VULNERABLE? SURVIVABLE? HELICOPTER ASSAULT SUPPORT IN MANEUVER WARFARE AUTHOR MAJOR M. B. MINNEHAN CSC 1988 SUBJECT AREA AVIATION EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title. VULNERABLE? SURVIVABLE? HELICOPTER ASSAULT SUPPORT IN MANEUVER WARFARE Thesis. Assault support helicopters are frequently criticized as being too vulnerable to modern threat weapons. Their survival is enhanced when employed in maneuver warfare within functional combined arms and defended as a highly mobile ground target. Issue. Helicopter survivability cannot be measured in isolation. It is the final product of the combination of actions and reactions of two opposing forces. A combatant employing maneuver warfare tactics focuses on the enemy situation by using initiative, rapid tempo operations, and decentralized supporting arms as combined arms to disrupt enemy cohesion. Maneuverists search for and create gaps or weaknesses to exploit, and avoid surfaces or strengths. Typically, helicopter crews will defend themselves as airborne targets against AAA and SAM systems by denying or degrading observation using terrain flight. If acquired, the aircrew will attempt to deceive the target acquisition system and finally, to disrupt the missile guidance. Maneuverists, however, will focus their assault support defense on the enemy's perspective of the helicopter--that of a highly mobile ground target capable of low to medium altitudes. Consequently, the assault support helicopters that are already operating in the terrain flight mode will be engaged by ground threat weapons: armored combat vehicles, small arms, ATGM's, and artillery. These weapons pose a more significant threat than AAA and SAM's because they are employed in vastly greater numbers, offer no indication of tracking or firing other than visual observation, and are accurate. Conclusion. Vulnerability is reduced by defending against the threat vis-a-vis the enemy s perspective. Maneuver warfare enhances the survivability of helicopter assault support by examining all the influences in their proper relationship to each other to search for gaps and avoid strengths. VULNERABLE? SURVIVABLE? HELICOPTER ASSAULT SUPPORT IN MANEUVER WARFARE OUTLINE Thesis Statement. Assault support helicopters are frequently criticized as being too vulnerable to modern threat weapons. Their survival is enhanced when employed in maneuver warfare within functional combined arms and defended as a highly mobile ground target. I. Maneuver Warfare Theory A. Time-Competitive OODA Loop B. Tactics: Techniques and Education C. Filters: Mission-Type Orders, Focus of Effort, Surfaces and Gaps D. Firepower E. Counterattack F. Reserve G. Command and Control H. Operation Art I. Amphibious Operations II. Helicopter Survivability Measures A. SEAD B. AAA C. Armored Combat Vehicles D. Small Arms E. Air Defense Missiles F. Artillery G. Tactical Air H. Radioelectric Combat I. NBC, Directed Energy VULNERABLE? SURVIVABLE? HELICOPTER ASSAULT SUPPORT IN MANEUVER WARFARE For Marine Corps purposes the helicopter is here to stay. Commanders will never again be satisfied to plan and fight without the vertical landing mobility helicopters provide. In 1946, the Marine Corps suggested using helicopters as the vehicle to conduct landings from dispersed amphibious ships with the advent of atomic weapons. This concept was expanded during the Korean War to include command, liaison, casualty evacuation, and troop transport. In General Shepherd's words `the helicopter became the greatest single innovation during the Korean conflict as a tactical and humanitarian medium of transportation." The Vietnam conflict obscured the developing concept of helicopter assault support/airmobility by highlighting its value in counter-guerrilla operations. The assault support concept was effective in spite of the challenging terrain and high density altitudes of Vietnam. A common thread linked the development of helicopter procedures and tactics from Korea and Vietnam. Helicopters operated with friendly air superiority and without significant enemy air defense, ground or air. Assault support helicopters are frequently critized as being too vulnerable to modern threat weapons. Their survival is enhanced when employed in maneuver warfare within functional combined arms and defended as a highly mobile ground target. Whether one characterizes warfare as attrition, maneuver, or moral, the essence of war as described by Clausewitz is: "everything is uncertain; calculations have to be made with variable quantities, all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects, and war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites." This uncertainty and chance together with suffering, confusion, exhaustion, and fear comprise the environment of all military action that Clausewitz calls "friction."1 All theories have limitations and Clasewitz's are no exception; they are designed to educate the commander--not to be applied as laws or standards prescribing what to do.2 The training thrust of the current Commandant, General A. M. Gray, is to develop a maneuver warfare thought process that is independent of the type equipment owned or conflict locale, but is focused on enemy engagement. An enemy, no matter how he is equipped or positioned, needs cohesion to fight effectively. The maneuver warfare theory disrupts this cohesion by operating faster than the enemy's Observation-Orientation-Decision- Action time cycle or "OODA Loop as developed by retired Air Force colonel John R. Boyd. This initiative based, rapid tempo of operations will make us unpredictable. We use this uncertainty to generate confusion and disorder within the enemy. The enemy is unable to construct a mental image of us quickly enough to match our fast operational rhythm.4 This is the theoretical essence of maneuver warfare; but how do we apply it? General Gray has stated that the maneuver warfare thought process must have a purpose because the movement part of maneuver will expend valuable resources. Training for maneuver warfare involves no formulas or checklists, but emphasizes uncertainty and initiative. The Second Marine Divison under General Gray had three objectives in their training: (1) to train leaders to welcome uncertainty and use it against the enemy, (2) to use all combat information and intelligence interests extended 100 -200 miles faster than the enemy, while organizing a flexible logistics response as much as adequate material support, (3) to instill self discipline in commanders to maneuver their force advantageously through the development of basic techniques and maneuver warfare tactics.5 Maneuver warfare tactics entail a mental process that goes beyond deciding to use a certain type of attack or defense. They are also the why and how you arrived at your decision. This thought process evolves frorn a combination of techniques and education. This combination is characterized by three concepts: mission-type orders; the focus of effort, and the search for surfaces and gaps. What is the goal of this process? It is to develop a unique approach based on the enemy's situation, not your own. It involves the initiative and flexibility of junior leaders who are guided by a thorough knowledge and understanding of their commanders' intent. Theoretically, they will progress through the OODA Loop faster than the enemy. Rapid tempo operations require effective techniques or individual combat skills, otherwise the OODA Loop process slows or stops. Efficient unit battle drills will increase a commander's flexibility and enhance his initiative to focus on the enemy's situation. Sound techniques are more critical to maneuver warfare than attrition warfare because of the shift of emphasis to the enemy's situation from one's own. Developing battle drills for ground maneuver units should also include the unit's logistical, fire support, and assault support assets to build realistic responsiveness to the ground scheme of maneuver. Armed with effective techniques and battle drill a commander also needs to know how best to employ these skills based on the enemy's particular situation. Education in military history is essential with the emphasis on the commander's thinking--why he made a decision rather than what decision was made and it's consequences. Techniques that are employed based not on disrupting the enemy's cohesion, but on stereotyped training scenarios causes one to be predictable to the enemy. Generally, the infantryman thinks only in present time and is concerned with just his immediate surroundings.6 The "friction" in war permits a leader to be alert to unique employment opportunities, not a victim of fixed ideas and training scenarios. The mission-type order encourages subordinates to use initiative to comply with the commander's intent in relation to the enemy's situation. The following abstract from Bill Lind's Maneuver Warfare Handbook describes the mission type order: In contrast to the current five-paragraph order, in which the mission is usually to seize a piece of terrain, the mission-type or- der provides subordinate commanders with an understanding of what their superior wants to accomplish vis-a-vis the enemy. For example, paragraph two of the five paragraph order states, usually in geographic terms, the mission of the unit. It may read something like,"At 0900 on 1 Jan 88, this battalion will attack and seize Hill 48 (grid 123456) and be prepared to continue the attack on order." The mission-type order would, instead, state, "At 0900 on 1 Jan 88, this battalion will attack through Hill 48 in order to prevent enemy observation and interference with amphibious offloading in the beachhead area." This order clearly shows the intent of the commander and orients on the enemy rather than a terrain feature. Subordinate commanders, aware of the overall purpose of the attack, may deviate from the geographic objective to accomplish the commander's intent, The requirement to attack through Hill 48 also allows them to exploit any gaps created by the attack. If necessary, instructions in paragraph 3--Execution--can delineate lim- its of advance.7 The subordinate, based on his knowledge of the commanders' intent two levels up, now has the flexibility to rapidly transit the OODA Loop focused on the enemy situation. Reporting by exception to a forward command with minimum key players in a mobile CP challenges command and control. However, it should encourage issuing simple orders and maintaining the focus on the enemy's cohesion to be followed up by seizure of a terrain feature as directed. The focus of effort concept is particularly useful to MAGTF's with inherent supporting arms/combat multipliers against numerically superior enemy forces, It is a conceptual, not just a physical identification of the main attack. The subordinate commanders are aware the supporting arms will concentrate their support for a particular unit. This helps orient their efforts in view of the decisive point in the battle. The subordinate commanders should not expect an equal distribution of supporting arms assets.8 The third concept that filters the techniques and education process and provides direction for the focus of effort is called surfaces and gaps. The surface describes the enemy strength while the gap is the enemy weakness or hole through which to direct your effort. The ground commander should select the gap from his reconnaisance information, recon-pull, not from an axis of advance selected from higher headquarters; command-push, which is based on reconnaisance along the previously chosen axis of advanced The gap is located by a reconnaisance screen oriented on the enemy, not on one's own unit.9 The gap may have to be created through an active air supremacy doctrine with SEAD or better yet, destruction of enemy air defenses l0 The search for gaps in maneuver warfare demands the utilization of supporting arms as combined arms. This enhances the survivability of ground targets, the infantry and assault support helicopters. Sound techniques, supplemented by education, that are applied through mission-type orders, focus of effort, and surfaces and gaps are only a portion of the maneuver warfare process. A discussion follows of four instruments of warfare which, when appropriately used are an integral part of the maneuver warfare tactics: firepower, counterattack, the reserve, and command and control. Firepower for maneuver warfare is used to support maneuvers and not strictly to destroy the enemy. The deadly combined arms capability of a MAGTF could create a gap to maneuver through if one is unable to find a hole. As in attrition warfare; firepower is used to destroy or suppress the enemy; however, maneuverists use firepower to move around or through an enemy rather than simply to destroy the enemy. The emphasis, therefore, is on very responsive supporting arms that are used as combined arms to place the enemy in a crisis, never letting him regain his balance.11 The counterattack is a critical tool in maneuver warfare to breakdown the cohesion of an attacking enemy. It is an especially useful measure when defending against a numerically superior enemy. Unexpectedly attacking the enemy while he is committed, slowed, or disorganized with a strong, relatively mobile reserve or other available committed force will certainly weaken him, but more importantly the critical timing and surprise will diminish his cohesion.12 Defensively, the most likely source for a counterattack would be the reserve. Committing the reserve to exploit offensive success gives the commander increased influence over the outcome of the battle. The less that is known about the enemy the stronger the reserve should be. This provides the commander with the flexibility to react to uncertainty and use this uncertainty against the enemy. After committing the reserve, he should follow up this action by designating another reserve to exploit new successes. Command and control in maneuver warfare is different than what is currently being used. Presently, command and control is focused inward and concerned primarily with equipment and technology. Hardware does not lead--people lead. Any discussion of command and control needs to emphasize the commander's leadership in communicating his intent and his . ability to monitor the accomplishment of the mission without demanding burdensome periodic reports from subordinates. The command and control system must run smoothly if the subordinate is to exercise his initiative in executing the commander's intent while focusing in the enemy. The commander must position himself forward to recognize his tactical situation and still maintain his ability to change the focus of effort or to exploit success. A commander should not be trapped in a command post by an overreliance on equipment. Many commanders will lament the above discussion and claim it is impossible to coordinate the supporting arms for a ground maneuver element without the minute by minute commentary to which they are accustomed. Greater decentralization and more timely responsiveness from logistics, air support, and artillery will have to be developed to affect the maneuver warfare thought process.13 Maneuver warfare tactics are related to strategic and political goals through a process called the operational art. Operational art is the use of battle or the treat of battle to attack the enemy's strategic concern, The "commanders can concentrate superior strength against enemy vulnerablilities at the decisive time and place to achieve strategic and policy aims."14 Operational art precluded operational attrition warfare when fighting battles outnumbered by using maneuver warfare. "Determining when and where to fight so a tactical victory has a strategic result is the operational art."15 The Marine Corps' amphibious operations capability with its inherent mobility provides theater commanders with a valuable asset for displaying this operational art. However, the maneuver warfare concept has generated debate on improving the current amphibious warfare doctrine to avoid landing our forces on the beach against a numerically superior force and engaging in attrition warfare. Selection of narrow landing points in enemy gaps may avoid using the WW II method of using broad and exposed beaches. LCAC and the MV-22 technology will aid commanders in rapidly changing their focus of effort and landing points to create confusion among the enemy defenders. Confronting a Soviet style, air defense threat presents an opportunity for arguing the current helicopter assault support "vulnerable or survivable" issue. A MAGTF commander facing numerically superior enemy forces demands a responsive, credible intelligence system to assist him in countering an air defense threat. With this intelligence, the initial combined arms response should involve a fixed wing strike package using air to surface guided missiles such as SHRIKE/HARM. The phrase, combined arms response, emphasizes that SEAD involves not only artillery but fixed wing, attack helicopters, NGF and any other weapons system owned or available to the MAGTF. Failure to destroy or suppress these air defense weapons systems requires the assualt support helicopter pilot to attempt to deny or degrade observation by an enemy. If acquired, the aircrew will attempt to deceive the target acquisition system and finally, to disrupt the missile guidance. 16 The AAA threat, normally consisting of the ZU-23, ZSU-23-4, S-60, and the ZSU-X will be employed in positions selected to fire on helicopters operating in terrain flight modes (low level, contour; nap of the earth). The threat aquisition means includes both optical and radar tracking. Indirect fire and smoke should be used to suppress this threat based on thorough intelligence and pilot reports. Smoke does not affect the radar mode of the ZSU-23-4 or the S-60, but it can be used to deceive and to gain time until indirect fire can be used. The ability to maneuver to adequate standoff range, use terrain masking, and locate and attack the threat has been enhanced with the AN/APR-39 radar warning receiver and the AN/ALO-136 radar jammer equipment. The helicopter pilot should present the smallest target possible when flying within range of the AAA systems. He should also select routes and positions that afford the best background, cover, and color tones while avoiding areas of loose debris that generate rotor-wash signatures. The lethality of attack helicopters employing TOW and Hellfire missiles during asault support operations provides the MAGTF commander's maneuver element increased standoff, better firepower, and most importantly, reduced exposure time. 17 An air defense threat that is too often overlooked but is critical to a commander using maneuver warfare tactics is the threat of the enemy's armored vehicles. Soviet combat doctrine stresses high rates of advance and have therefore equipped their maneuver units and air spotters in a variety of armored combat vehicles. These Include tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and reconnaisance vehicles. The threat weapons endemic to these vehicles which maneuver in formation include: machine guns, the ATGM's Sagger and Swatter, the AT weapons Spandrel and Spigot, and the tank guns themselves. Recent Soviet doctrine defines the helicopter not as an airborne target, but as a highly mobile ground target that is capable of low to medium altitude, but is employed similar to a tank or armored personnel carrier.18 Hence, the terrain flight mode our helicopters have been forced to use to avoid detection from the AAA systems has exposed these aircraft to ATGM's. Unlike most AAA, ATGM's give no indication of tracking or firing, are very accurate, and are employed in great numbers. When existing threat weapons are analyzed from current Soviet doctrine, a MAGTF commander will quickly realize how critical maneuvering through gaps, whether existing or created by combined arms, becomes to helicopter assault support survival. . The small arms threat is similar to the armored combat vehicles in that it is overshadowed in premission planning by the AAA and SAM's, yet it is employed in vastly greater numbers and like ATGM's, the helicopters have no indication other than visual observation of being tracked or fired upon. Using the combined arms team, direct and indirect fire are the most effective countermeasures against the small arms threat. Helicopter crews will use terrain flight to avoid detection and to gain surprise while planning adequate standoff range to preclude effective engagement by small arms. As Bill Lind recently discussed in a maneuver warfare seminar, the helicopter should be considered "tactically fragile" versus "tactically robust" because in the NOE flight mode the helicopter is right on top of the enemy. The NOE flight mode is the most effective countermeasure against the air defense missile threat. In NOE flight, the helicopter pilot can avoid detection from all radar-guided air defense missiles i.e., SA-6, SA-11, except the SA-8 Gecko. The MAGTF commander would have to suppress or destroy the Gecko or plan assault support routes around its 12.5 kilometer range. The soft target nature of the threat radar-dependent missile systems make them very vulnerable to our fire suppression. Additionally, chaff/flare dispensing systems on aircraft can be effective against radar-guided and/or infrared-seeking missile threats by deceving the aircraft's intention or by acting as decoys. These measures buy time for the pilot to maneuver by terrain masking. The man-portable infrared missile system SA-7 has had difficulty locking-on aircraft operating in NOE flight in vegetated areas. Masking effectively degrades the SA-7 and SA-9 capabilities; however, the SA-7 is very difficult to detect and may be located in unsuspected ambush sites. The key to surviving the air defense missile threat is to operate at NOE altitudes that are under threat . radar system capabilities following combined arms SEAD fires. 19 The Soviet artillery threat and its "area saturation in massive barrages" concept using mortars, howitzers, guns, rockets, and missiles is another overlooked but formidable threat against helicopter assault support operating in the terrain flight modes. The best survivability tactic is suppression with combined arms of the various exposed elements: artillery crews, fire direction centers, and observers. These soft targets are especially vulnerable to our counterbattery fire and fixed-wing offensive air support. Besides suppression and destruction, the MAGTF commander can ensure his assault support routes, while using terrain flight, will avoid likely artillery targets such as prominent terrain features, assembly areas, likely avenues of approach, and massed infantry and armor units. Especially important is dispersal of aircraft while on the ground both in support of maneuver units and in air facilities. Decentralization of helicopter assault support to rapidly respond to the ground scheme of maneuver should entail consideration for keeping the helicopters away from the likely enemy artillery targets so they are not destroyed.20 The tactical air threat, both rotary and fixed wing, is countered by avoiding detection and taking evasive action. However, our latest attack helicopter the AH-1W may be equipped with AIM-9M sidewinder air-to-air missiles for an antihelicopter role and self defense against fixed-wing aircraft.21 The challenge for MAGTF commanders will be to train aircrews with the helicopter and fixed-wing threat simulated in force on force exercises. Eventually, integration of the helicopter air to air missile defense system within assault support will give helicopterborne units increased survivability when maneuvering through enemy gaps. . The Radioelectronic Combat (REC) threat is the Soviet's integration of signal intelligence, direction finding, jamming, deception, and destructive fires to disrupt our command, control, and communications. Although many assault support pilots frequently operate in EMCON environments, only until we train to operate comfortably without radios will we begin to defeat this REC threat. REC's purpose is to limit, delay, or nullify the use of the adversary's radios and other command and control systems while protecting their own. The threat is broken down into four parts: signal intercept, direction finding, jamming, and electronic transmission. Signal intercept can be countered using secure voice and limiting transmission time to less than 20 seconds, but can be defeated by not using the radio equipment at all. The direction finding threat should cause us to use communication equipment only when absolutely necessary and breaking up short 20 second transmissions with periods of radio silence. Otherwise, we may be providing the enemy the location of our transmitters, targeting data, intelligence data, and planning data for jamming operations. The jamming threat normally involves three types: spot or one frequency, barrage or wide band of fequencies, and sweep or rapid jamming through a wide band. The primary technique to counter this threat is to keep operating and not to say anything that indicates the enemy is effective in his jamming. Also, masking the antenna, using alternate frequencies or radios, and most importantly, submitting a MIJI report is necessary. The electronic deception threat is categorized as manipulative and imitative. Manipulation involves tactical deception by inserting erroneous information in elctronic transmissions. Imitative deception may cause you to compromise information and can be stopped by authentication. The REC threat demands minimal or no use of radio communication. The maneuver warfare thought process complements this countermeasure because it focuses on the enemy and is therefore ambiguous, necessarily simple, and does not encourage long detailed transmissions for REC to disrupt.22 The NBC and directed energy or laser threats potentially have the greatest impact on helicopter assault support. Admittedly, employment of nuclear weapons may be governed more by political and strategic objectives than their tactical effect. However, commanders need to be aware of not only the magnitude of physical destructiveness, but the psychological effect as well. The chemical and biological threats would more likely be encountered than the nuclear, and the threat forces can be expected to employ these weapons when it is advantageous for them to do so. Proper use of NBC defensive equipment and dedicated training in a simulated NBC environment will ensure the MAGTF understands the impact that NBC weapons will have on their operations. Countering laser weapons requires updating aircrew personnel on the latest threat capabilities and developing individual eye protection. This new threat readily reinforces the maneuverist's resolve to search for the enemy's gaps and to avoid his surfaces. Airspace and the various purposes it is used for has become as important to ground operations as terrain. The myriad of threats impacting helicopter assault support has forced the aircraft into the terrain flight mode. This fact is as irreversible to the MAGTF commander today as the added dimension of mobility through vertical landings has been since the Korean conflict. The employment of supporting air operations by either combatant may ultimately determine the outcome of engagements.23 Vulnerability is only a subset of survivability, and in helicopter assault support the most vulnerable part is the pilot. Maneuver warfare tactics and defending against the threat vis-a-vis the enemy's perspective--that of helicopters as a highly mobile ground target capable of low to medium altitudes--reduces the vulnerability of the pilot. This is a significant departure from the traditional attrition warfare planning of helicopter operations as a low to medium altitude airborne target, ignoring certain threat ground weapons i.e., ATGM's. Helicopter survivability can not be measured in isolation. It is the final product of a combination of actions and reactions of two opposing forces. This combination of actions and reactions has been described by General Trainor as the six factors of modern warfare: intelligence, electronics, maneuver, combined arms, flexible logistics, and command and control or understanding the commander's intent. The purpose of the above factors is to avoid attrition and through initiative, to stay ahead of an opponent in thought and action.24 Survivability of helicopter assault support can only be appreciated by examining all the influences in their proper relationship to each other, which by all indications is enhanced in maneuver warfare. 1Michael Howard, Clausewitz (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983)p. 25. 2Howard 32. 3John C. Scharfen, "Tactics and Theory of Maneuver Warfare," Amphibious Warfare Preview, 2 (July 1984),30. 4William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press 1985), p.5. 5Scharfen 14. 6Adolf Von Schell, Battle Leadership (Columbus, Georgia: The Benning Herald, 1933), p.57. 7Lind 30. 8Lind 18. 9Lind 19 1OG.W. Caldwell, "The Destruction of the Soviet Air Defense System," Marine Corps Gazette, 69 (December 1985),66. 11William S. Lind, "Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare," Marine Corps Gazette, 72 (January 1988), 16. 12Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 21. 13Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 22 l4Department of the Army, Operations. FM 100-5 (Washington D.C.), p.27. 15Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 24 l6Walter H. Hermsmeier, "Threat: The Key Threat to Army Aviation," U.S. Army Aviation Digest, 31 (March 1985),28. 17Department of the Army, Aircraft Battlefield Countermeasures and Survivability, FM 1-101 (Washington D.C. 1982), pp. 2-22-12. 18Hermsmeier 28. 19FM 100-5,2-22 2-26. 2OFM 1-101, 322 21Melinda M. Lacroix, "Helicopter Defense Update," Marine Corps Gazette, 72 (March 1988), 8. 22FM 1-101,5-15-24. 23FM 100-5,9. 24B. E. Trainor, "New Thoughts on War," Marine Corps Gazette, 64 (December 1980), 49. Bibliography Department of the Army. Aircraft Battlefield Countermeasures and Survivablity. FM 1-101. Washington D.C., 1982. Department of the Army. Operations, FM 100-5. Washington D.C., 1986. CaldweIl, G. W. "The Desruction of the Soviet Air Defense System." Marine Corps Gazette, 69 (December 1985), 65-70. Hermsmeier, Walter H. "Threat: The Key Threat to Army Aviation." U.S. Army Aviation Digest, 31 (March 1985), 28-30. Howard, Michael. Clausewitz. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1983. Lacroix, Melinda M. "Helicopter Defense Update." Marine Corps Gazette, 72 (March 1988) 8. Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder, Colorado. Westview Press, 1985. Lind, William S. "Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare." Marine Corp Gazette. 72 (January 1988), 16-17. Lupfer, Timothy T. The Dynamics of Doctrine. The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine During The First World War. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studied Institute U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1981. Montross, Lynn. Cavalry of the Sky. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954. Scharfen, John C. "Tactics and Theory of Maneuver Warfare." Amphibious Warfare Review, 2 (July 1984), 10-14,30. Tolson, JohnJ. Vietnam Studies - Airmobility - 1961-1971. Washington D.C., Department of the Army, 1973. Trainor, B. E. "New Thoughts on War." Marine Corps Gazette, 64 (December 1980), 49-51. Von Schell, Adolf. Battle Leadership, Columbus, Georgia: The Benning Herald, 1933.
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