Terrorist Suicide Operation Analysis
CSC 1985
SUBJECT AREA General
I. INTRODUCTION
In the second half of the twentieth century terriorism has
become a critical issue all over the world. It is no longer
limited to small and remote countries or to historically explosive
regions such as the Middle East. Terrorism has managed to flourish
in almost every democracy in the world: the PLO in Lebanon and
Israel, the Corsican movement in France, Armenian terrorists in
Turkey and North America, the Provisional IRA in Ireland and Great
Britain, the Red Brigade in Italy, the Red Army in Japan, the
Baader-Meinhof Gang in West Germany, the Libyan state-sponsored
"death squads" in the Middle East and Europe, the Tupamoros in
Uruguay, and recently the Maoist Shining Path movement in Peru and
the Shiite fundamentalist groups in Iran and Lebanon. Most of
these organizations have found it convenient to cooperate with each
other, forming what the author Claire Sterling has accurately
depicted as a "terror network." These groups do not restrict their
operations to their original country or area and have spread a mesh
of terror over the entire world. A quick glance at the map of
terror in the world shows that the groups concentrate on and appear
to cooperate to some extent on missions in democratic countries,
countries where public opinion has significant influence on
goverment policy.
Terrorism has become a weapon by which the fear of masses of
innocent civilians exerts a pressure on the governments responsible
for their safety, a pressure which often forces unwilling
compromises with the terrorists and which yields them an indirect
but quite potent form of political power. What motivates groups
towards terrorism? We can classify terrorist groups as follows:
Nationalist motivations (e.g. the PLO), ideological motivations
(e.g. Marxist groups such as elements of the IRA and Maoist groups
such as the Shining Path), religious motivations (e.g. Shiite
funadmentalist groups), and motivations that extend the power of an
existing nation state (e.g. the Libyan "death squads"). Some
groups appear to have a narrow focus, such as the abortion clinic
shutdowns attempted by some pro-life groups in the U.S. or the
Shiite groups in Iran and Lebanon. Other manifest several
tendencies at once such as the Marxists national liberation groups.
During a June, 1977, conference on international terrorism held in
France, Professor Dror of Israel's Hebrew University defined the
six trends that have assisted the growth of terrorism into a first
degree, strategic problem in the second half of the 20th century:
1. The rapid development and proliferation of all kinds of
weapons and the ability of terrorist organizations to acquire large
quantities of efficient and destructive devices.
2. The modern socio-technological system which has developed
and created numerous highly vulnerable targets such as
transportation nets, power grids, and dense concentrations of
populations.
3. The development of mass media which now permits terrorists
rapid and direct access into people's homes, allowing them free
advertising of their goals, grievances, and power. In a sense, the
media have transformed many butchers into media stars, often
permitting greater media access to the Daniel Ortegas of the world
than to the Sister Theresas.
4. Modern transportation, especially aircraft, which serve as
a tool for rapid evacuation and mobility for the terrorists. It
also permits the selection of targets which are diverse and widely
separated, allowing the PLO in Lebanon to hit targets such as the
Lod Airport massacre using Japanese Red Army terrorists flown in on
commercial jets.
5. Controversies and disagreements in the international system
which result in either active or passive support. This is
especially troublesome with countries which behave as if they were
paranoid creations instead of national legal entities and who use
terrorists as tools for their political, ideological, or religious
goals. Examples here include the Soviet Union, Libya, Syria, Cuba,
and Iran, who support avrious groups with funds, weapons, training
instructors and bases, and even diplomatic cover.
6. Finally, the Western emphasis on a tradition of political
liberalism and a sensitivity to human rights issues. While
acknoledging the positive aspects of these traits, it must be
accepted that they place a great burden on Western nations' ability
to effectively counter terrorism.
Terrorism, like any major sociological phenomenon, is a very
broad and complex subject. In this research paper, I chose to deal
with two dimensions of terrorism found in the PLO: terrorist
training and suicide missions which spring from nationalist
motivations. The concept of premeditated suicide training and
operations is strange and quite difficult for most individuals
brought up in a Western Free World culture. For that purpose, I
will use an operation conducted by the "Fatah", a component of the
PLO, on 4-5 March 1975 in Tel-Aviv... the "Savoy operations." The
goal of the analysis of this operation is to familiarize the reader
with this special type of terrorism so as to provide a better
understanding and knowledte of how to deal with this plague of
modern societies. Knowledge such as this is a key ingredient to
success in military operations so it is perhaps fitting here that
we remember the words of a classic Chinese military thinker seen
through the pen of his modern day counterpart, Mao Tse-tung:
"We must not belittle the saying in the book of Sun Wu Tzu, the
great military expert of ancient China, 'Know your enemy and know
yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster.'"
Each terrorist operation is different, unique due to the
familiar characteristics of battle and men. Thus, one Fatah
mission will be somewhat different than another. I have chosen a
"typical successive" suicide operations but again I must emphasize
that is only one example from Fatah and not necessarily typical of
other terrorist organizations.
The analysis of this operation has been conducted from a
military perspective and the investigation was only looking at the
terrorist side of the operation. In order to understand the
motivations of these terrorists, it is impossible to avoid touching
on some broader issues such as the political aspects of the PLO. I
will attempt to avoid these issues, including the social psychology
of the Palestinians, to the extent possible. These issues are
naturally a part of the operations mainly as they affect the morale
and motivation of the terrorists. In this work of limited scope,
they will be dealt with as necessary.
The first part of this research paper will describe the
training of the PLO: military, political, ideological, and
psychological. I will examine this as a generic topic, without
tying it specifically to suicide type missions. This will provide
the reader with some background on terrorism, the PLO as an
organization, and its people. The second part of the paper will
analyze the specific operation which occurred on 4-5 March 1975 and
which was described by the Israeli State Radio as follows:
"On the night of March 4th, 1975, at 11:00 PM eight terrorists
in two teams were landed by rubber boat on Tel-Aviv's beach.
Shooting and throwing grenades, they captured the Savoy Motel near
the center of the city, capturing the guests as hostages. Early in
the morning of March 5th, an Israeli paratroop unit penetrated into
the motel, killing seven terrorists and capturing one. Five
hostages were freed and five were killed by the terrorists. A few
hours later the ship that transported the terrorists was captured
and its crew (including another terrorist commander) were taken as
prisoners."
II. THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO)
Background of the PLO
The PLO was founded during a convention in East Jerusalem in
May, 1964. In June, 1964, the PLO declared its resolutions,
including the goal of the liberation of Palestine: "Palestine is
an Arab homeland." The so-called Palestinian problem stems from
1948 and the Israeli War of Independence when 600,000 Palestinian
refugees spread over the Arab World during the conflict with the
Arab countries. Most of these refugees found temporary homes in
Jordan and Egypt. The Fatah was also founded in 1964 and was
initially sponsored by Syria. Fatah is the largest and most
influential group in the PLO. Since February, 1969, Yasser Arafat
has served as the Head of the PLO. See Figure 1 for a current PLO
Organizational Chart.
Since its inception, the PLO has conducted its fight with
Israel using both political and military means and supported by all
of the Arab states. The resulting guerrilla war with Israel peaked
in 1982 when Israel invaded Lebanon, and the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) destroyed the PLO's bases and forced them to be evacuated to
other Arab states. The war between the Palestinians and the Jews
is not just the fighting of two nations over the same piece of land
but also involves a battle between two distince cultures. The PLO
represents an oriental society with its traditions and habits.
Israel is basically a Western-style democratic society on a
socialist model. This last sentence, emphasizing the cultural as
well as the national basis of the conflict, should be kept foremost
in the reader's mind as he/she follows the rest of this paper.
Click here to view image
TRAINING
Terrorism as a form of political expression has no
meaning unless it is supported by physical and moral terrorism.
Throughout the century until the mid-1960's terrorists
believed that they had only to give a man a bomb or a revolver
and encourage him to throw it or fire it at "the enemy." These
agents provocateur gave their agents no training in how or where
to use their weapons and it was not even considered essential
that they should know how they worked. Fatah was the world's
first organization to embark upon systematic training for
terrorism and the other groups within the PLO soon followed.
From the military point of view, such training made good sense:
for terrorisim to thrive, it must be seen to be successful and
greater success could only come from efficient training.
Training includes few different areas. In this work, I
will deal with the following areas of training: military
trainings, political and ideological training, and psychologist
training. Each area of training is completed with the other
ones and those all have the same final goal: to build a
structure of military force in order to fight Israel.
Military Training:
The early extensive training of Palestinians was
carried on in Algeria. Later on, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon
became centers of training activity. After the Jordanian
civil war on September 1970, training camps were moved out
of Jordan, mostly into Syria and Lebanon, which became the
major locus of training camps, supply depots, and repair
facilities. In 1971, Libya began to fund and organize
training camps. At the high point of PLO-Libyan relations
in early 1972, there were said to be as many as 8,000
commandos training in Libya. Specialized training is given
in Algeria, Egypt, and Libya. Palestinian frogmen are said
to have been trained in Ras Hilal near the Libyan-Egyptian
border since 1971.
Selected trainees have been sent to the People's
Republic of China and Vietnam. Palestinians are trained
also in Iraq, Yemen, Kuwait, Uganda, the Soviet Union, East
Germany, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia. The
training camps are usually in rear areas, often in
mountainous terrain and are kept as inconspicuous as
possible. Installations usually consist of nothing more
than ordinary buildings or tents.
The instructors are not always themselves terrorists.
Many come from regular army units and are specialists in the
use of explosives and booby traps, small arms, camouflage,
field survival, attacks against underwater targets, and in
assassination. Secured from the armies of Libya, Algeria or
Syria, these men do a tour of duty in some terrorist camp
and then return home. Other teachers are Palestinians who
have been specially trained as instructors in Arab
countries. By 1976, progress in training had reached a
point where a "War College of the Palestinian Revolution"
was graduating officers to serve in the "al-Asifah forces."
The Soviet Union and other eastern block countries,
especially East Germany, are training Palestinian
instructors and also sending selective men from special
units who visit terrorist camps to impart particular
knowledge about the recognition and killing of enemy
intelligence agents, for instance. South Yemen has become a
major training center, mainly because its geographically
isolated position gives it a high degree of invulnerability
from attack and security from spies. At any moment in South
Yemen, in the three camps at Hanf, Mukalla and Al-Gheidha,
about 700 Cubans, backed up by 1,500 Russians and 116 East
Germans, are training terrorists from all over the world.
Trainees have included members of the German Red Army
faction and the South Moluccans of the Netherlands. The
Egyptian magazine October reported on May 16, 1978:
South Yemen has turned the island of Socotra
into a stronghold for the Palestinian terror
organizations and for terrorists from many
countries. Soviet experts are also operating
on the Island.
The Russians initiated their intensive training in
1978. Hundreds of Palestinians were being given advanced
terrorist training in 40 top security schools, mostly in the
Moscow suburbs and also at Baku, Tash Kent and Odessa. A
course is attended by up to 60 PLO trainees, drawn from the
various groups according to a quota system. The routine is
well established. Carrying doctored Jordanian, Iranian or
Lebanese passports, the recruits travel to Moscow, where
they are met by the Director of the PLO office.
The first lectures are about the achievements of the
Bolshevik Revolution and the advantages of the Soviet
order. After aptitude tests, those Palestinians considered
above average are transferred for special courses to KGB
schools, though they are not allowed to meet the
intelligence officers from Libya, Syria, Iraq and South
Yemen who are trained there.
Between 1974 and 1979, at least 1,000 Palestinians had
been trained in the Soviet Union or other eastern block
countries.
There is a description of a training camp at Sanprobal
near Simferapol on the Black Sea and it says:
There for six months, the Palestinians--along with
activists from Libya, Iraq, South Yemen and Algeria--
are given an arduous course of study, including basic
military field exercises, communications techniques and
lectures in theory. But at the heart of all this
instruction comes extensive 'engineering classes' . . .
The syllabus includes the following:
Study of regular and electronic detonators
Production of incendiary devices
Preparation of an electrical charge by means of a
detonation
Study of exploding metals
Crossing rivers by rubber or wooden boats
Study of fuse types-detonating card red;
instantaneous fuse red; safety fuse black
Blowing up of vehicles, ammunition dumps, petrol
tanks
Preparation of anti-personnel minefields.
In an Arab country, a typical camp contains from 100 to
150 recruits. A Fatah camp in Syria, for example, had 120,
ranging in age from 17 to 25, with five military
instructors, a physical training instructor, and a political
commissar. The rank and file of the recruits are made up
predominantly of peasants and members of the lower middle
class with the great majority coming from the refugee camps.
A volunteer that is accepted is sent to a training camp
for a trial period of 20 days, during which his stability,
obedience, and capacity for self discipline are assessed.
About a third of the volunteers are said to fail. Those who
pass go on to take the regular course, lasting two months,
as full fledged guerrilla terrorists. Physical training
includes long distance running, jujitsu, and karate.
Military training starts out with instruction in the
use of a variety of weapons, such as automatic rifles and
pistols, bazookas, rockets, mines, and "white weapons"
(daggers and bayonets). Tactical training includes
simulated individual and group attacks on enemy
installations, ambushes, laying mines, crossing minefields,
crossing electronic fences, and hand-to-hand combat.
Seasoned recruits go through maneuvers with live ammunition,
and run over obstacle courses which include barriers of
flaming kerosene. Night marches are often undertaken and
many hours are spent on guard duty. Special attention is
given to familiarizing the recruits with use of the terrain,
which is often not well-suited for guerrilla operations,
except for mountainous areas. Discipline in the camps is
strict; alcoholic drinks are prohibited and meals are
usually eaten standing up. A man found asleep on guard duty
three times in a row is summarily discharged. The typical
training schedule is as follows:
4:00 A.M. Reveille, a run, physical training
4:45 A.M. Breakfast
5:15 A.M. Wash, clean up camp
7:30 A.M. Assembly for discussion, day's program
distribution of tasks
9:30-10:00 A.M. Free time
10:00-12:00 Noon Physical training, close combat
training, reading
12:00-1:30 P.M. Lunch
1:30-3:00 P.M. Free time, cleaning equipment, weapons
training, target practice
3:00-5:00 P.M. Political education
5:00-6:00 P.M. Free time
6:00 P.M. Supper
8:00-9:00 P.M. First night watch begins, lights out
In addition to the commando subjects, there are few
schools that have full size dummy aircraft for practicing
the art of hijacking. Detailed plans of every type of
passenger aircraft are available from the PLO's central
intelligence department and the movement of cabin staff has
been studied and reported.
Other subjects that are being taught in foreign
countries include photography, forgery, languages,
cryptography, oratory and disguise.
Terrorists chosen for a raid against Israel in which
they have little chance of surviving are not of high
intellectual calibre. Their training has been largely
military with a heavy emphasis on indoctrination, based on
the duty they owe to Islam. Many leave on their mission
expecting to become "martyrs" and, therefore, to reach
paradise immediately after death at the hands of Israeli
soldiers. Their main aim is to kill as many Israelis as
possible. To this end, their training has been designed to
make them persist in the face of all the odds against them
and not to surrender. Certain terrorist coups, such as the
raids and massacres of children at the towns Kiryat Shemona
and Maalot show that the training has been horrifyingly
successful.
The PLO has neglected no aspect of training. It
includes aviation in Syria. Its major terrorist amphibious
training center is at Benghazi, Libya, which is far enough
from Israel to deter the Israelis from striking at it. They
used to have an amphibious warfare school at Tyre, Southern
Lebanon, until the War in 1982.
Training is so diverse and is taken so seriously that
the PLO in 1978 created an affiliate organization, the
Palestinian Administrative Development Institute (PADI) to
run management training courses. Graduation ceremonies are
held and a high ranking PLO official always attends. PASDI
is partly designed to give the PLO a respectable face in the
management-minded West and is an integral part of a master
plan which can only be seen as extraordinarly sophisticated.
Political Training
In keeping with their ideological conceptions of
insurgent war, all commando groups provide some form of
political training. The rationale behind this attitude is
expressed by a Fatah leader: "In a liberation movement,
political policy springs from the mouth of the rifle, and we
in Fatah are fighters in the political field as well as in
the military field. Each of these fields serves and
complements the other with Fatah's general strategic plan.
Thus, we do not differentiate between political action and
military action, and to emphasize this we refrain from
sending to the armed resistance field any combatant unless
he passes through our political organization."
The same leader said that Fatah's basic rule is that
its men "should first be politicians, and then fighters."
The terrorist training camps devote as much as ten hours a
week or more to political indoctrination and discussion.
Each camp ordinarily has its own library containing Arabic
newspapers and periodicals, the Palestinian National
Covenant, the numerous publications of the PLO and Fatah,
and the writings of terrorist leaders like Habash and
Hawatimah. Instruction is given in subjects such as Arab
and Islamic history, the Palestinian cause, the goals of the
Palestinian Revolution, and the "evils" of Zionism and
imperialism.
A description of political training in Fatah camp says:
"Political formation is of a much lower standard than
military training. Certainly there are political books:
Castro, Guevara, Mao Tse-tung, Giap, Rodinson, General de
Gaulle's memoirs and also Mein Kampf. In view of my
surprise at the inclusion of the latter work, the political
commissar explained that it was necessary to read everything
and that, as the Israelis behave like Nazis, it is useful to
know something about the Nazis."
The general intellectual level is underdeveloped, and
if we do not consider the presence of revolutionary books as
the expression of an integrated political culture, it can be
seen during discussion on precise points (not general
declarations and stock phrases) that the theoretical tools
are embryonic and the ideology confused. From Fanon they
take the description of the psychology of the colonized and
the need to resort to violence: from Guevara, the test
advocating the need for armed conflict; from Mao, the
concept of the prolonged war; from Debray, whose works are
extensively translated into Arabic, the idea that the party
is useless, for "the guerrilla nucleus is the party in
gestation." The only elements which are in some way
integrated are those that can be integrated by a national
movement, which is what Fatah really is.
Another description of Fatah political training was
provided by Al-Sayyad. The school, called "The School of
political cadres," consisted of a corridor of a building.
It contained a blackboard, an emblem of Fatah, a map of
Palestine, and a blow up drawing of Kalashnikov. The
students were regular Fatah members and the instructor was a
Fatah unit leader. The curriculum consisted of: the study
of different revolutions, the historical background of the
Palestine conflict, the aims and ideologies of the movement,
the Zionist movement and Israeli military establishment, the
revolutionary awakening and revolutionary conduct, the
geography of Palestine, and training techniques which would
be used in helping Arab farmers.
Another visitor to the PFLP school (Habash faction)
described that the course lasted five months, longer than
those run by other movements. The training given both
political and military was directed to forming cadres
capable of running bases, creating and giving purpose to
clandestine cells and planning guerrilla action in town and
country.
The program was based on 45 hours of work per week, the
political and military studies alternative from week to
week. The political program was developed into four
sections with courses made up of factual lectures,
explanations and discussion of books. The status of
teachers varied: some had come to give only one lecture and
depart, while others were paid staff. The students, aged
from 18 to 30, were carefully selected and their program
covered these subjects.
1. Marxist-Leninist Theory:
Principles of Marxist Philosophy
The Communist Manifesto
Marx, Engels, Marxism, Lenin
Utopian Socialism and Scientific Socialism
State and Revolution
Origins of the Family, the State and Property
2. The Kind of Age We Are Living In:
Imperialism
Revolution and Counter-Revolution
National Liberation Movements and Neo-colonialism
The Socialist Camp and the Third World
The Revolution in China, Korea, Vietnam and Cuba
The Workers' Movement in Europe
The National Arab Liberation Movement
Arab Unity and Socialist Perspectives
3. Political Problems:
Israel and What it is Like
Imperialism and the Arab Reaction
The Strategy of the War for Popular Liberation
The Nature of the Regimes in Jordan, Lebanan, Syria,
Iraq, Egypt
The Palestinian Problem and the Arab World
4. PFLP:
The Birth and Development of the Movement
The First Split and its Causes (PFLP-High Command)
The Second Split and its Causes (PDFLP)
The PFLP as the Marxist-Leninist Party
The PFLP at the Military Level
Relations with Political Organizations and the Arab
States
The PFLP in Lebanon
The PFLP and the Arab Nationalist Movement
Comparing Fatah, the PFLP and PDF shows that PDF's
training ahead of any of the others, in sophistication,
including as it does exposure to the works of such western
thinkers as Maurice Dobb, Paul Ravah, and Charles
Bettelheim
PLO Psychological Training
Aside from the various other training functions one would
expect in a "shadow government" and a military organization, one
PLO training department deals specifically with terrorism, that is
to say, the psychology of terror as opposed to its tactics which
are taught separately. The PLO appears to have been first in the
specific use of psychological conditioning of terrorist forces.
Prior to the introduction of psychological training, the degree of
terror induced from a mission had been merely that which naturally
resulted from the individual act (e.g. raid, embassy seizure, or
aircraft hijacking). The PLO ensured that its schools were staffed
with psychologists who specialized in the "fear factor." The most
effective of these instructors were Soviets and Bulgarians
although, after 1978, Syrians, Iraqis, and Palestinians largely
took over psychological training from the Soviets.
Trainees are taught that the greatest degree of terror can be
induced in adults by making either explicit or implicit threats
against children. This technique has been used many times against
those Israeli Arabs who have not been eager enough to help the PLO
with safe houses, funds, and information. Students of terrorism
are also told that uncertainty engenders fear and, therefore,
hostages should never be given information of any kind so as to
heighten this aura of uncertainty. Discomfort also increases the
hostages stress, fear, and uncertainty; for this reason hostages
are normally not permitted the use of the lavatory or even to stand
up and stretch. Constant efforts at reducing the hostages
self-confidence are taught to students of terror tactics: again, it
is taught that he should be killed. Additional tactics are taught
concerning demoralization of hostages: hostages are never to be
allowed to comb their hair, to wash up, or to use cosmetics. it
can seen that these techniques, when taken together, tend to weaken
the will, the morale, the confidence and sense of identity of
hostages. These techniques come directly from the Soviet KGB
manual on the treatment of political prisoners.
Students are constantly reminded that "terror must be seen to
be terrifying;" making people half afraid means nothing. They must
really believe that their lives are in danger. Then, they will
never forget."
II. THE SAVOY OPERATION
This part is based upon facts and from the author's personal
knowledge the framework of the analysis of the operation will be as
follows:
A. Mission.
B. Concept of Operations
C. Biography of the Terrorists and Their Backgrounds.
D. Sequence of Actual Events.
E. Training.
F. Psychological Preparation.
G. Equipment.
H. Intelligence Gathering and Deception.
I. Comparison the Plan and Execution.
Now that we have studied the training of the PLO in military,
political, and psychological areas, we will look at their execution
of terrorist missions. We will look at terrorist operations from
the following perspectives:
A. Types of operations.
B. Reasons for chossing certain objectives.
C. Reasons for choosing the specific date of an operation.
A. Types of Operations
Terrorist operations can be generally divided into two types:
raids (i.e. limited objectives missions with planned withdrawals)
and suicide missions (i.e. missions where no planned withdrawal
exists... "one way" operations where the terrorist(s) are trained
for the mission execution and to kill themselves while doing the
mission). Raids may involve either killing missions, mining or
booby trapping operations, hostages kidnappings, hit-and-run mortar
or rocket attacks, or some combinations of the above. Suicide
missions may also involve kidnapping hostages so as to dramatize
the event with prolonged negotiations over certain demands to be
met for their release; in the final analysis, the tactics used
still inevitably call for suicide and involve murder of the
hostages...typical for the killing mission.
B. Reasons for Choosing Certain Objectives
Objectives for both raids and suicide missions are mainly
oriented against people even when the military objectives are set
as buildings. An objective can be chosen because it serves as a
political feature (e.g. Parliament), it is a religious holy place
(e.g. the mosque at Mecca), or will house an important function
(e.g. the IRA attack on the British conservative party convention).
An objective can be selected several times in order to force people
to permanently leave it (e.g. repeated PLO shellings and three
terrorist attacks on the northern Israeli city of Naharia). An
objective can be chosen because it is symbolic (e.g. Kibbutz
Hanitta was attacked four times because it represents a symbol of
the Jewish settlements in the far north of Israel). There are also
the reasons of proximity and intelligence: an objective is chosen
either because it is physically convenient (e.g. the recent attempt
to put a car bomb into Metullah on the Israeli-Lebanese border) or
because terrorist intelligence indicates that penetration to the
objectives has a high probability of success (e.g. the recent
tourist penetration of the White House should alert the reader to
the potential for a similar terrorist penetration of such high
political value targets).
C. Reasons for Choosing the Date of an Operation
Dates normally symbolize well-known historic events such as the
Israeli declaration of independence, date of the founding of the
PLO, or date of the start of the 1967 War. Some dates may not be
as obvious to all: the date of an Israeli retaliation raid which
occurred years ago and was not-highly publicized; the date of an
important event in a country which provides support to the
terrorists (e.g. May Day). Of course the date of an operation may
be closely tied to the objective, as in the case when there are
ongoing peace negotiations that the terrorists want to disrupt; in
those cases, the terrorists are providing a violent political forum
to remind people of their goals and power. A final reason is one
normally associated withy military operations: the date is one when
the forces are ready to execute, intelligence is adequate, the
weather is suitable, etcetera....
The Savoy operation represents a typical suicide killing
mission. It was planned to hit into the Tel-Aviv city center,
which is in the most densely populated region of Israel, in order
to create an impressive shock effect. The operation was in
retaliation for a surgical raid that the Israeli Defense Forces did
into Beirut in April, 1973, where they killed three of the top PLO
leaders. The Savoy operational group was named after one of these
martyred terrorists, Youssef Abu Nagar; a psyhological point that
the PLO'S Beirut radio station emphasized while the Savoy mission
was ongoing. The date of the Savoy operation was chosen because of
purely military reasons concerning team readiness and
transportation. The type of operation selected for the Savoy
operation, the suicide killing mission, related most probably to
the high risk involved in any attempted withdrawal from such urban
terrain located so far from terrorist safe havens, as well as the
fact that it was a sort of demonstration of faith in the memory of
martyrs, an auto da fe.
A. Mission
This was the mission briefed to the group on 20 February 1975
by "Abu Gihad":
Suicide mission to capture two objectives in Tel-Aviv: (1) the
Manshia neighborhood Youth Club, and (2) the Tel-Aviv Opera
Building. The group would gather as many hostages as possible and
then make demands for the release of prisoners in Israeli jails.
If the Israelis would not meet the demands in 4 hours the hostages
would be killed and the terrorists would commit suicide. In case
the two objectives could not be located, any alternate populated
buildings would be selected as targets. During the movement over
the beach and assault on the objectives, the group was directed to
kill as many Israelis as possible.
B. Concept of Operations
A small commercial ship would transport the group from its base
in Lebanon along a commercial route with a deviation to bring them
to a point 25 miles west of Tel-Aviv. The eight man group (there
were originally 10 in training) would be divided into two four man
teams, departing from the ship at night with each team in a rubber
boat. Four hours of motoring was planned with naviation by compass
and use of the light houses located north and south of Tel-Aviv.
After landing, each team would move to its assigned objective with
shooting in the streets. After seizure of the objectives and
hostages, negotiations were planned. If the Israelis would meet
the demand for the release of the 20 POW's, the terrorists and
their hostages were to be evacuated by commercial aircraft to
Damascus. If the Israelis would not meet the terrorists' demands,
which was anticipated, the entire Savoy group would commit suicide.
There was no alternative withdrawal plan.
C. Biography of the Terrorists and Their Backgrounds
1. Musa Juma El-Tallka, age 23. His parents were Bedouins
(i.e. desert tribesmen) who left the town of Beer-Sheba in the
south of Palestine in 1948, immigrating to Zarka in Jordan. Musa
was born in 1952. At the refugee camp in Zarka, Musa was taught in
school that he was from Beer-Sheba. At the age of 19, in 1969, he
joined the Palestinian Liberation Army (PLA) and went through
military training near Jarash. After a few months, he quit and
crossed the Syrian border to join Fatah. There he spent several
more months in training. His story picks up again in 1972 when he
tried to penetrate with four other terrorists into northern Israel
through the Golan Heights. The Israeli Defense Forces discovered
the penetration and, after an exchange of gunfire, the team
withdrew. In early 1974, Musa joined the special boat commando
(SBC) section of Fatah and was sent to the Syrian Navy camp called
Muaskar El Gabla which is located near the port of Latakia. He
underwent training in swimming, diving, and naval demolitions. At
another camp called Burg-A-Slam, also near Latakia, Musa was taught
boat handling, and sea navigation using a compass. This special
training took place in November, 1974. Following that, Musa was a
member of a four man team sent to Lebanon where they were briefed
about a killing raid by "Abu Gihad," the Head of Fatah's armed
forces. This killing mission involved swimming south along the
Mediterranean coast to attack the Israeli tourist city of Naharia.
The team failed to find Naharia and swam back. After two months,
Musa was again called to "Abu Gihad," and was told about a new
mission, the operation that would become the Savoy operation. Musa
was to become the only survivor of the Savoy Mission.
2. Muhammed Mashala was born in Tool Karem, a city on the West
Bank. He was raised in a healthy family environment and graduated
high school in 1969. Muhammed then went to study in Beirut
University but he soon decided to quit and to join Fatah. He was
recruited into the intelligence department of Fatah and sent to
special Hebrew language training in Damascus. In 1972, Muhammed
was sent into Israel across the Jordan River on the legitimate
pretext of visiting his family. He spent most of the time on
reconnaissance in Tel-Aviv. After that, he was sent to Kuwait on a
recruiting mission where he also did propaganda work and money
collection. Muhammed was described as an arrogant man who was
proud that he was the only one with a high school education in the
Savoy operational group.
3. Hader Muhammed, age 28, the oldest member of the Savoy
group. he was born in Gaza. The son of a fisherman, he had
natural expertise in seamanship. Hader joined Fatah when he was 16
and it had just been founded. He went to Beirut from where he was
sent to the Fatah Headquarters in Abasia, Damascus. From then on,
Hader devoted his life to fighting the "hated Jewish state." He
said that the Fatah was his only home. Hader was on one
penetration operation into Israel before 1967. In 1970, he was
wounded during an Israeli raid to Karame, Jordan. During the 1970
"Black September" fighting with the Jordanians, Hader escaped from
Jordan to Syria. Until the Savoy operation, Hader spent most of
his time as in instructor in camps in Syria and in southern
Lebanon.
4. Ziad Talk El Zrir. Ziad was younger brother of the
commander of Fatah in southern Lebanon. His brother, Azmi Zrir,
was killed later during Teh 1982 Lebanon War. Ziad made himself
responsible for morale in the Savoy group. Originally from Hebron,
Ziad was an extremely devout Moslem.
5. Musa Awad, age 19. Two months prior to the Savoy
operation, Musa escaped from the Gaza Strip. Like Hader Muhammed,
Musa was the son of a fisherman.
6. Muhammed El Masri. Originally from Nablus, a city on the
West Bank, Muhammed was an introvert and not a good team worker.
Hsi father died when he was young; Muhammed spent most of his youth
in the streets, never joining any school. He was a young criminal
who was under police surveilance. Muhammed joined Fatah as a way
of escaping from the police. He had a speech impediment, was a
follower. He saw Fatah as his home.
7. Abu El Lel, age 22. Abu's family is originally from Lydda,
Israel, although he was born outside of Israel.
8. Ahmed Hamid, age about 26. His family is orginally from
Ramalla on the West Bank where he was born. He was very
experienced.
There were few common links betwen the members of the Savoy
group. Here are a few examples of these links:
a. Most of them were connected to the land of Palestine by
having been born there or having parents who still lived there,
including the West Bank and Gaza.
b. All, except Muhammed Mashala, had no high school education.
At least three members of the group had no formal education.
c. All, except two, of the group came from sociologically
unhealthy family environments. Some had social problems, such as
juvenile crime, from their early childhood.
d. From the military perspective, there was varied levels of
operational experience in the group. Three had been on previous
raids. Two had no experience.
e. All members had been trained in Syria and Lebanon.
f. None in the group had a personal vengeful motive; none had
family members hurt or killed by Israelis.
Social Composition of the Group
The group was composed of two different social types:
Palestinians whose origin was the West Bank and those who came from
the Gaza Strip. El Gonfer, their instructor, noticed the tension
between these types which was due to the inferiority that the Gaza
Palestinians felt towards those who came from the West Bank. The
West Bank Palestinians held Jordanian citizenship and had restored
their lives from the refugee camps; they had a sound educaion.
Those who came from the Gaza Strip had been kept in the refugee
camps by the Egyptians who treated them as second class citizens;
they were forced to depend on the U.N. for aid. In Palestine, the
Gaza people had originally come from mud villages along the
Mediterranean beach; the West Bank people had lived in stone
villages. These two social types were suspicious of each other and
built their social infrastructure in the group within these
subgroups. Another aspect of the group's social composition was
the contrast between the young, inexperienced terrorists and those
who were relatively more mature with experience from previous
operations. "Abu Gihad" recognized these social differences and
personally decided on the membership of each team. Each team was
built from equal membership of these social types and commanders
from each sub-grouping. Hader Muhammed came from Gaza and Ahmed
Hamid came from Ramallah on the West Bank.
D. Sequence of Actual Events
28 December 1974: Musa Guma, El Tallka, and Ahmed Hamid were
called to the Headquarters of Fatah in Damascus, Syria, and were
asked to "volunteer" for a special, dangerous mission. The
commander who called and spoke with them was "Abu Gihad", the
commander of the military arm of the Fatah Organization.
29 December 1974: Musa Guma and Ahmed Hamid reported to the
headquarters of the special boat commando department (hereafter,
SBC) in Latakia, a Syrian port. They were received by the
commander of that department, Gallal Abdalla, whom they had known
from previous terrorist training. They were introduced to the
remainder of the group, which at that point was composed of 10 men.
30 December 1974: The group met "Abu Gihad" and were briefed
in general about the dangerous mission that they had volunteered
for; this was the first that the other eight of them had heard of
the mission. The mission described by "Abu Gihard" was:
"Every one of you has been chosen for a mission of penetrating
into Israel from the sea. You will have to train yourselves
intensively in boating, sea navigation, and swimming. Each one of
you was chosen for the mission due to your special talents and the
fact that the Organization has trust in you."
31 December 1974: Gallal Abdalla, the SBC department
commander, brought the group to a camp called Burg-A-Slam near the
Latakia beach. There they met their instructor "El Gonfer"
(literally, "the lion cub"). "El Gonfer" was 19 years old.
1 January 1975: Training began and lasted a month.
31 January 1975: The group, including their instructor, was
directed to be moved to the refugee camp Sabra in Beirut by
telegram from the Fatah headquarters in Damascus. They were driven
from Syria into Lebanon in civilian clothing carrying special
certificates signed by Syrian Intelligence.
3 February 1975: The group reported to the Sabra camp
commander, Azmi Zrer, who was also the Fatah commander of South
Lebanon. The terrorists were briefed in greater detail about the
mission by "Abu Gihad":
"You will sail in a ship which normally carries fuel cargo for
Cyprus. Your direction will be south towards Egypt. The ship's
captain will bring you to a spot 30 miles west of Tel-Aviv's beach.
The rest of the way you will motor with two rubber boats so that
the Israeli radar will not discover you. When you arrive at the
beach you will capture two public buildings with hostages. Later
on, you will be briefed about the exact buildings, the way to deal
with the hostages and the Israeli government."
"Abu Gihad" then named the commanders of the two teams that
were to take the buildings: Hader Muhammed and Ahmed Hamid. The
group was moved to a base of the SBC in Sarafend, about 8
kilometers north of Tyre, and remained there. The camp is located
in an isolated house 1 kilometer from the beach highway. The
instructor "El Gonfer" got two Zodiak boats from Azmi Zrer, the
Sabra commander, and was made responsible for preparing the boats
with the help of an aide. "El Gonfer" also brought the guns and
the rest of the assault equipment, storing it in the camp near
Tyre.
15 February 1975: This day had been designated as D-day but
because due to the lack of a transport ship the operation was
delayed. That day the administrators of the "El Asifa" (literally,
"the sword") group of Fatah was looking for a ship in Beirut using
an Egyptian intermediary. The Egyptian was an engineer who worked
in a Beirut insurance company and was paid for his role.
16 February 1975: A ship named "Fahree El Deen", belonging to
a Lebanese, was rented in Beirut with its two man crew and an
Egyptian navigator for 1000 Lebanese pounds.
20 February 1975: The group received a very detailed briefing
by "Abu Gihad". Immediately after the briefing, "Abu Gihard"
interviewed each on the 10 men. He asked each of them if they
didn't want to quit and be freed from the mission. After the
private interviews, two of the men were relieved from the mission.
It was later claimed that they had been caught in a homosexual
affair.
20-26 February 1975: Training Continued. The groups morale
was considered ver low.
26 February 1975: "Abu Gihard" appeared again and gave an even
more detailed version of the 20 February briefing.
Monday, 3 March 1975: D-1
1200 hours: A message was broguth by Azmi Zrer's driver:
"Today, 1600 departure."
The group then made the last equipment
Inspections.
1630 hours: "Abu Gihad" and Azmi Zrer joined the group.
They proceeded to the beach at Sarafend Base.
That same morning the ship sailed from Beirut and at noon
arrived at the Sidon port. In Sidon, the crew received further
instructions: "Continue south to Sarafend (near Tyre). Be there at
night and signal yourselves."
1800 hours: The group gather on the Sarafend beach dressed
in civilian clothes. The last briefing was
given by "Abu Gihard". The team commanders
were given a list of prisoners and were
instructed to demand their release from
Israeli jails. They were also given
Propaganda papers writted in Hebrew, both
Israeli and Jordanian money, a small
Commercial transistor radio, and a Japanese
Radio for communication with headquarters.
1900 hours: The group and its instructor left the beach
and sailed in their boats to the ship, which
had arrived and signalled.
2000 hours: Loading was completed. This ship departed
Sarafend.
Tuesday, 4 March 1975: D-day
0100 hours: The ship changed course from west to
south-southwest. They continued to try to
contact headquarters but failed. A Hebrew
voice was heard on their frequency.
Morning Hrs. "El Gonfer" rehearsed the boat departures from
the ship and discovered that on had a broken
motor. Another attempt was made at contacting
headquarters but also failed. After some
confusion, "El Gonfer" decided that both teams
would go ashore in one boat. The other boat
was cut up and thrown overboard.
1700 hours: The ship reached the boat departure point.
1900 hours: The group launched and motored towards
Tel-Aviv at sixteen knots.
2330 hours: The group landed on the beach and captured the
Savoy Motel within minutes. Three people were
killed, two were hidden in a cabinet, and
eight more were held hostage. Three Israelis
escaped. An IDF soldier was killed preventing
the terrorists from moving to a second
objective.
Wednesday, 5 March 1975: D+1
0420 hours: An Israeli Defense Forces unit assaults the
motel. Seven terrorists are killed and one is
captured. Five hostages were freed (including
the couple in the cabinet) and five were
killed by the terrorist during the operation.
Later on the ship and its crew were caught by
the IDF Navy.
E. Training
Military Training
The first session of training for this special mission lasted
about four weeks. It was conducted in Latakia, Syria. In the
mornings, it included two hours of motoring with the rubber boats
with emphasis on compass navigation. During the afternoons, there
were two hours of weapons training and exercises capturing houses
with fighting in built-up areas (urban terrain); during this time,
demolitions was practiced. At night, ideological discussions were
held about the goals of Fatah and the great achievement of becoming
martyrs. These nightly discussions included sessions about the
"crimes of the Zionists."
The second session of the draining was conducted in Sarafend
near Tyre, Lebanon, and lasted about two weeks. Their main efforts
were directed at exercises in built-up areas (urban terrain),
fighting to capture a house using the exact teams that "Abu Gihad"
had designated. Each terrorist was assigned a special task such as
searching rooms, covering the steps, etcetera....Two of the
terrorists received special training in demolitions, including
electric explosives.
F. Psychological Training and Preparation
Beyond the fact that during training the group conducted
ideological discussions with its instructor El Gonfer, it is
important to note that both teams were briefed together by "Abu
Gihad" who gave them a feeling of self-importance regarding their
mission. The exact nature of the mission and its suicide character
were told to the group only in a late stage of their preparation.
On 30 December 1974 before they started training, the group was
told by "Abu Gihad" about a "dangerous mission." The next day,
they met again with him for a more detailed briefing...still no
mention that this was to be a suicide mission. The first time that
it was disclosed that this was a suicide mission was on 20 February
1975 when "Abu Gihad" said: "That is the reason that you were
chosen for that mission--we trust you. The danger will not make
you regret." Before he proceeded with his mission briefing on 20
February 1975, "Abu Giahd" spoke with them about how their mission
would change the political situation in the Middle East. H e gave
them the feeling that they were important and made them proud of
their mission. He described the negotiations between President
Sadat and Prof. Kissinger, mentioning that Kissinger "is a Jew and
does what Israel wants him to do. They will try to bury the
Palestinian problem. If Sadat succeeds, Syria may follow him. We
have to break this conspiracy and you were chosen to fulfill this
holy duty. You will attack the enemy in his heart and prove to the
whole world that no steps will be taken without the Palestinians."
Later on, he interviewed each man personally and asked him if he
regretted being in the mission help was offered to the men's
families....
A code word "sharafe" - "self-pride" in Arabis - was used a lot
during the psychological training. Self-pride is important to
every combatant but sharafe has an especially big role in Arab
tradition. "Abu Gihad" said: "The sharafe will be stronger than
the fear of suicide." Later in the operation we can see several
times when this term drove the group to carry on its mission and
not to give up. During the ship's movement phase, the men were
very quiet, introverted, each one within himself. When they found
that only one rubber boat was left for the mission, few of them
tried to withdraw with excuses such as: "one boat isn't enough" we
won't have the ability to work in two teams." The instructor El
Gonfer played on their sharafe and through that he forced them to
continue on their mission. During the negotiations with the
Israelis, it was suggested that they give up"...and anybody will
get hurt." They refused to surrender and during the assault all
but one of the terrorists were killed. In different terrorist
operations, the men have proven far less decisive.
After the briefings by "Abu Gihad", the group's morale dropped
very low. El Gonfer tried to speak with the group. Rest periods
were abandoned. They were obviously sullen but dangerous.
Training on Treatment of the Hostages
In his 26 February 1975 briefing, "Abu Gihad" emphasized the
brutal treament that he expected for the hostages. "Don't treat
them with comparison. Shoot each one that moves." In execution,
they followed that order, shooting the old man in the reception
room and two other guests, hitting an old French lady on the head.
In conclusion to the training chapter, it is obvious that the
group was provided basic training in boating and weapon fighting.
Their psychological motivation was based on their social
background. In order to secure their devotion to the suicide
mission, they received high level Fatah briefings from "Abu Gihad"
which used the techniques of bringing them gradually into the exact
mission -suicide - so they were accustomed to the atmosphere of
dangerous mission and in the late stage they were informed about
the suicide mission - it was easy for them to accept it - it didn't
come as a big shock. In addition, they were encouraged to
volunteer for the mission. The long briefing of the political
situation and the big change that their mission will do was
important to encourage the team who suffered from personal
inferiority and underestimated themselves. This psychological
training worked well enough; during the tense seige of the motel
they repeatedly stated that they were ready to die; seven out of
eight of them did,
G. Equipment
The equipment required by the group consisted of weapons, food,
first aid, explosives, propaganda and the POW list, money, and
communications gear.
a. Weapons. Each terrorist was armed with the Soviet AK-47
Kalishnikov rifle with six magazines as well as a pistol with a
spare magazine. In addition, the terrorists carried four hand
grenades each and electric demolitions which were used when the
Israeli Defense Forces stormed the motel. The demolitions included
two TNT boxes and detonation cables.
b. Food and First Aid. The group had brought no food with
them. During the negotiations they said that they were very
hungry: "We haven't eaten for three days." During the
negotiations, they also said that they had bandages but when one
was actually wounded, an Israeli woman was treated with a sheet
because there were no bandages. The lack of such basic
preparations certainly increased the stress and feeling of
isolation of the group and was perhaps intentional on the part of
Fatah in order to assure a short suicide mission.
c. Propaganda. The teams were issued propaganda leaflets
written in Hebrew which they dropped outside the Savoy after
seizing it. The propaganda was basically about "the legitimate
fighting of the PLO to free Palestine." In addition, each team
received a list of 20 POW's which was given to the Israelis during
negotiations.
d. Money. The teams were provided with money in both Israeli
pounds and Jordanian dynars for use as required. This is
interesting because it implied that some purchases were possible in
Israel; yet the very nature of the mission made such transactions,
at least in Israel, unlikely.
e. Communications Gear. Each team was issued a radio
transistor radio manufactured in Japan. As far as we know, no plan
for frequency monitoring, stations, or time tables existed. Just
prior to departure from Sarafen, the group was also issued a small
Toshiba brand radio transmitter. They were told that its range was
60 miles, permitting contact with the headquarters during the night
of the attack. No one received any training on this radio.
H. Intelligence Gathering and Deception
There were two main areas for intelligence gathering - the
overall movement to the objective area and the objectives
themselves; in addition, there was the need for operational
deception to cover the penetration into Israel.
a. Movement and Deception. We do not have enough information
to conclude how much the terrorists really knew about the Israeli
sea and beach patrols. They probably had no special efforts aimed
at securing such information. From previous operations, however,
they were aware that such patrols existed; there was no concerted
effort to get exact details of patrolling operations. In order to
deal with the problem of patrolling, the terrorists decided to use
deception: a commercial ship carrying cargo from Limasol, Cyprus,
supposedly bound south enroute to Port Said, Egypt. The ship
hoisted in its sails when within 50 kilometers of Tel-Aviv, using
only its engine in order to keep its visual and radar signatures as
small as possible. This was also the reason for using rubber boats
for the long voyage from the drop point into the beach. This
deception was a success and contrasts with the failure of a
previous mission near Nahariya, Israel, where the sea movement was
discovered by Israeli patrol boats. It was only after the Savoy
operation was over that the mother ship was located and detained by
the Israelis.
b. Intelligence About the Objectives. As described
previously, one of the terrorists, Muhammed Maslaha, had served as
a Fatah agent reconnoitering Tel-Aviv in 1972. He knew the area
and had recommended the choice of objectives. During the 20
February 1975 briefing by "Abu Gihad" a tourist map of Tel-Aviv
with English print data was brought to the group. Only one of the
group could read this map. That is all the intelligence given the
group about their objectives. The group was obviously lacking
critical information: how big were the buildings, how many people
would be there at the time of the attack, what kind of enemy would
they face, and, perhaps most importantly, how were they to get to
the objectives?
c. Covering Story in the Event of Capture. As the end of his
briefing on 26 February 1975, Abu Gihad" emphasized the group's
"covering story" in the event of capture by the Israelis: "If,
unfortunately, one of you will fall as a POW you have to say that
you came from Egypt. We want the Israelis to retaliate against the
Egyptians and not the Lebanese. Maybe this will contribute to the
failure of the negotiations between Israel and Egypt." The rubber
boat that was blown up by a booby trap on the Tel-Aviv beach was
found to be marked with Egyptian markings and colors; apparently,
this was also to support the "made in Egypt" cover story. This
additional deception was poorly planned and would not have
withstood a serious investigation.
I. Comparing the Plan and Execution
We will now compare the operational planning with the way it
was actually conducted. The Savoy operation was executed in four
distanct phases: (a) sea movement to Zodiak boat drop point, (b)
ship-to-shore movement and beach landing, (c) assault and capture
of the objectives, and (d) operations in the objectives.
a. Sea Movement Phase
Planning Execution
1. Embarkation. Embarkations The ship sailed from Beirut
was to be conducted at night with the at 0800 and arrived as
signalling itself with special lights. Planned off Sarafend. The
The ship would transit from Beirut commando found the ship
during daylight and anchor next to without problems. During
Sarafend. The Zodiak boats would the loading of the boats,
then load on the ship one was hit in its engine,
rendering it inoperable.
There were no spare boats
2. Ship's Movement. The The ship departed Sarafend
course was to head west as if to at 0830 and sailed west
Cyprus and then turn south along until 1300, then turning
the Port Said, Egypt route. Sails south. They arrived at
would be taken in, using engine the drop point at 1700
only, when they were 50 kilometers which was too early, so
off Tel-Aviv. On arrival at the they continued south and
drop point, the boats were to be backtracked for a 1900
debarked and the ship would pro- drop. On debarkation, the
ceed west to Cyprus. Ship sailed to Cyprus.
3. Rehearsal. None During the ship's movement,
planned for debarkation. El Gonfer, who was both
instructor and commander
during movement, ordered
the captain to stop
engines and practice
debarkation just before
1200. At that point, they
discovered that the damaged
boat was no good. They
removed the engine and cut
the boat up, throwing it
into the sea. This was to
reduce suspicions if they
were stopped by an Israeli
patrol boat. After some
confusion, El Gonger
ordered the mission to con-
tinue with one boat.
4. Communication. The After departure from Sara-
ship's departure was to be radioed fend, they tried to contact
back using a special code on a headquarters but failed
certain frequency. They were surprised to hear
a Hebrew voice on the fre-
quency. Later they tried
again without luck. They
had been given only one
frequency.
Conclusions from the Sea Movement Phase. The ship's crew was
well trained and had no problems with sailing and navigation. On
the other hand, the terrorists had problems with loading, damaging
the boat, and with communications. Although they eventually
decided to proceed, El Gonfer had to force them after they had
decided to abort the mission. El Gonfer was able to do this by
talking to their Arab pride and hatred of the Jews.
b. Ship-to-shore Movement Phase
Planning Execution
1. Movement to the Beach. The teams sailed in only
Each team was to motor in one boat. One boat at 16 knots. As
Movement to the shore would take four planned, the trip took
hours. The lighthouses north and about four hours. They
south of Tel-Aviv would assist in landed as planned
navigation to a point ashore between
the lights.
2. Beach Landing. The On landing, they opened
terrorists were to open fire immedi- fire, wounding some
ately on landing and booby trap the civilians on the beach.
boats prior to moving on the objec- The boats were booby
tives. The Israeli security forces trapped and exploded an
were to be surprised by the booby hour later, injuring no
traps. one.
Conclusions from the Ship-to-shore Movement Phase. the
movement and navigation, which wasn't planned to a precise location
on the beach, was conducted well. The penetration of Israel's
coast was covert until landing. The teams followed orders and
booby trapped their only boat.
C. Movement to and Capture of the Objectives
1. Movement on the Objec- On landing they opened fire
tives. Hader's team objective was in all directions. They
the Manshia neighborhood Youth Club, were very excited, rushing
located south of the landing beach. into the first beachside
Hamed's team was to move north of the street. They quickly lost
landing beach and capture the Opera their way and their agent
Building. Muhammed Maslaha, the forgot his directions.
agent who reconnoiterred Tel-Aviv in After a few minutes, they
1972, would direct them to their stopped trying to find the
objectives. In the event that they objectives. They remem-
couldn't locate the objectives, they bered "Abu Gihard's order
were to seize any other buildings to capture any other
including as many hostages as building. They met an
possible. The distance between the Israeli policeman who fired
planned objectives was 150 meters. on them, forcing them to
move on the nearest pop-
ulated building.the
Savoy Motel. Both teams
moved on the one objective.
2. Assualt of the Objec- The terrorists basically
tives. "Abu Gihad" had briefed the followed their planned
teams on capturing the objectives. tactics. They killed an
The teams were to burst through the old man in the reception
door, firing on anyone staying in the room, firing indiscrimi-
reception rooms. Two men were to nately as they searched the
guard the door and the rest would go rooms. Four more people
to the second floor, searching the were killed or wounded, all
rooms and gathering all hostages in civilians, including an old
a single room on the highest floor. lady and a 13 year old boy.
The hostage roon would be booby They gathered the hostages
trapped prior to starting in southwest room on the
negotiations with the Israelis. third floor. Two men
guarded the hostages while
two guarded the roof and
two guarded the entrance
steps. The rest moved
between the third floor and
the roof. The hostages'
room was booby trapped very
late, about 0400.
Conclusions from the Ship-to-shore Movement phase. Criticism
of this phase involves land navigation, individual discipline, fire
control, hostage treatment, and timeliness following orders.
Regarding land navigation, the terrorists made the mistake of
relying on one man who had been in the area three years earlier;
using a tourist map, they immediately became disoriented after
landing and couldn't find their objectives. They had poor
individual discipline, under great personal tension they fired
indiscriminately without the orders of their team commanders.
Their fire discipline itself was poor as they opened fire too
early, warning the police and resulting in a prompt confrontation
near the Savoy; this forced them, again under great stress, to
seize the first populated building without plans for follow-on
objectives. Their brutal treatment of the hostages follows "Abu
Gihad's" order to show no compassion..."if someone moves, shoot
him;" but by this indiscriminate killing, they reduced their
hostages by four. Finally, although they generally followed their
assault tactics, they were late in booby trapping the hostages'
room. In summary, due to bad navigation and stupid shooting, they
missed their objectives, capturing only one building. Later, when
they realized that they only had eight hostages, they tried to move
out of the Savoy but were trapped inside by the fire of a young
solider who live nearby and was home on leave. The soldier was
killed in later fighting. The terrorists prime error was to focus
on killing as many as possible, without realizing that it could get
in the way of capturing hostages and negotiating a POW release.
c. Operations in the Objectives
Planning Execution
1. Negotiations. "Abu Gihad On landing, they killed the
had given specific direction on how to Israelis as described deal
with the Israeli government. He above. After capturing the
said "it is important to kill a few motel, they used an Israeli
Israelis after landing to demonstrate woman who spoke Arabic as
your sincere goals. After capturing their moderator. This
the hostages, order the Israelis to woman did most of the
free 20 POW's. Their names are on the speaking with the Israelis.
list that you will pass to the The terrorists passed the
Israelis. These POW's they have to POW list along with their
Send in an airplane to Damascus or demand to speak with the
Cairo. Make it clear that if this foreign ambassadors. The
demand is not met, you will blow up Israelis replied that they
the buildings with everyone inside. were complying with the
None of you will fail and become a demand but needed more
POW." After giving the Israelis the time. The terrorists tried
list of POW's, the teams were to to find radio messages by
demand to see the French, U.N. and listening to Arabic and
Vatican ambassadors. They would Hebrew broadcasts but were
Confirm the ambassadors' identities unable to get relevant
with their passports and have them news. They became dis-
escort the departure of the terrorists appointed and felt let
and hostages to the airport. At the down. (Earlier, Israeli
airport, they were to free the Radio had reported about
hostages but keep the ambassadors the operation at 0050
on the flight to Damascus, Cairo hours. At 0100, the PLO
or even Paris. When the ambassadors station from Beirut
arrive at the objectives, they were reported on the mission,
to become the only negotiation moder- dedicating it in retalia-
ators. The terrorists were to give tion for the Israeli April
the Israelis an ultimatum of four 1973, raid on Beirut.) The
hours to bring the ambassadors. terrorists demanded the
release of 20 POW's and
made other propaganda
statements. They gave a 10
hour ultimatum. From time
to time during the
negotiations, the
terrorists said that enough
time had passed and that
they wanted to die.
2. Fighting in the Objec- The terrorists only booby
tives. After four hours of negotia- trapped the hostages' room
tions, they had planned to set the at 0400. four hours after
demolitions and blow themselves and they captured the motel
the hostages up. During the night, there
were exchanges of fire; one
team commander was killed
and the other wounded. One
of the deputy commanders
took charge and acted
aggressively. Suspecting
that the Israeli lady
moderator had told the
authorities which room
they were located in, he
had them moved to another
room. At 0420, Israeli
commandos assaulted and
the room was blown up. All
of the terrorists,
excepting one, were killed.
Conclusions from the Operations in the Objectives Phase. The
terrorists were devoted to their mission, even though they were
late in booby trapping the room and lengthened the ultimatum from
four to ten hours. These deviations can be explained by their
confusion and the fact that the Israelis gave a good explanation of
the need for a delay; the terrorists obviously wanted to give the
negotiations a chance. If the Israelis ahd assaulted earlier, the
late booby trapping would have made the assault easier and perhaps
greatly reduced casualties. The terrorists demonstrated
operational flexibility when they combined teams and shifted
commanders when the original men were taken out of action. Despite
the suicide nature of this mission, it is interesting to note that
a few bullets from one Israeli soldier were sufficient to stop the
terrorists from escaping from the Savoy and capturing a better
objective; this says something about the terrorists individual
bravery. Ultimately though, the terrorists blew themselves up
during the assault by the Israelis. They were devoted to the end,
refusing Israeli suggestions to surrender "peacefully." In some
other "suicide missions, devotion had failed but in this group the
social combination had provided itself...at least from "Abu
Gihad's" point of view. Even though the terrorists were listening
for radio news, it is very clear that they gave up trying to
contact their headquarters and fully expected that the end result
would be suicide.
case Tel-Aviv. Once in Tel-Aviv, it is of less importance that the
terrorists capture the planned objectives; it is sufficient that
they capture any objective as long as there are a reasonable number
of hostages.
In order to achieve the first goal of penetration into Israel,
the first phase of the mission must be well planned and
accomplished. With the lower importance assigned to the second
goal of killing and capturing, the effect on the mission planning
was basically just to "get in" and let the attack phase take care
of itself. This certainly makes such an operation much more
flexible for both planning and execution: not a great deal of
detail was required in planning, training, control, and
coordination during the execution phase. If the group was able to
merely penetrate Israel from the sea, they had already succeeded in
large measure. Looking closely at the penetration phase of the
operation, despite the equipment problems with one of the Zodiak
rubber boats along with the communication problems with the radio
transmitter, both the sea movement and the ship-to-shore movement
were accomplished according to the plan. Deception planning for
the ship's transit worked; no one suspected the true purpose of
this "coastal commerce ship". Israeli sea patrols did not
intercept the ship and it arrived at the right spot offshore on
time. This may not seem like a major achievement, but in Israeli
waters it was! On most sea penetration missions prior to the Savoy
operation, Israeli sea patrols had intercepted the terrorists prior
to landing or during crossings which occurred just beyond the
border, interception occurred on the border crossing itself. So,
despite the obviously low navigational abilities of the Savoy group
(remember, they immediately got lost after landing!), it was
sufficient to accomplish the primary goal of getting to Tel-Aviv.
Just as in the case with the ship's transit, this appears to be a
simple matter (i.e. "get in"), but in the 1978 "highway bus"
operation, the terrorists also tried to sea land at Tel-Aviv and
came ashore 40 miles north; even in that mission, the broadest
Fatah goal - penetrating anywhere into Israel - could still be
regarded as successful.
Having achieved the first goal of penetration, accomplishing
the second goal of killing was relatively simple given the beach
landing in a densely populated area. This broaden the target area
enormously so that "every bullet finds its target and even a blind
man becomes a sniper." For this goal, it was not necessary to
seize the planned objectives and, at any rate, the terrorists did
not seize those objectives simply because they got lost. Unlike
well-trained commandoes, the terrorists did not know how to orient
themselves by landmarks and street signs; once off their planned
route, they could not retrace their steps to it. This was probably
inevitable given their lack off training in land navigation in an
urban area as well as the fact that they only had one map, a
tourist map and that one in a foreign language. Their only other
hopes were a good deal of luck and the man who had been in the city
briefly three years prior to the mission. Fortunately for the
people in the Youth Club and the Opera House, the group possessed
neither luck nor a knowledgeable reconnaissance member.
The group demonstrated its low standard of discipline by
opening fire too early and without good reason. This resulted in a
nearly immediate confrontation with Israeli police, further
complicating the group's attempts to find a suitable target. They
were forced to pick a nearby building, the Savoy Motel, which was a
disappointing objective for them ue to its small number of
hostages. So, through poor planning and training for their second
goal, they had already programmed themselves for failure in that
they could not "kill as many as possible" because they could not
find many targets even though they were in the midst of a sea of
people. From earlier comments though, it is evident that the exact
number killed was not a sensitive issue; even in killing only a few
Israelis instead of a few dozen they had achieved their second goal
to a degree. Of course, nowhere yet do we see a goal of
negotiating POW releases...this was never a part of their training,
nor was it well addressed in planning. Perhaps this is because
goals are something that is possible to achieve; negotiations with
the Israelis had proved futile given their policy against it.
The suicide part of the definition of this operation had
significant influence on the entire mission. Suicide is an act
that is done against the most powerful basic natural instinct of
survival. By accepting a suicide mission, a soldier crosses the
line of reasonable fear that normally restricts his actions in a
combat environment; he becomes a war machine, a robot (a recent
movie, Terminator, illustrates this point as a robot is "killed"
several times before his components are crushed out of
electro-mechanical action). To stop the suicide solider you must
kill him. Because of the absolute extremity of the consequences of
suicide missions, a soldier's reasons for volunteering for this
type of mission must be extremely deep emotions or convictions; in
the case of the Savoy mission, it was the group's deep hatred of
the Israelis. The Palestinian terrorists' personal background was
reinforced by long and constant ideological and psychological
education and conditioning. Their decision and actions cannot be
simply explained by strong nationalistic motivations.
Psychological testing of these kinds of individuals reveals deep
personality problems, such as inferiority complexes, which hold the
promise of being surmounted by an operation that will be give that
solider importance and respect, if not a type of immortal fame.
"Abu Gihad" was careful to concentrate on the aspect of importance
and martyrdom during his many briefings to the group and individual
terrorists; in fact, the number of his briefings suggests that he
realized the need for repeated conditioning. The terrorists'
leaders met with them just minutes prior to their final departure,
reemphasizing the political importance of the mission and playing
heavily on the terrorists' sense of sharafe (pride).
The terrorists, including the instructor El Gonfer, were
trained against self-resistance to suicide. During the sea
movement, when it was discovered that one boat was inoperative,
members voiced thoughts of withdrawing; this also happened several
times later when ashore. But, their long education and
conditioning process was quite effective, especially the recent
briefing by "Abu Gihad"; thus, these men drove themselves to
suicide on purpose not out of typical desperation. This has not
always been the case in such operations. On many occasions, groups
gave up and went to prison, especially when they were intercepted
before capturing any hostages. Thus, it seems that hostages tend
to provide the potential suicide killers a tangible object of their
emotions, justifying their sacrifice and giving them motivation to
continue with the mission to its horrible concluion.
As we saw before, a part of the success of the Savoy group was
due to its special social characteristics. Another part of its
success was that it was composed of two four man teams - twice the
usual strength of such operations. There were two teams naturally
because two objectives had been planned. Their numbers increased
the internal group stress factor so that no one individual wanted
to be the first to show his fear and that he had no sharafe. Thus,
the Israelis were confronted with an usually large number of
"fearless" warriors with very flexible objectives.
From a military point of view, suicide missions are
distinguished from common raids due to the dogged determination of
the terrorists and the simplicity of their plans and conduct,
mainly due to the lack of evacuation and withdrawal phases. The
withdrawal phase of typical raids is often the most complicated
part and normally involves a high degree of planning and training
of the unit and any supporting units. A second point is that the
parent terrorist organization, in this case Fatah, has implicitly
placed a higher value on its raiders than on those selected for
suicide missions, knowing that in the end they will be destroyed
(this thought would be shocking for those who have been conditioned
for sharafe in such "important" missions). Therefore, should the
group be intercepted and killed enroute to the objectives on a
suicide mission, Fatah does not consider the mission a disaster,
merely an unfortunate loss of war tools or potential fighters, not
a loss of valuable human lives. As the Fatah radio usually
broadcasts in such instances, "they pave the way for the just
struggle for Palestine." So, such an attitude permits the
terrorist leadership to gamble much more on suicide missions than
it would on other operations. It also permits a broader range of
targets encompassing much higher risks than are acceptable in
routine raiding missions. This, added to the low cost of equipment
associated with such missions (i.e. a few rifles, pistols, radios,
and rubber boats), explains much about the shallow planning and
training for the Savoy operation. Here the high degree of
individual and group motivation and dedication to the cause cover
the large gaps created by lack of skills, careful planning and
training, good equipment, and supporting forces.
The evacuation of the terrorists in the Savoy operation was
evidently not considered a realistic option. This occurred because
of two main reasons. First, Israel had previously demonstrated a
high resistance to any negotiating tactics. Second, withdrawal was
not essential to motivating the terrorists or achieving mission
goals. In the event the terrorists had to blow themselves and
their hostages up, Fatah could and did say that there had been a
"peaceful alternative" that had been rejected by the Israelis.
Thus, the withdrawal plans, such as they were, were merely to give
the group some hope that the Israelis could be forced to release
POW's. This is a very sensitive area for the Fatah because its
terrorists are not religious zealots like the Shiite terrorists.
The mirage of a withdrawal provides the Fatah a means of helping
its people rationalize. Fatah terrorists are less fanatic than
Shiites; for that reason, many suicide teams have not rationalized
suicide and have given up when confronted. It is apparent that
"Abu Gihad" had no real intention to withdraw his troops,
particularly when one considers the type of radio, without either
back-up transmitters or alternate frequencies and totally lacking
in communications training and troubleshooting skills. It is
doubtful that there was anyone listening for the Savoy group on
their assigned channel which was too close to commonly used Israeli
channels to be useful in long range transmissions. Another clue to
Fatah's attitude was the lack of any broadcasts to the group over
the regular Fatah radio, despite the fact that they had been
provided transistor receivers. Thus, when all facts are considered
regarding the sincerity of Fatah's plans for the group's
withdrawal, it is clear that "Abu Gihad" and his superiors wanted
the group dead with the blame on the Israelis for preventing a
"peaceful" solution and no blame cast on Fatah for the killing and
injury of civilians.
The fighters of the Savoy group did demonstrate a relatively
good standard of soldiering despite their poor fire control
discipline. This is not a common feature with other terrorist
groups. As directed, they booby trapped their rubber boat,
destroying their only immediate means of withdrawal. When
disoriented, they did not panic; they showed good flexibility by
changing their objective. Their conduct of the assault on the
objective and subsequent consolidation while holding the hostages
and attempting negotiations was according to their limited training
and planning. Their treatment of the hostages was exactly as they
had been instructed...brutal. The group's action during the
Israeli commando storming of the motel was also "correct;" they
demolished the building, killing themselves and half of the
hostages. This last action was one of the few incidents of its
kind that had worked as planned. The group acted quickly and in a
good soldierly manner when the two team commanders were hit by
Israeli fire; a deputy team commander immediately took charge and
the operation continued. All of the above occurred because "Abu
Gihad" had been careful in selecting a mixture of both experienced
and inexperienced terrorists for the mission.
The factors that have been described in detail all contributed
to the success of the Savoy operation from Fatah's viewpoint.
Fortunately for societies, this group was not representative of
terrorist teams. Unfortunately, the PLO's struggle in the Middle
East as well as the struggles of other terrorist organizations will
not end in the near future. The PLO will continue its raids and
suicide missions even if the ultimate goal of achieving a
Palestinian state seems remote and unlikely.
In the last few years we have also seen the emergence of and
new type of terrorist, the religious zealot whose faith supports
martyrdom for his cause. As we have seen in Iran during its war
with Iraq and, separately, in Lebanon, religious fanatic groups can
sponsor individual terrorist suicide operations (e.g. the truck
bombing of the U.S. Marine Headquarters in 1983), small team
suicide operations, and even operations by large numbers of
suicidal people (e.g. reported use of masses of youths and
untrained personnel exhorted into combat aginst Iraqi troops by
Iranian Revolutionary Guards). This is a new phenomenon. The
world as yet has no effective means of facing and stopping the
earlier forms of terror so this new and apparently more dangerous
from leaves societies extremely vulnerable.
In summary, I wish that I could be more optimistic on this
subject instead of being merely descriptive. There does not seem
to be any ready prescriptions. Sooner or later a terrorist
organization is likely to acquire a nuclear weapon by theft or from
one of the outlaw nations that supports such actions. As the
terrorist must work his craft primarily against people, preferably
defenseless civilians and especially children and women, the use of
threat to use a nuclear device will be directed against a
population center. The more sensitive the area and the greater the
likelihood of access to the media for propagandizing their cause,
the more likely a target becomes. So cities such as Tel-Aviv,
Paris, Rome, New York, and Washington become attractive targets
when their nations oppose the goals of the terrorist organization.
There seems to be no limitation to the madness of human beings when
they define their morality and ethics as simply those things that
further the cause of their ideology, organization, or faith.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
1. Golan, Aviezer, The Long Night
2. Amos, Palestinian Resistance
3. Sharabi, Palestinians and Israel
4. O'Nell, Bard E., Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political Military
Analysis
5. Chaliand, Palestinian Resistance
6. Dbandt, William B., Palestinian Nationnalism; Its Political and
Military Dimensions
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