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Operation Steadfast: The United States Army Reorganizes Itself


CSC 1985


SUBJECT AREA Topical Issues





USMC Command and Staff College April 1985

Quantico, VA


Operation STEADFAST: The United States Army

Reorganizes Itself







The history of the United States Army is more than the stirring


accounts of battles, campaigns, leaders, and soldiers arrayed in a


chronology or divided along any analytical azimuth. There is another


history, the history of the Army in peace, which is very important.


What happens in the peacetime Army helps to determine the performance


of the Army in war. The study of the Army as an organization is a


vital to understanding the Army in war or peace. The Army as an org-


anization is at once a federal bureaucracy and a professional Ameri-


can institution. Consequently, the study of the Army requires an in-


terdisciplinary approach to fully appreciate the complexity of the


organization and the interrelationships of simulataneous endogeneous


and exogeneous forces at any point in history. Therefore, the hist-


ory of the Army is to a surprisingly large degree the history of the


organization as much as it is the history of the relatively brief,


violent, and vitally important encounters which are the raison d'etre


for the organization.


A study of the organization may begin with structure and proced-


ures, political relationships and the environment of the era. The


structure and processes, informal and formal, sociological and


political, help to determine who shall "run" the uniformed,


professional Army. This is very important despite the outward


appearances today of a great, green machine and consumer of vast


resources. This was important in the pre-World War II Army which


appeared to be so many far-flung small outposts peopled by polo-


players and dedicated students of war alike.


People really make the difference in the Army as an organizat-


ion. The organizational structure and procedures which help to


select the uniformed leaders of the service are subject in turn to


the influence of the leaders. We have come full circle. The


idiosyncratic influences in this mass organization are as vital as


the individual pyschological factrors are in combat. Individuals in


key positions leave an imprint on the organization which is difficult


to quantify but impossible to ignore. The success and failure of the


Army on the battlefield and its ability to help deter war is


predicated on the Army as an organization of structure, procedures,


and people in peace. Obviously, politics intervene in the vertical


spectrum of war from individual combat to global strategy. Yet,


success and failure at all levels is influenced by the Army, as it


is, in peace. Operationally, battlefield success in war in the


tactical levels from squads to the theater operations is largely a


function of the Army, rather than politics of any stripe. Also, the


environment of a period of time affects all aspects of the


organization. The history of the United States Army as an


organization parallels the growth of the modern, American, democratic




This paper is a detailed account of the Army Reorganization of


1973, Operation STEADFAST. It examines how, given the structure,


procedures, people and environment, a very important reorganization


was conceived and managed by the professional officers of the


institution which led to real changes in the structure, procedures.


and people of the organization.


Once the decision was made to begin the withdrawal of U.S.


Forces from Vietnam in the Summer of 1969, the Army was a bureaucracy


facing a classic situation of organizational retrenchment. Yet, the


obvious external pressures on the Army as an institution from every


direction in American society and from every other national


institution did not dictate the timing nor the exact shape of the


changes in the organization. It seems that the direction of change


would necessarily be a reduction in size and resources for some years


to follow.


However, the Army Reorganization of 1973 was the first of three


reorganizations, which as a sum became a fundamental reformation of


the organization. The change was profound because, unlike the


changes of the turn-of-the-century Root Reforms or the 1942


Reorganization (or the incremental changes in iterations of the


National Security Act of 1947), this reorganization was internally


directed with the assistance of the civilian leadership in the


Department of the Army. Whereas, all former reorganizations required


the alliance of a very activist Secretary and a reform-minded


contigent of officers to battle the entrenched bureaucratic interests


of another alliance of officers and their allies in Congress. This


reorganization is more limited in scope than the Prussian reforms of


the early 19th Century because it did not involve the society at


large, nor did it explicitly reform the principal organizations


within the Army. It was a reform which preserved and enhanced the


opportunities for the professional officer corps to maintain its


autonomy in the management of the organization within the framework


of civilian control over the military. This was an absolutely


essential prerequisite to marshal the human and material resources


needed to rebuild the Army after the political debacle in Vietenam


and the disintegration of the Army which was away from the fight.


The United States Army in 1985 was painfully rebuilt from the


uniformed mob of the early 1970's by the investment of the hard work


of the officer and non-commissioned officer corps and the infusion


of some fine young people and carefully managed resources. The key


individuals to set the stage for the rebuilding of a national


institution were Army Generals William E. DePuy, Bruce C. Palmer Jr.,


and Creighton W. Abrams Jr. This is an examination of the first step


in the reformation, Operation STEADFAST.

























Petronius Arbiter's quote was a beloved epigram for many Army


officers as the Army reorganized itself during the throes of the


traumatic withdrawal from Southeast Asia. The epigram was facile


enough to vent the frustrations of staff offficers pushing papers in


the Pentagon. Yet, as the epigram gave no indication of the real


training and expertise of someone called Petronius Arbiter, the Army


Reorganization of 1972-73 could appear to be much less than it really


was. Actually, Petronius Arbiter was the chronicler of the


pornographic carryings on of the court of the Emperorer Nero. (1) In


fact the Army Reorganization of 1972-73 was more than a shuffling of


the housekeeping duties of the stateside Army to meet the pressures


of the Executive Branch and the Congress to drastically reduce after


a war. The Army's Reorganization was an extraordinary, internally-


directed move to develop improved control of the management of the


Army and, consequently, increase the autonomy of the Army under the


direction of the professional, uniformed officers. The turbulent


decade since the last major reorganization of the Army in 1962 (based


on the Hoelscher Committee's Project 80 Study) had not sown the seeds


for the need to reorganize as much as it had created the opportunity


for major changes.


The "reforms" and reorganization brought about during the


McNamara era threatened the autonomy of the Army more than any other


Service. When the analysts for the Secretary of Defense sought to


develop a programmatic approach to manage the department under the


direction of a chief executive officer, the Army was ill-prepared to


report its assets in personnel, equipment and finances. It was


equally at a loss to explain how all the pieces of the puzzle of


commands, combat units and headquarters' staffs fit together to man,


equip, train and employ an "Army". Since the 19th Century the Army


had been a series of semi-autonomous bureaus, which were loosely


federated as the "staff", and the units spread out in the field,


which were the "line". The organizational history of the Army is the


story of conflict between the line and the staff. The opportunities


for conflict are neither accidental nor neglected anachronisms. As a


member of the Executive Branch, the War Department (the Department of


the Army), the United States Army (the regulars), the Army of the


United States (the National Guard and the conscripts), and the United


States Army Reserve (the Reserves - also part of the Army of the


United States) have their perogatives in the management of resources


and their internal autonomy written into the legislative concrete of


the United States Code. The internal bureaucratic struggles of the


organization are fanned in the fires of the budgetary process.


In the decade of the Sixties the Office of the Secretary of


Defense (OSD) was about to abrogate the autonomy, divided as it


was, of the Army. The war in Vietnam diverted the attention of OSD


and the Army to the pressing details of present-tense crisis after


crisis. The Army Staff in Washington and the line organizations in


the Continental United States (CONUS) did an excellent job in


preparing and prosecuting a distant war with minimal support from


mobilization. The fighting Army which was built after the post-


Korean doldrums from the latter 1950's through the 1968 may have been


the finest, professsonal Army fielded by the United States. The Army


as a bureaucracy, however, was in different shape. Since OSD had


taken the steps to bring the Services in line with the programmatic


approach of major U.S. corporations, the Army existed in the note-


books of organizations and commands on the shelf behind Secretary


Mcnamara's desk. (2) The sum of the notebooks, theoritically, was


the Army "program". Every change within the Army which changed


resource allocations had to be approved through the OSD. The Army,


staff and line, was becoming the handmaiden to the notebooks. While


the daily attention of the Army and OSD were focused on Vietnam


several steps were taken which would allow the Army to move towards a


thoughtful reorganization. The start of the withdrawal from Vietnam


in the Summer of 1969 created the pressures which plunged the Army


headlong into the pursuit of reorganization. The events which


prepared the way for reorganization included the following.




The Haines Board - 1966. The Report to the Army Board to Review


Officers Schools in February 1966 concluded the Continental Army


Command had too much to do. The report recommended further study to


reduce the span of control for the Continental Army Command. (3)


Interestingly enough the report was chaired by the officer who would


later oppose such a reorganization as the CONARC Commander, General


Ralph E. Haines.


The Brown Board - 1967. The Brown Board was an in-depth


examination of the Army's equipment management from Company-level to


Headquarters, Department of the Army. The Board recommended changes


in the Army's logistical procedures and organization. (4)


The Blue Ribbon Defense Panel - 1970. The Report to the President


and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense was an


across the board review of the Department. Mr. Gilbert H. Fitzhugh,


Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer of the Metropolitan


Life Insurance Company, headed a bi-partisan panel which produced 133


recommendations for Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird on July 1,


The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (VCSA or the "Vice") Gen. Bruce


Palmer Jr. attended a briefing with Secretary Laird, Mr. Fitzhugh and


members of the Blue Ribbon Panel on 19 July. When Gen. Palmer


briefed the Army's General Staff Council the following day he was


critical of the Panel's recommendations. He did not agree with the


Panel's recommendations for "a single program budget structure". (5)


Secretary Laird had taken the responsibility for the Army programs


and budget from the notebooks behind the desk and given it back to


the Army. However, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff (AVCSA or the


"A-Vice") Lieutenant General (Lt.Gen.) William E.DePuy was aware of


the need to review the Army's organization and management. The


coming reduction in the size of the Army in the post-Vietnam era


would put new pressures on the Army. If the Army failed to influence


the process of cutting back, then it might have been reduced and


controlled with a capriciousness and completeness far exceeding


McNamara's notebooks. Consequently, the appointment of the Blue


Ribbon Panel in 1969 was the impetus for the Chief of Staff, Gen.


William E. Westmoreland, the Vice Chief, Gen.Palmer, and the


Asssistant Vice Chief, Lt.Gen. DePuy to appoint an ad hoc study group


from the Force Planning Analysis Directorate of the Army Staff to


look at the organization of the Department of the Army.(6) Lieutenant


Colonel (Lt.Col.or LTC) Winthrop Whipple, Jr., an operations analyst


and LTC John V. Foley, a cost accountant, spent the summer of 1969


studying the Army organization. They reported to Lt.Gen. DePuy and


formally briefed Gen. Westmoreland at the end of September. The


Whipple-Foley "Pillot Study on DA (Department of the Army)


Organization" was a tightly controlled review of organizational


problems and the especific personalities involved. Dissemination of


any information outside of the Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of


Staff (OAVCSA) was expressly forbidden. The report was an outline of


the problems of organization, management, and personalities. The


report found Continental Army Command (CONARC) had too many roles and


missions. The Combat Developments Combat (CDC) was a command without


resources. The Army Material Command (AMC) did not have life-cycle


control for the equipment management. Personnel management was


fragmented among three agencies: OPO (Office of Personnel


Operations), TAGO (The Adjutant General's Office), and DCSPER (Deputy


Chief of Staff for Personnel). (8)


Based on this report, Gen. Westmoreland appointed Major General


David S. Parker as the chairman of a Special Review Panel (SRP) on


Department of the Army organization on 30 September 1969. "The


Parker Panel" had a charter to report recommendations to the problems


identified in the Whipple-Foley Pilot Study by July 1970. The panel


would not look at tactical organizations. The panel would closely


examine the U.S. Continental Army Command, the Combat Developments


Command, the Army Material Command, and the Headquarters Department


of the Army Staff (the Army Staff or ArStaff). (9)




The Parker Panel. Maj.Gen. David S. Parker selcted LTC Richard W.


Thompson as the Executive Officer for the panel. LTC Thompson came


from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (DCSOPS)


at the end of 1969. (10) The "Initial Terms of Reference" were ap-


proved by Gen. Westmoreland to give guidance for the panel. The pan-


el was to investigate the roles of the U.S.Continental Army, the sub-


ordinate numbered armies of the continental United States (CONUSA),


the Military District of Washington, the Combat Developments Command,


the Class II Activities reporting directly to the Department of the


Army Staff, and the Headquarters, Department of the Army Staff. (11)


The panel was to examine the agencies to look at the organization and


management of the resources to run the Army. Specifically, the panel


would look at the allocation of functions within the Army Staff and


the major CONUS commands. It would look at proposals for alternative


organization and management practices which would help the Army


operate with reduced resources. The panel would recommend procedures


to carry out the changes.


Maj.Gen. Parker chose 13 officers from a pool of 80 to serve on


the panel by January 1970. One civilian, a budget expert from the


Deputy Chief of Staff of Logistics (DCSLOG), was also a member. The


panel interviewed widely throughout the headquarters in Washington


and the installations across the United States. It interviewed some


retired officers. Additionally, the panel interviewed representat-


ives of major civilian industries (for example IBM and Xerox).


The questions to the military commanders and to the captains of


industry were to the point. Executives were asked about the level of


decision-making, systems management (horizontal) vs. functional


management (vertical), and the growth and use of ad hoc committees.


Staff issues of organization, function and growth were addressed.


The Army leadership wanted to know if the shape of management


information systems was a function of the techniques of management,


the nature of the business, or the degree of supervision by a board


of governors. It was especially important to see how organizations


dealt with the related functions of research and development,


material procurement, storage, sale, rental, maintenance, and


elimination of obsolete equipment. (12)


The panel developed 41 "Revised Problem Statements" by 28 April


1970. Seven of the problems were with the Army Staff, one was with


CONARC, and the other thirty-three were with the functional


responsibilities shared by the Army Staff and the three major


commands in the United States; CONARC, Combat Developments Command


(CDC), and the Army Material Command (AMC). (13) Many of the


complaints dealt with the procedures used on the staff to complete


the paperwork for any "staff action". The overlapping


responsibilities among the staff lead to endless "turf fights".


The Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff (OAVCSA) was


a source of controversy. The panel reviewed the functions of the


OAVCSA in detail. The OAVCSA had been intended as a stop-gap measure


which would work its way out of a job in two years as it addressed


the issues driven by OSD. (14) After General Johnson retired in


1968, the new Chief of Staff, Ben. William E. Westmoreland, brought


in his team with Gen. Bruce C. Palmer,Jr. as the Vice Chief of


Staff. The new Assistant Vice-Chief was William E. DePuy, Lt Gen.


DePuy redefined the duties of the A-Vice to solve some of the more


pressing problems of the Army Headquarters. The A-Vice got involved


in the need to reach budgetary compromises somewhere below the


absolute pinnacle of the organization. More of the efforts of the A-


Vice and the importance of the office as a means to intervene in the


Army Headquarters will be discussed later. The "off-line" office of


the OAVCSA allowed the Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Army


to have a very high-popwered office for fire-fighting the issues of


crucial importance to the organization without becoming bogged down


in the details of day-to-day responsibilities The Parker Panel


reported, "In spite of the announced trend toward decentralization


within the DOD, the requirement for rapid and detailed response is


likely to require a continuing capability such as is provided by the


OAVCSA." (15)


The Parker Panel determined that the responsibility for


management doctrine for all the non-tactical management of


information systems was fragmented among the Army Staff. The Army


needed to closely examine how its many systems were operating, how


they were regulated and interacted, and how they contributed to the


management of the Army. The Army Authorization Documents System


(TAADS) is the paperwork which shapes, supports, directs, and


authorizes the Army at one level of authority below public law. An


Army does not move on its stomach, it moves on its Regulations


and Tables. TAADS had become too slow to keep up with the Army in


transition. The Army had not standardized its Automatic Data


Processing Systems (ADPS) communications. (16)


There were many cooks and no chef for material development. The


Office, Chief of Research and Development (OCRD) did not have the


sole authority in the research and developoment field. The


criticisms in the area of material development were not restricted to


OCRD. The problems were an indictment of the entire system by the


users of any piece of equipment in the Army, the Army Staff, the DOD,


and the Congress. The AMC, CDC, OCRD, ODCSOPS, and the OAVCSA were


involved in the research, development and acquisition of material for


the Army. General Chesarek, the former A-Vice and the Commanding


General of AMC at the time, wanted to put another Deputy Chief of


Staff on the Army Staff. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Material


Systems (DCSMS) would consolidate many of the functions spread across


the staff and among the major commands. (17) This would help to


solve the problem of running all requirements for materiel through


the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force development (ACSFOR).


Furthermore, the Army lacked the technically competent officers to


manage a weapon or piece of equipment from its conception through


development until it is phased out of the inventory. The career


development of officers needed for the material life-cycle management


was not receiving enough attention.


The Combat Developments Command (CDC) was criticized because it


was a major command without any clout. CDC should have been the


organization for the Army to develop the doctrine to guide the


employment of its many weapons systems and units across the spectrum


of combat. There were overlapping responsibilities between CONARC


and CDC for doctrinal publications. There was inadequuate


interaction between the doctrine developer and the schools. Yet, the


CDC was lacking in manpower and financial resurces. Consequently,


the officer in CONARC who was supposed to monitor the training in one


of the Army schools had no corespondent at CDC who could write


doctrine. The officer at CONARC would have to fill both functions.


The organization had problems remaining a conceptual research-


oriented organizationl. Finally, there was overlapping assignment of


logistics doctrine responsibilitiies. (18)


The Parker Panel noted problem areas in Army force development.


Since CDC did not contribute to the development of doctrine and


material requirements, it could not effectively contribute to the


Planning and Programming aspects of the budget cycle. CONARC did not


incorporate new doctrine into its training and educational programs.


Logistics doctrine was split among DCSLOG, AMC, and the CONARC


schools . There was criticism of the Combat Developments Experiment


Center (CDEC) at Fort Ord and the Mobile Army Sensor System, Test and


Evaluation Center (MASSTER) at Fort Hood. The Army Staff needed to


develop force mobilization plans which integrated logistics. The


Parker Panel also noted the problems for ACSFOR, and the ACSFOR


directorates for Aviation, Air Defense, and Nuclear, Biological and


Chemical Operations. (19)


The personnel side of the house illustrated the problems of


fractured responsibilities among the Deputy Chief of Staff for


Personnel (DCSPER). The Adjutant Generl's Office (TAGO), and the


Office of Personnel Operations (OPO). Problems existed in personnel


actions (promotions, efficiency reports), procurement of personnel,


civil schooling, personnel records, separations, and Reserve forces


records administration. (20)


The Army Staff could not agree on the role of the Comptroller.


The functions of the Comptroller had not changed since its inception


in 1948, but the management environment had changed significantly.


The Comptroller is the director of Army budgeting, but the A-Vice and


the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR) had a


great deal to do with the programming end of programming and


budgeting. The Comptroller's role in cost analysis needed


definition. The flow of automated data reports should be included in


the duties of the Comptroller, yet much of the control of the


management of information systems was being controlled by the OAVCSA.


Finally, the Comptroller had dual responsibilities to the Chief of


Staff and to an Assistant Secretary of the Army. The Army had to


decide how to allocate increasingly scarce resources. (21)


The Continental Army Command (CONARC) suffered from its wide


span of control. It had four major functions of individual education


and training, force development, force employment, support and


service. The support and service mission, alone, entailed


the management of 42 Army posts in the U.S. Furthermore, there was


the layering of the Continental Army (CONUSA or subordinate numbered


armies) between CONARC and the installations. The Military District


of Washington as a separate headquarters under CONARC jurisdiction


was another issue. (22)


Maj.Gen. Parker briefed the A-Vice, Gen. DePuy, on 15 May. Gen.


DePuy noted that programming was not one of the workload indicators


which generated the staff workload statistics. The result did not


reflect the true workload for the army Staff. (23) He also noted


that programming guidance came from the Secretary of the Army. Since


the OAVCSA was doing the troubleshootiong for the Secretary, any


agency given more responsibility for programming would have to work


with the OAVCSA. DePuy asked the Panel to look at the integrator-


coordinator role of the OAVCSA.


Lt.Gen. DePuy "insisted that technology drives doctrine." (24)


The responsibilitly for doctrine should be assigned to a new Deputy


for Material Systems (DCSMS). He believed that CONARC let the


schools develop doctrine independently. Consequently, he wanted to


put all of the schools, including the Army War College, under the


Combat Developments Command. The schools should be taken away from


CONARC because "CONARC has too great a workload, is too big, too


broke, and ultra-conservative ... too much routine and too much to


do." (25) "If CONARC is to look at relative costs and installation


management, they can't do anything else. They can't be the


instrument for getting new ideas into young leaders." (26) DePuy


recognized the problem of dividing training and education, yet he


still wanted to give CDC control of the curriculum in the Army




The briefing for the Vice, Gen. Palmer, was 21 May. Ben. Palmer


did not want to move the Weapons Systems Analysis (WSA) out of the


OAVCSA because the WSA gave the Office of the Chief of Staff an


"independent review capability." (27) Furthermore, he did not want a


DCSMS with a WSA to be "in bed" with the Army Material Command (AMC).


He preferred to transfer WSA functions to ACSFOR instead of DCSMS.


Gen. Palmer was against moving the installation functions from


the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to the Chief of Engineers.


Also, he did not want to reduce the Assistant Chief of Staff for


Communications-Electronics from a General Staff to a Special Staff


Agency. (28)


Gen. Palmer noted that Gen. Westmoreland looked at CONARC "as


the largest and perhaps most important command in the Army" which


will be important in the next ten years "in maintaining a modern Army


and in developing new concepts." (29) Furthermore, the Army War


College should remain under the Army Headquarters. The Military


District of Washington should be transferred from CONARC to the Army


Headquarters. Gen. Palmer approved releasing the proposals to the


Army Staff, but he did not want the Commanding Generals of CONARC or


CDC to be informed until "we get guidance from Gen. Westmoreland."


(30) Maj.Gen. Parker gave an "interim" report to Generals DePuy,


Palmer and Westmoreland on 2 June 1970. Gen. Westmoreland directed


Maj. Gen. Parker to "solicit comments from the Major Commands,


arrange for a special session with the Army Staff before final


decisions, and to inform the Secretary of the Army of the panel


proposals as soon as possible." (31) Gen. Westmoreland was


interested in the concept of a DCSMS and requested further


development of the concept. He wanted to generally retain CONARC "in


its present configuration", although he was willing to put the


Command and General Staff College and the Army War College under the


Combat Developments Command. He noted that the CDC could be made


responsible for doctrine and curricula and place all officer schools


under CDC. In most cases Gen. Westmoreland did not want to change


things. For example, he did not want to split CONARC into two


separate commands. When Maj.Gen. Parker met with Gen. Westmoreland


again on 6 June, the Chief directed the Special Review Panel submit


its complete report with recommendations and alternatives on 31 July.


The Chief would appoint a panel of Senior officers under Gen. Palmer


to consider two issues. Gen. Palmer would look at the CONARC and CDC


reorganization proposals to create a Combat Doctrine and Schools


Command and to create a Deputy Chief of Staff for Material Systems.


The rest of the panel report would be sent to the Army Staff for


normal staff procedures of review. (32)


Maj.Gen. Parker briefed the General Staff Council on 16 June


1970. The key officers of the Army Staff gave the report mixed


reviews and many different suggestions. Secretary of the Army


Stanley Resor, UnderSecretary Thaddeus R. Beal and the Assistant


Secretaries were briefed on 18, 20, and 24 June. Mr. Resor was not


anxious to transfer the Weapons Systems Analysis from the OAVCSA to


the new DCSMS. He wanted to retain an independent office to review


and analyse the big budget programs of modernizing the Army. Mr.


Resor did not endorse or reject the Special Review Panel report.


Since the Chief gave guidance to staff the report through normal


channels, the required written comments began to surface. The first


comments came from Colonel John B. Wadsworth, Jr. the Deputy


Secretary to the General Staff for Staff Action Control. He


supported some of the proposals for a new Deputy Chief of Staff for


Materiel Systems, for trnasferring personnel management to a Person-


nel Command, and for the management of information systems by the


Comptroller. He opposed redesignating the A-Vice as the Director of


the Army staff and placing him directly between the principals of the


Army Staff and the Chief.


Gen. Palmer held a special Senior Officer's meeting on 24 July.


The meeting's agenda was limited to the issues of creating a Combat


Development and Schools Command and a Deputy Chief of Staff for


Materiel Systems. The Commanding General of CONARC, Gen. Woolnough,


was the most adamant in his opposition to the recommendations of the


panel. He argued that CONARC was responsible for individual and unit


training. Furthermore, all of the units, training centers, and


schools support CONARC's training mission. Additionally, Gen.


Woolnough urged the Combat Developments Command be returned to CONARC


to compliment the training mission. (33) He believed the


organizational strength was found in keeping together the Command


which accounted for 45% of the Army's military personnel. Dividing


functions would only serve to push disagreements up to the Army Staff


when they could be resolved at CONARC Headquarters.


The Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR), Lt.


Gen. Weyand, strongly opposed the proposal for a DCSMS. He contended


the problem was not the need for a single manager of all the


resources. He questioned the entire Special Review Panel report on


omitting the "why". A DCSMS would not solve the problems raised in


the report. The problem was the requirements. Thus, the real problem


was to determine what the real needs of the Army were. (34)


In July the Parker Panel submitted its recommendations to Gen.


Westmoreland. The Panel proposed the following major changes for the


Army Staff: Consolidation of the responsibilities for materiel


development and acquisition into a Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel


Systems (DCSMS), by involving the merger of CRD with DCSLOG PEMA


(Procurement, Equipment and Missilies, Army) operations;


consolidation of personnel functions in OPO by transferring it to


personnel functions from the Adjutant General's Office and DCSPER


into a new organization called the Army Personnel Center (APC);


eliminating or transferring to AMC certain operating functions of


DCSLOG; eliminating the Office of the Chief of Support Services and


transferring its functions to DCSLOG and the Army Personnel Center


(35) The office-of the A-Vice would keep its hand in the budget and


management of information systems. The Weapons Systems Analysis


office in the OAVCSA would move to the new DCSMS. In the field the

Military District of Washington (MDW) wouold be moved from CONARC to


Headquarters, Department of the Army. The Combat Developments


Schools Command (CDSC) would be created by combining the Combat


Developments Command, Project MASSTER at Fort Hood and the Combat


Developments Experiment Center (CDEC).


Gen. Westmoreland met with the Parker Panel on 24 September.


Gen. Westmoreland was not ready to move ahead to create a DCSMS since


"a clear case had not been presented, and the staff is split wide


open." (36) He ordered further study of the issues around developing


a single Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Systems. At a briefing


on 10 October Maj.Gen. Parker attempted to answer some of the


questions about DCSMS. He outlined the differences on the issue of


the DCSMS as being a split between those who felt the change was


inadequate to the problem and those who felt the change would put


too much power in the hands of a single principal on the Army Staff.


He also indicated he wanted to move some officer billets from WSA to


ACSFOR to improve the analytical capability of the ACSFOR. Gen.


Westmoreland sent Maj.Gen. Parker back for further research. He


wanted a study of the "Two Deputy Concept". One deputy would be the


Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs. The other Deputy would be the


Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans.


By 30 November Gen. Palmer had made 34 management improvements.


He agreed to take no further action until Gen. Haines' staff at


CONARC had completed their study on management. Gen. Palmer told


Lt.Gen. DePuy in a personal note on 20 December 1970 that he wanted


to have a meeting with the Chief in January. He noted that he did


not want to go for any great changes because he felt "this is a poor


time for any drastic" reorganizations and he wanted to "continue to


improve our organization and modus operandi through evolutionary


changes." (37) He outlined a number of interim steps he wanted to


have taken by the Army Staff, CONARC, and CDC.


On 21 January Maj.Gen. Parker returned to brief the Chief. The


Vice, Gen. Palmer, argued against the Two Deputy concept. Gen. West-


moreland told Maj.Gen. Parker to study the problem further. Maj.Gen.


Parker returned on 1 February to brief again. Both Gen. Palmer and


Maj. Gen. Parker argued against the Two Deputy concept. Gen.


Palmer's briefings on the DCSMS on 22 October, 7 December, and 11


December proved to be inconclusive. In the meantime the principal


commanders of CONARC, AMC, and CDC changed. Maj.Gen. Parker prepared


a memorandum for Gen. Palmer which gave the views of the new


Commanding Generals and two Generals from the Army Staff. The


consensus of the new views was to not change.(38) When the


memorandum was routed through the A-Vice, Lt.Gen. DePuy, he added the


following comment for Gen. Palmer, "I have taken the liberty of


making some margin notes -pointing out some dubious statements and


conclusions. The staff is divided - confused - and bickering. We


need a decision." (39)


Gen. Westmoreland reviewed the Parked Panel report for the last


time on 27 and 29 January 1971. No major changes were approved


except for moving the Military District of Washington (MDW) from


CONARC and making it a MACOM (Major Command) of the Army on 1 July


1971. Gen. Westmoreland supported his new set of senior staff


officers and commanders. The Parker Panel had outlined the problems


and some solutions. Yet, the procedure had failed to bring about


change. Why? The panel had had "carte blanche" in the selection of


the personnel for the panel, in the organization and in the


procedures to be followed. Unlike the Hoelscher Committee from


McNamara's days, there were no directives from the Secretary's


Office. The problems were not beyond the wit of man to perceive.


The major problems were: "(1) Control over the overall materiel


acquisition cycle -particularly the interrelationship (interfaces)


between development and production and the fragmented responsibility


for the whole materiel cucle at the Army Staff level involving


ACSFOR, OCRD, and DCSLOG. (2) The relationships between CONARC and


CDC, including the unmanageable span of control at CONARC and the


practical subordination of CDC to ACSFOR. CDC had responsibility


without the effective authority especially in the area of developing


doctrine. (3) The Personnel Management area, especially the


continued fragmentation of its functions among TAGO, OPO, and DCSPER.


(40) Furthermore, there was no problem in getting the data and


information desired, although the quality of much of the statistics


was indicative of the nature and scope of the problems.


In June 1970 Maj.Gen. Parker advised the Chief of Staff that one


way of dealing with the recommendations would be to "bite the bullet"


and accept the recommendations of the Special Review Panel without


staffing the recommendations of the panel through the very staffs who


have vested interests in maintaining the status quo. This was the


method used by the McNarney Committee in 1942 and by Secretary


of Defense Robert McNamara in 1962. (41) However, General


Westmoreland chose to staff the Panel Report. Also, there was a six


month delay in making decisions because of the Blue Ribbon Defense


Panel. The Army had to see what the OSD would do. Finally, the


changes in senior personnel shifted the attitudes of the key


decision-makers of the Army against major changes in CONARC, CDC, and


the issue of a Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel Systems. The Panel


had recommended comprehensive changes in almost everyone's turf in


the Commands and on the Army Staff. Gen. Westmoreland chose to stand




Continental Army Command 72 : Mission and Structure, November


1971. The U.S. Continental Army Command anticipated the coming


reductions in the budget. On 3 October 1970 a special Management


Improvement Panel was established to "develop new innovative concepts


for management improvements within the U.S. Continental Army Command


and to list those concepts in order of feasibility, suitability, and


desirability; and to develop the methodology for converting such


concepts to command action. This special panel was to conduct its


review based on the following assumptions: That the pressure to


reduce the size of the Army would continue as a result of the rollup


in Vietnam and reductions in other overseas areas; that austere


funding of the U.S. Continental Army Command's misson and support


program would continue through FY 1972 and into future fiscal years."


(42) CONARC's panel met from 17 November 1970 through the end of


February 1971. The panel concluded there were five areas which


demanded much in resources: organizational structure, mission


prioristies, school training, intraservice support, and contractual


requirements. The panel concluded in their report in March 1971 that


"streamlining" the command structure "provided the most far-reaching


method of acheiving economies while modernizing and simplifying


operations." (43)


Interestingly, the report on the command structure was the only


report of five which was not forwarded to the Department of the Army.


General Haines did not believe the reorganization recommended was


appropriate at the time. He informed the Vice Chief of Staff about


the report and his reasons for asking the panel to revise it.


General Haines did not want to eliminate the subordinate Army


headquarters from CONARC because he wanted them "to provide effective


co-ordination in the event of domestic emergencies or disasters; to


provide co-ordination of the support of Reserve Component training;


to insure the co-ordinated planning and execution for rapid


mobilization; and to preserve the Army visibility in major


metropolitan areas. (44)


While the CONARC panel was revising Report No. 1 on the command


structure, the Department of the Army eliminated one of the major


subordinate Army commands. The Fifth Army at Fort Sheridan, Illinois


was eliminated and the boundaries were redrawn to have four Armies


(CONUSA) in the continental U.S. The revised report shifted


responsibilities and the size of staffs among the commands in CONARC.


Gen. Haines did not approve the report. However, the report


demonstrated the difficulty of resolving the problems with CONARC's


organizational structure. Much work had produced an effort which did


adequately provide an answer to the problem of scarce resources and


many headquarters.


In the meantime the Special Review Panel (SRP - Parker Panel)


had concluded its work with two recommendations of particular


interest to CONARC. A Recommendation No. 31 dealt with the Reserve


Component structure and Recommendation No. 32 considered the


allocation by function of administrative, logistical, and other


management functions to different headquarters in CONARC. The CONARC


Management Panel did not address these recommendations. Furthermore,


Gen. Palmer, the Vice, let Gen. Haines know that "there was a


growing feeling in the Pentagon that one level of headquarters


between the Department of the Army and the installations in the


continental United States should be eliminated." (45) Gen. Haines


had asked Gen. Palmer not to act on the recommendations of the


Parker Panel in January 1971 until CONARC completed its own study.


When Gen. Haines rejected his staff's work in September he decided to


address the Parker Panel criticisms directly. He directed his Deputy


Chief of Staff, Comptroller, to prepare a major policy statement for


the Vice Chief of Staff. A report was prepared in October 1971, but


Gen. Haines did not believe the letter and short report were adequate


to make CONARC's case. Gen. Haines discussed his desires for the


CONARC 72 study with his Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Staff,


Comptroller. The CONARC 72 -- Mission and Organization Study was


completed in mid-November 1971 and forwarded to the Department of the


Army on 25 November 1971. (46) Five alternative solutions for


restructuring the command organization in CONARC were presented. The


study concluded the present command structure should be retained. It


indicated "that the existing command structure of the U.S.


Continental Army Command had a single headquarters responsible for a


major portion of the Army's mission relative to combat-ready forces,


and base operations in the continental United States. The day-to-day


performance of these missions was decentralized, insofar as possible


to four geographical commands, relieving Headquarters, U.S.


Continental Command, of many co-ordinating and operating functions


and ensuring a workable span of command and control. At the same


time, the overall structure permitted maximum flexibility, efficient


use of available resources, close co-ordination of Active Army and


Reserve Component activities and a rapid expansion of the training


base in the event of mobilization. The structure above installation


level - Headquarters, CONARC, and the four area (Army) headquarters


in the continental United States -- included fewer headquarters than


at any time in the history of the U.S. Army since World War I." (47)


The report left three major functional missions -- forces for


two unified commands, training, and base operations in the hands of


one headquarters, CONARC. The efforts of the CONARC Commander, Gen.


Haines, helped delay the Vice Chief of Staff, Gen. Palmer, from


taking any action to change the command structure of CONARC. Yet,


two years had passed since the formation of the Parker Panel and the


problems of the management of the resources sent to the vast array of


organizations under the umbrella of CONARC Headquarters remained.


CONARC was a budget-managed command. Gen. DePuy observed that the


management was in the hands of civilians in the comptroller shops at


every level. (48) CONARC simply divided the money as they saw fit


and then let the numbered Armies (CONUSA) divide the money to the


subordinate elements. The money was not dedicated to programs down


to the using program element. As the Army was reducing, cuts would


be made to the combat force structure and to the training base.


CONARC would pass the cuts down with a cookie-cutter rather than


drawing down within a program at all levels in the organization.


Lt. Gen. DePuy noted," They would pass out the money and wait


for the screams. That was the manageemnt system, and some of those


screams were intolerable at the Department of the Army level, because


some dumb things were being done." (49) The pressure to manage the


shrinking budget was insufficient to force change on its own. A


change in the Headquarters, Department of the Army, helped to


facilitate the major reorganization which could not be accomplished


by studies alone. The Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff of


the Army (OAVCSA) was a key to enable the future Army reorganization.


The Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff (OAVCSA). Gen.


Harold K. Johnson, the Chief of Staff, told the General Staff he was


creating a new Office of Assistant Vice Chief of Staff within the


office of the Vice Chief of Staff on 11 February 1967. The Chief was


responding to the pressures of the McNamara reforms in the Department


of Defense. The Army had to get control of the two issues which were


coming to head. First, the Army had to learn to handle the


programmatic approach to budgeting under the Planning, Programming,


and Budgeting System (PPBS). The Army had to be able to explain how


it spend its resources to the accountants in the Office of the


Secretary of Defense (OSD). Second, the Army had to manage the


automatic data processing systems (ADP) coming on line at the time.


The Army was only beginning to develop the systems to account for all


the soldiers and all of the pieces of equipment and the distribution


of funds around the world. As the computers came on line they would


simply produce reams of inaccurate information at high speeds until


the management techniques and controls were developed to close all


the loops in reporting to produce accurate and timely reports.


Consequently, the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff, the A-Vice, would be


the principal assistant to the Vice Chief of Staff for developing


guidance and integrating the efforts of the Army staff to improve the


management of Army resources of personnel, materiel, forces,


facilities, studies, and funds. In addition to PPBS and management


of information systems, the A-Vice would look at weapons systems


analyses. The A-Vice was never intended to be a permanent change in


the Army Staff. The A-Vice received his power from the Vice and the


Chief. He did not have any formal organizational power as an


intermediate or super-staff above the Army Staff.


The A-Vice's Office had four staff agencies. The three


directorates were the Force Planning Analysis (later Planning and


Program Analysis), Weapons Systems Analysis (later Materiel


Programs), and the Management Information Systems. Additionally,


there was an office of the Coordinator of Army Studies.


The OAVCSA was not without controversy. The Chief, Gen. Harold


K. Johnson, had an obvious intent for an office as a "stop-gap"


measure to produce "an improved resource planning and management


system".(50) Yet, the OAVCSA was perceived by some on the Army Staff


as an interloper on their perogatioves. The principal officers of


the staff and their subordinates did not want the A-Vice to intervene


in decisions which they believed were wholly within their area of


responsibility. Common criticisms included:


1. The power and position of the OAVCSA tended to disrupt


and distorted the normal operations of the Army Staff.


2. The size of the OAVCSA generated a high demand for


quality personnel at the expense of the remainder of the




3. The size of the OAVCSA resulted in its getting into


primary staff activity-- tended to develop parallel actions


which have been assigned to staff agencies and then to be a


proponent of these uncoordinated "solutions."


4. The existence of the OAVCSA tended to insulate the


staff from interaction with the Secretariat.


5. The development of a strong inter-disciplinary


capability in the OAVCSA reinforced the tendency to handle


quick-response actions in-house rather than requiring and


assisting the appropriate staff agencies to become more




6. The size of the OAVCSA resulted in an increased


requirement for detailed information to support the


monitoring and review role. A duplication of data


available from the staff resulted.


7. The principal of management by exception was violated


by the OAVCSA monitoring role.


8. The existence of the OAVCSA had an adverse impact on


staff morale since the OAVCSA projected a "palace guard"




9. The OAVCSA constituted one more agency in the coord-


ination exercise. Virtually, every action had to touch


base with the OAVCSA due to its broad, vague charter.


10. The OAVCSA was oriented to the Office of the Secretary


of Defense and does not understand or support the Army




The criticisms actually help to illustrate, point-by-point, why the


OAVCSA was a means which facilitated the Reorganization of 1973. The


office was the organizational key to bring about major change in a


short time in a large organization. Lt. Gen. DePuy was able to use


his office to prepare, criticize, and promote reorganization in a


decisive manner without losing control of the process to the


organizational biases and prerogatives of the Army Staff and the


Major Commanders. The organizational key was in hand, but here we


must take a close look at the influence of the individual in


bureaucratic politics. It took a General Officer with the unique


combination of drive, vision, and in-fighting expertise to use the


OAVCSA to drive through a major reorganization. It took an office of


specially selected individuals in the OAVCSA to support the


initiative which Lt. Gen. DePuy and Gen. Palmer sought.


CAS. The Coordinator of Army Studies (CAS) had no standing staff


supervision responsibilities. In this respect Lt. Gen. DePuy used


the office in a unique mannner. In December of 1971 the office was


headed by LTC John Seigle. One of the principal officers involved in


planning the Reorganization of 1973, LTC James S. V. Edgar, recalled


that LTC Seigle "ran an amazing little shop. It was sort of the


distilled essence of the Social Sciences Department (at West Point)."


"It was a very good group of people, almost all of them are general


officers now. (Although that's not necessarily a guarantee of good


people, it's pretty close.) John ran a very collegial shop. There


was very little directive involved. Each person, when he came in,


was encouraged to get involved. Each person when he came in, was


encouraged to get something out of his craw - the one project that he


always wanted to do or to get done - how would you change the Army,


if you had a chance. And this happpened to be the chance, because an


amazing number of these projects were carried out successfully,


mainly because of the tremendous access that we had to Gen. DePuy as


a result of John's close relationship with him." (52)


The office was less than fifteen officers. Some of the officers


were recruited from the Department of Social Sciences at West Point,


some were recruited from the graduating classes at the National War


College, and some were gleaned from the Army Staff. Once the


officers were in the office, they would spend several months working


to get up to the speed of the office. On Saturdays Lt. Gen. DePuy


would chair seminars where the office would review all the actions


CAS was involved in. These sessions were important to keep the


entire office informed on what was occurring. Moreover, theme


sessions helped build the enthusiasm of the officers by letting them


know they were a part of all the major and interesting actions in the


Army Headquarters. Lt.Col. Seigle held staff calls on Thursday.


Also, Lt. Gen. DePuy took the opportunity to continue the


professional training of the lieutenant colonels. He felt the need to


have a "small select group" like the CAS to do "offline" projects for


the Chief or the Vice (53). Lt. Gen. DePuy wanted to have "some


group of people in reserve to do things that can't be described ahead


of time". He used the group to start pilot studies. He noted that


"real trick" in the Army "in getting anything important done, is to


be able to anticipate what will be important at some time, to back


off from the date that it will be important, a year, to work on it


with intelligent people, for a long time, meaning that you do it over


and over and over and over again. And the first twenty times it's


wrong, and then it begins to get right, then you do it twenty more


times, and then it's pretty good. But nobody knows, you don't have a


deadline, because it's your own project. Nobodys saying where is


that study, you see, because if it isn't ready, you don't want to


float it. That is a capability that I've tried to protect, because


it produces very good work" (54).






The Parker Panel passed into oblivion but the problems identi-


fied by the Special Review Panel did not disappear. CONARC continued


to be a very large command which was not program-oriented. CONARC


was a "budget-managed command".(55) CONARC did not know what they


were spending money for when they divided their budget among the


Continental Armies. The Continental Armies would divide their money


to their subordinate elements of Divisions, schools, training


centers, and installations. As the Army continued to withdraw from


Vietnam throughout 1971 cuts were made to reduce the training base


and the combat units in the States. When CONARC did not manage the


cutbacks "all sorts of things would suddenly flair up out at some


division or post that made no sense at all." (56)


Finally, in December 1971, Gen. Palmer approached the A-Vice,


Lt. Gen. DePuy, and gave him the job of looking into the


reorganization of CONARC. Lt. Gen. DePuy said he accepted it with


enthusiasm. He turned to the studies group. The officers were given


a month to come up with the concept (57).


LTC Louis Menetrey was about to take over from LTC Seigle as the


head of CAS when he was asked to start an effort to to reorganize


CONARC. LTC Menetrey listened as LT. Gen. DePuy laid out the broad


parameters of his thinking. The effort was to be very close hold.


LTC Menetrey could have one other person to work on the project. He


"made all kinds of notes from this conversation which probably took


and hour, an hour and a half." (58) Gen. Palmer and Lt. Gen. DePuy


worked very closely on the project. It was DePuy who worked with the


officers from the CAS as they refined the broad thinking through to


more specific proposals. LTC Menetrey began an iterative process.


"Every day or every other day, we'd spend a few minutes with General


Depuy and show him what we had. He would spin out his idea some


more, and this evolved over time, maybe a month, into a series of


"Butcher" charts.(59) Lt. Sen. DePuy had his mission-type order


taken from general concepts "to the next level of specificity" and


broken out "with some of its implications, but on a very close hold


basis".(60) Lt. Gen. DePuy did not want to let the information get


out until he knew he had "the high Command" with him. (61). LTC


Menetrey had LTC James S. V. Edgar working with him on the project.


Edgar "became aware of a paper that somebody was working on that was


going to do away with or carve up Combat Developments Command (CDC),


Since that was my area, I hopped in and began to have some thoughts


of my own 'CDC must be doing a number of things. How do we make


sure that those things that it does do and used to do don't get lost


in the shuffle?' I began to get associated with that." (62)


LTC William Tuttle was told to get the thoughts together in a


draft paper. LTG DePuy felt he had the right idea for the


reorganization and directed that Edgar and Tuttle put the plan


togetter. No more papers would be written. Everything was put on


large "butcher" paper so that nothing could find its way to a copying


machine. The charts were put in the safe every night. Lt. Gen.


DePuy used the charts as a means to keep updating and changing the


plan. LTC Edgar remembered,


"We didn't just sit around and BS, and we didn't do a study


either. We sat down, and we worked on a briefing with General


DePuy. These were, I think, some of the happiest hours of my


military career. In order to get General DePuy's time, we


would come in on Sarturday morning. So we would all be sitting


around in our civilian clothes, and you know how it is when you


come in on Saturdays and you wear slightly loud, civilian


clothes, just to demonstrate that you're on your own time. But


we would sit in General DePuy's office at this conference


table. It would be General DePuy and maybe John Seigle or Lou


Menetrey, who followed John, and Tuttle and I, and maybe Fred


Mahaffey. There would be just a few of us. Maybe Jerry


Galloway upon occasion. We would work on this briefing, and we


would work, as I recall, on yellow pads just sort of roughing


out the idea of what the briefing charts would be. That was


the things that imposed some disicipline upon our discussions.


DePuy would say, 'Well, here's the point we ought to make,' and


we would argue about how to make this point or whether it was a


valid point to make or how to structure the argument, and that


sort of thing. Then, we would go on to the next thing, and


this was basically the way that it was done. Then I guess when


we got closer to the final version, it was all put on butcher


paper. I can remember making those damn butcher paper charts


myself, and although I had studied inclined, single stroke


lettering while a cadet, my lettering was not that good. So we


had what were obviously a bunch of homemade butcher paper


charts, which I think added to the aura of the briefing when it


was finally given."(63)




The iterations of the concept moved along in December. Guidance


from the A-Vice included "cooling" the language, stressing the


overextension of CONARC, describing four alternatives, and outlining


the problem area; of the future -- forces, training, and material


acquisition -- rather than criticising CONARC and CDC (64). Also, in


December Gen. Haines asked for a meeting in Washington to present his


staff's report, CONARC 72. The meeting was set for 12 January 1972.


Since Gen. Haines of CONARC could be expected to present the most


opposition to the reorganization, the timing of the meeting was


fortunate for the proponents of change. It would provide the CAS the


opportunity to surface the major problem areas which mitigated


towards change. They would learn Gen. Haines' explanations and the


basis for his possible future arguments while they were still


preparing their briefing to sell the reorganization to the Army




The conference on 12 January 1972 lasted for seven hour. The


meeting had Gen. Haines, his executive - Col. Morton, Brig.Gen. West


-his comptroller, and BG Hannum- his force developer from CONARC.


There were twenty-five officers from the Army Staff, including Lt.


Gen. DePuy and seven other general officers. General Haines began


the meeting with opening remarks. He had the following criticisms:


OSD is "180 degrees in the wrong direction" when it


suggests personnel reductions in vital areas such as HQ, CONUSA. HQDA


(Headquarters, Department of the Army) should have used the option to


choose alternative ways of acheiving the reductions required.


There had been a recent trend toward creating both small


functional commands and special functional assistants for the


Volunteer Army initiatives, drug programs, etc. These actions had


caused burdens for HQ,CONARC by generating resource requirements and


ceation of parallel monitoring staff elements without resource




There was too much centralization of both authority and


personnel talent within HQDA. On the other hand, the five CONUSA HQS


had the very lowest priority for talented officers.


General Haines reviewed the historical evolution and


organizational structure of HQ, CONARC and HQ, CONUSA. He stressed


that CONARC had its expertise in training, readiness, and operations


of forces but personnel, supply and financial management functions


had been thrust upon CONARC. He pointed out that schools and


training deserved the primary attention of a command and that the


four CONUSA HQS were his "resource brokers" in addition to


commanding Reserves, providing area representation, etc.


Th e Comptroller of the Army's study of management


functions in CONUSA has an "over-simplified mission". Functions will


have to be evaluated individually to determine appropriate final


placement of management responsibility.


HQ, CONARC has made and is continuing to make many


recommendations for cutting back on nonessentials and overhead:


combining the Institute for Military Assistance with the JFK Center;


creating one "Center" for Adjutant General and Finance Schools;


moving the Military Police School to Ft. McClellan; closing aviation


training at Ft. Wolters and Hunter Army Airfield; consolidating the


Signal School at Ft. Gordon; and either closing Ft. Polk or beginning


essential permanent construction. Gen. DePuy commented that such


decisions will have to be targeted on apprpriate 1972 "Windows".(65)


Discussion followed on many topics. The management functions


were discussed in detail. Gen. Haines wanted to keep the resource


management functions at the Continental US Armies. Yet, the new


supply and personnel automatic data processing systems operated from


the installation level and "seemed" to be moving toward centralized


management at the Department of the Army. Gen. Haines also wanted to


have force development at HQ,CONARC. Funds for base operations for


the Army Reserves should have been handled with Active Army funds and


directed to the installations. Yet, funds for operations for the


Reserves should have gone through the Continental US Armies to the


Reserve units. (66) The action officers from the Staff asked


questions and tbe discussion continued. Gen. Haines stated the trend


of returning more Active Army forces to the US would probably require


organizational changes in CONARC in about five years. Additionally,


the CDC-CONARC interface was not a serious problem since the Center


Team" concept had proven quite efffective. The worldwide


responsibility for unit training was primarily executed through the


CONARC school system while the unit training for actual CONARC forces


was executed through the command channels of CONARC.(67)


In two weeks the planning for the Reorganization was complete


and ready to run the gauntlet for approval. Lt. Gen. DePuy had a


series of murder-board sessions where he had "all the other hotshots"


from throughout the OAVCSA criticize the briefing. As the Army's


manager, "the guy who did the budgeting and the planning," he "had


spent a lot of time briefing Congressional staffs on the Army's


programs, and he was very much aware of the outside pressures that


were pushing the Army -- The pressure to improve the teeth to tail


ratio, the pressure to do better on development of equipment", the


pressure to make the Volunteer army work. Edgar noted "He had a very


well-developed sense of who was pressing from outside the Army - from


DOD, from Congress, and those places. I thinK one of his essential


criteria was that the thing had to be marketable to meet those


pressures and meet those demands. I don't think I ever recall him


sitting down and spelling that out in one discourse, but we became


aware of it... As we would float ideas on Saturday mornings, he would


say, 'That won't work. That won't sell.' On occasion he would float


an idea and we would tell him that it would not work, which was the


fun of Saturday morning."(68)


When DePuy was confident that the briefing was where it should


be he scheduled meetings with the Vice and the Chief.(69) Gen.


Palmer was briefed on Thursday, 27 January 1972. Gen. Palmer, who


initiated the effort and had been kept abreast of developments, was


very enthusiastic". (70) Gen. Westmoreland approved the plan


after his briefing on the next day, 28 January 1972. The following


day, Saturday 29 January 1972 was the crucial briefing with Secretary


of the Army, Robert Froehlke. Given the statutory authority of the


Secretary, no reorganization could take place without his approval.


Furthermore, since the days of Elihu Root at the turn of the century,


no reorganization or reform had taken place without the active and


early participation of the Secretary. This major reorganization was


internally conceived and directed by uniformed officers.


Mr. Froehlke was personally briefed by Lt. Gen. DePuy. In the


earlier briefings DePuy had only used the butcher paper charts. He


had a short paper, "The Impetus for Change", written from the


briefing. It was almost a transcript of the briefing. As Col. Edgar


noted, "The figures in there, the diagrams, like the one on the Army


organizations since 1962 is right out of the briefing. There was a


diagram just like that in the briefing." Looking at the paper, "you


can just imagine a butcher paper chart that said 'three things we


have to do better -- maintaining the forces in readiness, training


individuals, devleloping new force structure' there would be a


butcher chart which had those three ticks on it."(71) LTC Tuttle


noted that DePuy did the briefings unassisted. "The simplicity and


directness of the approach, the lack of the normal trappings of


decision briefings with their twin projector; and prepared script,


unquestionably impressed the recipients -- and contributed to the


reception of the succinct, direct approach of the proposal itself."


(72) Mr. Froehlke appproved the plan. After a whirlwind three


days, Lt.Gen. DePuy had to wait until Monday to brief the Secretary


of Defense. Secretary Melvin Laird approved the plan. However, the


approval process was not over.


Earlier, Lt. Gen. DePuy had a series of briefings for all the


heads of the staff agencies. The Deputy Chiefs of the army Staff


were briefed by LTC Tuttle or Edgar. LTC Edgar observed that Lt.


Gen. DePuy would "sit back a little disassociated from it." "DePuy


would sit there and listen to the briefing and then talk about it.


This way DePuy wasn't having to defend the briefing. They could both


sit there and criticize the briefing," (73) Lt. Gen. DePuy emphasized


the case for reorganization on its own merits for the good of the


Army. He sold the case to the army Staff as having "a lot of logic


in the thing. There's a basic, fundamental simple logic that is


awfully hard to argue against and that was that the combat


development process and the schools are both part of a larger


process of doctrine and training in the Army. Training stems


from doctrine. Doctrine has to be informed by training


experience and weapons systems. Tactics is the application of


weapons to the enemy on behalf of a mission. Putting that set


of functions back together was obviously right. Everybody was


worried about one aspect of it, and rightly so. That was that


CONARC had many training centers at predominantly troop


installations and vice versa. From a management point of view


there was a fear that we were slicing through almost every


installation in some awkward way and that we might lose the


potential economy of scale which was represented by CONARC, and


there was merit in that worry. There was then and there is


today. It is not easy... the relationship between FORSCOM


(Forces Command) and TRADOC (Training and Doctrine Command) at a


place like Fort Sill where you have the III Corps Artillery, the


Artillery School, and a training center is not necessarily an


easy one. But we were willing to pay that price in order to


acheive the focus of CONARC on readiness and the focus of TRADOC


on doctrine and training. Those are natural divisions with a


powerful logic of their own. Everybody agreed. Even Jack


Norton (Commanding General CDC) agreed the first time I went out


and talked to him about it". (74)




Furthermore, the "Impetus for Change" emphasized the management


improvements to "reduce both the number of intermediate echelons and


the size and number of headquarters." (75) The reduction of personnel


from "manpower intensive headquarters and support activities" would


save money because of the "high per capita cost of personnel". (76)


Also, the nature of the post-Vietnam Army was illustrated as follows:


Vietnam meant: - The attention of the Army as a whole


shifted from training from the full spectrum of war to fighting a


particular type of war.


- A large proportion of our units were stationed outside of


the Continental United States (CONUS).


-Emphasis was placed upon the active forces at the expense


of the reserves, since the expansion was performed without a large




-That part of the Army not in Vietnam became a sustaning


base, training and providing individual replacements for Vietnam.


-The materiel system was oriented to combat consumption.


Constraints on the defense budget were relaxed and the system for


materiel development was, in the case of many items, short-circuited.


The post-Vietnam Army is different: -With a higher


proportion of the Army in CONUS it will be of increasing importance


that deployable forces maintain a high state of readiness.


-A smaller active Army must peace a greater reliance on


reserve forces.


-A smaller, volunteer Army requires that each soldier


receive individual training that develops his potential more fully.


-Extremely limited resources for defense present much more


difficult choices in developing and fielding new organizations,


weapons and doctrine.


In short, the requirements of the immmediate future mean that


three Army functions will assume increased importance:


-Maintaining the forces in readiness.


-Training individuals in tactics, techniques, and skills.


-Developing new structure and materiel systems. (77)


The paper related the functions to the organizations in being.


CONARC was divided into a "Force Mission" and a "Training Mission


(Doctrine)". The case for reorganization was cogently presented to


show how the reorganization would really do all of the following:


- Reduce CONARC span of control.


- Emphasize training, readiness, and contingency planning


for deployable forces.


- Close the loop between doctrine and schools.


- Rationalize the combat and force development process.


- Simplify the test and experimentation process.


- Be manageable.


- Fulfill area responsibilities in CONUS. (78)


Lt. Gen. DePuy said it was a very remarkable experience that


should go "in the Guinness Book of records" to go from concept to


approval in one week. (79) DePuy had gained approval from the


decision-makers who had to approve the reorganization and he had


received agreement from the key players on the Army Staff which


effectively isolated the two major commands to be reorganized, CONARC


and CDC. The day after Secretary of Defense Laird aprroved the plan,


Lt. Gen. DePuy briefed Gen. Haines, Commanding General of CONARC.


The Vice, Gen. Palmer, told Gen. Haines two days earlier that some


reorganization would take place. It was up to Lt. Gen. DePuy to


explain the nature of the reoganization on 2 February. CONARC would


be divided into a Force Command, whose headquarters would move to Ft.


McPherson, Ga. and a Doctrine and Training Command which would move


into the old CONARC headquarters at Ft. Monroe, Va. "On 8 February


1972, General DePuy informed the CONARC Chief of Staff that the


Department of the Army was then planning to appoint an overall


Project Manager for the reorganization process and would then task


the major commands involved as executive agents for the actual


planning and implementation. He further indicated that the U.S.


Continental Army Command would be designated as the executive agent


for planning, developing, and establishing the two new major


commands." (80)


Gen. Haines took action on two fronts. He asked for a "reclama"


meeting with the Chief to make his case against the reorganization.


He prepared his own command to take the guiding hand for any changes


if they must come. The Special Study Group (SSG) at CONARC headquar-


ters was established as a permanent planning board. The principals


were Brig. Gen. L.M. Jones, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for


Military Operations and Reserve Forces, who was designated as Special


Assistant for the development of the Force Command; Brig. Gen. G. J.


Duquemin, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Individual Training,


who was designated as the Special Assistant for the development of


the Doctrine and Training Command; and Brig. Gen. R.L. West, Deputy


Chief of Staff, Comptroller, who was designated as CONARC Staff Co-


ordinator. Generals Jones and Duquemin were assigned to the Study


Group for fulltime duty. Maj. Gen. Donald R. Pepke, the CONARC Chief


of Staff, named the study "Operation Steadfast" on 14 February. He


chose the title from the motto of the 4th Infantry Division ("Stead-


fast and Loyal"), which he had commanded in combat in Vietnam.(81)


The Special Study Group became the STEADFAST Study Group (SSG).


Meanwhile officers in the OAVCSA were preparing for Gen. Haines


reclama visit. Col. Menetrey (he was promoted), the chief of CAS,


briefed Gen. Westmoreland on 11 February to prepare him for the 16


February meeting with Gen. Haines.


Gen. Haines presented five major points at a luncheon with the


Chief on 16 February. He argued the development of the plan on a


very close hold basis by Department of Army staff officers neglected


the "installation point of view" for feasibility and desirability.


Second, he felt the study did not deal with a mobilization situation.


Third, he did not feel that two new headquarters could be organized


within the spaces presently authorized for CONARC. He thought some


personnel spaces could be saved at intermediate levels as the


automatic data processing systems for personnel, logistics,and


financial management (BASOPS II) for base operations came on line.


Fourth, he felt strongly that the number of continental Armies should


not be reduced from four to three until the BASOPS II systems became


operational. Finally, he argued against the timing of a major


reorganization of the Army. He let all of his arrows fly.


"He stated that the Army needed a period of stabilization to


digest and implement the large number of directives from the


Department of the Army and ,in addition, to get on with the job


of improving professionalism, discipline, and attitude


throughout the Army. He stressed again the momentum gained in


these areas by the team effort of the commanders in the


continental United States and the adverse effect that the


proposed reorgaization could have on that effort. He pointed


out the difficulties in meeting the proposed date of 1 July 1972


for organizing two new commands -- only four and one-half months


in the future -- since both the U.S. Continental Army Command


and its subordinate Armies were well into the development of

their Command Operating Budgets of FY 1973. He also cited the


awkwardness of the 1 July date since it fell in the middle of

the summer training period for the Reserve Components and the


Reserve Officer Training Corps. In addition, this date would


affect the conduct of the Williamson Board tests which were


sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and involved


almost all elements of the U.S. Continental Army Command.


General Haines felt that there was a clear requirement carefully


to spell out the responsibilities of the the two new commands and


the subordinate numbered armies for conducting and supporting


the training of the Reserve Components and the Reserve Officer

Training Corps. Moreover, he was convinced that the above


factors presented a valid argument for a new slower


implementation schedule. He stated his belief that the new


Chief of Staff should have the opportunity to guide the


reorganization and not be faced with a fait accompli on the very


date he was to assume his new assignment. He also suggested


that prior to final approval, the Chief of Staff seek the advice


of certain retired officers -- such as Generals Bruce Clarke,


Hamilton Howze, and Paul Freeman -- who were accomplished troop


leaders and trainers.(82)



Generals Westmoreland and Palmer held their positions that the


reorganization should continue. They agree to extend the timetable


for reorganization to two years. The new Chief of Staff would be


informed at the earliest possible moment. They rebutted some of Gen.


Haines criticisms. Gen. Westmoreland noted the reduction of the


subordinate numbered armies was not firm. Also, the location for the


Forces Command headquarters would be studied further. Finally, Gen.


Westmoreland stated that he felt the job at U.S. Continental Army


Command was too big for one individual, although he complimented Gen.


Haines on his performance of duty in that assignment."(83) The rest


of the conversation delved into the details of the plan itself.


While Gen. Haines opposed the reorgainization at each step, Lt.


Gen. John Norton, whose CDC was to become two smaller agencies and


transfer some functions to the new training and doctrine command,


initially agreed to the plan. His memo to Lt. Gen. DePuy on 9


February stated, "In general, I feel that we can move ahead toward


the new organization in minimum amount of time. In the end I see the


Army in general and Combat Developments in specific receiving a net


gain once the new organization and way of doing business settles


down. I am prepared to furnish any assistance you or your staff


require to translate the broad plan into the detailed implementation


plan." (84)


In response to Gen Haines' criticisms of the lack of focus and


understanding for the problems of the installations, the Installation


Model Team was formed. Maj.Gen. Robert Fair had responsibility for


the project and made Col. H.L. Myron the team chief. The team was to


travel to several posts in the U.S. and develop the data base to


detail the problems and issues in dividing CONARC and removing the


subordinate numbered armies as a management level above the training


and combat forces units and installations. The team examined the


concept for reorganization in 27 separate functional areas. It was a


functional analysis of all the systems and procedures that flowed


from an individual unit or installation up through levels of command


to Headquarters, Department of the Army. It was a preparation to


counter the entrenched bureaucratic defense, "you did not go into


enough detail." The Headquarters, Department of the Army acquired


far more detailed data in the six weeks of research during February


and March 1972 than CONARC or any other headquarters possessed. (85)


The draft for the proposed charter for the Project Manager for


Reorganization was prepared by Headquarters, Department of the Army


and forwarded to the Headquarters, CONARC a day before the meeting


among Gen. Haines, the Chief, and the Vice. Two days after the


meeting the proposed charter was revised. The revisions reflected


the points of agreement between Gen. Haines and the Chief. This


included the revised schedule to have the new headquarters become op-


erational 1 July 1973 instead of 1 July 1972. The Commander,CONARC,


was directed to consult with the Commander, CDC, in planning and


developing the new organizations. Also, Gen. Haines would have the


formal task of disestablishing his own command. Some compromises had


been made to the perogatives of a four-star general.


In the corporate structure of the U.S. Army the Chief of Staff


is not the Chief Executive Officer of the corporation. Titles 10 and


50 of the U.S. code do not give him the statutory authority of a


Chief Executive. However, he has vast authority in officer


assignments and retirements, if the Secretary of the Army supports


him. He operates in a mode of consultation and consensus with the


other four-star generals who are not assigned out to the unified and


joint commands.


On 28 February Secretary Froehlke sent a memorandum to the


Secretary of Defense on the reorganizaton. He stated", Based on


your approval of the concept, planning has progressed to the point


where we are now ready to proceed with more detailed study." (81)


Furthermore, "Unless you object, we plan to initiate the detailed


study of the reorganization by naming a Project Manager this week.


He will coordinate the detailed planning and propose phasing for the


reorganization, and will report to me through the Chief of staff. I


am satisfied that this reorganization concept goes in the correct


drection. I am less certain, however, whether it goes quite far


enough. Before making such a final determination, I intend to


discuss the concept thoroughly with the designate to replace the


Chief of Staff." (87)


The Secretary kept the action with the uniformed officers. The


Project Manager faced a difficult task. Lt. Gen. DePuy wanted Maj.


Gen. James F. Kalergis to be the program manager because he was


"probably the most experienced and effective organizational expert in


the Defense Department ... He is one smart cookie, also tough." (88)


DePuy is quoted as saying," There is only one guy in the Army who can


run this reorganization and I am going to give the names of three


people. Two of them will not be available, and one of them will, and


that's going to be General Kalergis." (89)


LTC's Edgar and Tuttle briefed Maj. Gen. Kalergis before he was


appointed to be the Project Manager. They briefed him with the old


butcher charts in a "nice dog and pony show, a Huntley-Brinkley sort


of thing." (90) After they finished they went to another office and


sat down across from Kalergis. He asked, "Well, where is the study?"


(91) There was no study per se. The Parker Panel a year earlier was


the only recent formal study of the problem. All Kalergis had was


the briefing paper, "Impetus for Change", which was created from the


the old butcher charts. The two Lt. Colonels were loaned to


Kalergis. Eventually LTC Tuttle went back to other projects in the


CAS. LTC Carl Vuono was brought out of the Program, Planning and


Analysis Officer to join LTC Edgar. They became the nucleus of the


Special Projects Office. LTC Vuono recruited the officers for the


office of the Project Manager. Officers came from the Army War


College and the Army Staff. "The word went out from DePuy,


certainly, and maybe from the Palmer level or higher that while we


may not want the best man in DCSOPS, we want the second best guy in


DCSOPS. So, we got a bunch of very, very good people." (92) Maj.


Gen. Kalergis immediately demanded Col. Paul Raisig be assigned to


his office. Raisig had worked with Kalergis in Vietnam and had "done


a marvelous job taking over a battalion that had a couple of


commanders relieved or shot." (93) Col. Paul Raisig eventually became


Kalergis' deputy. LTC Vuono became "sort of the vice chief" and LTC


Edgar became the "resident ideologue." Edgar remembered, "I was the


keeper of the pure flame of the reorganization, since I had been with


it since its birth and I interpreted 'Impetus for Change'."(94) On 6


March 1972 Maj. Gen. James Kalergis was taken from his duties as the


Deputy Commanding General for Logistical Support, U.S. Army Materiel


Command to be the Army Project Manager for Reorganization (DA-PMR).


He met with the Chief on 8 March and the CONARC STEADFAST principals


on 9 March.


When he met with the STEADFAST group, he let them know he had


decided to draw up a new charter for his managership. Also, he would


issue a reorganization directive under the authority of his new


charter which would have all the details he wanted promulgated.


Checkpoints would be built into the reorganization plan where both


the Department of the Army and CONARC would stop, thoroughly review


the plans, and validate that they were on the right course. (95)


Maj. Gen. Kalergis met with Secretary of the Army Froehlke on 10


March. He was directed by the Chief of Staff to report by means of


In-Process Reviews according to the following schedule:


-Outline Plans for Organization and 25 Mar 1972


Transfer of Functions


-FY 1974 Program Estimates 1 May 1972


-Organization Plan 1 Jun 1972


-Budget Adjustments 1 Aug 1972


Also, he was to "inform the Chief of Staff on all significant matter


that arise in the execution of his mission." (96) The action was


kept with the uniformed officers. The Assistant Secretaries of


the Army and the General Counsel wrote memorandums to the Mr.


Froehlke in the first week of March on the proposed reorganization.


The results were generally favorable with specific comments


reflecting their individual interests. They were not to carry the




During March and April 1972, Maj. Gen. Kalergis worked to flesh


out the details of the reorganization in an atmosphere of some


progress, cooperation, and some stone-walling. He had to evaluate


all on-going staff actions and studies throughout the Army which


might be affected by the reorganization. These included the CONUS


Medical Activities Study, Troop Support Command Study, the effort of


Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics to examine a


centralized commissary management system for the continental U.S.,


the Myron Study of installation management, the Army Materiel Command


reorganization plan, the study to establish a centralized military


personnel center for the Army, and all of the automated maagement


information systems unique to personnel, finance and logistical


resource management, etc.,etc. Generals Palmer and DePuy did not get


involved in supervision, although they were kept abreast of the


situation at all times. Their main relationship was to "support him,


give him access, and keep the forces that were opposed to the plan


sufficiently at bay so that he could get the job done." (97)


For example, a 1 March memorandum to Lt. Gen. DePuy reported on


visit by LTC Tuttle, CAS, to the Installation Model Team at Ft. Lee,


Va. In addition to the progress being made in the area of logistics,


force development, and other manpower areas, Tuttle noted the team


needed the authorization to expand their research. Specifically, the


Team's charter was limited to the installation. Since some


management information systems went through the Continental Armies,


the team needed to have a team go to one of the Continental Armies


(a subordinate numbered army). Then, he noted," There is a major


conflict brewing (exemplified by General Haines' letter to


General Palmer on the "All Installations Under One Command").


General Jones apparently did the staff study and was rather


adamant about the necessity of the proposal. CONARC seems to


start from the assumption that each installation commander will


command everything on the post. General Jones sees the need.


therefore, for the installation commander to report to both the


Doctrine and Training commander and to the Force commander. The


rationale for this postition seems to lie in the difficulty that


small units might have if no one supervises them directly.


General Jones seems convinced that no parallel now exists in the


tenancy arrangements which sveral CONARC schools operate on AMC


installations. Likewise, there are several STRAF (Strategic


Army Forces) units on AMC installations. It appears that a lot


of fixed positions are being established on command


relationships before the Installation Model Team gets done with


its work. We do not believe that Colonel Myron is persuaded by


the CONARC position and seems to be heading in the direction of


not separating mission and resources. This is one issue that


must be watched closely, else the objectives of the


reorganization could well be thwarted." (98)




The memorandum illustrates the struggle to control the details


of the implementation of the reorganization. At this stage it was


possible for one headquarters (CONARC vs. Department of the Army) or


the other to gain de facto control of resources and the direction of


the new organizations by manipulating the relationship any unit or


installation will have with CONARC's shadow successor in the Forces




The STEADFAST Study Group completed a charter which was approved


through CONARC to delineate responsibilities. It began work on the


Outline Plan which was due at the Department of the Army on 5 May


1972. Maj. Gen. Kalergis met with the STEADFAST Study Group in late


March and early April. He emphasized "the fact that the major impact


of the reorganization would be at the installation level, but that


the area responsibilities of the subordinate army headquarters should


not be minimized. The existing functions of the subordinate armies


in the continental United states would have to be analyzed in depth;


Operation STEADFAST planning elements would have to pay particular


attention to mobilization requirements and to the integration of


training for both the Active Army and the Reserve Components. With


regard to manpower requirements, General Kalergis pointed out that


the two new major commands world require sizeable staffing and that


they should be accorded an appropriate place on the Department of the


Army Master Priority List (DAMPL) in order to ensure an adequate


quality of staffing." (99) The concern over personnel spaces in the


chain of command from the installation up to Washington would provide


an opportunity for the proponents of reorganization. The proposal


would give the installation commanders control of their resources for


their installations and "stovepipe" the logistical, personnel and


financial systems up to Department of the Army. (100) The proposal


would help to eliminate intermediate headquarters personnel spaces


and to make the installation commanders around the country the allies


of the reorganization as they looked to gain control of their own


resources. CONARC and CDC headquarters were isolated from the head


shed" of the Chief and the Secretary of the Army, the principals on


the Army Staff (the deputy Chiefs of Staff), and the subordinate


installation commanders on the issues of reorganization.


The process of planning would progress in three consecutive


stages. They were as follows:


Stage 1 - Develop an outline (feasibility) plan and the


preliminary validation of the concept.


Stage 2 - Develop a detailed plan, resolve issues and con-


duct final validation of the concept.


Stage 3 - Implementation plan.


Stage 1, the preliminary validation of the concept began, with


the publication of the Initial Planning Guidance on 5 April 1972.


This provided the staffs and commands with the authority to initiate


detailed planning. It oulined the concept in clear, simple terms.


Actions - a. Establish a Force Command over all active and reserve


army combat forces in the continental United States (CONUS).


b. Establish a Doctrine and Training Command devoted to


developing doctrine, associated force organization, requirements for


materiel, and training officers and soldiers.


c. Establish an independent agency for the direction of


operational test and evaluation.


d. Establish a Concepts and Analysis Agency to provide


an in-house capability at the Department of the Army level for


analysis of force design and major weapons systems requirements.


e. Eliminate one headquarters echelon between Department


of the Army and the major tactical commands and installations in the


United States. (101)


The guidance delegated responsibilities and restated that the


Project Manager for Reorganization (PMR) "has the full line authority


of the Chief of Staff, Army, for planning and coordinating the


implementation of those organizational changes directed by the


Secretary of the Army." (102) The Army had formal marching orders to


get on with the reorganization. The Executive Agents were given a


suspense of 5 May for their initial plans.


Meanwhile, concern over the reorganization at CONARC manifested


itself in more pleas for changes in the pace and direction of the


reorganization. Gen. Haines sent a personal correspondence to Gen.


Westmoreland on 14 April 1972. Gen. Haines was concerned that the


combat developments program would be subordinated to the individual


training mission in the new organization. He argued that "the


current readiness posture of Active Army forces stemmed from the


personnel posture of the entire army which would not be changed by


the proposed reorganization. He went on to point out, while there


might be some long-range improvement in individual training by


recombining that function with combat developments, the split of


individual and unit training might eventually prove to be


detrimental. General Haines was not convinced that the attainment of


the third objective (to develop new force structure, doctrine, and


materiel systems) rested on the split of the U.S. Continental Army,


Command and the stripping down of its subordinate armies. He felt


that the reorganization was untimely because of all of the factors


affecting the Army in the continental United States at that time.


Such matters as high turnover rates; a zero draft environment;


contemporary problems of race, drugs, dissent, and absenteeism; the


lack of completely workable and standardized ADP systems; the concept


tests conducted under the MASSTER Program; and the tests involving


the employment of the Reserve Components, all combined to create an


environment in the Army which could ill afford the turbulence and the


loss of effectiveness which the reorganizational concepts would


create." (103) He added, "Rather than carefully reasoned, thorough


analyses, we are making hurried estimates as to the functional


concepts that will govern after reorganization and from these


estimates we are determining the manpower requirements to staff


reorganized headquarters. I place little confidence in the validity


of these estimates. I am apprehensive that someone at the Department


of the Army will consider the data sufficiently precise to support a


decision to reorganize. Most importantly, I am concerned that


someone would use these hastily developed data to support the POM


which will be submitted on 22 May." (104)


The Secretary of the Army was briefed on 24 April. Secretary


Froehlke, Under Secretary BeLieu, Gen. Westmoreland, Gen. Phillips,


Gen. Palmer, Maj. Gen. Kalergis, Col. Gosling and LTC Pihl were


present. When the Secretary asked who was causing the problems in


the development of the plans for the reorganization, Maj. Gen.


Kalergis replied that he expected opposition from Generals Norton and


Haines when they were faced with external reorganization proposals.


The Secretary was assured that the Department of the Army


Installation Management Team was not implementing actions. The Team


was conducting a formal analysis survey. The Under Secretary, Mr.


BeLieu "made the statement that we had left out a most important


objective and that addresses the question of area responsibilty. It


was pointed out that this was a subordinate objective and this


objective would be covered -- and that, in fact, it is in the


criteria for analysis. Mr. Belieu stressed the importance of three-


star general officers being located in areas where they could sneak


authoritatively to the Governors, other responsible officials, and


the public." (105) The Secretary wanted to be able to present a


package to the Secretary of Defense which would present the forward-


looking image of the reorganization to the Department of Defense and


the public. The Secretary was advised that the actual reorganization


should not be moved forward of 1 January 1973 because of the


election. Maj. Gen. Kalergis emphasized "the requirement for


detailed planning prior to any announcements, and pointed out that we


are trying to give ourselves more time for detailed planning so as to


insure a systematic, successful reorganization once reorganization


starts."(106) A press release, letter to Congressmen, and the


Charter of the Office of the Project Manager for reorganization were


approved as written. Secretary Froehlke stated that when the new


Chief of Staff was announced, he wanted to have a picture taken of


General Westmoreland, the new Chief of Staff, himself, and the


Project Manager for the Reorganization to emphasize the importance


and the support behind the reorganization plans. At the end of the


meeting the Chief and the Vice stayed behind to discuss the Back


Channel messages for Generals Haines and Norton.


Maj. Gan. Kalergis was directed to prepare the "EYES ONLY" Back


Channel reply from Gen. Westmoreland to Gen. Haines. LTC Vuono


drafted a message which included the admonition, "the basic decisions


as to the form of this reorganization have been made." Later in the


message the guidance was given; "Each of the sequential steps which


you have described in your message obviously must be taken and this


is what I expect to be done." Finally, he concluded, "I have


discussed the substance of this position with Secretary Froehlke and


we both agree that we must adhere to the planning and implementation


schedule that I have outlined. Warm Regards." (107) Remaining


problems were to be directed to the Project Manager, Maj. Gen.


Kalergis. Gen. Haines had gone to the mat and lost. Lt. Gen. Norton


would retain some control of combat developments by being designated


as the Deputy Commander for Combat Developments, CONARC.


The opponents of change still had an opportunity to stop the


reorganization. It was widely "known" that Gen. Creighton Abrams


would come home from the top job in Vietnam to replace Westmoreland


as the Army Chief of Staff in June 1972. Secretary Froehlke's only


concern with forging ahead with the reorganization was the position


the new Chief would take. This suggests several things. It may mean


this reorganization was not an issue important enough to the


Secretary to let the new Chief's position influence his suitability


for the job. Alternatively, it may mean that the reorganization was


truly an internally-driven issue which should be left for the


uniformed officers to resolve. Since this was the Spring of the


Vietnam Easten Offensive, the McGovern candidacy through the


primaries, and the "stop the government" demonstrations, perhaps this


was an issue which was not so crucial to the Secretary without the


new Chief's active sponsorship. Maj. Gen. Kalergis briefed Gen.


Abrams sometime after 28 February. The new Chief would support the


concept of the reorganization. He could fine tune the


reorganization as he wished after he took over his new duties.


The Office of the Project Manager was organized to develop a


procedure for validating the feasibiity of the Executive Agents'


outline plans along functional lines. The office was organized into


numbered teams. Each officer within the team was assigned functional


areas of responsibility to monitor.


Maj. Gen. Kalergis issued his reorganization directive on 24


April 1972. The directive served to "provide the authority for the


initiation of the detailed planning which was to required to properly


validate the concepts for reorganizing certain functions of the


Department of the Army; to designate executive agents who would


develop the detailed plans for the orderly activation of the new


commands and the modification of existing commands and agencies; to


develop planning guidelines; to identify actions which would have to


be accomplished concurrently with the planning; to establish a


tentative schedule for the actual reorganization processes and to


develop the detailed plans for the orderly activation of the new


commands and the modification of existing commands and agencies, to


develop planning guidelines; to identify actions which would have to


be accomplished concurrently with the planning; to establish a tent-


ative schedule for the actual reorganization processes; and to out-


line channels of communication and administrative procedures."(108)


This directive stipulated, again, that the Project Manager for


Reorganization had the full line authority of the Chief of Staff for


planning and co-ordinating the implementation of "those changes


directed by the Secretary of the Army." He was responsible for


validating plans and their implementation. Furthermore, he was the


sole agent for all of the Departmant of the Army for co-ordination


and direction of all actions required for the reorganization. Yet,


Commander, CONARC, the Commander,CDC, and the Assistant Chief of


Staff for Force Development on the Army staff were the executive


agents to actually make the transfers for the changes. The opponents


of change were the "do-ers" for the manager of change. Despite this


marriage of necessity, the planning moved forward. The planning


concepts for the Force Command and the Training and Doctrine Command


were written.


On the same day that Kalergis issued his directive, the


Secretary of the Army signed the Charter of the Office of the Project


Manager for Reorganization. The manager had all of the statutory


authority the Department of the Army could muster on its own. On 27


April the first public announcement was made.


The CONARC Operation STEADFAST Outline Plan was submitted to the


Project Manager on 4 May 1972. This plan gave the organizational


structure for the two new commands, U.S. Army Force Command and the


U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. The subordinate numbered


armies would command the U.S. Army Reserve, manage the Reserve


Officer Training Corps Program, co-ordinate support for domestic


emergencies, co-ordinate geographical area responsibilities, plan for


mobilization, and supervise training over the National Guard. (109)


The report projected estimated costs for the establishment of the two


new commands and the maintenance of the three U.S. armies. The


estimate indicated annual manpower savings of 1,289 spaces and annual


savings in operating costs of approximately $13.5 million. (110)


Several problems surfaced. The Project Manager's staff response


criticized CONARC for accepting the input from the Combat


Developments Command almost verbatim and not putting enough detail


into the planning for Training and Doctrine Command. Furthermore,


the figures for manpower and costs for Recruiting Command would have


to be separated from the overall figures. There was some question as


to whether the Reserve Officer Training Corps should be in the Forces


command or the Training and Doctrine Command. The wiring diagrams


were criticized for having too many blocks. CONARC was advised to


consolidate more functions. Maj. Gen. Kalergis "warned CONARC that


all plans for the reorganization would have to reflect a reduction in


grade structure for military and civilian spaces and steps would have


to be taken to ensure a proper balance between the military and


civilians." (111) The outline plan would serve as a feasibility plan.


The next plan, the detailed plan for reorganization would really


develop the alternatives for decisions.


The Project Manager, Maj. Gen. Kalergis, met with the CONARC


Commander, Gen. Haines, and the CONARC staff on 9 May 1972. There


were twelve points raised. All of the observations were problem


areas in the reorganization. There was no suggestion of any


diversion or postponement of the effort. One of Gen. Haines'


greatest concerns was the role of the installations. If a senior


commander had both combat forces and training units or a school on


his post, as the installation commander he might have to report to


two commanders in the new commands.


Also on 9 May, the Office of the Project Manager released their


validation document, "Validation Process for Continental United


States Reorganization". This document provided the methodology for


validation the Outline Plans submitted by the Executive Agents.


For example, the "Functional Study of CONUSA Management" was a


validation of the earlier study "Functional Study of Installation


Management, April 1972." The functional study developed three


organizational concepts to support a reorganization of CONARC. The


report also recommended the disposition of CONUSA management


functions with the associated staffing and reports. (112) Each


option outlined the "who would report to whom" for every office on


an installation in excruciating detail. Each option was examined to


identify places where manpower spaces could be cut. Meanwhile, Maj.


Gen. Kalergis continued to visit local comnmanders to discuss the


feasibility of automated systems in resource management under the new




The decision to continue planning and complete the first phase


of the reorganization was made on 7 June 1972. The Secretary of the


Army approved the concept of the feasibility of the outline plans and


directed continuation of the next phase of the planning effort. Maj.


Gen. Kalergis issued the "Guidance for Reorganization Detailed


Planning" to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development.


Department of th4e Army, the CONARC Commander and the Commander of


CDC on 15 June 1972. The next suspense for the Executive Agents was


set for 20 July 1072. Guidance for detailed planning went from "a to


g". for example, the manpower strength targets were set for the


major organizations. The management philosophy was to have "full


management" at the installations level and "exception management" at


higher levels. Other guidance was given for the command and control,


schools , assignment of US Army Recruiting Command, management of


combat developments, implementation of 'Basic Policies for Weapons


Stystems Acquisition in the Department of the Army', logistics


management planning, troop support, mobilization, location of Force


Command Headquarters, Department of the Army Personnel Center.


medical activites, STRATCOM, Army Materiel Command, costs, and


sensitivity to personnel. (112)


CONARC was working a concept to establish doctrinal centers to


develop new concepts, doctrine, and organization. The centers were a


Tactical Center at Ft. Leavenworth, a Logistical Center at Ft. Lee,


and an Administrative Center at Ft. Benjamin Harrison. (114)


Supplemental Guidance from the Office of the Project Manager was


approved on 20 June. These instructions were on stationing,


installations, and economic analysis. (115)


The period from 15 June to 20 July was the development of the


detailed plans. Work continued at a furious pace in the CONARC and


CDC Headquarters. Since CONARC served as the housekeeper to almost


every Army activity in the U.S., the reorganization touched almost


every functional area in the Army. A conference was held on civilian


personnel displacement at CONARC Headquarters. One problem was the


Reserve Office Training Corps and the U.S. Army Reserve were spread


across the country, so it was difficult to determine who would be


their landlord, pay different bills, provide transportation,


maintenance, repair parts and general supplies etc. Another problem


was units (and nearby commanders) on any given post may be from the


subordinate numbered armies, the Forces Command, or the Training and


doctrine Command. The Chief of Staff, CONARC, Maj. Gen. Pepke,


forwarded a letter to Maj.Gen. Kalergis on the installation


management studies and their utility in rewriting Army Regulation 10-


10. The Army regulations are the organizational concrete which


estabish relationships, policies and procedures for the vast


enterprise. When Maj. Gen. Kalergis forwarded the letter to his


superiors, he added this telling remark on the cover sheet,"Attached


letter from MG Pepke on the functional studies of CONARC and


installation management conducted by COL Myron's group reinforces our


view of what a singularly important effort that was. CONARC is


making extensive use of the studies in their reorganization planning.


This is a long step in the right direction as it reflects the


positive attitude for CONARC." (116)


Gen William C. Westmoreland retired on 30 June 1972. While


Gen. Abrams confirmation was held up in Congress, the Vice, Gen.


Palmer became the Acting Chief of Staff of the Army. Congress held


up the confirmation to question the administration's war in Cambodia.


Lt. Gen. Norton presented the CDC Detailed Plan for Reorganiza-


tion on 19 July 1972. CDC was able to eliminate 416 manpower spaces


and release a 90- man tank company to another command, but they had


not met the overall goals of the reduction. Norton voiced his con-


cern over unresolved problems. He noted there were basic differences


of opinion concerning the command structure and the procedures for


conducting operational testing and field experimentation. As pre-


viously described, the automated Basic Policies for Systems Acquisi-


tion in the Department of the Army had not been developed for appli-


cation to the new organization of the Army in the continental U.S.


Also, how was the Department of the Army going to manage the new Test


Agency and the new Concepts Analysis Agency? Once again he argued


that the timing of the reorganization precluded a thorough look at


all of the alternatives. (117)


The CONARC Detailed Plan for Reorganization also was submitted


on 19 July 1972. The CONARC historian's account of the concerns of


the CONARC Chief of Staff, Maj. Gen. Pepke, will be given in full to


illustrate the nature of the problems.


"He was concerned about the command relationships which were


apparent in the Detailed Plan, particularly that which he


labeled the "dual-hat syndrome." Throughout the Detailed Plan


it was very evident that the basic reorganization concept had


forced the subordinate amy commanders, as well as every


installation commander, to report to more than one senior


headquarters. While this split in responsibility was not


unique, the proliferation of this practice at almost every level


was a grave concern to the U.S. Continental Army Command.


General Pepke pointed out that this meant that total


responsibility was being thrust upon the installation commander


and it was he who would have to account for all resources


received and expended. Looking down, the installation


commander/manager "commanded" as far as he could see; looking


up, on the other hand, he could see several managers, any one of


which would be his "commander" under certain circumstances. The


position of the CONUS Army Commander would be equally


difficult, since he had the burden of tremendous


responsibilities and an increased geographical area to oversee,


yet his control of resources was minimal and his authority was


tenous. His relationship to the major installation commanders


in his area of responsibility was merely one of "co-ordination


before crisis."




While the STEADFAST planners had attempted to specify the


command relationships of the subordinate armies with the major


commands and their subordinate installations, those relationships had


been difficult to define and left room for misunderstandings. Maj.


Gen. Pepke pointed out that, fundamentally, management was not


synonymous with command, a fact that heated problems with the


implementation of plans already developed. While the management


arrangements contained in the Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan


appeared to be practicable and workable, the command arrangements


departed substantially from the traditionally understood military


principle of unity of command. A decision to execute this plan


constituted a decision to abandon this long accepted principle and


accept in its stead the concept of a split in allegiance, loyalty,


and responsibility as a normal command alignment. Maj. Gene Pepke


pointed out that the consensus of his staff was that this constituted


a dangerous departure from sound command theory and practice.


However, Maj. Gen. Pepke firmly pointed out that the Operation


STEADFAST planners would continue to review the Detailed Plan for


reorganization and would use it as the basis for te required


Implementation Plan." (118) The last comment was the most telling.


CONUS was on board with the program for reorganization.


The Operation STEADFAST Detailed Plan was submitted to the


Project Manager on 20 July 1972. The detailed plan was in literally


very detailed. In addition to the Executive Summary there were three


books. Book I had data which would be related to Phases I and II in


the Outline Plan for the period from January to December 1973. This


book had personnel and cost data. This book also had the


chronological sequence of actions to complete the reorgainzation.


Book I had the various levels of management from the highest


headquarters down to all the schools and installations. Book II


covered the period from January to July 1974. This book was


concerned with the final co-ordination of the new commands being


formed. Book III was a list of the on-going actions. These actions'


relationships with STEADFAST were not clear. Potential changes in


Books I and II were noted. (119) The detailed plans gave the


reorganization its shape.


The Training and Doctrine Command would be responsible for "the


development , direction, management, and supervision of individual


training for the Active Army and the Reserve Components as well as


for formulating and documenting concepts, doctrine, training


literature, materiel requirements, and orgainzation for the Army as a


whole." The Commander would develop the plans and programs for the


introduction of new materiel into the Army. Also, he would command


the Army school system and would be additionally responsible for the


recruitment and procurement of officer and enlisted personnel. This


means the Commander of Training and Doctrine Command would directly


command 20 major installations, 35 schools, 3 doctrine and


development centers, the Army training centers, and the U.S. Army


Recruiting Command. He would direct Reserve Officer Training Corps


programs and maintain operational control of the U.S. Army Reserve


Schools and Training Divisions through the Continental U.S. Armies.


The Commander, U.S. Forces Command would command all units of


the Strategic Army Forces and of the U.S. Army Reserve and would


supervise the training of the Army National Guard. He would have


command, but not operational control of the Army Reserve and Training


Schools and Training Divisions. He would command all of the


installations associated with the Command and the Continental U.S.


Armies except for the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program. The


subordinate numbered armies (the Continental U.S. Armies) would have


the primary missions to "command the U.S. Army Reserve; management of


the Reserve Officer Training Corps Program; co-ordination of


geographic responsibilities; planning for mobilization; co-ordination


of support of domestic emergencies; and the exercise of training


supervision over the Army National Guard. The subordinate armies


would be completely eliminated from the chain of command with respect


to installations and Active Army units and activities. (120) Manpow-


er and cast figures were developed (see charts).


CONARC defined the following major issues as remaining in the


plan: civilian personnel management; civilian grade structure;


augmentation of the Third Army Headquarters; environmental impact


statements; manpower displays and troop lists; the new Medical


Command; the Army Personnel Center; installation mission statements


and area support responsibilities; the disposition of reports;


information systems; the new Logistics Management Concept; management


of Engineer functions; the Army Casualty System; management of the


ROTC programs, the Army Reserve Schools and Training Divisions; mobi-


lization planning; the U.S. Army Strategic Communications Command;


the development of the schools model; the University concept, the


Enlisted Evaluation Center; and the management of the combat


developments program. (121)


The Project Manager's Office conducted a detailed analysis of


the plans with the help of the Army Staff. This created an iterative


process with drafts being circulated to all staff agencies and


revisions made. The Chief of Staff designee, Gen. Creighton Abrams,


was briefed on the planning. He was interested in every aspect of


the project. He took a particular interest in the improved


management of the Reserve Components and Reserve Officers Training


Corps. (122) Gen. Abrams asked for a detailed layout of systems


support and time schedule for the overall reorganization. Maj. Gen.


Kalergis helped to establish a board of senior officers at the


Department of the Army level to develop an acceptable concept for


managing the Reserve Components. (123)


The Secretary of the Army approved the guidance for continuing


the reorganization plan on 23 August 1972. Lt.Gen. DePuy and Maj.


Gen. Kalergis showed that there should be no large increase in the


budget but there would be major reshuffling of the budget within


certain programs. "Mr. Froehlke commented that if there turned out


to be a large increase in the FY 74 budget to support the


reorganization, then 'this is not the way to go.'" Mr. Froehlke was


aware of Gen. Abrams interest in Reserve Components. Gen. Abrams


observed that the Reserve problem lay in the support and types of


people devoted to Reserve Components. The problem was not


organizational. Lt. Gen. Depuy commented on Gen. Abrams' interest


in systems development to show the inter-relationship between


organizational actions and systems actions. DePuy emphasized that


regardless of the organizational actions taken, the new automatic


data processing (ADP) systems should not drive the decisions to


reorganize. Interestingly enough, Mr. Froehlke said he must honor


his commitment to the Governor Linwood Holton of Virginia to inform


him first of any plan to move the Recruiting Command Headquarters


(USAREC) from Virginia. Finally, "the Secretary posed no objection


to the 23 August guidance and approved its issuance." (124)


The Guidance for Reorganization Planning was published. The


guidance directed "the development of Case Study and Justification


Folders, Civilian Personnel Reduction Plans, and/or Realignment Fact


Sheets, as appropriate, in accordance with existing directives."


(125) The principal planners were to develop the documentation. The


guidance lead to the formulation of the budget through coordination


with the Army Comptroller and the Project Manager. Additionally, the


guidance lead to a thorough analysis of area support


responsibilities. The research illustrated "uncoordinated,


overlapping, and conflicting area support missions which required 150


separate maps to display." (126)


During the next two months the steps necessary for the


implementation of the plan were completed and approved. On 26


September the joint Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel/ United


States Continental Army Command Reserve Officer's Training Corps


management concept was approved. The test agency implementation was


approved with the Operations Test and Evaluation Agency


implementation plan approval on 26 September. The CONARC plan for


the assignment of schools was resolved in mid-October. The Ballistic


Missile Defense Management Study was briefed in August. The


strategic communications recommendation for a single U. S.


continental communications management structure was approved by the


Army on 11 September. The Chemical Implementation Plan and the


Recruiting Command relocation plans were near completion. (127)


A summary of the Reorganization, "CONUS Reorganization - 1973"


was prepared and approved by the Chief of Staff and the Secretary.


The summary document was sent in a letter to all major commands on 2


October. This officially informed all of the commands (and the


commanders) that the validation of the Reorganization was completed


and approved. The details of the personnel spaces and the dollars


and cents allocation in the next budget were the only pieces of the


puzzle missing. The Army was commanded, "Forward, March."


CONARC's due date for the submission of the Detailed Plan was


moved from 30 September to 20 October. By 12 October the commanders-


designate for the two new commands had been selected. Lt. Gen.


William T. Kerwin, Jr. and Lt.Gen. DePuy were to command. It


appeared that the Forces Command would be commanded by a full


General, four-stars, while the Training Command would be commanded by


a Lt. General, three-stars. General Abrams wanted a four-star


general for the command, but he did not know if could get the


authorization for another four-star general. The Army had


75 more general officers in the Summer of 1972 than it would be


allowed to have by DOD and the Congress in the following year. Among


the generals to retire early to bring the number of general officers


to the authorized number would be Generals Haines and Norton. DePuy


remembers Abrams as being "somewhat undecided as to which of us ought


to go to which command." DePuy personnally preferred the Training


Command while Gen. "Dutch" Kerwin preferred the Forces Command. When


DePuy was told he would get the Training Command he was also told,


"But you will probably be a Lieutenant General." He responded that


it made no difference. (128)


When Lt. Gen. Kerwin met with the new STEADFAST Steering Group,


he "observed that the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for


Personnel in each of the new commands was too large; spaces would


have to be clearly earmarked for reduction when the Standard


Installation/Division Personnel Reporting System (SIDPERS) was


operational and on-line. In addition, the Directors of Management


Information systems (DMIS) would have to placed on the level of the


Chiefs of Staff as required by Army Regulation 18-1. It was not made


clear, however whether the establishment of this directorate as a


special staff section would suffice." (129) Both Generals wanted


spaces cut from the Logistics sections because the Logistics Center


at Ft. Lee would assume responsibility for the work then being done




The CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group was directed to develop at


least four alternatives to handle the dismemberment of the CDC. The


alternatives included: "a combination of schools and combat


developments; a system somewhat paralleling that suggested by General


DePuy; a functional approach to combat developments similar to the


organization already established for the Office of the Deputy Chief


of Staff for Training and Schools; or the existing organization of


the Combat Developments Command reduced to approximately 150


personnel. It was abundantly clear to the participants at the


briefing that the intent of the guidance was to reduce the strength


of the combat developments staff office at TRADOC Headquarters; to


build up the three combat developments centers and make them strong;


and to ensure a close and continuous, effective and efficient


interface at the schools level." (130) The combat developments issue


was resolved at a meeting on 19 October. After some discussion


between the CONARC STEADFAST Steering Group and Lt. Gen. DePuy,


approved the CONARC recommendation to organize combat developments as


a Deputy Chief of Staff office in TRADOC organized along the


functional lines of operational control, quality control,


organizations, and miscellaneous with a 250 person ceiling. (131)


CONARC's revision to the Detailed Plan had to go through four


revisions between 20 October and 22 December 1972. The revisions


concerned the three functional combat developments centers (Combined


Arms, Logistics, and Administration), economic analysis, standardized


functional statements and organizational structures for the


Continental armies, Readiness Assistance Regions for Reserve


Components, and the ROTC Regions. Revisions from all of the


principal planners continued from 2 October through 9 November. On


2 November the Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army briefed the


Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Secretary. The Army's


reorganization was briefed as solving our manpower problems and


operating within limited funds. It would improve the development of


weapons and materiel. Most of the Active Army would be in CONUS.


The Active Army would be smaller. There would be a greater reliance


on the Reserves. It would reinforce the role of the installation


commander. (132) The reorganization had goals to improve the


readiness of the Active and Reserve Component forces, harness the


school and the combat development activities, improve the quality and


responsiveness of Army management, and reinforce the management role


of the installation commander. (133)


The installation managers, the commanders of major Army posts,


were responsible for the Forces Command and the Training and Doctrine


Command missions associated with their posts. Some of the


responsibility included the management service clubs, commissaries,


communications and medical support. Meanwhile, the Department of the


Army was to operate to keep all commands "pulled together", make


decisions on priorities and resource allocations, establish


centralized controls for tasking commands and provide resources, and


reduce the staff involvement in the day-to-day operations of the


major commands. (134)


The Army Materiel Command would undergo reorganization at the


same time as the CONARC/CDC Reorganization. Also, the major


initiative of the new Chief of Staff, the reorganization of the Army


Staff was briefed. This reorganization should be covered in the same


detail as OPERATION STEADFAST. It is important because within the


space of two years the Army was reorganized by its Major Commands,


its Staff, and by the units of the line. The three organizational


changes may be examined on their own, but they are interrelated.


Taken as a sum they are among the most significant changes in the


history of the United States Army and have shaped the Army, barring


unforeseen radical events, until well into the 21st Century.


Briefly, the Department of the Army Staff reorganization would


"Adjust Headquarters, Department of the Army procedures and/or


organizational structure consistent with the Continental United


States Reorganization, transfer operating functions to Major


Commands and field operating agencies, improve responsiveness of


the Army Staff, and reduce authorized spaces" for the Army


Staff, its 22 Staff support agencies, and 51 associated field


operating agencies." (135)


Finally, the decision was made to make a public announcement of the


Army's Reorganization in January 1973.


The role of the Army Staff was widened to execute the details of


the CONARC/CDC reorganization as normal staff actions. It was


epecially important to complete the cost estimates in time for the


budget. Once these figures were prepared by 30 November, the staff


had to turn its attention to set the Reorganization in the


institutiional concrete of documentation. A memorandum dated 5


December 1972 provided guidance for "Publication Changes Required by


the Reorganization of the Army in CONUS." At least thirteen Army


Regulations had to be changed from AR 1-24, Army Management Doctrine


to AR 10-13, US Army Strategic Communications Command. (136) Letters


were prepared to go to key members of Congress from Mr. Froehlke.


The letters contained a draft of legislation "to amend titles 10, 32,


and 37 United States Code, with respect to accountability and


responsibility for United States property, and for other purposes."




The Congress was notified of the Reorganization on 10 January


1973. A press conference was held on 11 January at the Pentagon.


The briefing covered the main points of the Reorganization. During


the question and answer period, it was disclosed that no bases would


be closed. The estimate for one-time costs was roughly $100 million.


Afterwards the savings were estimated to be approximately $190


million per year. Furthermore, there would be a reduction of 4,000


military and 11,000 civilian personnel. (138) The new Vice Chief of


Staff of the Army, Alexander Haig, was present.


The Army published information on the Reorganization in its


publication, Commanders Digest. The entire issue of 25 January was


given to the Reorganization. The highlights were given as folows:


-Elimination of the Continental Army Command (CONARC), the


Combat Developments Command (CDC) and the Third United States Army.


-Creation of the Forces Command (FORSCOM), a single field


headquarters to supervise the unit training and combat readiness of


all Army units to include the Army Reserve and the Army National




-Creation of the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) , a


single field headquarters to direct all Army individual training and


education, and the development of organizations, materiel


requirements and doctrine.


-Consolidation of the Munitions Command and the Weapons


Command into an Armaments Command.


-Consolidation of the major headquarters elements of the


Electronics Command.


-Consolidation and realignment of the Army depot system.


-Elimination of major administrative levels between all


major Army posts and the Department of the Army.


-Increased responsibility, authority, and flexibility or


installation commanders.


-Establishment of a major active Army organizational


framework, organized solely to improve reserve component readiness.


-Improving the quality and administration of the ROTC




-Creation of a new command to provide improved delivery of


Army health care in the United States.


-Improving responsiveness to individual needs and goals in


handling personnel matters in the Army.


-Improving the weapons development and procurement


processes by updating managerial practices and organizations in


recognition of technological advances.


-Elimination of 813 personnel spaces from the Army staff in


the Pentagon.


-Transfer of an additional 1,986 individuals from the


Department of the Army Headquarters Staff to other commands or field


operating agencies.


-A reduction in requirements of approximately 15,000


military and civilian personnel spaces. (139)


Also, the Department of the Army Pamphlet 360-813 for the Fourth


Quarter of FY 73 carried an article on the reorganization.


Maj. Gen. Kalergis, the Project Manager, issued his final


guidance on 5 February 1973. Consequently, CONARC made what was


supposed to be its final revisions to OPERATION STEADFAST and


published them on 28 February 1973. There were further refinements


to the organizational structures and the functional statements for


the two new headquarters. The detailed overview of the Force


Developments/Combat Developments process within TRADOC were revised


as well as segments of the Combined Arms Center and the


Administration Center. There was an update to the Management


Information Systems chapters, while the Logistics Management concepts


were deleted. (140) The schedule for the final implementation was


prepared. The schedule began on 1 March 1973 and would be essentially


complete by 1 July 1973. Also, there was a list of Positive


Indicators to list events and conditions to indicate the


reorganization developed as planned. The Audit Trail traced the


savings and costs in dollars and personnel spaces.


A list of supplemental studies indicates how the reorganization


served as the impetus and the umbrella for Army-wide reorganization


and reformation. The list included:


Continental Army Command OPERATION STEADFAST Detailed Plan,


20 July 1972


Revision to OPERATION STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 20 October




Revision to STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 30 November 1972


Revision to STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 18 December 1972


Revision to STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 22 December 1972


Reserve Component Management, Revision to STEADFAST


Detailed Plan, 10 January 1973


Revision to STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 17 January 1973


Audit Trails of CONUS Reorganization, Supplement to


STEADFAST Detailed Plan, 17 February 1973


OPERTION STEADFAST Revised Detailed Plan,28 February 1973


Continental Army Command OPERATION STEADFAST Phased


Implementation Plan, 30 November 1972


Installation and Activity Study, 22 November 1972


DA Plan for Consolidation for Chemical Corps Functions, 15


December 1972


Army Air Defense Command (ARADCOM) Installation and


Activity Consolidation, Realignments, and Reductions, 24 November




Management of US Army Commissaries, 18 October 1972


Analysis of Proposal to Establish a Troop Support Command,


18 September 1972


US Army Criminal Investigation Command Reorganization,


US Army Strategic Communications Command Communications


Management Plan for CONUS-Vertical Command Concept, 5 September 1972


US Army Strategic Communications Command Implementation


Plan for Communications Management in CONUS, 1 December 1972


Modification of the US Army Correctional System, 13


December 1972


Detailed Implementation for AMEDD Reorganization in CONUS,


20 July 1972


US Army Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN) Plan, 11


September 1972


Detailed Plan for the US Army Club Management Agency, 4


December 1972


US Army Intelligence Command Reorganization Plan, 8 August




US Army Combat Developments Command Reorganization One


Detailed Plan, 20 July 1972


Detailed Plan for the Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA), 20


July 1972


Detailed Plan for the US Army Test and Evaluation Agency,


20 Judy 1972


HQ, Department of the Army Staff Management Plans, 22


November 1972


Publication Changes Required by Reorganization of the Army


in CONUS, 5 December 1972


Revision of Reorganization Plan for the AMEDD in CONUS, 30


September 1972


Revision of Reorganization Plan for the AMEDD in CONUS, 30


November 1972. (141)


Gen. Kerwin assumed his duties as the Commanding General of


CONARC on 1 February 1973. On 1 March he became the provisional


commander of the two new (provisional) commands. He retained the


CONARC title until 31 December 1973. Lt. Gen. DePuy became a Deputy


at CONARC in March of 1973. DePuy brought some of his own officers


down with him to help form the new Headquarters. These included Max


Thurman, John McGiffert Jr., and Max Noah, who became General




Revisions of the OPERATION STEADFAST Detailed Plan continued


with modifications on 9 March, 18 May, 5 June 1973, and 15 August


1973. The revisions cleared up the final details. The new hands were


on the tiller with Kerwin and DePuy. Their separate Headquarters


began to function on 1 July 1973 and the transfers of personnel and


functions were essentially complete by 1 December 1973. The


STEADFAST Steering Group was disestablished on 13 September 1973 at


TRADOC and on 7 October 1973 at FORSCOM. There were many details in


General Officer assignments and responsibilities as well as the


details of the routing of on-going and day-to-day actions.


Yet, the Spring and Summer of 1973 were the denouement to the


greatest reorganization of the Army since 1942. It was the beginning


of the next two phases of major reorganization in the Army Staff and


the line units of the Army. The first phase, the CONUS


Reorganization, may be called the Palmer-Depuy reorganization,


although Gen. Abrams helped shape the implementation of the change in


great detail. It led to the next two phases, changes in the Army


Staff and the changes in the Army configuration in the field from 11


to 16 Divisions which were the Abrams' "reformation". It was the


genesis for Gen. DePuy's tour of duty at TRADOC where he would put


his personal imprint on the training of the United States Army for


decades to follow in the DePuy "training revolution."







Operation STEADFAST was the first of three reorganizations of the


Post-Vietnam Army. The reorganization of the Army in the continental


United States was followed by the reorganization of the Army Staff,


Headquarters, Department of the Army, and the reorganization of the


line, the units in the field, to expand from 11 to 16 Divisions.


These reorganizations gave shape to what would become the post-


Vietnam Army. They pre-empted organizational change at the direction


of the Executive Branch or the Legislature. The reorganization


brought greater managerial efficiency to the organization which


allowed it to make better use of the constrained resources issued


during the decade when the Army should have been modernizing after


the years spent focused on Vietnam. Since the Army was in a better


position to manage its resources, it was arguably able to keep its


civilian superiors from becoming too involved in the micro-management


of the Army program. Furthermore, the degree of autonomy gained in


resource mangement enabled the Army to maintain relatively greater


autonomy in other internal matters of the organization. This


relative autonomy from the civilian dictation of the internal


leadership and management of the Army allowed the organization to


recapture its "essence" as a combat-ready organization and a trans-


national institution with a professional officer and non-commissioned


officer corps. This does not suggest there is a simple civilian-


military dichotomy in the management of the Army. There are changing


constellations of civilian allies and dilettantes through the levels


of the Office of the Presidency, the Department of Defense and the


Department of the Army (as well as those who would run parts of the


services from Capitol Hill). There were four Presidents between 1973


and 1981. The Army leadershlp was faithful to the tenet of civilian


control of the military. The issue was the internal management of


the organization rather than the overall direction of the defense


establishment. The reorganizations allowed the Army to persevere


through a period of excruciating national tumult and self-doubt with


its value system and purpose intact. It set the stage for all of the


hard work by many, many soldiers around the world to rebuild the Army


to be prepared to defend the nation and to remain constant to "Duty,


Honor, Country".


Let us review the points which are intrinsically supported by


the research.




- In late 1971 the Army was under pressure to change following the


Vietnam War. The Parker Panel had illustrated the need and some


possible alternatives for change in the Army organization and


management. Yet, the Parker Panel did not serve as a catalyst for




- The Office of the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff served as a unique


foci for the pressing issues of program cutbacks, budgeting,


compurterization, and other management issues near the top of the


Army pyramid. Furthermore, Lt.Gen. DePuy used one of his offices,


the Coordinator for Army Studies, to assist him in defining and man-


aging important issues "off-line" from the Army Staff and Commands.


- Gen. Bruce Palmer, the Vice, and Lt.Gen. DePuy recognized the


"impetus for change". They had a plan devised to address the most


pressing management issues at hand, which meant the enhanced control


of the units, schools, and installations in the continental United




-Generals Palmer and DePuy finessed their opposition within the Army


and won approval for the reorganization from their superiors. They


were able to maintain control of the implementation of the


reorganization to insure the details did not skew the overall






1. James E. Hewes Jr. "New Wine and Old Bottle; II: The Parker Panel

Fiasco, 1969-1971. Chapter VI- unpublished manuscript.(Center for

Military History, Washington,1982), p.1.


2. Ibid., p.3.


3. Anonymous. "Overview the Advanced Planning Process CONUS

Reorganization-1973". James E. Hewes Jr. Papers. (Center for Military

History,Washington,1974), p.2.


4. Ibid., p.3.


5. MFR, 22 July 1970,sub: VCofSA Discussion of Blue Ribbon Defense

Panel Report.


6. Hewes., p.9.


7. Ibid., p.10.


8. Ibid., p.11-12.


9.LOI, 30 September 1969, Gen. William C. Westmoreland,Jr.,sub:Review

of DA Organizations.


10. Hewes., p.13.


11. Report, 1 March 1971, sub:Report of SpecialReview Panel on DA

Organizatiion, Vol. II,TAB B. HQ DA.


12. Letters,Questionaires, March 1970, Files of CONUS Reorganization.

Folder labelled "Parker Panel".


13. Hewes., p.16.


14. Report of the Special Review Panel on DA Organization Vol.II.,

(HQ DA,Washington,1970), p. II-4 to II-6.


15. Ibid., p.II-4-10.


16. Ibid., p.II-5-19.


17. Hewes., p.21.


18. Report of Special Review panel on DA Organization., p.II-16-6 to



19. Ibid., p.II-9-6 to II-9-16.


20. Ibid., p.II-7-1 to II-7-6.


21. Ibid., p.II-6-3 to II-6-4.


22. Ibid., p.II-15-7 to II-15-11.


23. MFR, 19 May 1970,sub: Briefing for AVCofSA,15 May 1970.


24. Ibid.


25. Ibid.


26. Ibid.


27. Hewes., p.31.


28. Ibid., p.32.


29. Ibid.


30. Ibid., p.33.


31. MFR. 10 June 1970,sub: DA Organization, 3,6 June 1970.


32. Ibid.


33. MFR. 27 July 1970, sub: Senior Officers Meeting, 24 July 1970.


34. Ibid.


35. Hewes., p.26.


36. Hewes., p.44.


37. Letter. 20 December 1970, Personal Note to LTG DePuy.


38. Memorandum. 14 December 1970,sub: Recent Comments on Draft

Special Review Panel (SRP) Report.


39. Ibid.


40. MFR. 12 July 1971, sub: Interview with LTC Richard W. Thompson,

Executive Officer, SRP OCS (The Parker Panel, Monday 12 July



41. Ibid.


42. Jean R. Moenk. Operation STEADFAST Historical Summary: A History

of the Reorganization of the U. S. Continental Army Command (1972-

1973). (Ft. McPherson, Ga., Ft. Monroe, Va.),p.7.


43. Moenik., p.8.


44. Ibid., p.9.


45. Ibid., p.10.


46. Ibid., p.12.


47. Ibid., p.14.


48. General (RET) William E. DePuy, Interview, June 1984, p.21.


49. Ibid., p.22.


50. Hewes., p.17.


51. Report of Special Review Panel on DA Organization., p. II-4-9 to



52. Col. James S. V. Edgar, Interview, 8 December 1981.


53. General (RET) William E. DePuy, Interview (Doyle), 8 March

1973, p.21.


54. Ibid., p.2.


55. General (RET) William E. DePuy , Interview (Mullen/Brownlee), 19

March 1979, p.21.


56. Ibid., p.22.


57. Ibid.


58. Maj. Gen. Louis C. Menetrey, Interview, 31 March 1982, p.12.


59. Ibid.


60. DePuy (Doyle)., p.32.


61. Ibid.


62. Edgar., p.7.


63. Ibid., p.8.


64. MFR. 10 December, 20 December 1971,sub: Reorganization.


65. MFR. 19 January 1972, sub: Conference with Gen. Haines.


66. Ibid.


67. Ibid.


68. Edgar., p.19.


69. Ibid., p.9.


70. DePuy (Mullen/Brownlee).. p.23.


71. Edgar., p.10.


72. Col. William G. Tuttle, "Command and Practice", Army Command and


Management: Theory and Practice Vol. II., (Carlisle

Barracks,1976), p.692.


73. Ibid.


74. DePuy (Hewes)., p.34-35.


75. Briefing, "The Impetus for Change". January 1972.


76. Ibid.


77. Ibid.


78. Ibid.


79. DePuy (Mullen/Brownlee)., p.23.


80. Moenk., p.39.


82. Ibid., p.41-42.


83. Ibid., p.42.


84. Memorandum. LTG John Norton. February 1972.


85. Brig. Gen. William Tuttle, Interview, 23 September 1981, p.38.


86. DePuy (Hewes)., p.35.


87. Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Robert Froehlke,sub:

Reorganization,28 February 1972.


88. DePuy (Hewes)., p.35.


89. Edgar., p.15.


90. Ibid.


91. Ibid., p.16.


92. Ibid.


93. Ibid.


94. Ibid.


95. Moenk., p.45.


96. Memorandum,10 March 1972,Gen, William C.

Westmoreland,Jr.,sub:CSA Guidance to PMR.


97. DePuy (Hewes)., p.36.


98. Memorandum, 1 March 1972, LTC William Tuttle,sub: Visit With

Installation Model Team at Ft. Lee.


99. Moenk., p.52.


100. Menetrey., p.18.


101. Memorandum, 5 April 1972, Maj.Gen. James G. Kalergis,

sub:Initial Planning Guidance.


102. Ibid.


103. Moenk., p.53-54.


104. Correspndence,14 April 1972, Gen. Ralph E.Haines,

sub:Reorganization Planning.


105. Memorandum, Maj. Gen. James G. Kalergis, 24 April 1972, sub:

Briefing to Secretary of the Army.


106. Ibid.


107. Message, 24 April 1972, LTC Vouno, sub:Reorganization Planning.


108. Directive, 24 April 1972, Maj. Gen. James G. Kalergis, sub: PMR

Reorganization Directive.


109. Moenk., p.86.


110. Ibid., p.91.


111. Ibid., p.94.


112. Study, April 1972, sub: Functional Study of Installation



113. Memorandum, 15 June 1972, Maj. Gen. James G. Kalergis, sub:

Guidance for Reorganization Detailed Planning.


114. Moenk., p.112.


115. Ibid., p.116.


116. Memorandum, 30 june 1972, Maj. Gen. James G. Kalergis,sub:

Letter from MG Papke.


117. Moenk., p.133-135.


118. Ibid., p.136-137.


119. Ibid., p.136.


120. Ibid., p.137, p.146.


121. Ibid., p.146.


122. Overview The Advance Planning Process CONUS Reorganization.


123. Moenk., p.152.


124. Memorandum, LTC Paul J. Raisig,Jr., sub:Briefing for the

Secretary of the Army on 23 August 1972 Guidance.


125. Memorandum, 24 August 1972, Maj. Gen. James G. Kalergis,

sub:Guidance for Reorganization Planning.


126. Ibid.


127. Overview the Advance Planning Process CONUS Reorganization.


128. DePuy (Mullen/Brownlee)., p.25.


129. Moenk., p.213.


130. Ibid.


131. Ibid., p.215.


132. Briefing, 2 November 1972, LTC Paul C. Raisig,Jr.,sub: Outline

of Opening Remarks by Secretary of the Army Froehlke.


133. Ibid.


134. Ibid.


135. Ibid.


136. Letters,December 1972,sub;Proposed Legislation.


137. Memorandum, 5 December 1972, OAVCSA, sub: Publication Changes

Required by the Reorganization of the Army in Conus.


138. News Briefing, 11 January 1973, Secretary of the Army Robert F.

Froehlke and Creighton W. Abrams.


139. Commanders Digest.,Vol.13 No.12, January 25, 1973, p.2.


140. Executive Summary., 28 February 1973, sub: Operation STEADFAST

Revised Detailed Plan.


141. Report of Special Review Panel on DA Organization.


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This paper is an historical account of the events of the


Reorganization of 1972-1973. I did not attempt to take one


historiographical approach or another. Also, there are many


political science paradigms for bureaucratic political science


framework. The political science literature on bureaucracies begins


with Max Weber. Every major contribution since Weber provides a new


perspective for analysis. Chester Barnard looked at the direction of


public orgaizations with the focus on the role of the executive


(The Functions of the Executive, 1938). Herbert Simon recorded and


refuted the parables of public administration (Administrative


Behavior,1958). Peter Blau and Richard Scott looked at the process


of organizational change with the key being innovations by the


executive in terms of inducement-contribution balance for


organizations (Formal Organizations, 1962). Edward Banfield looked


at planning as rational choice, means-ends schema (Concepts and


Issues in Administrative Behavior) and with emphasis on the mechanism


of choice of public interest as a partial determinant of the control


of public interest (Politics, Planning and the Public Interest,


1955). James March and Herbert Simon studied planning as result of


rational choice inproblem solving (Organizations,1958) and included


"Gresham's Law of planning which stated daily routines drive out


planning. Charles Lindblom (The Policy-Making Process, 1968) and


Yehzekhel Dror added to the literature with emphasis on the


incremental nature of change in organizations. Morton Halperin


specifically addressed the planning in organizations (Bureaucratic


Politics and Foreign, Policy, 1974). James Q. Wilson (The


Investigators, 1978), and Hugh Heclo (Government of Strangers) added


specificity as to the varying interests of different people within


organizations. There have been explanations of organizational


behavior as sociological interpretations (Selznick), cultural


interpretations (Crozier) and economic interpretaions (Niskanen).


This paper provides the grist for an analytical mill. The next step


would be to borrow from Karl Popper (Conjectures and Refutations) and


attemps to rigorously test a hypothesis. Consequently, the


conclusions from this paper are only inferences from the research and


observation of the author. The utility of the paper is the


exposition of the "facts", the data, of the case and the suggaestion


of their importance.The paper illustrates several issues in bureau-


cratic politics; the Army as an professional orgainzation, the Army


as a unique Federal bureaucracy, management in civil-military


relations, and the turning point in history for the post-Vietnam era.





This paper is totally indebted to the work of Dr. James E. Hewes


Jr. Dr. Hewes gathered all of the primary source documents and had


conducted important interviews before his retirement from the Center


of Military History. The original documents had been retreived from


the U.S. Government storage. I went through the boxes of materials


Dr. Hewes had at the Center of Military History. I found twenty


boxes which had material for my paper. While researching at the


Center I acquired other papers and interviews for my research.

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