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                     EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Title.             VULNERABLE? SURVIVABLE?
Thesis. Assault support helicopters are frequently criticized as being too
vulnerable to modern threat weapons. Their survival is enhanced when
employed in maneuver warfare within functional combined arms and
defended as a highly mobile ground target.
Issue. Helicopter survivability cannot be measured in isolation. It is the
final product of the combination of actions and reactions of two opposing
forces. A combatant employing maneuver warfare tactics focuses on the
enemy situation by using initiative, rapid tempo operations, and
decentralized supporting arms as combined arms to disrupt enemy
cohesion. Maneuverists search for and create gaps or weaknesses to
exploit, and avoid surfaces or strengths. Typically, helicopter crews will
defend themselves as airborne targets against AAA and SAM systems by
denying or degrading observation using terrain flight. If acquired, the
aircrew will attempt to deceive the target acquisition system and finally,
to disrupt the missile guidance. Maneuverists, however, will focus their
assault support defense on the enemy's perspective of the helicopter--that
of a highly mobile ground target capable of low to medium altitudes.
Consequently, the assault support helicopters that are already operating in
the terrain flight mode will be engaged by ground threat weapons: armored
combat vehicles, small arms, ATGM's, and artillery. These weapons pose a
more significant threat than AAA and SAM's because they are employed in
vastly greater numbers, offer no indication of tracking or firing other than
visual observation, and are accurate.
Conclusion. Vulnerability is reduced by defending against the threat
vis-a-vis the enemy s perspective. Maneuver warfare enhances the
survivability of helicopter assault support by examining all the influences
in their proper relationship to each other to search for gaps and avoid
                  VULNERABLE? SURVIVABLE?
Thesis Statement. Assault support helicopters are frequently criticized
as being too vulnerable to modern threat weapons. Their survival is
enhanced when employed in maneuver warfare within functional combined
arms and defended as a highly mobile ground target.
I. Maneuver Warfare Theory
  A. Time-Competitive OODA Loop
  B. Tactics: Techniques and Education
  C. Filters: Mission-Type Orders, Focus of Effort, Surfaces and Gaps
  D. Firepower
  E. Counterattack
  F. Reserve
  G. Command and Control
  H. Operation Art
  I. Amphibious Operations
II. Helicopter Survivability Measures
  B. AAA
  C. Armored Combat Vehicles
  D. Small Arms
  E. Air Defense Missiles
  F. Artillery
  G. Tactical Air
  H. Radioelectric Combat
  I. NBC, Directed Energy
                   VULNERABLE? SURVIVABLE?
   For Marine Corps purposes the helicopter is here to stay. Commanders
will never again be satisfied to plan and fight without the vertical landing
mobility helicopters provide. In 1946, the Marine Corps suggested using
helicopters as the vehicle to conduct landings from dispersed amphibious
ships with the advent of atomic weapons. This concept was expanded
during the Korean War to include command, liaison, casualty evacuation,
and troop transport. In General Shepherd's words `the helicopter became
the greatest single innovation during the Korean conflict as a tactical and
humanitarian medium of transportation."
   The Vietnam conflict obscured the developing concept of helicopter
assault support/airmobility by highlighting its value in counter-guerrilla
operations. The assault support concept was effective in spite of the
challenging terrain and high density altitudes of Vietnam. A common
thread linked the development of helicopter procedures and tactics from
Korea and Vietnam. Helicopters operated with friendly air superiority and
without significant enemy air defense, ground or air.
   Assault support helicopters are frequently critized as being too
vulnerable to modern threat weapons. Their survival is enhanced when
employed in maneuver warfare within functional combined arms and
defended as a highly mobile ground target. Whether one characterizes
warfare as attrition, maneuver, or moral, the essence of war as described
by Clausewitz is: "everything is uncertain; calculations have to be made
with variable quantities, all military action is intertwined with
psychological forces and effects, and war consists of a continuous
interaction of opposites." This uncertainty and chance together with
suffering, confusion, exhaustion, and fear comprise the environment of all
military action that Clausewitz calls "friction."1 All theories have
limitations and Clasewitz's are no exception; they are designed to educate
the commander--not to be applied as laws or standards prescribing what
to do.2 The training thrust of the current Commandant, General A. M. Gray,
is to develop a maneuver warfare thought process that is independent of
the type equipment owned or conflict locale, but is focused on enemy
   An enemy, no matter how he is equipped or positioned, needs cohesion
to fight effectively. The maneuver warfare theory disrupts this cohesion
by operating faster than the enemy's Observation-Orientation-Decision-
Action time cycle or "OODA Loop as developed by retired Air Force colonel
John R. Boyd.  This initiative based, rapid tempo of operations will make
us unpredictable. We use this uncertainty to generate confusion and
disorder within the enemy. The enemy is unable to construct a mental
image of us quickly enough to match our fast operational rhythm.4 This is
the theoretical essence of maneuver warfare; but how do we apply it?
   General Gray has stated that the maneuver warfare thought process
must have a purpose because the movement part of maneuver will expend
valuable resources. Training for maneuver warfare involves no formulas
or checklists, but emphasizes uncertainty and initiative. The Second
Marine Divison under General Gray had three objectives in their training:
(1) to train leaders to welcome uncertainty and use it against the enemy,
(2) to use all combat information and intelligence interests extended 100
-200 miles faster than the enemy, while organizing a flexible logistics
response as much as adequate material support, (3) to instill self
discipline in commanders to maneuver their force advantageously through
the development of basic techniques and maneuver warfare tactics.5
Maneuver warfare tactics entail a mental process that goes beyond
deciding to use a certain type of attack or defense. They are also the why
and how you arrived at your decision. This thought process evolves frorn a
combination of techniques and education. This combination is
characterized by three concepts: mission-type orders; the focus of effort,
and the search for surfaces and gaps. What is the goal of this process? It
is to develop a unique approach based on the enemy's situation, not your
own. It involves the initiative and flexibility of junior leaders who are
guided by a thorough knowledge and understanding of their commanders'
intent. Theoretically, they will progress through the OODA Loop faster
than the enemy.
   Rapid tempo operations require effective techniques or individual
combat skills, otherwise the OODA Loop process slows or stops. Efficient
unit battle drills will increase a commander's flexibility and enhance his
initiative to focus on the enemy's situation. Sound techniques are more
critical to maneuver warfare than attrition warfare because of the shift
of emphasis to the enemy's situation from one's own. Developing battle
drills for ground maneuver units should also include the unit's logistical,
fire support, and assault support assets to build realistic responsiveness
to the ground scheme of maneuver.
     Armed with effective techniques and battle drill a commander also
needs to know how best to employ these skills based on the enemy's
particular situation. Education in military history is essential with the
emphasis on the commander's thinking--why he made a decision rather
than what decision was made and it's consequences. Techniques that are
employed based not on disrupting the enemy's cohesion, but on stereotyped
training scenarios causes one to be predictable to the enemy. Generally,
the infantryman thinks only in present time and is concerned with just his
immediate surroundings.6 The "friction" in war permits a leader to be
alert to unique employment opportunities, not a victim of fixed ideas and
training scenarios.
     The mission-type order encourages subordinates to use initiative to
comply with the commander's intent in relation to the enemy's situation.
The following abstract from Bill Lind's Maneuver Warfare Handbook
describes the mission type order:
         In contrast to the current five-paragraph order, in which the
   mission is usually to seize a piece of terrain, the mission-type or-
   der provides subordinate commanders with an understanding of what
   their superior wants to accomplish vis-a-vis the enemy. For example,
   paragraph two of the five paragraph order states, usually in geographic
   terms, the mission of the unit. It may read something like,"At 0900 on
   1 Jan 88, this battalion will attack and seize Hill 48 (grid 123456) and
   be prepared to continue the attack on order." The mission-type order
   would, instead, state, "At 0900 on 1 Jan 88, this battalion will attack
   through Hill 48 in order to prevent enemy observation and interference
   with amphibious offloading in the beachhead area." This order clearly
   shows the intent of the commander and orients on the enemy rather
   than a terrain feature. Subordinate commanders, aware of the overall
   purpose of the attack, may deviate from the geographic objective to
   accomplish the commander's intent, The requirement to attack through
   Hill 48 also allows them to exploit any gaps created by the attack. If
   necessary, instructions in paragraph 3--Execution--can delineate lim-
   its of advance.7
The subordinate, based on his knowledge of the commanders' intent two
levels up, now has the flexibility to rapidly transit the OODA Loop focused
on the enemy situation. Reporting by exception to a forward command
with minimum key players in a mobile CP challenges command and control.
However, it should encourage issuing simple orders and maintaining the
focus on the enemy's cohesion to be followed up by seizure of a terrain
feature as directed.
   The focus of effort concept is particularly useful to MAGTF's with
inherent supporting arms/combat multipliers against numerically superior
enemy forces, It is a conceptual, not just a physical identification of the
main attack. The subordinate commanders are aware the supporting arms
will concentrate their support for a particular unit. This helps orient
their efforts in view of the decisive point in the battle. The subordinate
commanders should not expect an equal distribution of supporting arms
   The third concept that filters the techniques and education process and
provides direction for the focus of effort is called surfaces and gaps. The
surface describes the enemy strength while the gap is the enemy weakness
or hole through which to direct your effort. The ground commander should
select the gap from his reconnaisance information, recon-pull, not from an
axis of advance selected from higher headquarters; command-push, which
is based on reconnaisance along the previously chosen axis of advanced The
gap is located by a reconnaisance screen oriented on the enemy, not on
one's own unit.9 The gap may have to be created through an active air
supremacy doctrine with SEAD or better yet, destruction of enemy air
defenses l0 The search for gaps in maneuver warfare demands the
utilization of supporting arms as combined arms. This enhances the
survivability of ground targets, the infantry and assault support
   Sound techniques, supplemented by education, that are applied through
mission-type orders, focus of effort, and surfaces and gaps are only a
portion of the maneuver warfare process. A discussion follows of four
instruments of warfare which, when appropriately used are an integral
part of the maneuver warfare tactics: firepower, counterattack, the
reserve, and command and control.
   Firepower for maneuver warfare is used to support maneuvers and not
strictly to destroy the enemy. The deadly combined arms capability of a
MAGTF could create a gap to maneuver through if one is unable to find a
hole. As in attrition warfare; firepower is used to destroy or suppress the
enemy; however, maneuverists use firepower to move around or through an
enemy rather than simply to destroy the enemy. The emphasis, therefore,
is on very responsive supporting arms that are used as combined arms to
place the enemy in a crisis, never letting him regain his balance.11
   The counterattack is a critical tool in maneuver warfare to breakdown
the cohesion of an attacking enemy. It is an especially useful measure
when defending against a numerically superior enemy. Unexpectedly
attacking the enemy while he is committed, slowed, or disorganized with a
strong, relatively mobile reserve or other available committed force will
certainly weaken him, but more importantly the critical timing and
surprise will diminish his cohesion.12
   Defensively, the most likely source for a counterattack would be the
reserve. Committing the reserve to exploit offensive success gives the
commander increased influence over the outcome of the battle. The less
that is known about the enemy the stronger the reserve should be. This
provides the commander with the flexibility to react to uncertainty and
use this uncertainty against the enemy. After committing the reserve, he
should follow up this action by designating another reserve to exploit new
   Command and control in maneuver warfare is different than what is
currently being used. Presently, command and control is focused inward
and concerned primarily with equipment and technology. Hardware does
not lead--people lead. Any discussion of command and control needs to
emphasize the commander's leadership in communicating his intent and his
ability to monitor the accomplishment of the mission without demanding
burdensome periodic reports from subordinates.  The command and control
system must run smoothly if the subordinate is to exercise his initiative
in executing the commander's intent while focusing in the enemy.  The
commander must position himself forward to recognize his tactical
situation and still maintain his ability to change the focus of effort or to
exploit success.  A commander should not be trapped in a command post by
an overreliance on equipment.  Many commanders will lament the above 
discussion and claim it is impossible to coordinate the supporting arms
for a ground maneuver element without the minute by minute commentary 
to which they are accustomed.  Greater decentralization and more timely
responsiveness from logistics, air support, and artillery will have to be
developed to affect the maneuver warfare thought process.13
     Maneuver warfare tactics are related to strategic and political goals
through a process called the operational art.  Operational art is the use of
battle or the treat of battle to attack the enemy's strategic concern,  The
"commanders can concentrate superior strength against enemy
vulnerablilities at the decisive time and place to achieve strategic and
policy aims."14  Operational art precluded operational attrition warfare
when fighting battles outnumbered by using maneuver warfare.
"Determining when and where to fight so a tactical victory has a strategic
result is the operational art."15
    The Marine Corps' amphibious operations capability with its inherent
mobility provides theater commanders with a valuable asset for displaying
this operational art.  However, the maneuver warfare concept has
generated debate on improving the current amphibious warfare doctrine to
avoid landing our forces on the beach against a numerically superior force
and engaging in attrition warfare.  Selection of narrow landing points in
enemy gaps may avoid using the WW II method of using broad and exposed
beaches. LCAC and the MV-22 technology will aid commanders in rapidly
changing their focus of effort and landing points to create confusion
among the enemy defenders.
   Confronting a Soviet style, air defense threat presents an opportunity
for arguing the current helicopter assault support "vulnerable or
survivable" issue. A MAGTF commander facing numerically superior enemy
forces demands a responsive, credible intelligence system to assist him in
countering an air defense threat. With this intelligence, the initial
combined arms response should involve a fixed wing strike package using
air to surface guided missiles such as SHRIKE/HARM. The phrase,
combined arms response, emphasizes that SEAD involves not only artillery
but fixed wing, attack helicopters, NGF and any other weapons system
owned or available to the MAGTF. Failure to destroy or suppress these air
defense weapons systems requires the assualt support helicopter pilot to
attempt to deny or degrade observation by an enemy. If acquired, the
aircrew will attempt to deceive the target acquisition system and finally,
to disrupt the missile guidance. 16
   The AAA threat, normally consisting of the ZU-23, ZSU-23-4, S-60, and
the ZSU-X will be employed in positions selected to fire on helicopters
operating in terrain flight modes (low level, contour; nap of the earth).
The threat aquisition means includes both optical and radar tracking.
Indirect fire and smoke should be used to suppress this threat based on
thorough intelligence and pilot reports. Smoke does not affect the radar
mode of the ZSU-23-4 or the S-60, but it can be used to deceive and to
gain time until indirect fire can be used. The ability to maneuver to
adequate standoff range, use terrain masking, and locate and attack the
threat has been enhanced with the AN/APR-39 radar warning receiver and
the AN/ALO-136 radar jammer equipment. The helicopter pilot should
present the smallest target possible when flying within range of the AAA
systems. He should also select routes and positions that afford the best
background, cover, and color tones while avoiding areas of loose debris
that generate rotor-wash signatures. The lethality of attack helicopters
employing TOW and Hellfire missiles during asault support operations
provides the MAGTF commander's maneuver element increased standoff,
better firepower, and most importantly, reduced exposure time. 17
   An air defense threat that is too often overlooked but is critical to a
commander using maneuver warfare tactics is the threat of the enemy's
armored vehicles. Soviet combat doctrine stresses high rates of advance
and have therefore equipped their maneuver units and air spotters in a
variety of armored combat vehicles. These Include tanks, infantry fighting
vehicles, armored personnel carriers, and reconnaisance vehicles. The
threat weapons endemic to these vehicles which maneuver in formation
include: machine guns, the ATGM's Sagger and Swatter, the AT weapons
Spandrel and Spigot, and the tank guns themselves. Recent Soviet doctrine
defines the helicopter not as an airborne target, but as a highly mobile
ground target that is capable of low to medium altitude, but is employed
similar to a tank or armored personnel carrier.18 Hence, the terrain flight
mode our helicopters have been forced to use to avoid detection from the
AAA systems has exposed these aircraft to ATGM's. Unlike most AAA,
ATGM's give no indication of tracking or firing, are very accurate, and are
employed in great numbers. When existing threat weapons are analyzed
from current Soviet doctrine, a MAGTF commander will quickly realize how
critical maneuvering through gaps, whether existing or created by
combined arms, becomes to helicopter assault support survival.
The small arms threat is similar to the armored combat vehicles in
that it is overshadowed in premission planning by the AAA and SAM's, yet
it is employed in vastly greater numbers and like ATGM's, the helicopters
have no indication other than visual observation of being tracked or fired
upon. Using the combined arms team, direct and indirect fire are the most
effective countermeasures against the small arms threat. Helicopter
crews will use terrain flight to avoid detection and to gain surprise while
planning adequate standoff range to preclude effective engagement by
small arms. As Bill Lind recently discussed in a maneuver warfare
seminar, the helicopter should be considered "tactically fragile" versus
"tactically robust" because in the NOE flight mode the helicopter is right
on top of the enemy.
   The NOE flight mode is the most effective countermeasure against the
air defense missile threat. In NOE flight, the helicopter pilot can avoid
detection from all radar-guided air defense missiles i.e., SA-6, SA-11,
except the SA-8 Gecko. The MAGTF commander would have to suppress or
destroy the Gecko or plan assault support routes around its 12.5 kilometer
range. The soft target nature of the threat radar-dependent missile
systems make them very vulnerable to our fire suppression. Additionally,
chaff/flare dispensing systems on aircraft can be effective against
radar-guided and/or infrared-seeking missile threats by deceving the
aircraft's intention or by acting as decoys. These measures buy time for
the pilot to maneuver by terrain masking. The man-portable infrared
missile system SA-7 has had difficulty locking-on aircraft operating in
NOE flight in vegetated areas. Masking effectively degrades the SA-7 and
SA-9 capabilities; however, the SA-7 is very difficult to detect and may
be located in unsuspected ambush sites. The key to surviving the air
defense missile threat is to operate at NOE altitudes that are under threat
radar system capabilities following combined arms SEAD fires. 19
The Soviet artillery threat and its "area saturation in massive
barrages" concept using mortars, howitzers, guns, rockets, and missiles is
another overlooked but formidable threat against helicopter assault
support operating in the terrain flight modes. The best survivability
tactic is suppression with combined arms of the various exposed elements:
artillery crews, fire direction centers, and observers. These soft targets
are especially vulnerable to our counterbattery fire and fixed-wing
offensive air support. Besides suppression and destruction, the MAGTF
commander can ensure his assault support routes, while using terrain
flight, will avoid likely artillery targets such as prominent terrain
features, assembly areas, likely avenues of approach, and massed infantry
and armor units. Especially important is dispersal of aircraft while on the
ground both in support of maneuver units and in air facilities.
Decentralization of helicopter assault support to rapidly respond to the
ground scheme of maneuver should entail consideration for keeping the
helicopters away from the likely enemy artillery targets so they are not
   The tactical air threat, both rotary and fixed wing, is countered by
avoiding detection and taking evasive action. However, our latest attack
helicopter the AH-1W may be equipped with AIM-9M sidewinder air-to-air
missiles for an antihelicopter role and self defense against fixed-wing
aircraft.21 The challenge for MAGTF commanders will be to train
aircrews with the helicopter and fixed-wing threat simulated in force on
force exercises. Eventually, integration of the helicopter air to air
missile defense system within assault support will give helicopterborne
units increased survivability when maneuvering through enemy gaps.
The Radioelectronic Combat (REC) threat is the Soviet's integration of
signal intelligence, direction finding, jamming, deception, and destructive
fires to disrupt our command, control, and communications. Although
many assault support pilots frequently operate in EMCON environments,
only until we train to operate comfortably without radios will we begin to
defeat this REC threat. REC's purpose is to limit, delay, or nullify the use
of the adversary's radios and other command and control systems while
protecting their own. The threat is broken down into four parts: signal
intercept, direction finding, jamming, and electronic transmission.
   Signal intercept can be countered using secure voice and limiting
transmission time to less than 20 seconds, but can be defeated by not
using the radio equipment at all. The direction finding threat should cause
us to use communication equipment only when absolutely necessary and
breaking up short 20 second transmissions with periods of radio silence.
Otherwise, we may be providing the enemy the location of our
transmitters, targeting data, intelligence data, and planning data for
jamming operations. The jamming threat normally involves three types:
spot or one frequency, barrage or wide band of fequencies, and sweep or
rapid jamming through a wide band. The primary technique to counter this
threat is to keep operating and not to say anything that indicates the
enemy is effective in his jamming. Also, masking the antenna, using
alternate frequencies or radios, and most importantly, submitting a MIJI
report is necessary. The electronic deception threat is categorized as
manipulative and imitative. Manipulation involves tactical deception by
inserting erroneous information in elctronic transmissions. Imitative
deception may cause you to compromise information and can be stopped by
authentication. The REC threat demands minimal or no use of radio
communication. The maneuver warfare thought process complements this
countermeasure because it focuses on the enemy and is therefore
ambiguous, necessarily simple, and does not encourage long detailed
transmissions for REC to disrupt.22
   The NBC and directed energy or laser threats potentially have the
greatest impact on helicopter assault support. Admittedly, employment of
nuclear weapons may be governed more by political and strategic
objectives than their tactical effect. However, commanders need to be
aware of not only the magnitude of physical destructiveness, but the
psychological effect as well. The chemical and biological threats would
more likely be encountered than the nuclear, and the threat forces can be
expected to employ these weapons when it is advantageous for them to do
so. Proper use of NBC defensive equipment and dedicated training in a
simulated NBC environment will ensure the MAGTF understands the impact
that NBC weapons will have on their operations. Countering laser weapons
requires updating aircrew personnel on the latest threat capabilities and
developing individual eye protection. This new threat readily reinforces
the maneuverist's resolve to search for the enemy's gaps and to avoid his
   Airspace and the various purposes it is used for has become as
important to ground operations as terrain. The myriad of threats
impacting helicopter assault support has forced the aircraft into the
terrain flight mode. This fact is as irreversible to the MAGTF commander
today as the added dimension of mobility through vertical landings has
been since the Korean conflict. The employment of supporting air
operations by either combatant may ultimately determine the outcome of
   Vulnerability is only a subset of survivability, and in helicopter assault
support the most vulnerable part is the pilot. Maneuver warfare tactics
and defending against the threat vis-a-vis the enemy's perspective--that
of helicopters as a highly mobile ground target capable of low to medium
altitudes--reduces the vulnerability of the pilot. This is a significant
departure from the traditional attrition warfare planning of helicopter
operations as a low to medium altitude airborne target, ignoring certain
threat ground weapons i.e., ATGM's.
   Helicopter survivability can not be measured in isolation. It is the final
product of a combination of actions and reactions of two opposing forces.
This combination of actions and reactions has been described by General
Trainor as the six factors of modern warfare: intelligence, electronics,
maneuver, combined arms, flexible logistics, and command and control or
understanding the commander's intent. The purpose of the above factors is
to avoid attrition and through initiative, to stay ahead of an opponent in
thought and action.24 Survivability of helicopter assault support can only
be appreciated by examining all the influences in their proper relationship
to each other, which by all indications is enhanced in maneuver warfare.
   1Michael Howard, Clausewitz (New York: Oxford University Press,
1983)p. 25.
   2Howard 32.
   3John C. Scharfen, "Tactics and Theory of Maneuver Warfare,"
Amphibious Warfare Preview, 2 (July 1984),30.
   4William S. Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook (Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press 1985), p.5.
   5Scharfen 14.
   6Adolf Von Schell, Battle Leadership (Columbus, Georgia: The Benning
Herald, 1933), p.57.
   7Lind 30.
   8Lind 18.
   9Lind 19
   1OG.W. Caldwell, "The Destruction of the Soviet Air Defense System,"
Marine Corps Gazette, 69 (December 1985),66.
   11William S. Lind, "Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare," Marine Corps
Gazette, 72 (January 1988), 16.
   12Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 21.
   13Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 22
   l4Department of the Army, Operations. FM 100-5 (Washington D.C.),
   15Lind, Maneuver Warfare Handbook, 24
   l6Walter H. Hermsmeier, "Threat: The Key Threat to Army Aviation,"
U.S. Army Aviation Digest, 31 (March 1985),28.
   17Department of the Army, Aircraft Battlefield Countermeasures and
Survivability, FM 1-101 (Washington D.C. 1982), pp. 2-22-12.
   18Hermsmeier 28.
   19FM 100-5,2-22 2-26.
   2OFM 1-101, 322
   21Melinda M. Lacroix, "Helicopter Defense Update," Marine Corps
Gazette, 72 (March 1988), 8.
   22FM 1-101,5-15-24.
   23FM 100-5,9.
   24B. E. Trainor, "New Thoughts on War," Marine Corps Gazette, 64
(December 1980), 49.
Department of the Army. Aircraft Battlefield Countermeasures and
   Survivablity. FM 1-101. Washington D.C., 1982.
Department of the Army. Operations, FM 100-5. Washington D.C., 1986.
CaldweIl, G. W. "The Desruction of the Soviet Air Defense System." Marine
   Corps Gazette, 69 (December 1985), 65-70.
Hermsmeier, Walter H. "Threat: The Key Threat to Army Aviation." U.S.
   Army Aviation Digest, 31 (March 1985), 28-30.
Howard, Michael. Clausewitz. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press,
Lacroix, Melinda M. "Helicopter Defense Update." Marine Corps Gazette, 72
   (March 1988) 8.
Lind, William S. Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Boulder, Colorado. Westview
   Press, 1985.
Lind, William S. "Misconceptions of Maneuver Warfare." Marine Corp
   Gazette. 72 (January 1988), 16-17.
Lupfer, Timothy T. The Dynamics of Doctrine. The Changes in German
   Tactical Doctrine During The First World War. Fort Leavenworth,
   Kansas: Combat Studied Institute U.S. Army Command and General Staff
   College, 1981.
Montross, Lynn. Cavalry of the Sky. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1954.
Scharfen, John C. "Tactics and Theory of Maneuver Warfare." Amphibious
   Warfare Review, 2 (July 1984), 10-14,30.
Tolson, JohnJ.  Vietnam Studies - Airmobility - 1961-1971. Washington
     D.C., Department of the Army, 1973.
Trainor, B. E. "New Thoughts on War." Marine Corps Gazette, 64 (December
     1980), 49-51.
Von Schell, Adolf. Battle Leadership, Columbus, Georgia: The Benning
   Herald, 1933.

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One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger - by Matthew Yglesias