UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!


The Marine Component Headquarters and Wartime Functions

The Marine Component Headquarters and Wartime Functions


CSC 1995







Title: The Marine Component Headquarters and Wartime



Author: Major J.S. Mitchell, United States Marine Corps


Thesis: The Marine service component headquarters need to

be lean, but fully capable of performing a variety of

functions in support of the CINC and the Marine warfighter

during a wartime scenario.


Background: The Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience led

the Marine Corps to consider establishing separate Marine

service component headquarters for each unified CINC. In

February 1992 the Commandant released a message proposing a

review of the functions and capabilities required of a

component headquarters as well as proposing that Fleet

Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific be designated as the

Marine service component headquarters. In a September 1992

the Commandant formally established these service component

commands. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command

requested that the Center for Naval Analyses conduct a study

on CINC service component concepts for the Marine Corps.

The study team made several recommendations on service

component structure and functions. The Marine Corps Force

Structure Planning Group developed an additional list of

functions and made structure recommendations. To these

lists were added unified command requirements for functions

required of a service component. Since then the Marine

component commands have wrestled with the issues of

structure and function. It has been an evolutionary

process and great strides have been made, but there are

milestones yet to be reached.The size and organization of

staffs has yet to be resolved. The division of labor within

the component headquarters and the prevention of bleed over

or duplication of functions with the warfighter require

continuous refinement.


Recommendations: The Marine component headquarters need to

be fully represented at each of the unified commands. The

staffs must be lean, but fully capable (with augmentation)

of performing their mission during wartime. A definite

division of labor needs to exist with the component

headquarters and with the warfighter during wartime.


The Marine Component Headquarters and Wartime Functions




In February 1992, the Commandant of the Marine Corps


(CMC) released a message proposing a "...thorough review of


the functions and capabilities required [of a service


component] headquarters.1 The message also proposed that


the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (CG,


FMFPAC) be the service component commander for USCINCPAC and


the designated service component commander for USCINCCENT.


The message further proposed that the Commanding General,


Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (CG, FMFLANT) be the service


component commander for USCINCLANT (now CINCUSACOM) and the


designated service component commander for USCINCEUR and


USCINCSOUTH. CMC formally established these service


component commands in September 1992.2 Since then the


Marine Corps has worked diligently at achieving full


componency. It has been an evolutionary process and there


are milestones yet to be reached. The Marine service


component headquarters need to be lean, but fully capable


of performing a variety of functions in support of the CINC


and the Marine warfighter from multiple locations during a


wartime scenario.


The Desert Shield/ Desert Storm experience led the


Marine Corps to consider establishing separate Marine


service component headquarters for each unified command.


In the Gulf, CG I MEF was dual-hatted as COMMARCENT, the


Marine component commander under USCINCCENT. CG, I MEF and


most of his staff were located at a forward headquarters.


Collocated with CINCCENT in Riyadh were a small staff and a


Marine two-star general officer. The fact that the other


services (except for the Navy) had larger staffs in Riyadh,


headed by three-star general officers, suggested that the


Marine Corps was not receiving equal representation and that


it should consider a similar structure.


Prior to this time separate service components did not


exist in the Marine Corps. Organizations that came close to


it, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (FMFLANT), Fleet Marine


Force Europe (FMFEUR) (DESIGNATE) and Fleet Marine Force


Pacific (FMFPAC) were type commands under the Navy Service




Why did the Marine corps establish Marine component


commands? The answer is threefold. First, as already


stated, the Gulf War experience demonstrated the requirement


for a service component headquarters, collocated with the


unified command in theater separate from the MAGTF


warfighting commander. Secondly, a Marine component command


allowed for direct access to the unified commander and his


staff. This served to provide ever present Marine Corps


visibility and influence on the use of Marine Forces and


brought the Corps in line with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of


1986. Lastly, the establishment of Marine service component


commands brought the Corps more in line with the arrangement


at the service chief level. CMC had been a member of the


Joint Chiefs of Staff for sometime and this same arrangement


at the theater CINC level was desirable.


Within this context, the Marine Corps Combat


Development Command (MCCDC) requested that the Center for


Naval Analyses (CNA) perform a study on CINC service


component concepts for the Marine Corps.3 These concepts


were to include roles, missions and functions as well as


organizational structures for the headquarters.


The CNA study team first delineated roles, missions and


function of component headquarters in peacetime, wartime


and during transition to war. Secondly, the team identified


capabilities and deficiencies of the Marine Corps to perform


these roles. Lastly, the team developed and analyzed


courses of action to increase the ability of the Marine


Corps to take on these responsibilities. The results of the


study were published in June 1994 in a series of classified


and unclassified reports. The results of the have received


mixed reviews. For the record, it is worth reviewing in


broad terms the approach that the team used in their


analysis, to include issues that were beyond their scope and


needed to be resolved by the Marine Corps and some final


cautions that they put forward.


The team began their research by reviewing JCS Pub. 2,


Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Joint doctrine defines


service component commands as consisting of the Service


component commander and all those individuals, units,


detachments, organizations and installations under his


command that have been assigned to the unified command.


Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations or


installations may operate directly under the service


component commander and should contribute to the mission of


the CINC.4 Additionally, UNAAF addresses service component


commanders having responsibilities that derive from their


positions in both the operational and Service chains of


command.5 These functions are listed at Appendix A.


It is appropriate to mention at this time that the


Marine Corps Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) under


then, Brigadier General Krulak, also published a list of


functions for the service component headquarters. This list


briefly described the role of the service component


headquarters above and beyond those listed in UNAAF.6 It


stated that the component headquarters would be the primary


source for administrative and logistics support functions


combined with coordination and liaison functions. This


would serve to assist the warfighter by relieving him of


those functions not directly associated with warfighting.


Additionally, an even more expansive list emerged when joint


doctrine, coupled with the FSPG, was added to service


component functions and requirements derived from recent


exercises, contingencies and requirements from theater


CINCS. This last source is critical in that OPLANS,


CONPLANS, strategic plans and CINC policies hold the real


key to the requirements of service components.


Returning to the CNA study, there were several issues


that the team revealed requiring Marine Corps action. Among


them were: 1) the functions of the service component versus


other headquarters, 2) the size of the headquarters and 3)


the service component functions in support of a Joint Task


Force.7 The team also cautioned the Marine Corps that there


were certain steps that needed to be taken in order to


implement an effective headquarters. Along them were: 1)


the development of meaningful doctrine, 2) the pursuit of a


rigorous training program to teach this doctrine and 3) the


absolute requirement to overcome the warfighter bias on the


part of the component commander and staff.8


After conscientiously addressing the factors above, the


team used a requirements-based approach in the study to


develop concepts for a service component headquarters.


Functions were determined using a top-down approach, i.e.


that the theater CINC would establish the requirements for


their components. Consequently each theater CINC was


visited to collect data and, as stated earlier joint


doctrine, Marine Corps publications, exercise and


operational after-action reports were consulted.


Next, the team identified potential courses of action


for a service component headquarters. This was done using a


zero based approach meaning that all possible structures


were examined. Eight organizational structures were


identified for a headquarters. These structures covered the


spectrum of distance, both conceptual as well as physical


from the CINC. Each course of action contained a peacetime


and wartime component as well as a reference to a "cell" if


the service component had representation at the CINC. The


courses of action varied from those that were combined Navy


and Marine Corps in both peacetime and wartime to those that


were a full component staff (Marine only) that were


collocated with a CINC in peacetime and responsible to him


alone and also deployed with that CINC in time of crisis.


Once the courses of action were finalized each was assessed


with respect to their ability to perform the required


component functions. Then a theater by theater analysis was


performed and the results tallied.


As a final step, the study looked at the various costs


of implementing each of the courses of action by theater for


the Marine Corps overall. This yielded a list of options


with pros and cons for each. The study team also proposed a


method of selecting the best possible option for performing


the required service component functions.


In taking this approach the study traded depth for


scope. This was purposeful in that many different component


initiatives came up during the study and it was important to


consider every alternative. Another consequence was that


the study did not develop tables of organization and


equipment for the headquarters , nor did the team suggest


sources of augmentation for the headquarters in wartime.


During the course of the CNA study and even since its


release the two component headquarters have continued to


evolve into what they are today. Figure 1 depicts the


current Unified Combatant Commanders (CINCS) and the Marine


Service component headquarters relationship to each CINC.


Figure 1.


CINC Marine service component headquarters

(location) (location)


(Hawaii0 (Hawaii)


(Korea) (Hawaii)


(Tampa) (Hawaii)


(Norfolk) (Camp Lejeune)


(Panama) (Camp Lejeune)


(Germany) (Camp Lejeune)


Under the current setup MARFORLANT is under the


Combatant Command (COCOM) of CINCUSACOM as a provider of


CONUS-based forces to other Combatant Commanders and


MARFORLANT is under the COCOM of CINCPAC. This is not to


say that the National Command Authority (NCA) will not


transfer COCOM of deploying forces to another CINC during


contingency or crisis operations.


The Marine Corps is still wrestling with service


componency and all that it entails. One indication of this


is that the Commanding General, MCCDC, chartered yet another


working group during the fall 1994 to develop a concept for


command and control of a Marine service component


headquarters. The group met in Quantico during October and


in January published FMFRP 14-32 (Coordinating Draft). This


document has yet to be staffed and approved as a concept.


The issue of command and control (C2) as it relates to


service components has amplified dramatically the increased


requirements for C2 capabilities at the headquarters that


are state of the art.


The component headquarters are also closing the gap on


those functions performed by the headquarters in peacetime,


wartime, during the transition to war and in relation to the


warfighter. I have included the CMA study functions at


Appendix B. These functions are currently being reevaluated


and it is my belief that this process will continue


indefinitely as the Marine Corps grows into full componency.


The most important group of functions listed are those


required of a service component command in wartime. After


all, these are the functions most often exercised in CINC


directed exercises, crisis, and contingencies. Ironically


these are the functions that still cause the greatest degree


of teeth gnashing at the service component/ warfighter


level. It is absolutely essential that the Marine Corps


come to terms with the division of labor and duplication of


effort between the service component/ warfighter in a


wartime setting. The Marine Corps must convince its


personnel that the roles of a service component- advising,


supplying, training etc.- are critical to accomplishing the


mission. Careful articulation of the functions of each


headquarters and more particularly, the division of labor


within the service component (remain behind staff vs.


forward deployed command element) will help prevent the


"bleeding over" of functions to the warfighter.


Having said this, both component commanders and their


staffs play a pivotal role in optimizing preparation and


employment of the combat power of committed Marine Forces.


It is imperative that each headquarters be structured,


staffed, equipped, augmented, and trained to provide the


required functions in an effective, efficient and timely




Before addressing functions and recommending who should


perform them in a wartime scenario certain considerations


need to be put on the table. There are three assumptions


relating to CINC's USMC Service Component Headquarters and


they are:9 1) One Major Regional Contingency (MRC)


deployment will involve at least partial mobilization of the


Reserves, 2) Two nearly simultaneous MRC's (involving two


deployed USMC Service Component Headquarters) will include


full mobilization of the Reserves and 3) the CINC's USMC


Service Component and the MAGTF will frequently perform


complimentary actions in certain functional areas, although


to differing degrees and with different perspectives (i.e.


different levels of deployment planning and support). When


hostilities begin the MAGTF will focus on employment of


operating forces on the battlefield and the component


headquarters will assume the responsibility for the support


and sustainment of the MAGTF.


Under existing plans MARFORLANT is a service component


without a MRC to plan for.10 In each of MARFORLANT's three


theaters there exists or soon will exist a MARFOR


(designate) at a minimum. MARFORLANT does not currently


envision a requirement to deploy a forward headquarters to


any locations other than where they have elements in place,


i.e. Stuttgart, Panama City, or Norfolk. In the event of a


near simultaneous MRC scenario however, this equation will


change and depending on the time/space line, the component


headquarters may have to deploy. To date MARFORLANT has


deployed several Joint Task Force Headquarters, but has not


exercised the capability of deploying the MARFOR


Headquarters. In actuality, if a requirement arose, a


portion of the MARFOR Headquarters would augment the


existing designate in theater in order to accomplish the


component mission while a remain behind staff would stay at


Camp Lejuene.


Conversely, MARFORPAC is intimately involved in


planning for multiple MRC's under the direction of two


CINC's (USCINCCENT and CINCCFC). To amplify, in the event


of general war on the Korean Peninsula, COMMARFORPAC would


be designated as Commander, Combined Marine Forces Command


(COMCMFC) and Commander, USMC Forces (COMUSMARFORK) when


designated. In this capacity MARFORPAC has actively


participated in Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens and has deployed a


headquarters under canvas in Hawaii with great success.


To date, both MARFOR's have made great strides toward


assuming their full roles as component headquarters, but


definite milestones have yet to be met.


The component headquarters must be lean, yet effective


organizations. Its functions are critical to the Marine


Corps capability in a joint warfighting environment.11


However, assets assigned to the component headquarters are


deducted from those available to the rest of the Marine


Corps. I believe there is a trade-off here. If the Marine


Corps fails to staff the designate headquarters for our


components with less than the requisite numbers of personnel


by grade, MOB, and experience level, the Corps ability to


gain an advantage and remain engaged at all levels of


planning will never be achieved. This may serve to alienate


the CINC and nullify the component commanders relationship


with that CINC during an actual crisis. Therefore, the


component staff must be lean, containing only those assets


and personnel needed on a full time or frequent basis. Less


frequent requirements should be met only when required for


execution and then, sourced from allocated assets; either


preplanned active duty augmentation and/or Reserve unit




The likelihood of either MARFOR deploying their entire


headquarters as a USMC Component is remote. In fact, both


CINCUSACOM and USCINCPAC would have to deploy before this


would happen. The reality does exist for a level II


headquarters (something less than the entire staff, but


fully functional and capable of providing the full spectrum


of component functions) to deploy out of either or both


headquarters in a MRC x 2 scenario. This will create a


situation as described earlier wherein there is a deployed


headquarters supporting one CINC and a garrison remain


behind staff supporting that deployed headquarters as well


as retaining its responsibility to other assigned CINC's.


In that regard, what functions can be performed by the


remain behind staff? What functions are absolutely


required to be carried forward by the deployed command


element? Are their functions that should be shared between


the two staffs? Are there functions that the warfighter


(MEF) requires that could be performed by either the


deployed component command element or the remain behind


component staff?


Let's examine the functions/responsibilities of the


component headquarters. I will not address any of these


functions by individual staff section as that is beyond the


scope of this paper.


The deployed headquarters needs to advise the CINC on


the proper employment of Marine forces and represent the


interests of those forces with the CINC on a daily basis.


By this I mean proper mission assignment and maintenance of


the integrity of the MAGTF, whatever its size. The deployed


headquarters needs to be prepared to accomplish assigned


operational missions. I say this realizing the service


component at large is a provider of forces and sustainment,


focusing on support for the MAGTF (MEF) and providing an


interface with the CINC. However, on rare occasions the


deployed element may be directed to "employ forces".


Neither the headquarters itself nor its command and control


support elements are designed for this possibility.


Augmentation would be required. The deployed headquarters


needs to inform the CINC of plans for changes in logistics


support that affect his (the CINC) and the MAGTF'S


operational capability and sustainability. This will


include planning, directing, and monitoring common item


support as well as making appropriate arrangements for host


nation support requirements of USMC forces. Intimate


knowledge of sourcing, availability, transportability,


throughput and the ability to deliver replacement personnel


and logistics will be a critical function of the deployed


headquarters. This relates directly to the ability of the


deployed headquarters to consolidate, review, and validate


said requirements for replacement personnel and equipment as


well as planning, directing and monitoring force


reconstitution if required. This can be accomplished by


maintaining a constant dialogue with the MAGTF in theater


and remaining engaged as a staff in the CINC's future plans.


Development, recommendation, and review of rules of


engagement is another function levied on the deployed


headquarters. Knowledge of current and future operations in


theater can best be monitored by being on scene.


The forward deployed headquarters sole purpose is to operate


in support of the CINC, at the joint/ combined level, and in


support of the MAGTF commander conducting maneuver in




As such it will be incumbent on the remain behind staff


to take the lead on specific responsibilities in support of


that CINC (allowing the deployed headquarters to focus its


efforts in theater) as well as all functions/


responsibilities to other CINCs to which the headquarters is


assigned. These specific functions in support of the CINCs


should include, conducting joint training, because any


crisis short of one or more MRC's will necessitate


continuance of JCS and CINC directed exercises throughout


the world. This staff needs to remain dedicated to


developing program and budget requests that comply with CINC


guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities as well


as informing the CINC of such decisions that could affect


future operational and contingency planning. There are a


multitude of service peculiar functions that the remain


behind staff should take responsibility for such as,


networking and coordinating with HQMC, the other USMC


component commander, the supporting establishment and the


Reserves. They must continue training in USMC service


doctrine, tactics and techniques as well as performing


service peculiar intelligence functions.


There are a multitude of functions/ responsibilities that


will be inescapably shared between the forward deployed


headquarters and the remain behind staff. The performance


of these functions/responsibilities will commence well in


advance of any deployment, but must continue to be


accomplished in a transparent/seamless fashion during and


after the deployable headquarters is in theater. These


functions include identifying and validating shortfalls in


USMC forces and support to be sourced by other


services/agencies. Both headquarters must possess the


capability to source, coordinate and direct via global


sourcing the deployment of Marine forces into a designated


theater(s). They must be able to consolidate and validate


deployment priorities consistent with the CINC's guidance,


then develop and monitor both deployment and redeployment


requirements and plans. Lastly, they must direct force


deployment and then commensurate with the cessation of


hostilities redeploy those forces.


My recommendations on those functions performed by the


warfighter that should be performed by the either the


deployed headquarters or the remain behind staff does not


fit nicely into an either/or category. The warfighter knows


best what functions he needs to perform on the battlefield


in order to best accomplish the mission. Therefore, there


are functions which the warfighter should retain, but the


deployed component headquarters and the remain behind staff


should take a proactive role in assisting the warfigter in


the performance of these functions above all others.


The first is that of enemy prisoner of war (EPW)


processing. The Gulf War experience taught everyone some


sobering lessons on the burden placed on combat units


responsible for handling EPWs. The deployed staff needs to


assist the warfighter in establishing and implementing


custody, handling, accountability and transfer procedures.


They need to establish and make manning arrangements for


collection and holding facilities far removed from the front


lines as EPWs are evacuated rearward. This will involve but


not be limited to ensuring coordination of transportation,


further interrogation, health care and administrative




A second area wherein the deployed headquarters can


provide tremendous assistance to the warfighter is in the


area of intelligence, particularly national/theater


collection assets. Through detailed coordination with the


warfighter the component headquarters can request and


coordinate via the CINC all requirements for assets. With


the warfighter's concurrence the component headquarters can


recommend allocation of intelligence resources, collection


and production tasking. Additionally, in coordination with


the warfighter the headquarters can formulate, prioritize


and validate requirements for assets thus freeing up the


warfighter's intelligence personnel for more pressing




The last area is that of target analysis, validation


and bomb damage assessment(BDA). Here again, the Gulf War


produced some painful lessons for the warfighting staff and


their ability to conduct proper target analysis, then


validate those targets prior to conducting air strikes and


subsequently receive timely BDA in order to reassess the


requirement to restrike targets if necessary. The component


headquarters can provide an invaluable service to the


warfighter by way of personnel and resources to assist in


this area.


The Marine Corps will eventually achieve it's goal of


full componency. As the Marine Corps works toward this end


it must continue to build component headquarters that are


lean, yet capable. These headquarters must be adequately


trained and equipped to support a multitude of CINCs, as


well as a Marine warfighter from a number of potential


locations during wartime. This means that each staff will


be required to perform a multitude of functions individually


and collectively in order to accomplish the mission. This


will not be an easy task, but the time to organize and train


is now, not when the balloon goes up and rounds are going


down range.



Appendix A

*Advising the CINC on proper employment of forces of

the service component

*Accomplishing assigned operational missions

*Selecting and nominating units of the parent service

for assignment to another subordinate force

*Conducting joint training

*Informing the CINC of plans for changes in logistics

support that affect the CINC's operational capability

or sustainability

*Developing programs and budget requests that comply

with CINC guidance on warfighting requirements and


*Informing the CINC of program and budget decisions

that could possibly affect operational and contingency


The doctrine also indicates that CINC service

components have responsibilities to their own services

which include:

*Providing internal administration and discipline

*Training in service's doctrine, tactics, and


*Performing logistics functions that are standard to

the command (except when otherwise directed by the


*Performing service intelligence functions



Appendix B

Peacetime Functions

*Represent USMC interests- Represent, or be an advocate

for Marine Corps interests in the theater- Make

recommendation to the CINC on proper employment of

Marine Forces.

*Coordinate USMC plans and policies with CINC, other

components and warfighters- For example, policies on

reserve augmentation support would need to be

articulated to the CINC.

*Provide administrative support-Ensure administrative

support exists and/or provide support to all assigned

and apportioned Marines in theater. Peacetime support

includes maintaining service records, payment of

personnel, receiving, controlling and storing

classified material etc.

*Provide logistic support-Ensure logistics support

exists and/or provide logistics support to all Marines

in theater. Monitor and assess logistics posture of

Marines in theater, identify requirements for

storage of supplies and war reserves, and coordinate

MPF activities of required.

*Participate in deliberate planning process:



-supporting plans and annexes

*Participate in Planning, Programming and Budgeting

System- assess impact of OSD budget decisions on Marine

Corps capabilities. Inform and advise CINC when

decisions affect operational and contingency

planning and readiness. Prepare and submit budget

proposals in support of Marine activities in theater.

*Coordinate training in area of responsibility

*Implement CINC's guidance for administration logistics

and training

*Develop memorandums of agreement (MOA) and memorandums

of understanding (MOU)

*Participate in negotiations for wartime host nations

support or interservice agreements

*Participate in working groups and committees

Wartime Functions

*Represent Marine Corps interests-Make recommendations

to the CINC or proper employment of Marine Forces in

support of future plans

*Coordinate with other components-coordinate with other

service components on joint/ combined boards/ agencies.

*Coordinate with warfighter- To include, as required,

operational(e.g. planning) matters

*Coordinate logistics support- coordinate release of

war reserve materials. Arrange for inter theater

transfer of equipment from supporting CINC theaters and

locating lost shipments

*Perform RSO duties- Provide for receipt, staging and

onward movement of assigned or apportioned forces

*Provide administrative support to Marines in theater-

To include, all the peacetime support functions and

ensuring hostile pay, arranging emergency leave, and

supporting hospitalized Marines

*Implement CINC's guidance in administration,

logistics, and training

*Participate in CINC future planning- Actively

participate in CINC future planning cell. Advocate

USMC warfighters interests. Coordinate planning with


*Serve as a nucleus of a JTF headquarters- Provide the

nucleus of a JTF headquarters when required. Prepare

for augmentation, as required. In coordination with

augmentees, perform functions of a JTF headquarters to

include: planning deployment, employment,

sustainment, and redeployment; assisting JFC in

directing, controlling, and coordinating planning

activities of the subordinate component commands;

developing courses of actions and staff

estimates, etc.

*Coordinate MOAs and MOUs

*Perform remain behind functions- Perform peacetime

component functions as required. These functions would

be in support of a service component headquarters in

wartime and would encompass ongoing service component

responsibilities in theater. These functions include

providing inputs to the CINCs integrated priority list

and participating in the deliberate planning cycle.

These functions also include supporting other

combatants CINCs that the component headquarters have

obligations too. Remain behind functions also

include providing support to the warfighter.

Transition to War Functions

*Participate in Crisis Action Team (CAT) -Develop/

modify plans for Marine Forces based upon situation and

liaison with CAT

*Participate in planning and working groups

*Monitor/ provide Marine JOPES/TPFDD input- Monitor

flow of Marine forces into theater. Continue

coordination with warfighter

*Transition from the peacetime to wartime headquarters.

Arrange for the personnel and equipment necessary to

perform wartime functions. Deploy to theater as







Center for Naval Analyses. Developing a Concept for Maine

Service Component Headquarters. Study. CRM 93-132,

June 1994.


Center for Naval Analyses. Joint Doctrine on Service

Component Headquarters. Study. CIM 310, February



Commandant, United States Marine Corps. Message to Major

Subordinate Commands. Subject: "Organization and

Functions of Marine Component Command Headquarters."

041950Z February 1992.


Commandant, United States Marine Corps. Message to Major

Subordinate Commands. Subject: "Marine Service

Component Commands." 011952Z September 1992.


Componency Command and Control (C2) Working Group Meeting.

Developing a Concept for Command and Control of a

Marine Service Component Headquarters, 11-13 October

1994. C393. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Combat

Development Command, 1994.


Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication (FMFRP) 14-32

(Coordinating Draft). A Concept for Command and

Control Capabilities of the CINC USMC Service Component

Headquarters. Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps.

January 1995.


Headquarters, U.S. Marine Forces, Atlantic. Separation of

U.S. Marine Forces, Atlantic and II Marine

Expeditionary Force Staff Functions, 1995: Policy

Memorandum 1-95. Camp Lejuene, NC: Commander, U.S.

Marine Forces, Atlantic, 1995.


Headquarters, U.S. Marine Forces, Pacific. Observations

from Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens 1993 (UFL 93). Study.

October 1993.


JCS Publication (JCS) Pub. 2. Unified Action Armed Forces

(UNAAF). Washington, DC: The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

December 1986.



1. Commandant, United States Marine Corps, Message 041950Z Feb 1992, Organization and Functions

of Marine Component Command Headquarters(U), Unclassified.


2. Commandant, United States Marine Corps, Message 011952Z Sep 1992, Marine Corps service

Component Commands (U), Unclassified. This message also appoints COMMARFORPAC as the designated

service component commander to Commander, U.S. Forces Korea (COMUSFORKOREA).


3. Developing a Concept for the Marine Corps Service Component Headquarters (Alexandria, Va:

Center for Naval Analyses) p. 1.


4. Joint Chiefs of Staff Publication, JCS Pub. 2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAFF) (Washington,

D.C: Joint Chiefs of Staff) p. 3-24.


5. Ibid., pp. 3-25-26.


6. "Developing a Concept for the Marine Corps Service Headquarters" (Alexandria, Va: Center for

Naval Analyses) p. 16.


7. Ibid., pp. 6-7.


8. Ibid., p. 8.


9. FMFRP 14-32 (Coordinating Draft) A concept for Command and Control Capabilities of a CINC

USMC Service Component Headquarters, 12 January 1995 p. 1-2.


10. E-mail from Colonel Robert P. Mauskapf, Executive Assistant, COMMARFORLANT, 14 March



11. FMFRP 14-32, p. 3.


12. Ibid., p. 1.


Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list