{19}\) Although China has historically not been a belligerent nation, her emerging world power status and rising nuclear capabilities should be taken seriously by the US. The next chapter discusses the importance of this issue.

**Notes**

1. Quoted in Xue, 170.
2. Chaliand, 224.
Notes

4 Olmo, 49.
5 Xue, 168.
7 Olmo, 31.
9 Olmo, 19.
11 Johnston, 5-6.
12 Xue, 173.
13 Ibid., 174-175.
15 Johnston, 10.
16 Kim, 6.
17 Ibid., 9.
18 Johnston, 10.
19 Olmo, 125.
Chapter 5

Implications for the Future

Despite China’s military modernization programs and rapidly growing economy, Dr. Kim argues that she is simply a weak state pretending to be strong. Numerous domestic problems could hinder China’s attempt to achieve world power status. This in turn may cause trouble on the international scene if China flaunts her growing military strength, and especially her expanding nuclear might, as a means to hide these internal weaknesses. Recent instances of questionable Chinese foreign policy have further increased global concern over her true future intentions, which in turn could impact US, and even global, security. The US must therefore remain engaged in China and respond if necessary by offering assistance in these problem areas in order to nurture her growth in ways beneficial to the US and the world as a whole.

China’s Internal Problems

Despite the outward appearance of a country with a strong, growing economy possessing a capable, upgrading military, China’s internal position is still one of turmoil and change. Just as China’s past was troubled with internal disorder, her present is characterized by numerous economic, social, environmental, and political problems which may hamper her rise to world status. Without the proper assistance in dealing with these
issues—from the US and the world community alike—China’s rise may prove to be an unwelcome one.

Although the World Bank predicts China’s economy may actually surpass that of the US by the year 2002, China’s population continues to skyrocket; therefore her per capita income stays relatively low. *Time* reported this month that, although China’s “national growth…has averaged ten percent a year for the past 18 years…the average per capita income last year stood at about $250.” Setbacks such as double-digit inflation likewise detract from potential economic gains. Furthermore, China’s reluctance to repay international loans has caused some potential investors to be hesitant, thereby impacting the capital base needed to secure foreign expertise and technology for her desired military modernization programs.

China’s growing population has had other economic impacts. Despite instituting the policy of allowing families to have only one child, China’s population has not yet stabilized, forcing her to import more food and oil. This, along with the loss of fertile soil to water pollution and farmers leaving their fields for the cities in search of a more lucrative way of life, has caused China to become increasingly dependent on other nations to feed her people. Additionally, China’s oil consumption has continued to rise and actually exceeded production in 1993 for the first time in forty years. China has consequently proposed an aggressive nuclear power program as a way to relieve the oil demand. Despite an optimistic plan for twelve operating reactors, only two are known to be functioning, and predictions are that only five percent of China’s power requirements will be supplied by nuclear reactors by the year 2000. For the foreseeable future then, the Chinese will continue to be dependent on imports for food and energy requirements.
Another setback—and one that grabbed US and world attention—was the Tiananmen Square incident in the spring of 1989. Thousands of university students and factory workers demonstrated for nearly six weeks, demanding democracy and an end to government corruption. When the Chinese communist leadership used “troops and tanks to crush the demonstrations, killing hundreds of students,” Sino-US relations suffered a serious setback. Even though this was an internal crisis rather than an external one, the grave human rights implications caused concern in the US and served as a reminder of the strength of the communist regime. As President Clinton stated in his National Security Strategy published in February of last year, we must work with the Chinese in the future and “continue to press for improved respect for human rights.”

Faced with the domestic problems that stem from uncontrollable population growth, pollution, urbanization, and domestic unrest, China could turn to a strong military as a way to cover up her internal shortcomings. In fact, Dr. Kim believes that possessing such a military will compel China to demonstrate her toughness abroad as she becomes more insecure and fragmented at home. This is a valid argument, especially when coupled with the examples of China’s recent irrational behavior presented in the next section.

**China’s Questionable Foreign Policy**

Recently a number of actions by the Chinese have caused concern on the international scene as to her true future intentions. Chinese territorial aspirations in the South China Sea, coupled with controversial arms sales to irresponsible regimes, have cast some doubts as to whether China really wants to play by the rules. Will China be a responsible actor, or is she willing to take whatever measures she sees necessary to gain global recognition?
One disturbing aspect of China’s recent foreign policy is her stated desire to claim the disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands. At least six different nations have competing claims over the two chains, which are potentially oil-rich and straddle vital Asia-Pacific sea lanes. The conflict stems from “the proposition that the seabed resources of disputed areas in the South China Sea should be jointly developed, while shelving the issue of sovereignty.” What is most disturbing is evidence from recent Chinese military writings that “war is still considered preferable to the appearance of surrendering sovereign claims.” In addition, Chinese scholars and publicists have repeatedly stated that “China will never occupy an inch of foreign territory, nor will it yield an inch” of its own. What is noteworthy here is China’s policy of “protectionism,” maintaining what is hers and what she believes to be hers. Whether this is a case of Chinese aggression or one of “self-defense,” the Paracel and Spratly Islands issue is one in which the US may find itself involved in the near future.

Another disturbing aspect of China’s foreign policy is her recent sale of missiles and nuclear technology to countries like Pakistan. According to a New York Times article last August, “American intelligence reports repeatedly that the Chinese are building a factory for Pakistan to turn out missiles, capable of carrying nuclear warheads, that could reach India.” The article points out, however, that China and India fought a border war in the early 1960s, and neither country ever forgot that. Furthermore, the Sino-Indian war was the catalyst for both countries seeking a nuclear capability. This fact, along with the known distrust between Pakistan and India, explains why China considers Pakistan an ally and India always a potential enemy. With this in mind, Chinese assistance to Pakistan against a common enemy does not seem to be quite as irrational.
Even though some aspects of China’s foreign policy have been questionable by Western standards, researching her motivations for such actions shows that they have not been totally irresponsible. Her disputed territorial claims and arms sales can actually be traced back to her defensive needs, be they physical (in terms of land mass) or psychological (in terms of an implied ally). Understanding China’s future intentions, therefore, must also include the realization that her policies may not always be compatible with our own.

**US National Security Implications**

China’s defense modernization programs and foreign policy objectives could realistically pose a challenge to US interests and security. Steady improvements in China’s economic and military capabilities could lead her to be more assertive, thereby producing diplomatic tensions and perhaps even armed conflicts. Fear of China provoking an external confrontation to distract attention from internal woes would not be unfounded.\(^\text{16}\) The US must therefore be prepared to take an active role in China’s development.

On the one hand, China’s nuclear weapons modernization programs and her related arms control policies could pose some possibly severe implications to world peace. China’s pursuit of a more viable nuclear triad and her sometimes careless arms sales have raised legitimate concerns over her desired future goals. On the other hand, a balanced assessment of China’s programs and policies requires highlighting some of their positive aspects. Mr. Robert G. Sutter, a Senior Specialist in International Politics in Washington, D.C., points out that “current Chinese actions assure that Chinese nuclear weapons are better designed and safer to handle than they might otherwise be. They also preclude a
possibly more expensive and potentially more destabilizing buildup of conventional military force China might undertake if [she] were no longer able to rely on [her] nuclear arsenal.”\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless, the US must remain cautiously engaged in China, since issues such as human rights and territorial disputes may quickly ignite.

Despite China’s isolationist history, Dr. Kim charges that she was one of the ten most “crisis active states” during the five decades from 1929-1979. He does point out, however, that all but one of China’s foreign policy disputes were based on national security issues, protecting what the Chinese termed “sacred home territory.” He further states that “China has yet to resort to military force purely on behalf of the communist revolutionary cause, nor has China used [her] military power recklessly in a manner befitting naked aggression.”\textsuperscript{18} Although these historical indicators are all positive, they should not be relied upon to predict China’s upcoming conduct. A number of recent actions has raised concern over her true intentions for the future.

Probably the most threatening Chinese behavior in recent years stems from her “do as I say and not as I do” attitude. Dr. Kim calls it China’s “Jekyll-and-Hyde diplomacy.”\textsuperscript{19} In spite of officially agreeing to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in March of 1992, her stated willingness to participate in negotiations for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and accepting the stringent parameters of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) restricting the sale of missiles, China continues her “who me?” denial behavior.\textsuperscript{20} China’s sale of missiles and nuclear technology to Third World customers clearly violates the agreements mentioned above, but when confronted with evidence of these sales, China reiterates her accession to those same agreements and restates her nonproliferation pledges. Furthermore, she insists that the arms sold are for purely
defensive and peaceful uses. As far as justifying her own continued nuclear development despite signing the CTBT, China claims that “mankind needs to keep developing ‘peaceful’ nuclear weapons in case a giant asteroid is discovered careering [sic] through space on a collision course with the earth.”21

The sale of missiles and nuclear technology to Third World countries, especially confirmed terrorist states such as Libya and Iran,22 may lead some to conclude that China is a rogue state herself due to guilt by association. Although these arms sales are undeniable, the motivations behind them are open to interpretation. One explanation is based on China’s monetary needs, since “China’s economic modernization program forces the military to sell many of its advanced weapons and technologies in order to fund [its] own development programs.”23 Dr. Kim offers another possibility, stating that “China’s missile sales…earned not only hard currency but also a much-sought diplomatic switch from Taipei to Beijing.”24 This reiterates the People’s Republic of China’s wish to be recognized as the “official China” and her desire to establish diplomatic relations with other countries. Furthermore, “Chinese leadership found the arms sales, especially in the nuclear and missile field, as another way of demonstrating its status as a global power, and that festering regional conflicts in the Third World…could not be resolved without China’s participation.”25 Thus the need for hard currency, the desire to gain diplomatic recognition, and the drive to become a global power, as well as the defensive motivations discussed in the previous section, are all legitimate reasons for the Chinese selling arms to whomever can buy them.

In summary, China’s future intentions could impact US national security interests. Her military modernization programs and arms control policies may lead to increased
tension between the two countries. Specifically, China’s sale of nuclear technology is a major source of concern. One of the future challenges for US and world leadership is to emphasize to the Chinese the need to be responsible in selecting their buyers. Other challenges are discussed in the next section.

**US Response**

Given that China is *not* an international rogue state and *is* trying to be a responsible world power, the US must stay committed to the region in accordance with President Clinton’s *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*. In this document he states that the US will continue to be actively involved with China, because “nowhere... is the need for continued US engagement more evident” than in the East Asia region.26 The President’s three goals of enhancing US security, bolstering the nation’s economy, and promoting democracy abroad provide a perfect framework for discussing our future relationship with the Chinese.

In order to enhance security, US leadership must make a concerted effort to involve the Chinese in any future talks concerning nuclear proliferation. The 1981 Joint Congressional Resolution for nuclear technology transfer provides a solid foundation for such an effort. Although it deals primarily with technology for nuclear power reactors, it establishes guidelines and ensures safeguards are in place for the safe and peaceful transfer of such technology. Included are provisions for the President to certify that China is legitimately using the technology and not exploiting its dual-use capabilities by helping other nations build nuclear weapons. If discrepancies or injustices are discovered, provisions are also in place allowing the US to disapprove further technology sales.27
Looking to the future, it is imperative that China and the other two second-tier nuclear states be included in any upcoming discussions on nuclear disarmament. As stated earlier, current US and Russian nuclear drawdowns in compliance with START I and II increase the relative nuclear strength of Great Britain, France, and China. However, further bilateral cuts in the two superpowers’ arsenals are unlikely without some commitment from the second-tier states to also pursue nuclear reductions. The problem lies in the mistrust among the five players, especially between Russia and China. Russia tends to lump the capabilities of the other four nuclear states together when discussing hard numbers. She argues that they are all still potential enemies, China in her own right and the US, Great Britain, and France as NATO allies. Russia can accept par with the US, but cannot extend that balance to the second-tier states and thereby be outnumbered four-to-one. China, on the other hand, is unlikely to disarm until reaching a parity with the US and Russian arsenals. In fact, an official Chinese response to Russian President Boris Yeltsin’s request for disarmament following the START II agreement clearly stated that China would participate only after the two superpowers had reduced their nuclear arsenals to “a level matching China’s.” China’s rationale is based on “the absence of allied relations with either superpower and the necessity to deter both, relying on [her] own capabilities.” Further complicating the issue is the question of verification. Given China’s historic isolationism and reluctance to openness, it is doubtful that a genuine verification system can be established. This dilemma is one that will require a lot of thought at the senior political leadership level but must be dealt with in order to maintain global security in this emerging post-Cold War world.
In spite of China’s rapidly growing economy, her numerous domestic problems detract from her ability to make significant gains. According to President Clinton,

A stable, open, prosperous, and strong China is important to the US and to our friends and allies in the region. A stable and open China is more likely to work cooperatively with others and to contribute positively to peace in the region and to respect the rights and interests of its people. A prosperous China will provide an expanding market for American goods and services. We have a profound stake in helping to ensure that China pursues its modernization in ways that contribute to the overall security and prosperity of the Asia Pacific region.31

The US needs to pursue a policy which assists China in coping with her internal issues, for “the problems others face today can…quickly become ours, tomorrow.”32 Offering assistance in dealing with the consequences of overpopulation, urbanization, and environmental pollution in China is therefore in the best interests of the US. Alleviating these problems will permit China to realize her potential economic gains. These in turn will promote regional prosperity and may consequently provide additional markets for US commodities, thereby bolstering the US economy in fulfillment of our national strategy.

The third pillar in President Clinton’s national security strategy deals with promoting democracy abroad. Although it would be absurd to consider converting communist China’s form of government, we must “continue to press for improved respect for human rights” in the region. In spite of the Tiananmen Square massacre, there are “forces within China, and, indeed, within the Chinese Communist Party itself, that continue to work for political change and democratic reform.”33 We must carefully and cautiously support such forces, balancing our desires to promote democracy and human rights with our respect for China’s political nature so as not to jeopardize her potential gains in this area.
Overall, our relationship with the Chinese should be based on the positive application of the instruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, information, and military) rather than their coercive use. Well-known statesmen and authors have pointed out that sanctions do not work as well as rewards. Continued Presidential and Congressional involvement and support for China will demonstrate our resolve to nurture her rise in global status. Economic assistance and incentives will help steer her in a direction beneficial to the US and the rest of the world. Increased public and global awareness of China’s potential gains will increase her credibility as a rising international power. These are just a few of the ways the non-military instruments of power can be used positively to assist China’s rise to world status.

The US military can also be a positive influence on China by reestablishing military-to-military contacts in accordance with our National Military Strategy. Such ties existed between the US Army and China’s People’s Liberation Army until President George Bush suspended them in response to the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. According to General John M. Shalikashvili, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, such “contact programs are one of the most effective instruments in our efforts to create a more stable security order. Today there are opportunities to forge new and more cooperative security relationships both with former adversaries and with formerly nonaligned nations.” Furthermore, US Army Colonel Jer Donald Get, a Foreign Area Officer for the PRC, has authored a report for the Strategic Studies Institute concerning the merits of such army-to-army contacts. He argues that since China is relevant to US interests, and one of America’s most effective engagement tools is the US Army, then it makes sense to use the army to positively influence China as she develops into a world power.
instruments of power in a positive manner to encourage China’s rise will help achieve our national security strategy by enhancing security, bolstering economic revitalization, and promoting democratic ideals.

Notes

1 Kim, iii.
2 Hendricks, toolbook.
4 Hendricks, toolbook.
5 Kim, 17.
6 Hendricks, toolbook.
7 Cooper, 273.
9 Kim, 32.
10 Ibid., 15.
11 Ibid., 14.
12 Ibid., 16.
13 Ibid., 18.
14 The author’s term.
16 Kim, iii.
18 Kim, 18.
19 Ibid., 19.
20 Ibid., 29.
21 Ibid.
22 Olmo, 79.
23 Ibid., viii.
24 Kim, 30.
25 Ibid., 29.
26 White House, 39.
27 Hendricks, toolbook.
30 Arbatov, 223.
31 White House, 40.
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32 Ibid., ii.
33 Cooper, 273.
35 Col Jer Donald Get, What’s With the Relationship Between America’s Army and China’s PLA? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 15 September 1996), iii.
37 Get, vi.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

Based on my research, I believe the People’s Republic of China is a developing responsible world power and not an international rogue state. Her isolationist history, defensive military thinking, and deterrent-based nuclear strategy all provide a solid foundation for this conclusion. However, significant internal problems and some recent questionable foreign policy decisions indicate that China will continue to challenge US foreign policy makers.

The demise of the Soviet Union presents the US with the opportunity to reassess her relationships with other countries in the post-Cold War world. China is a leader among the countries warranting consideration, especially given her position as a major player in the emerging international order. Furthermore, US and Russian nuclear drawdowns brought about by START I and II increase the relative size and strength of China’s nuclear arsenal. These factors, coupled with China’s own military modernization programs, highlight the need to be concerned with China’s role in the new international system.

China’s history is one of deep-rooted isolationism which can be traced back some 4,000 years. Even during the Cold War, China’s doctrine was not based on imperialism but rather on defense and protecting her homeland from invasion. This theme carried over to China’s motivations for developing her nuclear capability during this time. China’s
post-Cold War thinking, including her military modernization programs, continues to reflect that defensive strategy.

China’s current military upgrades, while representing significant increases in capability, are still a modest endeavor and do not necessarily pose a threat to the US or the Asia-Pacific region. What does cause concern is China’s proliferation of these capabilities, especially nuclear ones, to other countries. Coupled with her domestic problems, the fear is that China may use this newly developed military might to muscle her way onto the international scene.

China, therefore, deserves the attention that any important nation receives in our foreign policy relations. The US must realize, though, that China is a proud and powerful nation and not just another communist country that should be contained. The US, and the world for that matter, does not need another Cold War. US policy makers should positively engage China to help rather than hinder her progress and seek a peaceful consensus in areas such as human rights where the two countries do not quite agree. Understanding the People’s Republic of China for who she is, not for who we want her to be, is therefore key to ensuring her peaceful rise to world power status and establishing a secure post-Cold War world.
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Get, Col Jer Donald. What’s With the Relationship Between America’s Army and China’s PLA? Carlisle Barracks, PA: US Army War College, 15 September 1996.