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Reorganizing The Fleet Marine Force: From Division-Wing Teams To Marine Expeditionary Brigades

Reorganizing The Fleet Marine Force: From Division-Wing Teams To Marine Expeditionary Brigades


CSC 1989




Command and Staff College

Marine Corps Combat Development Center

Quantico, Virginia





Reorganizing the Fleet Marine Force:

From Division-Wing Teams to Marine Expeditionary Brigades




Major Joseph H. Schmid, U. S. Marine Corps

15 May 1989









DATE: 9 JUNE 1989


This paper proposes reorganizing the Fleet Marine Forces


around permanent Marine Expeditionary Brigades. After reviewing


the current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces down to the


battalion and squadron level, a discussion of the problems


arising out of the current organization is offered. The


reorganization plan has two goals--to resolve the problems with


the current organization and to reduce the number of headquarters.


A reduction in the number of headquarters would allow conversion


of the associated manpower structure to that for warfighting


elements. The proposed organization is analyzed from the


perspective of its impact on the the ground combat element, the


air combat element, the combat service support element, the


command element, manpower structure, and on Title 10, United


States Code.


The paper concludes that reorganization to permanent Marine


Expeditionary Brigades is possible without a reduction in mission


capabilities. The conclusion summarizes both the problems


resolved by the proposed plan and those left unresolved.







List of Figures iii


Preface iv




I. Introduction 1


Current Organization of the Fleet Marine Forces 1


Statement of the Problem 7


Statement of the Proposal 15


II. Analysis 21


Impact on Ground Combat Element 21


Impact on Aviation Combat Element 28


Impact on Combat Service Support Element 42


Impact on Command Element 44


Impact on Manpower Structure 47


Impact on Public Law 52


III. Conclusions 56


Figures 58


Anotated Bibliography 78




1. Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic 58


2. 2d Marine Division 59


3. 2d Marine Aircraft Wing 60


4. 2d Force Service Support Group 61


5. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific 62


6. I Marine Expeditionary Force 63


7. 1st Marine Division 64


8. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing 65


9. 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade 66


10. III Marine Expeditionary Brigade 67


11. 3d Marine Division 68


12. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing 69


13. I and II Marine Expeditionary Force (proposed) 70


14. III Marine Expeditionary Force (proposed) 71


15. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Amphibious) 72



16. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Maritime 73

Prepositioning Force) (proposed)


17. Marine Expeditionary Brigade (Reserve 74

Mobilization) (proposed)


18. Aviation Organization (proposed) 75


19. Brigade Service Support Group (proposed) 76


20. Distribution of Enlisted Marines 77


21. Distribution of Marine Officers 77






This paper proposes reorganizing the Fleet Marine Forces


into Marine Expeditionary Brigades. In analyzing the effect of


this proposal, the focus was on the manpower structure depicted


in Tables of Organization for Fleet Marine Force units. The


analysis of this proposal was admittedly limited in several ways.


First, the Tables of Equipment were not examined; thus, the


effect of this proposal on unit equipment was not addressed.


The political consequences of billet reductions within the Fleet


Marine Forces were also not considered. The effect on manpower


structure by programmed-weapons systems was not included in this




Sources for this paper ranged from published articles and


books to official Marine Corps documents, memoranda and personal


letters. Documents and memoranda were obtained from staff


copies. Personal letters from representatives of the Commanders-


in-Chief of the Unified Commands were in response to requests


from the author. Citations for sources are keyed to the


bibliography entry number and source page number. A citation


such as (40-31) refers to entry 40 in the bibliography, page 31.





Current Organization of the Fleet Marine Forces



The organizations of the Fleet Marine Forces vary between


the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. However, there are some


command relationships that are similar to each. Regardless of


the fleet, the Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, is a


type commander responsible for the administration and training


of all of his subordinate units. The subordinate units of the


Fleet Marine Forces come under the operational control of the


Commanders- in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic or Pacific Fleets, when




Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic is organized as shown in


Figure 1. Reporting directly to the Commanding General, Fleet


Marine Force, Atlantic (FMFLant) are the Commanding General,


II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and the Commanding


Officers of three Marine Expeditionary Units (22d, 24th, 26th


MEU's). The Commanding General, II MEF, exercises operational


control over the 2d Marine Division, the 2d Marine Aircraft


Wing, the 2d Force Service Support Group, the 4th Marine


Expeditionary Brigade, and the 6th Marine Expeditionary


Brigade (MEB). Each of these commands have standing


headquarters, or "command elements" as they are known in


Marine jargon.


However, the 2d Marine Division, 2d Marine Aircraft Wing,


and 2d Force Service Support Group are the only major


subordinate commands that have permanently assigned forces.


The Marine Expeditionary Brigades and the Marine Expeditionary


Units have designated forces. Designated forces are


squadrons, battalions, and companies that are earmarked for


deployment with Marine Expeditionary Brigades and Units.


These designated forces remain under the command and control


of their parent command until deployment, at which time


command and control is shifted. This double counting is not


limited to just the operating forces. The Commanding


General, FMFLant, is "double-hatted" as Commanding General,


II MEF. The Commanding General, 2d Marine Division, is also


"double-hatted" as Deputy Commander, II MEF.


The major subordinate commands of II MEF have fairly


traditional organizations. The Second Marine Division is


organized as shown in Figure 2. This is the standard


divisional organization of a headquarters battalion, three


infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and five


independent battalions - assault amphibian, combat engineer,


light armored infantry, reconnaissance, and tank. Recent


decisions of the Commandant of the Marine Corps have changed


the internal organization of many of the battalions within the


Marine Division in order to enhance the combat readiness of


those units (1). Among these changes were the placing in


cadre the 2d Battalion, 6th Marines, adding scout infantrymen


to and redesignating the Light Armored Vehicle Battalion as


the Light Armored Infantry Battalion, adding a fourth rifle


company to each of the battalions in 8th Marines, and


reassigning the 2d Battalion, 4th Marines from the 3d Marine


Division to the 2d Marine Division.


The Second Marine Aircraft Wing does not have a table of


organization since, by doctrine, it is task organized to


perform the six functions of Marine aviation - assault


support, offensive air support, aerial reconnaissance,


electronic warfare, anti-air warfare, and control of aircraft


and missiles. However, like all Marine Aircraft Wings, it has


a Marine Wing Headquarters Squadron, a Marine Wing Support


Group, a Marine Air Control Group, and aircraft groups


composed of helicopter, attack, and fighter aircraft, as shown


in Figure 3. The Second Force Service Support Group (FSSG) is


organized, as all FSSG's are, into eight battalions, each


fulfilling one of the eight functions of combat service


support. This organization is clearly shown in Figure 4.


Fleet Marine Force, Pacific (FMFPac), has units spread


across the Pacific Ocean and, thus, does not have as neat


organizational charts as its counterpart in the Atlantic.


Reporting directly to the Commanding General, FMFPac, are the


Commanding Generals, I Marine Expeditionary Force and 1st


Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The Commanding General, III


Marine Expeditionary Force, is forward deployed to Okinawa,


Japan, and is under the operational control of the Commander,


U.S. 7th Fleet, and under the administrative control of the


Commanding General, FMFPac. These command relationships are


shown in Figure 5.


Major subordinate commands of I MEF are the 1st Marine


Division, 1st Force Service Support Group, 3rd Marine Aircraft


Wing, 5th and 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigades, and the 11th,


13th, and 15th Marine Expeditionary Units. The organization


of the 1st Marine Division is shown in Figure 7. The Division


has a structure similar to that of 2d Marine Division. The


notable exception is that 1st Marine Division has four rifle


companies in each infantry battalion. Like the 2d Marine


Division, the 1st Marine Division also had to place an


infantry battalion in cadre to provide the fourth rifle


company to the battalions in the 1st Marine Regiment.


However, the fourth battalion in each regiment was obtained by


permanently reassigning four battalions from the 3d Marine


Division to the 1st Marine Division.


Third Marine Aircraft Wing is task organized as shown in


Figure 8. Performing the same functions as the 2d Marine


Aircraft Wing, the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing also has control,


support and aircraft groups. However, the number of fighter,


attack, and helicopter groups and squadrons differs between


the two wings.


As with II MEF, only the 1st Marine Division, 1st Force


Service Support Group, and the 3rd Marine Aircraft Wing have


forces permanently assigned. The Expeditionary Brigades and


Units, similar to those in II MEF, have forces only designated


for their use. As with II MEF, the Commanding Generals are


also "double hatted" in I MEF. The Commanding General, I MEF


is also the Commanding General, 1st Marine Division. The


Commanding General, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is the


Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division. The


Commanding General, 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is


also the base commander at the Marine Corps Air-Ground


Training Center, 29 Palms, California. The Commanding


Officer, 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade is also serves as


Commanding General, Landing Force Training Command,




The First Marine Expeditionary Brigade, located at


Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii, is the only expeditionary brigade with


forces permanently assigned. It is composed of a regimental


landing team, a Marine Aircraft Group, and a Brigade Service


Support Group, as shown is Figure 9. The regimental landing


team has three infantry battalions and an artillery battalion.


The Marine Aircraft Group has four medium helicopter


squadrons, one heavy helicopter squadron, one light/attack


helicopter detachment, four fighter squadrons, and a Marine


Air Control Squadron. Although designated as a Marine


Expeditionary Brigade, the 1st MEB, with its assigned forces,


does not have the combat capability of any of the other


expeditionary brigades with their designated forces. The


assigned forces do not reflect the table of organization for


the 1st Marine Expeditionary Brigade's mission.


III Marine Expeditionary Force, the forward deployed MEF


in the Western Pacific, has the most inferior combat power of


any of the expeditionary forces. As shown in Figure 10, III


MEF is composed of 3d Marine Division, 1st Marine Aircraft


Wing, 3d Force Service Support Group, and 9th Marine


Expeditionary Brigade. III MEF is the only expeditionary


force that does not man forward deployed expeditionary units.


However, the MEU's from I MEF, when forward deployed, come


under the operational control of the Commanding General, III


MEF. Like the expeditionary brigades in the other MEF's, 9th


Marine Expeditionary Brigade is merely a headquarters with


forces designated to it. Of the other major subordinate


commands, only 3d Force Service Support Group is of


comparable size and organization to its companion groups in


the other MEF's.


The organizations of the 3d Marine Division and the 1st


Marine Aircraft Wing are depicted in Figures 11 and 12,


respectively. 3d Marine Division has only two infantry


regiments with two battalions each. Each of these infantry


battalions is permanently assigned to either the 1st or the 2d


Marine Division and is serving with the 3d Marine Division on


a six-month deployment in accordance with the Unit Deployment


Program. The Division's artillery regiment has only two


direct support battalions and has a general support battalion


equipped with towed 155mm howitzers vice a general support


battalion equipped with self-propelled 155mm howitzers and


self-propelled 8-inch guns. Among the independent battalions,


1st Armored Assault Battalion is composed of two tank


companies and two amphibious assault companies. The other


divisions have tank and amphibious assault battalions, each


with four companies.


First Marine Aircraft Wing is similarly understrength


compared to the other aircraft wings. 3d Marine Aircraft Wing


has fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft groups, a support group,


and a control group. However, among these groups the Wing has


only two fighter, one attack, one all-weather attack, one


medium helicopter, one heavy helicopter, and one light/attack


helicopter squadron.


Statement of the Problem



The 1985-1989 Five Year Defense Plan Guidance, in an


effort to ensure a credible amphibious warfare capability,


established a requirement to simultaneously lift the assault


echelons of a MEF and of a MEB (17-i). To lift the assault


echelon of a MEF today would require all of the amphibious


assets in both the Atlantic and the Pacific Fleets. However,


each Fleet does have sufficient assets to lift the assault


echelon of a MEB. Thus, the largest combat force with which


the Marine Corps could conduct a timely amphibious assault in


either the Atlantic or the Pacific Fleet is a Marine


Expeditionary Brigade. As a result of this amphibious lift


constraint, the Marine Corps has debated the dilemma of


deploying as a MEB and employing as a MEF, or as it has been


called, the composite MEF.


Compounding this dilemma are other factors affecting the


way the Marine Corps is organized and trained for combat. One


of the most significant is the anticipated reduction in the


Marine Corps budget for the next several years. Less money


necessitates decreased manpower and decreased training


expenses. At the same time, the theater commanders-in-chief


have levied requirements on the Marine Corps for increased


joint service planning and increased responsiveness to the


call for deployment. Lastly, the Marine Corps has adopted a


new warfighting philosophy to enable it to win outnumbered on


any battlefield in the future.


The current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces is


incompatible with the resolution to these problems. This


leads to four problems:


1. Efficiency in responding to the call of the theater


2. Synchronization with our view of the foreseeable future

3. Implementation of our maneuver warfare philosophy.

4. Wasteful use of scarce manpower assets.


In order to improve the responsiveness of a MAGTF to the


call of a theater commander-in-chief, the Commandant of the


Marine Corps approved in 1983 the permanent MAGTF headquarters


concept. Two specific concerns that formed the basis for this


were increased emphasis on rapid deployment of MAGTF's and


increased joint service planning commitments requiring


operational data from MAGTF's. This emphasis on rapid


deployment can not be overstated. The theater commanders-in-


chief require a Marine Expeditionary Brigade to be ready for


embarkation within four days of notification and a MEF within


ten days of notification (23,24,25,26). Although the object


of the permanent MAGTF headquarters concept was to eliminate


`ad-hocery' in time of crisis," it does not do so for the


combat elements of the MAGTF. Except for the case of the MEF,


the ground combat element must be task organized by


reinforcing an infantry unit with combat arms units


(artillery, combat engineer, light armored infantry,


reconnaissance, and tank) from the division. The aviation


combat element must be task organized to perform all six


functions of Marine aviation. This will require the task


organization of units from at least six different Groups. The


combat service support element must also task organize units


from eight different battalions. The permanent MAGTF


headquarters concept only eliminates "ad-hocery" within the


MAGTF command element which represents approximately 5% of the


personnel strength of the MAGTF.


This "ad-hocery" not only exists to form the MAGTF, but


also to employ it in combat. Under the composite MAGTF


concept, Marine Corps forces will deploy to a conflict as a


MEB and employ in combat as a MEF. Employment as a MEF will


necessitate bringing the MEF, division, wing, and FSSG


headquarters into the theater as soon as possible, or


designating some smaller unit as a "forward" headquarters.


Shortly after these "forward" headquarters are established,


the appropriate elements of the MAGTF will shift from the


command of the MEB to the command of the "forward"


headquarters. n the case of the MAGTF command elements,


one MEB headquarters is designated as the "forward leaning"


MEB, the first to deploy. The other MEB command element is


embedded in the MEF headquarters to ensure that the MEF and


MEB staffs are equally proficient in joint coordination with


the theater commanders-in-chief. However, the first MEB


command element to deploy is the one that has not had the


experience working with the commander-in-chief. To


rectify that problem, a portion of the MEF command element


will fly into the theater of conflict as soon as possible


and merge with the "forward leaning" MEB command element.


As a result, the MEF command element is composed of parts


of two different staffs who have not worked together.


division, wing, and FSSG headquarters The MAGTF Master


Plan was developed in 1989 to establish the "operational


foundation for the organization, manning, equipping,


training, and development of doctrine and operational


techniques for MAGTF's through the year 2000" (4-1.1). In


fulfilling this charter, the MAGTF Master Plan predicts the


types of operations that MAGTFs will execute in the


foreseeable future (4-5.1). The most common employments


for a MAGTF are stability operations and limited objective


operations. The probability of employment of a MAGTF in


conventional operations short of general war can be


described as only "may" occur during the next twenty years.


"General war is the armed conflict between major powers, in


which the total resources of the belligerents are employed


and the national survival of a major belligerent is in


jeopardy" (4-5.7). The United States has been involved in


two, and perhaps three, general wars in over 200 years--the


Revolutionary War, the Civil War, and World War II. Thus,


the least likely employment for a MAGTF is in a general




The Haynes Board attempted to "develop alternative force


structures, concepts of employment, and disposition and


deployment of Marine Corps forces through 1985" (12). This


study concluded that our current organization of division-wing


teams is best suited for general war, but that an organization


based on Marine Expeditionary Brigades is best suited for


stability and limited objective operations. The study also


advocated that retaining the division-wing organization would


prevent infatuation with low intensity conflict mission and


avoid a commando mentality complex. However, the MAGTF Master


Plan states that MAGTF's must be prepared to perform commando


type mission such as "port and airfield seizures", "recovery


of downed aircraft, equipment, and personnel through


clandestine insertion of forces", "in-extremis hostage rescue


operations", and "counterterrorist operations" (5-5.3). Thus,


the current organization inhibits preparation for and


execution of the very missions for which a MAGTF is most


likely to be employed.


The Marine Corps has adopted a maneuver warfare


philosophy as its basic warfighting doctrine. This philosophy


holds that decentralized command is necessary to cope with the


uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat and to develop


the tempo of operations that we desire. Decentralized command


means that subordinates may make their own decisions based on


their understanding of their superior's intent. The ability


for seniors and subordinates to communicate through mutual


understanding and anticipating each other's thoughts is


essential for success under this doctrine. This implicit


communication is based on a shared philosophy and experience


which can only be developed through the familiarity and trust


that arises from established, long-term working relationships.


The current organization detracts from the establishment


of these habitual relationships. The "ad-hocery" necessary to


task organize the ground combat, the aviation combat, and the


combat service support elements prevents long-term, working


relationships between the commanders and their staffs. Yet,


it is in these very units that this decentralized command must


be exercised. A concern for the impact of constant turmoil on


the professional competence of the MAGTF headquarters staff


led to the decision to approve the permanent MAGTF


headquarters concept (22). Constant turmoil should have the


same effect on the professional competence of the staff of


each subordinate element of the MAGTF as it does on the


professional competence of the headquarters staff.


Not only does our current "ad-hocery" prevent long-term,


working relationships between the MAGTF commander and his


staff, but also between the MAGTF commander and his


subordinate commanders. Currently, forces are only designated


for employment with a particular MAGTF. Forces are assigned


to the parent division, wing, or FSSG and are subject to that


parent's commands. Thus, it is possible that a designated


unit may be assigned a mission by its parent commander


rendering it unavailable for employment with the MAGTF. For


example, units participating in a Combined Arms Exercise at 29


Palms, California, as directed by their parent division or


wing, would not be able to meet the embarkation response time


required by the theater commanders-in-chief. Thus, a


substitute unit would be deployed into combat without


the habitual relationships between commanders that


our warfighting doctrine deems necessary for success.


This unity of command issue has even greater significance


when considering the current practice of "dual hatting"


Commanding Generals. The Commanding General, Fleet Marine


Force, Atlantic, is also the Commanding General, II MEF. The


Commanding Generals of the 1st and the 3rd Marine Divisions


are also the Commanding Generals of I and III MEF,


respectively. Compounding the problem in III MEF is the fact


that the Assistant Division Commander is dual hatted as the


Commanding General of 9th MEB. Under our current concept of


deployment as a MEB and employment as a MEF, the MEF command


element falls in on the MEB command element. During that


period when the MEB is being composited to a MEF, the question


of who is commanding the Marine Division is not merely an


academic issue.


The Haynes Board, long before our warfighting doctrine


was published, espoused some of its basic tenets. According


to the Board, although a division-wing organization provided


flexibility, an organization built around brigades supported


the air-ground concept and enhanced training as an integrated


combined arms team. In summation, the Board stated that only


a combined arms team will win on the future battlefield (12).


The current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces is


characterized by redundant headquarters. There are MEB


command elements which will probably be called upon to command


the brigade during its initial, rapid deployment into the


theater of conflict. There are the MEF command elements that


exercise command over all the major subordinate commands.


Lastly, there are the major subordinate commands (division,


wing, FSSG) that are, according to the Haynes Board, ideally


suited for combat in the least likely level of conflict.


Both the Haynes Board and the Hogaboom Board (3)


recognized the concern for personnel and fiscal constraint.


The Hogaboom Board reported that "although the current


manpower availability was not the guiding or overriding


consideration" in their efforts to determine the organization


and composition of the Fleet Marine Forces beginning in 1958,


the Board did keep in mind "the practical background fact


that, in an era of rising military costs and limited personnel


availability, great weight must be given to the goal of


accomplishing more with less" (3). The Haynes Board also


addressed the personnel constraint issue. The Board concluded


that a brigade organization is effective when forced to reduce


personnel structure due to fiscal constraint. The Board went


on to say that 196,000 Marines are insufficient to support


three divisions and three aircraft wings. (On 30 September


1988, the personnel strength of the Marine Corps was 197,195


Marines.) The Haynes Board did, however, identify the


strongest argument for retention of the division-wing


organization. Section 5013, Title 10, United States Code


states that the Marine Corps "shall be so organized as to


include not less that three combat divisions and three air


wings..." (2-606).


Statement of the Proposal



To resolve the problems arising out of the existing


organization and to prepare for the 21st century, the Marine


Corps should reorganize the Fleet Marine Forces. This


reorganization should include three elements:


l. Permanently establish Marine Expeditionary Brigades


as the only major subordinate command of Marine Expeditionary




2. Integrate a reserve, mobilization Marine


Expeditionary Brigade into two of the active Marine


Expeditionary Forces.


3. Transfer the manpower structure of superfluous


command elements to that of necessary combat elements.


Under this proposal, I and II MEF would have two active


duty MEB's, one mobilization MEB, and three MEU's. II MEF


would just two active duty MEB's. In each of the MEF's, one


MEB would fulfill the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF)


mission while the other MEB would fulfill the amphibious


assault mission. The mobilization MEB would be manned by


Selected Marine Corps Reserve units. All MEB's and MEU's


would have permanently assigned forces. Each MEF would also


have a Force Troops unit. Within the context of this


proposal, Force Troops is not a major subordinate command as


in days of old, but merely a collective title for units not


assigned to a MEB. Each MEF would retain its geographical


orientation: II MEF - Europe, III MEF - Asia, and I MEF -


global reserve. Figures 13 and 14 depict the proposed


organizational charts for I and II Marine Expeditionary Forces


and III Marine Expeditionary Force, respectively.


Forces would be assigned, as opposed to designated, to


the amphibious MEB and to the MPF MEB. All assigned forces


would come under the command and control of the Brigade


Commanding General. The existing tables of organization for


maritime prepositioning force (T/O 1001) and amphibious (T/O


1002) brigades form the basis for manning these standing


brigades. Figures 15 and 16 depict the subordinate units of


the ground combat element, aviation combat element, combat


service support element, and command element of the amphibious


and maritime prepositioning force brigades, respectively.


The ground combat element in both brigades is a


regimental landing team. The regimental landing team is task


organized to include an infantry regiment, a direct support


artillery battalion, and two general support (self propelled)


artillery batteries, two assault amphibian companies, one


combat engineer company, one light armored infantry company,


one reconnaissance company, two tank companies, and an anti-


tank platoon. The headquarters and service company of the


infantry regiment has also been task organized to include a


military police platoon, a communications platoon, a service


platoon, a radar beacon team, and a SCAMP (Sensor Control and


Management Platoon) sensor employment squad. These


small units formerly were assigned to the headquarters


battalion of the Marine division.


The aviation combat element is a Marine Aircraft Group


(MAG) that is task organized to perform the six functions of


Marine aviation. To accomplish this, the MAG has four


helicopter squadrons, and four fixed wing squadrons


permanently assigned. Whenever the brigade is deployed or


employed, a detachment from each of the Force Troops squadrons


would be assigned to the brigade, as necessary. In addition


to the flying squadrons, the MAG has two Marine Wing Support


Squadrons which permit flight operations at two expeditionary


airfields. To ensure control of aircraft and missiles, the


MAG also has a Marine Air Control Squadron (MACS) and a


battery each from the Low Altitude Air Defense (LAAD)


Battalion and from the Light Anti-Aircraft Missile (LAAM)


Battalion. The Marine Air Control Squadron is reorganized


with assets from other Control Group squadrons. From the


Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron, MACS assumed the assets


and responsibility to provide air traffic control


simultaneously to two independent and geographically separated


expeditionary airfields and three remote area landing sites.


Marine Air Support Squadron transferred the assets and


responsibility to operate a direct air support center and an


air support radar team. From Marine Wing Communications


Squadron, MACS received a comm squadron detachment. The


Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron of the Marine Air


Control Group provided the assets for MACS to operate a


Tactical Air Command Center.


The Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG) is a task


organized to provide autonomous support. The BSSG is


organized into eight companies that mirror the battalion


structure of the Force Service Support Group. Figure 19


depicts the proposed structure of a BSSG. The Headquarters


and Service Company would provide the BSSG command element, a


communications platoon, a military police platoon, and a


service platoon. The Supply company would consist of a supply


platoon, a ration platoon, a medical logistics platoon, and an


ammunition platoon. The Maintenance Company has ordnance,


motor transport, engineer, electronic, and general support


maintenance platoons. The BSSG would also have one Motor


Transport Company and one Landing Support company augmented by


a Beach and Port platoon. Medical services would be provided


by a Dental Company and a new Medical company consisting of an


existing Casualty and Clearing Company and a Surgical Support


platoon. Engineer support would be provided by a Bulk Fuel


Company and by an Engineer Company augmented by an Engineer


Support platoon and a Bridge platoon.


In I MEF and II MEF, three standing Marine Expeditionary


Units (MEU) would be structured according to their existing


standardized troop lists (29). Each MEU is composed of a


battalion landing team, a composite helicopter squadron


(CH-46, CH-53, AH-1, UH-1, and AV-8), a MEU Service


Support Group, and a MEU command element. The three


composite squadrons are supported by the assets from


three medium helicopter squadrons (HMM), one light/attack


helicopter squadron (HMLA), one heavy helicopter squadron


(HMH), and one attack squadron (VMA).


The reserve mobilization MEB has significantly greater


ground combat power than either the amphibious or the MPF


MEB's. Figure 17 depicts the subordinate units of the ground


combat element, the aviation combat element, the combat


service support element, and the command element of the


reserve mobilization brigade. This MEB has a direct support


artillery battalion (M1l4 &nd M198 howitzers), a general


support artillery battalion (M198 howitzers), a general


support (self propelled) artillery battalion (M109 and Mll0


howitzers), and an additional general support (self


propelled) artillery battery instead of just a direct


support artillery battalion, and two general support (self


propelled) artillery batteries (M109 and Mll0 howitzers). the


mobilization MEB has significantly more artillery support


since the general support artillery battalions were removed


from the active duty forces and placed in the reserve forces


as part of the Commandant's combat readiness enhancements. It


also has an additional combat engineer company and, even more


significantly, a tank battalion vice just two tank companies.


The aviation combat element (ACE), unlike the ACE of other


MEB's, has a VMGR squadron (KC-130). The reserve BSSG has the


same capabilities as the BSSG for the MPF MEB. However, the


command element of the reserve mobilization brigade does not


have a Radio Company but does have a full Air Naval Gunfire


Liaison Company (ANGLICO), a full Force Reconnaissance


Company, and a full Civil Affairs Group.


Force Troops consists of the MEF Command Element, a


Support Regiment, a Marine Aircraft Group, and a Service


Regiment. Each of these regiments and the Group consist of


one- of-a-kind units that have not been assigned to a brigade.


The third element of this proposal is to transfer the


manpower structure of superfluous command elements to that of


necessary combat units. This excess structure would be


created by the elimination of 29 units within each MEF. The


command elements of the following units would be abolished:




Division HQ Wing HQ H&S Co, H&S Bn


Svc Co, H&S Bn MAG HQ H&S Co, Engr Spt Bn

HQ Co, Inf Regt MALS H&S Co, Maint Bn

HQ Bty, Art Regt H&HS, MACG H&S Co, Med Bn

H&S Co, AA Bn H&HS, MWSG H&S Co, Den Bn

H&S Co, CE Bn MATCS H&S Co, Ldg Spt Bn

H&S Co, LAI Bn MWCS H&S Co, Sup Bn

H&S Co, Recon Bn MASS





It bears repeating that only the command element of these units


will be eliminated.






Impact on the Ground Combat Element



Adoption of this proposal will have five fundamental


impacts on the ground combat element:


1. Reduction in the number of infantry battalions

assigned to the MEU (SOC) mission.

2. Elimination of numerous commands.

3. Military occupational specialty (MOS) progression.

4. Employment of the Reserves.

5. Combat power of the ground combat element.


The impacts are neither inherently good nor inherently bad,


but are simply consequences that may or may not be maximized


for the future good of the Marine Corps.


One of the most obvious impacts of this proposal on the


ground combat element is the reduction in the number of


infantry battalions assigned to the MEU (SOC) mission.


Currently, there are four battalions each, in I and II MEF,


that serve in sequence with three MEU command elements. The


pairing of four battalions with three MEU command elements


guarantees that any specific battalion will serve with the


same MEU command element only once in five-and-a-half years.


However, FMFM 1, the Marine Corps warfighting doctrine, states


that habitual relationships facilitate implicit communication,


which is essential for success when employing the maneuver


warfare philosophy (16-63). To improve these habitual


relationships, this proposal permanently assigns three


battalion landing teams within I and II MEF to three MEU


command elements. The fourth battalion landing team is


assigned to a regimental landing team that comprises the


ground combat element of one of the MEB's.


Without a doubt, the most controversial issue raised by


this proposal is the elimination of numerous commands. Within


each MEF the Marine division, the artillery regiment, the


amphibious assault battalion, the combat engineer battalion,


the light armored infantry battalion, the reconnaissance


battalion, the tank battalion, and the division headquarters


battalion would all be disbanded. This action is primarily


aimed at the headquarters elements of these units. This


proposal assigns all of the subordinate elements of these


units to the Commanding General of each Marine Expeditionary


Brigade. Thus, there are no subordinate units for the


division, artillery regiment, or independent battalion


headquarters to command and control. Since there are no


subordinate units for them to command and control, it follows


that there is no need for those headquarters.


In addition to disbanding the division, the artillery


regiment, and the six independent battalion headquarters,


three infantry regimental headquarters would also be


disbanded, one from each MEF. In I and II MEF, three infantry


battalions are permanently assigned to the three MEU command


elements. Since the MEU command element provides permanent


command and control, there is no reason for the existence of


the parent infantry regiment. In matters of concern between


the battalions of adjacent MEU's, the MEB command element


would provide the coordinating instructions. Thus, even in


that minor role, there is no need for the regimental


headquarters. In III MEF, one of the two regiments on Okinawa


would be disbanded. This proposal assigns one regimental


landing team to the amphibious MEB and the MPF MEB in each


MEF. Thus, the requirement for regimental headquarters is two


per MEF. However, in III MEF there are three regimental


headquarters--two in Okinawa and one in Hawaii. The MEB in


Hawaii is assigned the MPF mission while the MEB in Okinawa is


assigned the amphibious mission. Since there is but one MEB


in Okinawa, there is need for but one regimental headquarters


there. To eliminate superfluous units, one regiment in


Okinawa should be disbanded. Two consequences of the


elimination of the artillery regiment, and the independent


battalion headquarters are the lack of command opportunities


and the lack of MOS progression for officers. Traditionally,


the artillery regiment is commanded by a colonel with a


secondary MOS of 0802. The assault amphibian, the combat


engineer, and the tank battalions are traditionally commanded


by lieutenant colonels with primary MOS's of 1803, 1302, and


1802, respectively. However, under this proposal, the ground


combat element is comprised of one regimental landing team


with three infantry battalions, one direct support artillery


battalion, two general support artillery batteries, and one


company each of amphibious assault vehicles, combat engineers,


light armored infantry, reconnaissance, and tanks. Thus, in


each regimental landing team there is just one battalion


command and four battery command opportunities for officers


with a primary MOS of 0802, and just one company command


opportunity for officers with primary MOS's of 1302, 1802, or




Under the current system, officers with primary MOS's of


0802, 1302, 1802, and 1803 progress in MOS development by


service in companies or batteries as company grade officers,


service on battalion staffs as majors, and service as


battalion commanding officers as lieutenant colonels. Field


grade artillery officers have the additional opportunity for


MOS development with service on the artillery regimental


staff. However, with the elimination of the artillery


regiment and the independent battalion headquarters, field


grade officers will not have these opportunities for MOS


development. Additionally, without the independent battalions


there will not be a readily available pool of mentors to


instruct company grade officers and advise the ground combat


element commander on the most advantageous method of


employment of the organic combat support assets--artillery,


amphibious assault vehicles, combat engineers, light armored


infantry, reconnaissance teams, and tanks.


The first problem can be addressed in a candid manner.


Although it is unfortunate that the number of commands is


reduced, it is not the mission of the Marine Corps to provide


command opportunities for all of its officers. The Marine


Corps exists to conduct land warfare as a part of naval


campaigns in support of our national objectives. Officer


assignments are made to meet the needs of the Corps.


For the second problem, the issue really becomes one of


ensuring that experts are available to advise the ground


combat commander on the integration of the infantry and the


combat support units. These experts would be available to the


commander under this proposal. Advisors to the commander


would be found on the commander's staff and not


necessarily in the combat support unit. Military


occupational specialty developmental progress for combat


support officers would be by service in companies and


batteries where tactical employment would be taught by


the company commander. As the combat support officers


progressed in rank, they would serve on various MAGTF


command element staffs where they would learn combat


support integration. The next command billet they might


attain would be the ground combat element commander.


There is no compelling reason why an officer with a


combat support background should not aspire to command of


a battalion landing team or a regimental landing team.


These landing teams are much more than an infantry


battalion or regiment with some supporting arms. They


are combined arms teams of artillery, amphibious assault


vehicles, infantry and light armored infantry,


reconnaissance teams, tanks, and combat engineers. Tbe


background of the commander should reflect the same.


Under this proposal, I and II MEF each have one


mobilization MEB which is composed entirely of units from the


Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR). The Marine Corps


Reserve is "charged with providing the means for rapid


expansion of our Corps during a national emergency" (16-5.7).


This rapid expansion is achieved by augmenting the active duty


units with personnel replacements from the Individual Ready


Reserve and by reinforcing active duty units with additional


units from the Selected Marine Corps Reserve. Prior to this


proposal, the reinforcing units from the SMCR were envisioned


to be no larger than a battalion or a squadron. The SMCR has


sufficient units to field the ground combat element of two


MEB's (10-8.6).


Assignment of a mobilization MEB to I and II MEF resolves


a critical problem during employment of those MEF's. Of


twelve infantry battalions assigned to I MEF, two are always


deployed to III MEF on the unit deployment program, one is


always forward deployed with a MEU (SOC), and one is in


training to replace the forward deployed MEU (SOC) battalion.


Thus, at any time, three, and most likely four, infantry


battalions are unavailable, leaving just eight battalions to


be employed with the MEF. In II MEF, the situation is even


more critical. Of the nine battalions assigned, one is always


forward deployed as part of the Landing Force Sixth Fleet, one


is in training to replace the forward deployed battalion, and


one is always deployed to III MEF on the unit deployment


program. Thus at any time, three battalions are unavailable,


leaving just six battalions to be employed with the MEF. III


MEF is similarly strapped with only six infantry battalions--


two in Hawaii and four on Okinawa. Assigning a reserve,


mobilization MEB to I and II MEF guarantees each MEF of the


conceptual minimum employment of nine infantry battalions.


This guarantee is not without cost. In order to employ the


reserve MEB, the Congress must order a national


mobilization or the President must execute his authority to


mobilize up to 200,000 reservists without a national


mobilization. Although both of these actions are fraught with


political liability for the President, it does ensure that a


Marine Expeditionary Force is not committed to combat without


the support of the nation.


The final major issue concerning the ground combat


element is the credibility of its combat power. The degree to


which a military unit represents a credible force is


determined by the capabilities of its opposition. A Marine


Expeditionary Brigade, with its regimental landing team,


Marine aircraft group, and brigade service support group, is a


credible force immediately on arrival in a low-intensity or mid-


intensity conflict. Clearly, for sustained, land operations


in a high-intensity conflict, a Marine Expeditionary Force,


with its much greater ground combat power, air power, and


sustainability, is required. One aspect of the ground combat


power of the MEF that is addressed by this proposal but not


our existing organization is the availability of the


battalions assigned to the activated Marine Expeditionary


Units. The forward deployed MEU's are under the operational


control of the theater Commanders-in-Chief. As such, MEF


planners can not assume that the subordinate units of the MEU


will be available if the MEF is deployed for some contingency.


This proposal guarantees greater combat power for the MEF by


assigning to it a reserve, mobilization MEB.


Impact on the Aviation Combat Element



Adoption of this proposal will have five fundamental


impacts on the aviation combat element:


1. Realignment of squadrons within each Marine Aircraft


2. Availability of squadron assets.

3. Revised concept of employment for the Marine Aviation

Logistics Squadron.

4. Elimination of numerous commands.

5. Revised concept of employment for the Marine Air

Command and Control System.


The most obvious impact of this proposal is the


realignment of squadrons within the Marine Aircraft Group


(MAG). This proposal would realign the composition of each


NAG from one along functional lines to one that ensures the


capability to provide all six functions of Marine aviation.


This realignment will require some units to relocate, but only


to the extent required to obtain the proper distribution of


squadrons within a theater. Lastly, the realignment will


provide the MAG headquarters staff with the necessary training


for the MAG to fulfill its mission as the aviation combat


element of a Marine Expeditionary Brigade.


Currently MAG's are organized along functional lines--


control groups, support groups, helicopter groups, fighter


groups, and attack groups. This proposal would "mirror image"


all the MAG's that are assigned as the aviation combat element


of a MEB. Each of these Groups would have two (one for MPF


MAG's) medium helicopter squadrons (HMM) flying the V-22, one


heavy helicopter squadron (HMH) flying the CH-53E, one


light/attack helicopter squadron (HMLA) flying the UH-1 and


the AH-1, two fighter/attack squadrons (VMFA) flying the F/A-


18, one attack squadron (VMA) flying the AV-8, and one all-


weather attack squadron (VMA(AW)) flying the A-6. In addition


to the flying squadrons, each MAG would have one aviation


logistics squadron (MALS), two support squadrons (MWSS), one


substantially reinforced air control squadron (MACS), a low


altitude air defense (LAAD) battery, and a light anti-aircraft


missile (LAAM) battery.


In addition to the realignment of the MAG's assigned to


the amphibious and the maritime prepositioning force brigades,


six other squadrons in I and II MEF would be permanently


aligned with a Marine Expeditionary Unit. Three medium


helicopter squadrons, one heavy helicopter squadron, one


light/attack helicopter squadron, one attack squadron, and one


low altitude air defense platoon are required to fulfill the


standardized troop lists of three MEU's (28). One medium


helicopter squadron and one-third of the assets, including


intermediate support, of each of the other squadrons would be


assigned to each of the MEU's.


Each Force Troops of each MEF would also have a MAG.


This Group would have an aerial refueler transport squadron


(VMGR) flying the KC-130, and an observation squadron (VMO)


flying the OV-10. The Force Troops MAG in II MEF would have a


tactical electronic warfare squadron (VMAQ) flying the EA-6,


while the Force Troops in I MEF would have a tactical


reconnaissance squadron (VMFP) flying the F/A-18. Each of


these squadrons is capable of employing detachments to support


either of the two brigades or any of the MEU's.


With the realignment of squadrons within each MAG there


will also be some relocation of squadrons. This proposal does


not require that all units of a particular Group are


garrisoned at the same air station. The only requirement is


that all units assigned to any particular Group must be


located within the same theater. Within I and II MEF,


squadrons would remain garrisoned at their current air


stations. Within III MEF some squadrons must be relocated


from Hawaii to Okinawa. Table 1 illustrates the current, on-


hand distribution (O/H), proposed distribution of flying squadrons


among the three MEF's (REQR) and the total number of squadrons


specified by the Aviation Master Plan (PLAN).


Only eleven flying squadrons would have to be relocated--


eight squadrons between the MEF's and three within III MEF.


Any plan that proposes to relocate additional squadrons to a


foreign country must consider the impact on the established


balance of forces. This plan would increase the number of









HMM 5 6 6 6 4 3 15 18 15

HMH 5 3 3 3 1 2 9 6 8

HMLA 4 3 2 3 0 2 6 8 8

VMFA 3 4 6 4 3 4 12 12 12

VMA 4 3 4 3 0 2 8 8 8

VMA (AW) 2 2 3 2 0 2 5 5 6


flying squadrons on Okinawa by one medium helicopter squadron


relocated from Hawaii. This increase would be offset by a


decrease of two support squadrons relocated from Okinawa to




Once the squadrons are properly distributed throughout


the MEF's, the Groups will face a serious span of control


problem. A MAG headquarters in I or II MEF will have its


subordinate squadrons spread across three air stations located


hundreds of miles apart. The MAG in Okinawa will have its


squadrons spread between Futenma and Iwakuni. Although this


is not the ideal basing plan, it is no different from that


which is intended whenever a MAGTF is employed. Rotary


wing and fixed wing aircraft will not be based at the same


airfield. The range and response time of rotary wing aircraft


are such that it requires them to be forward based. Fixed


wing aircraft have much quicker response time and can,


therefore, operate effectively from an air base safely


ensconced in the rear area. It is during peacetime that we


are enjoined to prepare for war (14-41). Thus it is logical,


hence appropriate, that a MAG headquarters must, in peacetime,


contend with the same span of control problem it will face in




After implementing this realignment, the MAG will avoid


the "ad hocery in crisis" that the Commandant decried (18).


When a MEB is deployed for combat, the MAG that forms its


aviation combat element will be far more ready than our Groups


today. The realigned MAG is, following the advice of the


Commandant (22), task organized for the "most likely


contingency." Clearly, the MEF commander can still refine the


task organization with units from Force Troops or from the


sister brigade. The vast majority of the subordinate squadron


commanders will have established the long-term working


relationships with their group commander necessary to develop


familiarity and trust, which are essential to our doctrine of


maneuver warfare (14-63). Not only have the squadron


commanders developed these habitual relationships, the MAG


headquarters staff has also developed long-term working


relationships. The Group staff is well prepared to execute


all six functions of Marine aviation since it does so in


peacetime with its permanently assigned assets.


A critical factor in the viability of this plan is


whether sufficient assets exist to allow them to be allocated


to each brigade. When insufficient assets exist to meet all


requirements simultaneously, it is prudent to hold all assets


as general purpose forces. Such is the case in this proposal


with the squadrons that have been assigned to Force Troops.


Excesses and shortages in the number of squadrons required to


execute this plan must be referenced to the number of


squadrons envisioned in 2001 by the Aviation Master Plan.


The Aviation Master Plan envisions a change in the number


of each type of helicopter squadron and an increase in the


number of observation and of tactical reconnaissance


squadrons. The number of medium helicopter squadrons will


increase from 15 to 18 with the conversion from the H-46 to


the V-22. This will be accomplished by changing three heavy


helicopter squadrons to medium squadrons with their conversion


from the H-53D to the V-22. Three more heavy helicopter


squadrons will exchange their H-53D aircraft for the H-53E.


This change will bring the total number of heavy helicopter


squadrons, flying the CH-53E, to six. The number of


light/attack helicopter squadrons will increase from six to


eight with the introduction of the AH-1W. The number of


observation squadrons will increase from two to three. The


number of tactical reconnaissance squadrons will increase from


one to three with the conversion from the RF-4 to the F/A-18.


On the SMCR side of the aviation plan, almost every


aircraft community will change either number of squadrons or


type of aircraft. Both medium helicopter squadrons and the


only heavy helicopter squadron will convert from the H-46 and


the H-53D to the V-22. In the process of the conversion, four


squadrons will emerge from the three. All three light


helicopter squadrons (HML) and the only attack helicopter


squadron (HMA) will merge to form two light/attack helicopter


squadrons (HMLA). All three fighter/attack and all five


attack squadrons will convert from the F-4 and the A-4 to the


F/A-18 and the AV-8. They will emerge from the conversion as


four VMFA and two VMA squadrons. One additional VMGR squadron


has joined the SMCR. Finally, the VMFP squadron will exchange


its RF-4 for the F/A-18D.


Table 2 illustrates the flying squadron requirements,


active duty and reserve, for the Aviation Master Plan and for


this plan. The only inconsistencies between this proposal and


the Master Plan are with the HMH and VMA(AW) squadrons, active


and reserve, the active HMM squadrons, and the reserve VMO,


VMAQ, and VMFP squadrons. An examination of these communities


will reveal the rationale for these differences.


This proposal established a requirement for 15 medium


helicopter squadrons based on the current inventory of medium


helicopter squadrons. The V-22 has a greater range and


quicker response time than the H-46. Hence, it is illogical


that with the introduction of a more capable aircraft the


Marine Corps would need more medium lift squadrons flying that




The heavy lift requirement has shifted from the H-53D to


the H-53E. The Aviation Master Plan envisions six heavy lift


helicopter squadrons, sufficient assets for one per MEB.


However, that plan ignores the requirement for the assets of


one squadron to support the three MEU's on each coast. The


current acquisition strategy for the H-53E is for a


procurement of 105 aircraft through the end of 1991 to support


six operational squadrons and one training squadron. However,


a total procurement of 191 aircraft is required to meet the


Marine Corps heavy lift requirements into the next century


(16-3.23). This additional procurement will be sufficient,


baring an increase in aircraft attrition, to rectify the


shortages in the number of HMH squadrons in both the active


duty and the reserve forces.


This proposal requires an all-weather attack capability


in each MEB--amphibious, MPF, and reserve mobilization. This


capability is performed by A-6 squadrons. However, the



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current inventory and the planned inventory of these squadrons


is not sufficient to provide one squadron per MEB. As shown


in Table 2, the Marine Corps has only five A-6 squadrons.


Throughout the aviation community there is an unspoken


reluctance to increase the number of A-6 squadrons, regardless


of need, due to its relatively slow speed, wing design


problems, and near equivalent capabilities of more modern


aircraft. Although the A-6 is eminently capable of fulfilling


its all-weather role with a substantial weapons load, the


economic realities of reopening a production line for an aircraft


that has some significant shortcomings dominate the decision not


to increase the number of A-6 squadrons. However, at the start


of the next century, the Marine Corps needs an all-weather attack


capability for each of its expeditionary brigades. This


capability may be met by acquisition of a new aircraft (highly


unlikely given the coming austere budgets and historical


acquisition time), or by modification of an existing aircraft.


The Aviation Master Plan envisions a SMCR with one VMO,


one VMAQ, and one VMFP squadron. This proposal lists those


squadrons as excess. The concept of employment of the VMO,


and the VMGR squadrons are as MEF assets. However, there is


no plan to employ the 4th Marine Division, the 4th Marine


Aircraft Wing and the 4th Force Service Support Group as a


MEF. The VMAQ squadron, in addition to being a MEF asset,


is generally considered to be a national asset. A reserve


mobilization MEB has no need for these squadrons. This


MEB can not be employed without a Presidential "200,000


call-up" or a national mobilization. In either case, the


conflict has escalated from low-intensity or mid-intensity


conflict to high-intensity conflict. Thus, the full


capabilities of the MEF to perform these missions are


presumably already in the theater of conflict. The needs


of the Marine Corps would be better served by transferring


the physical assets of these squadrons to the active




The concept of employment of the Marine Aviation


Logistics Squadron (MALS) must be revised for the effective


implementation of this proposal. Recently, the Marine Corps


adopted the MALS concept. Under this, the Group headquarters


portion of the old Headquarters and Maintenance Squadron


(HAMS) was removed and designated simply as the MAG


headquarters. The "and Maintenance" portion of the HAMS was


redesignated as the MALS. This redesignation is only somewhat


more appropriate since the "and Maintenance" portion not only


included the intermediate maintenance functions, but also the


aviation supply function. With the exception of aviation


intermediate maintenance and aviation supply, the functions of


Marine aviation logistics are really performed by the Marine


Wing Support Squadron. Each aircraft group was, nevertheless,


assigned a MALS. The concept of employment of the MALS is


evident from the amphibious and the maritime prepositioning


force brigade tables of organization (11). A fixed wing and a


rotary wing MALS is to be assigned to each brigade.


Since each MALS has only the personnel and equipment to


provide intermediate maintenance for the aircraft assigned to


the parent aircraft group, the concept of contingency support


packages evolved. A contingency support package (CSP)


consists of the people, parts, equipment, and mobile


maintenance facilities necessary to support the aircraft


assigned for the mission. The contingency support package is


developed by adding a deployment CSP (DCSP) and a fly-in


support package (FISP) to a core or common CSP. The common


CSP is one that is universally applicable to all Marine


fixed wing or to all rotary wing aircraft. The deployment CSP


is composed of the support items unique to any particular


aircraft. The people required for the deployment CSP are


listed on each squadron's table of organization as "MALS


augment." The equipment for the deployment CSP comes from a


pro rata share of the old HAMS equipment. The fly-in support


package is a ten day supply of organizational level parts that


the flying squadron normally takes on the flight ferry. Under


this concept, each MALS would support the aircraft that were


collocated with it.


This proposal assigns but one MALS to each MAG and none


for the squadrons assigned to a MEU. For the latter


squadrons, the ship's Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance


Department (AIMD) provides the common CSP, while each squadron


must provide its own deployment CSP. When deployed, the MALS


provides the common CSP and each squadron provides its


deployed CSP. Under the current concept of employment, the


flying squadrons and their parent MALS are all collocated with


the MAG headquarters. Under this proposal, they are not, for


it is quite conceivable that a MAG headquarters and its


associated MALS will have assigned squadrons spread among


three air stations. At least one of those three air stations


will not have a MALS garrisoned there. The issue then becomes


one of now having organized the MALS for warfighting, how is


it adapted for peacetime?


A solution to the problem can be obtained from the Navy.


Each air station that garrisons a significant number of flying


squadrons would establish an aircraft intermediate maintenance


department. The common CSP from the former HAMS and the


deployment CSP's from the squadron would be assigned to the


AIMD as category I augmentees under the Fleet Assistance


Program. Essentially, all the production capability of the


MALS would be "fapped" to the AIMD. The aircraft maintenance


management functions would remain as the only permanent


functions within the MALS. The drawback to this plan, as with


the current one, is that the commander who must employ the


MALS in combat has little control over the training of the


Marines who will man it.


As with the ground combat element, one of the most


partisan issues raised by this proposal is elimination of


numerous commands within each MEF: the wing headquarters,


the wing headquarters squadron, the support group, the control


group, the air traffic control squadron, the air support


squadron, the communications squadron, the headquarters and


headquarters squadrons of both the control group and the


support group, and the LAAD and LAAM battalions. In addition


to these units, one MAG headquarters and its associated MALS


from I MEF and two MAG headquarters and MALS from II MEF would


be eliminated. Additionally, if only 15 V-22 squadrons


are maintained instead of 18, then one HMH and three HMM flags


would be folded. The final four flags to be folded would be


from the SMCR--the observation squadron, the tactical


electronic squadron, the tactical reconnaissance squadron, and


one of the two air support squadrons (MASS).


Elimination of these units really represents elimination


of redundant levels of command. The warfighting capability of


the squadrons, battalions, groups and wings has been


reorganized under another existing command. However, in the


few cases where actual warfighting capability was eliminated--


three HMM, one HMH, and three SMCR squadrons, the squadrons


were eliminated because they were superfluous to our concept


of employment in a low- or mid-intensity conflict.


Another major problem, though perhaps not as parochial


as the previous one, is the concept of employment for the


Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS). The revised


concept of employment must address integration of the MACCS


into the host nation or joint task force (JTF) air command and


control system for the initial brigade that is deployed into


the theater of conflict. It must also account for the


integration of subsequent brigades into the theater air


command and control system. Finally, it must provide a means


for the joint task force commander to task the MAGTF commander


with air missions.


Once a Marine brigade, whether it was amphibious or


maritime prepositioning force in origin, has assumed control


of air operations ashore, it must be able to exercise that


control to the same degree of capability of that formerly of


an aircraft wing. Each brigade has been task organized with


the assets of the former air control group to be able to


provide just that degree of control. The air control element


of the aviation combat element will become integrated in the


theater air command and control system. In a low-intensity


or mid-intensity conflict, a brigade may be the only Marine


force in the theater. Thus, the air command and control


problem is resolved. The MACCS is completely integrated into


the theater system and the joint task force commander can


directly task the MAGTF commander for air missions. As the


conflict escalated and the size of the Marine presence


increased from a MEB to a MEF, the MAGTF commander could


request a greater portion of the air command and control


system. The air control elements of each follow-on brigade


would link with the first air control element. Thus, the


first element into the theater becomes the central node for


the MAGTF air command and control system. Although the MACCS


has expanded to a decentralized command and control system,


the joint task force air component commander still maintains a


single point of contact with the MAGTF. The joint task force


commander as always has a direct line to the MAGTF commander


for assigning any missions, air or ground.


Impact on the Combat Service Support Element



The impact of this proposal on the Brigade Service


Support Group should be evaluated with the following,


subjective criteria: (1) command and control, (2) training and


supervision, (3) limited equipment, (4) peacetime


requirements, and (5) transition from peace to war. The


Center for Naval Analysis used the same criteria for


evaluating a BSSG structure concept (33-8.1).


In evaluating the impact of this proposal on the BSSG


with respect to command and control functions, one major point


to consider is that many functions of combat service support


are interdependent. Coordination of these functions will


require the involvement of the combat service support element


commander. This coordination also suggests abandonment of the


functional area management concept. A commander accustomed to


coordinating interdependent functions will, presumably, be


more prepared to do so in combat than another commander who


had until just prior to deployment been assigned to a


functional battalion.


Evaluating the impact of this proposal with respect to


supervision and training yields two opposite conclusions. The


train as you are going to fight philosophy is firmly embraced


by this proposal. Although the commander may be better


trained, it is impossible to predict whether the smaller


functional units of the BSSG, companies, foster more effective


military occupational specialty training than the larger units


of the FSSG. Organizing in BSSG's increases the requirement


for qualified supervisors. Additionally, since the units are


smaller, the supervisory billets will be of a lower grade than


in the FSSG. The problem becomes one of not only obtaining


supervisors but of obtaining young, qualified supervisors.


One of the key issues raised by this proposal is the lack


of equipment to support two brigades. Clearly, this proposal


is hampered by the proliferation of oversized, expensive,


seldom used or one-of-a-kind items within the combat service


support element. The 1987 study by the Center for Naval


Analysis discovered only seven one-of-a-kind items in the 1990


BSSG equipment list (33-8.8).


Another argument against this proposal is that the BSSG


lacks the depth of assets to be able to support conflicting


peacetime requirements. Elimination of the conflicting


peacetime requirements is precisely the objective of this


proposal. Presumably the unity of the brigade command will


prevent brigade units from being assigned missions that do not


have any bearing on the brigade's overall mission.


All Marine Corps commands are enjoined to focus all


peacetime activities on achieving combat readiness (14-41).


However, in spite of our combat readiness and our task


organization for the most likely contingency, there will be


some last moment "ad hocery" or refinements to the task


organization. The staff of a functional battalion may be more


qualified than the staff of a BSSG to allocate assets during a


task organization refinement.


Impact on the Command Element



The adoption of this proposal will have five significant


effects on the command element:


1. Reinforcement of the principle of unity of command.

2. Support for implementation of the maneuver warfare


3. Complication of span of control problems.

4. Increased professional competence of the MAGTF staff.

5. Elimination of the composite MAGTF problem.


Most importantly, the MEB commander will finally have direct


influence on the training of the Marines he will have to lead


in combat. The MEB commander will now be able to maintain


habitual relationships with his staff and subordinate


commanders. However, the MEF commander will have multiple


ground combat elements.


With the elimination of redundant and parallel commands,


there will be no need to "dual hat" a general officer as the


commander of two distinctly different commands. Additionally,


with the elimination of the division, wing and FSSG command


billets, there will be an excess number of general officers.


Thus the Marine Corps will change from a situation of a lack


of general officers requiring "dual hatted" commanders to a


situation of a lack of general officer billets. The Marine


Corps can meet this change by fulfilling its needs for general


officers elsewhere or by reducing the number of general


officers. More significantly, the MAGTF commander may now


devote more time to fighting his MAGTF.


A second advantage of this proposal is that with the


assignment of units to the command vice the designation of


units, the commanding general finally has control over the


tactical proficiency of the units he will lead in combat. By


the existing organization, the subordinate units of the MEB


remained under the command and control of the parent command


until the MAGTF was activated. At that time, the subordinate


unit would shift to the operational command and control of the


MEB commander. The MEB commander would have a chance to


observe the tactical proficiency of the subordinate units only


during an exercise or during an actual contingency. However,


under this proposal, the MEB commander has the responsibility


of not only leading his units in combat, but also of


preparing them for war.


The adoption of his proposal facilitates acceptance of


the maneuver warfare doctrine. The MEB commander and his


staff have a greater opportunity improve their tactical


proficiency while daily commanding and controlling assigned


forces. The MAGTF forces are directed toward a geographical


area. Therefore, the commander and his staff will have a


greater opportunity to identify possible antagonists and to


perform area studies than will a commander of general purpose


forces, such as divisions and wings. The information obtained


from the study of potential antagonists and of mission areas


will better prepare the MEB commander to strike at the enemy's


critical vulnerabilities and to destroy his will to fight.


One difficult issue raised by this proposal is that of


span of control. Under the existing MAGTF organization, each


MAGTF has normally one ground combat element. A MEU has a


battalion landing team; a MEB, a regimental landing team; and


a MEF, a Marine division. The MAGTF commander could assign a


mission to the ground combat element commander and allow him


to coordinate the fires and maneuver of his regiments. It is


possible that a MEF commander might have two ground combat


elements, each consisting of a Marine division. Due to the


size of each of these ground combat elements, it is highly


unlikely that they would be assigned the same objective. For


the purposes of maneuver and fire support coordination, the


two ground combat elements could be considered to be


conducting independent operations. Under the proposed


reorganization, a MEF would have two or more MEB's, each with


a regimental landing team. In this case, MEF commander would


now have to direct and coordinate the fires and maneuver of


each regimental landing team since it is most likely that all


of the ground combat elements would be assigned missions on


the same objective.


Permanent MAGTF headquarters were created, in part, out


of a concern for the professional competence of the MAGTF


staff. With the existing MAGTF headquarters, the staff may


develop develop the necessary relationships to operate


efficiently. However, one of the major functions of the


staff is to assist the MAGTF commander in integrating the


combat power of his subordinate elements. Now with forces


assigned, the staff will be able to practice in peacetime


the tasks they must accomplish in combat.


This proposal may eliminate the composite MAGTF problem.


Under this reorganization, there will be no headlong drive to


get the MEF, division, wing and FSSG headquarters into the


theater of conflict. Each MEB is fully capable of commanding


and controlling all the functions of the aviation, ground


combat and combat service support elements and fighting as an


integrated MAGTF. The MEF commander exercises control over


the combat units through his subordinate MEB commander. The


MEF commander and his staff are, therefore, required in the


theater of conflict only when more than one MEB is present.


Impact on Manpower Structure



Although this proposal may produce beneficial effects on


each element of the MAGTF, it must produce significant


manpower savings to warrant the turmoil of reorganization.


There are three major manpower concerns that must be addressed:


1. Number of saved or excess billets.


2. Officer and enlisted grade distribution.


3. MOS progression.


Manpower structure is dependent on the personnel budget


and rank distribution. For a given budget, the number of


billets that can be created is dependent on the annual pay,


hence the rank, of the billet holder. It is, therefore, not


particularly useful to simply count the number of excess


billets created by the proposal. Those billets must be


related to their impact on the personnel budget.


Since annual pay is one of the largest direct operating


costs included in the personnel budget, any analysis should


use annual pay as the sole cost of a billet. The difficulty


in expressing excess billets strictly in terms of dollars is


that the figures lose significance. Therefore, the cost of


each billet shall be normalized by the average annual pay of a


Private/Private First Class. Table 3 lists the average annual


pay for Marines of each rank. Table 4 summarizes the ratio


between the average annual pay of a Pvt/PFC and all the other


ranks. A cursory view of these tables shows that a Sergeant


Major has an average annual pay of $37,827, which is roughly


3.5 times greater than that of a Pvt/PFC. Therefore, on a


dollar basis, a Sergeant Major's billet is equivalent to 3.5


Pvt/PFC billets. Likewise, a colonel's billet is equivalent


to 6.0 Pvt/PFC billets. Table 5 lists the excess manpower



Click here to view image


structure created within each MEF by abolishing the command


elements of those 29 units. The excess billets of each unit


are listed by the number of enlisted billets, the number of


officer billets, and the number of Pvt/PFC equivalents. A


brief look at Table 5 shows that although 95 officers and 274


enlisted Marines are assigned to the Wing Headquarters, their


average annual pay is equivalent to that of 921 privates. By


way of comparison, a rifle company has an equivalent pay of


244.6 privates and a medium helicopter squadron, 364.5 privates.


With the elimination of 29 command elements in each MEF,


the Marine Corps realizes a total excess of 12,792 enlisted


billets and 1830 officer billets. Table 6 lists the total


number of excess billets by rank. These numbers represent






Pvt/PFC LCpl Cpl Sgt SSgt GySgt 1stSgt SgtMaj

2085 3372 2988 2031 1225 870 489 318


Lts Capt Maj LtCol Col Gen

330 555 414 234 87 15



7.2% of the enlisted strength and 9.0% of the officer


strength. The total annual pay of these billets is over $305


million, which is approximately 8.6% of the estimated $3,549


million the Marine Corps spends for pay. By comparison, the


annual payroll of 114 rifle companies or 75 medium helicopter


squadrons is less than that of these excess billets.


Although this proposal represents a 7.2% reduction in


enlisted strength and a 9.0% reduction in officer strength,


there is no significant change in the remaining grade


distribution. Figures 20 and 21 compare the existing grade


distribution with that as a consequence of this proposal for


both enlisted Marines and Marine officers, respectively. The


greatest change in the enlisted distribution is just 3/10th of


one percent. The officer ranks show a slight skewing toward


the lower grades with the ratio of lieutenants increasing 2.4%.


Even though the grade distribution remains the same, the


proposal does create a problem with MOS progression for


officers. The same problem of diminished command opportunity


that artillery officers, tracked vehicle officers, and


engineer officers face in the ground combat element will


confront combat service support officers, air defense


officers, air support officers and air traffic control


officers. In the enlisted ranks, MOS progression is not


exacerbated by the proposal since the preponderance of the


excess senior enlisted billets were taken from the division,


wing, and FSSG staffs. Again, the candid response to this


problem is not all Marines will be afforded the opportunity


for a major command; nor will they all be afforded the


opportunity to serve for twenty years.


Clearly, this proposal can produce significant manpower


savings. It will, of course, take some time to abolish these


billets and to relocate the billet holders before the savings


can be realized. If the personnel budget is drastically


reduced requiring vertical cuts in the manpower structure,


then this proposal offers an excellent opportunity to absorb


those cuts without sacrificing combat efficiency.


Impact on Public Law



Section 5013, Title 10, United States Code, currently


states, "The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy,


shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat


divisions and three air wings and such other land combat,


aviation, and other services as may be organic therein" (2-


606). Prior to implementation of this proposal, this section


of Title 10 must be amended. A simple but sufficient


amendment is to replace the words "three combat divisions and


three air wings" with "three Marine Expeditionary Forces."


The effect of this change must be measured against the


legislative intent of the original version and how well that


purpose has been achieved.


Following the post-World War II military unification


hearings, Congress, in addition to establishing the charter of


the modern Marine Corps, established its composition. Section


206(c) of the National Security Act of 1947 stated, "The


United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy,


shall include land combat and service forces and such aviation


as may be organic therein" (40-31). This broad description of


the Marine Corps composition did not establish its minimum


size. President Harry Truman and the top leadership of the


new Department of Defense, including Secretary of Defense


Louis Johnson, Secretary of the Navy Francis Matthews,


Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar Bradley,


and Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Forrest Sherman, were


openly hostile toward the continued existence of the Marine


Corps as a co-equal service. Since these men held budgetary


authority over the Marine Corps, the strength of the Corps


fell from over 92,000 in 1947 to under 75,000 in 1950 (40-38).


The outbreak of hostilities in Korea stopped the almost


certain elimination of the Marine Corps or at least, its


reversion to its traditional role with greatly reduced size


and influence. Despite the performance of the 1st Marine


Division in Korea, the civilian leadership in the Pentagon


remained hostile to the Marine Corps. However, Congress


passed the Douglas-Mansfield Act (Public Law 82-416) on 20


June 1952, giving the Commandant of the Marine Corps co-equal


status with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all issues of direct


interest to the Marine Corps. The Act also established the


current language of Title 10, Section 5013. Thus, the


legislative intent of the Act was to protect the existence of


the Marine Corps by establishing a minimum strength.


The terms "combat division" and "air wing" are


sufficiently vague that one may argue for any sized Marine


Corps based on his definition of the terms. Since 1952, the


size of a Marine infantry division has varied widely. The


size of an Army division has also varied in size during that


period. Even today the strength of any Army division


(infantry, light infantry, mechanized, air assault, airborne,


or armor) is different from that of any Marine division. In


fact, the strength of each Marine division differs from each


other. A Marine aircraft wing is significantly larger, by an


order of magnitude, than a comparably named Navy or Air Force


unit. To the Air Force and the Navy, an air wing is the next


level unit above a squadron. The embodiment of the Navy's


definition is the carrier air wing or functional wing. Marine


aircraft wings, which number approximately 400 aircraft, dwarf


the Navy carrier air or type commander wings and the Air Force


wings, each of which number less than 100 aircraft.


Although the Douglas-Mansfield Act ensured the continued


existence of the Marine Corps in the early 1950's, has the


wording of the Act, ". . . not less than three combat


divisions and three air wings . . .", protected the manpower


strength of the Marine Corps from falling below that level? A


quick review of the strength of the Marine Corps today answers


that question with a resounding NO! The Third Marine Division


currently has but four infantry battalions, two tank


companies, and two amphibious assault battalions. The First


Marine Aircraft Wing is similarly understrength with but two


fighter/attack squadrons, two attack squadrons, one refueler


squadron and one each, medium, heavy, and light/attack


helicopter squadron. Clearly, the Third Marine Division and


the First Marine Aircraft Wing are not a full "combat division


and air wing" within the intent of the law.


The change in wording from "three combat divisions and


three air wings" to "three Marine Expeditionary Forces" does


not change the basic meaning, intent, or protection afforded


by the original law. Although the change replaces the


original nebulous terms with equally nebulous terms, the new


terms reflect the current Marine Corps employment philosophy.


It is clear from the legislative history of the Douglas-


Mansfield Act that the people of the United States want a


Marine Corps. This change does not affect that basic desire


of the people.







This plan is a viable alternative to the current organization


of the Fleet Marine Forces. The plan provides the opportunity to


realign manpower structure from redundant units to combat arms


units. The proposal also provides a rational basis for aviation


programming decisions. Lastly, it provides an organization


that is conducive to the implementation of the Marine Corps


warf ighting doctrine.


The plan eliminates 29 redundant headquarters within each


MEF. The manpower structure of these excess units equates to


114 rifle companies. This structure can be redirected into


combat arms units to fulfill critical needs, such as a fourth


rifle company in each infantry battalion or an additional


light/attack helicopter squadron or, the excess structure can


be eliminated outright, thus creating a substantial savings in


the Marine Corps military personnel account.


The proposal can be implemented immediately except for


several aviation considerations. The current distribution of


squadrons and capabilities is insufficient to meet the


requirements of the Marine Corps under this organizational


plan. However, the identified deficiencies in light/attack


helicopter, heavy lift helicopter, and all-weather attack


capabilities provides a rational basis for aviation


programming decisions.


This proposal vastly complicates the span of control


problems for the MEF commander in combat. The MEF will be


composed of three subordinate MEB's. Since none of the MEB's


will possess sufficient combat power to achieve a MEF


objective single handedly, the MEF commander must coordinate


the elements of two or more MEB's on a single objective. This


issue could be resolved prior to acceptance of the proposal or


simply tabled in the expectation that a MEF would not be


employed as a complete unit in the foreseeable future.


The warfighting doctrine of the Marine Corps requires


harmonious sychronization of the independent initiative of


subordinate commanders. This can only be achieved by the close


and continuous relationship for the senior commander and his


subordinates. This proposal contains an organizational scheme


that supports the establishment of those relationships.


The current organization of the Fleet Marine Forces is


NOT "broken." Division-wing teams have served the needs of


the Marine Corps for many years. As we view the next century,


we see the Marine Corps racked by budgetary constraints and


often employed on short notice in stability operations and


limited objective operations. We should adopt an


organizational structure that is maximized for those


operations and one that can survive financial austerity.



Click here to view image






1. Commandant of the Marine Corps message. "Execution for POM

90-94 MAGTF Structure and Manning Requirements." Washington:

HQMC, 222030z June 1988. Provided implementing instructions for

the recommendations of the Force Structure Study Group, 1988.


2. United States Government. United States Code, Title 10.

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983. Provided specific

wording of the law that establishes the mission and size of the

Marine Corps.


3. United States Marine Corps. Organization and Composition of

the Fleet Marine Force (Hogaboom Board). Washington: HQMC,

1956. Primarily concerned with the organizaton and composition

of the Division, Wing, and Force Troops. Concerned about the

impact of reduced military budgets and manpower.


4. United States Marine Corps. MAGTF Master Plan (Final

Draft). Quantico: Marine Corps Combat Development Center, 1989.

Provided direction for the Marine Corps during the next decade.

Defined levels of conflict. Provided guidance on force structure.


5. United States Marine Corps. Report of the Force Structure

Study Group. Washington: HQMC, 1988. Recommended structure

changes that would provide a Total Force capability of fighting

and winning the most likely conflicts of the 1990's.


6. United States Marine Corps. Guidelines for Forming a

Composite MAGTF. Washington: Advanced Amphibious Study Group,

1985. Provided an initial concept for compositing a MEB to a MEF.


7. United States Marine Corps. "Final Report: 1-85 Compositing

Evaluation." Camp Pendleton: I Marine Amphibious Force, 1985.

Evaluated several techniques for compositing a MEB to a MEF.


8. United States Marine Corps. "C4I Study: Report of First

Study Iteration." Camp Pendleton: I MAF, 1985. Initial report

of an evaluation of several techniques for compositing a MEB to a



9. United States Marine Corps. Headquarters Redundancy

Analysis (Board of Colonels). Washington: HQMC, 1987.

Evaluated missions of FMFLant/Pac, MEF, MEB, Division, Wing, and

FSSG headquarters. Also evaluated missions of bases and stations.


10. United States Marine Corps. Fleet Marine Force (IP 1-4).

Quantico: MCCDC, 1987. Provided a somewhat dated description of

the organization of the Fleet Marine Forces.


11. United States Marine Corps. "Tables of Organization."

Washington: HQMC, 1988. Invaluable resource for evaluating

manpower and organizational requirements of the Fleet Marine

Forces. Obtained tables of organization on computer diskettes

from the Central Design and Programming Activity, Quantico. That

form proved much easier to use than paper or microfiche forms.


12. United States Marine Corps. Mission and Force Structure

Study (Haynes Board). Washington: Headquarters Marine Corps,

1976. Described major considerations for both keeping the Division,

Wing, and FSSG organization, and for adopting a permanent brigade



13. United States Marine Corps. Marine Air-Ground Task Force

Doctrine (FMFM 0-1). Washington: HQMC, 1979. Provided a

cursory explanation of the roles of the various MAGTF's and how

they function.


14. United States Marine Corps. Warfighting (FMFM 1).

Washington: HQMC, 1989. Provided the Marine Corps philosophy on

command and control in combat.


15. United States Marine Corps. The Permanent MAGTF

Headquarters Concept and How It Applies in the Formation of a

Composite MAGTF. Washington: Advanced Amphibious Study Group,

1985. Provided a revised concept of compositing a MEB to a MEF.


16. United States Marine Corps. Concepts and Issues.

Washington: HQMC, February l989. Provided an explanation for

Congress for the need for various Marine Corps programs for the

next decade.


17. United States Navy. Department of the Navy Long Term

Amphibious Lift Requirement and Optimum Ship Mix Study.

Washington: Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 1983.

Presented programs to provide the assets required to conduct

amphibious assaults with a MEF and a MEB by 1994.




18. Commandant of the Marine Corps memorandum for the Chief of

Staff, HQMC. 8 March 1985. Provided the Commandant's views on

the permanent MAGTF headquarters concept.


19. Chief of Staff, HQMC memorandum to Deputy Chief of Staff

(Plans, Policies and Operations). 15 January 1985. Provided the

Chief of Staff's views on the revised, permanent MAGTF

headquarters concept.


20. Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans, Policies, and Operations),

HQMC memorandum for the Assistant Commandant. "Marine Air Ground

Task Force Headquarters Decision Brief." 8 June 1983. Provided

the background information leading to the decision to approve the

permanent MAGTF headquarters concept.



21. Director, Operations Division memorandum to Deputy Chief of

Staff (Plans, Policies, and Operations), HQMC. "Permanent MAGTF

HQ Concept." l March 1985. Provided a summary of the revised,

permanent MAGTF headquarters concept.


22. Special Assistant for Amphibious and Prepositioning Matters

(PP&O) memorandum for the Commandant, HQMC. "Permanent MAGTF

Headquarters Concept." 13 January 1985. Provided, as a marginal

note, the Commandant's views on the revised, permanent MAGTF

headquarters concept.


23. Brigadier General Marc A. Cisneros, USA, United States

Southern Command. Letter to author. 7 February 1989. Provided

the response time the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command,

requires of a MEB or MEF.


24. Major General J. P. Hoar, USMC, United States Central

Command. Letter to author. 30 January 1989. Excellent response

to author's letter. Provided the response time the Commander-in-

Chief, U.S. Central Command, requires of a MEB or MEF.


25. Major General Royal N. Moore, Jr, USMC, United States

Pacific Command. Letter to author. 27 January 1989. Provided

the response time the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command,

requires of a MEB or MEF.


26. Major General H. C. Stackpole, III, USMC, United States

Atlantic Command. Letter to author. 15 February 1989. Provided

the response time the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command,

requires of a MEB or MEF.


27. Lieutenant General E. J. Godfrey, USMC. Address to the ACMC

Committee. Washington: HQMC, 30 January 1989. Provided the

views of the Commanding General, FMF Pacific, on force structure



28. Colonel Michael Wyly, USMC. "Modernizing the MAGTF."

Unpublished essay. Provided a discussion of the need to

reorganize from divisions and wings to brigades.


29. Lieutenant General E. T. Cook, USMC. Commanding General,

Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic, letter, "Standardization of MEU

(SOC) Troop and Equipment Lists. 28 June 1988. Provided the

organizational strengths of each element of the MEU.




30. Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record. Where Does the Marine

Corps Go From Here? Washington: Brookings Institute, 1976.

Discussed post-Vietnam War missions for the Marine Corps as a

whole. Not a significant value for this project.


31. Lieutenant Colonel Kenneth J. Clifford. Progress and

Purpose: A Developmental History of the United States Marine

Corps, 1900-1970. Washington: History and Museums Division,

HQMC, 1973. Emphasized the innovations of the Marine Corps.

Briefly discussed the environment and recommendations of the

Hogaboom Board.


32. Lieutenant Colonel John S. Grinalds, USMC. Structures for

the Marine Corps for the 1980's and 1990's. Washington:

National Defense University, 1978. Discusses structure of Marine

Corps in terms of global mission. Not of significant value for

this project.

33. Mark T. Lewellyn, Dana Burwell, Harold Furchtgott-Roth,

Dwight Lyons, and Margaret Tierney. Analysis of the Marine Corps

Combat Service Support Structure. Alexandria: Center for Naval

Analysis, April 1987. Provided indepth analysis of several

organizational structures of the combat service support elements,

including a permanent BSSG. Recommended for further study.


34. Allan R. Millett. Semper Fidelis, The History of the United

States Marine Corps. New York: Macmillan Publishing Company,

Inc, 1980. Provided scholarly overview of the history of the

Marine Corps. Greatest value was the extensive bibliography.


35. Lieutenant Colonel Ronald R. Borowitz, USMC. "Improving Marine

Air," Marine Corps Gazette. February 1984. Recommended forming

one composite MAG within each MEF for service as a MEB ACE.


36. Major Robert J. Bozelli, USMC. "Rethinking MACCS," Marine

Corps Gazette. October 1988. Identifies mobility,

survivability, communication, and training as deficiencies with

the MACCS.


37. Lieutenant Colonel J. J. Flynn, USMC and Major D. A.

Quinlan, USMC. "The Brigade is Beautiful," Marine Corps

Gazette. September 1972. Proposed reorganizing into seven

MEB's. Each FMF would also have a Force Logistics Command, a

Force Aviation Command, a Fleet Marine Training Command, and a

Combat Support Command. The Combat Service Command would fall

under the command of the base commanders.


38. Lieutenant Colonel H. T. Hayden, USMC. "CSS for the MAGTF,"

Marine Corps Gazette. May 1985. Identifies the duplicity of

effort between the FSSG and the MWSS. Recommends transferring

more functions from the FSSG to the MWSS to develop a MAG service

support group.


39. Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr, USMC. "The Cat with More than Nine

Lives," Proceedings. June 1954. Presents the historical account

of the events leading up to the passage of Public Law 82-416.


40. Colonel R. D. Heinl, Jr, USMC. "The Right to Fight," Proceedin

September 1962. Presents the historical account of the events

leading up to the passage of the National Security Act of 1947

and of Public Law 82-416.


41. Captain Timothy E. Junette, USMC. "Reorganizing Marine Corps

Aviation," Marine Corps Gazette. October 1988. Describes the

problems of compositing the Aviation Combat Element of a MEB.


42. Lieutenant Colonel Willis J. King, Jr, USMC. "Tailoring Marine

Aviation For the Task at Hand," Marine Corps Gazette. October

1988. Discusses the problem of task organizing aviation assets

for a MAGTF is a period of austere budgets.


43. Major T. C. Linn, USMC. "The Composite MAGTF Concept,"

Marine Corps Gazette. August 1984. Describes several techniques

for compositing various MAGTF's.


44. Captain Jeffery L Kreinbring, USMC. "Let's Organize for the

Mission," Marine Corps Gazette. October 1987. Proposes

reorganizing into eight MEB's--three MPF, three amphib, and 2 to

support 3 MEU's on each coast__with abolition of the Division,

Wing, and FSSG.


45. Major T. C. Morgan, USMC. "Deploying and Employing,"

Marine Corps Gazette. May 1984. Proposed Marine Corps-wide

standardization of unit SOP's, thus facilitating employment of a

force task organized from two or more divisions or wings.


46. Colonel E. F. Riley, USMC. "Command Relationships in the

MAGTF," Marine Corps Gazette. July 1985. Describes

deficiencies in the MAGTF command structure that impede its

operation as a combined arms team.


47. Jack Shulinson and Major Edward F. Wells, USMC. "First In,

First Out," Marine Corps Gazette. January 1984. Described the

events leading to the introduction of the 9th MEB into combat in



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