Reorganizing The Fleet Marine Force: From Division-Wing Teams To Marine Expeditionary Brigades
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Manpower
Command and Staff College
Marine Corps Combat Development Center
Quantico, Virginia
Reorganizing the Fleet Marine Force:
From Division-Wing Teams to Marine Expeditionary Brigades
Major Joseph H. Schmid, U. S. Marine Corps
15 May 1989
ABSTRACT
NAME: MAJOR JOSEPH H. SCHMID, USMC
TITLE: REORGANIZING THE FLEET MARINE FORCES:
FROM DIVSION-WING TEAMS TO MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADES
DATE: 9 JUNE 1989
This paper proposes reorganizing the Fleet Marine Forces
around permanent Marine Expeditionary Brigades. After reviewing
the current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces down to the
battalion and squadron level, a discussion of the problems
arising out of the current organization is offered. The
reorganization plan has two goals--to resolve the problems with
the current organization and to reduce the number of headquarters.
A reduction in the number of headquarters would allow conversion
of the associated manpower structure to that for warfighting
elements. The proposed organization is analyzed from the
perspective of its impact on the the ground combat element, the
air combat element, the combat service support element, the
command element, manpower structure, and on Title 10, United
States Code.
The paper concludes that reorganization to permanent Marine
Expeditionary Brigades is possible without a reduction in mission
capabilities. The conclusion summarizes both the problems
resolved by the proposed plan and those left unresolved.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
List of Figures iii
Preface iv
Chapter
I. Introduction 1
Current Organization of the Fleet Marine Forces 1
Statement of the Problem 7
Statement of the Proposal 15
II. Analysis 21
Impact on Ground Combat Element 21
Impact on Aviation Combat Element 28
Impact on Combat Service Support Element 42
Impact on Command Element 44
Impact on Manpower Structure 47
Impact on Public Law 52
III. Conclusions 56
Figures 58
Anotated Bibliography 78
LIST OF FIGURES
Page
1. Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic 58
2. 2d Marine Division 59
3. 2d Marine Aircraft Wing 60
4. 2d Force Service Support Group 61
5. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 62
6. I Marine Expeditionary Force 63
7. 1st Marine Division 64
8. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing 65
9. 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade 66
10. III Marine Expeditionary Brigade 67
11. 3d Marine Division 68
12. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 69
13. I and II Marine Expeditionary Force (proposed) 70
14. III Marine Expeditionary Force (proposed) 71
15. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Amphibious) 72
(proposed)
16. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Maritime 73
Prepositioning Force) (proposed)
17. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Reserve 74
Mobilization) (proposed)
18. Aviation Organization (proposed) 75
19. Brigade Service Support Group (proposed) 76
20. Distribution of Enlisted Marines 77
21. Distribution of Marine Officers 77
PREFACE
This paper proposes reorganizing the Fleet Marine Forces
into Marine Expeditionary Brigades. In analyzing the effect of
this proposal, the focus was on the manpower structure depicted
in Tables of Organization for Fleet Marine Force units. The
analysis of this proposal was admittedly limited in several ways.
First, the Tables of Equipment were not examined; thus, the
effect of this proposal on unit equipment was not addressed.
The political consequences of billet reductions within the Fleet
Marine Forces were also not considered. The effect on manpower
structure by programmed-weapons systems was not included in this
analysis.
Sources for this paper ranged from published articles and
books to official Marine Corps documents, memoranda and personal
letters. Documents and memoranda were obtained from staff
copies. Personal letters from representatives of the Commanders-
in-Chief of the Unified Commands were in response to requests
from the author. Citations for sources are keyed to the
bibliography entry number and source page number. A citation
such as (40-31) refers to entry 40 in the bibliography, page 31.
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Current Organization of the Fleet Marine Forces
The organizations of the Fleet Marine Forces vary between
the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. However, there are some
command relationships that are similar to each. Regardless of
the fleet, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, is a
type commander responsible for the administration and training
of all of his subordinate units. The subordinate units of the
Fleet Marine Forces come under the operational control of the
Commanders- in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic or Pacific Fleets, when
deployed.
Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic is organized as shown in
Figure 1. Reporting directly to the Commanding General, Fleet
Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLant) are the Commanding General,
II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and the Commanding
Officers of three Marine Expeditionary Units (22d, 24th, 26th
MEU's). The Commanding General, II MEF, exercises operational
control over the 2d Marine Division, the 2d Marine Aircraft
Wing, the 2d Force Service Support Group, the 4th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, and the 6th Marine Expeditionary
Brigade (MEB). Each of these commands have standing
headquarters, or "command elements" as they are known in
Marine jargon.
However, the 2d Marine Division, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing,
and 2d Force Service Support Group are the only major
subordinate commands that have permanently assigned forces.
The Marine Expeditionary Brigades and the Marine Expeditionary
Units have designated forces. Designated forces are
squadrons, battalions, and companies that are earmarked for
deployment with Marine Expeditionary Brigades and Units.
These designated forces remain under the command and control
of their parent command until deployment, at which time
command and control is shifted. This double counting is not
limited to just the operating forces. The Commanding
General, FMFLant, is "double-hatted" as Commanding General,
II MEF. The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division, is also
"double-hatted" as Deputy Commander, II MEF.
The major subordinate commands of II MEF have fairly
traditional organizations. The Second Marine Division is
organized as shown in Figure 2. This is the standard
divisional organization of a headquarters battalion, three
infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and five
independent battalions - assault amphibian, combat engineer,
light armored infantry, reconnaissance, and tank. Recent
decisions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps have changed
the internal organization of many of the battalions within the
Marine Division in order to enhance the combat readiness of
those units (1). Among these changes were the placing in
cadre the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, adding scout infantrymen
to and redesignating the Light Armored Vehicle Battalion as
the Light Armored Infantry Battalion, adding a fourth rifle
company to each of the battalions in 8th Marines, and
reassigning the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines from the 3d Marine
Division to the 2d Marine Division.
The Second Marine Aircraft Wing does not have a table of
organization since, by doctrine, it is task organized to
perform the six functions of Marine aviation - assault
support, offensive air support, aerial reconnaissance,
electronic warfare, anti-air warfare, and control of aircraft
and missiles. However, like all Marine Aircraft Wings, it has
a Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron, a Marine Wing Support
Group, a Marine Air Control Group, and aircraft groups
composed of helicopter, attack, and fighter aircraft, as shown
in Figure 3. The Second Force Service Support Group (FSSG) is
organized, as all FSSG's are, into eight battalions, each
fulfilling one of the eight functions of combat service
support. This organization is clearly shown in Figure 4.
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), has units spread
across the Pacific Ocean and, thus, does not have as neat
organizational charts as its counterpart in the Atlantic.
Reporting directly to the Commanding General, FMFPac, are the
Commanding Generals, I Marine Expeditionary Force and 1st
Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The Commanding General, III
Marine Expeditionary Force, is forward deployed to Okinawa,
Japan, and is under the operational control of the Commander,
U.S. 7th Fleet, and under the administrative control of the
Commanding General, FMFPac. These command relationships are
shown in Figure 5.
Major subordinate commands of I MEF are the 1st Marine
Division, 1st Force Service Support Group, 3rd Marine Aircraft
Wing, 5th and 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigades, and the 11th,
13th, and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units. The organization
of the 1st Marine Division is shown in Figure 7. The Division
has a structure similar to that of 2d Marine Division. The
notable exception is that 1st Marine Division has four rifle
companies in each infantry battalion. Like the 2d Marine
Division, the 1st Marine Division also had to place an
infantry battalion in cadre to provide the fourth rifle
company to the battalions in the 1st Marine Regiment.
However, the fourth battalion in each regiment was obtained by
permanently reassigning four battalions from the 3d Marine
Division to the 1st Marine Division.
Third Marine Aircraft Wing is task organized as shown in
Figure 8. Performing the same functions as the 2d Marine
Aircraft Wing, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing also has control,
support and aircraft groups. However, the number of fighter,
attack, and helicopter groups and squadrons differs between
the two wings.
As with II MEF, only the 1st Marine Division, 1st Force
Service Support Group, and the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing have
forces permanently assigned. The Expeditionary Brigades and
Units, similar to those in II MEF, have forces only designated
for their use. As with II MEF, the Commanding Generals are
also "double hatted" in I MEF. The Commanding General, I MEF
is also the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. The
Commanding General, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is the
Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division. The
Commanding General, 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is
also the base commander at the Marine Corps Air-Ground
Training Center, 29 Palms, California. The Commanding
Officer, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is also serves as
Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command,
Pacific.
The First Marine Expeditionary Brigade, located at
Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, is the only expeditionary brigade with
forces permanently assigned. It is composed of a regimental
landing team, a Marine Aircraft Group, and a Brigade Service
Support Group, as shown is Figure 9. The regimental landing
team has three infantry battalions and an artillery battalion.
The Marine Aircraft Group has four medium helicopter
squadrons, one heavy helicopter squadron, one light/attack
helicopter detachment, four fighter squadrons, and a Marine
Air Control Squadron. Although designated as a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, the 1st MEB, with its assigned forces,
does not have the combat capability of any of the other
expeditionary brigades with their designated forces. The
assigned forces do not reflect the table of organization for
the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade's mission.
III Marine Expeditionary Force, the forward deployed MEF
in the Western Pacific, has the most inferior combat power of
any of the expeditionary forces. As shown in Figure 10, III
MEF is composed of 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft
Wing, 3d Force Service Support Group, and 9th Marine
Expeditionary Brigade. III MEF is the only expeditionary
force that does not man forward deployed expeditionary units.
However, the MEU's from I MEF, when forward deployed, come
under the operational control of the Commanding General, III
MEF. Like the expeditionary brigades in the other MEF's, 9th
Marine Expeditionary Brigade is merely a headquarters with
forces designated to it. Of the other major subordinate
commands, only 3d Force Service Support Group is of
comparable size and organization to its companion groups in
the other MEF's.
The organizations of the 3d Marine Division and the 1st
Marine Aircraft Wing are depicted in Figures 11 and 12,
respectively. 3d Marine Division has only two infantry
regiments with two battalions each. Each of these infantry
battalions is permanently assigned to either the 1st or the 2d
Marine Division and is serving with the 3d Marine Division on
a six-month deployment in accordance with the Unit Deployment
Program. The Division's artillery regiment has only two
direct support battalions and has a general support battalion
equipped with towed 155mm howitzers vice a general support
battalion equipped with self-propelled 155mm howitzers and
self-propelled 8-inch guns. Among the independent battalions,
1st Armored Assault Battalion is composed of two tank
companies and two amphibious assault companies. The other
divisions have tank and amphibious assault battalions, each
with four companies.
First Marine Aircraft Wing is similarly understrength
compared to the other aircraft wings. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
has fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft groups, a support group,
and a control group. However, among these groups the Wing has
only two fighter, one attack, one all-weather attack, one
medium helicopter, one heavy helicopter, and one light/attack
helicopter squadron.
Statement of the Problem
The 1985-1989 Five Year Defense Plan Guidance, in an
effort to ensure a credible amphibious warfare capability,
established a requirement to simultaneously lift the assault
echelons of a MEF and of a MEB (17-i). To lift the assault
echelon of a MEF today would require all of the amphibious
assets in both the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets. However,
each Fleet does have sufficient assets to lift the assault
echelon of a MEB. Thus, the largest combat force with which
the Marine Corps could conduct a timely amphibious assault in
either the Atlantic or the Pacific Fleet is a Marine
Expeditionary Brigade. As a result of this amphibious lift
constraint, the Marine Corps has debated the dilemma of
deploying as a MEB and employing as a MEF, or as it has been
called, the composite MEF.
Compounding this dilemma are other factors affecting the
way the Marine Corps is organized and trained for combat. One
of the most significant is the anticipated reduction in the
Marine Corps budget for the next several years. Less money
necessitates decreased manpower and decreased training
expenses. At the same time, the theater commanders-in-chief
have levied requirements on the Marine Corps for increased
joint service planning and increased responsiveness to the
call for deployment. Lastly, the Marine Corps has adopted a
new warfighting philosophy to enable it to win outnumbered on
any battlefield in the future.
The current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces is
incompatible with the resolution to these problems. This
leads to four problems:
1. Efficiency in responding to the call of the theater
commanders-in-chief.
2. Synchronization with our view of the foreseeable future
3. Implementation of our maneuver warfare philosophy.
4. Wasteful use of scarce manpower assets.
In order to improve the responsiveness of a MAGTF to the
call of a theater commander-in-chief, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps approved in 1983 the permanent MAGTF headquarters
concept. Two specific concerns that formed the basis for this
were increased emphasis on rapid deployment of MAGTF's and
increased joint service planning commitments requiring
operational data from MAGTF's. This emphasis on rapid
deployment can not be overstated. The theater commanders-in-
chief require a Marine Expeditionary Brigade to be ready for
embarkation within four days of notification and a MEF within
ten days of notification (23,24,25,26). Although the object
of the permanent MAGTF headquarters concept was to eliminate
`ad-hocery' in time of crisis," it does not do so for the
combat elements of the MAGTF. Except for the case of the MEF,
the ground combat element must be task organized by
reinforcing an infantry unit with combat arms units
(artillery, combat engineer, light armored infantry,
reconnaissance, and tank) from the division. The aviation
combat element must be task organized to perform all six
functions of Marine aviation. This will require the task
organization of units from at least six different Groups. The
combat service support element must also task organize units
from eight different battalions. The permanent MAGTF
headquarters concept only eliminates "ad-hocery" within the
MAGTF command element which represents approximately 5% of the
personnel strength of the MAGTF.
This "ad-hocery" not only exists to form the MAGTF, but
also to employ it in combat. Under the composite MAGTF
concept, Marine Corps forces will deploy to a conflict as a
MEB and employ in combat as a MEF. Employment as a MEF will
necessitate bringing the MEF, division, wing, and FSSG
headquarters into the theater as soon as possible, or
designating some smaller unit as a "forward" headquarters.
Shortly after these "forward" headquarters are established,
the appropriate elements of the MAGTF will shift from the
command of the MEB to the command of the "forward"
headquarters. n the case of the MAGTF command elements,
one MEB headquarters is designated as the "forward leaning"
MEB, the first to deploy. The other MEB command element is
embedded in the MEF headquarters to ensure that the MEF and
MEB staffs are equally proficient in joint coordination with
the theater commanders-in-chief. However, the first MEB
command element to deploy is the one that has not had the
experience working with the commander-in-chief. To
rectify that problem, a portion of the MEF command element
will fly into the theater of conflict as soon as possible
and merge with the "forward leaning" MEB command element.
As a result, the MEF command element is composed of parts
of two different staffs who have not worked together.
division, wing, and FSSG headquarters The MAGTF Master
Plan was developed in 1989 to establish the "operational
foundation for the organization, manning, equipping,
training, and development of doctrine and operational
techniques for MAGTF's through the year 2000" (4-1.1). In
fulfilling this charter, the MAGTF Master Plan predicts the
types of operations that MAGTFs will execute in the
foreseeable future (4-5.1). The most common employments
for a MAGTF are stability operations and limited objective
operations. The probability of employment of a MAGTF in
conventional operations short of general war can be
described as only "may" occur during the next twenty years.
"General war is the armed conflict between major powers, in
which the total resources of the belligerents are employed
and the national survival of a major belligerent is in
jeopardy" (4-5.7). The United States has been involved in
two, and perhaps three, general wars in over 200 years--the
Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and World War II. Thus,
the least likely employment for a MAGTF is in a general
war.
The Haynes Board attempted to "develop alternative force
structures, concepts of employment, and disposition and
deployment of Marine Corps forces through 1985" (12). This
study concluded that our current organization of division-wing
teams is best suited for general war, but that an organization
based on Marine Expeditionary Brigades is best suited for
stability and limited objective operations. The study also
advocated that retaining the division-wing organization would
prevent infatuation with low intensity conflict mission and
avoid a commando mentality complex. However, the MAGTF Master
Plan states that MAGTF's must be prepared to perform commando
type mission such as "port and airfield seizures", "recovery
of downed aircraft, equipment, and personnel through
clandestine insertion of forces", "in-extremis hostage rescue
operations", and "counterterrorist operations" (5-5.3). Thus,
the current organization inhibits preparation for and
execution of the very missions for which a MAGTF is most
likely to be employed.
The Marine Corps has adopted a maneuver warfare
philosophy as its basic warfighting doctrine. This philosophy
holds that decentralized command is necessary to cope with the
uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat and to develop
the tempo of operations that we desire. Decentralized command
means that subordinates may make their own decisions based on
their understanding of their superior's intent. The ability
for seniors and subordinates to communicate through mutual
understanding and anticipating each other's thoughts is
essential for success under this doctrine. This implicit
communication is based on a shared philosophy and experience
which can only be developed through the familiarity and trust
that arises from established, long-term working relationships.
The current organization detracts from the establishment
of these habitual relationships. The "ad-hocery" necessary to
task organize the ground combat, the aviation combat, and the
combat service support elements prevents long-term, working
relationships between the commanders and their staffs. Yet,
it is in these very units that this decentralized command must
be exercised. A concern for the impact of constant turmoil on
the professional competence of the MAGTF headquarters staff
led to the decision to approve the permanent MAGTF
headquarters concept (22). Constant turmoil should have the
same effect on the professional competence of the staff of
each subordinate element of the MAGTF as it does on the
professional competence of the headquarters staff.
Not only does our current "ad-hocery" prevent long-term,
working relationships between the MAGTF commander and his
staff, but also between the MAGTF commander and his
subordinate commanders. Currently, forces are only designated
for employment with a particular MAGTF. Forces are assigned
to the parent division, wing, or FSSG and are subject to that
parent's commands. Thus, it is possible that a designated
unit may be assigned a mission by its parent commander
rendering it unavailable for employment with the MAGTF. For
example, units participating in a Combined Arms Exercise at 29
Palms, California, as directed by their parent division or
wing, would not be able to meet the embarkation response time
required by the theater commanders-in-chief. Thus, a
substitute unit would be deployed into combat without
the habitual relationships between commanders that
our warfighting doctrine deems necessary for success.
This unity of command issue has even greater significance
when considering the current practice of "dual hatting"
Commanding Generals. The Commanding General, Fleet Marine
Force, Atlantic, is also the Commanding General, II MEF. The
Commanding Generals of the 1st and the 3rd Marine Divisions
are also the Commanding Generals of I and III MEF,
respectively. Compounding the problem in III MEF is the fact
that the Assistant Division Commander is dual hatted as the
Commanding General of 9th MEB. Under our current concept of
deployment as a MEB and employment as a MEF, the MEF command
element falls in on the MEB command element. During that
period when the MEB is being composited to a MEF, the question
of who is commanding the Marine Division is not merely an
academic issue.
The Haynes Board, long before our warfighting doctrine
was published, espoused some of its basic tenets. According
to the Board, although a division-wing organization provided
flexibility, an organization built around brigades supported
the air-ground concept and enhanced training as an integrated
combined arms team. In summation, the Board stated that only
a combined arms team will win on the future battlefield (12).
The current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces is
characterized by redundant headquarters. There are MEB
command elements which will probably be called upon to command
the brigade during its initial, rapid deployment into the
theater of conflict. There are the MEF command elements that
exercise command over all the major subordinate commands.
Lastly, there are the major subordinate commands (division,
wing, FSSG) that are, according to the Haynes Board, ideally
suited for combat in the least likely level of conflict.
Both the Haynes Board and the Hogaboom Board (3)
recognized the concern for personnel and fiscal constraint.
The Hogaboom Board reported that "although the current
manpower availability was not the guiding or overriding
consideration" in their efforts to determine the organization
and composition of the Fleet Marine Forces beginning in 1958,
the Board did keep in mind "the practical background fact
that, in an era of rising military costs and limited personnel
availability, great weight must be given to the goal of
accomplishing more with less" (3). The Haynes Board also
addressed the personnel constraint issue. The Board concluded
that a brigade organization is effective when forced to reduce
personnel structure due to fiscal constraint. The Board went
on to say that 196,000 Marines are insufficient to support
three divisions and three aircraft wings. (On 30 September
1988, the personnel strength of the Marine Corps was 197,195
Marines.) The Haynes Board did, however, identify the
strongest argument for retention of the division-wing
organization. Section 5013, Title 10, United States Code
states that the Marine Corps "shall be so organized as to
include not less that three combat divisions and three air
wings..." (2-606).
Statement of the Proposal
To resolve the problems arising out of the existing
organization and to prepare for the 21st century, the Marine
Corps should reorganize the Fleet Marine Forces. This
reorganization should include three elements:
l. Permanently establish Marine Expeditionary Brigades
as the only major subordinate command of Marine Expeditionary
Forces.
2. Integrate a reserve, mobilization Marine
Expeditionary Brigade into two of the active Marine
Expeditionary Forces.
3. Transfer the manpower structure of superfluous
command elements to that of necessary combat elements.
Under this proposal, I and II MEF would have two active
duty MEB's, one mobilization MEB, and three MEU's. II MEF
would just two active duty MEB's. In each of the MEF's, one
MEB would fulfill the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)
mission while the other MEB would fulfill the amphibious
assault mission. The mobilization MEB would be manned by
Selected Marine Corps Reserve units. All MEB's and MEU's
would have permanently assigned forces. Each MEF would also
have a Force Troops unit. Within the context of this
proposal, Force Troops is not a major subordinate command as
in days of old, but merely a collective title for units not
assigned to a MEB. Each MEF would retain its geographical
orientation: II MEF - Europe, III MEF - Asia, and I MEF -
global reserve. Figures 13 and 14 depict the proposed
organizational charts for I and II Marine Expeditionary Forces
and III Marine Expeditionary Force, respectively.
Forces would be assigned, as opposed to designated, to
the amphibious MEB and to the MPF MEB. All assigned forces
would come under the command and control of the Brigade
Commanding General. The existing tables of organization for
maritime prepositioning force (T/O 1001) and amphibious (T/O
1002) brigades form the basis for manning these standing
brigades. Figures 15 and 16 depict the subordinate units of
the ground combat element, aviation combat element, combat
service support element, and command element of the amphibious
and maritime prepositioning force brigades, respectively.
The ground combat element in both brigades is a
regimental landing team. The regimental landing team is task
organized to include an infantry regiment, a direct support
artillery battalion, and two general support (self propelled)
artillery batteries, two assault amphibian companies, one
combat engineer company, one light armored infantry company,
one reconnaissance company, two tank companies, and an anti-
tank platoon. The headquarters and service company of the
infantry regiment has also been task organized to include a
military police platoon, a communications platoon, a service
platoon, a radar beacon team, and a SCAMP (Sensor Control and
Management Platoon) sensor employment squad. These
small units formerly were assigned to the headquarters
battalion of the Marine division.
The aviation combat element is a Marine Aircraft Group
(MAG) that is task organized to perform the six functions of
Marine aviation. To accomplish this, the MAG has four
helicopter squadrons, and four fixed wing squadrons
permanently assigned. Whenever the brigade is deployed or
employed, a detachment from each of the Force Troops squadrons
would be assigned to the brigade, as necessary. In addition
to the flying squadrons, the MAG has two Marine Wing Support
Squadrons which permit flight operations at two expeditionary
airfields. To ensure control of aircraft and missiles, the
MAG also has a Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) and a
battery each from the Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD)
Battalion and from the Light Anti-Aircraft Missile (LAAM)
Battalion. The Marine Air Control Squadron is reorganized
with assets from other Control Group squadrons. From the
Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron, MACS assumed the assets
and responsibility to provide air traffic control
simultaneously to two independent and geographically separated
expeditionary airfields and three remote area landing sites.
Marine Air Support Squadron transferred the assets and
responsibility to operate a direct air support center and an
air support radar team. From Marine Wing Communications
Squadron, MACS received a comm squadron detachment. The
Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron of the Marine Air
Control Group provided the assets for MACS to operate a
Tactical Air Command Center.
The Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG) is a task
organized to provide autonomous support. The BSSG is
organized into eight companies that mirror the battalion
structure of the Force Service Support Group. Figure 19
depicts the proposed structure of a BSSG. The Headquarters
and Service Company would provide the BSSG command element, a
communications platoon, a military police platoon, and a
service platoon. The Supply company would consist of a supply
platoon, a ration platoon, a medical logistics platoon, and an
ammunition platoon. The Maintenance Company has ordnance,
motor transport, engineer, electronic, and general support
maintenance platoons. The BSSG would also have one Motor
Transport Company and one Landing Support company augmented by
a Beach and Port platoon. Medical services would be provided
by a Dental Company and a new Medical company consisting of an
existing Casualty and Clearing Company and a Surgical Support
platoon. Engineer support would be provided by a Bulk Fuel
Company and by an Engineer Company augmented by an Engineer
Support platoon and a Bridge platoon.
In I MEF and II MEF, three standing Marine Expeditionary
Units (MEU) would be structured according to their existing
standardized troop lists (29). Each MEU is composed of a
battalion landing team, a composite helicopter squadron
(CH-46, CH-53, AH-1, UH-1, and AV-8), a MEU Service
Support Group, and a MEU command element. The three
composite squadrons are supported by the assets from
three medium helicopter squadrons (HMM), one light/attack
helicopter squadron (HMLA), one heavy helicopter squadron
(HMH), and one attack squadron (VMA).
The reserve mobilization MEB has significantly greater
ground combat power than either the amphibious or the MPF
MEB's. Figure 17 depicts the subordinate units of the ground
combat element, the aviation combat element, the combat
service support element, and the command element of the
reserve mobilization brigade. This MEB has a direct support
artillery battalion (M1l4 &nd M198 howitzers), a general
support artillery battalion (M198 howitzers), a general
support (self propelled) artillery battalion (M109 and Mll0
howitzers), and an additional general support (self
propelled) artillery battery instead of just a direct
support artillery battalion, and two general support (self
propelled) artillery batteries (M109 and Mll0 howitzers). the
mobilization MEB has significantly more artillery support
since the general support artillery battalions were removed
from the active duty forces and placed in the reserve forces
as part of the Commandant's combat readiness enhancements. It
also has an additional combat engineer company and, even more
significantly, a tank battalion vice just two tank companies.
The aviation combat element (ACE), unlike the ACE of other
MEB's, has a VMGR squadron (KC-130). The reserve BSSG has the
same capabilities as the BSSG for the MPF MEB. However, the
command element of the reserve mobilization brigade does not
have a Radio Company but does have a full Air Naval Gunfire
Liaison Company (ANGLICO), a full Force Reconnaissance
Company, and a full Civil Affairs Group.
Force Troops consists of the MEF Command Element, a
Support Regiment, a Marine Aircraft Group, and a Service
Regiment. Each of these regiments and the Group consist of
one- of-a-kind units that have not been assigned to a brigade.
The third element of this proposal is to transfer the
manpower structure of superfluous command elements to that of
necessary combat units. This excess structure would be
created by the elimination of 29 units within each MEF. The
command elements of the following units would be abolished:
DIVISION WING FSSG
Division HQ Wing HQ H&S Co, H&S Bn
HQ Co, HQ Bn MWHS H&S Co, MT Bn
Svc Co, H&S Bn MAG HQ H&S Co, Engr Spt Bn
HQ Co, Inf Regt MALS H&S Co, Maint Bn
HQ Bty, Art Regt H&HS, MACG H&S Co, Med Bn
H&S Co, AA Bn H&HS, MWSG H&S Co, Den Bn
H&S Co, CE Bn MATCS H&S Co, Ldg Spt Bn
H&S Co, LAI Bn MWCS H&S Co, Sup Bn
H&S Co, Recon Bn MASS
H&S Co,Tk LAAD Bn
LAAM Bn
It bears repeating that only the command element of these units
will be eliminated.
CHAPTER II
ANALYSIS
Impact on the Ground Combat Element
Adoption of this proposal will have five fundamental
impacts on the ground combat element:
1. Reduction in the number of infantry battalions
assigned to the MEU (SOC) mission.
2. Elimination of numerous commands.
3. Military occupational specialty (MOS) progression.
4. Employment of the Reserves.
5. Combat power of the ground combat element.
The impacts are neither inherently good nor inherently bad,
but are simply consequences that may or may not be maximized
for the future good of the Marine Corps.
One of the most obvious impacts of this proposal on the
ground combat element is the reduction in the number of
infantry battalions assigned to the MEU (SOC) mission.
Currently, there are four battalions each, in I and II MEF,
that serve in sequence with three MEU command elements. The
pairing of four battalions with three MEU command elements
guarantees that any specific battalion will serve with the
same MEU command element only once in five-and-a-half years.
However, FMFM 1, the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine, states
that habitual relationships facilitate implicit communication,
which is essential for success when employing the maneuver
warfare philosophy (16-63). To improve these habitual
relationships, this proposal permanently assigns three
battalion landing teams within I and II MEF to three MEU
command elements. The fourth battalion landing team is
assigned to a regimental landing team that comprises the
ground combat element of one of the MEB's.
Without a doubt, the most controversial issue raised by
this proposal is the elimination of numerous commands. Within
each MEF the Marine division, the artillery regiment, the
amphibious assault battalion, the combat engineer battalion,
the light armored infantry battalion, the reconnaissance
battalion, the tank battalion, and the division headquarters
battalion would all be disbanded. This action is primarily
aimed at the headquarters elements of these units. This
proposal assigns all of the subordinate elements of these
units to the Commanding General of each Marine Expeditionary
Brigade. Thus, there are no subordinate units for the
division, artillery regiment, or independent battalion
headquarters to command and control. Since there are no
subordinate units for them to command and control, it follows
that there is no need for those headquarters.
In addition to disbanding the division, the artillery
regiment, and the six independent battalion headquarters,
three infantry regimental headquarters would also be
disbanded, one from each MEF. In I and II MEF, three infantry
battalions are permanently assigned to the three MEU command
elements. Since the MEU command element provides permanent
command and control, there is no reason for the existence of
the parent infantry regiment. In matters of concern between
the battalions of adjacent MEU's, the MEB command element
would provide the coordinating instructions. Thus, even in
that minor role, there is no need for the regimental
headquarters. In III MEF, one of the two regiments on Okinawa
would be disbanded. This proposal assigns one regimental
landing team to the amphibious MEB and the MPF MEB in each
MEF. Thus, the requirement for regimental headquarters is two
per MEF. However, in III MEF there are three regimental
headquarters--two in Okinawa and one in Hawaii. The MEB in
Hawaii is assigned the MPF mission while the MEB in Okinawa is
assigned the amphibious mission. Since there is but one MEB
in Okinawa, there is need for but one regimental headquarters
there. To eliminate superfluous units, one regiment in
Okinawa should be disbanded. Two consequences of the
elimination of the artillery regiment, and the independent
battalion headquarters are the lack of command opportunities
and the lack of MOS progression for officers. Traditionally,
the artillery regiment is commanded by a colonel with a
secondary MOS of 0802. The assault amphibian, the combat
engineer, and the tank battalions are traditionally commanded
by lieutenant colonels with primary MOS's of 1803, 1302, and
1802, respectively. However, under this proposal, the ground
combat element is comprised of one regimental landing team
with three infantry battalions, one direct support artillery
battalion, two general support artillery batteries, and one
company each of amphibious assault vehicles, combat engineers,
light armored infantry, reconnaissance, and tanks. Thus, in
each regimental landing team there is just one battalion
command and four battery command opportunities for officers
with a primary MOS of 0802, and just one company command
opportunity for officers with primary MOS's of 1302, 1802, or
1803.
Under the current system, officers with primary MOS's of
0802, 1302, 1802, and 1803 progress in MOS development by
service in companies or batteries as company grade officers,
service on battalion staffs as majors, and service as
battalion commanding officers as lieutenant colonels. Field
grade artillery officers have the additional opportunity for
MOS development with service on the artillery regimental
staff. However, with the elimination of the artillery
regiment and the independent battalion headquarters, field
grade officers will not have these opportunities for MOS
development. Additionally, without the independent battalions
there will not be a readily available pool of mentors to
instruct company grade officers and advise the ground combat
element commander on the most advantageous method of
employment of the organic combat support assets--artillery,
amphibious assault vehicles, combat engineers, light armored
infantry, reconnaissance teams, and tanks.
The first problem can be addressed in a candid manner.
Although it is unfortunate that the number of commands is
reduced, it is not the mission of the Marine Corps to provide
command opportunities for all of its officers. The Marine
Corps exists to conduct land warfare as a part of naval
campaigns in support of our national objectives. Officer
assignments are made to meet the needs of the Corps.
For the second problem, the issue really becomes one of
ensuring that experts are available to advise the ground
combat commander on the integration of the infantry and the
combat support units. These experts would be available to the
commander under this proposal. Advisors to the commander
would be found on the commander's staff and not
necessarily in the combat support unit. Military
occupational specialty developmental progress for combat
support officers would be by service in companies and
batteries where tactical employment would be taught by
the company commander. As the combat support officers
progressed in rank, they would serve on various MAGTF
command element staffs where they would learn combat
support integration. The next command billet they might
attain would be the ground combat element commander.
There is no compelling reason why an officer with a
combat support background should not aspire to command of
a battalion landing team or a regimental landing team.
These landing teams are much more than an infantry
battalion or regiment with some supporting arms. They
are combined arms teams of artillery, amphibious assault
vehicles, infantry and light armored infantry,
reconnaissance teams, tanks, and combat engineers. Tbe
background of the commander should reflect the same.
Under this proposal, I and II MEF each have one
mobilization MEB which is composed entirely of units from the
Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR). The Marine Corps
Reserve is "charged with providing the means for rapid
expansion of our Corps during a national emergency" (16-5.7).
This rapid expansion is achieved by augmenting the active duty
units with personnel replacements from the Individual Ready
Reserve and by reinforcing active duty units with additional
units from the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. Prior to this
proposal, the reinforcing units from the SMCR were envisioned
to be no larger than a battalion or a squadron. The SMCR has
sufficient units to field the ground combat element of two
MEB's (10-8.6).
Assignment of a mobilization MEB to I and II MEF resolves
a critical problem during employment of those MEF's. Of
twelve infantry battalions assigned to I MEF, two are always
deployed to III MEF on the unit deployment program, one is
always forward deployed with a MEU (SOC), and one is in
training to replace the forward deployed MEU (SOC) battalion.
Thus, at any time, three, and most likely four, infantry
battalions are unavailable, leaving just eight battalions to
be employed with the MEF. In II MEF, the situation is even
more critical. Of the nine battalions assigned, one is always
forward deployed as part of the Landing Force Sixth Fleet, one
is in training to replace the forward deployed battalion, and
one is always deployed to III MEF on the unit deployment
program. Thus at any time, three battalions are unavailable,
leaving just six battalions to be employed with the MEF. III
MEF is similarly strapped with only six infantry battalions--
two in Hawaii and four on Okinawa. Assigning a reserve,
mobilization MEB to I and II MEF guarantees each MEF of the
conceptual minimum employment of nine infantry battalions.
This guarantee is not without cost. In order to employ the
reserve MEB, the Congress must order a national
mobilization or the President must execute his authority to
mobilize up to 200,000 reservists without a national
mobilization. Although both of these actions are fraught with
political liability for the President, it does ensure that a
Marine Expeditionary Force is not committed to combat without
the support of the nation.
The final major issue concerning the ground combat
element is the credibility of its combat power. The degree to
which a military unit represents a credible force is
determined by the capabilities of its opposition. A Marine
Expeditionary Brigade, with its regimental landing team,
Marine aircraft group, and brigade service support group, is a
credible force immediately on arrival in a low-intensity or mid-
intensity conflict. Clearly, for sustained, land operations
in a high-intensity conflict, a Marine Expeditionary Force,
with its much greater ground combat power, air power, and
sustainability, is required. One aspect of the ground combat
power of the MEF that is addressed by this proposal but not
our existing organization is the availability of the
battalions assigned to the activated Marine Expeditionary
Units. The forward deployed MEU's are under the operational
control of the theater Commanders-in-Chief. As such, MEF
planners can not assume that the subordinate units of the MEU
will be available if the MEF is deployed for some contingency.
This proposal guarantees greater combat power for the MEF by
assigning to it a reserve, mobilization MEB.
Impact on the Aviation Combat Element
Adoption of this proposal will have five fundamental
impacts on the aviation combat element:
1. Realignment of squadrons within each Marine Aircraft
Group.
2. Availability of squadron assets.
3. Revised concept of employment for the Marine Aviation
Logistics Squadron.
4. Elimination of numerous commands.
5. Revised concept of employment for the Marine Air
Command and Control System.
The most obvious impact of this proposal is the
realignment of squadrons within the Marine Aircraft Group
(MAG). This proposal would realign the composition of each
NAG from one along functional lines to one that ensures the
capability to provide all six functions of Marine aviation.
This realignment will require some units to relocate, but only
to the extent required to obtain the proper distribution of
squadrons within a theater. Lastly, the realignment will
provide the MAG headquarters staff with the necessary training
for the MAG to fulfill its mission as the aviation combat
element of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
Currently MAG's are organized along functional lines--
control groups, support groups, helicopter groups, fighter
groups, and attack groups. This proposal would "mirror image"
all the MAG's that are assigned as the aviation combat element
of a MEB. Each of these Groups would have two (one for MPF
MAG's) medium helicopter squadrons (HMM) flying the V-22, one
heavy helicopter squadron (HMH) flying the CH-53E, one
light/attack helicopter squadron (HMLA) flying the UH-1 and
the AH-1, two fighter/attack squadrons (VMFA) flying the F/A-
18, one attack squadron (VMA) flying the AV-8, and one all-
weather attack squadron (VMA(AW)) flying the A-6. In addition
to the flying squadrons, each MAG would have one aviation
logistics squadron (MALS), two support squadrons (MWSS), one
substantially reinforced air control squadron (MACS), a low
altitude air defense (LAAD) battery, and a light anti-aircraft
missile (LAAM) battery.
In addition to the realignment of the MAG's assigned to
the amphibious and the maritime prepositioning force brigades,
six other squadrons in I and II MEF would be permanently
aligned with a Marine Expeditionary Unit. Three medium
helicopter squadrons, one heavy helicopter squadron, one
light/attack helicopter squadron, one attack squadron, and one
low altitude air defense platoon are required to fulfill the
standardized troop lists of three MEU's (28). One medium
helicopter squadron and one-third of the assets, including
intermediate support, of each of the other squadrons would be
assigned to each of the MEU's.
Each Force Troops of each MEF would also have a MAG.
This Group would have an aerial refueler transport squadron
(VMGR) flying the KC-130, and an observation squadron (VMO)
flying the OV-10. The Force Troops MAG in II MEF would have a
tactical electronic warfare squadron (VMAQ) flying the EA-6,
while the Force Troops in I MEF would have a tactical
reconnaissance squadron (VMFP) flying the F/A-18. Each of
these squadrons is capable of employing detachments to support
either of the two brigades or any of the MEU's.
With the realignment of squadrons within each MAG there
will also be some relocation of squadrons. This proposal does
not require that all units of a particular Group are
garrisoned at the same air station. The only requirement is
that all units assigned to any particular Group must be
located within the same theater. Within I and II MEF,
squadrons would remain garrisoned at their current air
stations. Within III MEF some squadrons must be relocated
from Hawaii to Okinawa. Table 1 illustrates the current, on-
hand distribution (O/H), proposed distribution of flying squadrons
among the three MEF's (REQR) and the total number of squadrons
specified by the Aviation Master Plan (PLAN).
Only eleven flying squadrons would have to be relocated--
eight squadrons between the MEF's and three within III MEF.
Any plan that proposes to relocate additional squadrons to a
foreign country must consider the impact on the established
balance of forces. This plan would increase the number of
TABLE 1
FLYING SQUADRON DISTRIBUTION
I MEF II MEF III MEF TOTAL
SQDN O/H REQR O/H REQR O/H REQR O/H PLAN REQR
HMM 5 6 6 6 4 3 15 18 15
HMH 5 3 3 3 1 2 9 6 8
HMLA 4 3 2 3 0 2 6 8 8
VMFA 3 4 6 4 3 4 12 12 12
VMA 4 3 4 3 0 2 8 8 8
VMA (AW) 2 2 3 2 0 2 5 5 6
flying squadrons on Okinawa by one medium helicopter squadron
relocated from Hawaii. This increase would be offset by a
decrease of two support squadrons relocated from Okinawa to
Hawaii.
Once the squadrons are properly distributed throughout
the MEF's, the Groups will face a serious span of control
problem. A MAG headquarters in I or II MEF will have its
subordinate squadrons spread across three air stations located
hundreds of miles apart. The MAG in Okinawa will have its
squadrons spread between Futenma and Iwakuni. Although this
is not the ideal basing plan, it is no different from that
which is intended whenever a MAGTF is employed. Rotary
wing and fixed wing aircraft will not be based at the same
airfield. The range and response time of rotary wing aircraft
are such that it requires them to be forward based. Fixed
wing aircraft have much quicker response time and can,
therefore, operate effectively from an air base safely
ensconced in the rear area. It is during peacetime that we
are enjoined to prepare for war (14-41). Thus it is logical,
hence appropriate, that a MAG headquarters must, in peacetime,
contend with the same span of control problem it will face in
combat.
After implementing this realignment, the MAG will avoid
the "ad hocery in crisis" that the Commandant decried (18).
When a MEB is deployed for combat, the MAG that forms its
aviation combat element will be far more ready than our Groups
today. The realigned MAG is, following the advice of the
Commandant (22), task organized for the "most likely
contingency." Clearly, the MEF commander can still refine the
task organization with units from Force Troops or from the
sister brigade. The vast majority of the subordinate squadron
commanders will have established the long-term working
relationships with their group commander necessary to develop
familiarity and trust, which are essential to our doctrine of
maneuver warfare (14-63). Not only have the squadron
commanders developed these habitual relationships, the MAG
headquarters staff has also developed long-term working
relationships. The Group staff is well prepared to execute
all six functions of Marine aviation since it does so in
peacetime with its permanently assigned assets.
A critical factor in the viability of this plan is
whether sufficient assets exist to allow them to be allocated
to each brigade. When insufficient assets exist to meet all
requirements simultaneously, it is prudent to hold all assets
as general purpose forces. Such is the case in this proposal
with the squadrons that have been assigned to Force Troops.
Excesses and shortages in the number of squadrons required to
execute this plan must be referenced to the number of
squadrons envisioned in 2001 by the Aviation Master Plan.
The Aviation Master Plan envisions a change in the number
of each type of helicopter squadron and an increase in the
number of observation and of tactical reconnaissance
squadrons. The number of medium helicopter squadrons will
increase from 15 to 18 with the conversion from the H-46 to
the V-22. This will be accomplished by changing three heavy
helicopter squadrons to medium squadrons with their conversion
from the H-53D to the V-22. Three more heavy helicopter
squadrons will exchange their H-53D aircraft for the H-53E.
This change will bring the total number of heavy helicopter
squadrons, flying the CH-53E, to six. The number of
light/attack helicopter squadrons will increase from six to
eight with the introduction of the AH-1W. The number of
observation squadrons will increase from two to three. The
number of tactical reconnaissance squadrons will increase from
one to three with the conversion from the RF-4 to the F/A-18.
On the SMCR side of the aviation plan, almost every
aircraft community will change either number of squadrons or
type of aircraft. Both medium helicopter squadrons and the
only heavy helicopter squadron will convert from the H-46 and
the H-53D to the V-22. In the process of the conversion, four
squadrons will emerge from the three. All three light
helicopter squadrons (HML) and the only attack helicopter
squadron (HMA) will merge to form two light/attack helicopter
squadrons (HMLA). All three fighter/attack and all five
attack squadrons will convert from the F-4 and the A-4 to the
F/A-18 and the AV-8. They will emerge from the conversion as
four VMFA and two VMA squadrons. One additional VMGR squadron
has joined the SMCR. Finally, the VMFP squadron will exchange
its RF-4 for the F/A-18D.
Table 2 illustrates the flying squadron requirements,
active duty and reserve, for the Aviation Master Plan and for
this plan. The only inconsistencies between this proposal and
the Master Plan are with the HMH and VMA(AW) squadrons, active
and reserve, the active HMM squadrons, and the reserve VMO,
VMAQ, and VMFP squadrons. An examination of these communities
will reveal the rationale for these differences.
This proposal established a requirement for 15 medium
helicopter squadrons based on the current inventory of medium
helicopter squadrons. The V-22 has a greater range and
quicker response time than the H-46. Hence, it is illogical
that with the introduction of a more capable aircraft the
Marine Corps would need more medium lift squadrons flying that
aircraft.
The heavy lift requirement has shifted from the H-53D to
the H-53E. The Aviation Master Plan envisions six heavy lift
helicopter squadrons, sufficient assets for one per MEB.
However, that plan ignores the requirement for the assets of
one squadron to support the three MEU's on each coast. The
current acquisition strategy for the H-53E is for a
procurement of 105 aircraft through the end of 1991 to support
six operational squadrons and one training squadron. However,
a total procurement of 191 aircraft is required to meet the
Marine Corps heavy lift requirements into the next century
(16-3.23). This additional procurement will be sufficient,
baring an increase in aircraft attrition, to rectify the
shortages in the number of HMH squadrons in both the active
duty and the reserve forces.
This proposal requires an all-weather attack capability
in each MEB--amphibious, MPF, and reserve mobilization. This
capability is performed by A-6 squadrons. However, the
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current inventory and the planned inventory of these squadrons
is not sufficient to provide one squadron per MEB. As shown
in Table 2, the Marine Corps has only five A-6 squadrons.
Throughout the aviation community there is an unspoken
reluctance to increase the number of A-6 squadrons, regardless
of need, due to its relatively slow speed, wing design
problems, and near equivalent capabilities of more modern
aircraft. Although the A-6 is eminently capable of fulfilling
its all-weather role with a substantial weapons load, the
economic realities of reopening a production line for an aircraft
that has some significant shortcomings dominate the decision not
to increase the number of A-6 squadrons. However, at the start
of the next century, the Marine Corps needs an all-weather attack
capability for each of its expeditionary brigades. This
capability may be met by acquisition of a new aircraft (highly
unlikely given the coming austere budgets and historical
acquisition time), or by modification of an existing aircraft.
The Aviation Master Plan envisions a SMCR with one VMO,
one VMAQ, and one VMFP squadron. This proposal lists those
squadrons as excess. The concept of employment of the VMO,
and the VMGR squadrons are as MEF assets. However, there is
no plan to employ the 4th Marine Division, the 4th Marine
Aircraft Wing and the 4th Force Service Support Group as a
MEF. The VMAQ squadron, in addition to being a MEF asset,
is generally considered to be a national asset. A reserve
mobilization MEB has no need for these squadrons. This
MEB can not be employed without a Presidential "200,000
call-up" or a national mobilization. In either case, the
conflict has escalated from low-intensity or mid-intensity
conflict to high-intensity conflict. Thus, the full
capabilities of the MEF to perform these missions are
presumably already in the theater of conflict. The needs
of the Marine Corps would be better served by transferring
the physical assets of these squadrons to the active
forces.
The concept of employment of the Marine Aviation
Logistics Squadron (MALS) must be revised for the effective
implementation of this proposal. Recently, the Marine Corps
adopted the MALS concept. Under this, the Group headquarters
portion of the old Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron
(HAMS) was removed and designated simply as the MAG
headquarters. The "and Maintenance" portion of the HAMS was
redesignated as the MALS. This redesignation is only somewhat
more appropriate since the "and Maintenance" portion not only
included the intermediate maintenance functions, but also the
aviation supply function. With the exception of aviation
intermediate maintenance and aviation supply, the functions of
Marine aviation logistics are really performed by the Marine
Wing Support Squadron. Each aircraft group was, nevertheless,
assigned a MALS. The concept of employment of the MALS is
evident from the amphibious and the maritime prepositioning
force brigade tables of organization (11). A fixed wing and a
rotary wing MALS is to be assigned to each brigade.
Since each MALS has only the personnel and equipment to
provide intermediate maintenance for the aircraft assigned to
the parent aircraft group, the concept of contingency support
packages evolved. A contingency support package (CSP)
consists of the people, parts, equipment, and mobile
maintenance facilities necessary to support the aircraft
assigned for the mission. The contingency support package is
developed by adding a deployment CSP (DCSP) and a fly-in
support package (FISP) to a core or common CSP. The common
CSP is one that is universally applicable to all Marine
fixed wing or to all rotary wing aircraft. The deployment CSP
is composed of the support items unique to any particular
aircraft. The people required for the deployment CSP are
listed on each squadron's table of organization as "MALS
augment." The equipment for the deployment CSP comes from a
pro rata share of the old HAMS equipment. The fly-in support
package is a ten day supply of organizational level parts that
the flying squadron normally takes on the flight ferry. Under
this concept, each MALS would support the aircraft that were
collocated with it.
This proposal assigns but one MALS to each MAG and none
for the squadrons assigned to a MEU. For the latter
squadrons, the ship's Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance
Department (AIMD) provides the common CSP, while each squadron
must provide its own deployment CSP. When deployed, the MALS
provides the common CSP and each squadron provides its
deployed CSP. Under the current concept of employment, the
flying squadrons and their parent MALS are all collocated with
the MAG headquarters. Under this proposal, they are not, for
it is quite conceivable that a MAG headquarters and its
associated MALS will have assigned squadrons spread among
three air stations. At least one of those three air stations
will not have a MALS garrisoned there. The issue then becomes
one of now having organized the MALS for warfighting, how is
it adapted for peacetime?
A solution to the problem can be obtained from the Navy.
Each air station that garrisons a significant number of flying
squadrons would establish an aircraft intermediate maintenance
department. The common CSP from the former HAMS and the
deployment CSP's from the squadron would be assigned to the
AIMD as category I augmentees under the Fleet Assistance
Program. Essentially, all the production capability of the
MALS would be "fapped" to the AIMD. The aircraft maintenance
management functions would remain as the only permanent
functions within the MALS. The drawback to this plan, as with
the current one, is that the commander who must employ the
MALS in combat has little control over the training of the
Marines who will man it.
As with the ground combat element, one of the most
partisan issues raised by this proposal is elimination of
numerous commands within each MEF: the wing headquarters,
the wing headquarters squadron, the support group, the control
group, the air traffic control squadron, the air support
squadron, the communications squadron, the headquarters and
headquarters squadrons of both the control group and the
support group, and the LAAD and LAAM battalions. In addition
to these units, one MAG headquarters and its associated MALS
from I MEF and two MAG headquarters and MALS from II MEF would
be eliminated. Additionally, if only 15 V-22 squadrons
are maintained instead of 18, then one HMH and three HMM flags
would be folded. The final four flags to be folded would be
from the SMCR--the observation squadron, the tactical
electronic squadron, the tactical reconnaissance squadron, and
one of the two air support squadrons (MASS).
Elimination of these units really represents elimination
of redundant levels of command. The warfighting capability of
the squadrons, battalions, groups and wings has been
reorganized under another existing command. However, in the
few cases where actual warfighting capability was eliminated--
three HMM, one HMH, and three SMCR squadrons, the squadrons
were eliminated because they were superfluous to our concept
of employment in a low- or mid-intensity conflict.
Another major problem, though perhaps not as parochial
as the previous one, is the concept of employment for the
Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS). The revised
concept of employment must address integration of the MACCS
into the host nation or joint task force (JTF) air command and
control system for the initial brigade that is deployed into
the theater of conflict. It must also account for the
integration of subsequent brigades into the theater air
command and control system. Finally, it must provide a means
for the joint task force commander to task the MAGTF commander
with air missions.
Once a Marine brigade, whether it was amphibious or
maritime prepositioning force in origin, has assumed control
of air operations ashore, it must be able to exercise that
control to the same degree of capability of that formerly of
an aircraft wing. Each brigade has been task organized with
the assets of the former air control group to be able to
provide just that degree of control. The air control element
of the aviation combat element will become integrated in the
theater air command and control system. In a low-intensity
or mid-intensity conflict, a brigade may be the only Marine
force in the theater. Thus, the air command and control
problem is resolved. The MACCS is completely integrated into
the theater system and the joint task force commander can
directly task the MAGTF commander for air missions. As the
conflict escalated and the size of the Marine presence
increased from a MEB to a MEF, the MAGTF commander could
request a greater portion of the air command and control
system. The air control elements of each follow-on brigade
would link with the first air control element. Thus, the
first element into the theater becomes the central node for
the MAGTF air command and control system. Although the MACCS
has expanded to a decentralized command and control system,
the joint task force air component commander still maintains a
single point of contact with the MAGTF. The joint task force
commander as always has a direct line to the MAGTF commander
for assigning any missions, air or ground.
Impact on the Combat Service Support Element
The impact of this proposal on the Brigade Service
Support Group should be evaluated with the following,
subjective criteria: (1) command and control, (2) training and
supervision, (3) limited equipment, (4) peacetime
requirements, and (5) transition from peace to war. The
Center for Naval Analysis used the same criteria for
evaluating a BSSG structure concept (33-8.1).
In evaluating the impact of this proposal on the BSSG
with respect to command and control functions, one major point
to consider is that many functions of combat service support
are interdependent. Coordination of these functions will
require the involvement of the combat service support element
commander. This coordination also suggests abandonment of the
functional area management concept. A commander accustomed to
coordinating interdependent functions will, presumably, be
more prepared to do so in combat than another commander who
had until just prior to deployment been assigned to a
functional battalion.
Evaluating the impact of this proposal with respect to
supervision and training yields two opposite conclusions. The
train as you are going to fight philosophy is firmly embraced
by this proposal. Although the commander may be better
trained, it is impossible to predict whether the smaller
functional units of the BSSG, companies, foster more effective
military occupational specialty training than the larger units
of the FSSG. Organizing in BSSG's increases the requirement
for qualified supervisors. Additionally, since the units are
smaller, the supervisory billets will be of a lower grade than
in the FSSG. The problem becomes one of not only obtaining
supervisors but of obtaining young, qualified supervisors.
One of the key issues raised by this proposal is the lack
of equipment to support two brigades. Clearly, this proposal
is hampered by the proliferation of oversized, expensive,
seldom used or one-of-a-kind items within the combat service
support element. The 1987 study by the Center for Naval
Analysis discovered only seven one-of-a-kind items in the 1990
BSSG equipment list (33-8.8).
Another argument against this proposal is that the BSSG
lacks the depth of assets to be able to support conflicting
peacetime requirements. Elimination of the conflicting
peacetime requirements is precisely the objective of this
proposal. Presumably the unity of the brigade command will
prevent brigade units from being assigned missions that do not
have any bearing on the brigade's overall mission.
All Marine Corps commands are enjoined to focus all
peacetime activities on achieving combat readiness (14-41).
However, in spite of our combat readiness and our task
organization for the most likely contingency, there will be
some last moment "ad hocery" or refinements to the task
organization. The staff of a functional battalion may be more
qualified than the staff of a BSSG to allocate assets during a
task organization refinement.
Impact on the Command Element
The adoption of this proposal will have five significant
effects on the command element:
1. Reinforcement of the principle of unity of command.
2. Support for implementation of the maneuver warfare
doctrine.
3. Complication of span of control problems.
4. Increased professional competence of the MAGTF staff.
5. Elimination of the composite MAGTF problem.
Most importantly, the MEB commander will finally have direct
influence on the training of the Marines he will have to lead
in combat. The MEB commander will now be able to maintain
habitual relationships with his staff and subordinate
commanders. However, the MEF commander will have multiple
ground combat elements.
With the elimination of redundant and parallel commands,
there will be no need to "dual hat" a general officer as the
commander of two distinctly different commands. Additionally,
with the elimination of the division, wing and FSSG command
billets, there will be an excess number of general officers.
Thus the Marine Corps will change from a situation of a lack
of general officers requiring "dual hatted" commanders to a
situation of a lack of general officer billets. The Marine
Corps can meet this change by fulfilling its needs for general
officers elsewhere or by reducing the number of general
officers. More significantly, the MAGTF commander may now
devote more time to fighting his MAGTF.
A second advantage of this proposal is that with the
assignment of units to the command vice the designation of
units, the commanding general finally has control over the
tactical proficiency of the units he will lead in combat. By
the existing organization, the subordinate units of the MEB
remained under the command and control of the parent command
until the MAGTF was activated. At that time, the subordinate
unit would shift to the operational command and control of the
MEB commander. The MEB commander would have a chance to
observe the tactical proficiency of the subordinate units only
during an exercise or during an actual contingency. However,
under this proposal, the MEB commander has the responsibility
of not only leading his units in combat, but also of
preparing them for war.
The adoption of his proposal facilitates acceptance of
the maneuver warfare doctrine. The MEB commander and his
staff have a greater opportunity improve their tactical
proficiency while daily commanding and controlling assigned
forces. The MAGTF forces are directed toward a geographical
area. Therefore, the commander and his staff will have a
greater opportunity to identify possible antagonists and to
perform area studies than will a commander of general purpose
forces, such as divisions and wings. The information obtained
from the study of potential antagonists and of mission areas
will better prepare the MEB commander to strike at the enemy's
critical vulnerabilities and to destroy his will to fight.
One difficult issue raised by this proposal is that of
span of control. Under the existing MAGTF organization, each
MAGTF has normally one ground combat element. A MEU has a
battalion landing team; a MEB, a regimental landing team; and
a MEF, a Marine division. The MAGTF commander could assign a
mission to the ground combat element commander and allow him
to coordinate the fires and maneuver of his regiments. It is
possible that a MEF commander might have two ground combat
elements, each consisting of a Marine division. Due to the
size of each of these ground combat elements, it is highly
unlikely that they would be assigned the same objective. For
the purposes of maneuver and fire support coordination, the
two ground combat elements could be considered to be
conducting independent operations. Under the proposed
reorganization, a MEF would have two or more MEB's, each with
a regimental landing team. In this case, MEF commander would
now have to direct and coordinate the fires and maneuver of
each regimental landing team since it is most likely that all
of the ground combat elements would be assigned missions on
the same objective.
Permanent MAGTF headquarters were created, in part, out
of a concern for the professional competence of the MAGTF
staff. With the existing MAGTF headquarters, the staff may
develop develop the necessary relationships to operate
efficiently. However, one of the major functions of the
staff is to assist the MAGTF commander in integrating the
combat power of his subordinate elements. Now with forces
assigned, the staff will be able to practice in peacetime
the tasks they must accomplish in combat.
This proposal may eliminate the composite MAGTF problem.
Under this reorganization, there will be no headlong drive to
get the MEF, division, wing and FSSG headquarters into the
theater of conflict. Each MEB is fully capable of commanding
and controlling all the functions of the aviation, ground
combat and combat service support elements and fighting as an
integrated MAGTF. The MEF commander exercises control over
the combat units through his subordinate MEB commander. The
MEF commander and his staff are, therefore, required in the
theater of conflict only when more than one MEB is present.
Impact on Manpower Structure
Although this proposal may produce beneficial effects on
each element of the MAGTF, it must produce significant
manpower savings to warrant the turmoil of reorganization.
There are three major manpower concerns that must be addressed:
1. Number of saved or excess billets.
2. Officer and enlisted grade distribution.
3. MOS progression.
Manpower structure is dependent on the personnel budget
and rank distribution. For a given budget, the number of
billets that can be created is dependent on the annual pay,
hence the rank, of the billet holder. It is, therefore, not
particularly useful to simply count the number of excess
billets created by the proposal. Those billets must be
related to their impact on the personnel budget.
Since annual pay is one of the largest direct operating
costs included in the personnel budget, any analysis should
use annual pay as the sole cost of a billet. The difficulty
in expressing excess billets strictly in terms of dollars is
that the figures lose significance. Therefore, the cost of
each billet shall be normalized by the average annual pay of a
Private/Private First Class. Table 3 lists the average annual
pay for Marines of each rank. Table 4 summarizes the ratio
between the average annual pay of a Pvt/PFC and all the other
ranks. A cursory view of these tables shows that a Sergeant
Major has an average annual pay of $37,827, which is roughly
3.5 times greater than that of a Pvt/PFC. Therefore, on a
dollar basis, a Sergeant Major's billet is equivalent to 3.5
Pvt/PFC billets. Likewise, a colonel's billet is equivalent
to 6.0 Pvt/PFC billets. Table 5 lists the excess manpower
Click here to view image
structure created within each MEF by abolishing the command
elements of those 29 units. The excess billets of each unit
are listed by the number of enlisted billets, the number of
officer billets, and the number of Pvt/PFC equivalents. A
brief look at Table 5 shows that although 95 officers and 274
enlisted Marines are assigned to the Wing Headquarters, their
average annual pay is equivalent to that of 921 privates. By
way of comparison, a rifle company has an equivalent pay of
244.6 privates and a medium helicopter squadron, 364.5 privates.
With the elimination of 29 command elements in each MEF,
the Marine Corps realizes a total excess of 12,792 enlisted
billets and 1830 officer billets. Table 6 lists the total
number of excess billets by rank. These numbers represent
TABLE 6
EXCESS BILLETS
Pvt/PFC LCpl Cpl Sgt SSgt GySgt 1stSgt SgtMaj
2085 3372 2988 2031 1225 870 489 318
Lts Capt Maj LtCol Col Gen
330 555 414 234 87 15
7.2% of the enlisted strength and 9.0% of the officer
strength. The total annual pay of these billets is over $305
million, which is approximately 8.6% of the estimated $3,549
million the Marine Corps spends for pay. By comparison, the
annual payroll of 114 rifle companies or 75 medium helicopter
squadrons is less than that of these excess billets.
Although this proposal represents a 7.2% reduction in
enlisted strength and a 9.0% reduction in officer strength,
there is no significant change in the remaining grade
distribution. Figures 20 and 21 compare the existing grade
distribution with that as a consequence of this proposal for
both enlisted Marines and Marine officers, respectively. The
greatest change in the enlisted distribution is just 3/10th of
one percent. The officer ranks show a slight skewing toward
the lower grades with the ratio of lieutenants increasing 2.4%.
Even though the grade distribution remains the same, the
proposal does create a problem with MOS progression for
officers. The same problem of diminished command opportunity
that artillery officers, tracked vehicle officers, and
engineer officers face in the ground combat element will
confront combat service support officers, air defense
officers, air support officers and air traffic control
officers. In the enlisted ranks, MOS progression is not
exacerbated by the proposal since the preponderance of the
excess senior enlisted billets were taken from the division,
wing, and FSSG staffs. Again, the candid response to this
problem is not all Marines will be afforded the opportunity
for a major command; nor will they all be afforded the
opportunity to serve for twenty years.
Clearly, this proposal can produce significant manpower
savings. It will, of course, take some time to abolish these
billets and to relocate the billet holders before the savings
can be realized. If the personnel budget is drastically
reduced requiring vertical cuts in the manpower structure,
then this proposal offers an excellent opportunity to absorb
those cuts without sacrificing combat efficiency.
Impact on Public Law
Section 5013, Title 10, United States Code, currently
states, "The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy,
shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat
divisions and three air wings and such other land combat,
aviation, and other services as may be organic therein" (2-
606). Prior to implementation of this proposal, this section
of Title 10 must be amended. A simple but sufficient
amendment is to replace the words "three combat divisions and
three air wings" with "three Marine Expeditionary Forces."
The effect of this change must be measured against the
legislative intent of the original version and how well that
purpose has been achieved.
Following the post-World War II military unification
hearings, Congress, in addition to establishing the charter of
the modern Marine Corps, established its composition. Section
206(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 stated, "The
United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy,
shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation
as may be organic therein" (40-31). This broad description of
the Marine Corps composition did not establish its minimum
size. President Harry Truman and the top leadership of the
new Department of Defense, including Secretary of Defense
Louis Johnson, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley,
and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest Sherman, were
openly hostile toward the continued existence of the Marine
Corps as a co-equal service. Since these men held budgetary
authority over the Marine Corps, the strength of the Corps
fell from over 92,000 in 1947 to under 75,000 in 1950 (40-38).
The outbreak of hostilities in Korea stopped the almost
certain elimination of the Marine Corps or at least, its
reversion to its traditional role with greatly reduced size
and influence. Despite the performance of the 1st Marine
Division in Korea, the civilian leadership in the Pentagon
remained hostile to the Marine Corps. However, Congress
passed the Douglas-Mansfield Act (Public Law 82-416) on 20
June 1952, giving the Commandant of the Marine Corps co-equal
status with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all issues of direct
interest to the Marine Corps. The Act also established the
current language of Title 10, Section 5013. Thus, the
legislative intent of the Act was to protect the existence of
the Marine Corps by establishing a minimum strength.
The terms "combat division" and "air wing" are
sufficiently vague that one may argue for any sized Marine
Corps based on his definition of the terms. Since 1952, the
size of a Marine infantry division has varied widely. The
size of an Army division has also varied in size during that
period. Even today the strength of any Army division
(infantry, light infantry, mechanized, air assault, airborne,
or armor) is different from that of any Marine division. In
fact, the strength of each Marine division differs from each
other. A Marine aircraft wing is significantly larger, by an
order of magnitude, than a comparably named Navy or Air Force
unit. To the Air Force and the Navy, an air wing is the next
level unit above a squadron. The embodiment of the Navy's
definition is the carrier air wing or functional wing. Marine
aircraft wings, which number approximately 400 aircraft, dwarf
the Navy carrier air or type commander wings and the Air Force
wings, each of which number less than 100 aircraft.
Although the Douglas-Mansfield Act ensured the continued
existence of the Marine Corps in the early 1950's, has the
wording of the Act, ". . . not less than three combat
divisions and three air wings . . .", protected the manpower
strength of the Marine Corps from falling below that level? A
quick review of the strength of the Marine Corps today answers
that question with a resounding NO! The Third Marine Division
currently has but four infantry battalions, two tank
companies, and two amphibious assault battalions. The First
Marine Aircraft Wing is similarly understrength with but two
fighter/attack squadrons, two attack squadrons, one refueler
squadron and one each, medium, heavy, and light/attack
helicopter squadron. Clearly, the Third Marine Division and
the First Marine Aircraft Wing are not a full "combat division
and air wing" within the intent of the law.
The change in wording from "three combat divisions and
three air wings" to "three Marine Expeditionary Forces" does
not change the basic meaning, intent, or protection afforded
by the original law. Although the change replaces the
original nebulous terms with equally nebulous terms, the new
terms reflect the current Marine Corps employment philosophy.
It is clear from the legislative history of the Douglas-
Mansfield Act that the people of the United States want a
Marine Corps. This change does not affect that basic desire
of the people.
CHAPTER III
CONCLUSIONS
This plan is a viable alternative to the current organization
of the Fleet Marine Forces. The plan provides the opportunity to
realign manpower structure from redundant units to combat arms
units. The proposal also provides a rational basis for aviation
programming decisions. Lastly, it provides an organization
that is conducive to the implementation of the Marine Corps
warf ighting doctrine.
The plan eliminates 29 redundant headquarters within each
MEF. The manpower structure of these excess units equates to
114 rifle companies. This structure can be redirected into
combat arms units to fulfill critical needs, such as a fourth
rifle company in each infantry battalion or an additional
light/attack helicopter squadron or, the excess structure can
be eliminated outright, thus creating a substantial savings in
the Marine Corps military personnel account.
The proposal can be implemented immediately except for
several aviation considerations. The current distribution of
squadrons and capabilities is insufficient to meet the
requirements of the Marine Corps under this organizational
plan. However, the identified deficiencies in light/attack
helicopter, heavy lift helicopter, and all-weather attack
capabilities provides a rational basis for aviation
programming decisions.
This proposal vastly complicates the span of control
problems for the MEF commander in combat. The MEF will be
composed of three subordinate MEB's. Since none of the MEB's
will possess sufficient combat power to achieve a MEF
objective single handedly, the MEF commander must coordinate
the elements of two or more MEB's on a single objective. This
issue could be resolved prior to acceptance of the proposal or
simply tabled in the expectation that a MEF would not be
employed as a complete unit in the foreseeable future.
The warfighting doctrine of the Marine Corps requires
harmonious sychronization of the independent initiative of
subordinate commanders. This can only be achieved by the close
and continuous relationship for the senior commander and his
subordinates. This proposal contains an organizational scheme
that supports the establishment of those relationships.
The current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces is
NOT "broken." Division-wing teams have served the needs of
the Marine Corps for many years. As we view the next century,
we see the Marine Corps racked by budgetary constraints and
often employed on short notice in stability operations and
limited objective operations. We should adopt an
organizational structure that is maximized for those
operations and one that can survive financial austerity.
Click here to view image
BIBLIOGRAPHY
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
1. Commandant of the Marine Corps message. "Execution for POM
90-94 MAGTF Structure and Manning Requirements." Washington:
HQMC, 222030z June 1988. Provided implementing instructions for
the recommendations of the Force Structure Study Group, 1988.
2. United States Government. United States Code, Title 10.
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983. Provided specific
wording of the law that establishes the mission and size of the
Marine Corps.
3. United States Marine Corps. Organization and Composition of
the Fleet Marine Force (Hogaboom Board). Washington: HQMC,
1956. Primarily concerned with the organizaton and composition
of the Division, Wing, and Force Troops. Concerned about the
impact of reduced military budgets and manpower.
4. United States Marine Corps. MAGTF Master Plan (Final
Draft). Quantico: Marine Corps Combat Development Center, 1989.
Provided direction for the Marine Corps during the next decade.
Defined levels of conflict. Provided guidance on force structure.
5. United States Marine Corps. Report of the Force Structure
Study Group. Washington: HQMC, 1988. Recommended structure
changes that would provide a Total Force capability of fighting
and winning the most likely conflicts of the 1990's.
6. United States Marine Corps. Guidelines for Forming a
Composite MAGTF. Washington: Advanced Amphibious Study Group,
1985. Provided an initial concept for compositing a MEB to a MEF.
7. United States Marine Corps. "Final Report: 1-85 Compositing
Evaluation." Camp Pendleton: I Marine Amphibious Force, 1985.
Evaluated several techniques for compositing a MEB to a MEF.
8. United States Marine Corps. "C4I Study: Report of First
Study Iteration." Camp Pendleton: I MAF, 1985. Initial report
of an evaluation of several techniques for compositing a MEB to a
MEF.
9. United States Marine Corps. Headquarters Redundancy
Analysis (Board of Colonels). Washington: HQMC, 1987.
Evaluated missions of FMFLant/Pac, MEF, MEB, Division, Wing, and
FSSG headquarters. Also evaluated missions of bases and stations.
10. United States Marine Corps. Fleet Marine Force (IP 1-4).
Quantico: MCCDC, 1987. Provided a somewhat dated description of
the organization of the Fleet Marine Forces.
11. United States Marine Corps. "Tables of Organization."
Washington: HQMC, 1988. Invaluable resource for evaluating
manpower and organizational requirements of the Fleet Marine
Forces. Obtained tables of organization on computer diskettes
from the Central Design and Programming Activity, Quantico. That
form proved much easier to use than paper or microfiche forms.
12. United States Marine Corps. Mission and Force Structure
Study (Haynes Board). Washington: Headquarters Marine Corps,
1976. Described major considerations for both keeping the Division,
Wing, and FSSG organization, and for adopting a permanent brigade
organization.
13. United States Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force
Doctrine (FMFM 0-1). Washington: HQMC, 1979. Provided a
cursory explanation of the roles of the various MAGTF's and how
they function.
14. United States Marine Corps. Warfighting (FMFM 1).
Washington: HQMC, 1989. Provided the Marine Corps philosophy on
command and control in combat.
15. United States Marine Corps. The Permanent MAGTF
Headquarters Concept and How It Applies in the Formation of a
Composite MAGTF. Washington: Advanced Amphibious Study Group,
1985. Provided a revised concept of compositing a MEB to a MEF.
16. United States Marine Corps. Concepts and Issues.
Washington: HQMC, February l989. Provided an explanation for
Congress for the need for various Marine Corps programs for the
next decade.
17. United States Navy. Department of the Navy Long Term
Amphibious Lift Requirement and Optimum Ship Mix Study.
Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1983.
Presented programs to provide the assets required to conduct
amphibious assaults with a MEF and a MEB by 1994.
LETTERS AND MEMORANDA
18. Commandant of the Marine Corps memorandum for the Chief of
Staff, HQMC. 8 March 1985. Provided the Commandant's views on
the permanent MAGTF headquarters concept.
19. Chief of Staff, HQMC memorandum to Deputy Chief of Staff
(Plans, Policies and Operations). 15 January 1985. Provided the
Chief of Staff's views on the revised, permanent MAGTF
headquarters concept.
20. Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans, Policies, and Operations),
HQMC memorandum for the Assistant Commandant. "Marine Air Ground
Task Force Headquarters Decision Brief." 8 June 1983. Provided
the background information leading to the decision to approve the
permanent MAGTF headquarters concept.
21. Director, Operations Division memorandum to Deputy Chief of
Staff (Plans, Policies, and Operations), HQMC. "Permanent MAGTF
HQ Concept." l March 1985. Provided a summary of the revised,
permanent MAGTF headquarters concept.
22. Special Assistant for Amphibious and Prepositioning Matters
(PP&O) memorandum for the Commandant, HQMC. "Permanent MAGTF
Headquarters Concept." 13 January 1985. Provided, as a marginal
note, the Commandant's views on the revised, permanent MAGTF
headquarters concept.
23. Brigadier General Marc A. Cisneros, USA, United States
Southern Command. Letter to author. 7 February 1989. Provided
the response time the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command,
requires of a MEB or MEF.
24. Major General J. P. Hoar, USMC, United States Central
Command. Letter to author. 30 January 1989. Excellent response
to author's letter. Provided the response time the Commander-in-
Chief, U.S. Central Command, requires of a MEB or MEF.
25. Major General Royal N. Moore, Jr, USMC, United States
Pacific Command. Letter to author. 27 January 1989. Provided
the response time the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command,
requires of a MEB or MEF.
26. Major General H. C. Stackpole, III, USMC, United States
Atlantic Command. Letter to author. 15 February 1989. Provided
the response time the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command,
requires of a MEB or MEF.
27. Lieutenant General E. J. Godfrey, USMC. Address to the ACMC
Committee. Washington: HQMC, 30 January 1989. Provided the
views of the Commanding General, FMF Pacific, on force structure
reductions.
28. Colonel Michael Wyly, USMC. "Modernizing the MAGTF."
Unpublished essay. Provided a discussion of the need to
reorganize from divisions and wings to brigades.
29. Lieutenant General E. T. Cook, USMC. Commanding General,
Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, letter, "Standardization of MEU
(SOC) Troop and Equipment Lists. 28 June 1988. Provided the
organizational strengths of each element of the MEU.
BOOKS AND JOURNALS
30. Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record. Where Does the Marine
Corps Go From Here? Washington: Brookings Institute, 1976.
Discussed post-Vietnam War missions for the Marine Corps as a
whole. Not a significant value for this project.
31. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford. Progress and
Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine
Corps, 1900-1970. Washington: History and Museums Division,
HQMC, 1973. Emphasized the innovations of the Marine Corps.
Briefly discussed the environment and recommendations of the
Hogaboom Board.
32. Lieutenant Colonel John S. Grinalds, USMC. Structures for
the Marine Corps for the 1980's and 1990's. Washington:
National Defense University, 1978. Discusses structure of Marine
Corps in terms of global mission. Not of significant value for
this project.
33. Mark T. Lewellyn, Dana Burwell, Harold Furchtgott-Roth,
Dwight Lyons, and Margaret Tierney. Analysis of the Marine Corps
Combat Service Support Structure. Alexandria: Center for Naval
Analysis, April 1987. Provided indepth analysis of several
organizational structures of the combat service support elements,
including a permanent BSSG. Recommended for further study.
34. Allan R. Millett. Semper Fidelis, The History of the United
States Marine Corps. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,
Inc, 1980. Provided scholarly overview of the history of the
Marine Corps. Greatest value was the extensive bibliography.
35. Lieutenant Colonel Ronald R. Borowitz, USMC. "Improving Marine
Air," Marine Corps Gazette. February 1984. Recommended forming
one composite MAG within each MEF for service as a MEB ACE.
36. Major Robert J. Bozelli, USMC. "Rethinking MACCS," Marine
Corps Gazette. October 1988. Identifies mobility,
survivability, communication, and training as deficiencies with
the MACCS.
37. Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Flynn, USMC and Major D. A.
Quinlan, USMC. "The Brigade is Beautiful," Marine Corps
Gazette. September 1972. Proposed reorganizing into seven
MEB's. Each FMF would also have a Force Logistics Command, a
Force Aviation Command, a Fleet Marine Training Command, and a
Combat Support Command. The Combat Service Command would fall
under the command of the base commanders.
38. Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Hayden, USMC. "CSS for the MAGTF,"
Marine Corps Gazette. May 1985. Identifies the duplicity of
effort between the FSSG and the MWSS. Recommends transferring
more functions from the FSSG to the MWSS to develop a MAG service
support group.
39. Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr, USMC. "The Cat with More than Nine
Lives," Proceedings. June 1954. Presents the historical account
of the events leading up to the passage of Public Law 82-416.
40. Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr, USMC. "The Right to Fight," Proceedin
September 1962. Presents the historical account of the events
leading up to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947
and of Public Law 82-416.
41. Captain Timothy E. Junette, USMC. "Reorganizing Marine Corps
Aviation," Marine Corps Gazette. October 1988. Describes the
problems of compositing the Aviation Combat Element of a MEB.
42. Lieutenant Colonel Willis J. King, Jr, USMC. "Tailoring Marine
Aviation For the Task at Hand," Marine Corps Gazette. October
1988. Discusses the problem of task organizing aviation assets
for a MAGTF is a period of austere budgets.
43. Major T. C. Linn, USMC. "The Composite MAGTF Concept,"
Marine Corps Gazette. August 1984. Describes several techniques
for compositing various MAGTF's.
44. Captain Jeffery L Kreinbring, USMC. "Let's Organize for the
Mission," Marine Corps Gazette. October 1987. Proposes
reorganizing into eight MEB's--three MPF, three amphib, and 2 to
support 3 MEU's on each coast__with abolition of the Division,
Wing, and FSSG.
45. Major T. C. Morgan, USMC. "Deploying and Employing,"
Marine Corps Gazette. May 1984. Proposed Marine Corps-wide
standardization of unit SOP's, thus facilitating employment of a
force task organized from two or more divisions or wings.
46. Colonel E. F. Riley, USMC. "Command Relationships in the
MAGTF," Marine Corps Gazette. July 1985. Describes
deficiencies in the MAGTF command structure that impede its
operation as a combined arms team.
47. Jack Shulinson and Major Edward F. Wells, USMC. "First In,
First Out," Marine Corps Gazette. January 1984. Described the
events leading to the introduction of the 9th MEB into combat in
Vietnam.
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