Military

White Knight Or White Elephant:  The M1A1 "Abrams" In The Marine Corps
AUTHOR Major Karl J. Gunzelman, USA
CSC 1989
SUBJECT AREA - Operations
                      EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
           TITLE:  White Knight or White Elephant:
             The M1A1 "ABRAMS" in the Marine Corps
I.   Purpose:  To ascertain the usefulness of the M1A1
"Abrams" main-battle tank (MBT) in its doctrinal roles: that
of a combat support element; and, as part of a maneuver unit
within the the Marine Corps division.
II.  Problem:  Although the M1A1 is the premier western MBT,
it was designed especially as a tank destroying system and
not as an infantry-support weapon system.  Its limitations in
the infantry support role, and the Marine Corps  inability to
compliment its offensive characteristics, restricts an
otherwise awesome and very expensive capability.
III. Data:  The Marine Corps requires a main-battle tank that
can serve as an infantry support weapon, and that can operate
as part of a combined-arms maneuver force.  The Abrams, on
the other hand, was designed by the U.S. army primarily to
destroy tanks.  It operates only in the Army's mechanized
divisions which are force-structured to facilitate the tank s
capabilities.  The M1A1 has few of the features requisite of
a good infantry support weapon.  Even when compared to the
older M-60 A1 tank, the M1A1 lacks certain essentials, such
as ammunition variety, redundant communication capability and
even physical protection, required of an infantry support
weapon.  While the M1A1 organization can be an excellent
maneuver unit, the Marine Corps lacks the force structure to
fully exploit the M1A1's capabilities as an offensive weapon
system.  Historical evidence substantiates the need for
compatible and mutually supporting systems to ensure success
on the battlefield.  The Marine Corps risks repeating past
mistakes.
IV.  Conclusions:  The Abrams will perform inadequately in
either of its doctrinal roles.  It is neither the infantry-
support weapon, so desperately needed by its infantry units,
nor is it the Marine Corps' combat-arm-of-decision in
combined-arms offensive operations.
V.   Recommendations:  The Marine Corps must either change
its equipment and organization to effectively employ its tank
assets, or it must change its concept of operation.  If the
Marine Corps should change the former, it must be willing to
accommodate a subsequent increase in strategic mobility
requirements.  If it should change its concept of operation,
either the role of the tank should change, or the tank should
be removed as an asset.
                    White Knight or White Elephant:
                The M1A1 "ABRAMS" in the Marine Corps
                   by Major Karl J. Gunzelman, USA
Thesis Statement:  The Marine Corps has procured a main-
battle tank (MBT) that fails to adequately support its
doctrinal missions as an infantry support weapon and as an
element of a maneuver force.
I.   Extolling Its Virtues
     A.  Operationally better than the M-60 A1
     B.  Role of the MBT in the Marine Corps
II.  Tanks as infantry-support weapons
     A.  Historical purpose
     B.  Most armies unsuccessful
     C.  The Marine Corps enjoyed great success
III. Today's MBT is a poor infantry-support weapon
     A.  Primary ammunition is limited to two rounds
     B.  The infantry-phone has disappeared
     C.  Armored protection is no longer provided
IV.  Evolving MBT Doctrine
     A.  The Marine Corps is adjusting
     B.  It just can not support it
V.  Learning from History
     A.  Offensive doctrine calls for compatible weapons
     B.  Incompatible forces historically lose
     C.  The Soviet threat is no longer incompatible
VI   Fire vs fire
     A.  Marine Corps vs a Soviet-style force
     B.  Borrowing from the U.S. army
VII. Nothing is easy
             WHITE KNIGHT OR WHITE ELEPHANT?
I.   Extolling its Virtues
     To the delight of many, the Marine Corps recently
decided to procure the same main battle tank as the U.S.
Army:  the M1A1 "Abrams" with some minor configurational
differences.  The Abrams is certainly a technological advance
over the Patton (M-60)) series, incorporating significant
increases in speed, in armored protection, and in armament.
The recent literature on the M1A1, in fact, contrasts the
pros and cons of replacing the M-60 A1 with the Abrams.  An
example, a comment by Col Lawrence G. Karch in the Marine
Corps Gazette, refutes William S. Lind's remark that the
Marine Corps does not need the M1A1, but an upgraded version
of the M-60 series MBT.
     Among other things Col Karch remarks that, the M1A1 is
superior to the M-60 A1 in performance, in spite of the fact
that it is heavier and uses more fuel.  It can be considered
a "super tank" and is invulnerable to all direct fire ground
weaponry (of today) ecept the Future Soviet Tank (FST).
Operational availability is greater than 90%, Mean Time
Between Mission Failure (MTBMF) is 640 kilometers and the gas
turbine demonstrates a MTBMF of 10,000 kilometers.  The
supportability parameters are better than the M-60 A1 and
overall are quite good.  While the Marine Corps will receive
66 M1A1's in FY89, the Marine Corp could only afford 14 in
the POM.  Congress has decided on 66.  COL Karch states that
"This places the Marine Corps in the fortunate position of
getting the best tank in the world at what amounts to a
bargain basement price."1
     When comparing one tank to the other, one would certainl
agree that the M1A1 is technically superior to any of the
tanks in the M-60 series.  Vet, one would hope that the
Marine Corps is looking at the M1A1 (at $3 million a copy),
less from a machine versus machine viewpoint, and more from
the perspective of how the tank can best serve as part of the
division's tank battalion.  The latest guidance in regard to
this role is found in OH 6-1, where the tank unit is assigned
two basic missions.  The first mission calls for using tanks
(platoon, company or battalion) to provide combat support to
the Marine division; the second mission dictates employing
them as a maneuvering force.2  An examination of MBT
employment, with emphasis on the M1A1, in each of these roles
will assist in understanding just how much utility the M1A1
has in the Marine Corps division.
II.  Tanks as Infantry-Support Weapons
     The primary role of the Main Battle Tank (MBT), towards
fulfilling the combat support mission in the Marine Corps, is
to serve as an infantry support weapon.  Historically, a
great deal of emphasis has been put on this mission.  The
first versions of the MBT were introduced in World War I for
the specific role of physically breaking through obstacles
covered by artillery and machinegun fire.  Their rates of
march were much the same as dismounted infantry, and they
carried the infantry support weapons of the day.  They were
indeed infantry-support weapon systems.
     Both French and Russian doctrine prior to World War Two
called for using tanks to support the infantry.  In the
defense, this normally entailed small units of armor
dispersed about the infantry along a somewhat static line.
The infantry support doctrine was greatly influenced by the
events of World War One and the abortive attempts to use
armor in the Spanish Civil War.  Even the German army engaged
in many an argument as to how tanks should be employed.  As
Von Mellenthin explains in Panzer Battles:  "Between 1935 and
1937 a tense struggle was fought out within the German
General Staff regarding the future role of armor in battle.
The German Chief-of-Staff, General Beck, wished to follow the
French doctrine and tie down the tanks to close support of
the infantry. "3
     During World War Two the British designed a number of
their tanks to support the infantry.  John Keegan explains
that "the Churchill, for example, like the Matilda and
Valentine, was an  `infantry' tank, descending directly from
the trench-crossing, wire-crushing Mother of the First World
War, and designed like it to destroy by fire or intimidation
the resistance of enemy infantry in strong points."4  The
British, unfortunately, did not enjoy much success with these
vehicles.
     The U.S. Marine Corps, conversely, very successfully
employed U.S. tanks in the infantry-support role.  Nichols
and Shaw state in Okinawa: Victory In The Pacific that:
   Armor was used entirely as an infantry weapon on Okinawa,
   and the one time the tanks attempted to operate without
   infantry support, during the 27th Division's attack at
   Kukazu Ridge on 19 April (1955), the results were
   disastrous.  The success of the tank-infantry team was
   due to the stress laid in training and in combat on
   mutual cooperation:  the tank supported and protected the
   infantryman and vice versa.5
     The importance of the tank in this setting probably can
not be understated as the authors go on to say that:
   On Okinawa, in the judgement of General Sheperd, `if any
   one supporting arm can be singled out as having
   contributed more than any others during the progress of
   the (Okinawan) campaign, the tank would certainly be
   selected'.  The Marine general was supported in his
   opinion by the commander of the Japanese Thirty-second
   army who issued a battle lesson which stated that `the
   enemy's power lies in his tanks.  It has become obvious
   that our general battle against the American force is a
   battle against their M-1 and M-4 tanks'.6
     Actually, these tanks were well suited for the infantry
support role; they were, however, totally inadequate in the
role of anti-tank weapon.  The M-1 was little more than an
armored machinegun carrier and the M-4, although the U.S.
army's main battle tank of the day, has long been considered
by some as performing disastrously in its primary role as an
anti-tank weapon, but well suited as an infantry support
system. 7
     Even before the Marine's effective use of it in World
War II. however, the tank was undergoing change.  As early as
the 1920's the tank began to be conceived as the dominant arm
of the military; yet, it was not until well into the Second
World War that the tank took on its present day configuration
of heavy armor, large gun and operational mobility.  Since
then, the emphasis on tank design has led to the removal of
all but the barest of ancillary systems (two or three small
caliber machineguns for self-protection).  The high explosive
(HE) cannons (for soft targets) are gone as are the bow
machineguns (against enemy infantry).  The emphasis,
firepower-wise, is the tank-killing main gun.8
III. Today's MBT is a Poor Infantry-Support Weapon
     An infantry support weapon system must be responsive to
the infantry's need to move, shoot, communicate and survive,
much as the MBT does for the "tanker."  It should have space
enougn for transporting the infantry and his gear where they
both are needed; it should be capable of providing effective
direct and indirect fires, and in calibers both large and
small against a myriad of target types; communication between
the infantryman and his vehicle should be simple and easy;
and, finally, the infantry support weapon system should
provide a degree of survivability to both the vehicle system
and the infantryman.
     A casual inspection of today's main battle tank is
evidence enough to conclude that the MBT fails to meet most
of the criteria set above.  The decrease in the utility of
the MBT as an Infantry-support weapon system is clearly seen
in the transition from the Marine Corps present MBT (the M-60
A1) to the Marine Corps newest generation tank (the M1A1).
Granted, the M1A1 Abrams provides a 120mm direct fire cannon
that will penetrate any known armored vehicle in the world.
It provides its crew with an unsurpassed measure of mobility
and survivability from both ballistic ordnance and chemical
agents.  Unfortunately, when it was designed, a number of
essential elements for supporting an accompanying infantry
force were left off.
     First of all and contrary to Captain Gudmundsson's
assumption 9, the M1A1 has only two main gun rounds; High
Explosive Anti-Tank (HEAT) and armored Piercing Fin
Stabilized Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) or "SABOT," both
essentially anti-armor rounds.  In addition to HEAT and
SABOT, the M-60 A1 has a high-explosive plastic (HEP) round,
an anti-personnel (APERS) round or "Beehive," and a white
phosphorus (WP) round.  Other considerations include the
removal of the "infantry" phone and the inability to use the
protection afforded by the tank itself.
     The HEP round is an anti-material ammunition that gives
the MBT a capability to effect greater blast, concussion and
fragmentation than either of the anti-armor rounds.  It is
especially effective against concrete.  When the HEP round
detonates against a concrete surface it creates a "scabbing"
effect (the opposite side shatters into small pieces).  The
HEP round can destroy reinforced concrete up to 6 to 8 feet
thick.  In essence, the HEP has many of the characteristics
of  an artillery round, and it can be employed as a direct
fire artillery round.10
     The Beehive round is used primarily against troops in
the open.  Its mechanical time fuze can be set for muzzle
action or to function at any range from 200 to 4,400 meters.
This round significantly increases the infantry's ability to
engage threat infantry at extended ranges. 11
     The WP round provides a capability to mark and screen
targets.  Marked targets can then be engaged by other direct
fire means, aviation delivered weapons and field artillery
delivery systems.  The WP round can also be used to ignite
combustible material and for psychological effect (it
burns). 12
     The M-60 A1 also has an external phone, located on the
left rear bumper that allows an individual to talk to the
crew while they are "buttoned up."  It allows an infantry
command post or observation post to run wire to the tank and
talk to the crew in a more secure means than afforded by the
radio.
     Finally, the infantryman can no longer use the MBT to
provide himself protection.  Prior to the M1A1, the
infantryman could stand to the rear of the tank and use the
tank's armor to shield himself from fire to his front and
oblique.  Unlike the M-60 A1, which vented its exhaust
skyward, the M1A1 vents its exhaust toward the rear.  The gas
turbine, which powers the M1A1, also produces an extremely
high temperature exhaust capable of burning anyone who stands
too near it.
     The trend towards specializing the MBT to defeat enemy
armor will continue in the future.  A recent decision to
reduce the tank crew size to three and to increase the
caliber of its main gun to defeat increasingly more resistant
armors further substantiates the fact that the MBT will
continue to deviate from any ability to serve as an infantry-
support weapon.  In fact, the Marine Corps would probably be
better served by the M-60 A1 as an infantry-support weapon
than by the Abrams.  Perhaps, the Marine Corps is buying the
the M1A1 primarily for use in its maneuver force role, since
it will perform so poorly in its role as an infantry-support
weapon.
IV.  Evolving MBT Doctrine
     Only recently has the Marine Corps changed its doctrine
regarding the employment of the division's tank battalion.
As mentioned above, the past concept for employment centered
on using tanks in an infantry-support role.  Doctrine
underwent change in the late 1970's in order to take full
advantage of the offensive characteristics of the M-60 A1
Main Battle Tank (MBT).  By 1981, doctrine stated that the
M-60 A1 battalion would serve as an independent maneuver
unit, provide antitank protection, or conduct mechanized
operations. 13  Today, the concept for employing the tank
battalion has been further refined to parallel the army's
practice of cross-attaching tank units with infantry units
and vice versa, in order to have maneuver units comprised of
compatible forces. 14  The revised doctrine, along with the
new tank, is supposed to increase the Marine Division's
ability to fight and defeat an enemy via combined arms
operations.
     The Marine Corps willingness to evolve doctrinally, as
new technology presents itself, is no doubt encouraging.
However, the introduction of the M1A1 into the Marine
Division will do more to inhibit the Division's ability to
conduct offensive operations, than it will to promote that
ability.  Regardless of how well the concept of cross-
attachment as a part of mechanized operations has served the
U.S. Army, its adoption by the Marine Corps will lead to a
misapplication of the "combined arms" principle.  Forces must
be compatible to effectively operate together, especially
during offensive operations against a Soviet or Soviet-
Surrogate threat, and the Marine Corps does not have this
compatibility.
     There is no doubt that each Marine tank company equipped
with the Abrams gives the task force an unsurpassed
capability in firepower, armor protection, mobility, and
shock action.  However, these capabilities give the Abram's
companies and battalion such a high-tempo offensive
capability that the remainder of the division can neither
operate with it nor support it during offensive operations.
If all units cannot work together, then they are not really
combined; and, if combined arms cannot be maintained during
offensive operations, then the one who violates this
principle invites disaster.  A brief review of the division's
lack of mobility and subsequent compatibility sheds light on
the problem.
     The Marine assault Amphibian Vehicles (AAV), Light
armored Vehicles (LAV), and trucks can move the infantry over
various types of terrain, but they do not possess the Abrams'
cross-country capabilities.  Helicopter movement allows the
transport of infantry, artillery, and other assets in an
expeditious manner, but neither the CH-46 nor the CH-53
allows these assets to engage in combat while in flight.
Helicopters, both assault and cargo, are also incapable of
sustained operations in a hostile mechanized environment.
Indeed, mobility problems abound.
     When not transported by helicopter, most of the
division's artillery must be towed by a prime mover.
Although the M-109 self-propelled howitzer assets may be
given a mission of direct support to the task force(s), they
are limited in quantity (only three batteries in each
division).  Their commitment to a direct support mission also
deprives the division commander of flexibility in providing
indirect fire support to other units.  The other combat
support and combat service support units essential to
combined arms operations also depend on truck transport, much
of which is an external asset that must be borrowed.  Not
only do the engineers, medical units, and logistical support
units suffer from a compatibility problem due to the type of
transport, they also suffer from a possible availability
problem should those transportation assets be required
elsewhere.
V.   Learning from History
     The problem the Marine Corps faces today is one that the
most famous pioneer of mechanized warfare came to grips with
many years ago.  As early as 1929, Heinz Guderian saw the
importance of compatibility among weapon systems.  In Panzer
Leader, Guderian says he "became convinced that tanks working
on their own or (even) in conjunction with infantry could
never achieve decisive importance...that tanks would never be
able to produce their full effect until the other weapons on
whose support they must inevitably rely were brought up to
their standard of speed and of cross-country performance."15
He also understood "that the effectiveness of the tanks would
gain in proportion to the ability of the infantry, artillery
and other divisional arms to follow them in an advance across
country. "16
     Guderian's understanding was subsequently and
empirically substantiated.  Not only did Guderian experierce
success with this doctrine (in France and Russia), but so did
his adherents.  F.W. Von Mellenthin attributes the success of
the Panzer division, in all theaters of war and against all
enemies, to this "balanced force of all arms. "17  When not
overwhelmed by the opposition, the exploitation of this
balanced and compatible force proved successful for Rommel in
North Africa, for Manstein on the Eastern Front, and for
Balck on the Western Front.
     For those who did not adapt to this style of maneuver
warfare, defeat was inevitable.  The British designed and
employed their MBT's (different from infantry-support tanks)
for operations independent of infantry.  As Simpkin points
out in Mechanized Infantry, the Cruiser Tank, with its
subturrets and ball-mountings, right through to the Comet of
1944 indicated a response by the tanker who anticipated an
absence of close infantry support.18  There is a certain
degree of validity in this anticipation, as the British
tankers often fought without their infantry support.
     John Keegan writes in The Face Of Battle that in Europe
"(during) the final stage of the Goodwood offensive east of
Caen, the British tanks which arrived at the foot of Borgubus
Ridge, there to be destroyed by the heavier guns of the I SS
Panzer Corps, had far outstripped their accompanying infantry
by the speed of their advance;"19 In Northern Africa, Keegan
portrays much the same picture as "... time and again in the
Desert the Germans forced the British to throw their fragile
Crusaders and Stuarts, unsupported by infantry escorts, on to
the muzzles of their 88mm anti-tank guns (using their own not
very superior Panzer Mark IIIs to bait the trap)."20  In
fact, North Africa is replete with examples of British
forces, superior in combat power, suffering defeat from the
smaller, yet more compatible forces of Rommel.
     The initial successes of Guderian in France have as much
to do with French tactics as with German ingenuity.  The
French insisted on using their armor forces in a piecemeal
fashion to support the infantry, rather than as part of a
mobile and combined arms counterattack force.  The French
army, with its superior tank forces and greater availability
of transport, were capable of greater compatibility than were
the Germans.  However, the French simply chose riot to take
advantage of the capability.
     The Russians also failed to grasp the importance of
mobile forces working together.  Stalin interpreted the
disastrous employment of tanks in the Spanish Civil War in
much the same fashion as the French.  Having purged his
premier maneuverists (to include Tukhachevskii) prior to the
war, Stalin would have the Russian armor employed in the
infantry-support role.  In Mechanized Warfare, Simpkin states
that even up to the battle of Stalingrad "the Red army no
longer saw any need for mobile forces on the German pattern"
and that "despite the excellence of T34/76 tank, there is
little evidence that the Red army which faced Hitler's
onslaught envisioned operations of a tempo and scope beyond
those of dismounted infantry. "21  But, the Soviets learned.
The Stavka (Supreme Field Headquarters) Directive of 10
January 1942, and other orders, radically altered the status
quo with the reformation of tank and mechanized corps and a
year later with the formation of tank armies.22
     Van Mellenthin admits that "the Russians copied these
(the German) tactics and soon became past masters of them, as
we learned to our cost in Citadel (German operation name for
battle of Kursk)."23   And it is that same battle of Kursk
that has provided the Soviet Military of today with much of
the data they continue to use to determine how they will
fight the next war.  Their present-day concept for operations
and their organizations for combat are based on the intricate
examinations of these data.
VI.  Fire Versus Fire
     The Marine Corps may one day fight either a Soviet-style
Motorized Rifle Division or its derivative.  If so, the
opposition is organized to move all of its combat and combat
support on some form of armored organic transport.  This
organization ensures more effective cooperation between arms
than is possible with the Marine Division.  As mentioned
previously, the Marine infantry and support units must: borrow
their transport, unless they walk, and in both cases little
armored protection is available.  Soviet infantrymen in their
BMP's and BTR's, the artillerymen in their 2S1 (122mm) and
2S3 (152mm) Self-Propelled Howitzers, and the other support
elements in their BRDM's ensure compatibility with the tank
units; moreover, these units form a true combined arms force.
     The U.S. Army, which relies primarily on mechanized
forces to combat a Soviet combined arms threat, uses the
Abrams only in conjunction with compatible forces.  Only the
mechanized divisions and armored Cavalry Regiments are
equipped with the M1A1.  It is in the tank battalions and
cavalry squadrons of these heavy organizations where the
main-battle tank serves as the principal combat element.  And
it is the tank battalions, with the mechanized infantry, that
share the burden of serving as the maneuver units of these
mechanized divisions.  The mechanized infantry fights from
the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV), which has replaced the
M113 because it could not keep pace with the M1A1.  The
artillery is entirely self-propelled, and the organic medical
and engineer support is provided some type of armored
tracked-vehicle.  Thus, the U.S. army's mechanized
organizations are structured to successfully employ their
tanks, in accordance with combined arms principle, against a
Soviet-Style threat.
     It becomes clear that the Marine Corps has borrowed a
concept of operation for employing the MBT from that part of
the U.S. Army, the Mechanized Division, that it least
resembles.  The Army's Airborne, Air Assault, Infantry and
Light Infantry Divisions, that operate in like fashion to the
Marine infantry, do not even field the Abrams.  The Light
Infantry Divisions (LID) and the Air Assault Division do not
have any tanks to speak of, and the armored Reconnaissance
Vehicles of the Airborne Division do not qualify for
consideration as main-battle tanks in definition or in
operational employment.   It is in fact the light infantry
battalion, comprised principally of infantry and void of
tanks, that serve as the maneuver units for these non-
mechanized divisions.  It is these divisions, whose whole
being is centered around the infantryman, and not the
mechanized divisions that the Marine Corps divisions most
resemble
VII. Nothing is Easy
     Since the M1A1 does not make a very good infantry
support weapon, and since the Marine Corps does not
compliment the offensive capabilities of the Abrams.
something else must be done to synchronize the Marine Corps'
fighting capability.  The Marine Corps must either change its
equipment and organization to effectively employ its tank
assets, or it must change its concept of operation.  If the
Marine Corps should change the former, it must be willing to
accommodate a subsequent increase in strategic mobility
requirements.  If it should change its concept of operation.
either the role of the tank should change, or the tank should
be removed as an asset.  Both courses of action have benefits
and problems associated with them.  But to do neither is a
roadmap to disaster.
                          FOOTNOTES
   1"He's Wrong on Tanks," Marine Corps Gazette, October
1988. p 30.
   2OH 6-1, Ground Combat Operations, January 1988, pp. 2-
15/16.
   3F. W. Von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, University of
Oklahoma Press. 1956. p. xvi.
   4John Keegan, The Face of Battle. Penguin Books. 1976,
p. 295.
   5Charles S. Nichols and Henry I. Shaw, Okinawa: Victory
In The Pacific. U.S. Government Printing Office. 1955. p 272.
   6Ibid,   p. 271.
   7Richard E. Simpkin's Mechanized Infantry, 1980, p. 20.
   8 Richard E. Simpkin's Tank Warfare, 1979, pp. 28-37.
   9Bruce I. Gudmundsson, "New Tanks for Old:  How Marines
Should Think About Armored Vehicles," Marine Corps Gazette,
(December 1988), 51-55.  On page 52 Captain Gudmundsson makes
the assumption that the M1A1 will have illumination and smoke
rounds in addition to tank killing rounds.
   10FM 17-12-1, Tank Combat Tables, 3 November 1986,
p. E-1.
   11Ibid, p. E-2.
   12Ibid, p. E-3.
   13FMFM 9-1, Tank Employment/countermechanized Operations,
9 December, 1981, pp. 1-2.
   14IP 1-4, Fleet Marine Eorce, June 1987, pp. 4-19 - 4-22.
   15Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (abridged), Ballantine
Books, New York, May 1987, p. 13.
   16Ibid., p. 26.
   17F. W. Von Mellenthin, Panzer Battles. Ballantine Books,
New York, October 1987, p. 29.
   18Richard E. Simpkin, Mechanized Infantry, Pergamon Press
Inc., New York, 1980, p. 13.
   19Keegan, p. 291.
   20Ibid.
   21Simpkin, Mechanized Infantry, p. 16.
   22Richard E. Simpkin, Red Armour, 1984, pp. 32&142.
   23Von Mellenthin, p. 279.
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