Military

The Marine Helicopter And The Korean War
AUTHOR Major Rodney R. Propst, USMC
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Aviation
                       EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
           The Marine Helicopter and the Korean War
     After WW II, the Marine Corps introduced a new dimension
in the mobility of assault troops and logistically resupply
with the advent of the helicopter.  Vertical envelopment was
developed at the Marine Corps Base in Quantico and proven
during the Korean War.
     As a direct result of the atomic tests at Bikini Lagoon,
in 1946, the Marine Corps sought innovative ways to disperse
assault forces during amphibious landings.  The Marine Corps
Schools at Quantico produced the concept for using the
helicopter and helped pioneer the development of HMX-1 as the
vehicle for testing the new vertical envelopment concept.
     HMX-1 was the first Marine helicopter squadron and as
such virtually set the pace in the development of combat
helicopter thinking.  The laboratory at Quantico would in 31
short months prepare the Marine Corps to go to war for the
first time with helicopters.
     The five HO3S helicopters of VMO-6 proved themselves
almost immediately upon their arrival in Korea, at Pusan.
They became the "secret weapon" of the Marine Brigade's
command and staff.  These aircraft became the lifeline that
brought thousands of wounded Marines to hospitals only
minutes after being wounded.
     The HRS-1's of HMR-161, after their arrival in the fall
of 1951, validated all of the thought that the Marine Corps
Schools at Quantico had put into the helicopter.  HMR-161
conducted the first vertical resupply of Marines and went on
to fly the first tactical vertical envelopment, in combat.
     As a newcomer to Marine aviation, the helicopter proved
itself as a valuable weapon in a balanced military force.
       THE MARINE HELICOPTER AND THE KOREAN WAR
                        OUTLINE
Thesis Statement.   After World War II, the Marine Corps
introduced a new dimension in the mobility of assault troops
and supplies with the advent of the helicopter.  Vertical
envelopment was developed at the Marine Corps Base, in
Quantico and proven during the Korean War.
I.  Early History of Marine Helicopters
    A.  Helicopter Program in 1947
    B.  Commissioning of HMX-1
    C.  Operations Packard II/III
    D.  Marine Corps Requirement for Assault Support
II. Preparations for the Korean War
    A.  1st Provisional Brigade
    B.  VMO-6
III. Pusan Perimeter
     A.  Missions
     B.  Call for increased numbers of helicopters
IV.  HMR-161
      A.  First vertical envelopment
      B.  Operations
V.  Statistics
VI. Lessons Learned/Future Developments
         THE MARINE HELICOPTER AND THE KOREAN WAR
     In August of 1945 the world entered the Atomic Age at
Hiroshima, Japan.  The atomic bomb created a new era in
warfare and as a result of it the Marine Corps began to
concentrate on ways to increase dispersion and reduce
vulnerability to this new and very lethal weapon.  In the
years immediately following World War II, the Marine Corps
pioneered and developed a new concept in the mobility of
assault troops and logistical resupply with the advent of the
helicopter.  Vertical envelopment was conceived at the Marine
Corps Base, in Quantico and proven during the Korean War.
     In 1946, Lieutenant General Roy S. Geiger, Commanding
General , Fleet Marine Forces , Pacific viewed the atomic
tests at Bikini Lagoon.  General Geiger felt strongly that
atomic weapons would impact on how the Marine Corps conducted
amphipbious operations.  In a letter dated 21 August, 1946
that General Geiger sent to the Commandant he stated:
     It is quite evident that a small number of atomic
     bombs could destroy an expeditionary force as now
     organized, embarked, and landed.. . [General Geiger
     urged the Commandant to] consider this a very
     serious and urgent matter [and that the Marine
     Corps] use its most competent officers in finding a
     solution to develop the technique of conducting
     amphibious operations in the Atomic Age.1
     The Commandant, General Alexander A. Vandegrift, acted
by referring General Geiger's letter to a special board of
General officers with instructions to:
     ...propose, after thorough research and
     deliberation, the broad concepts and principles
     which the Marine Corps should follow, and the major
     steps which it should take, to wage successful
     amphibious warfare at some future date...2
     On 16 December, 1946 the special board submitted an
advanced report to the Commandant recommending that parallel
programs be initiated to develop a transport seaplane and a
transport helicopter.  The board further recommended that an
experimental Marine helicopter squadron be organized to train
pilots and mechanics and that the Marine Corps Schools
develop a tentative doctrine for helicopter employment.3
     General Vandegrift concurred with the special board's
results and began the actions to make Marine helicopters a
reality.  General Vandegrift visualized the Vertical Assault
Concept as:
     With a relatively unlimited choice of landing
     areas, troops can be landed in combat formations
     and under full control of the flanks or rear of a
     hostile position.  The helicopter's speed makes
     transport dispersion at sea a matter of no
     disadvantage and introduces a time-space factor
     that will avoid presenting at any one time a
     remunerative atomic target.  It should also be
     noted that transport helicopters offer a means for
     rapid evacuation of casualties, for the movement of
     supplies directly from ship to dump and for
     subsequent movement of troops and supplies in
     continuing operations ashore.4
The Commandant's goal for 1947 was to organize one
developmental helicopter squadron with 12 helicopters in
order to study helicopter employment in amphibious
operations.
     On 10 March, 1947 the Marine Corps Schools' Committee of
the Academic Board headed by Colonel Robert E. Hogaboom
submitted its report on "Military Requirements of Helicopter
for Ship-to-Shore Movement of Troops and Cargo".  The report
stated:  "... it is more realistic to approach the problem in
increments, establishing initially the characteristics for a
purely assault conveyance. . . "5  The Mogaboom report went on
to list the specifications for the assault helicopter as:
     1.  5,000 pound payload
     2.  200 to 300 nautical mile range (500 miles with
     an auxiliary fuel tank)
     3.  100 knot cruising speed
     4.  4,000' hover ceiling
     5.  external hook and hoist
     6.  self-sealing fuel tanks
     7.  overall dimensions to be able to fit on the
     hangar deck and elevators of the aircraft carrier.6
     On 1 December, 1947, in compliance with the Commandant's
goal, Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-1) was commissioned
at MCAS Quantico, Virginia.  Colonel Edward C. Dyer, who had
been instrumental in establishing the Marine helicopter
program, was the Commanding Officer.  HQMC established the
mission for HMX-1 as:  "1. Develop techniques and tactics in
connection with the movement of assault troops in amphibious
operations, and  2. Evaluate a small helicopter as a
replacement for the present OY aircraft. . .".7 On that first
day of December 1947 Colonel Dyer was the sole member of
HMX-1 and the squadron would not receive any aircraft until 9
February, 1948 when two Sikorsky HO3S-1's would arrive.
     At the request of Lieutenant Colonel Victor H. Krulak,
the Assistant Director of the Senior School of the Marine
Corps Schools, HMX-1 participated in Operation Packard II
during May of 1948.  This operation was an amphibious command
post exercise developed and planned by the Marine Corps
Schools.  The operational plan was prepared by the student
staff and provided for an element of the landing force, the
staff of a regimental combat team (RLT), and HMX-1 to be
embarked on escort aircraft carriers.  Utilizing 5 HO3S-1s,
HMX-1 flew a total of 35 flights carrying 66 Marines and a
considerable amount of communications gear ashore from the
ship.8  Operation Packard II provided the framework that
proved helicopters could play an integral part in amphibious
operations.
     The Marine Corps Schools, by November 1948, had
developed the world's first manual entitled Amphibious
Operations--Employment of Helicopters (Tentative).  This book
was numbered 31 in a series of publications on amphibious
operations.9  Phib-31 detailed many of the advantages of the
helicopter and vertical assault, but more importantly it
projected the concept of vertical envelopment well into the
future, far outreaching the current capabilities of the
helicopters the Marines were flying in 1948.  Lieutenant
Colonel Krulak describes the approach that the Marine Corps
Schools used in preparing Phib-31:
     ...a propspective military philosophy.  It
     consists of thinking in terms of the next war
     instead of the last ,. . . This means starting with
     ideas, when you have nothing more tangible, and
     developing them into the concepts, procedures and
     weapons of the future. 10
Although, the Marine Corps was the last American military
service to have helicopters it became the first to institute
a long-range program of working out helicopter combat
techniques.11  (Phib-31 was copied by the U.S. Army, almost
word for word, in its first helicopter manual.)
        The months between 1948 and August of 1950 saw HMX-1
and the Marine Corps Schools continue to work on both the
concept of vertical envelopment and the machines used to fly
it.  There were more Packard Operations, new helicopters like
the HRP-1 and HTL-3, continued test and evaluation, and a
Marine Air Ground Task Force demonstration for President
Harry S. Truman and the members of Congress.
     On 25 June, 1950 eight divisions of the North Korean
People's Army (NKPA), crossed the 38th Parallel brushing
aside patrols of the army of the Republic of Korea (ROK) and
rapidly moved south in order to unify the Korean peninsula
into a Communist state.12  In response to the Republic of
Korea's request, on 28 June 1950, the United Nations ordered
military sanctions against the North Korean invaders and by 7
July the U.S. Marines were ordered to activate a Regimental
Combat Team.  The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was
activated under the command of Brigadier General Edward A.
Craig and was built around the 5th Marine Regiment and the
33rd Marine Air Group (MAG-33) of the 1st Marine Air Wing.
6,534 officers and men prepared to go to Korea.13
     HMX-1 was ordered, on the 7th of July, to send 8
officers and 30 men to the 1st Provisional Brigade for
assignment to Marine Observation Squadron 6 (VMO-6) of
MAG-33.  These Marines would fly and maintain four HO3S-1
helicopters and would be the first helicopter unit organized
for combat.
     14 July, 1950 saw VMO-6, commanded by Major Vincent J.
Gottschalk, embarked on the USS Badoeng Strait (CVE-116)
bound for Korea.14  After only 31 months of evaluation for
both the concept of helicopter employment and the aircraft
themselves the Marines were on their way to war for the first
time with helicopters.
     The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade landed at Pusan,
Korea on 2 August, 1950.  The next morning General Craig made
a reconnaissance of the area in a HO3S-1.  This flight began
a new era in command and control.  General Craig eventually
came to call the helicopter the "emergency weapon" of the
Brigade command and staff.15  The Brigade maneuvered rapidly
with the intent of counterattacking and stopping North Korean
penetrations.  The helicopters of VMO-6 proved their worth.
General Craig said of them:
     Marine Helicopters have proven invaluable. . .They
     have been used for every conceivable type of
     mission.  The Brigade utilized them for liaison,
     reconnaissance, evacuation of wounded, rescue of
     Marine flyers downed in enemy territory,
     observation, messenger service, guard mail at sea,
     posting and supplying of outguards on dominating
     terrain features and resupplying of small units by
     air. 16
     General Joseph L. Stewart recalled the use of the
helicopter when he was a Lieutenant Colonel and the G-3 of
the 1st Provisional Brigade at Pusan, Korea:
     ...I was the G-3 of the brigade in Korea that
     employed the first helicopters in combat. . .It was
     really dramatic to observe those who hadn't seen a
     helicopter operate before, to see the reactions and
     expressions of those who saw for the first time how
     the helicopter could be of such great assistance to
     us in planning these fast moving, put-out-the-fire
     type of operations.17
     Major Gottschalk, the Commanding Officer of VMO-6,
stated, with historical significance, that the helicopter
brought back a personal element to command and control on the
battlefield that had not been seen in modern times:
     ...perhaps the most important use of the helicopter
     in the early months of the Korean War concerned
     command and control.  The flexibility provided the
     Brigade Commander to control his forces, change
     direction of movement, give personal instructions
     to subordinate commanders, and observe the
     resultant battlefield movement in a dynamic fast
     moving situation provided a new dimension to
     tactical control of the battlefield in a difficult
     terrain setting. 18
     Major Gottschalk said, speaking of medevac flights,
that:
        the availability of the helicopter to pick up
     wounded from units that were cut off some distance
     from the main body improved the morale of the men
     in the lines.  [He added that rescue missions also]
     helped the morale of the fighter pilots in support
     of the Marine brigade.19
     The night of August 8th found Captain Victor A.
Armstrong flying the first night medevac by lifting a wounded
regimental surgeon to safety.
     The HO3S proved to be a rugged aircraft that could
continue to fly regardless of hard landings in rough terrain
and taking enemy small-arms rounds.  Lieutenant General
Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr., Commanding General, FMFPac, after
observing the helicopters operate in Korea, said:
     Later in Korea I saw helicopters come in with a
     dozen bullet holes in their wings and
     bodies--unless they are hit in a vital part, they
     will continue to fly.20
     During the month of August 1950, the helicopters of
VMO-6 logged 580 flights and a total of 348 flight hours with
their HO3S's.21
        General Craig was such an advocate of the use of
helicopters he wrote the following regarding their use in
Korea and in future conflicts:
     VMO-6 was flown to Pusan from Japan.  These
     aircraft have been invaluable in reconnaissance and
     the helicopters are a Godsend in this type of
     terrain, not only for reconnaissance but for
     supporting of combat patrols in mountainous
     terrain;  for supply of food, water, ammunition;
     but also for the evacuation of casualties. . By
     separate dispatch to you.. .a request has been made
     to bring out elements of the Helicopter Transport
     Squadron.  It is believed that this innovation will
     meet with outstanding results in combat in this
     mountainous terrain for the landing of patrols on
     top of mountain ranges.. .The helicopters presently
     available have been invaluable beyond expression
     ...[However) I feel they will not be able to
     sustain all the demands.22
     In September, 1950 VMO-6 prepared for the amphibious
assault at Inchon.  The helicopters of VMO-6 would play no
part in the landing because there were not enough of them to
lift the assault troops.  On 16 September, D+3, Captain
Armstrong landed his HO3S at the newly captured Kimpo
airfield with General Shepherd and Colonel Krulak as his
passengers.23  VMO-6 relocated to the airfield at Kimpo and
began flying a dawn-to-dusk schedule in support of the 1st
Marine Division as it fought its way across the Han river and
on to northwest approaches to Seoul.
     Seoul was officially liberated on September 29, 195O and
on 12 October the Marines of the 1st Marine Division were
backloaded on ships at Inchon to be moved to the other side
of Korea for a new adventure.
     After a noncontested landing at Wonsan, Korea the 1st
Marine Division, in November of 1950, was so extended that it
had units at Hagaru, some 50 miles from the division CP at
Hungnam.  Major General Oliver P. Smith, the Division
Commander, realized that he had unusual command and staff
problems.  General Smith ordered that the Main Supply Route
to the Chosin Reservoir be strengthend and that an airstrip
be constructed at Hagaru.  As a result of Chinese Communist
Forces (CCF) attacks in late November the 1st Marine Division
was divided into five self-contained perimeters.  The
helicopters of VMO-6 provided the only means of contact
between these isolated groups.24
     The night of December 1st saw the Marines come out
fighting their way from Yudam-ni to Hagaru, 14 miles that
would take 59 hours to cross.  On 6 December, 1950 the 1st
Marine Division began its breakout attack from Hagaru to
Koto-ri.  By the evening of the 7th of December with the 7th
Marines leading and the 5th Marines covering the division
fought its way to Koto-ri.  From there the division marched
to Hamhung with the lead elements reaching the sea late on
the 10th of December.  Every day of the breakout from the
Chosin Reservoir the aircraft of VMO-6 were on call.
Although the altitude reduced payloads and the bitter cold
added to the difficulties of upkeep and repair, the
helicopters of VMO-6 saved lives by flying medevacs and
bringing in medical supplies.
     From October 28 to December 15 VMO-6 flew 1,544 flights
for a total of 1,624.8 flight hours.25
     The 1st Marine Division was backloaded from Hungnam,
between 10 and 24 December, by the Navy ships of TF-9O.  The
division was taken back to Pusan, which had been the first
assembly area of the Brigade.  In five months the Marines had
managed to fight all around the Korean peninsula.
     The spring of 1951 saw VMO-6 continuing to support the
1st Marine Division as it had in 1950.  General Shepherd
again spoke of helicopters by saying:
     Due to the rugged terrain it would have been most
     difficult to operate in Korea without helicopters.
     They were a Godsend to the Marines.26
     In the summer of 1951, as the first year of Korean
operations drew to a close, Marine helicopters had flown
every mission except the one that had been envisioned for
them--vertical envelopment during an amphibious assault.  The
remedy for this lack was to be filled by Marine Transport
Helicopter Squadron (HMR) 161.  HMR-161 was commissioned 15
January, 1951 at MCAS El Toro, under the command of
Lieutenant Colonel George W. Herring.
     With 43 officers, 244 men and 15 Sikorsky HRS-1
helicopters HMR-161 sailed for Korea on 15 August, 1951.  The
HRS-1 was a transport helicopter capable of carrying five or
six combat Marines.27
     HMR-161 arrived at Pusan, Korea on 2 September, 1951 as
the 1st Marine Division launched an attack in the Punchbowl
area in eastern Korea.  HMR-161 moved to the front and shared
Field X-83, near Chondo-ni, with VMO-6.  The observation
pilots of VMO-6 briefed the transport pilots of HMR-161 on
the flying conditions in Korea.28
     On 12 September, 1951 HMR-161 indoctrinated the Marines
of the 1st Shore Party Battalion in the techniques of loading
and giving landing instructions to the large transport
helicopters.  The next day, in preparation for Operation
Windmill I, supplies were sorted into 800 pound loads.  At
1550 that day seven HRS-1 helicopters lifted with supplies
suspended below each aircraft to fly a seven mile route in
order to resupply the 2nd Battalion,  1st Marines.  Upon
landing each helicopter picked up battle casualties and the
wounded Marines were admitted to a hospital facility only 30
minutes after being wounded.
     Operation Windmill I consisted of 28 flights for a total
of 14.1 flight hours.  18,848 pounds of cargo were lifted and
74 casualties were medevaced.29
     On 20 September, 1951 the first helicopter-borne landing
of combat Marines took place in Operation Summit.  Despite
dense fog, HMR-161 lifted 224 fully equipped Marines to the
objective--Hill 884.  The HRS-1's also transported 17,772
pounds of cargo in support of Operation Summit.  The entire
operation consisted of 65 flights, 31.2 flight hours, and
took a total of four hours overall.30  The official report of
Operation Summit, read in part:
     These initial efforts have demonstrated strikingly
     the great contribution to tactical and logistical
     flexibility that the assault helicopter offers
     ...[The report went on to say that]...helicopter
     functions will be progressively enlarged as time
     passes, and that the aircraft type must be
     recognized as a requisite component of a balanced
     military force.31
     On 27 September HMR-161 conducted the first night troop
lift of combat Marines in Operation Blackbird.  The HRS-1's
lifted 200 Marines of "E" Company,  2nd Battalion,  1st Marines
to the Punchbowl, on a night with no moonlight, in two hours
and ten minutes.  Operation Blackbird was not an unqualified
success but many lessons were learned.  The official report
stated:
      ...night troop lifts in mountainous terrain are
     feasible provided a daylight reconnaissance of the
     landing zone together with the avenues of approach
     and retirement can be effected.  Present equipment
     indicates that under present conditions in Korea
     these night lifts should be limited to movements
within friendly territory.32
Operation Blackbird was the only large scale night lift of
combat Marines in the Korean War.
     11 October, 1951 saw HMR-161 make history and headlines
again.  Operation Bumblebee began that morning at 1000 when
the lift of 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines and it equipment
commenced.  The statistics tell the story of Operation
Bumblebee:
     Number of helicopters:   12.
     Number of flights:  156.
     Total flight time:  65.9 hours.
     Over-all time: 5.5 hours.
     Number of Marines lifted:  958.
     Average weight per man:  240 lbs.
     Total weight lifted:  229,920 lbs.
     HMR-161 continued to support the 1st Marine Division in
operations like:  Bushbeater, Rabbit-Hunt, Switch, Farewell,
and logistical support in Muletrain.  As 1952 passed HMR-161
grew both tactically and in their ability to respond to the
needs of those they supported.
     On 23 February, 1953 the Marines of HMR-161 began
Operation Haylift II.  This operation proved that the
helicopter was destined to have a unique place in logistical
support of combat Marines.  Over a four day period, an
average of 12 HRS-1's, flew from dawn to dusk carrying a
combined total of 31,589 pounds per hour.  Each aircraft made
27 round trips of the 15 mile leg and carried 11 tons of
supplies.  It would have taken a large fleet of trucks to
provide this type of support and it would have taken four
times as long.33
     Again HMR-161 and the helicopters from VMO-6 continued
to provide tactical and logistical support to the 1st Marine
Division in 1953 until the armistice was signed on 27 July,
1953.
     Helicopter pilots and aircrewmen suffered a total of
nine operational deaths in Korea, proving that their machines
were not overly vulnerable.
     HMR-161, from the first landing in Korea to the
Armistice in 1953, flew a total of 18,607 flights, 16,538
flight hours, lifted 60,046 people, and transported 7,554,336
pounds of cargo.  The transport squadron also evacuated 2,748
casualties in its 23 months in Korea.  VMO-6 flew out 7,067
casualties during its 35 months in combat. 34
     As a newcomer to Marine aviation, the helicopter proved
to be a valuable tactical weapon in Korea.  It met and
exceeded the expectations the pioneers of vertical
envelopment had for it.  The tactical technique of hit and
run had proved most effective when used in major troop
movements and not when used in small lifts.  The concepts
developed at Quantico, Virginia in the late `4Os by HMX-1 had
stood the test of war and had been proven in Korea.
Amphibious operations of the future would owe much of their
success to the pilots and men of VMO-6 and HMR-161 who flew
in Korea.
     For the Marine Corps today, perhaps the words of
helicopter designer Frank N. Piasecki spoken in 1953, are
exceptionally pertinent:
     The most dramatic progress will be increased speed
     of vertical-lift aircraft, [during the next half
     century].  This will come from two directions:
     helicopters designers will add speed to their
     machines; conversely, airplane designers will add
     vertical-lift capabilities to their high-speed
     aircraft.  The result will be a blending of the two
     types of flight into machines fully capable of both
     helicopter flight as we know it today and
     high-speed flight at velocities far beyond today's
     experimental supersonic speeds. . .35
The Marines of today have as great a challenge ahead of them
as the Marines of HMX-1 and the Marine Corps Schools had in
the years between WW II and the Korean War.
                         FOOTNOTES
  1Lieutenant Colonel Eugene W. Rawlins and Major William J.
Sambito, Marines and Helicopters 1946-1962 (Washington D.C.:
History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine
Corps,1976), p.11.
  2Ibid.p. 12.
  3Ibid.p.14.
  4Ibid.
  5Ibid.p.15.
  6Ibid.
  7Ibid.p.20.
  8Ibid.p.25.
  9Ibid.
  10Lynn Montross, Cavalry of the Sky, (New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1954),p.7.
  11Ibid.
  12Allan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis, (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co.),p.475.
  13Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.107.
  14Rawlins and Sambito, Marines and Helicopters
1946-1962, p .42.
  15Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.121.
  18Rawlins and Sambito, Marines and Helicopters
1946-1962, p .43.
  17General Joseph L. Stewart USMC, Oral History
Transcript, interview conducted 8 August, 1968(Washington
D.C.: Historical Division,Headquarters U.S. Marine
Corps, 1973),p.51.
  18Rawlins and Sambito, Marines and Helicopters
1946-1962,p.43.
  19Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.118.
  20General Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., Oral History
Transcript, (Washington D.C.: Historical Division,Headquarters
U.S. Marine Corps,1967),p.208.
  21Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.120.
  22Rawlins and Sambito, Marines and Helicopters
1946-1962,p .44.
  23Lynn Montross,  Flying Windmills in Korea", Marine Corps
Gazette, (September 1953),p.22.
  24Ibid.
  25Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.146.
  26Shepherd, Oral History Transcript,p.209.
  27Montross, Marine Corps Gazette,(September 1953),p.23.
  26Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.159.
  29Ibid.p. 162.
  30Montross, Marine Corps Gazette, (September 1953),p.24.
  31Montross, Cavalry of the Sky,p.165.
  32Ibid.p. 167.
  33Ibid.p.200.
  34Ibid.p.217.
  35Ibid.p.225.
                       BIBLIOGRAPHY
Millett, Allan. Semper Fidelis. New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co.
Montross, Lynn. Cavalry of the Sky. New York: Harper &
Brothers, 1954.
Montross, Lynn. "Flying Windmills in Korea." Marine Corps
Gazette, (September 1953)
Moskin, J. Robert. The U.S. Marine Corps Story. New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1977.
Rawlins, Eugene and Sambito, William. Marines and Helicopters
1946-1962. Washington D.C. :History and Museums Division,
Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps,1976.
Shepherd, Lemuel C. General. Oral History Transcript.
Washington D.C. :History and Museums Division, Headquarters
U.S. Marine Corps, 1967.
Stewart, Joseph L. General. Oral History Transcript.
Washington D.C. :History and Museums Division, Headquarters
U.S. Marine Corps, 1973.
Wray, Robert P. Colonel. Letter regarding Close Air Support
and Helicopters during the Korean War, 31 January 1989.



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list