The Falkland Islands War 1982: A Rifle Company Commander's Perspective
CSC 1986
SUBJECT AREA History
THE FALKLANDS WAR 1982
A RIFLE COMPANY COMMANDER'S PERSPECTIVE
by
Major David G. Wheen, Royal Marines
Command and Staff College
Education Center
Marine Corps Development and Education Command
Quantico, Virginia 22134
25 March 1986
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Subject Page
Presentation 1. 1.1 - 1.50
Presentation 2. 2.1 - 2.49
Video Tape Clips V.1
Slides: Presentation 1 S.1
Presentation 2 S.2
Maps: Falkland Islands Map 1
East Falkland Map 2
The Beachhead Map 3
42 Cdo's Battle Map 4
Citation: 42 Cdo RM C.1
THE FIRST PRESENTATION TO USMC COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
ON THE FALKLAND WAR
BY MAJOR D. G. WHEEN, RM
19 DECEMBER 1985
VIDEO - (2 MINUTES)
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THIS IS THE FIRST OF TWO
PRESENTATIONS ON THE FALKLANDS WAR OF 1982; AND BEFORE
I GO ANY FURTHER LET ME SAY FOR THE BENEFIT OF OUR
SPANISH SPEAKERS THAT THE WORD "FALKLAND" IS AS FAR AS
I AM CONCERNED INTERCHANGEABLE WITH THE WORD
"MALVINAS". I INTEND DURING THIS SESSION TO SKIP
QUICKLY THROUGH THE POLITICAL, HISTORICAL AND GEROGRAPH-
IC BACKGROUND AND SO SET THE SCENE FOR THE INITIAL
ARGENTINIAN INVASION; THEREAFTER, I SHALL CONCENTRATE
ON PERMA. THE NEXT SESSION WILL COVER THE LAND BATTLE,
PRIMARILY 42 CDO'S LAND BATTLE FOLLOWING THE BREAKOUT
OF THE BEACHHEAD.
YOU MAY WELL ASK WHY SHOULD YOU SPEND YOUR TlME
LISTENING TO ME WHEN YOU CAN, AND PROBABLY HAVE, READ
ABOUT THE WAR FROM VARIOUS BRITISH AND AMERCIAN BOOKS
AND PUBLICATIONS.
MY RESPONSE IS THREEFOLD: FIRST, THE ALTERNATIVE
FOR MY INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH PAPER WAS AN IN-DEPTH STUDY
OF EARL HAIG, THE BRITISH FIELD MARSHALL DURING WORLD
WAR I, EVEN THOUGH HE WAS INVOLVED IN THE BATTLE OF THE
SOMME, THAT WE HEARD ABOUT ON 1 DEC 1985. THIS WAS A
FAR LESS ATTRACTIVE PROPOSITION TO ME PERSONALLY. NEXT
THE FALKLANDS WAR IS THE FIRST MAJOR
NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS AND NAVAL AIR WAR CONDUCTED IN THE
MISSILE AGE. IT INVOLVED SIGNIFICANT SHIP AND AIRCRAFT
LOSSES: THIS SLIDE EG SHOWS SHIP LOSSES IT DOES NOT
SHOW THE 8 RN SHIPS DAMAGED BY BOMBS/EXOCET BUT NOT
SUNK; AND HIGH INTENSITY OPERATIONS ASHORE, AFLOAT, AND
IN THE AIR. IT SHOULD BE STUDIED TO DRAW OUT ANY
SIGNIFICANT LESSONS THAT WE CAN LEARN FROM IT. AND
FINALLY, I HAVE BEEN ASKED MANY TIMES BY FELLOW
STUDENTS ABOUT THE FALKLANDS WAR AND MY EXPERIENCES IN
IT. THIS SLIDE IS PARTICULARLY FOR BOB CHURCHILL. I
WAS A RIFLE COMPANY COMMANDER, IN COMMAND OF COY L, 42
CDO RM, SO MY EXPERIENCES ARE PERHAPS OF MORE RELEVANCE
TO A COMPANY COMMANDER'S COURSE SUCH AS AWS;
NEVERTHELESS, I FEEL I NOW HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING
OF MILITARY OPERATIONS, AND AM KEEN TO PASS ON SOME
RECOLLECTIONS AND OBSERVATIONS FOR YOU TO ACCEPT OR
REJECT AS YOU WISH. IN ADDITION TO MY OWN EXPERIENCES
MY SOURCES OF INFORMATION INCLUDE LONG CONVERSATIONS
OVER THREE YEARS WITH CO 42 CDO RM, LTCOL NICK VAUX,
FOR WHOM I WORKED BOTH AS A COY COMD AND SUBSEQUENTLY
WHEN HE WAS PROMOTED TO COLONEL AND WAS MY CHIEF OF
STAFF, HE WAS HERE AS RM ADVISOR 79-81 SO YOU MAY HAVE
MET HIM AT AWS;ALSO WITH THE BRIGADIER COMMANDER, 3 CDO
BDE RM, BRIGADIER NOW MAJ GEN JULIAN THOMPSON, ON WHOSE
STAFF I WORKED FOR TWO YEARS, AND ALSO WITH CLFFI
MAJOR GENERAL JEREMY MOORE, FOR WHOM I HAVE THANKFULLY
NEVER WORKED AS HE IS MARRIED TO MY COUSIN! ON THE
NAVAL SIDE I HAVE SPOKEN TO COMMODORE AMPHIBIOUS
WARFARE, THE CATF, AND MANY OTHER NAVAL OFFICERS BEFORE
DURING AND AFTER THE CONFLICT. I HAVE ALSO READ A
LARGE NUMBER OF BOOKS ON THE FALKLANDS AND WOULD BE
HAPPY TO RECOMMEND SOME, IF ANYONE WISHES TO FOLLOW-UP
THIS PRESENTATION. I DO NOT INTEND DISCUSSING SOUTH
GEORGIA AS I WAS NOT THERE. I WILL OF COURSE ENDEAVOR
TO ANSWER QUESTIONS ON THIS AND ANY OTHER ISSUES AT THE
END OF EACH PRESENTATION.
GEOGRAPHY
MAY I JUST FIRST CRAVE YOUR INDULGENCE AND JUST
REMIND YOU OF THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE FALKLANDS BECAUSE IT
LATER BECAME A VERY INFLUENTIAL FACTOR IN THE CONDUCT
OF OPERATIONS AT ALL TIMES. YOU WILL BE AWARE THAT IT
IS SOME 8,000 MILES FROM UK BUT ONLY APPROXIMATELY 35O
MILES FROM ARGENTINA, BUT OF EQUAL OR MORE SIGNIFICANCE
TO THE LAND FORCE IS ITS RELATIVE POSITION TO THE VAST
ANTARCTIC LAND MASS. THIS HAS A PROFOUND AFFECT ON THE
WEATHER. THERE IS NO GULF STREAM AS THERE IS IN THE
NORTH ATLANTIC TO WARM UP THE SEA AND
PRODUCE THE MILD WEATHER IN WINTER THAT WE EXPERIENCE
IN BRITAIN -- AND WE WERE, OF COURSE, DOWN THERE IN THE
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE'S MID WINTER. THE WINDS BLOW
NEARLY ALL THE TIME AND CHANGE IN INTENSITY VERY
RAPIDLY AND WITHOUT WARNING -- SOMETIMES CHANGING A
NOTCH ON THE BEAUFORT SCALE EVERY MINUTE.
THE WEATHER OBVIOUSLY DOES EXACTLY THE SAME AS THE
WIND AND ONE CAN GET SEVERAL PERIODS OF SNOW, RAIN AND
BRIGHT SUNSHINE, ALL IN ONE DAY. EACH SUCCEEDING THE
OTHER INCREDIBLY RAPIDLY.
THE LAND MASS OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS OF 4,697
SQUARE MILES IS ABOUT THE SAME SIZE AS THAT OF WALES OR
CONNECTICUT. THE COUNTRY IS ALMOST ALL PEAT BOG WITH
MOUNTAINS RISING UP THROUGH THE BOG. ALTHOUGH THE
MOUNTAINS ARE NOT HIGH BY SOME STANDARDS, THEY ARE
EXTREMELY RUGGED (THE HIGHEST IS MT. OSBORNE AT JUST
OVER 2,000 FEET, MT. KENT IS JUST OVER 1,200 FEET).
THE TOPS ARE CROWNED WITH CRAGGY, TOR-LIKE FEATURES.
ALL OVER THE ISLANDS THERE ARE ROCK-RUNS. THESE ARE
LIKE MAXI-SCREE AND EXTEND FOR MILES. SOME OF THE
ROCKS ARE HUGE. AS WE LATER DISCOVERED, IT CAN TAKE
HOURS TO CROSS A ROCK-RUN WHEN HEAVILY LADEN ESPECIALLY
AT NIGHT. THERE ARE NO ROADS EXCEPT IN THE IMMEDIATE
VICINITY OF STANLEY AND A FEW TRACKS NEAR EACH
SETTLEMENT. THERE HAD THEREFORE BEEN VERY LITTLE
BRITISH INVESTMENT IN TERMS OF CONSTRUCTION OVER THE
YEARS; ALL MATERIALS FOR WHICH WOULD HAVE HAD TO BE
IMPORTED. YOU WILL HAVE NOTICED THAT THERE ARE NO
TREES IN THE ISLANDS EXCEPT WHERE THEY'VE BEEN
CAREFULLY NURTURED AROUND THE HOUSES. CONCEALMENT
PARTICULARLY OF HQS WAS A MAJOR PROBLEM, AS HQ 3 CDO BN
RM FOUND OUT THE HARD WAY WHEN SUBJECTED TO AN AIR
ATTACK INTEIAL INLET.
THE POPULATION AS OF 1 APRIL 1982 WAS 1800. ALL
BUT 40 WERE OF BRITISH ORIGIN AND SPOKE ENGLISH. THE
REMAININING 40 WERE ARGENTINIANS CONCERNED WITH THE
OPERATION OF THE AIRFIELD AND IN PLANNING CONSTRUCTION
OF A NATURAL GAS STORAGE FACILITY.
HISTORY
THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WERE DISCOVERED BY THE
ENGLISH NAVIGATOR, JOHN DAVIS, IN 1592. THOUGH THE
ISLANDS WERE VISITED BY SIR RICHARD HAWKINS IN 1594,
AND OTHERS LATER, THEY WERE NOT NAMED THE FALKLAND
ISLANDS UNTIL 1690 AFTER THE THEN TREASURER OF THE NAVY
VISCOUNT FALKLAND. THE FRENCH WHO SAILED TO AND FROM
RIO DE LA PLATA CALLED THEM LES ILLES MALOUINES
(MALOOENES) AFTER THEIR HOME PORT OF ST. MALO. THE
SPANIARDS ON THE MAINLAND CORRUPTED THIS TO LAS ISLAS
MALVINAS.
IN 1764 SETTLERS LED BY DE BOUGAINVILLE OF FRANCE
LANDED IN EAST FALKLAND, WHILE IN THE 1765 CAPTAIN JOHN
BYRON CLAIMED THE ISLANDS FOR GREAT BRITAIN AND LEFT A
SMALL PARTY AT SAUNDERS ISLAND (NW FALKLAND ISLANDS).
IN 1766 THE FRENCH SETTLERS UNDER PRESSURE FROM SPAIN
WITHDREW. IN 1770 WITH SPAIN AND BRITAIN ON THE BRINK
OF WAR, THE SPANIARDS EJECTED THE ENGLISH! THE
FOLLOWING YEAR PORT EGMONT WAS REOCCUPIED BY THE
BRITISH, BUT VOLUNTARILY ABANDONED THREE YEARS LATER.
IN 1829 (I'M SORRY ABOUT THE MISPRINT IN THE
SLIDE) THE NEW REPUBLIC OF BUENOS AIRES, CLAIMING TO
HAVE INHERITED THE RIGHTS OF SPAIN, SENT LOUIS VERNET
TO THE ISLANDS TO DEVELOP A COLONY IN ITS NAME. TWO
YEARS LATER VERNET SEIZED 3 X US SEALING VESSELS; THIS
BROUGHT DOWN THE AMERICAN CORVETTE USS LEXINGTON
WHICH "LAID WASTE THE SETTLEMENT AND PROCLAIMED THE
ISLANDS FREE OF ALL GOVERNMENT". THE BRITISH, HOWEVER,
HAD NEVER RENOUNCED THEIR CLAIM, AND RESUMED OFFICIAL
OCCUPATION. THE COLONY WAS ESTABLISHED UNDER A
SUCCESSION OF NAVAL OFFICERS WHO WERE ENGAGED IN HYDRO-
GRAPHIC WORK UNTIL 1841 WHEN CIVIL ADMINISTRATION WAS
ESTABLISHED, THIS HAS REMAINED IN BEING EVER SINCE.
IN ORDER TO PROVIDE AS BALANCED AND IMPARTIAL A
PERSPECTIVE AS POSSIBLE LET ME MENTION ARGENTINA'S
POINT OF VIEW. ARGENTINA CLAIMED OWNERSHIP OF THE
ISLANDS BECAUSE:
A. IT HAD SUCCEEDED SPAIN IN THE TERRITORIES
FORMERLY RULED FROM BA.
B. SPAIN BY PURCHASING THE ISLANDS FROM FRANCE
HAD ACQUIRED THE RIGHT OF PRIOR OCCUPATION.
C. ARGENTINA THEN CLAIMED THAT BRITAIN HAD
ABANDONED. ITS CLAIM IN A SECRET, UNWRITTEN CLAUSE OF A
1771 DECLARATION.
D. BECAUSE BRITAIN HAD ABANDONED ITS SETTLEMENT
IN EAST FALKLAND IN 1774.
NOT MUCH CHANGED UNTIL SEPTEMBER '67 WHEN,
FOLLOWING UN INTERVENTION TWO YEARS EARLIER, TALKS ON
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS COMMENCED. ALL
FOUNDERED EVENTUALLY, PRINCIPALLY BECAUSE THE ISLANDERS
ARE BRITISH, SPEAK ENGLISH AND WISHED TO REMAIN
BRITISH. IN EARLY '81 THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT KEEN TO
REDUCE OUT-OF-NATO AREA DEFENSE EXPENDITURE ANNOUNCED
THE PHASING OUT OF HMS ENDURANCE, OUR ONLY RN SHIP
PERMANENTLY ON STATION IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, MEANWHILE
THE MILITARY REGIME NOW UNDER GENERAL GALTIERI IN
ARGENTINA WAS SUFFERING RAMPANT INFLATION AND NATIONAL
UNREST, AND FINALLY IN MARCH 82 THERE WAS A GROUP OF
ARGENTINIAN SCRAP METAL WORKERS UNLAWFULLY OPERATING
ASHORE IN S. GEORGIA. THESE THREE APPARENTLY UNRELATED
EVENTS TRIGGERED THE ARGENTINIAN INVASION OF THE
FALKLAND ISLANDS AND SOUTH GEORGIA ON 12 APRIL 1982.
ON 13 APRIL THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL CONDEMMED THE
ARGENTINIAN INVASION AND DEMANDED THE WITHDRAWAL OF
ARMY TROOPS.
DEFENSE
THE DEFENSE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS WAS VESTED IN:
A. NAVAL PRESENCE OF HMS ENDURANCE (AT THE TIME
OF THE INVASION NEARING S. GEORGIA SUPPOSEDLY TO DEAL
WITH THE SCRAP METAL WORKERS.)
B. FI DEFENSE FORCE - A HOMEGUARD OF 120
MEN DISPERSED AROUND ISLAND - ONLY 23 MEN REPORTED FOR
DUTY.
C. NP 8901 - A 40 MAN DETACHMENT OF RM COMMANDED
BY CAPTAIN RM GIVEN ACTING RANK OF MAJOR.
THIS FORCE, UNDER COMMAND OF MAJOR GARY NOOTT, RM
HAD JUST BEEN RELIEVED IN PLACE BY ITS SUCCESSOR, UNDER
MAJOR MIKE NORMAN. TO GET TO FI THIS GROUP HAD TO FLY
TO MONTE VIDEO AND BE TRANSPORTED BY SEA TO FI. FOR
OBVIOUS SOUND, PRACTICAL REASONS, THIS FORCE
TRADITIONALLY HAS TO TRAVEL UNARMED, IN CIVILIAN
CLOTHING AND WITH ONLY MINIMAL MILITARY PERSONAL
EQUIPMENT. THUS ON THE ISLAND WERE FOR EXAMPLE, 40
RIFLES, RADIOS FOR 40 MEN, ETC. AND MINIMAL DEFENSE
STORES. THIS DETACHMENT HAD PREVENTED SURREPTITIOUS
ARGENTINIAN OCCUPATION ON A COUPLE OF OCCASIONS BUT IT
IS SCARCELY A DETERRENT FORCE. IT WAS AT BEST A TRIP
WIRE FORCE AND IN THE EVENT OF A DETERMINED INVASION,
REINFORCEMENTS WERE CLEARLY ESSENTIAL.
CONSIDERATION HAD BEEN GIVEN TO REINFORCING THIS
DETACHMENT IN LATE MARCH 82 BUT THE STUMBLING BLOCK
REMAINED, HOW DO YOU POSITION IT? IT MAY HAVE BEEN
POSSIBLE TO ORGANIZE A SINGLE C130 TO FLY THE 8,000
MILES RETURN TRIP FROM ASCENSION ISLAND WITH INFLIGHT
REFUELING, AND LAND OR PARACHUTE TROOPS INTO THE
FALKLANDS - BUT THE EFFECT OF 1 X C-130 LOAD, EVEN IF
IT COULD HAVE ARRIVED IN TIME, WOULD HAVE BEEN
MINIMAL! MIKE NORMAN AND GARY NOOTT THEREFORE HAD TO
PLAN FOR THEIR DEFENSE WITHOUT REINFORCEMENT. IN
ESSENCE, THE KEYPOINT WAS GOVERNMENT HOUSE, KEY TERRAIN
- THE AIRPORT, SAPPER HILL, THEI APOLOGIZE FOR THE
SCRUFFY MAP, IT HAD BEEN IN MY MAP POUST FOR 20 DAYS!
THE MILITARY BARRACKS AT MOODY BROOK WERE ABANDONED
WHICH IS JUST AS WELL BECAUSE IT WAS SUBJECTED TO AN
OVERWHELMING ASSAULT 12 HOURS LATER THE DEPLOYMENT WAS
AS FOLLOWS:
2 MEN = YORK BEACH/CHRISTMAS BAY/SAPPER HILL/
8 MEN (SECTION) HARBOUR TOWN/OVERLOOKING ROAD/N OF
HARBOUR
THE MAIN DEFENSIVE POSITION WAS AT GOVERNMENT
HOUSE, TO WHICH THE 2 SECTIONS IN PORT STANLEY
AREA WERE TO WITHDRAW. THE 2 MEN OPS WERE TO MAKE
THEIR WAY BACK TO THE TOWN AS WELL AS POSSIBLE. THE
SECTION N OF THE WATER WAS TO GO INTO CAMP (THE
COUNTRYSIDE) AND ORGANIZE RESISTANCE. MR. REX HURT
(GOVERNOR) HOWEVER ORDERED THE SURRENDER BEFORE
SIGNIFICANT BRITISH CASUALTIES WERE RECEIVED, ONCE IT
WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE DEFENCE WAS OUTNUMBERED 20:1. II
IS THOUGHT THAT SOME 20 ARGENTINIANS WERE KILLED IN THE
INVASION. AT S. GEORGIA, IT WAS A SIMILAR STORY, WHERE
LT KEITH MILLS' DETACHMENT DISPLAYED GREAT GALLANTRY,
INFLICTING SERIOUS CASUALTIES. S. GEORGIA WAS LATER
REOCCUPIED BY M. COY, ONE OF THE OTHER 2 RIFLE COYS OF
MY UNIT, 42 CDO ON 26 APR 82. M COY WAS SPECIALLY
SELECTED FOR THIS UNIQUE MISSION SOLELY BECAUSE THE COY
COMMANDER CAPT CHRIS NUNN WAS SHE FIRST COY COMMANDER
TO WALK PASS THE CO OFFICE AND BE SEEN BY THE CO THAT
CRUCIAL MORNING. PETER BABBINGTON, THE OTHER COY COMD
AND I WERE GREEN WITH ENVY, AND WISHED WE'D ARRIVED AT
WORK EARLIER THAN NORMAL. EVENTS IN THE FALKLANDS
SUBSEQUENTLY ENDORSED PETER'S AND MY MORE LAID BACK
APPROACH. MIKE NORMAN HAVING BEEN RETURNED TO UK AS A
POW ON 5 APRIL 1985 AND BEEN DEBRIEFED, JOINED CANBERRA
IN ASCENSION -- AND FORMED COMPOSITE COMPANY (J) AS 42
CDO 3RD RIFLE COMPANY (TO REPLACE MCOY). WHILE MIKE
NORMAN AND HIS DETACHMENT WERE ORIGINALLY ON ROUTE TO
FI, 42 CDO WERE UNDERTAKING ARCTIC TRAINING IN
NORWAY. ON 27 DECEMBER 1981, I FLEW OFF WITH THE
REMAINDER OF THE CDO ADVANCE PARTY TO
PREPARE FOR THE ARRIVAL AND SUBSEQUENT TRAINING OF 42
CDO RM IN NORTH NORWAY. FOR THE SAME REASONS OF
ECONOMY THAT HAD FORCED THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE PHASING
OUT OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC ICE PATROL SHIP HMS
ENDURANCE, THE 1982 ANNUAL ROYAL MARINE ARCTIC
DEPLOYMENT WAS REDUCED FROM BRIGADE LEVEL TO COMMANDO
(BATTALION) LEVEL. I HAVE BEEN ASKED TO DESCRIBE THIS
TRAINING DURING THE FMF IN THE OFFENSE EXERCISE;
SUFFICE TO SAY THAT WE SPENT THREE MONTHS INTENSIVE
TRAINING SUCH THAT AT THE END OF THE PERIOD I KNEW THE
PERSONALITY, SHORTCOMINGS AND CAPABILITIES OF EVERY
VOICE ON THE RADIO, AND OF COURSE EVERY MAN IN MY
COMPANY. IN ADDITION TO 6 WEEKS OF INTENSIVE COMPANY
TRAINING, WE HAD CONDUCTED TWO MAJOR EXERCISES AT CDO
LEVEL OR ABOVE -- AND THE UNIT HAD A WELL PRACTICED
BATTLE PROCEDURE; PROBABLY SIGNIFICANTLY BETTER THAN
THE OTHER UNITS WHICH HAD BEEN TRG IN U.K. FOR THE
PREVIOUS 3 MONTHS, AND SUBJECTED TO THE USUAL BARRACKS
ROUTINES OF "DOG AND PONY" SHOWS ETC.
WE RETURNED FROM NORWAY IN THE ILL-FATED LSL SIR
GALAHAD ON 23 MARCH 1982, AND PROCEEDED ON TWO WEEKS
LEAVE, 3 OR 4 DAYS LATER; THE UNIT DISPERSING ON THE
USUAL 7 DAY NOTICE. WE WERE OF COURSE AWARE OF THE
ARGENTINIAN SCRAP METAL WORKERS' ILLEGAL OCCUPATION OF
SOUTH GEORGIA, BUT CLEARLY DID NOT KNOW WHAT WAS TO
HAPPEN ON 1 APRIL 1982.
I HAD A TELEPHONE CALL AT MY HOME IN SOMERSET AT
0400 HOURS ON 2 APRIL 1982 RECALLING ME TO BICKLEIGH,
PLYMOUTH, 42 CDO UK BASE. THIS PHONE CALL WAS A MERE
25 MINUTES AFTER THE BRIGADE COMMANDER HAD BEEN CALLED
-- AND THE REMAINDER OF THE UNIT WAS RECALLED DURING
THE COURSE OF THE MORNING. 42 CDO RM WAS ILL-PREPARED
FOR A FAST MOVE AS OUR HEAVY EQUIPMENT WAS STILL ON THE
HIGH SEAS RETURNING FROM NORWAY. ALTHOUGH WE HAD THE
LEAVE ADDRESS/PHONE NO OF ALL RANKS OF THE CDO, WE WERE
SCATTERED FAR AND WIDE. OUR S2 WAS IN CAMP LEJEUNE
MARRYING THE DAUGHTER OF THE DENTIST THE JW ATTACHE
FROM THE BRITISH EMBASSY, WHO WAS A GUEST AT THE
WEDDING ACTUALLY HANDED THE UNFORTUNATE BRIDEGROOM A
NOTE WHILE HE WAS WALKING UP THE AISLE OF THE CHURCH,
TELLING HIM TO CATCH A FLIGHT BACK TO THE UK AT 0700
THE FOLLOWING DAY; THE S3 WAS IN TUNISIA, THE XO AND OC
HQ CO WERE ON A LONG CIVILIAN SKI TOUR IN NORWAY.
NEVERTHELESS WITHIN 72 HOURS WE WERE READY TO GO. THE
WHOLE COUNTRY HAD MOBILISED, IN A WONDERFUL DISPLAY OF
SOLIDARITY, TO PREPARE THE 100 SHIPS COMPRISING 2X
CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS AND AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE FOR
DEPLOYMENT AND OERATIONS IN THE FALKLANDS. TRUCKS HAD
BEEN ENTERING OUR BASE AROUND THE CLOCK; I WAS ON DUTY
ONE EVENING WHEN THE ORDERLY OFFICER OF THE DAY
REPORTED ON THE TELEPHONE THAT OUR COMMANDO'S
AMMUNITION HAD ARRIVED. I SUGGESTED HE GET A WORKING
PARTY AND UNLOAD IT, HE SEEMED NOT TO UNDERSTAND, SO I
ASKED HIM WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS. HE
THEN EXPLAINED THAT WE HAD 26 X 16 TON TRUCKS FULL OF
IT!
VIDEO - (4 MINUTES)
CONCURRENTLY WITH OUR PREPARATIONS, THE RN AND
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE WERE ASSEMBLING SHIPS FOR THE ATF.
AN EARLY DECISION HAD BEEN MADE TO REQUISITION SHIPPING
TAKEN UP FROM TRADE (STUFT), INCLUDING SS CANBERRA,
FLAGSHIP OF P&O, THEN IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ON
COMPLETION OF A WORLD CRUISE. LIAISON OFFICERS FROM
THE UNITS TO BE EMBARKED FLEW TO GIBRALTAR, ALONG WITH
THE RN SHIP CONSTRUCTOR OFFICERS, AND HAD A WORKING
HOLIDAY ON THE THREE DAY RETURN PASSAGE TO
SOUTHHAMPTON. WITHIN TWO DAYS OF THE RETURN, DOCKYARD
WORKERS HAD ERECTED TWO NEW HELICOPTER LANDING SPOTS,
ONE OVER THE BEST OF THE THREE SWIMMING POOLS, THE
OTHER ON TOP OF THE WARDROOM BAR AND THE EMBARKATION OF
2,500 TPS WAS COMPLETE. THAT SAME DAY WE SAILED TO RV
WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE ATF AT ASCENSION ISLAND.
LIVING AND TRAINING CONDITIONS ON BOARD WERE
OUTSTANDING; A LUXURY LINER IS DEFINITELY THE WAY TO GO
TO WAR.
VIDEO - (2 MINUTES)
EMBARKED, ON THE SHIP WERE THREE BATTALION SIZED
UNITS, LATER TO BE REINFORCED BY A FURTHER RIFLE COPY,
BAND OF HQ CDO FORCES RM, ELEMENTS OF THE BDE MEDICAL
SQUADRON, AND HOSPITAL SURGICAL SUPPORT TEAMS, A
SEAKING HELICOPTER AND OTHER MISCELLANEOUS SUB UNITS;
ON BOARD WAS ALSO THE SPECIALLY APPOINTED DEPUTY
BRIGADE COMMANDER COLONEL TOM SECCOMBE WHO WAS THE
EMBARKED FORCE COMMANDER. THE ACCOMMODATION WAS
LUXURIOUS IN THE EXTREME. I LIVED IN A CABIN WITH A
DOUBLE BED (SADLY BY MYSELF) COMPLETE WITH BATHROOM AND
TWO BIG PICTURE WINDOWS. THE COST OF THIS
ACCOMMODATION IN 1982 PRICES FOR THE WORLD CRUISE WAS
$170 PER DAY. WE ALSO HAD EXTREMELY GOOD FOOD, THOUGH
WE REDUCED FROM A FIVE COURSE TO A THREE COURSE DINNER
EACH NIGHT DUE TO THE DIFFICULTIES OF RESUPPLY. THE
ENLISTED MEN LIVED IN SIMILAR COMFORT IN TWO BED AND AT
THE MOST FOUR BED CABINS. THE TRAINING FACILITIES WERE
ALSO FAR BETTER THAN ANY RN SHIP THAT I HAVE BEEN IN.
WE USED THE PROMENADE DECK, A CONTINUOUS 4OOM LOOP
AROUND THE SHIP, FROM 0700-2300 DAILY FOR FITNESS
TRAINING. THIS BUILT UP TO 9 MILE SPEED MARCHES WITH
EQUIPMENTI IN 90 MINUTES AND 20 MILE LOAD CARRIAGE
MARCHES IN BOOTS OF COURSE! WE ALSO HAD ACCESS TO
LANDING SPOTS, GAMES DECKS, TWO SWIMMING POOLS AND
OTHER AREAS NOT NORMALLY FOUND IN GREY LINE SHIPS.
VIDEO - 1 MINUTE
WE ALSO CONCENTRATED ON MEDICAL TRAINING. EVERY
MAN WAS TO BE ISSUED WITH MORPHINE AND EVERY OTHER MAN
WITH A DRIP BAG. EACH MAN LEARNED THE TREATMENT FOR
TRAUMA, WOUNDS, AND BURNS; AND HAVING SPENT THE WINTER
IN NORWAY WAS WELL AWARE OF THE TREATMENT FOR ALL COLD
WEATHER INJURIES. WE ALSO PRACTICED TREATING EVERYDAY
INJURIES AS WELL AS BATTLE WOUNDS AND LEARNED HOW TO DO
SUTURES. THE GALLEY WAS SOMEWHAT CONFUSED BY THE
REQUEST FOR SO MANY RAW PORK CHOPS UNTIL THEY GOT THESE
BACK, COVERED IN STITCHES. OUR DINNER THAT NIGHT WAS
PREDICATABLY NOT SUITABLE FOR MUSLIMS OR THOSE WITH
DELICATE STOMACHS.
THE OTHER MILITARY SKILL I WOULD HIGHLIGHT AS
RECEIVING PARTICULAR ATTENTION WAS THAT OF CALLING FOR
AND CONTROLING NAVAL, ARTILLERY, TANK AND MORTAR FIRE
SUPPORT. EVERY MAN IN MY COY WAS CAPABLE BY THE TIME
WE LANDED, OF CALLING FOR AND ADJUSTING FIRE SP, AND
HAD PRACTICED THIS ON WHAT WE CALL A "PUFF RANGE"; IN
THIS CASE A DETAILED CLOTH MODEL OF THE APPROACHES TO
PORT STANLEY BUILT IN THE EMPTY SWIMMING POOL UNDER THE
LANDING SPOT. I GOT A GREAT KICK PRIOR TO THE ACTUAL
BATTLE PERSONALLY CALLING FOR, AND ADJUSTING, A TWO
BATTERY FIRE MISSION.
WE ALSO HAD INTELLIGENCE AND ORIENTATION BRIEFS
FROM PREVIOUS COS OF NP8901, INCLUDING MAJ MIKE NORMAN
AND MAJ EWEN SOUTHBY TAILYOUR WHOM I SHALL MENTION
LATER. WE ALSO CONCENTRATED ON WEAPON HANDLING AND
SHOOTING, RADIO PROCEDURE AND REACTION TRAINING. WE
SPENT A LOT OF TIME ASSESSING WHAT EQUIPMENT WE MUST
TAKE ASHORE AND HOW THIS SHOULD BE TRANSPORTED, PACKED
OR CARRIED. WE ENDED UP WITH A LANDING LOAD OF
APPROXIMATELY 120-145 LBS. PER MAN. THIS WAS BROKEN
DOWN AS FOLLOWS: TWO MORTAR BOMBS AT 26 LBS, PERSONAL
WPN AND AMMO 50 LBS., 2 WATER BOTTLES, FOOD FOR 48
HOURS, SLEEPING BAG, SHELTER, SPARE CLOTHING; RADIO AND
BATTERIES, AND OTHER SPECIALIST EQUIPMENT REQUIRED BY
THAT INDIVIDUAL, HIS SECTION OR TROOP (SQUAD OR
PLATOON).
WE ALSO REHEARSED THE ASSAULT ROUTINES AND HAD TO
SORT OUT AND PRACTICE BY DAY AND NIGHT HOW TO EMBARK IN
LCVP/LCU FROM A 56,000 TON LUXURY LINER! THIS SLIDE
SHOWS LOADING DOORS OPEN AND 2 HELOS ON THE SPOTS.
OUR RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE RUNNING OF THE SHIP
WERE MINIMAL. EACH COY WAS DUTY FOR 1 X 24 HOUR PERIOD
EVERY 15 DAYS. MORE IMPORTANTLY, WE HAD TO DARKEN SHIP
PRINCIPALLY FOR ANTI-SUBMARINE DETECTION -- A DIFFICULT
PROBLEM FOR A LUXURY LINER WHICH MORE USUALLY IS LIT
LIKE A CHRISTMAS TREE, AND PREPARE AN AIR DEFENSE
CAPABILITY. THIS WE DID BY DEPLOYING 50 MACHINES GUNS
AROUND THE UPPER DECKS AND 12 BLOWPIPE MISSILES ON THE
SUPERSTRUCTURE.
WE KNEW OUR INITIAL DESTINATION WAS TO BE
ASCENSION ISLAND WHERE WE WOULD HAVE TO RV WITH THE ATF
SHIPS AND RESTORE.
TAPE - 4 MINUTES
ASCENSION ISLAND, LIKE DIEGO GARCIA, IS A BRITISH
ISLAND WITH CERTAIN FACILITIES LEASED TO U.S. ON
ASCENSION THIS IS PRIMARILY WIDEAWAKE AIRFIELD. IT WAS
TO HERE THAT CONSIDERABLE LOGISTIC SP FROM USA WAS SENT
TO HELP; PRINCIPALLY SIDEWINDER MISSILES AND COMMS
EQUIPMENT. BUT THE TIMESCALE FOR THE LANDING IN THE
FALKLANDS WAS DEPENDENT UPON THE FRANTIC POLITICAL
AND DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING AL HAIG, PERES DE
CUELLAR (UN SEC GENERAL) AND THE PRESIDENT OF PERU.
DESPITE WHAT THE TAPE SAID, FEW OF US HONESTLY BELIEVED
THAT WE COULD RESOLVE OUR DIFFERENCES BY NEGOTIATION --
EVEN THOUGH ARGENTINA AND BRITAIN HAVE BEEN CLOSELY
ALLIED FOR YEARS. THE FUTURE OF GALTIERI AND HIS
REGIME DEPENDED UPON RETENTION OF THE MALVINAS FOR
ARGENTINA AND MARGARET THATCHER'S POLITICAL CAREER WAS
AT STAKE TOO!
THE MOTIVATION FOR TRAINING WAS THEREFORE
UNBELIEVABLE. WE HAD WITH US FOR EXAMPLE APPROXIMATELY
15 CHAPLAINS AND 10-12 MEDIA MEN. THOUGH
TRADITIONALLY THESE PEOPLE DO NOT CARRY WEAPONS, THEY
UNDERTOOK THE FULL RANGE OF WEAPON TRAINING, MEDICAL
TRAINING, ETC. HAVING MENTIONED THE MEDIA, LET ME
DIGRESS A LITTLE. WE HAD WITH US NEWSPAPER, RADIO AND
TELEVISION MEN; THEY ARE TRADITIONALLY LEFT WING AND
SUSPICIOUS OF THE MILITARY. ONE OR TWO HAD BEEN WAR
CORRESPONDENTS IN VIETNAM, AFGHANISTAN OR LEBANON WHILE
MOST HAD REPORTED AT ONE STAGE OR ANOTHER UPON NORTHERN
IRELAND. IN IRELAND THE MEDIA APPEAR AFTER AN INCIDENT
HAS OCCURRED IN WHICH EITHER THE MILITARY MAY HAVE
SUFFERED CASUALTIES (AND THEREFORE "FAILED") OR
INFLICTED CASUALTIES PERHAPS "UNACCEPTABLY"! IN NO
INCIDENTS SUCH AS THESE COULD THE MEDIA BE FOREWARNED
OF THE MILITARY PLANS OR INTENTIONS FOR SECURITY
REASONS, NOR HAD THEY BEEN AWARE OF THE DEGREE OF
TRAINING, PLANNING, PREPARATION AND REHEARSALS
NECESSARY FOR EVEN THE MOST MUNDANE OPERATION. WHILST
ON BOARD CANBERRA, THEY BECAME FRIENDS WITH TROOPS OF
ALL RANKS AND BECAME ACTIVELY INVOLVED WITH OUR
TRAINING; AFTER ALL, THEIR LIVES WERE FOR ONCE AT
STAKE! THIS IS MAX HASTINGS, TAKING THINGS A LITTLE
SERIOUSLY FOR ONCE! WE, THE MILITARY IN GENERAL AND
THE RM IN PARTICULAR, NOW HAVE SOME FIRM FRIENDS IN THE
MEDIA. HOPEFULLY SOME WILL BECOME EDITORS OF NATIONAL
NEWSPAPERS OR TV PROGRAMMES IN THE YEARS TO COME WHERE
THEY WOULD HE VERY POWERFUL ALLIES TO HAVE.
NOW BACK TO PERMA. AS WE ARE TAUGHT, PLANNING IS
OF A CONTINUOUS AND DEVELOPING NATURE. HOWEVER, DUE TO
THE IMMENSE POLITICAL PRESSURE TO SAIL, THE INITIAL
PRE-EMBARKATION PLANNING DID NOT EXTEND TO PLANNING A
CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS ASHORE. PLANNING WAS LIMITED TO
BALANCING THE AVAILABLE (RN & STUFT) ASSETS WITH THE
BRIGADE COMMANDER'S ASSESSMENT OF WHAT FORCES HE WISHED
TO HAVE ASHORE. THE ORDER OF BATTLE EVENTUALLY
DEPLOYED WAS AS FOLLOWS: (BRIGADE) (ATTACHED)
MANY DESIRABLE ASSETS WERE OMITTED DUE SOLELY TO
LACK OF SPACE. THE MOST SIGNIFICANT OF THESE WERE
PERHAPS RPVs & 155 GUNS. RPVs BECAUSE WE HAD NO
AVAILABLE ASSETS FOR AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE AND
PHOTOGRAPHY, AND THESE WOULD HAVE GIVEN US THE REQUIRED
REAL TIME INFORMATION. THE 155 GUNS WOULD HAVE BEEN
USEFUL AS THEY WOULD HAVE ENABLED US TO ENGAGE THE
AIRFIELD PRIOR TO THE BATTLES FOR PORT STANLEY; AND
ALSO THEY DELIVER A MUCH GREATER PUNCH THAN THE 105's
THAT WE PRESENTLY HAVE. AS IT HAPPENED, THE LOGISTIC
TAIL TO SP THESE GUNS WOULD HAVE BEEN UNATTAINABLE; BUT
MORE ABOUT THAT IN PT II THE LAND BATTLE. AS YOU CAN
IMAGINE, THE LANDING FORCE WAS EFFECTIVELY A "COME AS
YOU ARE, IF YOU CAN PARTY".
ONCE WE HAD EMBARKED, THE PLANNING FOR THE
AMPHIBIOUS ASSAULT AND SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS ASHORE
WAS CONTINUOUS. THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER, WAS
CINCFLEET, ADMIRAL SIR JOHN FIELDHOUSE, BASED IN
NORTHWOOD LONDON; HIS MILITARY ADVISOR WAS INITIALLY
MAJ0R GENERAL JEREMY MOORE FROM HQ CDO FORCES RM.
UNTIL HE BECAME CLFF1, ON DEPLOYMENT OF A SECOND
BRIGADE ON D + 12. THE COMMANDER OF THE CARRIER GROUPS
WAS REAR ADMIRAL WOODWARD ABOARD HMS HERMES, WHILE THE
COMMODORE AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE, COMMODORE CLAPP, WHO WAS
CATF, AND BRIGADIER THOMPSON, INITIALLY THE CLF WERE
EMBARKED IN HMS FEARLESS. THESE FLAG OFFICERS AND
THEIR STAFFS WERE THE KEY PLANNERS. THOUGH GOOD MAPS
OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS EXISTED, THESE WERE ACCURATE
ONLY DOWN TO THE HIGH WATER MARK. NEITHER OFFICIAL
CHARTS NOR CONTINGENCY PLANS EXISTED FOR A MILITARY
OPERATION TO RECOVER THE FALKLANDS FOLLOWING A HOSTILE
INVASION. FORTUNATELY, A FORMER CO OF NP 8901, MAJOR
EWEN SOUTHBY TAILYOUR WAS A VERY KEEN, SINGLEHANDED
YACHTSMAN AS WELL AS A DISTINGUISHED ARTIST. HE HAD
SPENT HIS YEAR IN THE FALKLANDS DOING DETAILED BEACH
AND COASTAL SURVEYS THROUGHOUT THE ISLANDS. IN
DECEMBER 1981, HE HAD SENT A COPY OF HIS MANUSCRIPT TO
VARIOUS PUBLISHING, HOUSES. SADLY, AS THERE ARE NO
YACHTS OR INSHORE FISHING BOATS IN THE AREA, THERE
APPEARED TO BE NO MARKET FOR A FALKLAND ISLANDS COASTAL
NAVIGATION BOOK, THESE MANUSCRIPTS HAD THEREFORE BEEN
RETURNED WITH REGRETS! 14 WEEKS LATER, THE MOD
IMPOUNDED THESE MANUSCRIPTS AND CLASSIFIED THEM "TOP
SECRET". THESE, SUPPORTED BY EWEN'S EXPERTISE, BECAME
THE FUNDAMENTAL PLANNING DOCUMENTS. I AM PLEASED TO
SAY THAT THE BOOK IS NOW UNCLASSIFIED AND HAS BEEN
PUBLISHED. MANY WOULD ARGUE THAT A WAR IS A LITTLE
EXCESSIVE AS A PUBLICITY STUNT!
MANY FACTORS AFFECTED THE LANDING FORCES RECOM-
MENDATIONS ON THE LOCATION OF THE FBH. AN ASSUMPTION
INITIALLY WAS THAT WE WOULD HAVE AIR SUPERIORITY; AND
WHAT A FALSE AND COSTLY ASSUMPTION THIS WAS -- A
POLITICAL DECISION WAS MADE THAT THE OPERATION COULD
NOT BE DELAYED AND SO WE NEVER HAD AIR SUPERIORITY, AND
THE FLEET SUFFERED ENORMOUSLY BECAUSE OF IT.
NEVERTHELESS THE MAJOR FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED WERE:
* PROTECTION FOR THE AMPHIBOUS FLEET BOTH IN TERMS
OF AIR DEFENSE, AND FROM THE SOUTH ATLANTIC STORMS AND
* ENEMY DISPOSITIONS -- AN OPPOSED AMPHIBIOUS
ASSAULT CLOSE TO PORT STANLEY WAS THANKFULLY SWIFTLY
REJECTED DUE TO LACK OF RESOURCES AND CASUALTY
ESTIMATES.
THREE ALTERNATIVES WERE FINALLY CONSIDERED ON
17 APRIL AT ASCENSION ISLAND AT A MEETING CHAIRED BY
ADMIRAL SIR JOHN FIELDHOUSE. THESE WERE:
A. OCCUPY WEST FALKLAND FOR THE PURPOSE OF
BUILDING AN AIRSTRIP TO TAKE C130 AND F4 PHANTOM AC.
THIS WAS ADMIRAL WOODWARD'S PREFERENCE.
B. LAND IN LAFONIA, A FLAT AREA SOUTH OF GOOSE
GREEN AND THEN PRESS NORTH. THIS WAS A STAFF
ALTERNATIVE WITH MINIMAL ADVANTAGES, THAT WAS REJECTED
VERY QUICKLY.
C. ASSAULT AT SAN CARLOS.
THE SAN CARLOS LANDING SITE OFFERED THE AMPHIBIOUS
FORCE MANY ADVANTAGES. SAN CARLOS WATER WOULD PROVIDE
A SHELTERED ANCHORAGE IN WHICH THE SHIPS AND LANDING
CRAFT COULD EASILY UNLOAD THE LANDING FORCE AND ITS
EQUIPMENT. BY CLOSING OFF THE RELATIVELY NARROW
FALKLAND SOUND TO THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF SAN CARLOS
WATER, THE NAVY COULD DEFEND THE AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS
AGAINST ANY ENEMY SURFACE OR SUB-SURFACE ATTACKS.
SINCE THE SITE WAS 50 MILES OVER VERY ROUGH TERRAIN
FROM THE ENEMY'S MAIN FORCE AT PORT STANLEY, THE
ARGENTINES COULD PROBABLY ONLY ATTACK THE BRITISH
BEACHHEAD BY AIR OR WITH A RELATIVELY SMALL
HELICOPTERBORNE FORCE. FINALLY, THE HIGH GROUND THAT
SURROUNDED SAN CARLOS WATER WOULD PREVENT ARGENTINE
AIRCRAFT FROM USING THEIR FEARED, SEA-SKIMMING EXOCET
MISSILES TO ATTACK THE SHIPS UNLOADING IN SAN CARLOS
WATER.
THE SAN CARLOS SITE ALSO POSED A COUPLE OF
DISADVANTAGES. THE SURROUNDING HILLS THAT WOULD HELP
DEFEND AGAINST THE EXOCETS WOULD ALSO RESTRICT THE
RADAR ACQUISITION OF LOW-FLYING AIRCRAFT UNTIL THEY
EMERGED OVER THE HIGH GROUND. ALSO, THE NARROW WIDTH
OF FALKLAND SOUND WOULD GIVE THE ATF SHIPS LITTLE ROOM
IN WHICH TO MANEUVER AWAY FROM ENEMY AIR ATTACKS.
ADMIRAL FIELDHOUSE INDICATED THAT, SUBJECT TO
ENEMY DISPOSTION, HE PREFERRED THE SAN CARLOS OPTION AS
HE WANTED TO SEIZE EAST FALKLANDS VITAL OBJECTIVES
INCLUDING PORT STANLEY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.
ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS COMMENCED ON 27 APRIL AND
CONTINUED FOR THE SUCCEEDING 3 1/2 WEEKS UNTIL D-DAY,
FINALLY SELECTED FOR 21 MAY 1982. THEY DEPLOYED AS
FOLLOWS: I WOULD HIGHLIGHT STANLEY, GOOSE GREEN, LAX
MAY, PORT HOWEN & PEBBLE ISLAND.
THE AIMS OF THESE ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS WERE
INITIALLY BEACH RECONNAISSANCE AND IDENTIFICATION OF
ENEMY DISPOSITIONS. THESE WERE EVENTUALLY IDENTIFIED
AS SHOWN. THE ENEMY HAD A SIGNIFICANT RADIO DIRECTION
FINDING CAPABILITY, WERE WELL AWARE OF THE PRESENCE OF
SF OPS ASHORE, AND TRIED HARD TO LOCATE THEM. AT THAT
TIME WE HAD NO BURST TRANSMISSION FACILITY, AND THE
BEACH SURVEY REPORT FOR SAN CARLOS FOR EXAMPLE TOOK 2
1/2 HOURS TO SEND, IN MORSE. FORTUNATELY THE ARGENTIAN
HELICOPTERBORNE REACTION FORCE FAILED TO FIND THEM, SO
WELL WERE THEY CAMOUFLAGED. ALTHOUGH ON ONE OCCASION
IT LANDED WITHIN 50 METERS OF AN O.P. POSITION.
THE OFFENSIVE AIMS OF ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS
ASHORE WERE TO HARRASS THE ENEMY AND, FUNDAMENTAL TO A
LANDING AT SAN CARLOS, DESTROY THE ARGENTINIAN AIRBASE
AT PEBBLE ISLAND. A RAID ON PEBBLE ISLAND WAS CARRIED
OUT BY 48 MEMBERS OF SAS SUPPORTED BY NAVAL GUNFIRE
SPOT TEAMS, HMS INVINCIBLE AND A GUIDED MISSILE
DESTROYER WITH A SINGLE 5 INCH GUN. THE RAID WAS
PLANNED AND EXECUTED WITHIN 5 DAYS. SUCH A TIME SCALE
IS NOT RECOMMENDED BUT THE OPEATION WAS A COMPLETE
SUCCESS. ELEVEN ENEMY AIRCRAFT PRINCIPALLY THE
COUNTERINSURGENCY PUCARA, AND A RADAR STATION WERE
COMPLETELY DESTROYED, AND WE SUFFERED NO CASUALTIES.
THE TRAGIC DEATH OF 20 OF THESE MEN A FEW DAYS LATER IN
A HELICOPTER ACCIDENT WAS A GRIEVEOUS AND POIGNANT
LOSS.
OTHER ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS INCLUDED CHECKING
FALKLANDS SOUND FOR MINES, AND DOMINATION OF THE SEA
AREA. THE FORMER WAS ACHIEVED BY SENDING A FRIGATE THROUGH
THE SOUND, THE LATTER WAS ACHIEVED IN THE TAILING
AND SUBSEQUENT SINKING OF THE CRUISER GENERAL BELGRANO
(PREVIOUSLY THE U.S.S. PITTSBURGH. A WWII HEAVY
CRUISER) BY SUBMARINE AFTER WHICH THE ARGENTINIAN NAVY
NEVER AGAIN LEFT TERRITORIAL WATERS. THE NAVAL AIR
BATTLE CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE WAR STARTING WITH THE
SINKING OF HMS SHEFFIELD BY EXOCET. THIS WAS TWO DAYS
AFTER GENERAL BELGRANO WAS TORPEDOED, AND THOSE
OPTIMISTS WHO HAD REMAINED HOPEFUL OF A PEACEFUL
SETTLEMENT WERE FINALLY RECONCILED TO THE NEED FOR
COMBAT ASHORE. THE OTHER SHIP SUNK BY EXOCET WAS THE
ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, SHOW HERE. THE NAVAL AIR WAR WAS
EFFECTIVELY CONCLUDED ONLY 2 DAYS BEFORE THE SURRENDER,
WITH THE LAND LAUNCHED EXOCET STRIKE ON HMS GLAMORGAN
ON 12 JUN. I SAW THIS ATTACK DURING THE BATTLE FOR
MOUNT HARRIET, BUT MORE ABOUT THAT IN SESSION 2, THE
LAND BATTLE! IN ALL WE LOST 6 SHIPS AND HAD 8 DAMAGED;
ARGENTINA LOST 4 AGEING OR SMALL SHIPS. ALL ARE AWARE
OF THE SUCCESS OF THE HARRIER. MANY CORRECTLY ARGUE,
HOWEVER, THAT THE ARGENTINE AF WAS OPERATING AT THE
LIMIT OF ITS RANGE -- AND THEREFORE THEIR A/C WERE
UNABLE TO BE DETRACTED FROM THEIR BOMBING MISSION IN
MANEUVER AND
COUNTEROFFENSIVE OPERATIONS, THE COUNTER IS ALSO TRUE
THAT WE HAD NO AWAC CAPABILITY THOUGH WE DID ACTUALLY
REQUEST IT FROM USA, AND THE HARRIERS WERE THEREFORE
FIGHTING BLIND. FURTHERMORE, THE HARRIERS WERE ALSO
OPERATING AT THE LIMIT OF THEIR RANGE SINCE THE CARRIER
BATTLE GROUPS WERE STATIONED WELL EAST OF THE ISLANDS
TO AVOID EXOCET. NEVERTHELESS, HARRIERS WERE ALL WE
HAD AND THEY PERFORMED SUPERBLY.
NAVAL SHIPS ALSO CONDUCTED NIGHTLY SHELLING OVER
ARGENTINE POSITIONS AROUND PORT STANLEY, GOOSE GREEN,
MARE HARBOUR, FOX BAY, PORT HOWARD AND PORT LOUIS. YOU
WILL NOTICE THAT SAN CARLOS WAS NOT INCLUDED.
TOGETHER WITH THE PEBBLE ISLAND RAID, THE MISSION
BY THE RAF, WITH CARRIER BASED HARRIER ASSISTANCE, TO
BOMB PORT STANLEY AIRFIELD WAS THE MOST STIMULATING TO
THE GENERAL PUBLIC. THE WAR CABINET HAD INCIDENTALLY
REJECTED THE IDEA OF BOMBING AIR BASES IN MAINLAND
ARGENTINA AS BEING ESCALATORY. 2 VULCAN BOMBERS, THE
VANGUARD OF BRITAIN'S NUCLEAR DETERRENT IN THE 195Os
AND DUE FOR SCRAPPING ONCE TORNADO WAS INTRODUCED, AND
23 VICTOR K2 TANKERS WERE EARMARKED, TRAINED AND
DEPLOYED TO ASCENSION ISLAND. DUE TO A FAULTY WINDOW
WHICH PREVENTED THE NECESSARY PRESSURIZATION, ONE
VULCAN HAD TO TURN BACK, THE OTHER CONTINUED AND
DROPPED 21 X 1000 BOMBS. THE LOGISTIC SUPPORT BEHIND
THIS MISSION WAS ENORMOUS. THE VULCAN BOMBER ON ROUTE
TO THE TARGET HAD TO HAVE 7 IN FLIGHT REFUELS, AND THE
REFUELLERS THEMSELVES HAD TO BE REFUELLED. THE OVERALL
RANGE ASCENSION TO FALKLAND RETURN, IN EXCESS OF 8OO0
MILES, EQUATES TO A MISSION FROM MOSCOW TO NEW YORK AND
BACK OR ENGLAND TO PAKISTAN RETURN. THE DAY BEFORE
THIS MISSION, MY COMPANY HAD BEEN TRAINING ASHORE IN
ASCENSION ISLAND ON A 15 MILE LOAD CARRY AND SHOOTING
EXERCISE. JUST AS WE WERE ABOUT TO RETURN TO THE
CANBERRA, I WAS ORDERED TO PROVIDE TWO OF MY 3 RIFLE
TROOPS TO GUARD THE AIRFIELD, AND RETAIN THE SECURITY
OF THE OPERATION. IT WAS A DRAMATIC AND NOISY
EXPERIENCE, AND EXHILARATING TO REALIZE WE WERE AT LAST
STRIKING BACK. THE BBC WORLD SERVICE REPORTED THAT THE
ATTACK WAS A SUCCESS, AND PUNDITS IN U.K. DECLARED THAT
THE AIRFIELD MUST HAVE BEEN DAMAGED BEYOND USE. IT WAS
A CRUEL SHOCK A FEW WEEKS LATER TO FIND THAT THE
AIRFIELD HAD NEVER BEEN BLOCKED AND I SAW A/C MOVEMENTS
UP TO THE DAY BEFORE THE SURRENDER FROM 15 KM AWAY!
REPORTING THIS RAF/RN ATTACK, BRIAN HANRAHAN, A BBC TV
REPORTER ABOARD HMS HERMES, MADE THE CLASSIC REPORT
WHICH GAVE NOTHING AWAY. HE SAID, "I CANNOT TELL YOU
HOW MANY A/C WERE INVOLVED BUT I COUNTED THEM ALL OUT,
AND I COUNTED THEM ALL BACK IN." THERE WAS GREAT
ELATION THAT THIS ATTACK WAS APPARENTLY SUCCESSFUL
AGAINST A WELL DEFENDED AIRFIELD WITHOUT LOSS. THE
SHARP EYED AMONGST YOU WILL HAVE NOTICED THAT THESE 2
INDIVIDUALS ARE PARAS. THAT'S BECAUSE THE CARTOONISTS
WERE ALL RM.
WE SPENT ABOUT 3 WEEKS OFF ASCENSION ISLAND, WHILE
DIPLOMATIC NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED AND THE NAVY
ENDEAVORED TO ENFORCE THE MARITIME EXCLUSION ZONE (BY
SUBMARINE) AND THE SUBSEQUENT TOTAL EXCUSION ZONE (BY
(AIRCRAFT/SURFACE) BUT REGRETABLY COULD GET ASHORE ONLY
3 TIMES. THIS WAS THERE WAS ONLY 1 SMALL BEACH, AND
ALL LANDING CRAFT AND MANY HELOS WERE INVOLVED BY DAY
IN RESTORING THE SHIPS IN A TACTICAL MANNER. THE SPEED
WITH WHICH THE ATF AND PARTICULARLY GREY FUNNEL
TRANSPORT SHIPS DEPLOYED FROM UK WITHIN 2-3 DAYS HAD
PRECLUDED COMBAT LOADING -- PLANNING HAD AT THAT STAGE
NOT PROCEEDED BEYOND THE COMPOSITION OF THE FORCE AND A
POSSIBLE SCENARIO FOR LANDING. BY NIGHT WE SAILED
AROUND THE ISLAND, FEARFUL OF THE ARGENTINIAN TANKER
SPYING ON US MIGHT BE EQUIPPED WITH THE ITALIAN COSMOS
SDV THAT THEY THE ARGENTINIAN'S HAD RECENTLY
PURCHASED.
WE SHALL NOW BREAK FOR 10 MINUTES WHILE THE ATF
LINGERS IN THE SUN AT ASCENSION ISLAND.
VIDEO 2 MINS (SILENT)
BY THE TIME WE LEFT ASCENSION ISLAND ON 7 MAY 82, THE
CONCEPT OF OPS ASHORE HAD BEEN PREPARED, THOUGH THE 47
PAGE BRIGADE OP ORDER WAS NOT ISSUED UNTIL 12 MAY, WITH
"O" GP ON 13 MAY. HAVING SAID THAT, I RECEIVED A
WARNING ORDER WHILE STILL IN ASCENSION, THAT MY COY WAS
TO PREPARE FOR AMPHIBIOUS RAIDS ON THE WESTFALKLANDS
USING 1 X FRIGATE, 2 HELOS AND SMALL BOATS. THE FULL
BRIEFING PROCESS HAD BEEN COMPLETED DOWNS TO
MNE LEVEL BY 18 MAY 82, WHILE THE ATF SAILED SOUTH INTO
HEAVIER SEAS, STRONGER WINDS AND COLDER WEATHER. THE
TEMPO OF TRAINING SLACKENED A LITTLE AS FINAL
PREPARATIONS WERE MADE, MORE BLOOD WAS TAKEN, LETTERS
WERE WRITTEN HOME AND THE EQUIPMENT SCALES LAID DOWN,
TRIALLED AND TESTED OVER THE PREVIOUS WEEKS WAS
CHECKED, REVIEWED AND PACKED.
ON 19 MAY, THE 1500 MEN OF 4O CDO AND 3 PARA, OUR
FELLOW PASSENGERS ON CANBERRA CROSS DECKED. IT HAD
BEEN ENVISIONED THAT THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE BY JACKSTAY
TRANSFER, ONE MAN OF A TIME A HORRIFIC WAY OF PREPARING
TO GO TO WAR, BUT FORTUNATELY A BREAK IN THE WEATHER
ENABLED LANDING CRAFT TO BE USED.
THE AMPHIBIOUS TASK FORCE RV'D WITH THE LIGHT
CARRIER BATTLE GROUPS DURING THE NIGHT OF 19/20 MAY.
WE AWAKENED TO FIND OURSELVES IN SS CANBERRA IN THE
CENTER OF THE LARGEST OPERATIONAL AMPHIBIOUS FLEET THAT
HAD ASSEMBLED SINCE WORLD WAR II. IT WAS A TRULY
MEMORABLE EXPERIENCE, BUT ONE TINGED WITH GREAT
APPREHENSION. APPROACHING FROM THE EAST WE SPENT THE
DAY WITHIN THE TEZ AND WERE WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE
SUPER ETENDARD AIRCRAFT ARMED WITH EXOCET FROM
LUNCHTIME ONWARDS. FORTUNATELY THE DAY WAS IDEAL WITH
A VERY LOW CLOUD BASE AND INTERMITTENT RAIN, AND STILL
WE PLOWED ON TOWARDS THE FALKLANDS. DURING THE NIGHT
OF 20-21 MAY, WE HEADED TOWARDS PORT STANLEY, AND NAVAL
GUNFIRE SOFTENED UP TARGETS IN THAT AREA IN A
DEMONSTRATION DECEPTION. HAVING BEEN INFLUENCED BY
USMC, THE ARGENTINIANS ANTICIPATED AN OPPOSED LANDING
IN THE PORT STANLEY AREA, AND THE DEMONSTRATION WAS SO
SUCCESSFUL THAT EVEN AFTER D-DAY THEY THOUGHT SAN
CARLOS WAS A DIVERSION! CONCURRENTLY, THE SAS
UNDERTOOK A MOST OVERT FEINT IN A STANDOFF ATTACK ON
GOOSE GREEN WITH ADDITIONAL NGS. AS THE AMPHIBIOUS
TRANSPORT SHIPS, NAVAL GUNFIRE AND AIR DEFENSE SHIPS
HEADED TOWARDS FALKLAND SOUND, SBS WITH NGS ATTACK THE
1/2 COY POSITION ON FANNING HEAD, IDENTIFIED DURING
ADVANCE FORCE OPERATIONS, TO DIVERT THE ENEMY'S
ATTENTION. WITH SBS WENT A RM OFFICER BORN AND BRED IN
COSTA RICA WHO WAS A FLUENT SPANISH SPEAKER. HE WAS
ARMED WITH A LOUD SPEAKER AND HIS JOB WAS TO PERSUADE
THEM TO SURRENDER, BUT SADLY HIS VOICE COULD NOT BE
CLEARLY HEARD. AFTER A SOMEWHAT FRUSTRATING 7 HOUR
ACTION, 9 ARGENTINIANS WERE CAPTURED, THE REMAINDER
FILTERED INTO THE DARKNESS JUST BEFORE DAWN. HOWEVER
THE OVERALL MISSION WAS A SUCCESS IN THAT THE ACTION
CLEARLY DIVERTED THE ATTENTION OF THE ARGENTINIANS FROM
INTERFERING WITH THE MAIN LANDING. LEFT TO THEIR OWN
DEVICES, THEY COULD HAVE USED THEIR 1O5 MM RECOILLESS
ANTI-TANK GUN WITH DEVASTATING EFFECT AGAINST THE
UNARMOURED LCUs PACKED WITH TROOPS, AS THEY PASSED
SOUTH OF FANNING HEAD ON THEIR WAY INTO SAN CARLOS
WATER.
THE BRIGADE MISSION WAS TO CONDUCT A SILENT NIGHT
LANDING BY LANDING CRAFT, SO THAT BY FIRST LIGHT THE
BRIGADE WOULD HAVE SECURED THE HIGH GROUND OVERLOOKING
PORT SAN CARLOS, SAN CARLOS SETTLEMENT AND AJAX BAY.
AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE AFTER 1ST LIGHT, ONE LIGHT GUN
BATTERY WOULD BE FLOWN IN, FOLLOWED BY THE RAPIER BTRY
AND THEN THE REMAINING GUNS. THE DESIGN BEING THAT AS
SOON AS POSSIBLE THE BDE SHOULD BE IN A GOOD REVERSE
SLOPE DEFENSIVE POSITION READY TO FIGHT ARGENTINIAN AIR
OR GROUND ATTACKS, OR ANY COMBINATION OF THESE 2. THE
PLAN CALLED FOR 40 CDO TO LAND AT SAN CARLOS SETTLEMENT
AND 45 CDO AT AJAX BAY FIRST AND THEN 2 AND 3 PARAS TO
COVER S & N RESPECTIVELY. WHEN THE SAS FEINT ATTACK
LOCATED WHAT WAS CONSIDERED LIKELY TO BE THE ENEMY
STRATEGIC RESERVE AT DARWIN GOOSE GREEN, THE NEED TO
GET TO SUSSEX MOUNTAIN QUICKLY WAS OBVIOUS. THE PLAN
WAS THEREFORE CHANGED AT THE LAST MOMENT TO LAND 40 CDO
ON BLUE BEACH ONE AND 2 PARA AT BLUE BEACH TWO FIRST,
THEN 45 CDO ON RED BEACH AND 3 PARA ON GREEN BEACH
ONE. 42 CDO(-) WAS TO REMAIN ON CANBERRA IN RESERVE
UNTIL ORDERED. MY COY WAS STILL EARMARKED FOR RAIDS IN
WEST FALKLANDS, A ROLE WHICH PROMISED TO BE BOTH
STIMULATING AND EXCITING.
THE TIME FOR H-HOUR WAS SELECTED FOLLOWING A
BALANCING ACT BETWEEN RN WHO DID NOT WISH TO BE IN
HOSTILE AIRCRAFT RANGE BY DAY, AND JULIAN THOMPSON WHO
REQUIRED THE MAXIMUM TIME TO DEPLOY TROOPS BY NIGHT.
EVENTUALLY IT WAS SET FOR 2:30 AM LOCAL TIME.
4O CDO WAS ALLOCATED 2 SCORPION AND 2 SCIMITAR
LIGHT TANKS UNDER COMMAND AND THESE LANDED SIDE BY SIDE
IN THE FIRST 2 X LCUS. THE INTENTION BEING TO FIRE THE
MAIN ARMAMENT IF NECESSARY WHILE APPROACHING THE
BEACH. 40 CDO HAD 4 X LCUS AND 4 X LCVPS WHILE 2 PARA
HAD JUST 4 X LCUS.
THOUGH THERE WAS NEARLY AN HOUR'S DELAY IN H-HOUR
THE LANDING WAS A CLEAR SUCCESS AND ALL PERSONNEL GOT
ASHORE WITHOUT CASUALTIES. THE DELAY IN H-HOUR WAS
CAUSED PRIMARILY BECAUSE OF THE DIFFICULTY THAT HEAVILY
LADEN MEN EXPERIENCED IN MOVING THROUGH THE NARROW
PASSAGEWAYS AND EXIT IN CIVILIAN SHIPS. PARTICULARLY
BY ONE MAN FROM 2 PARA WHO FELL AND WAS INJURED GETTING
OFF NORLAND ONTO AN LCU.
VIDEO - (1 MIN)
AS IMPLIED BY THE TAPE, FRANTIC EFFORTS WERE MADE TO
BUILD UP THE AIR DEFENSES ASHORE WHILE WE WAITED
TENSELY FOR THE FIRST AIRCRAFT ATTACK WHICH WE KNEW
MUST COME SOON. AT 8 A.M. A SEA KING HELICOPTER WITH
THE RAPIER MISSILE AIR DEFENSE BATTERY RECONNAISSANCE
PARTY WAS FIRED AT, EAST OF PORT SAN CARLOS, ITS 2
ESCORTING LIGHT GAZELLE HELOS WERE HIT BY SMALL ARMS
FIRE. THESE AIRCRAFT WERE ARMED WITH SNEB ROCKETS AND
GPMGS, AND ACTED AS GUNSHIPS. ONE GAZELLE MANAGED TO
GET BACK TO AN LSL; SGT EVANS THE PILOT OF THE OTHER
WAS HIT. BY A
BRILLIANT PIECE OF FLYING AND, ALTHOUGH DYING OF HIS
WOUNDS, HE MANAGED TO PUT HIS AIRCRAFT GENTLY IN THE
WATER. HIS AIRCREWMAN SGT CANDLISH TENDED HIM AND
SWAM, DRAGGING HIM WHILE UNDER MACHINE GUNFIRE, THE 500
M TO PORT SAN CARLOS. AS CANDLISH WAS PULLING HIS
MORTALLY WOUNDED PILOT AND FRIEND FROM THE WATER HE SAW
ANOTHER GAZELLE DISINTEGRATE IN THE AIR, HAVING BEEN
HIT BY THE SAME GROUP. THE CREW OF TWO WERE KILLED
INSTANTLY. THESE THREE AIRCREW WERE THE ONLY MEN OF 3
CDO BDE RM KIA ON D-DAY. BUT OUT IN FALKLAND SOUND AND
IN SAN CARLOS WATER, WHERE MOST OF THE ATF SHIPS WERE,
MANY MORE GALLANT SAILORS WERE TO DIE UNDER ARGENTINE
AIR ATTACK.
ON CANBERRA WE HAD ASSEMBLED IN OUR COY ASSAULT
STATION FROM H-HOUR, THOUGH MOST OF US WERE AWAKE ALL
NIGHT, WAITING AND WATCHING. WATCHING THE ATTACK ON
FANNING HEAD AND THE PREPARATIONS FOR THE ASSAULT,
WATCHING THE SHIPS EASING INTO SAN CARLOS WATER AND
DISGOURGING LANDING CRAFT. WAITING FOR THE ARGENTINA
REACTION. EVERY MINUTE THAT PASSED GAVE US TIME TO
IMPROVE OUR AIR DEFENCES; WOULD THE DELAY ENABLE US TO
GET THESE ASHORE AND FULLY EFFECTIVE BEFORE THE FIRST
ATTACK. THE WAITING LASTED UNTIL 8:55 AM, WHEN A
SINGLE PUCARA ATTACKED CANBERRA BUT WAS DRIVEN OFF BY
MACHINE GUNFIRE. THEN AT 9:38 TWO MORE PUCARA ATTACKED
2 PARA ON SUSSEX MOUNTAIN AND D SON, 22 SAS,
WITHDRAWING FROM THEIR SUCCESSFUL DIVERSIONARY RAID ON
DARWIN. ONE WAS SHOT DOWN BY D SQN USING THE AMERICAN
STINGER MISSILE. THESE PUCARA WERE BASED AT GOOSE
GREEN ONLY 12-14 MILES TO THE SOUTH OF THE BEACHHEAD.
THEREAFTER, WE WERE SUBJECT PRINCIPALLY TO JET
AIRCRAFT. THE NEXT WERE A PAIR OF MIRAGE WHICH
ATTACKED THE ANCHORAGE AT 9:45. FROM THEN ON THE,
RAIDS SEEMED CONTINUOUS. CAPT BURNS THE SENIOR NAVAL
OFFICER IN CANBERRA, WHO HAD BEEN CALLING THOSE BELOW
DECKS TO TAKE COVER AT EACH AND EVERY ATTACK, ASSURED
US THAT HE COULD GIVE 2 MINUTES WARNING OF FUTURE
ATTACKS. AS HE WAS MAKING HIS ANNOUNCEMENT WE HEARD
THE ROAR OF ANOTHER MIRAGE OVER THE PA SYSTEM FOLLOWED
BY ABJECT APOLOGIES FROM CAPT BURN. THE AIRCRAFT HAD
APPROACHED AT WAVE TOP LEVEL TOTALLY UNDETECTED.
VIDEO (4 MINS)
SOME 72 AIRCRAFT BOMBED AND STRAFED THE ATF ON
D-DAY AND BY LATE AFTERNOON ALL OF THE FRIGATES IN OR
NEAR THE ANCHORAGE HAD BEEN HIT AND DAMAGED, ONE OF
THEM HMS ARDENT MORTALLY. AMAZINGLY NO FURTHER ATTACKS
CAME AND CANBERRA, THE LPDS AND THE LSLS REMAINED
INTACT. THIS WAS THE FIRST OPPORTUNITY THAT THE
ARGENTINE AIR FORCE MISSED TO CRIPPLE THE CDO BDE BY
ATTACKING AND SINKING
OUR SUPPLIES. ON D-DAY ALL OF THE BRIGADE AMMUNITION,
FUEL AND RATIONS WERE STILL EMBARKED, AND THE LOSS OF
THE LSLS WOULD HAVE RESULTED IN THE BRIGADE BEING
WITHOUT ITS COMBAT SUPPLIES OTHER THAN THOSE WHICH WE
CARRIED OURSELVES. INSTEAD THE ARGENTINIANS ATTACKED
BUT FAILED TO DESTROY THE AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS, THAT IS
THE RN SHIPS; TO US GRUNTS THIS
WAS CLEARLY A TACTICAL ERROR.
DUE TO IHE VULNERABILITY AND LACK OF AVAILABILITY
OF RN SHIPS IN FALKLANDS SOUND, MY COY MISSION WAS
CHANGED AND I REJOINED 42 CDO IN RESERVE. MY COMMANDO
WAS THANKFULLY ORDERED ASHORE AT ABOUT 11 AM, TO FOLLOW
UP THE 1/2 COY THAT SHOT DOWN THE TWO HELICOPTERS.
BRIGADIER THOMPSON WAS ALSO KEEN TO GET US OFF THE
CANBERRA, THE MOST PRESTIGIOUS SHIP OF THE ATF SO THAT
SHE COULD GET TO SEA AT LAST LIGHT. AS WE MOVED ASHORE
IN 4 X LCU'S WE WERE OF COURSE MOST FEARFUL OF ANOTHER
AIR ATTACK, BUT FORTUNATELY WITH ALMOST PREDICTABLE
BRITISH ROYAL AIR FORCE CUSTOM, THE ARGENTINIANS MUST
HAVE TAKEN A SHORT LUNCH BREAK, THEREBY ALLOWING US TO
LAND AT GREEN BEACH ONE WITHOUT INCIDENT. NEVERTHELESS
WE WERE SO KEEN TO GET OFF THE LCUS THAT WE MADE NO
COMMENT ABOUT THE THIGH DEEP WET LANDING TO WHICH WE
WERE SUBJECTED. WE WERE POSITIVELY ELATED TO GET
ASHORE, IN AN ENVIRONMENT SIMILAR TO DARTMOOR OR
SCOTLAND, WHERE WE FELT MUCH SAFER THAN ABOARD SHIP OR
LC.
THROUGHOUT OUR TIME IN THE BEACHHEAD WE WERE VERY MUCH
AWARE OF THE VERY VALIANT DEFENSE BY THE ROYAL NAVY,
AND OF THEIR CRUCIAL AND FUNDAMENTAL NAVAL GUNFIRE AND
AIR DEFENSE ACTIONS.
DUE TO OUR HOT PURSUIT ROLE WE WENT ASHORE IN
FIGHTING ORDER, A BELT/WEBBING EQUIPMENT WITHOUT
RUCKSACK BUT CARRYING 2 X MORTAR BOMBS ETC. HAVING
DUMPED THESE BOMBS AT THE MORTAR BASE PLATE POSITION AT
PORT SAN CARLOS, WE WERE ABLE TO MOVE MUCH FASTER AND
MY COY HAD THE FIRST CONTACT SOME HOURS LATER. WE SAW
4 FIGURES MOVING IN THE ROCKS ON "THE KNOB" A SMALL
PROMINATORY IN THE SAN CARLOS RIVER, WHICH ONE TROOP
(PLATOON) PROCEEDED TO ATTACK. IT WAS WITH
CONSIDERABLE EMBARRASSMENT THAT WE HAD TO REPORT ON
COMPLETION, NOTHING MORE THAN PENGUINS! MY BOSS LTCO
NICK VAUX WAS SIMPLY FURIOUS, BUT IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES
I BELIEVE WE WERE RIGHT TO SHOOT FIRST AND ASK QUESTION
LATER! THAT NIGHT AND THE NEXT WE SLEPT IN THE OPEN
WITHOUT SLEEPING BAGS OR OVERHEAD COVER. HAVING GOT
THOROUGHLY WET IN SALT WATER IN THE LANDING, WE WERE
VERY COLD, BUT DELIGHTED TO BE DOING THE JOB FOR WHICH
WE HAD TRAINED SO HARD. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF D+1,
HAVING FAILED TO CATCH THE FLEEING ENEMY, WE OCCUPIED A
DEFENSIVE POSITION IN CERRO MONTEVIDEO. FROM HERE WE
WATCHED THE REPEATED AIR ATTACKS ON SAN CARLOS OUR
SW AND CAME TO KNOW THAT IF THE AIRCRAFT TURNED LEFT AS
THEY FLEW
OVER US THEY'D BE SHOT DOWN IN A BIG RED PUFF OF SMOKE,
THIS WAS A MANEUVER NORMALLY PREPARATORY TO A SECOND
STRIKE AT THE FLEET. GO STRAIGHT ON PAST US AND THEY
SURVIVED BUT PERHAPS ONLY UNTIL THEY MET THE HARRIER
CAP OPERATING WEST OF THE FALKLANDS. HERE INCIDENTALLY
IS A CHART OF ENEMY AIRCRAFT SHOT DOWN AND HOW. MOST
AIRCRAFT ATTACKED FROM THE SOUTH, BUT IN ORDER TO HIT
ATTRACTIVE LF TARGETS ASHORE THEY HAD TO APPROACH FROM
EAST OR WEST. THIS WAS ONLY DONE ONCE WHEN FOUR
MARINES WERE KILLED, 12 WOUNDED, AND THE AMMO DUMP
HIT. I HAD A SPECTACULAR VIEW OF THIS FROM SUSSEX
MOUNTAIN. THIS SLIDE SHOWS FRIENDLY A/C LOSSES.
VIDEO (4 MINS)
AFTER 2 OR 3 DAYS IN CERRO MONTEVIDEO WE WERE
WITHDRAWN BY NIGHT BY LCU TO PORT SAN CARLOS WHERE WE
WERE RECONSTITUED AS A RESERVE. IT BEING A SUNDAY WE
EVEN HAD TIME FOR A COY CHURCH SERVICE, CONGREGATIONS
EXPANDED ENORMOUSLY DURING THE COURSE OF THE DISPUTE!
ON THE AFTERNOON OF 26 MAY, I WAS GIVEN AN ORDER OVER
THE RADIO TO MOVE MY COY IN 20 MINS; AND I TO CATCH A
HELO IN 5 MINS. NO FURTHER DETAILS WERE GIVEN FOR
SECURITY REASONS. I WAS FLOWN TO SUSSEX MOUNTAINS BY
GAZELLE TO TAKE OVER 2 PARA'S TAOR IMMEDIATELY. AFTER
A SHORT BRIEF BY THE CO, I WAS QUICKLY ABLE TO SELECT
THE KEY AREAS AND INDENTIFY THE VULNERABLE APPROACHES TO
THE BRIGADE ADMIN AREA THAT HAD TO BE COVERED BY
STANDING PATROLS. THE COY MOVED IN WITHOUT DIFFICULTY
AND ONCE MY XO AND
CSM HAD A FIRM UNDERSTANDING OF THE PLAN, I WENT TO
ATTEND THE CO'S ORDERS FOR THE BATTLE OF GOOSE GREEN.
THE BATTALION MOVED OUT UNDER COVER OF DARKNESS A
COUPLE OF HOURS LATER. AS I LISTEDNED ON MY HF RADIO TO
TGE BBC WORLD SERVICE EVENING NEWS, I WAS SIMPLY
HORRIFIED--AND THE CO APOPLECTIC WITH RAGE--TO HEAR
A REPORT ISSUED FROM LONDON THAT 2 PARA WAS NOW HEADING
TOWARDS GOOSE GREEN. THIS NEWS REPORT WAS HEARD BY THE
ARGENTINIANS WHO WE LATER DISCOVERED MOVED A REINFORCED
COY TO GOOSE GREEN FROM MOUNT CHALLENGER/MOUNT KENT TO
COUNTER THE THREAT.
THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF 2 PARA LTCOL H. JONES
WAS KILLED IN ACTION AT GOOSE GREEN, 2 NIGHTS LATER
WHEN THE ATTACK WAS FALTERING AND IN NEED OF A DRAMATIC
ACTION. HE WAS POSTUMOUSLY AWARDED THE VICTORIA CROSS,
THE SUPREME BRITISH AWARD FOR GALLANTRY, AND ONE OF
ONLY TWO AWARDED DURING THE WAR.
WE HAVE NOW REACHED THE STAGE WHERE WE ARE
BREAKING OUT OF THE BRIDGEHEAD, AND I INTEND TO COVER
THE LAND BATTLE IN THE NEXT PRESENTATION. NOW,
HOWEVER, IS A GOOD TIME TO MENTION SOME OF THE LESSONS
THAT CAN BE DRAWN FOR THE BATTLE SO FAR, WHILE THEY ARE
STILL FRESH IN OUR MINDS.
FIRST OF ALL, MODERN WARSHIP CONSTRUCTION HAS
UNTIL NOW FAVOURED LIGHT AND USUALLY HIGHLY FLAMMABLE
TOXIC MATERIALS. DAMAGE CONTROL AND FIREFIGHTING WAS
SO DIFFICULT THAT ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS THE SHIP
HAD TO BE ABANDONED AND LATER SANK. THE USE OF
ALUMINUM IN THE SUPERSTRUCTURE IS UNDER REVIEW, WHILE
OTHER MATERIALS SUCH AS MATTRESSES ARE NOW FIRE
RETARDENT.
THE VALUE OF ANTIFLASH PROTECTION FOR HEAD AND
HANDS WAS CLEARLY ILLUSTRATED. THE MAN-MADE FIBRE
OVERALLS MELTED TO THE SKIN AND CONTRIBUTED TO MANY
SERIOUS INJURIES. NATURAL FIBRE OVERALLS ARE NOW
ISSUED.
THE NAVY IN PARTICULAR AND THE FORCE IN GENERAL
LACKED AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING AND CONTROL SYSTEMS,
THEREBY LEAVING US PARTICULARLY VULNERABLE. A NUMBER
OF A/S SEAKING HELOS HAVE NOW BEEN CONVERTED TO
ACCOMPLISH THIS VITAL ROLE.
HELICOPTER ASSETS ARE VITAL WHERE TERRAIN
PROHIBITS MOBILITY, AND WE DID NOT HAVE ENOUGH. ALL
AVAILABLE SORTIES OF MEDIUM OR HEAVY HELO WERE USED FOR
ARTILLERY DEPLOYMENTS AND RESUPPLY. IT WAS ALSO
RELEARNT THAT A LIGHT RECONNAISSANCE OR COMMAND
HELICOPTER WITH ONLY LIMITED ARMAMENT AND IN COUNTRY
DEVOID OF NATURAL COVER IS VULNERABLE TO GROUND FIRE.
HARRIER WAS A MAJOR SUCCESS AND SHOWED
ITSELF TO BE FLEXIBLE, ROBUST, RELIABLE AND EFFECTIVE
ESPECIALLY WHEN EOUIPPED WITH YOUR AIM 9L AIR-TO-AIR
MISSILE. HOWEVER, DESPITE ITS SUCCESS, IT IS NOT A
FIGHTER AND IS NOT AS EFFECTIVE AS A FIGHTER WOULD HAVE
BEEN IN THE SAME CIRCUMSTANCES. THE UK HAD NO
ALTERNATIVE BUT TO USE THE HARRIER, WHICH PROVED ITSELF
BETTER THAN WAS EXPECTED.
AS FOR ATTACKS ON AIRFIELDS, THERE IS A NEED FOR AN
ADVANCED AIRFIELD ATTACK WEAPON. I UNDERSTAND THESE
ARE UNDER DEVELOPMENT.
THE ABSENCE OF A DEDICATED LAND FORCE, AIR
RECONNAISSANCE CAPABILITY WAS A SEVERE HANDICAP IN OUR
ABILITY TO GAIN ENEMY DISPOSITIONS. AT THE TIME OF THE
FALKLANDS THERE WERE TWO PLATOONS OF RPV WITH THE
BRITISH ARMY IN GERMANY. THIS FORCE IS NOW BEING
EXPANDED.
THE NEED FOR DEFENSE SUPPRESSION WEAPONS WAS CLEARLY
ILLUSTRATED. HARRIERS WERE EXPOSED TO HEAVY AND
ACCURATE GROUND FIRE DUE TO THE LACK OF THESE WEAPONS,
AND THREE WERE SHOT DOWN. SIMILARLY
SMALL ARMS FIRE ACCOUNTED FUR A NUMBER OF ARGENTINIAN
AIRCRAFT.
IN THE AIR DEFENCE FIELD ALL SURFACE SHIPS
REQUIRE A POINT DEFENCE CAPABILITY TO COUNTER THE
MISSILE THREAT. VULCAN PHALANX GUNS HAVE NOW BEEN
FITTED TO ALL WARSHIPS, AND ANTI MISSILE CHAFF
DISPENSERS DEVELOPED FOR ATTACHMENTS TO ALL SHIPS
INCLUDING MERCHANTMEN.
THERE IS ALSO A NEED FOR MORE REALISTIC AIR
DEFENSE TRAINING. IN PARTICULAR ALL SHIPS NEED TO BE
FITTED WITH A WIDE RANGE OF ON-BOARD TRAINERS IF THE
NAVY IS TO OPTIMIZE THE PERFORMANCES OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY
SYSTEMS. AND WE REQUIRE MORE REALISTIC TARGETS FOR
PEACETIME TRAINING OF AIR DEFENCE WEAPON SYSTEM
OPERATORS.
ASHORE, THERE WERE INSUFFICIENT LAND AIR DEFENCE
ASSETS. EVERY MANOEVRE BATTALION REQUIRES AN AIR
DEFENCE CAPABILITY. WE HAVE NOW STRENGTHENED OUR OWN
FAAD TROOP AND ISSUED THE BRANDNEW JAVELIN MISSILE. IN
DUE COURSE WE SHALL ALSO BE GETTING A RAPIER BATTERY
ORGANIC TO 3 CDO BDE.
THE RAPID DISPATCH OF THE AMPHIBIOUS FORCE IN
THREE DAYS WAS GOOD POLITICALLY, BUT CAUSED PROBLEMS TO
THE LANDING FORCE WHICH EMBARKED WITH LITTLE OR NO
INTELLIGENCE, AND NO FIRM MISSION OR PLAN. IT IS NOT A
RECOMMENDED METHOD OF GOING TO WAR, AND WAS NOT
MILITARILY NECESSARY.
THE SSN NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES WERE FLEXIBILE
AND POWERFUL INSTRUMENTS THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS, POSING
AN OBIQUITOUS THREAT WHICH THE ARGENTINES COULD NEITHER
MEASURE NOR OPPOSE.
SPECIAL FORCES PLAYED A KEY ROLE IN ADVANCE FORCE
OPERATIONS. THE COMBINATION IN A SINGLE PATROL OF
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING SKILLS WITH THE CAPACITY TO
MOUNT HIGHLY DESTRUCTIVE RAIDS GIVES THE MILITARY
COMMANDER A FLEXIBLE AND POTENT WEAPON.
FINALLY I'D LIKE TO QUOTE FROM A REPORT SENT TO
OUR CAPTAIN GENERAL HRH PRINCE PHILIP, THE DUKE OF
EDINBURGH.
"THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDINGS AT SAN CARLOS ON 21 MAY
1982 WERE THE FIRST OCCASION THAT AN ASSAULT LANDING
HAD TAKEN PLACE AT BRIGADE LEVEL SINCE THE SUEZ CRISIS
AND THE FIRST TIME SINCE 25 APRIL 1915 (AT CAPE HELLES)
THAT SUCH A LANDING HAD BEEN LAUNCHED FROM A TASK FORCE
INCORPORATING NON-SPECIALIST AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS. THE
AMPHIBIOUS DIMENSION WAS A PARAMOUNT FEATURE OF THE
OPERATION AND IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT ANY OTHER AMPHIBOUS
OPERATION HAS BEEN UNDERTAKEN WITH OPERATION
CORPORATE'S COMBINATION OF SPEED AND DISTANCE FROM THE
MOUNTING BASE. WITHOUT AN AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY AND
THE EXPERTISE IN THE SPECIALIST TECHNIQUES INVOLVED,
THE UNITED KINGDOM COULD NOT HAVE DELIVERED A MILITARY
RIPOSTE TO THE ARGENTINE INVASION.
THE PRESENCE OF SPECIALIST AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING FOR
OPERATION CORPORATE WAS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THE
SUCCESS OF THE OPERATION, PARTICULARLY DURING THE
INITIAL LANDINGS. THE AVAILABILITY OF THE TWO LPDS AND
THE SIX LSLS PROVED INVALUABLE, BUT THE LACK OF
SHIPPING WITH MULTI-SPOT HELICOPTER PLATFORMS,
ESSENTIAL FOR ACHIEVING REALLY EFFICIENT SHIP-TO-SHORE
MOVEMENT, WAS A SERIOUS HANDICAP. THIS COMMENT IN NO
WAY DIMINISHES THE OUTSTANDING CONTRIBUTION MADE BY
SHIPS TAKEN UP FROM TRADE (STUFT) WHICH PERFORMED
ADMIRABLY WITHIN THEIR OWN CAPABILITIES. NONETHELESS,
THE OPERATION EMPHASIZED FOUR POINTS CONCERNING
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPPING:
A. THERE WAS A SHORTAGE OF SPECIALIST AMPHIBIOUS
SHIPPING, AND IN PARTICULAR, SHIPS THAT WERE CAPABLE OF
OPERATING MORE THAN TWO HELICOPTERS AT A TIME. HMS
HERMES WAS THE ONLY HELICOPTER ASSAULT PLATFORM OF
SIGNIFICANCE BUT IT WAS NOT MADE AVAILABLE TO THE
AMPHIBIOUS FORCE.
B. EVEN WITH ALL SIX LSLS, DELIVERY OF VEHICLES
AND STORES REQUIRED SUBSTANTIAL USE OF STUFT.
C. THE INABILITY OF LSLS TO WORK HELICOPTERS OFF
THE FORWARD SPOT AT NIGHT DELAYED THE OFF-LOAD PLAN AND
PROVED TO BE A MAJOR HANDICAP. THE SAME APPLIED TO
STUFT ON WHICH NO NIGHT FLYING WAS ALLOWED.
D. STUFT SHIPPING WAS VERY VULNERABLE, BUT
CLEARLY PROVED ITS WORTH. ALTHOUGH AN ESSENTIAL
SUPPLEMENT TO THE AMPHIBIOUS GROUP, STUFT BY THEMSELVES
COULD NOT PROVIDE ANY FORM OF AMPHIBIOUS CAPABILITY.
APART FROM THEIR POOR COMMUNICATIONS AND TOTAL
INABILITY TO PROVIDE COMMAND AND CONTROL FACILITIES,
THEY ARE NOT BY THEMSELVES CAPABLE OF SUPPORTING AN
ASSAULT LANDING, OR OPERATING OVER THE BEACH WHERE
PORTS AND JETTIES DO NOT EXIST.
EXPERIENCE OF AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, AND THEIR
EXTREME FLEXIBILITY, ENABLED THE COMMANDERS AND STAFFS
INVOLVED TO ACHIEVE A SUCCESSFUL LANDING AND TO SECURE
A HARBOUR AND BEACHHEAD FROM WHICH LAND OPERATIONS
COULD BE DEVELOPED. THE ABSENCE OF ANY MAJOR SET-BACK
SHOULD NOT BLIND ANALYSTS TO THE RISKS TAKEN DURING AND
FOR A FEW DAYS AFTER THE LANDINGS. THE NECESSITY IN AN
AMPHIBIOUS LANDING FOR LOCAL AIR SUPERIORITY REMAINS
VALID.
THE RELEVANCE OF THIS CAMPAIGN TO AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS
IN EUROPE AND PARTICULARLY THE NORTHERN FLANK IS
UNDOUBTED. THE LESSONS EMERGING ARE NOT NEW BUT IT HAS
PROBABLY TAKEN A WAR TO REFRESH MEMORIES AND
RE-EMPHASIZE THE VALUE OF A SPECIALIZED AMPHIBIOUS
FORCE. THE NEED TO REPLACE THE CORE OF SPECIALIZED
AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS, CAPABLE OF LAUNCHING SUBSTANTIAL
NUMBERS OF HELICOPTERS, AND THE PROVISION OF EFFECTIVE
LOCAL AIR SUPERIORITY AND AIR DEFENCE ASSETS, ARE
LESSONS WHICH APPLY AS MUCH TO OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF
NATO AS THEY WERE SHOWN TO APPLY IN OPERATION
CORPORATE." FORTUNATELY THIS NEED HAS NOW BEEN
RECOGNIZED, AND REPLACEMENTS FOR THE AGEING LPDS AND
LSLS ARE IN HAND FOR THE 1990S. I SUPPOSE THE TWO
FUNDAMENTAL LESSONS LEARNT CAN BE SUMMARIZED AS
FOLLOWS:
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, I REGRET THAT TIME HAS NOT
ALLOWED ME IN THIS PRESENTATION TO COVER INNUMBERABLE
AREAS OF INTEREST TO THE NAVAL GUNFIRE, ARTILLERY OR
AIR DEFENCE EXPERT, THE MEDIC, TANKER, THE LOGISTICIAN,
AND EMBARKATION OFFICER, PILOT, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER
AND SO ON. FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE REST OF YOUR THOUGH,
WE SHALL BREAK FOR 10 MINUTES AND I SHALL TRY TO ANSWER
AS MANY QUESTIONS AS POSSIBLE WHEN WE RETURN.
PLEASE LISTEN FOR THE BELL.
THE SECOND PRESENTATION TO THE U.S. MARINE CORPS
COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE ON
THE FALKLANDS WAR 1982
BY MAJOR D. G. WHEEN, RM
10 MARCH 1986
VIDEO 11
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, GOOD AFTERNOON AND WELCOME TO
THE SECOND PRESENTATION ON THE FALKLANDS WAR. THOSE OF YOU
WHO MANAGED TO STAY AWAKE, AND CAN STILL REMEMBER PART I,
WILL REMEMBER WE COVERED THE POLITICAL, HISTORICAL AND GEO-
GRAPHIC BACKGROUND TO THE FALKLAND ISLANDS THAT LED TO THE
ARGENTINIAN INVASION ON 1/2 APRIL 1982, AND THE BRITISH
REACTION IN WHICH WE SENT OVER 100 SHIPS IN THE LARGEST
AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION SINCE WW II. WE WENT THROUGH PERMA,
AND DREW-OUT SOME OF THE MORE OBVIOUS LESSONS WE LEARNED IN
THE NAVAL, AMPHIBIOUS, AVIATION, AND ANTI-AIR WAR. THE AIM
OF THIS PRESENTATION IS TO COVER THE LAND BATTLE.I SHALL
NOT COVER ALL OF THE OPERATIONS IN DETAIL BUT LET ME REMIND
YOU THAT THE FORCE COMPRISED THE NECESSARY HQ, GCE, CSS
AND, TO A CERTAIN LIMITED EXTENT, THE AVIATION ELEMENTS OF
A 8/9 MAF. I SHALL PRIMARILY BE CONCENTRATING ON 42
COMMANDO'S OPERATIONS, PARTICULARLY L COY'S.
WE LEFT 2 PARA EN ROUTE TO GOOSE GREEN, IN THE FIRST
OVERT MOVE TO BREAK OUT OF THE BEACHHEAD. AS I THINK I
EXPLAINED IN THE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD LAST TIME,
BRIGADIER (GENERAL) JULIAN THOMPSON HAD INITIALLY CONTEM-
PLATED A RAID ON GOOSE GREEN BUT REJECTED THE IDEA BECAUSE
HE FELT THE ENEMY FORCE AT GOOSE GREEN COULD BE CONTAINED
AND BYPASSED. HE WAS, HOWEVER, PLACED UNDER POLITICAL
DIRECTION FROM THE UNITED KINGDOM TO TAKE UP THE OFFENSIVE,
AND EASE THE MEDIA AND MILITARY PRESSURE ON THE SHIPS OF
THE ATF IN FALKLAND SOUND. I DON'T INTEND GOING THROUGH
THE BATTLE IN DETAIL AS I WAS NOT INVOLVED, BUT IT WAS THE
FIRST SET-PIECE BATTLE OF THE WAR AND 2 PARA's VICTORY WAS
AN ENORMOUS BOOST TO MORALE. IT SET THE PATTERN FOR THE
LATER BATTLES IN THAT THE ATTACKING FORCE WAS IN EACH CASE
ENORMOUSLY OUTNUMBERED BY THE DEFENCE, WHO WERE IN WELL
PREPARED DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. THE BATTLE FOR GOOSE GREEN
WAS, HOWEVER, UNIQUE IN THAT IT SPILLED OVER THE FIRST
NIGHT AND INTO THE WHOLE OF THE NEXT DAY. LOW GENTLY
ROLLING HILLS MADE IT SEEM IDEAL TANK COUNTRY, BUT THESE
WERE NOT USED AS IT WAS FELT THEY WOULD GET BOGGED DOWN IN
THE PEAT. EXPERIENCE IN THE LONG MARCH ACROSS THE ISLAND
EVENTUALLY SHOWED THAT THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE CASE
AND JULIAN THOMPSON FREELY ADMITS HIS MISTAKE. A LACK OF
DIRECT AND INDIRECT FIRE SUPPORT WAS A PROBLEM THROUGHOUT
THE BATTLE. 2 PARA HAD JUST 3 X 1O5MM GUNS IN DIRECT SP,
AND ONLY TWO OF THEIR OWN 6 X 81MM MORTARS; HMS ARROW
PROVIDED NGS FROM 1 X 4.5" TURRET DURING THE NIGHT BUT HAD
DEPARTED BEFORE DAWN IN ORDER TO GIVE PROTECTION TO THE
ATF AROUND THE BEACHHEAD. 2 HARRIER GR3 (GROUND ATTACK
VARIANT) SORTIES EACH INVOLVING 2 HARRIERS WERE USED IN THE
DAY PRECEDING THE BATTLE, BUT ON THE FIRST MISSION THE FAC
AND HARRIER NEVER MADE CONTACT. MUCH OF THE FAC's EQUIP-
MENT HAD BEEN LEFT BEHIND DUE TO THE 12 MILE MANPACK MOVE.
THIS ALSO EXPLAINED THE LACK OF MORTARS AND ARTILLERY
ASSETS.
THE SECOND ILL-FATED SORTIE WAS FLOWN BY WING
COMMANDER PETE SQUIRE AND SQUADRON LEADER BOB IVESON;
IVESON HAD ALSO FLOWN THE FIRST SORTIE. THE HARRIERS MADE
TWO PASSES AND THEN BOB IVESON DECIDED, ON HIS OWN
INITIATIVE, TO MAKE A THIRD RUN TO ATTACK SOME TRENCHES,
IRONICALLY THE TRENCHES ON DARWIN HILL THAT WERE LATER TO
CAUSE SO MUCH TROUBLE TO 2 PARA. LET ME TELL YOU FAST
MOVERS, HARRIER PILOTS PARTICULARLY, WHAT HE WROTE;
"IT WAS A SILLY MOVE, A VERY POOR TACTICAL MOVE, AND
IT COST ME BECAUSE IT WAS ON THAT PASS THAT I WAS HIT. I
WAS COMING OFF TARGET, HEADING ROUGHLY WEST, AND WAS HIT BY
TWO FAIRLY LARGE-CALIBRE SHELLS - PROBABLY 30 OR 35 MILLS -
A HELL OF A THUMP WHICH RATTLED ME ROUND IN THE COCKPIT
BANGING MY HEAD ON THE SIDE OF THE CANOPY - IT MOVED THE
AIRCRAFT SIDEWAYS THAT MUCH. THINGS WENT VERY WRONG, VERY
QUICKLY, AFTER THAT. THE CONTROLS STOPPED WORKING; THERE
WAS SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT AND FINALLY FIRE, AT WHICH POINT I
PULLED THE HANDLE. I WAS IN A GOOD ATTITUDE TO EJECT BUT I
WAS A BIT FAST AND A BIT LOW - ABOUT 450 KNOTS AT 100 FEET.
THE CHUTE OPENED AND I FOUND MYSELF GOING RIGHT
TOWARDS THE FIREBALL OF MY AIRCRAFT IN FRONT OF ME. I
COULDN'T TELL WHETHER IT HAD STRUCK THE GROUND OR NOT. I
THINK NOW IT HAD BLOWN UP IN THE AIR. I WAS ONLY ON THE
CHUTE FOR ABOUT TEN TO FIFTEEN SECONDS BEFORE I HIT THE
GROUND, IN A BIT OF A HEAP AND VERY WINDED."
THE HARRIER'S SPEED HAD TAKEN IT WELL AWAY FROM GOOSE
GREEN. IVESON SUFFERED A COMPRESSION FRACTURE OF HIS BACK
AND WINDBLAST DAMAGE TO HIS EYES. HE MADE CONTACT WITH
FRIENDLY AIRCRAFT ON HIS SURVIVAL RADIO AND WAS PICKED UP
BY A NAVAL HELICOPTER TWO DAYS LATER. HE RECOVERED FROM
HIS INJURIES AND RETURNED TO THE FALKLANDS FOR A SECOND
TOUR AFTER THE WAR.
THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE FOR GOOSE GREEN, 2 SCOUT
HELICOPTERS FROM 3 CDO BDE AIR SQN WERE USED TO FLY IN
AMMUNITION AND EVACUATE CASUALTIES, INCLUDING THE CO, LTCOL
H. JONES. THEY WERE FINALLY ATTACKED BY A PUCARA AIRCRAFT,
AND AFTER A 5 MINUTE GAME OF CAT AND MOUSE, ONE WAS SHOT
DOWN KILLING CAPTAIN DICK NUNN RM INSTANTLY. HE WAS THE
BROTHER OF CHRIS, COY CMD OF M COY 42 CDO, AT THIS TIME IN
SOUTH GEORGIA.
THE LONG AND WEARY BATTLE STARTED AT 0230 ON 28 MAY
BUT THE ARGENTINIANS DID NOT FINALLY SURRENDER UNTIL DAY-
BREAK ON 29 MAY, 32 HOURS LATER. THE BATTLE COST 20
BRITISH LIVES AND 37 WOUNDED. 1100 PRISONERS WERE TAKEN
AND THE CAPTURED EQUIPMENT INCLUDED 4 X 1O5MM HOWITZER,
6 X 12OMM MORTARS, 6 X ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUNS AND 2X PUCARA
AIRCRAFT. I SAID EARLIER THAT THIS VICTORY WAS AN ENORMOUS
BOOST TO MORALE; I THINK YOU CAN NOW SEE WHY!
J COY 42 CDO WAS FLOWN TO THE AREA DURING THE NIGHT OF
28/29 MAY BUT ARRIVED TOO LATE TO TAKE PART IN THE BATTLE
SINCE THE ARGENTINIANS VERY SENSIBLY SURRENDERED. THEY
DID, HOWEVER, HELP SORT OUT THE PRISONERS, REHABILITATE THE
LOCALS AND EVACUATE CASUALTIES. DURING THE AFTERNOON OF
28 MAY, MY COY L WAS RELIEVED ON SUSSEX MOUNTAIN BY B COY
40 CDO AND WE MADE OUR WAY BACK ON FOOT TO SAN CARLOS
SETTLEMENT WHENCE WE WERE CARRIED AFTER LAST LIGHT BY LCU
TO PORT SAN CARLOS, PREPARATORY TO FLYING FORWARD TO THE
MOUNT KENT AREA. I SHALL NOW GET MAJGEN JEREMY MOORE TO
SET THE SCENE FOR SUBSEQUENT OPERATIONS.
VIDEO 12
CONCURRENT WITH THE END OF THE BATTLE FOR GOOSE GREEN,
45 CDO AND 3 PARA STARTED THE BIG YOMP ACROSS EAST
FALKLANDS. THEY MARCHED 80 MILES IN THREE DAYS CARRYING
ALL THEIR PERSONAL EQUIPMENT FOR COMBAT; THE PACKS WEIGHED
UP TO 110 LBS. IT HAD BEEN HOPED THAT THE WHOLE FORCE
COULD HAVE BEEN HELICOPTERED TO THE MOUNT KENT/MOUNT
CHALLENGER AREA WEST OF PORT STANLEY, BUT THE LOSS OF 3
CHINOOKS CH47 ON THE ATLANTIC CONVEYOR DASHED THESE HOPES.
THIS IS THE ACCOUNT FROM THE DIARY OF CAPTAIN IAN GARDINER,
A FELLOW COY COMD IN 45 CDO RM.
"THE WALK FROM PORT SAN CARLOS (NORTH EAST) TO NEW
HOUSE, SOME TWENTY KILOMETRES, WAS THE WORST OF MY LIFE.
THE WEATHER WAS NOT TOO BAD BUT THE GROUND WAS BOGGY.
WHERE IT WAS NOT BOGGY, THERE WERE STRONG LUMPS AND TUFTS
OF GRASS WHICH, HOWEVER ONE STANDS ON THEM, EVEN IN
DAYLIGHT, ONE STANDS A GOOD CHANCE OF TURNING ONE'S ANKLE.
IN PLACES IT WAS PRETTY STEEP BUT ALL FADED INTO
INSIGNIFICANCE COMPARED TO THE CURSED WEIGHT WE WERE
CARRYING - MUCH OF WHICH I KNEW TO BE WHOLLY UNNECESSARY.
I PROBABLY MAKE THINGS WORSE FOR MYSELF BY ALLOWING MY
BITTERNESS TO BURN UP ENERGY - BUT THE MARINES WERE
MAGNIFICENT. WE LOST THE FIRST MAN AFTER 200 YARDS - A MAN
KNOWN TO BE THE COMPANY SKATE - AND ABOUT SIX MORE OVER THE
NEXT FEW HOURS. THEY WERE MOSTLY THE WEAKER-SPIRITED MEN
WHO, ALTHOUGH THEY POSSIBLY DID HAVE SOMETHING WRONG WITH
THEM, WOULD PROBABLY HAVE FOUND SOME PRETEXT OR OTHER TO
ROLL AROUND IN AGONY IN ANY EVENT. THE REST WENT ON WITH
THE GREATEST OF STOICISM AND GOOD HUMOUR ALL DAY AND
THROUGH UNTIL 2 O'CLOCK THE FOLLOWING MORNING. I WAS
IMMENSELY PROUD OF THEM. IF POSSIBLE, MARCHING IN DARKNESS
WAS WORSE THAN DAYLIGHT, AND, FOR THOSE AT THE TAIL END OF
A QUEUE OF 600 MEN BUMPING AND STUMBLING THROUGH THE BLACK
NIGHT, LIFE MUST HAVE BEEN HELL. I WAS FAIRLY PREOCCUPIED
BY TRYING TO KEEP PEOPLE TOGETHER AND PERHAPS DIDN'T NOTICE
SO MUCH, BUT BY THE TIME WE HARBOURED UP, I WAS NEAR MY
WIT'S END.
AT 2 A.M. I GAVE THE ORDER TO BED DOWN WITHOUT ERECT-
ING BIVOUACS. OUR BIVVIES WERE SIMPLY A WATERPROOF GROUND-
SHEET SUPPORTED BY A SMALL STICK AND SOME RUBBER BUNGIES.
THIS WAS A BAD MISTAKE. IT RAINED DURING THE EARLY
MORNING, AND THE PLASTIC BAGS IN WHICH OUR SLEEPING BAGS
WERE STRETCHED DID NOT KEEP THE WATER OUT. OUR SLEEPING
BAGS WERE SOAKED. THE LAST CITADEL OF A MAN'S MORALE IS
HIS SLEEPING BAG. THE COMFORT AND RESOURCE IT OFFERS IS
AMAZING. ON SUBSEQUENT OCCASIONS, WHEN ONE WAS BEING
SHELLED OR HEARD BOMBING CLOSE BY, IT WAS AN INSTINCTIVE
AUTOMATIC REACTION TO WRIGGLE DEEPER INTO THE 'GREEN SLUG'.
WHEN ALL ELSE FAILED, WHEN THE WORLD CRUMBLED AROUND US,
EVEN IF THE SLEEPING BAGS HAD FAILED TO TURN UP IN THE
EVENING, ONE ALWAYS WAS VAGUELY COMFORTED BY THE PROSPECT
OF CLIMBING INTO A DRY BAG EVENTUALLY. WHEN MY CITADEL
WAS DRENCHED BY RAIN, MY MORALE WAS AT ITS LOWEST...I
WAS SUBSEQUENTLY TO SPEND MORE UNCOMFORTABLE AND MORE
BITTER NIGHTS AND IT WAS NOT THE LAST TIME MY CITADEL WAS
BREACHED - BUT ONE HARDENED. THE MEN WHO SURVIVED THAT
MARCH BASICALLY STUCK IT RIGHT THROUGH TO THE END." THIS
ACCOUNT ACCURATELY REFLECTS THE EXPERIENCES OF THE WHOLE
OF THE FORCE THAT MADE IT AS FAR AS THE APPROACHES TO PORT
STANLEY.
BACK NOW TO MANEUVRE OPERATIONS; JULIAN THOMPSON WAS
KEEN TO OCCUPY MT KENT AND MT CHALLENGER, THE KEYSTONES TO
SUBSEQUENT OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS AROUND STANLEY, AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. AN SAS SQN HAD CONDUCTED OPS IN THIS AREA FOR A
COUPLE OF DAYS, AND A SECURE LZ WAS LOCATED.
THE FIRST ATTEMPT ON 29 MAY TO FLY IN K COY, TAC HQ,
MOR TP AND 3 X 105 WAS FRUSTRATED BY A WHITE OUT, DESPITE
DETERMINED ATTEMPTS BY THE 4 PILOTS USING NIGHT VISION
GOGGLES. THE PILOT OF THE CHINOOK CH-47 WAS FLYING SO
LOW THAT HE ACCIDENTALLY DUNKED HIS WHEELS INTO THE
WATERS OF A LAKE. THE ALERT CREWMAN, FEARING THAT THE A/C
WAS ABOUT TO DITCH, JETTISONED THE DOOR. THEREAFTER THAT
HELO, THE ONLY CHINOOK TO SURVIVE THE SINKING OF SS
ATLANTIC CONVEYOR, WENT DOORLESS, THERE BEING NO SPARE
PARTS AVAILABLE! THE FOLLOWING NIGHT OF 30 MAY, THE FLY IN
USING SEAKING AND WESSEX FOR TROOPS AND THE CHINOOK FOR THE
ARTILLERY WAS ACHIEVED SUCCESSFULLY BUT NOT WITHOUT
EXCITEMENT. AT THE CRITICAL MOMENT, AN ARGENTINE SF PATROL
WANDERED ACROSS THE AREA. AS THE FIRST WAVE WAS LANDING, D
SQN 22 SAS ENGAGED THE ENEMY AND SWIFTLY DEALT WITH THEM,
BUT THE PILOTS HAD SOME WORRYING MOMENTS AS TRACER BULLETS
CRISS-CROSSED THE LANDING SITE.
BY FIRST LIGHT ON 31 MAY, K COY HAD REACHED THE SUMMIT
OF MOUNT KENT, ITS OBJECTIVE, TO FIND THAT THE ENEMY HAD
WITHDRAWN. FROM THIS SUMMIT COULD BE SEEN STANLEY AND THE
AIRFIELD ABOUT 20 KMS AWAY, WELL OUT OF RANGE OF OUR 1O5MM
GUNS; BUT THESE WERE ABLE TO ENGAGE MOODY BROOKE MARINE
BARRACKS: THE END WAS LITERALLY IN SIGHT BUT THERE WAS
MUCH STILL TO BE DONE.
COMMANDO TACTICAL HEADQUARTERS, ONE RIFLE COMPANY, ONE
SAS SQUADRON, SIX 81MM MORTARS AND THREE LIGHT GUNS WITH
VERY LITTLE AMMUNITION WERE SITTING ON A KEY PIECE OF
GROUND NEAR, AND NOBODY KNEW EXACTLY HOW NEAR, FIVE
ARGENTINE INFANTRY REGIMENTS, SUPPORTED BY THIRTY 1O5MM
GUNS AND SOME 155MM GUNS. THE NEAREST BRITISH TROOPS WERE
3 PARA AT LEAST HALF A DAY'S MARCH AWAY. THE NEAREST GUNS,
OTHER THAN THE THREE ALREADY FORWARD, WERE SIXTY-FIVE
KILOMETRES AWAY, NEARLY FOUR TIMES THE RANGE OF A 1O5MM
LIGHT GUN. EXCEPT FOR HARRIERS IN THE GROUND ATTACK ROLE,
THE 200 OR SO COMMANDOS AND SAS MEN WERE ON THEIR OWN.
MY COMPANY, L COY, WAS TO FLY FORWARD TO TAKE MOUNT
CHALLENGER THE FOLLOWING NIGHT 31 MAY/1 JUNE 1982, BUT
LTCOL VAUX SAID HE WISHED ME TO CONTACT HIM ON THE RADIO
TO CONFIRM MY ORDERS. I WAS UNABLE TO GET THROUGH ON MY
MAN-PACK PRC 320 HF RADIO OR ON ANY OF MY OTHER RADIOS FOR
THAT MATTER, SO I FLEW TO THE SAS COMMS SHACK AT SAN CARLOS
SETTLEMENT WHERE A SATTELITE TERMINAL LOANED BY USA WAS
LOCATED; D SQN BELOW MT. KENT ALSO HAD ONE. INITIALLY, I
GOT THROUGH TO ASCENSION ISLAND, 4,000 MILES AWAY, WHERE I
RECOGNIZED THE VOICE OF 21C 22 SAS WHO HAD BEEN MY OFFICE
MATE IN N. IRELAND FOR NEARLY 2 YEARS. I THEN GOT THROUGH
TO HEREFORD 8,000 MILES AWAY, AND FINALLY SPOKE TO MY BOSS
45 MILES AWAY. THE IMPLICATIONS OF A FEW INDEPENDENT
PATROLS BEING ABLE TO TALK TO HEREFORD, AND BE "PATCHED
THROUGH" TO WHITEHALL ARE IMMENSE: FIRST OF ALL, IT
GUARANTEED POLITICAL INTERFERENCE IN THE MILITARY
CAMPAIGN; SECOND, IT MEANT THAT THE WHOLE COMMAND STRUCTURE
COULD BE CIRCUMVENTED. FOR EXAMPLE, CEDRIC DELVES, THE OC
OF D SQN 22 SAS, WAS "TWIDDLING HIS THUMBS" BACK ON BOARD
SHIP, AFTER THE RECAPTURE OF S. GEORGIA WONDERING WHAT TO
DO, WHEN HE REALIZED THAT A RAID ON PEBBLE ISLAND WOULD BE
A SUITABLE TASK. HIS SUGGESTION WHICH WOULD INVOLVE THE
USE OF HMS INVINCIBLE, A GUIDED MISSILE DESTROYER AND OTHER
VALUABLE ASSETS WAS APPARENTLY REJECTED BY ADMIRAL
WOODWARD. A QUICK CALL BACK TO HEREFORD ENSURED THAT
ADMIRAL WOODWARD WAS DIRECTED A FEW HOURS LATER BY THE TASK
FORCE COMMANDER TO CARRY OUT SUCH AN OPERATION AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE! ANYWAY I SPOKE TO LTCOL NICK VAUX WHO CONFIRMED
MY ORDERS TO MOVE AS FAR EASTWARD ON MT. CHALLENGER AS
POSSIBLE. FROM THERE WE COULD DOMINATE THE ROAD FROM
STANLEY TO GOOSE GREEN AND THE GROUND TO MT. WALL. THAT
NIGHT WE FLEW INTO THE SAME LZ AND WERE GUIDED TO JUST
BELOW THE RIDGELINE BY SAS. THIS WAS OUR FIRST EXPERIENCE
OF CROSSING ROCK RUNS AT NIGHT WHILE HEAVILY LADEN. EVEN
THOUGH WE ONLY HAD OUR BELT EQUIPMENT, WPNS AND AMMO,
INCLUDING BLOWPIPE AIR DEFENCE MISSILES, 2 DAYS' FOOD,
SLEEPING BAG AND MINIMAL SHELTER, THE AVERAGE WEIGHT
WAS 60-70 LBS. IT TOOK US 8 HOURS TO COVER THE 5 MILES.
AS WE REACHED THE RIDGE WE SPREAD OUT INTO ATTACK FORMATION
AND CONDUCTED AN ADVANCE TO CONTACT ALONG THE RIDGELINE,
AND AS DAWN OF 1 JUNE 1982 ARRIVED, WE WENT FIRM IN A
PARTICULARLY SUITABLE ROCKY OUTCROP 3OOM X 2OOM 2KM WEST
ALONG THE RIDGELINE ON YOUR MAP 4 (AT GR 230705). THIS WAS
HOME FOR THE NEXT 11 DAYS FOR THE 189 MEN OF MY COY GROUP.
THIS GROUP INCLUDED MY 3 RIFLE TROOPS EACH OF 34, COY HQ
(10), FOO PARTY (5), FAC TEAM (3), SNIPER TEAM (2), RECCE
SECT (2 X 4), AE TP (20), RE TP (24) AD SECT (8), MFC PARTY
(2).
VIDEO 13
LIFE IN OUR HOME WAS RUGED. FIRST OF ALL, AS I
MENTIONED LAST PRESENTATION, THE WIND BLOWS MOST OF THE
TIME BUT CHANGES IN INTENSITY AND DIRECTION FREQUENTLY.
WITH OUR MAKESHIFT SHELTERS WE HAD TO CHANGE LOCATION FROM
ONE SIDE OF THE RIDGE TO THE OTHER, TO STOP BEING BLOWN
AWAY. WHEN THE WIND WAS NOT BLOWING, THE CLOUD BASE WAS
GENERALLY VERY LOW; TO THE EXTENT THAT IT, OR
NONAVAILABILITY OF HELD ASSETS PROHIBITED RESUPPLY FOR 5
DAYS. AS YOU CAN IMAGINE, WE WERE FAIRLY HUNGRY WHEN IT
EVENTUALLY CAME: 2 DAYS' RATIONS DON'T STRETCH THAT FAR.
FORTUNATELY, WE HAD LOCATED A SMALL ABANDONED ARGENTINIAN
POSITION, AND SO AFTER CAREFUL EXAMINATION OF EACH TIN AND
PACKAGE TO MAKE SURE IT HAD NOT BEEN CONTAMINATED, WE
GRATEFULLY ATE THEIR RATIONS. NEVERTHELESS WE EAGERLY
AWAITED THE ARRIVAL OF THE FIRST HELO!
DESPITE THESE ARGENTINIAN RATIONS, WE WERE DOWN TO ONE
CUBE OF HEXAMINE PER TROOP - THIS WILL HEAT 1 PINT OF WATER
IN CALM CONDITIONS TO BOILING POINT! AND A VERY LITTLE
DEHYDRATED FOOD WHICH WAS USELESS AS IT NEEDED COOKING!
THERE ARE AS YOU'LL RECALL NO TREES IN THE FALKLAND ISLANDS
AND THE PEAT BOG WAS COMPLETELY SODDEN SO WE HAD NO
COMBUSTIBLE MATERIALS. LIFE WAS PRETTY MISERABLE, WITH
FREEZING TEMPERATURES, RAIN OR SNOW AND 20-30 KNOT WINDS,
SO I WAS OBVIOUSLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE EFFECTS PARTICULARLY
OF EXPOSURE AND BATTLE CASUALTIES IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.
I AM PLEASED TO SAY THAT I HAD TO EVACUATE ONLY 1 MEDICAL
CASE, AND HE HAD A STOMACH PROBLEM. THERE WAS GREAT
ELATION ON DAY 5 WHEN THE SKIES CLEARED AND WE WERE
INFORMED A HELO RESUPPLY WAS EN ROUTE. IMAGINE OUR
DISAPPOINTMENT WHEN THE HELO ARRIVED NOT WITH FOOD OR
COOKING FUEL BUT MAIL. YOU CAN'T EAT LETTERS.
FORTUNATELY, OUR DISAPPOINTMENT DID NOT LAST LONG AND 15
MINUTES LATER FOOD THANKFULLY ARRIVED BEFORE THE MISTS
RETURNED FOR A FURTHER 24 HOURS.
HAVING MENTIONED MAIL, LET ME EXPAND A LITTLE. PRIOR
TO ANY COMBAT OPERATION, MOST MEN IN THE COY WROTE AT LEAST
ONE LETTER TO A WIFE, GIRLFRIEND, OR NOK. THESE WERE NOT
NECESSARILY WRITTEN IN A MORBID MANNER BUT YOU HAD TO MAKE
SURE THAT, WHAT YOU WROTE, WAS WHAT YOU INTENDED YOUR LOVED
ONES TO KEEP AND TREASURE, SHOULD YOU NOT SURVIVE OR
PERHAPS WORSE SHOULD YOU BE DESPERATELY WOUNDED OR BURNT.
I REMEMBER I WROTE 7 SUCH LETTERS HOME TO VIV, AND EACH ONE
WAS WRITTEN AS IF IT WAS MY LAST. IT REALLY EMPHASIZED IN
MY MIND, AND I THINK IN VIV'S TOO, WHAT WAS IMPORTANT IN
LIFE AND WHAT WAS UNNECESSARY OR FRIVOLOUS; AND FOR 2 OR 3
MONTHS AFTER OUR RETURN, I DARE SAY WE WERE THE BETTER FOR
IT. I REGRET IT DIDN'T TAKE LONG THOUGH TO GET THE URGE
FOR COMFORTABLE AND MATERIALISTIC CAPITALISM!
ANYWAY TO GET BACK TO WHAT WAS THEN OUR HOME, WHERE WE
ACCEPTED WHAT LITTLE WE HAD WITH GRATITUDE. AS YOU'VE
HEARD, FOOD WAS SCARCE, AND SO FAR AS WATER IS CONCERNED,
WE HAD TO FIND OUR OWN. THE NEAREST STREAM WAS 5 MILES
AWAY - EAST OF THE ARGENTINIAN REGIMENT AT MT. HARRIETT.
WE WERE ON TOP OF A MOUNTAIN BUT FORTUNTATELY THE WATER
SETTLED AND REMAINED ON THE SURFACE! IN COY HQ, 10 OF US
USED A PUDDLE 6 FT. LONG, 2 FT. WIDE AND 6 INCHES DEEP
FOR THE DURATION OF OUR STAY. HYGIENE OF COURSE WAS OF
CRUCIAL INTEREST BUT LUCKILY NO ONE AT THIS STAGE SUFFERED
FROM THE 'DOG'.
WE WERE ON THIS OUTCROP VIRTUALLY INVULNERABLE TO
SURFACE ATTACK AND SO I CANCELLED THE 1OO% STAND TO AT DAWN
AND DUSK, BUT WE WERE SUBJECTED TO PERIODIC 155MM HARASSING
FIRE. ON SEVERAL EVENINGS WE RECEIVED SALVOS OF 6X 155MM
SHELLS EVERY 20 MINUTES OR SO FOR A COUPLE OF HOURS EACH
TIME. THESE CAUSED NO CASUALTIES AND WERE NOTHING MORE
THAN A NUISANCE. THE ARGENTINE ARTILLERY WAS FIRING ONTO
THE HIGH FEATURES ALL ACROSS THEIR FRONT, AND I GOT THE
IMPRESSION THAT THIS WAS A BATTERY FIRING IN GENERAL
SUPPORT WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF FORWARD OBSERVERS. WE WERE
INDIRECTLY SUBJECTED TO ONLY ONE AIR ATTACK. 5 X 1000 LB.
BOMBS WERE DROPPED OUT OF THE TAILGATE OF A KC 130 ONE
NIGHT. THE EARTH TREMBLED AT EVERY EXPLOSION AND I
REPORTED TO CDO HQ THAT THESE LANDED 3 OR 400 METERS
NORTHWEST OF US, K COY RECKONED IT WAS 200M SOUTHEAST OF
THEM. AS WE WERE 5 KM APART, ONE OR BOTH OF US WAS WRONG,
ALL I DO KNOW IS THEY MADE AN ENORMOUS IMPRESSION UPON ME.
I COULD ONLY IMAGINE WHAT THE ARGENTINIANS AT THE AIRFIELD
MUST HAVE FELT WHEN THEY WERE SIMILARLY ATTACKED, AND THE
BOMBS LANDED VIRTUALLY ON TARGET, WITHIN THEIR MIDST!
TALKING OF THE AIRFIELD, WE COULD SEE IT AND THE PORT FROM
MT. CHALLENGER AND COULD SEE THE DAILY AIRCRAFT AND SHIP
MOVEMENTS. IT WAS VERY FRUSTRATING TO BE ABLE TO DO
NOTHING ABOUT IT. DESPITE THE TEZ, 2 OR 3 C 130 AIRCRAFT
MOVEMENTS OCCURRED EACH NIGHT, AND COASTAL SHIPS
OCCASIONALLY SEEMED TO RISK INTERCEPTION TOO. TO SAY I WAS
FRUSTRATED IS IN FACT AN UNDERSTATEMENT; I WAS FURIOUS
BECAUSE THE BBC WORLD SERVICE HAD SAID TIME AND TIME AGAIN
THAT THE TEZ WAS COMPLETE AND UNBREACHABLE, AND THE
AIRFIELD COMPLETELY BLOCKED. I WAS FURIOUS ABOUT HAVING
BEEN FED PROPAGANDA AND BELIEVING IT.
VISIBILITY IN THE FALKLANDS IS SUPERB WITH NO
POLLUTION, AND FROM OUR POSITION WE HAD AN AMAZING VIEW
EAST TOWARDS PORT STANLEY AND SOUTHWEST 12 KM TO PORT
PLEASANT (GR 165635) WHERE ON 8 JUNE 2 LSLS COULD CLEARLY
BE SEEN. IN THE WORST DISASTER OF THE WAR INCORRECTLY
CALLED "BLUFF COVE" THESE LSLS, SIR GALAHAD AND SIR
TRISTRAM, WERE BOMBED BY 5 SKYHAWKS. SIR TRISTRAM HAD
ACTUALLY UNLOADED MOST OF ITS CARGO AND THE 2 BOMBS CAUSED
LITTLE DAMAGE OTHER THAN KILLING 2. THE EFFECT ON SIR
GALAHAD WAS VASTLY MORE SERIOUS. WITHIN 45 MINUTES THE
WHOLE SHIP WAS ABLAZE WHEN THE SHIP'S MASTER, CAPTAIN
ROBERTS, FINALLY ABANDONED SHIP HIMSELF. AFTER THE
SURRENDER, THE GALAHAD WAS TOWED OUT TO SEA AND SUNK AS A
WAR GRAVE. 48 MEN DIED IN THE ATTACK AND 150 WERE BURNED
OR INJURED. WE WATCHED, TOTALLY IMPOTENT,AS THE ATTACK
CAME IN, AND WITHIN SECONDS COULD SEE THE SMOKE AND FLAME
BILLOWING OUT; MY FORWARD OP, 2 KM FROM THE ENEMY, ALSO
CLEARLY HEARD THE CHEERS OF THE ARGENTINIANS ON MT.
HARRIET. THEY COULD EQUALLY CLEARLY SEE THE ATTACK FROM 16
KMS AWAY, AND HAD SENT THE ORIGINAL SIGHTING REPORT. MY
AIR DEFENCE DETACHMENT FIRED ONE BLOWPIPE MISSILE AT
EXTREME RANGE, MORE OUT OF FRUSTRATION THAN HOPE, BUT IT
FAILED TO GET CLOSE TO ANY OF THE AIRCRAFT AS THEY SWUNG
SOUTH INSTEAD OF NORTH.
VIDEO 14
LET ME NOW TALK ABOUT PATROLLING, SO THAT YOU CAN SEE
HOW WE ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THE CO TO
MAKE HIS PLAN FOR THE ATTACK. PATROLLING INVOLVED THE
DOMINATION OF NO MAN'S LAND AND RECONNAISSANCE OF WHAT WAS
LIKELY TO BE OUR OBJECTIVE, MT. HARRIETT. BRIGADIER
THOMPSON OF COURSE REALIZED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO
COORDINATE ALL PATROLS AND SO APPOINTED A PATROL MASTER,
THE S03 G3TRG TO DO THIS. EACH CDO SENT OUT ONLY ONE TROOP
STRENGTH PATROL EACH NIGHT. MY COY SENT OUT 5, ROUGHLY ONE
EVERY OTHER NIGHT. THE FIRST WAS TO POSITION AN OP ON THE
EAST END OF MT. WALL, AT GR 275707. AS THIS WAS ONLY
2,OOOM FROM THE MAIN ARGENTINIAN DEFENSIVE POSITON, IT
SEEMED MOST LIKELY THAT IT WOULD BE ENGAGED FAIRLY EARLY
ON. IT WAS, THEREFORE, A VERY STRONG TEAM OF 16, INCLUDING
2 X 4 MAN TEAMS FROM RECCE TP, 2 SNIPERS, FAC AND FOO
TEAMS; I PLACED OC RECCE TP, WHO WAS UNDER COMMAND, AS THE
OC. I SPENT ALL NIGHT CLEARING AND POSITIONING THIS POST
WHICH EVENTUALLY MOVED IN WITHOUT DIFFICULTY. JUST BEFORE
FIRST LIGHT, I WAS AT GR2587O8 RETURNING TO MY COY BASE
WHEN VERY THICK MIST CAME DOWN. I STOPPED MY PATROL UNTIL
IT LIFTED SINCE I HAD NO DESIRE TO GET DISORIENTATED. AND
WE CRAWLED INTO OUR SLEEPING BAGS. TYPICALLY AS WE HAD NO
SHELTER OVERHEAD, IT STARTED TO "PEE" WITH RAIN. MY
SLEEPING BAG GOT SOAKING WET AND FOR THE NEXT 72 HOURS I
HAD TO PUT ON WATERPROOFS BEFORE CLIMBING INTO MY "SLUG".
AT THE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD LAST TIME, SOMEONE ASKED
WHAT KIT WAS THE MOST USEFUL; I FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO
ANSWER BECAUSE IT WAS ALL USEFUL -- THAT WHICH I DID NOT
HAVE BUT WHICH I SWEAR I SHALL NEVER AGAIN BE WITHOUT IS:
A. A GORETEX SLEEPING BAG COVER/BIVVY BAG
B. A HOLLOW-FILL SLEEPING BAG RATHER THAN A DOWN OR
FEATHER SACK. SCIENTIFICALLY THEY DRY 27 TIMES QUICKER AND
DON'T NOW SUFFER THE SERIOUS DEGRADATION THAT THEY USED TO,
WHEN DAMP. IN MY LAST JOB PROCURING AND TRIALING KIT FOR
SPECIAL FORCES, I CO-DIRECTED COMPREHENSIVE TRIALS LASTING
12 MONTHS AND INVOLVING LIVE TRIALS IN THE ARCTIC AND
CONTROLLED COLD CHAMBER EVALUATION AT TEMPS DOWN TO -40oC
(-40oF) AND INCLUDING 1 LITRE OF WATER PER BAG. THE
AMERICAN NORTH FACE BIG FOOT SLEEPING BAG CAME OUT ON TOP,
I CAN WHOLEHEARTEDLY CANRECOMMEND IT!
ANYWAY THE OP WAS ABLE TO REMAIN IN POSITION FOR
SEVERAL DAYS ENGAGING THE ENEMY WITH INDIRECT FIRE AND
GAINING VALUABLE DETAILS OF ENEMY DISPOSITION ON THE
FORWARD SLOPE OF MT. HARRIETT. AT DAWN ON DAY 1, HOWEVER,
THEY WERE HORRIFIED TO SEE AN ARGENTINIAN 5 MAN TENT ABOUT
5OOM FROM THEIR POSITION, AT GR 282707, BUT IT DIDN'T
BOTHER THEM UNTIL DAY 4 OR 5 WHEN THE ARGENTINIANS DECIDED
TO HAVE BREAKFAST ON THE SUMMIT OF MT. WALL FROM WHERE 2
MNES WERE CONSTANTLY ON WATCH. CURIOUSLY ON REACHING THE
SUMMIT, THE ARGIES FACED EAST, SAT DOWN AND STARTED TO
COOK. LT. CHRIS MAWHOOD DECIDED THAT THIS PATROL MUST BE
DEALTH WITH. AFTER DEPLOYING THE WHOLE FORCE INTO FIRE
POSITIONS WITH MGs, 66s, AND SLRs, 2 MEN WENT DAGGER-IN-
TEETH TO TRY TO CAPTURE THEM. WHEN ONLY 3 OR 4M OFF AND
DESPITE ABSOLUTE SILENCE, ONE OF THE ARGENTINIANS TURNED TO
LOOK OVER HIS LEFT SHOULDER, WITH WEAPON IN HAND, AND THE
LAST THING HE EVER SAW WAS A MNE APPROACHING. AFTER A
SHORT AND SUCCESSFUL ENGAGEMENT THE OP REQUESTED AND WAS
GIVEN PERMISSION TO WITHDRAW. FEARING AN ENEMY FOLLOWUP
THE OP FLED LEAVING MUCH HEAVY PERSONNEL EQUIPMENT BEHIND,
INCLUDING SLEEPING BAGS. THE LOGISTICS ON THE FALKLANDS
WAS SUCH THAT THERE WERE NO SPARE BAGS AVAILABLE; THEY HAD
ALL BEEN SUNK ON THE ATLANTIC CONVEYER. THE OP PARTY HAD
SEVERAL COLD NIGHTS UNTIL WE FINALLY OVERRAN THE
ARGENTINIAN POSITION, AND LIBERATED SOME OF THEIR EXCELLENT
BAGS!
AS THE OP WITHDREW, I RECEIVED A SIGINT REPORT THAT 3
X ARGENTINIAN TROOPS WERE EN ROUTE BY VEHICLE ALONG THE
ROAD TO CUT OFF THEIR WITHDRAWAL. I QUICKLY ASSEMBLED OUR
16 COY MGs AND MOVED FORWARD TO GR 257704 TO COVER THEIR
RETIREMENT ACROSS THE OPEN SADDLE BETWEEN MT. WALL AND MT.
CHALLENGER. THEY GOT ACROSS WITHOUT INTERFERENCE, AND
THERE WAS NO SIGN THROUGH THE SWIRLING MIST OF ANY ENEMY
FOLLOW-UP; ALONG THIS TRACK (POINT) BUT THAT IS NOT TO SAY
IT WAS CONTEMPLATED OR EVEN PLANNED. THE NEXT SIGINT
REPORT WE HAD WAS THAT THE ARGENTINIANS WERE GOING TO USE
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST US, AND WE DID NOT HAVE OUR GAS
MASKS WITH US; THEY WERE AT PORT SAN CARLOS WITH OUR HEAVY
EQUIPMENT. AMID FRANTIC EFFORTS, THESE WERE REMOVED FROM
OUR PACKS AND FLOWNFORWARD. THERE WAS MUCH RELIEF WHEN
THEY ARRIVED WITHIN TWO HOURS; THE EARLIER DISCOVERY OF
NAPALM AT GOOSE GREEN LENT SOME DEGREE OF CREDENCE TO THE
REPORT BUT WE WERE THANKFUL THAT WE WERE NEVER SUBJECTED TO
A GAS ATTACK. THE FINAL INPUT FROM SIGINT CAME DURING THE
BATTLE AT A VERY CRITICAL STAGE WHEN WE WERE HELD UP 600M
FROM THE SUMMIT OF MT. HARRIETT. I WAS TOLD THAT 12
HELICOPTERS WERE INBOUND TO THE MOUNTAIN TOP. AT FIRST I
THOUGHT THESE MUST BE MORTAR BOMBS SHOWING UP ON THE RADAR,
BUT I WAS ASSURED THEY WERE HELICOPTERS. I SURMIZED THAT
EVEN IF IT WERE ONLY 12 HUEYS, THE REINFORCEMENTS ALONE
WOULD BE ENOUGH TO CAUSE ME TO FAIL IN MY MISSION. I
THEREFORE HAD A RENEWED SENSE OF URGENCY THAT MIGHT HAVE
CONTRIBUTED TO ONE OR TWO OF MY CASUALTIES LATER IN THE
BATTLE.
TO GET BACK TO OUR PATROL PROGRAMME. THE NEXT NIGHT,
6 TROOP, UNDER THE COMMAND OF 2 LT. JULIAN PUSEY, LAID AN
AMBUSH DUE SOUTH OF OUR COY POSITION ALONG THIS TRACK FROM
GOOSE GREEN TO STANLEY - IN THE HOPE OF CATCHING STRAGGLERS
RETURNING TO STANLEY AFTER 2 PARA'S BATTLE BUT WE CAUGHT
NOTHING. THE PATROL THE FOLLOWING NIGHT WAS OUR FIRST
FORWARD OF MT. WALL, WHICH WAS STILL AT THIS TIME OCCUPIED
BY THE O.P. WHO HAD IDENTIFIED THE POSITIONS OF THE FORWARD
(WESTERN) SLOPE. ITS JOB WAS TO ENGAGE THE ENEMY ON THE
SOUTHWEST SIDE OF MT. HARRIETT, IN ORDER TO PINPOINT
OBSTACLES AND DFs, GAUGE THEIR LEVEL OF COMPETENCE AND
PROCEDURES, AND GENERALLY HARASS THEM. 4 TROOP, UNDER LT
KEN MCMILLAN MOVED OUT AT LAST LIGHT ALONG THE RIDGELINE
AND SOUTH OF MT. WALL. 3 HOURS LATER MNE CURTIS, A 230
LB. RN RUGBY PLAYER, STEPPED ON AN ANTIPERSONNEL MINE, AT
GR 285708. AT THAT TIME THE PATROL ALSO CAME UNDER
ARTILLERY FIRE. CPL CUTHELL, HIS SECTION COMMANDER,
ANOTHER LARGE RUGBY PLAYER, PICKED HIM UP AND CARRIED HIM
BACK THE WAY HE'D COME, FOR ABOUT 250M. THERE THE TROOP
STOPPED AND CURTIS GAVE HIMSELF MORPHINE WHILE THE REMNANTS
OF HIS FOOT WERE BOUND AND STRAPPED UP BY THE CORPSMAN
(MA). THE MISSION WAS ABANDONED, AND THEN STARTED THE
LONG, SLOW BUSINESS OF EVACUATING HIM BACK. THE WEATHER
WAS FOUL, AND THE LOW CLOUDS PROHIBITED HELICOPTER
CASEVAC. WHENEVER THE PATROL STAYED ON THE LOW GROUND
WHERE THE GOING WAS GOOD, THEY WERE SHELLED. AN OPTIMIST
WOULD SAY THAT PART OF THE MISSION HAD BEEN ACHIEVED, AS
WE'D FOUND SOME OF THEIR DFs AND LOCATED ONE MINEFIELD!
ANYWAY THE PATROL HAD TO GO ON THE ROUGH GROUND AT THE
FOOTHILLS TO THE SOUTH OF MT. WALL TO AVOID THE ARTILLERY.
THERE THE ROCK RUNS IMPEDED THEIR PROGRESS ENORMOUSLY, AND
MADE THE WHOLE THING A VERY TIRING EXERCISE FOR ALL. I'D
REMIND YOU THAT THERE ARE NO TREES IN THE FALKLANDS -- AND
NO LOCAL RESOURCES FOR MAKING A STRETCHER; I'M NOT SURE
ANYWAY THAT OVER THE BOULDERS ONE COULD HAVE BEEN
UTILIZED. EACH SECTION CARRIED 2X SLEEPING BAGS AND A KIP
(KIT INDIVIDUAL PROTECTION), USED FOR CONSTRUCTION OF
SHELTER TRENCHES. THESE WERE USED FROM TIME TO TIME BUT
WERE NOT VERY GOOD. AFTER A SECOND STOP FOR MORE
INTRAVENOUS DRIPS AND REST FOR ALL, THE TROOP EVENTUALLY
GOT BACK ABSOLUTELY EXHAUSTED AT 9 A.M. THOSE OF US WHO
HAVE IN THE PAST SKIPPED OVER THE CASEVAC PROCEDURES DURING
EXERCISES IN THE NATO SEQUENCE OF ORDERS, HAD BETTER TAKE
NOTE. AT ABOUT 10:30 THERE WAS A BREAK IN THE WEATHER AND
CURTIS WAS EVENTUALLY EVACUATED BY HELICOPTER TO SS
UGANDA. THOUGH THE OFFENSIVE MISSIONS OF THE PATROL WERE
NOT ACHIEVED, THE CO SURMISED THAT HE COULD NOT HOPE TO
SUCCEED IN A FRONTAL ASSAULT ACROSS THE OPEN GROUND THAT
WAS LIKELY TO BE MINED ALONG THE W OF MT. HARRIETT NORTH OF
THE TRACK. MNE CURTIS INCIDENTALLY HAS AN ARTIFICIAL LEG
AND WITHIN 9 MONTHS WENT SKIING IN COLORADO. THOUGH HE CAN
ALSO PASS OUR PHYSICAL FITNESS TEST HE HAS LEFT THE RM AND
IS CURRENTLY AT UNIVERSITY.
THE NEXT NIGHT I CLEARED A ROUTE WITH OUR COMBAT
AND ATTACHED ROYAL ENGINEERS FROM THE SADDLE BETWEEN MT.
CHALLENGER AND MT. WALL SOUTHWEST TRACK, TO THE TRACK, AND
THE FOLLOWING NIGHT I SENT OUT 5 TROOP, UNDER SGT WESTON
AND A SMALL RECCE SECTION UNDER SGT COLLINS TO FIND A ROUTE
ROUND THE SOUTH OF THE MINEFIELD. THE TROOP COMMANDER,
LT. BURNELLWAS SUFFERING FROM EXPOSURE SO DID NOT LEAD THE
PATROL. HE FORTUNATELY REVIVED WHEN WE GOT THE HELICOPTER
RESUPPLY OF FOOD THAT I'VE ALREADY SPOKEN ABOUT.
SGT WESTON'S PATROL WAS TO ESTABLISH A PATROL BASE AT
GR 290700, WHILE SGT COLLINS WAS TO GO FORWARD TO GR
310702. THEY WERE NEARING THE PATROL BASE LOCATION, WHEN
"BANG", MNE PATERSON STEPPED ON A MINE. THE PATROL COULD
NOT BE ABANDONED SINCE THE ATTACK WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE
NEXT NIGHT. SGT WESTON WITH ONE SECTION TOOK PATERSON BACK
1500M WHERE A HELICOPTER RECOVERED HIM 35 MINUTES LATER. A
SECTION COMMANDER ESTABLISHED THE PATROL BASE AND SGT
COLLINS WENT OFF. AS THE RESULT OF THIS PATROL, THE CO HAD
ALL THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO MAKE HIS PLAN. BUT NEXT DAY,
LSL SIR GALAHAD WAS HIT IN THE ATTACK I'VE ALREADY
MENTIONED, AND DUE TO THE REALLOCATION OF ALL HELO ASSETS
FROM ARTILLERY RESUPPLY TO CASEVAC DUTIES, THE BDE
COORDINATED ATTACK WAS DELAYED.
ADHERING TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT TIME SPENT IN RECLE IS
NEVER WASTED, THE FOLLOWING NIGHT, SGT COLLINS AGAIN WENT
OUT; HE FOUND A SAFE ROUTE, IDENTIFIED THE START LINE WHICH
WAS TO
BE THE FENCE TO THE SE OF MT. HARRIETT AND CAME BACK WITH
FIRST CLASS INFORMATION. -- DO PLEASE REMEMBER WE HAD NO
AIR PHOTOGRAPHS NOR ANY UP-TO-DATE INFORMATION OTHER THAN
THAT WHICH WE HAD OURSELVES GATHERED.
VIDEO 15
CONCURRENT WITH OUR PATROLLING AND OP ACTIVITY, K COY
AND LATER J COY ALSO CONDUCTED A SERIES OF PATROLS; IN ONE
PARTICULARLY SUCCESSFUL OPERATION, A TROOP OF K COY
DISCOVERED THAT GOAT RIDGE WAS UNOCCUPIED AND THAT THE
ENEMY HAD NUMEROUS DEPTH POSITIONS ON THE NORTH AND
NORTHEAST SLOPES OF MT. HARRIETT, ONE WELL FORWARD WITH AT
LEAST TROOP SIZED UNITS ON THE WESTERN TIP AND, NORTH AND
SOUTH OF IT, AND A COMPANY IN THE REAR.
WITH THE BDE ASSAULT AT LAST CONFIRMED FOR THE NIGHT
OF 11/12 JUNE, I WAS FLOWN TO THE COMFORT OF CDO HQ, WHERE
THERE WERE 2XBVO2S AND 2-MAN TENTS AND A FULL CDO "O" GP
WAS HELD ON 10 JUNE. IT SEEMED INCREDIBLE TO BE RECEIVING
ORDERS FOR A FULLSCALE LIVE COMMANDO NIGHT ATTACK. 2
MONTHS EARLIER, PETER BABBINGTON, K COY COMMANDER AND I
RECEIVED SIMILAR ORDERS FOR A NIGHT ATTACK IN EX ALLOY
EXPRESS, THE NATO N. NORWAY EXERCISE. ON THAT OCCASION, WE
SPENT A LONG TIME DISCUSSING BOUNDARIES AND HOW TO
DECONFLICT. AND IT CERTAINLY SAVED A LOT OF TIME NOW.
LET ME NOW QUOTE FROM THE OFFICIAL RECORD OF PROCEED-
INGS.
"THE DECISION TO ATTACK FROM THE REAR WAS FINALLY
TAKEN. ALTHOUGH IT WAS A BOLD MOVE THE CO WAS CONFIDENT
THAT, PROVIDED SECRECY WAS MAINTAINED UNTIL H-HOUR,
SURPRISE WOULD BE ACHIEVED. A 2 PHASE ASSAULT WAS DECIDED
UPON. K COY WAS TO CROSS THE SL FIRST AND SECURE THE
EASTERN END OF THE FEATURE FOLLOWED 60 MINUTES LATER BY L
COY SECURING THE W END. ONCE BOTH COYS WERE FIRM K WOULD
THEN PRESS ON TO SEIZE GOAT RIDGE.
A THOROUGH ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE "SOFTENING-UP"
WAS TO INCLUDE NAVAL GUN FIRE SUPPORT FROM THE FRIGATE
HMS YARMOUTH WITH 1 X 4.5" TURRET. J COY HAD ALREADY MOVED
FORWARD ONTO THE W SLOPE OF MOUNT WALL AND THE MORTARLINE
HAD BEEN ESTABLISHED IN THIS AREA TOO. AFTER LAST LIGHT
(AROUND - 2015 HRS) ON 11 JUNE K AND L COYS MOVED FORWARD
FROM MOUNT CHALLENGER (WHERE THEY HAD LAID-UP AND PREPARED
FOR BATTLE DURING DAYLIGHT THAT DAY) TO A RECEPTION AREA
CONTROLLED BY J COY IN THE LEE OF MOUNT WALL (GR264706).
HERE, BERGEN RUCKSACKS WERE LEFT BEHIND AND THE MOVE
FORWARD ALONG THE CLEARED ROUTE WAS UNDERTAKEN BY J COY
GUIDES. HERE ALSO THE COMMANDO SUFFERED ITS FIRST
CASUALITIES. ENEMY MORTAR FIRE KILLED ONE CPL AND WOUNDED
4 MVPS. ONE TP OF J COY HAD ALREADY GONE AHEAD AS SOON AS
DARKNESS FELL TO MARK THE ROUTE AND TO DROP OFF TWO MILAN
ANTI TANK MISSILE SECTIONS. ONE MILAN SECT WAS POSITIONED
IMMEDIATELY S OF HARRIET NEAR THE TRACK IN THE AREA
GR3O07OO. THEIR TASK WAS TO ENGAGE AND DESTROY THE ENEMY
BUNKERS AND SANGERS ON THE S SLOPES OF THE FEATURE, TO BE
ILLUMINATED BY THE CDO's MORTARS. THE SECOND MILAN SECT,
ON THE STANLEY - GOOSE GREEN TRACK TO THE EAST OF HARRIET,
WAS TO PREVENT ANY POSSIBLE ENEMY INTERFERENCE BY VEHICLES
APPROACHING FROM THE EAST. THE TP ITSELF WAS TO MEET UP
WITH THE RECCE TROOP OF 1 BN WELSH GUARDS WHICH HAD BEEN
TASKED TO SECURE THE SL. THE PL COMD OF THE GUARDS RECCE
PL HAD NOT ATTENDED 42 CDO's COMPREHENSIVE O GP, AND WE
WERE ALWAYS CONCERNED ABOUT THIS CRUCIAL PART OF THE
PROCEEDINGS. OC 12 TROOP SPENT AGES LOOKING FOR THE GUARDS
PL AND DID NOT FIND THEM TILL NEARLY 0200, WELL AFTER THE
PLANNED H-HOUR. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THERE WAS NO THOUGHT OF
PROCEEDING BEFORE WE KNEW THAT THE GUARDS KNEW WE WERE
THERE!
AT 2130, JUST OVER AN HOUR AFTER LAST LIGHT, K COY SET
OFF FOR THE SL AND H-HOUR WAS TIMED FOR 0100 HRS ON 12 JUN;
THEY HAD 3-1/2 HRS TO COVER THE 6 KM. ACCOMPANYING THEM
WAS A PORTER TP FORMED FROM HQ COY UNDER COMMAND OF THE
ADJT, WHO HAD COME FORWARD FROM CDO MAIN HQ, WHICH HAD
STAYED IN ITS ORIGINAL LOCATION NEAR MOUNT KENT FOR COMMS &
LOGISTIC REASONS. THIS TP WAS TO ACT AS A PORTER GROUP,
CARRYING THE SF KITS OF BOTH K AND L COYS THUS FREEING THEM
OF THAT BURDEN, IN ADDITION, THEY CARRIED EXTRA AMMO. THIS
TROOP WENT TO GROUND IN THE FUP JUST SHORT OF THE SL AND
THE INTENTION WAS FOR IT TO CARRY UP THE SF KITS TO THE
TOP OF HARRIET ONCE THE COY COMDS CALLED THEM FORWARD.
TAC HQ MEANWHILE POSITIONED ITSELF IN AN ABANDONED
ARGENTINIAN SOD-WALLED SANGER IN THE AREA GR275705. TAC
HQ, CONSISTING OF CO, S3, BC AND NGFSO PARTIES, SIGNALLERS
MOR OFFR SAPPER OFFR AND OC J COY, WAS TO SPEND 8 HRS IN
THIS FREEZING POSITION UNTIL 6 AM. J COY (-) AND THE ENGR
TP (26 STRONG) WERE AVAILABLE TO THE CO AS RESERVE.
THE WHOLE OF THE ENEMY POSITION WAS SHELLED WITHOUT
RESPITE AFTER LAST LIGHT. AT H-HOUR THE OP TP FROM J COY
POSITIONED ON THE E END OF MOUNT WALL PLAYED ITS PART IN
THE PLAN MOST EFFECTIVELY. AS A DIVERSION, IT OPENED UP ON
THE ENEMY POSITIONS OPPOSITE, FIRING VARIOUS ENEMY WEAPONS
CAPTURED PREVIOUSLY; IT SENT UP SCHERMULIES AND MADE A
GREAT DEAL OF NOISE AIMED AT DECEIVING THE ENEMY INTO
BELIEVING AN ARGENTINIAN PATROL WAS ENGAGED WITH IT. EVEN
IF THIS DECEPTION WAS NOT BELIEVED, THE SPECTACLE WAS
LIKELY TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM THE TWO RIFLE COYS SKIRTING
SOUTH TO THE FUP.
THE ENEMY PUT UP A COUPLE OF MORTAR ILLUM FLARES AS K
AND L COYS WERE MOVING ROUND. WE EXPECTED HEAVY ARTILLERY
AND MORTAR FIRE TO FOLLOW. NOTHING HAPPENED, AND ALTHOUGH
THE ENEMY TWICE REPEATED THESE SINGLE FLARE ILLUMINATION
SHOOTS BEFORE H-HOUR IT WAS A RELIEF TO REALIZE THEY WERE
MERELY RANDOM SHOOTS AND THAT THE COYS HAD NOT BEEN
SIGHTED.
I'LL SHORTLY BE SHOWING A TAPE OF, AMONGST OTHER
THINGS, K COY'S OPERATION BUT LET ME FIRST COVER THE
REMAINDER OF THE OPERATION FROM MY PERSPECTIVE AS L COY
COMD -- AND I'LL QUOTE FROM JULIAN THOMPSON'S BOOK "NO
PICNIC". INCIDENTALLY, MY COY AT THIS STAGE WAS 129
STRONG.
"L COMPANY'S TASK WAS TO CLEAR AND SECURE THE WESTERN
END OF THE MOUNT HARRIET FEATURE. STARTING AFTER K COMPANY
ACROSS THE SAME START LINE, SURPRISE HAD BEEN LOST AND SO
L COMPANY CAME UNDER EFFECTIVE FIRE FROM HEAVY MACHINE GUNS
WITHIN 200 METRES OF THE START LINE TAKING THREE CASUALTIES
ALMOST AT ONCE. CAPTAIN WHEEN, COMMANDING L COMPANY,
CALLED FOR MILAN TO FIRE AT THE MACHINE-GUN POSITIONS AND
AT LEAST FOUR SNIPER TEAMS, ALL EQUIPPED WITH NIGHT SIGHTS,
BEFORE REACHING ITS FIRST OBJECTIVE, THE WESTERN END OF THE
HARRIET SPINEBACK. THIS INVOLVED A FIGHTING ADVANCE OF
ABOUT 600 METRES AND, AS EACH POSITION TOOK A SEPARATE
TROOP OR SECTION ATTACK TO DEAL WITH IT, IT TOOK ABOUT FIVE
HOURS TO COVER THE DISTANCE FROM THE START LINE. THE
COMPANY FOUND THAT IT WAS BEST TO KEEP SKIRMISHING FORWARD
THROUGHOUT THIS ADVANCE, BECAUSE GOING TO GROUND FOR ANY
LENGTH OF TIME MEANT SITTING IN THE MIDDLE OF THE ENEMY
ARTILLERY FIRE TASKS; HERE ARTILLERY AND SMALL ARMS CAUSED
A FURTHER 4 GUNSHOT AND 7 SHRAPNEL CASUALTIES. AS THE
COMPANY ARRIVED AT THE WESTERN END OF MOUNT HARRIET THEY
FOUND LARGE NUMBERS OF ARGENTINES WISHING TO SURRENDER. IN
THE DARKNESS THERE APPEARED TO BE ABOUT FIFTY OF THEM,
ALTHOUGH WHEN DAYLIGHT ARRIVED MANY MORE APPEARED."
INCIDENTALLY, IT WAS AT THIS STAGE THAT WE SAW A LAND
LAUNCHED EXOCET MISSILE HEADING OUT TO SEA. HMS GLAMORGAN
DID NOT NEED US TO TELL THEM IT WAS INBOUND. IT HAD
ALREADY BEEN DETECTED AND AVOIDING ACTION INITIATED.
SADLY, THE MISSILE STRUCK THE HELO HANGER KILLING 13 AND
DESTROYING THE HELO.
WHEN REORGANIZED HIS COMPANY, SENT THE PRISONERS TO
THE REAR AND THEN ORDERED 5 TROOP TO MOVE FORWARD TO THE
COMPANY'S NEXT OBJECTIVE, AN ENEMY POSITION IN THE ROCKY
OUTCROP ABOUT 500 METRES DUE NORTH OF THE WESTERN END OF
HARRIET. BEFORE THEY MOVED, HOWEVER, WHEEN CONCENTRATED
ALL HIS MACHINE GUNS, LESS THOSE OF 5 TROOP, FIFTEEN GUNS
IN ALL, ON THE RIDGE. AS 5 TROOP MOVED FORWARD DOWN THE
SLOPE TO THE ROCKY OUTCROP, THEY CAME UNDER HEAVY FIRE FROM
THEIR OBJECTIVE. WHEEN PULLED THEM BACK AND THEN HIT THE
ENEMY WITH MORTAR, ARTILLERY AND MACHINE-GUN FIRE BEFORE
ORDERING 5 TROOP FORWARD AGAIN. THEY DASHED FORWARD WITH
GREAT DETERMINATION AND WINKLED OR KILLED OUT THE ENEMY."
THE REASON I DID NOT USE INDIRECT FIRE WEAPONS AT THE START
WAS BECAUSE THE FOO HAD ADVISED ME OF THE CRITICAL
AMMUNITION SHORTAGE WITH ONLY A FEW ROUNDS LEFT PER GUN.
L COMPANY WAS THEN ORDERED BY VAUX TO PRESS ON TO GOAT
RIDGE, WHILE K COMPANY REMAINED ON THE WESTERN END OF
HARRIET. TIME WAS GETTING SHORT AND VAUX WANTED TO BE FIRM
ON BOTH FEATURES BEFORE FIRST LIGHT AND THE EXPECTED
ARGENTINE COUNTERATTACK MATERIALIZED. L COMPANY FOUND
GOAT RIDGE UNOCCUPIED, ALTHOUGH, AS THEY ARRIVED, THEY SAW
ABOUT FIFTY ENEMY RUNNING UP THE SIDE OF TUMBLEDOWN AND
CALLED DOWN ARTILLERY FIRE ON THEM. (I SURMIZE THAT THESE
FLED FROM THE ROCKY OUTCROP FOLLOWING THE INTENSIVE
INDIRECT FIRE WE BROUGHT UPON IT.) VAUX AND HIS TACTICAL
HEADQUARTERS THEN LED J COMPANY DIRECTLY ON TO THE HARRIET
FEATURE FROM THE EASTERN END OF WALL MOUNTAIN. HE DID
NOT WISH TO WASTE TIME TAKING THEM ALONG THE ROUTE FOLLOWED
BY K AND L COMPANIES. THEY SPRINTED THROUGH THE MINEFIELD
WITH 'THEIR FINGERS CROSSED AND IF THEY COULD HAVE MANAGED
IT, THEIR TOES AS WELL'. THE MOST DANGEROUS MOMENT TO AN
ATTACKER IS OFTEN JUST AFTER HE ARRIVES ON AN OBJECTIVE AND
IN THE EUPHORIA, OR EXHAUSTION, OR BOTH, RELAXES AND IS
THEN HIT BY A COUNTERATTACK WHICH KNOCKS HIM OFF THE
HARDWON POSITION. THE WELL-TRAINED TROOPS IN 3 COMMANDO
BRIGADE SPEEDILY SET TO TO PREPARE THEMSELVES TO RECEIVE
SUCH AN ATTACK, BUT, EXCEPT ON ONE OCCASION, THE ARGENTINES
DID NOT MOUNT COUNTERATTACKS, ALTHOUGH IT IS ONLY WITH THE
WISDOM OF HINDSIGHT THAT WE KNOW THIS NOW. THEY DID,
HOWEVER, RESORT TO THE OTHER EXPEDIENT OF THOSE WHO HAVE
LOST GROUND, WHICH IS TO SHELL AND MORTAR THEIR RECENT
POSITIONS. VAUX CONSOLIDATED HIS COMMAND WITH L COMPANY ON
GOAT RIDGE AND THE ROCKY OUTCROP, K COMPANY ON THE WESTERN
END OF HARRIET AND J COMPANY ON THE EASTERN END.
THE DAWN FOUND ALL 3 COMMANDO BRIGADE'S OBJECTIVE
SECURE BUT WITH THE DAYLIGHT, THE ENEMY SHELLING
INTENSIFIED." LOOKING BACK OVER THE GROUND WE HAD JUST
COVERED, I RECKONED THAT WE WOULD HAVE DIED OF OLD AGE OR
STARVATION BEFORE BEING DRIVEN OFF IT. WE RATHER HOPED THE
ENEMY WOULD COUNTERATTACK SO THAT WE COULD SHOW THEM HOW
THE FEATURE SHOULD BE DEFENDED! 2 COYS OF 42 CDO HAD TAKEN
A REGIMENTAL POSITION FOR 2 KILLED AND 30 WOUNDED.
I THINK I OUGHT TO GO INTO A LITTLE MORE DETAIL ON
THE BATTLE. AS SOON AS WE CAME UNDER EFFECTIVE FIRE WE
RETURNED DIRECT AND LATER ARTILLERY/NGS FIRE AT THE 3 MAIN
SOURCES. THE EXTREME RIGHT MACHINE GUNPOST HAVING CAUSED
THE FIRST CASUALTIES ATTRACTED THE GREATEST RESPONSE,
WHEREUPON OC K COY PROTESTED OVER THE UCN THAT WE WERE
SHOOTING PERILOUSLY CLOSE TO HIS MEN. IN THE DIN IT WAS
DIFFICULT TO GET THROUGH ON THE RADIO TO TROOP AND SECTION
COMMANDERS, SO I USED VOICE: WITHIN A COUPLE OF MINUTES
OUR EFFECTIVE SUPPORTING FIRE STOPPED, -- BUT THIS
DEMONSTRATES THE DECONFLICTION PROBLEM AT NIGHT.
IT WAS OBVIOUS FROM THE START THAT THE ENEMY HAD
EFFECTIVE NIGHT OBSERVATION DEVICES. FOR THIS REASON, AND
SINCE SURPRISE HAD BEEN LOST DURING K COY'S ATTACK, I WAS
HAPPY FOR VOICE TO BE USED, AND THIS PROVED EFFECTIVE.
VISIBILITY WAS NOT TOO BAD, SO CONTROL AT SECTION LEVEL WAS
NOT DIFFICULT. IN ORDER TO OBSERVE PROGRESS OF THE COY I
CARRIED AN IWS. THIS WAS VERY EFFECTIVE UP TO 150M - 2OOM
BUT BEYOND THAT RANGE MEN TENDED TO MERGE INTO THE ROCKS,
PARTICULARLY AFTER THE MOON ROSE BEHIND THE MOUNTAIN. ON
TWO OCCASIONS I TASKED 6 TP TO FIRE MINIFLARES. THIS
PROVED USEFUL IN LOCATING THEIR FORWARD SECTION, AND
SURPRISINGLY NEITHER COMPROMISED THEIR POSITION NOR DREW
ENEMY FIRE.
CLOSING WITH THE ENEMY. ONCE WE HAD IDENTIFIED THE
APPROXIMATE AREA OF EACH MACHINE GUN/SNIPER POST WE HAD TO
USE CONVENTIONAL METHODS, AT TP LEVEL, OF LOCATING THE
ENEMY. THIS PROVED DIFFICULT IN THE ROCKY TERRAIN AT
NIGHT, PARTICULARLY AS THE ENEMY WERE MOVING FROM COVER TO
COVER, OR ELSE A SECTION POSITION WOULD OPEN UP WITH JUST
ONE RIFLE AT A TIME; THE AID BEING TO DECEIVE US INTO
BELIEVING THAT IT WAS A SINGLE SNIPER. ONCE IDENTIFIED, WE
FOUND ANTI-TANK WEAPONS IDEAL FOR ENGAGING THE ENEMY. WE
FIRED MILAN IN CONJUNCTION WITH MORTAR AND OTHER
ILLUMINANTS, AND THOUGH ON ONE OCCASION IT HIT THE WRONG
TARGET IT HAD A SHOCK EFFECT UPON THE ENEMY SUFFICIENT TO
PERSUADE THEM TO STOP FIRING! 84MM CARL GUSTAV HESH ROUNDS
PROVED REMARKABLY EFFECTIVE UP TO 150MM AND ON TWO
OCCASIONS I WATCHED THEM COMPLETELY SHATTER ENEMY MACHINE
GUN TEAMS. 66MM WERE ALSO USED EFFECTIVELY UP TO APPROX
5OM, TO SUPPRESS THE ENEMY FIRE. REGRETABLY WE HAD NO
M203, M79 OR SMAW WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE.
WE WERE ALSO MOST CONCERNED ABOUT RECOGNITION AT
NIGHT. EVENTUALLY WE DECIDED UPON A SMALL 2-4 INCH STRIP
OF WHITE TAPE ON OUR BELT HARNESS JUST BELOW THE
SHOULDERS. OUR HEADDRESS WAS ALSO DISTINCTIVE; OUR STEEL
HELMETS LOOKED DIFFERENT TO THE ARGENTINIANS AND
FURTHERMORE WERE FIENDISHLY UNCOMFORTABLE. MOST INCLUDING
MYSELF DITCHED THE HELMET AND WORE OUR TRADITIONAL GREEN
BERETS. FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE MEDICAL FRATERNITY, I HAD
NO HEAD OR NECK INJURIES WITHIN MY COY. ALL 14 WERE TO THE
TORSO AND LIMBS.
AND NOW BACK TO THE RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS:
THE PW SITUATION BEGAN TO CAUSE PROBLEMS AS IT BECAME
A FLOOD. SURPRISE AND SHOCK ACTION HAD DISLODGED THE MAJOR
PART OF 4 INFANTRY REGIMENT, AND 42 CDO TOOK OVER 300
PRISONERS. GUARDING THEM AND SENDING THEM BACK TO BDE
CAGES BECAME A REAL PROBLEM FOR NO FIGHTING SUB-UNITS COULD
BE SPARED AS A COUNTERATTACK SURELY MUST BE MOUNTED WITH US
OCCUPYING SUCH IMPORTANT GROUND. BOOSTED BY RANKS FROM
SURVEILLANCE TROOP, THE ADJUTANT'S PORTER TROOP DID
STERLING SERVICE, DOUBLING AS A FORWARD FIRST AID POST,
READYING THE MOST SERIOUSLY WOUNDED FOR CASEVAC BY HELI-
COPTER; THIS WAS ACHIEVED SEVERAL TIMES AS INCOMERS WERE
ACTUALLY LANDING BUT LUCKILY, NO HELICOPTER WAS HIT.
WE REALIZED THAT K COY IN THEIR INITIAL ASSAULT HAD
STRUCK THE REGIMENTAL HQ AND BATTALION SUPPORT ELEMENTS,
WHILE L COY TOOK OUT 2 REINFORCED COYS. THE SURPRISE
ACHIEVED DURING THE ATTACK WAS APPARENT FROM THE DEBRIS OF
PERSONAL POSSESSIONS, RADIOS, AMMO, WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT
STREWN EVERYWHERE. IT ALSO GAVE LIE TO THE RUMOUR THAT THE
ENEMY WERE POORLY EQUIPPED AND SUPPLIED - ON THESE
POSITIONS THEY CERTAINLY WERE NOT!
42 CDO CAPTURED 4 X 12OMM MORTARS AND 2 X 0.5
BROWNINGS ON MT HARRIET AND IT WAS WITH IMMENSE
SATISFACTION DURING 12/13 JUN THAT WE TURNED THEM ON THEIR
ERSTWHILE OWNERS, OCCUPYING TUMBLEDOWN AND MOUNT WILLIAM TO
THE EAST, FEATURES WHICH WITHIN 48 HRS WERE TO BE IN
BRITISH HANDS.
VIDEO 16
LET ME BRIEFLY SUMMARIZE A FEW KEY POINTS IN THE
CONDUCT AND SUCCESS OF THE BATTLE AGAIN QUOTING FROM G2 CRO
L.O.P. COMPLETE SURPRISE WAS ACHIEVED AND, AS EVER, WAS A
MAJOR REASON FOR SUCCESS.
COMMAND AND CONTROL ARE OBVIOUSLY VERY IMPORTANT AT
NIGHT AND IN THIS TERRAIN. MY PERSONAL VIEW (THAT IS OF
THE COIOC OFFICER IS THAT WITH K & L HAVING WORKED CLOSELY
IN THE FIELD IN NORWAY AT LENGTH IN FEB AND MAR WE HAD A
BUILT-IN ADVANTAGE: I.E., WE WERE PROPERLY "WORKED-UP".
IT WAS GOOD TO SEE THAT DARKNESS AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF
THE TERRAIN COULD BE OVERCOME IN SUCH "BITTY" FIGHTING AND
THAT THE COY & TP COMDS COULD EXERCISE FIRM CONTROL. GOOD
& TIMELY RADIO PROCEDURE IS OBVIOUSLY VITAL.
OUR (I.E., ALL BRITISH FORCES) SUCCESS IN NIGHT
OPERATIONS MADE ME THINK THAT WE SELL OURSELVES SHORT WHEN
IT IS SO FREQUENTLY RE-ITERATED IN STAFF COLLEGES AND ELSE-
WHERE THAT THE SOVIETS DO SO MUCH MORE NIGHT TRAINING THAN
US. WHETHER WE DO AS MUCH AS THE SOVIETS OR NOT, IT IS
CLEAR THAT BRITISH INFANTRY DOES HAVE THE ABILITY AND THE
INITIATIVE TO OPERATE VERY SUCCESSFULLY AT NIGHT.
INCIDENTLY, IN CONVERSATION LATER WITH CO 4 INF REGT, HE
REFUSED TO BELIEVE THAT EVERY ONE OF MY MEN DID NOT HAVE A
NIGHTSIGHT.
SPEEDY, ACCURATE ARTILLERY FIRE WAS ENCOURAGING TO
HAVE ON ONE'S SIDE, AND WE INSTINCTIVELY FELT IT WAS HAVING
A DETRIMENTAL EFFECT ON THE OPPOSITION'S MORALE. THE FOOs
WITH THE COY HAD TO BRING DOWN SUPPORTING FIRE WITHIN 1OOM
OF THE COYS. ON ONE OCCASION FOO WITH K COY CALLED FOR,
AND GOT, A REGIMENTAL FIRE MISSION INVOLVING FOUR GUN
BATTERIES. SECURING THE RIDGE WAS NO EASY MATTER AS THIS
PERHAPS DEMONSTRATES. THE COORDINATION OF THE ARTILLERY,
NAVAL GUNFIRE AND MORTAR FIRE DURING THE NIGHT WAS MOST
IMPRESSIVE AND THE CO-LOCATION OF THE CO, BC, NGSFO AND
MORTAR OFFER MEANT THAT THE FOOs AND THEIR RIFLE COY COMDS
COULD BE SUPPORTED WITH THE RIGHT TYPE AND WEIGHT OF FIRE
EXTREMELY QUICKLY.
NOW EQUIPMENT. WE CARRIED FULL SCALE AMMO FOR ALL
WEAPONS AND THE ONLY TROOP WEAPONS NOT CARRIED IN THE
ASSAULT WERE THE 2" LT MORTARS. THE EFFECTS OF MAW AND LAW
WERE TREMENDOUS AGAINST ENEMY INFANTRY. THE KIT CARRIED
WAS: FIGHTING ORDER WITH A RESPIRATOR BAG ON THE BELT TOO
- IT CARRIED SUCH THINGS AS WATER PROOFS, SURVIVAL RATIONS
AND OTHER ITEMS SUCH AS EXTRA SOCKS, RADIO BATTERIES AND
SOME EXTRA AMMO. WINDPROOF-SMOCKPOCKETS WERE ALSO CRAMMED
WITH ODDS AND ENDS NOT CARRIED ON EXERCISES BUT CONSIDERED
HIGHLY DESIRABLE IN ACTION, ESPECIALLY WITH LOGISTIC
RESUPPLY SO TENUOUS! (E.G. EXTRA TORCH BATTERIES, DRINKS
PACK, NUTTY, TOILET PAPER - THE MAJORITY HAD SOME SORT OF
"DOG" AT ONE STAGE OR ANOTHER, FOR WE USED ANY WATER
AVAILABLE IN THE HILLS - WE RARELY GOT WATER RESUPPLY BY
HEL, THE SPACE JUST WAS NOT AVAILABLE). THE '58 PATTERN
WEBBING WAS AWFUL. WITH EXTRA RATS/AMMO AND WHATEVER
HEXAMINE WE COULD CARRY, IT WAS HEAVY UN-COMFORTABLE, AND
AWKWARD WHEN WET. NEVERTHELESS WE ALWAYS MEANT TO ASSAULT
CARRYING IT: OUR PHILOSOPHY WAS THAT A BELT ORDER OR JUST
WEAPON ALONE WITH MAGAZINES IN POCKETS WAS ALL VERY WELL IN
PURSUIT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF MOBILITY IN THE ASSAULT, BUT
IF YOU WERE THEN PINNED DOWN/COUNTERATTACKED ON AN EXPOSED
FEACTURE, IT WAS BEST TO SACRIFICE SOME COMFORT IN TERMS OF
WEIGHT FOR THE COMFORT OF KNOWING THAT YOU COULD SURVIVE
A SET LENGTH OF TIME BEFORE YOU HAD TO HAVE OUTSIDE
ASSISTANCE. OUR SET LENGTH WAS 48 HOURS AND I THINK WE
FELT MUCH HAPPIER KNOWING WE HAD THIS CAPABILITY.
ADRENALIN IN THE ASSAULT CUSTOMARILY ENABLES "ROYAL" TO
CARRY FEARSOME WEIGHTS AND STILL FIGHT HARD!
ENEMY RESISTANCE WE MET WAS IN LINE WITH THAT
ENCOUNTERED ELSEWHERE IN THE CAMPAIGN: A HARD INITIAL
RESPONSE WHICH THEN CRUMBLED, EXCEPT FOR MACHINE GUNNERS
AND SNIPERS WHO FOUGHT VIGOROUSLY FOR MUCH LONGER.
VIDEO 17
WE HAD BEEN ORDERED TO BE PREPARED TO PRESS FORWARD
THE ATTACK ONTO MOUNT TUMBLEDOWN AND MOUNT WILLIAM IF THE
ENEMY FLED OUR INITIAL ATTACK, AND TIME ALLOWED. BY DAWN
IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT WE WERE IN NO POSITION TO ATTACK. WE
WERE EXHAUSTED, OUT OF AMMO AND SUFFERING SIGNIFICANT
CASUALTIES. MY 21C, A RADIO OPERATOR, MY TAC HQ MACHINE
GUNNER AND ONE OF MY TROOP COMMANDERS HAD ALL BEEN SHOT,
AND A FURTHER 10 ALSO WOUNDED. ANOTHER TROOP COMMANDER I
DISCOVERED WAS SUFFERING FROM SHELLSHOCK; AT 1330, I HAD
CALLED AN "O" GROUP FOR 1430 HOURS, JUST AFTER THE BATTLE.
AT 1425 THIS TROOP COMMANDER HAD NOT ARRIVED, NOR COULD I
SEE THAT HE WAS ON HIS WAY. THE TROOP WAS POLITELY ASKED
TO FIND HIM. HE WAS FINALLY DISCOVERED SITTING ON A
ROCK, FORTUNATELY ON THE REVERSE SLOPE, WAVING AT THE HELI-
COPTERS BRINGING IN THE SCOTS GUARDS! WHEN HE EVENTUALLY
ARRIVED, HE HAD A COMPLETELY VACANT LOOK ABOUT HIM AND ON
QUESTIONING WAS NOT AWARE OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED OVER THE
PREVIOUS 24 HOURS. A CHANGE OF SCENERY AT CDO HQ FOR 72
HOURS CURED HIM, SUPERFICIALLY AT LEAST. I ALSO WAS
SUFFERING FROM THE "DOG". IT HIT ME FIRST ON TOP OF MOUNT
HARRIET AFTER WE HAD TAKEN THE MAIN POSITION AND WERE ABOUT
TO STRIKE THE ROCKY OUTCROP. I MUST CONFESS THAT I
COORDINATED BOTH THE ARTILLERY AND MORTAR FIRE MISSIONS AND
FIVE MINUTES LATER THE TROOP ATTACK WITH MY TROUSERS ROUND
MY ANKLES! ONE WAY AND ANOTHER NO ONE HAS EVER PACKED
SUCH A PUNCH!
THE FOLLOWING DAY THE SCOTS GUARDS PREPARED FOR THEIR
ATTACK ON MT. TUMBLEDOWN FROM A POSITION IN TRENCHES LAID
OUT IN THE OPEN BEHIND US AT GRID 295715, AND I REGRET TO
SAY SUFFERED SOME SHRAPNEL WOUNDS. THEY WERE NOT
ADEQUATELY DUG IN, HAD NO OVERHEAD COVER AND WERE IN THE
OBVIOUS POSITION FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH THE NEXT ATTACK.
WE HAD IDENTIFIED A MINEFIELD BETWEEN THE EAST END OF
GOAT RIDGE AND THE WEST END OF MT. TUMBLEDOWN AT GR 323720.
A HARRIER STRIKE WAS THEREFORE CALLED AND WE HAD A BIRD's
EYE VIEW OF THE LASER GUIDED: BOMB STRIKING ON TARGET. THAT
NIGHT THE SCOTS GUARDS LAUNCHED THEIR ATTACK THROUGH MY
POSITION, THE EASTERN END OF WHICH WAS THEIR SECURE START
LINE. WE PROVIDED 2 X 50MM MACHINE GUNS IN DIRECT SUPPORT,
GRATEFULLY DONATED BY THE ARGENTINIANS. 42 CDO RM ALSO HAD
TO PROVIDE MORTAR FIRE SUPPORT, AS THE SCOTS GUARDS TUBES
GOT SUNK IN THE PEAT AFTER THE FIRST ROUNDS, HAVING BEEN
INADEQUATELY BEDDED IN. DURING THIS ATTACK I ACTED AS LO
WITHIN BRIGADIER WILSON'S ADVANCED TACTICAL HQ CONSISTING
OF HIM, HIS COS,ARTY COMD, S3 AND 2 RADIO OPERATORS. IT
STRUCK ME THAT THIS WAS INADEQUATE, THE BRIGADIER WAS
WITHOUT THE ESSENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS AND HIS NECESSARY
STAFF, AND THEY, BACK AT THE MAIN HQ, WERE NOT KEPT IN THE
PICTURE. FORTUNATELY, SHORTLY AFTER DAWN ON 14 JAN, AS THE
GHURKHA'S WERE ABOUT TO START THEIR ASSAULT ON MT. WILLIAM,
WE HEARD A REPORT OF WHITE FLAGS OVER STANLEY -- AND SO
CAME THE RUSH FORWARD. WITHIN 30 MINUTES OF CONFIRMATION,
HELICOPTERS WERE EN ROUTE TO TAKE FIRST MY COY, THEN THE
REMAINDER OF THE CDO UKM FWD TO THE NORTHEAST SLOPS OF MT.
UMBLEDOWN (TO GR 340725). THE SITUATION WAS VERY UNCLEAR
FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, AND PRESUMABLY CHAOTIC FOR THE
ARGENTINIANS. WE THEREFORE CONDUCTED THIS OPERATION AS A
HELICOPTER ASSAULT. ON LANDING WE DEPLOYED AND EVENTUALLY
MOVED OFF
THROUGH WHAT WE FEARED MAY BE ANOTHER MINEFIELD. IT WAS A
QUESTION OF "IN HIS MASTER'S STEPS HE TROD". I REGRET TO
SAY THAT I WAS THE MASTER! FOR FAIRLY OBVIOUS REASONS I
WAS MORE CONCERNED ABOUT CASUALTIES AFTER THE CEASEFIRE
THAN DURING THE BATTLE.
VIDEO 18
BY MIDAFTERNOON, WE WERE IN THE WESTERN SECTOR OF PORT
STANLEY, WHERE COMPOSITE COY J, FORMED BY COL NICK VAUX TO
REPLACE M COY IN SOUTH GEORGIA, AND CONSISTING PRIMARILY OF
FORMER MEMBERS OF THE ORIGINAL NP8901 BASED IN THE
FALKLANDS, HAD THE HONOR OF RAISING THE SAME UNION JACK
THAT HAD BEEN LOWERED IN SURRENDER 2 AND 1/2 MONTHS EARLIER
OUTSIDE GOVERNMENT HOUSE. MY COY AND J COY WERE BILLETED
IN THE SEAPLANE HANGAR WHICH HAD BEEN HIT BY A CLUSTER
BOMB. THE OFFICERS AND SNCOs OF OUR TWO COYS USED THE
MECHANICS WORKSHOP AND LOUNGE. WHEN IT RAINED A RED STAIN
IN THE CEILING SPREAD AND DRIPPED ONTO US, SO THE CSM
DETAILED SOMEONE TO GO UP ONTO THE CEILING TO INVESTIGATE.
WE THEN REALIZED THE HANGER MUST HAVE BEEN USED AS A MORGUE
AS THERE MUST HAVE BEEN 10 OR 15 ASSORTED LIMBS PILED UP ON
THE ROOF. OUTSIDE WAS A WHEELBARROW WITH A DEAD SOLDIER IN
IT, ON TOP OF HIM WAS A KIT BAG. WHEN ONE OF MY LTs PICKED
UP THE KIT BAG THE HEAD AND FOUR LIMBS FELL OUT IN 5
DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS. ANYWAY, WE WERE PLEASED A COUPLE OF
DAYS LATER TO MOVE INTO THE SHEEP SLAUGHTER HOUSE; IT WAS
VERY CLEAN EXCEPT FOR THE DEEP FREEZE ROOM WHICH WAS FULL
OF DECAYED LAMB. THERE HAD BEEN NO POWER FOR A COUPLE OF
WEEKS OR MORE. WHILE IN STANLEY, WE ALSO GOT MAIL AND
MAGAZINES OF ONE SORT OR ANOTHER FROM THE GRATEFUL
POPULATION IN THE UK WHO HAD DONATED SOME 25M POUNDS ($37M)
TO THE SOUTH ATLANTIC FUND.
IN STANLEY WE FOUND DOZENS OF LARGE CONTAINERS FULL OF
FOOD, CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT; THERE WAS NO NEED FOR US NOW
TO GO HUNGRY, BUT WATER REMAINED A PROBLEM AND MORE AND
MORE MNES GOT THE "DOG" AS A RESULT.
42 CDO TASK WAS TO ACCEPT THE SURRENDER OF THE
ARGENTINIANS WHO WERE TO ASSEMBLE AT THE AIRFIELD. THIS
WAS A LARGE ENOUGH AREA TO PLACE THE 11,000 ARGENTINIANS,
REPORTED TO BE ON THE ISLANDS, AND IT HAD ONLY ONE ACCESS
POINT, WHERE MY COY WAS BASED FOR 48 HOURS EVERY OTHER 2
DAYS.
MOST OF THE ARGENTIAN TROOPS SHAMBLED IN IN GROUPS OF
10 TO 30. WE DISARMED THEM AND CONFISCATED ALL WARFIGHTING
EQUIPMENT EXCEPT STEEL HELMETS AND GAS MASKS. SOME SUCH AS
THE 4TH MARINE REGIMENT MARCHED SMARTLY IN COLUMNS OF
ROUTE. CO IN FRONT, THEN ADJUTANT, A RIFLE COY, THE COLOURS
AND THEN THE REMAINDER. SOME 100M SHORT OF MY POSITION
THEY HALTED AND BURNT THEIR COLOURS. WHEN THEY REACHED ME,
THE CO HALTED THE REGIMENT, PLACED IT AT MY DISPOSAL AND
PERSONALLY GAVE ME HIS MATCHING PAIR OF PERSONALIZED COLT
.45's. OTHER SENIOR OFFICERS WERE LESS DIGNIFIED;
PARTICULARLY AS THEY TRIED-TO DRIVE IN THEIR MERCEDES
CROSS-COUNTRY VEHICLES, TO THE AIRFIELD. THESE I HIJACKED
- $750,000 IN 3 HOURS, AND MADE THEM WALK THE 2 MILES. IN
THE SURRENDER AGREEMENT, GENERAL MENENDEZ HAD REQUESTED
THAT THE OFFICERS, SOME OF WHOM WERE MOST UNPOPULAR WITH
THEIR MEN AND FEARED LYNCHING, BE ALLOWED TO KEEP THEIR
PISTOLS. THIS WAS APPROVED BY GENERAL MOORE, ALTHOUGH ONLY
A FEW FELT THE NEED FOR THEM! AS YOU CAN IMAGINE WE
COLLECTED A GREAT PILE OF WEAPONS, MAGAZINES, BAYONETS,
ETC.; SADLY WE AS INDIVIDUALS WERE ALLOWED TO BRING NONE
BACK, BUT EACH UNIT RETAINED A NUMBER OF SPECIALIZED
WEAPONS FOR SUBSEQUENT WORLDWIDE CONTINGENCIES. WHAT
HAPPENED TO THE SURPLUS 8000 WEAPON: THEY WERE TRAGICALLY
DUMPED IN THE SEA!
LIFE AT THE AIRFIELD FOR THE ARGENTINIAN POWs WAS
UNCOMFORTABLE, BUT IT WAS NO WORSE THAN FOR US. I WISH TO
RECOUNT ONLY 2 STORIES. TWO OR 3 DAYS AFTER THE SURRENDER,
THE BRIGADE MAJOR (MAB COS) TASKED 42 CDO RM - MY COY AND
ANOTHER--TO GO TO THE AIRFIELD AND CLEAR IT FOR SUBSEQUENT
FIXED WING AIR OPERATIONS. AFTER CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION
OR MORE PERCISELY, ARGUMENT, I CONVINCED HIM THAT WE COULD
"HACK THE PROBLEM" WITH MYSELF, MY CSM WHO IS A MILITARY
POLICEMAN BY MOS, AND A COUPLE OF MARINES FOR PROTECTION.
THE POWs REMAINED WELL DISCIPLINED UNDER THEIR OWN
OFFICERS, MPS AND DOGS AND WERE EAGER TO HELP. WITHIN 3
HOURS OF INSTRUCTING THE COMMANDANT OF THE PRISONERS, 8500
MEN WERE SWEEPING THE AIRFIELD WITH HARD SCRUBBING
BRUSHES, BROOMS, ETC. THE CARROT I GAVE THEM WAS THAT WE
WISHED TO FLY IN TENTS, FOOD AND SO ON FROM ASCENSION
ISLAND. COINCIDENTALLY, BEFORE THEY HAD FINISHED, THE
FIRST BRITISH C130 TO FLY OVER THE ISLAND, APPEARED
OVERHEAD, PROCEEDED TO DROP BY PARACHUTE A LOAD OF STORES
SOME 4 MILES TO THE WEST. THIS BOTH ENHANCED MY
CREDIBILITY WITH THE PRISONERS AND GOADED THEM TO GREATER
EFFORTS!
A DAY OR 2 LATER THE POW COMMANDANT ASKED ME IF I
COULD GET ADDITONAL WATER FOR THEM. THOUGH IT WAS IN VERY
SHORT SUPPLY, I MANAGED TO GET SOME - AND THEY WERE MOST
GRATEFUL. SO GRATEFUL IN FACT THAT I AND MY XO WERE
INVITED TO DINNER THE NIGHT BEFORE THE VAST MAJORITY OF THE
POWs WERE EVACUATED IN SS CANBERRA TO BUENOS AIRES. THE
DINNER WAS A TRULY MEMORABLE EXPERIENCE: NOT FROM THE
POINT OF VIEW OF THE FOOD, WHICH WAS APPALLING-- EVEN
THOUGH IT WAS THE FIRST FRESH FOOD I HAD HAD FOR A MONTH,
NOR EVEN FROM THE SECURITY POINT OF VIEW. JUST AS IN
IRELAND BOTH I AND MY XO HAD AUTOMATIC HAND GUNS LOADED AND
READY FOR SELF-PROTECTION, AND I HAD A SECTION ON VEHICLE
PATROL THROUGHOUT THE EVENING. THE DINNER WAS MEMORABLE
BECAUSE OF THE FASCINATING COMPANY. THE "PRESIDENT" WAS
THE COMMANDING OFFICER OF THE AIRFIELD AND ITS DEFENCE
FORCES; MR. VICE, THE CO OF THE 4TH MARINE REGIMENT, THE
OTHER INVOLUNTARY GUESTS WERE 2 STAFF OFFICERS, ONE TO EACH
OF THE COLONELS. THE CONVERSATION WAS IN ENGLISH AND
SIMILAR IN CONTENT AND SPIRIT TO ANY OTHER I OR ANY OF THE
OTHER IOs HAVE HAD HERE WITH U.S. OFFICERS OR AMONGST
OURSELVES. THEY HAD BEEN EDUCATED AT ENGLISH SCHOOLS IN
ARGENTINA OR BEEN TO UNIVERSITY IN ENGLAND, OR TO SANDHURST
OR CAMBERLEY, THE ARMY's TBS AND STAFF COLLEGE. WE
DEBRIEFED EACH OF THE BATTLES AND I DISCOVERED FOR THE
FIRST TIME THAT THEIR DEFENCES HAD BEEN INITIALLY DIRECTED
TO THE SOUTH WITH THE FRONT LINE ALONG MT. HARRIET, MT.
WILLIAM AND SAPPER HILL. WE ALSO DISCUSSED WORLD AFFAIRS
AND THEY REITERATED THAT THE LAST PEOPLE THEY WISHED TO
FIGHT WERE THE BRITS. THERE ARE, I THINK, MORE WELSH
SPEAKERS IN ARGENTINA THAN IN WALES AND MANY OF THEIR
EMOTIONAL TIES ARE WITH BRITAIN. THE ONLY SUBJECT UPON
WHICH WE AGREED TO DIFFER WAS ON THE STATUS OF THE
FALKLANDS. BUT EVEN THEN WHEN THEY SAID THIS IS ONLY THE
FIRST ROUND, AND THEY'LL BE BACK-I HAD TO AGREE! WE
PARTED AS GREAT FRIENDS-AND I EAGERLY AWAIT DIPLOMATIC
APPROVAL TO TAKE UP THEIR INVITATION TO LECTURE TO THEIR
STAFF COLLEGE ON "THE ATTACK." SINCE THEN I HAVE ONLY MET
ONE ARGENTINIAN, A DELIGHTFUL CIVILIAN WHOM I SAT NEXT TO
AT A FORMAL LUNCH AT THE FARNBOROUGH INTERNATIONAL AIR
SHOW. HE WAS INTERESTED IN SECONDARY RADAR AND IFF-
THANKFULLY NOT EXOCET-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT!!
EIGHT DAY AFTER THE SURRENDER, WHEN SS CANBERRA
RETURNED FROM TAKING ARGENTINIAN POW'S TO BUENOS AIRES, WE
REEMBARKED ON CANBERRA TO A MARVELOUS WELCOME, DELICIOUS
FOOD, OUR FIRST WASH FOR 31 DAYS AND THE LUXURY OF SITTING
ON A CHAIR AND SLEEPING IN A BED. THE 20 DAY RETURN
JOURNEY WAS ONE LONG MARVELLOUS PARTY: ON BOARD SS
CANBERRA WERE 3 CDO BDE RM, SOME 50% OF THE STRENGTH OF THE
ROYAL
MARINES AND WHAT A REUNION WE HAD. THERE WAS A CERTAIN
AMOUNT OF WORK TO BE DONE. POST OPERATION REPORTS AND
RECORDS OF PROCEEDINGS TO BE WRITTEN, STORES TO BE CLEANED
AND MUSTERED, MEDICAL SCREENING FOR TRENCH FOOT AND SO ON.
EXCITEMENT MOUNTED AS WE NEARED ENGLAND. OUR LANDFALL
WAS THE LIZARD IN CORNWALL AT ABOUT 1600 ON 10 JULY.
THEREAFTER WE WERE EXCORTED BY A FLOTILLA OF SMALL BOATS.
THAT EVENING THE CDO FORCES BAND THAT HAD PERFORMED QUITE
ADMIRABLY THROUGHOUT THE WAR AS STRETCHER BEARERS, POW
GUARDS, AIR DEFENCE CREW AND WORKING HANDS ABOARD SS
CANBERRA, PLAYED THE TRADITIONAL SUNSET CEREMONY; A VERY
MOVING OCCASION AT ANY TIME. HERE SO RAPTUROUS WAS THE
APPLAUSE THAT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN HISTORY, THEY DID AN
ENCORE, THE SUN SET TWICE THAT NIGHT! WE ARRIVED IN THE
SOLENT SHORTLY AFTER DAWN TO THE FANTASTIC WELCOME OF
THOUSANDS OF BOATS AND HUNDRREDS OF THOUSANDS OF SPECTATORS.
WE DOCKED IN SOUTHHAMPTON, THE HOME PORT OF SS CANBERRA AND
AFTER A TEARJERKING REUNION HEADED WEST IN A CONVOY OF
BUSES TO PLYMOUTH. AT EVERY VILLAGE, ROAD JUNCTION, BRIDGE
AND ROUNDABOUT ON THE 200 MILE JOURNEY, WERE CROWDS OF
PEOPLE WAVING FLAGS AND GREETING US HOME. IN DORCHESTER
FOR EXAMPLE, LADIES CAME ABOARD EACH BUS BEARING PINTS OF
GOOD ENGLISH BEER FOR ALL.
WE EVENTUALLY GOT HOME ON 12 JULY 1982, 3 MONTHS AND
FOUR DAYS AFTER LEAVING. MY COMMANDING OFFICER, NICK VAUX,
CALLED IT A FAIRY TALE WAR. WE DEPLOYED AND RETURNED ON A
ROUNDTRIP OF 16,000 MILES IN A LUXURY LINER WITH FIRST
CLASS TREATMENT THROUGHOUT. 7,000 OF US LANDED WITH
MINIMAL LOSS IN SAN CARLOS WATER AND FOUGHT A WAR AGAINST A
NUMERICALLY SUPERIOR FORCE OF 10,800, WHICH HAD HAD 6 WEEKS
TO PREPARE HIS DEFENSIVE POSITIONS. WE BEAT THEM DESPITE
ENORMOUS LOGISTIC AND OTHER DIFFICULTIES, AND THE COMMANDO
SUFFERED ONLY 2 KILLED AND 26 WOUNDED. ALL THIS WITHIN THE
SCHOOL SUMMER TERM, DURING WHICH MOST SERVICE CHILDREN IN
ENGLANDS ARE AWAY AT BOARDING SCHOOL FROM MID-APRIL TO
MID-JULY!
VIDEO 19
I DON'T INTEND GOING THROUGH THE NITTY GRITTY OF ALL
THE LESSONS THAT COULD BE LEARNED BECAUSE NOT ONLY WOULD
IT TAKE TOO LONG, BUT ALSO SOME DO NOT SUPPORT THE ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLE OF WAR!
I THINK, HOWEVER, I SHOULD MENTION JUST 5
FUNDAMENTALS:
A. THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT FOR GOOD TRAINING AT
ALL LEVELS.
B. THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF USING THE NIGHT TO BEST
ADVANTAGE.
C. THE DECISIVE NATURE OF SUPPORTING ARMS IN AN
INFANTRY BATTLE.
D. THE NEED FOR GOOD COMMUNICATIONS.
E. AND FINALLY, DON'T FORGET THAT LOGISTICIANS CAN
NEVER WIN A WAR, BUT THEY MOST CERTAINLY CAN LOSE
IT!
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, YOU HAVE BEEN VERY PATIENT IN
LISTENING TO ME FOR A LONG TIME, AND THANK YOU FOR YOUR
ATTENTION. I'LL SHORTLY TRY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU
MAY HAVE, BUT FIRST I'D LIKE TO WELCOME FROM THE BRITISH
EMBASSY, CAPTAIN RON CRAWFORD, A ROYAL MARINE SUPPORT
HELICOPTER PILOT WHO FLEW IN 3 WEEKS, 140 HOURS ON SINGLE
PILOT OPERATIONS WITH GREAT DISTINCTION DURING THE WAR.
BETWEEN US WE'LL DO THE BEST WE CAN TO SATISFY YOUR
PROFESSIONAL CURIOSITY.
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