The Marine Component Headquarters and Wartime Functions
CSC 1995
SUBJECT AREA - Manpower
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title: The Marine Component Headquarters and Wartime
Functions
Author: Major J.S. Mitchell, United States Marine Corps
Thesis: The Marine service component headquarters need to
be lean, but fully capable of performing a variety of
functions in support of the CINC and the Marine warfighter
during a wartime scenario.
Background: The Desert Shield/Desert Storm experience led
the Marine Corps to consider establishing separate Marine
service component headquarters for each unified CINC. In
February 1992 the Commandant released a message proposing a
review of the functions and capabilities required of a
component headquarters as well as proposing that Fleet
Marine Forces Atlantic and Pacific be designated as the
Marine service component headquarters. In a September 1992
the Commandant formally established these service component
commands. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command
requested that the Center for Naval Analyses conduct a study
on CINC service component concepts for the Marine Corps.
The study team made several recommendations on service
component structure and functions. The Marine Corps Force
Structure Planning Group developed an additional list of
functions and made structure recommendations. To these
lists were added unified command requirements for functions
required of a service component. Since then the Marine
component commands have wrestled with the issues of
structure and function. It has been an evolutionary
process and great strides have been made, but there are
milestones yet to be reached.The size and organization of
staffs has yet to be resolved. The division of labor within
the component headquarters and the prevention of bleed over
or duplication of functions with the warfighter require
continuous refinement.
Recommendations: The Marine component headquarters need to
be fully represented at each of the unified commands. The
staffs must be lean, but fully capable (with augmentation)
of performing their mission during wartime. A definite
division of labor needs to exist with the component
headquarters and with the warfighter during wartime.
The Marine Component Headquarters and Wartime Functions
In February 1992, the Commandant of the Marine Corps
(CMC) released a message proposing a "...thorough review of
the functions and capabilities required [of a service
component] headquarters.1 The message also proposed that
the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force Pacific (CG,
FMFPAC) be the service component commander for USCINCPAC and
the designated service component commander for USCINCCENT.
The message further proposed that the Commanding General,
Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (CG, FMFLANT) be the service
component commander for USCINCLANT (now CINCUSACOM) and the
designated service component commander for USCINCEUR and
USCINCSOUTH. CMC formally established these service
component commands in September 1992.2 Since then the
Marine Corps has worked diligently at achieving full
componency. It has been an evolutionary process and there
are milestones yet to be reached. The Marine service
component headquarters need to be lean, but fully capable
of performing a variety of functions in support of the CINC
and the Marine warfighter from multiple locations during a
wartime scenario.
The Desert Shield/ Desert Storm experience led the
Marine Corps to consider establishing separate Marine
service component headquarters for each unified command.
In the Gulf, CG I MEF was dual-hatted as COMMARCENT, the
Marine component commander under USCINCCENT. CG, I MEF and
most of his staff were located at a forward headquarters.
Collocated with CINCCENT in Riyadh were a small staff and a
Marine two-star general officer. The fact that the other
services (except for the Navy) had larger staffs in Riyadh,
headed by three-star general officers, suggested that the
Marine Corps was not receiving equal representation and that
it should consider a similar structure.
Prior to this time separate service components did not
exist in the Marine Corps. Organizations that came close to
it, Fleet Marine Force Atlantic (FMFLANT), Fleet Marine
Force Europe (FMFEUR) (DESIGNATE) and Fleet Marine Force
Pacific (FMFPAC) were type commands under the Navy Service
Components.
Why did the Marine corps establish Marine component
commands? The answer is threefold. First, as already
stated, the Gulf War experience demonstrated the requirement
for a service component headquarters, collocated with the
unified command in theater separate from the MAGTF
warfighting commander. Secondly, a Marine component command
allowed for direct access to the unified commander and his
staff. This served to provide ever present Marine Corps
visibility and influence on the use of Marine Forces and
brought the Corps in line with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of
1986. Lastly, the establishment of Marine service component
commands brought the Corps more in line with the arrangement
at the service chief level. CMC had been a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff for sometime and this same arrangement
at the theater CINC level was desirable.
Within this context, the Marine Corps Combat
Development Command (MCCDC) requested that the Center for
Naval Analyses (CNA) perform a study on CINC service
component concepts for the Marine Corps.3 These concepts
were to include roles, missions and functions as well as
organizational structures for the headquarters.
The CNA study team first delineated roles, missions and
function of component headquarters in peacetime, wartime
and during transition to war. Secondly, the team identified
capabilities and deficiencies of the Marine Corps to perform
these roles. Lastly, the team developed and analyzed
courses of action to increase the ability of the Marine
Corps to take on these responsibilities. The results of the
study were published in June 1994 in a series of classified
and unclassified reports. The results of the have received
mixed reviews. For the record, it is worth reviewing in
broad terms the approach that the team used in their
analysis, to include issues that were beyond their scope and
needed to be resolved by the Marine Corps and some final
cautions that they put forward.
The team began their research by reviewing JCS Pub. 2,
Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). Joint doctrine defines
service component commands as consisting of the Service
component commander and all those individuals, units,
detachments, organizations and installations under his
command that have been assigned to the unified command.
Other individuals, units, detachments, organizations or
installations may operate directly under the service
component commander and should contribute to the mission of
the CINC.4 Additionally, UNAAF addresses service component
commanders having responsibilities that derive from their
positions in both the operational and Service chains of
command.5 These functions are listed at Appendix A.
It is appropriate to mention at this time that the
Marine Corps Force Structure Planning Group (FSPG) under
then, Brigadier General Krulak, also published a list of
functions for the service component headquarters. This list
briefly described the role of the service component
headquarters above and beyond those listed in UNAAF.6 It
stated that the component headquarters would be the primary
source for administrative and logistics support functions
combined with coordination and liaison functions. This
would serve to assist the warfighter by relieving him of
those functions not directly associated with warfighting.
Additionally, an even more expansive list emerged when joint
doctrine, coupled with the FSPG, was added to service
component functions and requirements derived from recent
exercises, contingencies and requirements from theater
CINCS. This last source is critical in that OPLANS,
CONPLANS, strategic plans and CINC policies hold the real
key to the requirements of service components.
Returning to the CNA study, there were several issues
that the team revealed requiring Marine Corps action. Among
them were: 1) the functions of the service component versus
other headquarters, 2) the size of the headquarters and 3)
the service component functions in support of a Joint Task
Force.7 The team also cautioned the Marine Corps that there
were certain steps that needed to be taken in order to
implement an effective headquarters. Along them were: 1)
the development of meaningful doctrine, 2) the pursuit of a
rigorous training program to teach this doctrine and 3) the
absolute requirement to overcome the warfighter bias on the
part of the component commander and staff.8
After conscientiously addressing the factors above, the
team used a requirements-based approach in the study to
develop concepts for a service component headquarters.
Functions were determined using a top-down approach, i.e.
that the theater CINC would establish the requirements for
their components. Consequently each theater CINC was
visited to collect data and, as stated earlier joint
doctrine, Marine Corps publications, exercise and
operational after-action reports were consulted.
Next, the team identified potential courses of action
for a service component headquarters. This was done using a
zero based approach meaning that all possible structures
were examined. Eight organizational structures were
identified for a headquarters. These structures covered the
spectrum of distance, both conceptual as well as physical
from the CINC. Each course of action contained a peacetime
and wartime component as well as a reference to a "cell" if
the service component had representation at the CINC. The
courses of action varied from those that were combined Navy
and Marine Corps in both peacetime and wartime to those that
were a full component staff (Marine only) that were
collocated with a CINC in peacetime and responsible to him
alone and also deployed with that CINC in time of crisis.
Once the courses of action were finalized each was assessed
with respect to their ability to perform the required
component functions. Then a theater by theater analysis was
performed and the results tallied.
As a final step, the study looked at the various costs
of implementing each of the courses of action by theater for
the Marine Corps overall. This yielded a list of options
with pros and cons for each. The study team also proposed a
method of selecting the best possible option for performing
the required service component functions.
In taking this approach the study traded depth for
scope. This was purposeful in that many different component
initiatives came up during the study and it was important to
consider every alternative. Another consequence was that
the study did not develop tables of organization and
equipment for the headquarters , nor did the team suggest
sources of augmentation for the headquarters in wartime.
During the course of the CNA study and even since its
release the two component headquarters have continued to
evolve into what they are today. Figure 1 depicts the
current Unified Combatant Commanders (CINCS) and the Marine
Service component headquarters relationship to each CINC.
Figure 1.
CINC Marine service component headquarters
(location) (location)
CINCPAC MARFORPAC
(Hawaii0 (Hawaii)
CINCUNC/CFC MARFORPAC as MARFORK (designate)
(Korea) (Hawaii)
CINCENT MARFORPAC as MARCENT (designate)
(Tampa) (Hawaii)
CINCUSACOM MARFORLANT as MARFORUSACOM
(Norfolk) (Camp Lejeune)
CINCSOUTH MARFORLANT as MARFORSOUTH (designate)
(Panama) (Camp Lejeune)
CINCEUR MARFORLANT as MARFOREUR (designate)
(Germany) (Camp Lejeune)
Under the current setup MARFORLANT is under the
Combatant Command (COCOM) of CINCUSACOM as a provider of
CONUS-based forces to other Combatant Commanders and
MARFORLANT is under the COCOM of CINCPAC. This is not to
say that the National Command Authority (NCA) will not
transfer COCOM of deploying forces to another CINC during
contingency or crisis operations.
The Marine Corps is still wrestling with service
componency and all that it entails. One indication of this
is that the Commanding General, MCCDC, chartered yet another
working group during the fall 1994 to develop a concept for
command and control of a Marine service component
headquarters. The group met in Quantico during October and
in January published FMFRP 14-32 (Coordinating Draft). This
document has yet to be staffed and approved as a concept.
The issue of command and control (C2) as it relates to
service components has amplified dramatically the increased
requirements for C2 capabilities at the headquarters that
are state of the art.
The component headquarters are also closing the gap on
those functions performed by the headquarters in peacetime,
wartime, during the transition to war and in relation to the
warfighter. I have included the CMA study functions at
Appendix B. These functions are currently being reevaluated
and it is my belief that this process will continue
indefinitely as the Marine Corps grows into full componency.
The most important group of functions listed are those
required of a service component command in wartime. After
all, these are the functions most often exercised in CINC
directed exercises, crisis, and contingencies. Ironically
these are the functions that still cause the greatest degree
of teeth gnashing at the service component/ warfighter
level. It is absolutely essential that the Marine Corps
come to terms with the division of labor and duplication of
effort between the service component/ warfighter in a
wartime setting. The Marine Corps must convince its
personnel that the roles of a service component- advising,
supplying, training etc.- are critical to accomplishing the
mission. Careful articulation of the functions of each
headquarters and more particularly, the division of labor
within the service component (remain behind staff vs.
forward deployed command element) will help prevent the
"bleeding over" of functions to the warfighter.
Having said this, both component commanders and their
staffs play a pivotal role in optimizing preparation and
employment of the combat power of committed Marine Forces.
It is imperative that each headquarters be structured,
staffed, equipped, augmented, and trained to provide the
required functions in an effective, efficient and timely
manner.
Before addressing functions and recommending who should
perform them in a wartime scenario certain considerations
need to be put on the table. There are three assumptions
relating to CINC's USMC Service Component Headquarters and
they are:9 1) One Major Regional Contingency (MRC)
deployment will involve at least partial mobilization of the
Reserves, 2) Two nearly simultaneous MRC's (involving two
deployed USMC Service Component Headquarters) will include
full mobilization of the Reserves and 3) the CINC's USMC
Service Component and the MAGTF will frequently perform
complimentary actions in certain functional areas, although
to differing degrees and with different perspectives (i.e.
different levels of deployment planning and support). When
hostilities begin the MAGTF will focus on employment of
operating forces on the battlefield and the component
headquarters will assume the responsibility for the support
and sustainment of the MAGTF.
Under existing plans MARFORLANT is a service component
without a MRC to plan for.10 In each of MARFORLANT's three
theaters there exists or soon will exist a MARFOR
(designate) at a minimum. MARFORLANT does not currently
envision a requirement to deploy a forward headquarters to
any locations other than where they have elements in place,
i.e. Stuttgart, Panama City, or Norfolk. In the event of a
near simultaneous MRC scenario however, this equation will
change and depending on the time/space line, the component
headquarters may have to deploy. To date MARFORLANT has
deployed several Joint Task Force Headquarters, but has not
exercised the capability of deploying the MARFOR
Headquarters. In actuality, if a requirement arose, a
portion of the MARFOR Headquarters would augment the
existing designate in theater in order to accomplish the
component mission while a remain behind staff would stay at
Camp Lejuene.
Conversely, MARFORPAC is intimately involved in
planning for multiple MRC's under the direction of two
CINC's (USCINCCENT and CINCCFC). To amplify, in the event
of general war on the Korean Peninsula, COMMARFORPAC would
be designated as Commander, Combined Marine Forces Command
(COMCMFC) and Commander, USMC Forces (COMUSMARFORK) when
designated. In this capacity MARFORPAC has actively
participated in Exercise Ulchi Focus Lens and has deployed a
headquarters under canvas in Hawaii with great success.
To date, both MARFOR's have made great strides toward
assuming their full roles as component headquarters, but
definite milestones have yet to be met.
The component headquarters must be lean, yet effective
organizations. Its functions are critical to the Marine
Corps capability in a joint warfighting environment.11
However, assets assigned to the component headquarters are
deducted from those available to the rest of the Marine
Corps. I believe there is a trade-off here. If the Marine
Corps fails to staff the designate headquarters for our
components with less than the requisite numbers of personnel
by grade, MOB, and experience level, the Corps ability to
gain an advantage and remain engaged at all levels of
planning will never be achieved. This may serve to alienate
the CINC and nullify the component commanders relationship
with that CINC during an actual crisis. Therefore, the
component staff must be lean, containing only those assets
and personnel needed on a full time or frequent basis. Less
frequent requirements should be met only when required for
execution and then, sourced from allocated assets; either
preplanned active duty augmentation and/or Reserve unit
support.
The likelihood of either MARFOR deploying their entire
headquarters as a USMC Component is remote. In fact, both
CINCUSACOM and USCINCPAC would have to deploy before this
would happen. The reality does exist for a level II
headquarters (something less than the entire staff, but
fully functional and capable of providing the full spectrum
of component functions) to deploy out of either or both
headquarters in a MRC x 2 scenario. This will create a
situation as described earlier wherein there is a deployed
headquarters supporting one CINC and a garrison remain
behind staff supporting that deployed headquarters as well
as retaining its responsibility to other assigned CINC's.
In that regard, what functions can be performed by the
remain behind staff? What functions are absolutely
required to be carried forward by the deployed command
element? Are their functions that should be shared between
the two staffs? Are there functions that the warfighter
(MEF) requires that could be performed by either the
deployed component command element or the remain behind
component staff?
Let's examine the functions/responsibilities of the
component headquarters. I will not address any of these
functions by individual staff section as that is beyond the
scope of this paper.
The deployed headquarters needs to advise the CINC on
the proper employment of Marine forces and represent the
interests of those forces with the CINC on a daily basis.
By this I mean proper mission assignment and maintenance of
the integrity of the MAGTF, whatever its size. The deployed
headquarters needs to be prepared to accomplish assigned
operational missions. I say this realizing the service
component at large is a provider of forces and sustainment,
focusing on support for the MAGTF (MEF) and providing an
interface with the CINC. However, on rare occasions the
deployed element may be directed to "employ forces".
Neither the headquarters itself nor its command and control
support elements are designed for this possibility.
Augmentation would be required. The deployed headquarters
needs to inform the CINC of plans for changes in logistics
support that affect his (the CINC) and the MAGTF'S
operational capability and sustainability. This will
include planning, directing, and monitoring common item
support as well as making appropriate arrangements for host
nation support requirements of USMC forces. Intimate
knowledge of sourcing, availability, transportability,
throughput and the ability to deliver replacement personnel
and logistics will be a critical function of the deployed
headquarters. This relates directly to the ability of the
deployed headquarters to consolidate, review, and validate
said requirements for replacement personnel and equipment as
well as planning, directing and monitoring force
reconstitution if required. This can be accomplished by
maintaining a constant dialogue with the MAGTF in theater
and remaining engaged as a staff in the CINC's future plans.
Development, recommendation, and review of rules of
engagement is another function levied on the deployed
headquarters. Knowledge of current and future operations in
theater can best be monitored by being on scene.
The forward deployed headquarters sole purpose is to operate
in support of the CINC, at the joint/ combined level, and in
support of the MAGTF commander conducting maneuver in
theater.12
As such it will be incumbent on the remain behind staff
to take the lead on specific responsibilities in support of
that CINC (allowing the deployed headquarters to focus its
efforts in theater) as well as all functions/
responsibilities to other CINCs to which the headquarters is
assigned. These specific functions in support of the CINCs
should include, conducting joint training, because any
crisis short of one or more MRC's will necessitate
continuance of JCS and CINC directed exercises throughout
the world. This staff needs to remain dedicated to
developing program and budget requests that comply with CINC
guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities as well
as informing the CINC of such decisions that could affect
future operational and contingency planning. There are a
multitude of service peculiar functions that the remain
behind staff should take responsibility for such as,
networking and coordinating with HQMC, the other USMC
component commander, the supporting establishment and the
Reserves. They must continue training in USMC service
doctrine, tactics and techniques as well as performing
service peculiar intelligence functions.
There are a multitude of functions/ responsibilities that
will be inescapably shared between the forward deployed
headquarters and the remain behind staff. The performance
of these functions/responsibilities will commence well in
advance of any deployment, but must continue to be
accomplished in a transparent/seamless fashion during and
after the deployable headquarters is in theater. These
functions include identifying and validating shortfalls in
USMC forces and support to be sourced by other
services/agencies. Both headquarters must possess the
capability to source, coordinate and direct via global
sourcing the deployment of Marine forces into a designated
theater(s). They must be able to consolidate and validate
deployment priorities consistent with the CINC's guidance,
then develop and monitor both deployment and redeployment
requirements and plans. Lastly, they must direct force
deployment and then commensurate with the cessation of
hostilities redeploy those forces.
My recommendations on those functions performed by the
warfighter that should be performed by the either the
deployed headquarters or the remain behind staff does not
fit nicely into an either/or category. The warfighter knows
best what functions he needs to perform on the battlefield
in order to best accomplish the mission. Therefore, there
are functions which the warfighter should retain, but the
deployed component headquarters and the remain behind staff
should take a proactive role in assisting the warfigter in
the performance of these functions above all others.
The first is that of enemy prisoner of war (EPW)
processing. The Gulf War experience taught everyone some
sobering lessons on the burden placed on combat units
responsible for handling EPWs. The deployed staff needs to
assist the warfighter in establishing and implementing
custody, handling, accountability and transfer procedures.
They need to establish and make manning arrangements for
collection and holding facilities far removed from the front
lines as EPWs are evacuated rearward. This will involve but
not be limited to ensuring coordination of transportation,
further interrogation, health care and administrative
processing.
A second area wherein the deployed headquarters can
provide tremendous assistance to the warfighter is in the
area of intelligence, particularly national/theater
collection assets. Through detailed coordination with the
warfighter the component headquarters can request and
coordinate via the CINC all requirements for assets. With
the warfighter's concurrence the component headquarters can
recommend allocation of intelligence resources, collection
and production tasking. Additionally, in coordination with
the warfighter the headquarters can formulate, prioritize
and validate requirements for assets thus freeing up the
warfighter's intelligence personnel for more pressing
duties.
The last area is that of target analysis, validation
and bomb damage assessment(BDA). Here again, the Gulf War
produced some painful lessons for the warfighting staff and
their ability to conduct proper target analysis, then
validate those targets prior to conducting air strikes and
subsequently receive timely BDA in order to reassess the
requirement to restrike targets if necessary. The component
headquarters can provide an invaluable service to the
warfighter by way of personnel and resources to assist in
this area.
The Marine Corps will eventually achieve it's goal of
full componency. As the Marine Corps works toward this end
it must continue to build component headquarters that are
lean, yet capable. These headquarters must be adequately
trained and equipped to support a multitude of CINCs, as
well as a Marine warfighter from a number of potential
locations during wartime. This means that each staff will
be required to perform a multitude of functions individually
and collectively in order to accomplish the mission. This
will not be an easy task, but the time to organize and train
is now, not when the balloon goes up and rounds are going
down range.
Appendix A
*Advising the CINC on proper employment of forces of
the service component
*Accomplishing assigned operational missions
*Selecting and nominating units of the parent service
for assignment to another subordinate force
*Conducting joint training
*Informing the CINC of plans for changes in logistics
support that affect the CINC's operational capability
or sustainability
*Developing programs and budget requests that comply
with CINC guidance on warfighting requirements and
priorities
*Informing the CINC of program and budget decisions
that could possibly affect operational and contingency
planning
The doctrine also indicates that CINC service
components have responsibilities to their own services
which include:
*Providing internal administration and discipline
*Training in service's doctrine, tactics, and
techniques
*Performing logistics functions that are standard to
the command (except when otherwise directed by the
CINC)
*Performing service intelligence functions
Appendix B
Peacetime Functions
*Represent USMC interests- Represent, or be an advocate
for Marine Corps interests in the theater- Make
recommendation to the CINC on proper employment of
Marine Forces.
*Coordinate USMC plans and policies with CINC, other
components and warfighters- For example, policies on
reserve augmentation support would need to be
articulated to the CINC.
*Provide administrative support-Ensure administrative
support exists and/or provide support to all assigned
and apportioned Marines in theater. Peacetime support
includes maintaining service records, payment of
personnel, receiving, controlling and storing
classified material etc.
*Provide logistic support-Ensure logistics support
exists and/or provide logistics support to all Marines
in theater. Monitor and assess logistics posture of
Marines in theater, identify requirements for
storage of supplies and war reserves, and coordinate
MPF activities of required.
*Participate in deliberate planning process:
-OPLANS/CONPLANS
-JOPES/TPFDD
-supporting plans and annexes
*Participate in Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System- assess impact of OSD budget decisions on Marine
Corps capabilities. Inform and advise CINC when
decisions affect operational and contingency
planning and readiness. Prepare and submit budget
proposals in support of Marine activities in theater.
*Coordinate training in area of responsibility
*Implement CINC's guidance for administration logistics
and training
*Develop memorandums of agreement (MOA) and memorandums
of understanding (MOU)
*Participate in negotiations for wartime host nations
support or interservice agreements
*Participate in working groups and committees
Wartime Functions
*Represent Marine Corps interests-Make recommendations
to the CINC or proper employment of Marine Forces in
support of future plans
*Coordinate with other components-coordinate with other
service components on joint/ combined boards/ agencies.
*Coordinate with warfighter- To include, as required,
operational(e.g. planning) matters
*Coordinate logistics support- coordinate release of
war reserve materials. Arrange for inter theater
transfer of equipment from supporting CINC theaters and
locating lost shipments
*Perform RSO duties- Provide for receipt, staging and
onward movement of assigned or apportioned forces
*Provide administrative support to Marines in theater-
To include, all the peacetime support functions and
ensuring hostile pay, arranging emergency leave, and
supporting hospitalized Marines
*Implement CINC's guidance in administration,
logistics, and training
*Participate in CINC future planning- Actively
participate in CINC future planning cell. Advocate
USMC warfighters interests. Coordinate planning with
warfighters.
*Serve as a nucleus of a JTF headquarters- Provide the
nucleus of a JTF headquarters when required. Prepare
for augmentation, as required. In coordination with
augmentees, perform functions of a JTF headquarters to
include: planning deployment, employment,
sustainment, and redeployment; assisting JFC in
directing, controlling, and coordinating planning
activities of the subordinate component commands;
developing courses of actions and staff
estimates, etc.
*Coordinate MOAs and MOUs
*Perform remain behind functions- Perform peacetime
component functions as required. These functions would
be in support of a service component headquarters in
wartime and would encompass ongoing service component
responsibilities in theater. These functions include
providing inputs to the CINCs integrated priority list
and participating in the deliberate planning cycle.
These functions also include supporting other
combatants CINCs that the component headquarters have
obligations too. Remain behind functions also
include providing support to the warfighter.
Transition to War Functions
*Participate in Crisis Action Team (CAT) -Develop/
modify plans for Marine Forces based upon situation and
liaison with CAT
*Participate in planning and working groups
*Monitor/ provide Marine JOPES/TPFDD input- Monitor
flow of Marine forces into theater. Continue
coordination with warfighter
*Transition from the peacetime to wartime headquarters.
Arrange for the personnel and equipment necessary to
perform wartime functions. Deploy to theater as
required
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8. Ibid., p. 8.
9. FMFRP 14-32 (Coordinating Draft) A concept for Command and Control Capabilities of a CINC
USMC Service Component Headquarters, 12 January 1995 p. 1-2.
10. E-mail from Colonel Robert P. Mauskapf, Executive Assistant, COMMARFORLANT, 14 March
1995.
11. FMFRP 14-32, p. 3.
12. Ibid., p. 1.
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