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Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine gender is used, both men and women are included.
FOREWORD

Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3-41.1, *Rear Area Operations*, describes the Marine Corps’ approach to rear area operations. It provides general doctrinal guidance for the Marine Corps component and the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) commander and staff responsible for executing rear area operations. The principles and planning considerations discussed in this publication are applicable to the Marine Corps component and all MAGTFs and their subordinate commands.

MCWP 3-41.1 identifies the functions that occur within the rear area, which are integrated within the warfighting functions, to support the conduct of the single battle. It also discusses the command and control of rear area operations from the joint level to individual bases, planning considerations, and the execution of the rear area operations functions. This publication does not provide detailed tactics, techniques, or procedures for rear area security (see FMFM 2-6, *MAGTF Rear Area Security*, which will become MCRP 3-41.1A when revised).
MCWP 3-41.1 was reviewed and approved this date.

BY DIRECTION OF THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS

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Table of Contents

Chapter 1. The Rear Area

Protect the Force ........................................... 1-2
Support the Force .......................................... 1-3
Joint Doctrine .............................................. 1-5
Applicable Army Doctrine .............................. 1-8
Case Study: Guadalcanal 1942 ......................... 1-10

Chapter 2. Command and Control

The Joint Rear Area ........................................ 2-3
Organization of Marine Corps Forces ............... 2-7
Marine Corps Rear Areas .............................. 2-11
Base Defense ............................................. 2-19

Chapter 3. Planning

Marine Corps Planning Process ....................... 3-2
Warfighting Functions .................................. 3-5
The Operational Planning Team ..................... 3-11
Operation Plan and Operation Order ............... 3-13
Liaisons ............................................. 3-14

Chapter 4. Execution

Security ........................................... 4-1
Communications ................................. 4-8
Intelligence ....................................... 4-8
Sustainment ....................................... 4-9
Area Management ............................... 4-10
Movements ....................................... 4-11
Infrastructure Development ................. 4-15
Host-Nation Support ......................... 4-16

Appendix A. Rear Area Operations
Appendix Format

Appendix B. Glossary

Appendix C. References
Chapter 1

The Rear Area

“That the rear of an enemy’s army is the point to hit at should be obvious.”

—MajGen J.F.C. Fuller

Rear area operations are evolutionary in character. As an operation progresses, the geographic location, command and control structure, and organization of the rear area will change. Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DOD Dictionary for Military and Associated Terms, defines the rear area “for any particular command, [as] the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. This area is provided primarily for the performance of support functions. Further, it defines a joint rear area as “a specific land area within a joint force commander’s operational area designated to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force.”

Rear area operations protect assets in the rear area to support the force. Rear area operations encompass more than just rear area security. While rear area operations provide security for personnel, materiel, and facilities in the rear area, their sole purpose is to provide uninterrupted support to the force as a whole. Rear area operations enhance a force’s freedom of action while it is involved in the close and deep fight and extend the force’s operational reach. The broad functions of rear area operations, as delineated within both joint and Marine Corps doctrine, include—

- Security.
- Communications.
- Intelligence.
- Sustainment.
- Area management.
- Movements.
- Infrastructure development.
- Host-nation support.

**Protect the Force**

Force protection is essential to all military operations: from war to military operations other than war (MOOTW). It is conducted at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. Force protection preserves vital resources—lives, equipment, and materiel—so they can be used to accomplish the mission. It includes every action or measure that preserves combat power so it can be applied at the decisive
time and place. These actions include more than self-protection or base protection measures. They also include actions that reduce or eliminate the ability of the enemy or the environment to adversely affect the force’s ability to conduct successful operations.

Force protection attempts to safeguard our centers of gravity by protecting or reducing friendly critical vulnerabilities. This may include the protection of sea, air, and land lines of communications (LOC) or the protection of the host-nation infrastructure for friendly use. Aggressive force protection planning and execution is critical to the success of rear area operations. Protecting the forces, facilities, and assets in the rear area preserves the warfighting capability of the total force and permits expansion of its operational reach.

Support the Force

Support aids or sustains a force, enhances tempo, and extends operational reach. Force protection measures protect those critical forces, equipment, supplies, and components of the infrastructure needed to support and sustain the force. Sustainment of the force is primarily logistic support. However, other types of support that may occur in the rear area include manning, civil-military support, civil affairs, evacuations, training, political-military support, and religious services.

Both operational-level and tactical-level logistic operations occur within the rear area. At the operational level, the
Marine Corps component supports Marine Corps forces. The combatant command-level Marine Corps component commander may establish a rear area command and control organization to facilitate the transition from the operational to the tactical level of support.

Operational-level logistic operations occur in the communications zone and in the joint rear area. They provide a bridge between strategic-level logistic functions and tactical-level logistic functions. These operations sustain the force within the theater or during major operations. Operational-level support functions occurring in the rear area include force closure; arrival, assembly, and forward movement; theater distribution; sustainment; intratheater lift; reconstitution and redeployment; and services.

Within the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) area of operations, logistic support activities in the rear area occur primarily at the tactical level. Sustainment operations embrace the six functions of logistics. At the tactical level, these functions are—

- Supply.
- Maintenance.
- General engineering.
- Health services.
- Transportation.
- Services.
Joint Doctrine

Joint doctrine discusses rear area operations from the perspective of a joint force commander (designated as either a combatant, subordinate unified, or joint task force commander). The joint force commander designates a joint rear area to facilitate protection and support of the joint force. The joint force commander is responsible for all operations conducted in the rear area.

The rear area only includes the landmass where the rear area is physically located. Normally, airspace and sea areas are not included in the joint rear area, they are considered combat zones, and specific subordinate commanders are given responsibility for conducting combat operations in these areas. When the sea area and land area meet, the high-water mark is the boundary. The joint rear area is normally behind the combat zone and within the communications zone. It does not have to be contiguous to the combat zone (see fig. 1-1 on page 1-6). As with any command’s rear area, the joint rear area varies in size depending on the logistic requirements, threat, and scope of combat operations.

Places within the area of operations may become “de facto” rear areas; regions isolated by geographic boundaries that become relatively segregated from the main areas of conflict and become their own “rear area.” The commander may designate such areas as a part of the rear area. Units within those areas may have to rely on their own resources for support until a transportation infrastructure is established. Austere conditions should be anticipated and support facilities, population receptiveness, and overall host-nation support may be unpredictable and unreliable.
A battlespace can be either contiguous or noncontiguous. A contiguous battlespace is organized in a linear manner with the deep, close, and rear areas adjacent to each other and oriented toward the enemy. A noncontiguous battlespace is organized in a nonlinear manner, and the rear area could be located in several different locations and at great distances from the majority of Marine units. Therefore, the rear area is not easily defined as being part of either a contiguous or noncontiguous battlespace. Often, the component commander and the MAGTF commander determine a division of responsibility for the support and protection of those units.
The joint force commander may designate a member of the joint staff to serve as a joint rear area coordinator, but typically, the joint force commander tasks a Service component commander as the joint rear area coordinator. The joint rear area coordinator coordinates all aspects of the joint rear area operations for the joint force commander. See chapter 2 for more information on command relationships.

When conducting operations through Service components, the joint force commander may assign the Marine Corps component commander an area of operations for which he has responsibility. The area of operations should be large enough for the Marine Corps component commander to accomplish his assigned mission and protect his forces. Marine Corps commanders may assign an area of operations, and associated responsibility, to their subordinate commanders. The Marine Corps component commander also coordinates Marine Corps requirements within the joint rear area; therefore, it is essential that Marine planners at all levels have a solid grasp of joint doctrine concerning the rear area.

*Note.* During small-scale contingencies, or when operating within a joint task force, the MAGTF area of operations may be the same as the component area of operations. In a major theater of war, the MAGTF area of operations may only be a portion of the component area of operations.
Applicable Army Doctrine

Since the Marine Corps frequently operates with the Army, the Marine Corps must understand the Army’s rear area operations doctrine. Although the Marine Corps’ and Army’s doctrine are similar in that both Services agree that rear area functions are interrelated and impact operations throughout the battlespace, the Marine Corps’ perspective is based more heavily on joint doctrine than the Army’s.

The Army discusses the integrated functions of rear area operations throughout its doctrine, and its rear area doctrine reflects a very developed structure at the corps level. The corps commander establishes three command posts: main rear, and tactical. Normally, only the main and rear command posts are concerned with rear area operations. The main command post synchronizes rear area operations with deep and close operations. The rear command post creates a detailed plan for conducting rear area operations and integrating rear area functions into a concept of operations that supports the commander’s concept and intent. The rear command post is organized to perform four functions: movement, terrain management, sustainment, and security. Communications and intelligence are addressed within the overall operation. Host-nation support and infrastructure development are normally conducted at the joint or component levels. The Army Service component uses a decentralized command and control network of area commanders to exercise responsibility for rear area operations.
The Marine Corps believes that each rear area function should be addressed relative to mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available (METT-T) considerations. During planning, each echelon of command addresses all of the eight functions of rear area operations.

A very tangible difference between the two Services is the standardized organization and force structure that the Army dedicates to rear area operations. The Army’s role within the national defense structure requires it to make a significant commitment of resources to the rear area as part of its standard organization, and Army doctrine focuses heavily on the tactics, techniques, and procedures that these organizations require. In certain situations, the Army’s tactics, techniques, and procedures may be useful for Marine operations. However, given the expeditionary character of the Marine Corps and its employment of task-organized forces tailored to accomplish a wide variety of missions, Marine Corps doctrine focuses on concepts that will assist commanders and their staffs in planning, organizing, and employing forces for rear area operations in accordance with METT-T. While Marine Corps methodology offers a great deal of flexibility in organization and execution, it also places a greater demand on planners and decisionmakers.

**Case Study: Guadalcanal 1942**

The Guadalcanal campaign is a classic example of the evolutionary nature of rear area operations. It illustrates the eight broad functions of rear area operations: security, sus-
tainment, infrastructure development, communications, host-nation support, intelligence, area management, and security. It also demonstrates the relationship of the rear area to the deep and close areas of the battlefield.

In August 1942, Marines landed on Guadalcanal as the first step in a three-step campaign plan to stop the Japanese advance in the Pacific and to begin offensive operations through the Solomon Islands toward a major enemy base located at Rabaul. The 1st Marine Division, under the command of Major General A. A. Vandegrift, immediately seized Guadalcanal’s partially completed airfield, but the division did not have the combat power to secure the rest of the island, which was 25 miles wide and 90 miles long.

Major General Vandegrift considered a counterlanding to be the major threat to his force and therefore established the bulk of his defenses along the coast. Security and sustainment were an immediate priority. His meager supplies and equipment, which had been hastily stockpiled on the beach, had to be moved to an inland rear area, away from where he anticipated the close fight to take place. Until Marine aircraft could operate from the captured airstrip, Major General Vandegrift’s deep fight was limited to the range of his artillery. Accordingly, infrastructure development, specifically the completion of the captured airstrip, was his highest priority in order to expand the ability to take the fight to the enemy.

In the days and weeks that followed, the principal enemy counteractions were daylight air attack and nighttime naval
Rear Area Operations

surface fires. The rear area was reorganized, with command and control facilities relocated to locations shielded from naval gunfire and supply dumps dispersed to enhance survivability. The establishment of a small naval operating base unit enhanced ship-to-shore resupply. Ground transportation to support these actions was limited; therefore, host-nation support, in the form of local natives, provided the requisite manual labor. Completion of the airfield meant that the Marines could add greater depth to the battlespace in order to interdict enemy air and sea forces before they got to the island. Navy and Army air force squadrons eventually reinforced Marine air and, with the help of the SEABEEs, rear area infrastructure was expanded and a second airfield was constructed to further disperse and protect the aircraft.

As the battle progressed, information gathered from U.S. and host-nation sources indicated that the enemy would attempt to capture the airfield using the island’s interior approaches. Major General Vandegrift repositioned his ground defenses accordingly. A form of area management, this repositioning involved not only the infantry units manning his perimeter but also the location of his reserve and his artillery within the constricted rear area in order to better support the close fight as it developed. To improve security, additional ground combat units, both Marine and Army, were committed to Guadalcanal, allowing General Vandegrift to expand his perimeter in order to protect the airfields from direct enemy fire.

By November 1942, Major General Vandegrift commanded over 40,000 men, which included the equivalent of two
divisions, a joint tactical air force, and an assortment of support troops from all the Services. The command, control, and support requirements for a force of this size clearly exceeded the capability of a division headquarters. Therefore, in December 1942, the Guadalcanal command was expanded to an Army corps. Successful air and naval operations had curtailed the flow of enemy reinforcements to the island and the arrival of additional American divisions changed the character of ground operations. The newly established XIV Corps began an offensive to finally clear the enemy from the island. The increase in troop strength also brought a commensurate requirement for logistic support, and the Army assumed responsibility for resupply of all troops on the island. Given the primitive road network on the island, road improvement, traffic control, and the forward positioning of supplies was essential for a successful offensive.

Once Guadalcanal was secured, the entire island became, in effect, a rear area that supported the advance on the Solomons. The command structure changed again when it was placed under the administrative control of an island commander and consisted of a variety of tenant commands. Aircraft from all Services conducted offensive air operations from Guadalcanal’s airfields while ground combat units utilized the island’s terrain for realistic training areas and its expanded facilities to mount out for the follow-on phases of the campaign. Guadalcanal remained in operation as a support and training base right up until the end of the war. At the war’s end, personnel stationed at Guadalcanal completed their final tasks, which consisted of closure and
turnover of facilities and materiel to the host nation, selective explosive ordnance disposal, and the retrograde of personnel and equipment, before returning the island to the host nation.
Chapter 2

Command and Control

“Command and control is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. . . .

The commander commands by deciding what needs to be done and by directing or influencing the conduct of others. Control takes the form of feedback—the continuous flow of information about the unfolding situation returning to the commander—which allows the commander to adjust and modify command action as needed.”

—MCDP 6, Command and Control

Successful rear area operations require a reliable command and control structure. Central to the command and control of these operations is the organization (joint, combined, or Service) of the area within which the forces are operating. Other command and control considerations include communications, intelligence, planning, and deployment systems. The rear area communications system should be linked to higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands (to include joint or combined), supporting organization(s), and the principal staff of the main command post.

1. MCDP 6, Command and Control (October 1996) pp. 37 and 40.
The joint force commander may elect to divide the joint rear area by assigning rear area responsibilities to component commanders, normally Marine Corps or Army component commanders. These area commanders coordinate their rear area activities with the joint rear area coordinator. Figure 2-1 illustrates a typical joint rear area command relationship in a theater of operations.

The Marine Corps component commander may position support forces such as the Marine Corps logistics command (if established) and some MAGTF forces (e.g., portions of the aviation combat element) in the joint rear area.

Figure 2-1. Joint Rear Area Command Relationships.
The Joint Rear Area

The joint force commander is responsible for the successful conduct of rear area operations within the joint operations area. He normally establishes a joint rear area and designates a joint rear area coordinator to aid the command and control of operations. The joint force commander designates the joint rear area coordinator from his staff or from one of his subordinate commanders. Service component commanders may be assigned as the joint rear area coordinator.

Joint Force Commander

The geographic combatant commander is responsible for rear area operations within his area of responsibility. Likewise, a subordinate unified or joint task force commander is responsible for rear area operations in his area of operations or joint operations area. The joint force commander’s responsibilities include—

- Establishing a joint rear area.
- Planning and executing rear area operations.
- Establishing command relationships.
- Assigning responsibilities to subordinate commanders for the conduct of rear area operations.
- Establishing a command and control network.
- Establishing measures and procedures for the planning and execution of force protection.
• Establishing the classification of bases (single Service or joint).
• Assigning local defense responsibilities for bases.
• Establishing host-nation support agreements.

The joint force commander can assign tasks to a subordinate commander that would normally be assigned to the joint rear area coordinator. For example, when a major threat exists, the joint force commander can task one of the component commanders to counter the threat to maintain the integrity of the rear area. The component commander then has the authority and responsibility normally resident with the joint rear area coordinator.

**Joint Rear Area Coordinator**

The joint force commander normally designates a joint rear area coordinator to facilitate command and control of operations in the joint rear area. The joint rear area coordinator is either a member of the joint force commander’s staff or one of the assigned subordinate commanders. The joint force commander considers the mission, force capability, threat, and battlespace when designating the joint rear area coordinator. The joint rear area coordinator is responsible for—

• Coordinating the overall security of the joint rear area.
• Ensuring continuous support to all forces.
• Coordinating with the appropriate commanders in the rear area.
Establishing secure and survivable communications.
Ensuring a reliable intelligence network exists.
Ensuring all commands practice effective area management and movement control within the area of operations that support theater policies and requirements.
Coordinating host-nation support for commands operating within the joint rear area.
Accomplishing other tasks assigned by the joint force commander.
Coordinating all rear area operations with forces located in or transiting through the joint rear area; in particular, coordinating security operations, including the use of theater-level security forces.
Establishing a communications and intelligence network to support all commanders within the joint rear area.
Establishing or implementing joint rear area policies and procedures for the joint force commander.

The joint rear area coordinator coordinates with subordinate commanders to—

Create a security environment that supports the joint force commander’s concept of operations.
Develop an integrated and coordinated security plan.
Position and use the tactical combat force, if established, appropriately.
• Establish a responsive and integrated intelligence and counterintelligence network.
• Develop an effective communications network.
• Ensure area management responsibilities are exercised with due consideration for security.
• Ensure liaison is established between host-nation and U.S. forces.
• Protect key LOCs.
• Protect support activities.
• Disseminate and enforce rules of engagement.

The joint rear area coordinator normally forms a joint rear area tactical operations center to assist in the command and control of rear area operations and to perform planning, coordinating, monitoring, and advising of assigned tasks. The joint rear area tactical operations center coordinates with other joint rear area coordinator staff elements; higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters staffs; and host-nation and coalition headquarters staffs. The joint rear area tactical operations center is principally comprised of personnel from the joint rear area coordinator’s staff and representatives from components operating in the joint rear area. They are responsible for the planning and execution of security missions and for coordinating with the component commands operating in the joint rear area.
Organization of Marine Corps Forces

All joint forces with Marine Corps forces assigned or attached include a Marine Corps component. Regardless of how the joint force commander conducts operations, the Marine Corps component provides administrative and logistic support to Marine Corps forces. The joint force commander assigns missions to the Marine Corps component commander. The Marine Corps component commander assigns missions to the MAGTF, the Marine Corps logistics command (if established), the rear area command (if established), and the assigned or attached forces of other Services and nations.

The Marine Corps component commander determines the Marine Corps component—MAGTF command relationship and staff organization based on the mission, size, scope, and duration of the operation and the size of the assigned force. Three possible command relationships and staff organizations exist: one command and one staff, one commander and two staffs, and two commanders and two staffs.

In a one commander and one staff relationship, the commander is both the Marine Corps component and the MAGTF commander and a single staff executes both Marine Corps component and MAGTF functions. This arrangement requires the fewest personnel but places a heavy workload on the commander and the staff. A variation of the one commander and one staff organization is one commander and one staff with a component augmentation cell. For example, if a combatant commander establishes a
joint task force to deal with a small-scale contingency, the combatant command-level Marine Corps component commander might provide a deployable cell to augment the MAGTF staff. This variation requires additional personnel, but the size of the staff is still relatively small. Both variations of one commander and one staff are appropriate for small-scale contingencies.

In a one commander and two staff relationship, the commander is both the Marine Corps component and the MAGTF commander with two separate staffs. One staff executes the functions of the Marine Corps component while the other executes the functions of the MAGTF. This allows each staff to maintain a single, focused orientation, but the number of personnel required to maintain each staff increases. A one command and two staff relationship may be appropriate when the joint force commander is geographically separated from combat forces or for operations of limited scope and duration.

A two commander and two staff relationship consists of a Marine Corps component commander and a MAGTF commander, and each commander has his own staff. Two commanders and two separate staffs require the most personnel, equipment, and facilities. This arrangement may be used for major theater of war operations.
Marine Corps Component Commander

The Marine Corps component commander sets the conditions for conducting MAGTF operations. He achieves this by providing and sustaining Marine Corps forces that execute the tasks assigned by the joint force commander. He is also responsible for—

- Planning and coordinating tasks within the rear area.
- Conducting rear area operations in support of all Marine Corps forces in theater.
- Advising the joint force commander on the proper employment of Marine Corps forces.
- Selecting and nominating specific Marine Corps units or forces for assignment to other forces of the joint force commander.
- Informing the joint force commander on changes in logistic support issues that could affect the joint force commander’s ability to accomplish the mission.
- Assigning executive agent responsibilities to Marine Corps forces for rear area tasks.

The joint force commander may assign the Marine Corps component commander specific rear area responsibilities to be conducted by Marine Corps forces in the theater (e.g., area damage control, convoy security, movement control). The joint force commander may also require the Marine Corps component commander to provide a tactical combat
force to counter threats to the joint rear area. In a small-scale contingency, the joint force commander may designate the Marine Corps component commander as the joint rear area coordinator. The Marine Corps component commander also—

- Coordinates Service-related rear area operations issues.
- Balances the need to support the force with the need to protect it.
- Evaluates requirements versus capabilities, identifies shortfalls, and compares associated risks with ability to accomplish the mission. This is important where the component commander does not have enough assets to accomplish the tasks and must look to assigned MAGTF, unassigned Marine Corps forces, other Service forces, or host nation for assistance. The Marine Corps component commander, whenever possible, uses forces available from sources other than the MAGTF to accomplish his rear area tasks.

**MAGTF Commander**

The MAGTF commander is responsible for operations throughout his entire battlespace. The MAGTF commander provides command and control to fight a single battle—deep, close and rear.

Integration and coordination of rear area operations are a key part of MAGTF operations and begin during planning.
Rear area representatives assist the MAGTF commander in organizing assigned capabilities to accomplish the assigned mission; therefore, they must be present during all MAGTF planning. For example, the integration of rear area fire support requirements into the MAGTF’s fire plan is critical. Air support requests for the rear area are submitted for incorporation in the MAGTF air tasking order. Main supply routes, transportation assets, and logistic support, which all flow from the rear area, must be organized to support the MAGTF commander’s concept of operations.

**Major Subordinate Commanders**

Marine Corps component or MAGTF major subordinate commanders execute most rear area functions. For example, the force service support group may execute the movement control plan for the Marine expeditionary force (MEF). A major subordinate commander could also be appointed the rear area coordinator or rear area commander. For example, the MAGTF commander could designate the combat service support element commander as his rear area coordinator. If a major subordinate commander is tasked to perform rear area functions or is designated the rear area coordinator or commander, he may require additional resources to fulfill these responsibilities.

**Marine Corps Rear Areas**

Successful rear area operations require an effective command and control organization and reliable command and control systems, including communications, intelligence,
and planning. Three options for command and control of rear area operations are for the Marine commander (Marine Corps component or MAGTF) to retain command and control, designate a rear area coordinator, and/or designate a rear area commander.

The Marine commander determines how he will command and control rear area operations based on his analysis of METT-T factors. He must consider how higher commanders will command and control rear area operations (e.g., battlespace, organization, force laydown) to ensure that his decisions support the higher commander’s intent and concept of operations. The Marine commander must also consider location (which greatly influences all other factors), manning, equipment requirements, and procedures.

The rear area coordinator or rear area commander can be the Marine commander’s deputy, a member of the commander’s staff, a subordinate commander, or an individual assigned to the command specifically for that purpose. The difference between a commander and a coordinator is the degree of authority. Coordinating authority allows the designated individual to coordinate specific functions or activities; in this case rear area functions. A coordinator has the authority to require consultation between agencies, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. If the agencies cannot reach an agreement, the matter is referred to the common commander. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and
for planning the employment, organization, direction, coordination, and control of military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. It also includes the responsibility for the health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

The rear area, and the operations conducted within it, will typically expand and contract based on the character and progression of the assigned mission and the operating environment. The organization and structure of forces and resources employed within the rear area, along with the corresponding command and control structure, may undergo significant change as the situation evolves. The Marine commander may retain command and control of rear area operations during the initial stages of an operation. He may designate a rear area coordinator to handle rear area operations as ports and air bases become available and more Marine Corps forces flow into theater. As the theater develops further—with numerous forward deployed forces, extensive transportation infrastructure (ports, highway networks, airfields, and railroads), or a rear area threat that requires a tactical combat force—the Marine commander may designate a rear area commander.

Regardless of the rear area command and control alternative chosen, the rear area functions of security, communications, intelligence, sustainment, area management, movements, infrastructure development, and host-nation support must be conducted.
Retaining Command of the Rear Area

The commander may retain command and control of rear area operations if—

- The scope, duration, or complexity of the operation is limited.
- The battlespace is restricted.
- The nature of the mission is fundamentally linked to the rear area, such as humanitarian assistance or disaster relief.
- The enemy threat to rear area operations is low.
- Retention of command and control is logical during the early phase of an evolutionary process (e.g., initiation of operations).

Given the inherent link between rear area operations and the overall mission during Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Somalia retained control of all the functions of rear area operations. The joint task force commander’s “mission was to secure major air and sea ports, key installations, and food distribution points to provide open and free passage of relief supplies; to provide security for convoys and relief organizations; and to assist [United Nations] and nongovernmental organizations in providing humanitarian relief under [United Nations] auspices.”

Marines principally executed these tasks

because they initially constituted the preponderance of the joint force.

**Establishing a Rear Area Coordinator**

The commander may elect to delegate control of some or all rear area operations to a rear area coordinator if—

- The scope, duration, or complexity of the operation increases.
- The assigned battlespace increases in size.
- The enemy threat level in the rear area increases, thereby requiring a greater degree of coordination.
- One person needs to focus on rear area operations so that the commander can concentrate on the close and deep fight.
- The delegation of control over the rear area is the next logical phase of an evolutionary process (e.g., build-up of forces in theater).

For example, during Operation Desert Shield, the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Central Command/Commanding General, I MEF designated one of his subordinate commanders as his rear area coordinator.
Establishing a Rear Area Commander

The commander may elect to delegate control of some or all rear area operations to a rear area commander if—

- The scope, duration, or complexity of the operation reaches a level that rear area operations demand a commander’s full time and attention or exceeds the scope of a coordinator’s authority.
- The size of the assigned battlespace must be subdivided to effectively command and control.
- The enemy threat level (level III) in the rear area is significant enough that it requires a combined-arms task force (tactical combat force) to counter. (See page table 4-1.)
- There is a need to assign authority for any or all of the rear area functions under a subordinate commander, with the customary authority and accountability inherent to command.
- The designation of a rear area command is the next phase of the evolutionary process (e.g., expansion of the battlespace).

For example, during Operation Desert Shield, the Commander, Marine Corps Forces Central Command/Commanding General, I MEF designated his deputy commander as his rear area commander.
Establishing Command and Control Facilities

The rear area coordinator or rear area commander normally establishes a facility from which to command, control, coordinate, and execute rear area operations. This facility normally contains an operations cell and a logistic cell to coordinate the following:

- Security forces (e.g., military police, tactical combat force).
- Fire support agencies.
- Support units (e.g., supply, engineer, medical).
- Movement control agencies.
- Other command and control facilities.
- Bases and base clusters.
- Other organizations as necessary (e.g., counterintelligence team, civil affairs group).

A rear area command and control facility may be located within or adjacent to an existing facility or it may be a single-purpose facility established specifically for rear area operations. An existing facility may include an existing organization, a cell within an existing organization, or a separate organization collocated with a host organization. When located within or adjacent to an existing facility, a rear area command and control facility may be able to use some of the existing facility’s personnel and equipment, thus reducing the need for additional resources. Based on the scope of rear area operations within a major theater of
war, it may be necessary to establish a separate rear area command and control facility.

Table 2-1 shows the appropriate titles for rear area command and control organizations at the various Marine Corps command echelons. The commander establishes various rear area command and control organizations, but the naming of those organizations should conform to the table to promote common understanding.

**Table 2-1. Rear Area Command and Control Organizations.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Echelon</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Facility</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps Component</td>
<td>Marine rear area coordinator (MRAC)</td>
<td>Marine rear area operations center (MRAOC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Marine rear area commander (MRA-COM)</td>
<td>Marine rear area command post (MRACP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGTF or Major Subordinate Command</td>
<td>Rear area coordinator (RAC)</td>
<td>Rear area operations center (RAOC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Rear area commander (RACOM)</td>
<td>Rear area command post (RACP)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rear area coordinator or rear area commander executes assigned tasks to ensure that rear area operations support the conduct of tactical operations in the close and deep battle. The rear area command and control facility integrates and coordinates its activities with the main and forward com-
mand posts to ensure that the Marine Corps component or MAGTF commander has a better understanding of the battlespace and can influence and orchestrate the single battle.

The rear area command and control facility must have reliable communications and connectivity with the higher, adjacent, and subordinate headquarters involved in rear area operations. Connectivity to the joint rear area intelligence network, movement control infrastructure, and other support structures is also vital to the successful conduct of rear area operations.

**Base Defense**

Base defense operations are the measures used to protect operations that are executed or supported by the base. Base defense is an important part of rear area operations while security is the basic responsibility of every commander in all operations. Base and base cluster commanders are designated to provide coordinated base defense. Specific rear area command and control relationships should be included in the appropriate operations orders, and commanders are responsible for integrating their plans and executing base defense. Base defense forces are not tactical combat forces. Base defense forces provide ongoing security for a specific location (a base) or a number of locations (a base cluster), while tactical combat forces respond to threats throughout the entire rear area.

Base and base cluster commanders conduct security operations through a base defense or base cluster operations cen-
ter. Unit or element commanders are assigned as base or base cluster commanders since they normally possess the personnel and equipment to command and control base defense operations. Unit or element commanders designated as base or base cluster commanders conduct base defense operations from their existing operations centers. These operations centers coordinate and direct the security activities of all organizations—organic and tenant—within the base or base cluster. Base defense and base cluster operations centers integrate their activities with the Marine Corps component or MAGTF rear area command and control facility. See figure 2-2.

**Base Cluster Commander**

The base cluster commander is responsible for the security of the base and for coordinating the security of all of the bases within his designated cluster. He integrates the defense plans of the bases into a base cluster defense plan. He also establishes a base cluster operations center, normally within his existing operations center. The base cluster operations center is the focal point for planning, coordinating, and controlling base cluster defense.

For example, during the Vietnam conflict, Marines operated out of a major air base at Da Nang, as did various U.S. Air Force and South Vietnamese Air Force units. Marines also operated out of two outlying facilities. (Titles and terminology during this time period were different, but the arrangement was essentially the same as a base cluster defense.)
In this example, the aviation combat element commander is assigned as the base commander where he is located. He also could be given the responsibility for other nearby smaller bases as the base cluster commander, such as —

- Marine aircraft groups and squadrons.
- Marine combat service support units.
- Marine ground combat units.
- Forces from other Services or nations.
- Nonmilitary U.S., allied, and host-nation personnel.

**Figure 2-2. Example of a Base Defense Command Relationship.**
Initially, base defense responsibilities were not well thought out. On 28 October 1965, the enemy successfully penetrated one of the outlying facilities inflicting numerous casualties and destroying 19 aircraft. As a result, the Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) placed an officer in charge of the internal security provided by the various commands and units at Da Nang. The officer was directed to establish an integrated defense and to coordinate the defensive measures of the two outlying facilities with Da Nang. In that officer’s own words, his responsibilities “included field artillery battery positions (but I could not infringe upon command responsibilities of the artillery regimental commander), water points, bridge and ferry crossing sites. LAAM [light antiaircraft missile] sites on mountain peaks, ammunition dumps, supply dumps, and units of the MAW [Marine aircraft wing].”

**Base Commander**

The base commander is responsible for the security of the base. For base defense purposes all forces—organic and tenant—within the base are under the base commander’s operational control. The base commander establishes a base defense operations center, normally within his existing operations center, to assist in the planning, coordination, integration, and control of defense activities.

Subordinate commanders within the Marine Corps component or the MAGTF may be designated as base commanders. They will be responsible for all operations within the boundaries of the base. They will also be responsible for
coordinating and communicating with higher and adjacent organizations.

For example, during the Vietnam conflict, the commanding officer of Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 16 performed the duties of a base commander. MAG 16 was the major command located at the Marble Mountain Air Facility. The commanding officer of MAG 16 integrated the security efforts of his own group with combat service support personnel and SEABEEs located at Marble Mountain and accomplished all this from his group command post. After the establishment of the Da Nang base cluster, MAG 16’s commanding officer continued to receive his taskings for air operations from 1st MAW while coordinating the defense of his base with the III MAF officer in charge of the cluster.
Chapter 3

Planning

“Planning is an essential and significant part of the broader field of command and control. We can even argue that planning constitutes half of command and control, which includes influencing the conduct of current evolutions and planning future evolutions.”

—MCDP 5, Planning

The battlespace is geographically divided into deep, close, and rear area to ease planning and to decentralize execution. However, a commander must always view the battlespace as an indivisible entity because events in one part of the battlespace may have profound and often unintended effects throughout the entire battlespace. Therefore, the importance of the rear area must be addressed during planning and rear area operations must be an integrated, continuous part of the planning process. As in close and deep operations, the commander must consider the effects of rear area operations in achieving the mission so he can effectively use all of his valuable resources. He must envision the organization and resources necessary to conduct a given operation at its peak, and then conducting reverse planning to support that vision.

1. MCDP 5, Planning (July 1997) p. 11.
Simply put, the commander must “begin with the end in mind.” The commander must also remember that rear area operations are continuous. They occur before, during, and after close and deep operations. The disruption of critical activities in the rear area by enemy action can reverse an otherwise successful operation or degrade the effectiveness of close and deep operations.

**Marine Corps Planning Process**

The Marine Corps Planning Process (MCPP) supports the commander’s decisionmaking. It helps organize the thought processes of the commander and the staff throughout the planning and execution of military operations. It focuses on the threat, and it is based on the Marine Corps warfighting philosophy of maneuver warfare. Since planning is an essential part of command and control, the MCPP recognizes the critical role of the commander in planning. It capitalizes on the principle of unity of effort and supports the creation and maintenance of tempo. The three tenets of the MCPP—top-down guidance, single-battle concept, and integrated planning—are derived from the doctrine of maneuver warfare.

The MCPP organizes the planning process into six manageable and logical steps (see fig. 3-1). It provides the commander and the staff a means to organize planning activities and to transmit the plan to subordinates and subordinate commands. Through this process, all levels of command can begin their planning effort with a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent. The MCPP can
be as detailed or as abbreviated as time, staff resources, experience, and the situation allow. See MCWP 5-1, *Marine Corps Planning Process*, for more information.

Planning centers around the commander. Through *top-down planning*, the commander provides the direction and intent required to ensure unity of effort by all parts of the force. The commander determines the priority of actions and resource allocations to accomplish the mission. The com-

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**Figure 3-1. The Marine Corps Planning Process.**
mander’s guidance—expressed in terms of his vision of achieving a decision as well as the shaping actions required to accomplish his mission—gives personnel planning rear area operations a clearer picture of how those operations support overall mission success.

Just as the Marine Corps’ maneuver warfare doctrine orients us towards defeating the enemy’s center of gravity by exploiting one or more critical vulnerabilities, the opponent can be expected to attempt the same action against friendly centers of gravity and associated critical vulnerabilities. Airfields, logistic units, installations, facilities, and resources located in the rear area are not merely subject to attack; they are, in many cases, the preferred targets. Therefore, planners analyze friendly centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities to identify vital areas and assets essential to the success of the force and to identify and prioritize the actions needed to preserve the warfighting capability of the total force and increase its operational reach.

Planners use the single-battle concept to focus the efforts of the total force and to accomplish the mission. While dividing the battlespace into close, deep, and rear areas offers a certain degree of utility, the commander and the staff must retain the conceptual view of the single battle to ensure unity of effort throughout planning and execution. The rear area is a vital part of the commander’s single battle. While the battle is normally won in the close or deep fights, failure to properly plan and execute operations in the rear area can delay or even prevent victory. To avoid diverting combat power from essential close and deep operations needed to
win the single battle, the commander has to carefully plan and efficiently execute rear area operations.

Integrated planning provides the commander and the staff a disciplined approach to planning that is systematic, coordinated, and thorough. It helps planners consider all relevant factors, reduce omissions, and share information across all the warfighting functions (command and control, maneuver, fires, intelligence, logistics, and force protection). Integrated planning requires the appropriate warfighting function representation to ensure operations are integrated across the battlespace. The planning process addresses the eight rear area functions within the broader context of the warfighting functions. Integrated planning reduces the potential for unintended consequences and diminishes the tendency to "stovepipe" or miss critical tasks.

Warfighting Functions

Warfighting functions encompass all military activities in the battlespace. Planners consider and integrate warfighting functions when analyzing how best to accomplish the mission. By using the warfighting functions as integration elements, planners ensure that all actions are focused toward a single purpose. While portions of all rear area functions are addressed in each warfighting function, certain rear area functions are more prominent in specific warfighting functions. The following subparagraphs describe the relationship between warfighting functions and rear area functions.
Command and Control

Command and control fuses the facilities, equipment, organizations, architecture, people, and information that enable the commander to make the timely decisions to influence the battle. It encompasses all military operations and functions, harmonizing them into a meaningful whole. Command and control provides the intellectual framework and physical structures through which commanders transmit their intent and decisions to the force and receive feedback on the results. In short, command and control is the means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken. This warfighting function encompasses all the functions of rear area operations. See figure 3-2.

![Six Warfighting Functions Diagram](image)

**Figure 3-2. Command and Control.**
Maneuver

Maneuver is the movement of forces to gain an advantage over the enemy in order to accomplish the objective. While tactical maneuver aims to gain an advantage in combat, maneuver within the rear area is directed at positioning reserves, resources, and fire support assets for potential advantage over the enemy. While potential planning considerations exist for all the rear area functions, the rear area functions of intelligence, area management, and movements are significant planning considerations within this warfighting function. See figure 3-3.

Fires

The commander employs fires to delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or facilities as well as to
affect the enemy’s will to fight. The use of fires is not to attack every enemy unit, position, piece of equipment, or installation. The commander selectively applies fires, usually in conjunction with maneuver, to reduce or eliminate a key element that results in a major disabling of the enemy’s capabilities. While potential planning considerations exist for all rear area operations functions, security, communications, intelligence, sustainment, area management, movements, and infrastructure development are rear area functions that significantly affect the warfighting function of fires. See figure 3-4.

**Figure 3-4. Fires.**

**Intelligence**

Intelligence underpins all planning and operations and is continuous. It provides an understanding of the enemy and
the battlespace as well as assists in identifying enemy centers of gravity and critical vulnerabilities. Intelligence cannot provide certainty because uncertainty is an inherent attribute of war. Rather, intelligence estimates the possibilities and probabilities in an effort to reduce uncertainty. Intelligence operations are conducted to support the entire battlespace including the rear area. They require an appropriate level of planning and the commitment of resources to support the commander’s single battle.

National and theater intelligence agencies routinely prepare and update intelligence products specifically focused on supporting rear area operations. The intelligence section must anticipate the assigned area of operations and gather information on existing infrastructure, transportation, communications, and logistical nodes. Beginning with any existing intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) products, the intelligence section enhances the commander’s and the staff’s understanding of the battlespace. The intelligence effort also anticipates enemy courses of action and analyzes the terrain in respect to rear area security. This warfighting function significantly impacts planning for all eight rear area functions. See figure 3-5 on page 3-10.

Logistics

Logistics encompasses all activities required to move and sustain military forces. Strategic logistics involves the acquisition and stocking of war materials and the generation and movement of forces and materials to various theaters. At the opposite end of the spectrum, tactical logistics is con-
Concerned with sustaining forces in combat. It deals with the feeding and care, arming, fueling, maintaining, and movement of troops and equipment. Operational logistics links the strategic source of the means of war to its tactical employment. Logistic support constitutes one of the major components of rear area operations. While potential planning considerations exist for all the functions of rear area operations, significant considerations include sustainment, area management, movements, infrastructure development, and host-nation support. See figure 3-6.

**Force Protection**

Force protection involves those measures used to conserve our own forces’ fighting potential so that it can be applied at the decisive time and place. These actions imply more than
base defense and individual protective measures. Force protection is one of the major concerns of rear area operations. While force protection considerations are a factor in all military planning, security, intelligence, area management, movements, and host-nation support are rear area functions that receive significant attention within this warfighting function. See figure 3-7 on page 3-12.

### The Operational Planning Team

To assist in the planning effort, the commander may establish an operational planning team (OPT). The OPT is built around a core of planners from the G-3 future operations section and additional representatives from the remaining primary staff sections. Other special staff representatives

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**Figure 3-6. Logistics.**

In the image, there is a diagram illustrating the six warfighting functions: C2, Maneuver, Fires, Intel, Logistics, and Force Protection. Below these functions, there are additional branches labeled Security, Comm, Intel, Sustainment, Area Management, Movements, Infrastructure, and Host Nation Support. The diagram also includes a legend indicating significant considerations and potential considerations.
and subject matter experts, including a rear area representative, are assigned to the OPT as required. Liaison officers from adjacent, subordinate, and supporting organizations may also be assigned to the team. Members of the OPT may be designated as warfighting function representatives. Warfighting function representation may be drawn from the various representatives and liaisons assigned to the OPT based on their experience and training in the functional area.

While the OPT considers issues pertinent to the six warfighting functions that may affect rear area operations, the rear area planning representative considers issues involving all rear area functional areas. The rear area planning representative serves as the focal point for information on the rear area. The rear area planning representative passes rear area information requests from the MAGTF OPT to the rear area for further processing and coordination.
area coordinator or rear area commander. Information on rear area unit capabilities is provided to the MAGTF OPT by the rear area planning representative. Once the MAGTF operation order is published, the rear area planning representative aids the plan’s execution by returning to the rear area operations center, if established, as a staff member in the operations section. The rear area planning representative returns to the MAGTF OPT as needed to support additional MAGTF planning efforts.

**Operation Plan and Operation Order**

Since rear area operations support the conduct of the single battle, planners address tasks for the conduct of rear area functions and the attendant authority in the basic plan or order. Amplifying information is located in annexes to the operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD). For example, Appendix 16 (Rear Area Operations), of Annex C (Operations) (format contained in app. A). Additional information on rear area operations may be in the following annexes:

- A (Task Organization).
- B (Intelligence).
- D (Logistics).
- E (Personnel).
- G (Civil Affairs).
- J (Command Relationships).
- P (Host Nation Support).
Liaisons

Liaison personnel play a critical role during the planning for rear area operations. As warfare has become more complex, communications have become more important. Large forces maneuvering over widely dispersed terrain, the use of combined arms, and the interface with other Services and other countries require reliable communications to ensure successful conduct of operations. The potential for confusion is high and the need for knowledge and understanding at all levels of command is crucial. Liaison personnel from the component, MEF, and major subordinate commands can help reduce this confusion.

Commanders send liaisons to participate in their respective higher headquarter’s OPTs. These liaisons represent their commander, are highly qualified, and provide subject matter expertise. More importantly, they serve as a conduit between their parent command and the OPT. The liaison must be able to convey commander's intent, understand the assigned mission, understand the information needed to support the planning at the parent command, and represent his commander’s position. To allow the liaison to function effectively at the OPT, the commander may give his liaison limited decisionmaking ability.

Liaisons are fundamental to commanders staying abreast of future operations planning and they help prevent “stovepiping” during operational planning. For example, the rear area coordinator or rear area commander might assign a liaison officer to the MEF OPT. The liaison identifies the concerns
and the considerations of the rear area coordinator or commander to the OPT. This maintains a clear line of communication between the MEF commander, the major subordinate commanders, and the rear area coordinator or rear area commander.

Liaisons must be—

- Tactically and technically proficient within their functional area of expertise.
- Knowledgeable in the sending command’s operating procedures.
- Knowledgeable in the sending command’s current and future operations plans.
- Able to represent the commander’s position.
- Familiar with the receiving unit’s doctrine, operating procedures, and organization for command and staff functioning.
Chapter 4

Execution

“Plans and orders exist for those who receive and execute them rather than those who write them. Directives must be written with an appreciation for the practical problems of execution.”

—MCDP 5, Planning

While rear area operations are planned to facilitate unity of effort throughout the battlespace, specific rear area functions are tasked to appropriate commanders for execution. The commander may assign any or all of the eight rear area functions to his subordinate commanders or he may elect to retain control of one or more of them within his own headquarters staff. Regardless of how he divides the tasks, all eight functions must be addressed in appropriate directives.

Security

Commanders have an inherent responsibility for the security of their personnel, equipment, and facilities. The component commander and the MAGTF commander are

1. MCDP 5, Planning (July 1997) p. 89.
ultimately responsible for the security of their assigned rear areas. The rear area may be divided into smaller geographic areas to enhance overall command and control. Units are responsible for their local security. In the rear area, security objectives include—

- Preventing or minimizing disruption of support operations.
- Protecting personnel, supplies, equipment, and facilities.
- Protecting LOCs.
- Preventing or minimizing disruption of command and control.
- Defeating, containing, or neutralizing any threat in the rear area.

Commanders employ both active and passive measures to provide security. Active measures include organizing for defensive operations, coordinating reconnaissance and surveillance, providing security to convoys, positioning air defense units in the rear area, establishing liaison with fire support organizations, employing close air support, establishing reaction forces, developing defensive plans and positioning assets in support of them, patrolling, and training in defensive skills. Passive measures include camouflage, dispersion, and cover.

Security operations in the rear area require detailed planning and aggressive execution. They must be integrated with all other operations. Subordinate units are responsible
for the conduct of local security operations, but must coordinate with the overall rear area coordinator or rear area commander. Types of security operations include—

- Populace and resource control operations.
- Enemy prisoner of war operations.
- Noncombatant evacuation operations.
- Civilian control operations.
- Area damage control operations.
- Combat operations.

Other operations conducted within the rear area that facilitate the conduct of security operations include deception operations; civil affairs operations; nuclear, biological, and chemical defense operations; and psychological operations.

**Populace and Resource Control Operations**

Populace and resource control operations are conducted to locate and neutralize insurgent or guerilla activities. Normally host-nation police and civilian or military units carry out these activities, but U.S. military forces, particularly military police, can also conduct or support these operations. Populace and resource control operations are primarily conducted in conjunction with civil affairs operations. Population and resource control operations assist the establishment and maintenance of positive relationships between military forces and local populations.
Enemy Prisoner of War Operations

Enemy prisoner of war operations are normally conducted by military police and supported by other forces as required. Policies and procedures for the security, receipt, processing, and transfer of enemy prisoners of war are established by the senior commander and promulgated down to all other commands to ensure the efficient conduct of the operations. Since enemy prisoners of war are normally held on a temporary basis in rear areas, the rear area operations center oversees the conduct of these operations. The MAGTF or designated major subordinate command executes most of the functions for the control, care, and transfer of enemy prisoners of war. Enemy prisoners of war captured by Marine Corps forces are transferred to a designated U.S. theater organization for transfer to the host nation.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

Noncombatant evacuation operations are conducted to ensure the safety and security of U.S. citizens and selected foreign nationals. These operations are typically conducted on short notice, and they require critical resources such as transportation, security forces, communications capabilities, and facilities. This requires extensive, detailed, and integrated planning. Planners must remember that evacuees can have a negative impact on the conduct of other rear area operations; specifically, the requirements to control their movement in hostile areas, provide facilities for their use, and deploy security forces during their evacuation. Planners
must ensure that noncombatant evacuation operations can be conducted without affecting other ongoing operations.

**Civilian Control Operations**

Civilian control operations include the collection, retention, and interrogation of civilian internees, detainees, and refugees. While normally a host-nation requirement, U.S. forces participate when directed. The Law of War, rules of engagement, and other established agreements guide participation with a host nation. Marine Corps forces will not, unless specifically directed by higher headquarters, assume responsibility for refugees. Marine Corps forces can assist in directing or stopping the movement of civilians if they are in danger or if they hinder military operations.

**Area Damage Control Operations**

Reducing the potential of damage to the rear area infrastructure is a critical concern. This is especially important given the destructive capabilities of current weapon systems. Planning and executing these operations should occur at the lowest possible level of command. Initial area damage control operations are tied in with force protection measures since both attempt to protect existing assets. If an enemy attack is successful and damage has been inflicted, then area damage control operations include recovery and restoration efforts. Essential facilities and equipment damage will receive priority for corrective maintenance in order to return them to normal operations.
Area damage control operations include actions taken before, during, or after hostile, natural, or manmade disasters to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effect. Integrated planning is key to successful area damage control operations. Therefore, the Marine Corps component commander, area or MAGTF commander, and/or base or base cluster commander must ensure that specific responsibilities are designated and that all possible coordination with Marine Corps, other Service, and host-nation forces are accomplished. Detailed procedures, command relationships, and responsibilities should be spelled out in the OPORD or fragmentary order. Area damage control plans must be integrated at all levels of command to ensure rapid and appropriate response.

**Combat Operations**

Combat operations, including both active and passive measures, are planned for and conducted to counter a threat to operations in the rear area. All forces must look carefully at their vulnerabilities to ascertain the level of risk each presents and be able to constantly reassess how they might be better protected.

Table 4-1 illustrates the levels of threats likely to be encountered in combat operations in the rear area and suggests probable responses from appropriate tactical forces. Local security forces (sometimes referred to as response forces) and internal security capabilities are used to counter level I and II threats. The Marine Corps component and
MAGTF commander normally establish a tactical combat force to counter level III threats.

The tactical combat force is a task-organized combat unit capable of quickly responding to enemy threats. The tactical combat force can range in size from a company to a regiment depending on the situation and factors of METT-T. It could be a combat unit temporarily in the rear area or a designated task-organized force with the capability to perform the mission. The tactical combat force should be capable of controlling ground and air fires and coordinating its actions with other Marine, joint, or host-nation forces. It should have sufficient mobility and should be located in a position that allows it to respond to potential threats in a timely fashion. The MAGTF rear area commander, if designated, directs MAGTF tactical combat force operations and ensures its integration with other rear area activities.

Table 4-1. Threat Levels and Response Forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat Level</th>
<th>Possible Threat</th>
<th>Response Force</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Level I</td>
<td>Agents, sympathizers, terrorists, and saboteurs.</td>
<td>Unit, base, and base cluster self-defense measures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level II</td>
<td>Small tactical units, unconventional forces, and guerillas.</td>
<td>Self-defense measures and local response force(s) with organic supporting arms.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level III</td>
<td>Large tactical units (air, helicopterborne, amphibious).</td>
<td>Tactical combat force.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The rear area commander will plan for and execute tactical combat force missions in accordance with the overall commander’s concept of operations. The rear area operations center, if established, monitors events and is the conduit for communications throughout the rear area for the tactical combat force.

**Communications**

Good communications throughout the battlespace enables command and control. Conversely, effective rear area support operations ensure that a communications system is redundant, reliable, and secure. To ensure operational effectiveness, the communications system must be linked to the rear area operations center, if established. The communications network should include higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands as well as supporting organizations.

**Intelligence**

Effective and timely intelligence and counterintelligence are essential to the planning and conduct of operations in the rear area. Accurate intelligence is particularly important in the rear area so that the limited combat forces available for security operations can respond to threats in a timely manner. Continuous, integrated IPB is important to the rear area commander and staff. IPB allows him to maintain situational awareness on the effects of enemy capabilities, terrain, and weather on his operations over time. IPB includes areas adjacent, forward, and rearward of the designated rear
area because specific units and activities in those areas can have a pronounced effect on operations.

Counterintelligence is one of the most important ways for local commanders to contribute to the intelligence system in the rear area. Counterintelligence activities include investigations, operations, collection, reporting, analysis, production, and dissemination. It assists commanders in identifying enemy target priorities in the friendly rear area and thus enhances force protection.

The intelligence section of the rear area operations center must be able to communicate directly with higher, adjacent, and subordinate organizations (Marine, joint, combined, and host-nation) to ensure the timely flow of information and intelligence products. The main command post should ensure that the rear command post is provided with all the intelligence it requires to conduct rear area operations. The intelligence section maintains a situation map of the rear area and areas from which threat activities can directly influence rear area operations. This section develops intelligence requirements, to include electronic warfare, operations security, interrogator-translator teams, and imagery support. Since this section normally lacks the assets with which to gather and analyze information, support must be provided by other intelligence centers.

Sustainment

Fully integrated logistic support enables tactical operations, but force sustainment must be balanced with protection of
the force and accomplishment of the overall mission. The combat service support element plans, executes, and manages sustainment operations throughout the Marine commander’s battlespace. To ensure success, sustainment planning must be fully integrated into overall mission planning. The rear area operations center, if established, monitors sustainment activities in the rear area to deconflict them with other activities. A sustainment section monitors requirements and ensures the integration of planned requirements with movements, area management, and other rear area functions. This section monitors protection and movement issues for convoys and interfaces with the bases for their sustainment requirements. The sustainment section will also interface with the joint rear area coordinator to ensure that the capabilities of the sustainment units and that the requirements of the Marine Corps forces are understood.

Area Management

Area management affects the successful conduct of rear area operations, as well as the overall mission. While the commander is ultimately responsible for area management within his battlespace, he normally conducts area management through his G-3. The G-3 must integrate and balance deep, close, and rear operations to conduct a single battle. As the battlespace evolves, the commander may designate a rear area coordinator or rear area commander to conduct area management within the rear area based on higher headquarters’ concept of operations. This person must conduct continuous coordination with the G-3 to ensure effective area management for both current and future operations.
In area management, the amount and type of available, usable space drives the positioning of assets. An asset’s position has a direct effect on force protection and support. Positioning is based on unit mission (concept of intended use), physical battlespace requirements, suitability and survivability of available facilities, current threat assessment, supportability, LOC, terrain, and risk. The commander uses these factors throughout planning and execution to ensure the maximum use of limited resources, facilities, and terrain.

During planning, the rear area commander develops an area management overlay. The overlay should be provided to all subordinate units and include current and proposed laydown sites. It is a vital management tool for the rear area commander’s use, especially when coupled with the movement control and security plans.

**Movements**

Per Joint Pub 3-10, *Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations*, “movements within a [joint rear area] involve the receipt of combat forces and their movement to forward areas.” Therefore, the ability to control movements into, within, and out of the rear area is critical. Movements can be tactical, operational, or administrative. They are normally conducted as part of the tactical, logistic, force protection, or deception plan. A detailed movement control plan helps synchronize and control all movements into and out of the rear area.
Within joint doctrine, movement control is the terminology used to define movement of combat forces. Movement control is the act of and organizing the effects of planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over LOCs. Thus, movement control involves both functions and agencies.

Joint Pub 4-01.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control*, describes the functions of movement control as planning, apportioning, allocating, deconflicting, validating priorities, coordinating movements, in-transit visibility, and force tracking. It identifies the principles of movement control as centralized control and/or decentralized execution, flexible movement, regulated movement, maximized use of carrying capacity, and forward support.

Movement control agencies plan, route, schedule, and control the movement of personnel and cargo over LOCs to support the deployment and employment of forces. Depending on the command level, a movement control agency can be either a permanent or temporary. To conduct deployments, the Marine Corps component, MAGTF, major subordinate commands, and lower level commands (battalion, squadron, company) activate and augment movement control centers.

If a rear area coordinator or rear area commander has been tasked to conduct movement control, his rear area command and control organization coordinates with the appropriate movement control agencies to monitor and supervise movements in the rear area to ensure they support the movement
control plan for the entire battlespace. The role of the rear area coordinator or rear area commander is not directive in nature, and only in emergent situations would he influence the execution of plans, priorities, or policies promulgated by the force movement control center or the logistics and movement control center. For further information see MCWP 4-1, Logistics Operations.

**Marine Corps Component Movement Control Center**

The Marine Corps component movement control center provides information processing and advises the Marine Corps component commander as to the status of subordinate unit deployments. It coordinates with the U.S. Transportation Command on transportation requirements, priorities, and allocations.

**Force Movement Control Center**

The force movement control center allows the MEF commander to control and coordinate all MEF movement and deployment support activities. It coordinates transportation priorities and allocations with U.S. Transportation Command components (Army Materiel Command, Military Sealift Command, and Military Traffic Management Command). It normally includes operations and logistic representatives. In joint and combined operations, the force movement control center establishes liaison and communications with the theater movement control center and other commands or host nations in whose areas it is operating.
The MAGTF commander may delegate responsibility for routine day-to-day movement control to the combat service support element commander.

**Logistics and Movement Control Center**

Movement control throughout the MEF commander’s assigned battlespace is a major consideration for the planning and execution of the single battle, and it requires significant augmentation to exercise command, control, and enforcement over movement of forces. Therefore, the MEF commander may direct the force service support group commander to develop and execute a MEF movement control plan. The force service support group commander uses the logistics and movement control center to accomplish these tasks. The principle focus of this control center is to allocate, schedule, and coordinate ground transportation requirements based on the MEF commander’s priorities.

During deployment, combat service support units (or the supporting establishment) organize logistics and movement control centers near deploying units. Each marshaling base and/or station has a logistics and movement control center. The force movement control center tasks the logistics and movement control centers to provide organic or commercial transportation, transportation scheduling, materials handling equipment, and other support during marshaling.
Unit Movement Control Centers

Major subordinate commands providing forces to deploying MAGTFs (to include the force service support group) set up unit movement control centers at their headquarters and at every subordinate deploying unit level down to battalion, squadron, and individual company level to control and manage marshaling and movement.

Infrastructure Development

Infrastructure generally refers to fixed and permanent installations, fabrications, or facilities used for the support and protection of forces. Infrastructure development normally focuses on facility security modification and battle damage repair, which includes main supply route repair and improvement. In underdeveloped areas, construction of temporary facilities is a key planning consideration. These are normally austere facilities designed for short-term use; however, their construction can be time, manpower, and equipment intensive. The use of available host-nation support and civilian logistic capabilities, manpower, equipment, supplies, materiel, and facilities reduces the impact on Marine Corps forces. The rear area operations center normally prioritizes and coordinates infrastructure development activities within the rear area in order enhance overall effectiveness of operations. Planning and monitoring of these activities is critical because any delays in building facilities or enhancing the security of critical sites could adversely impact conduct of actions across the battlespace.
Host-Nation Support

The use of host-nation support is intended to enhance the overall effectiveness of Marine Corps forces. Host-nation support is not just logistics. The Marine Corps normally plans for the use of personnel, vehicles, supplies, and facilities. If the host nation is sufficiently developed, it can include petroleum products, electricity, and water. Maximizing the use of host-nation capabilities in the rear area increases the availability of Marine Corps logistic capabilities for close and deep operations. When planning host-nation support, the commander should consider the following factors:

- Effect of host-nation support on friendly force morale.
- Effect on security.
- Ability to support.
- Dependability or willingness of host nation to accomplish tasks.
- Availability of needed support.
- Status of standing international agreements.

The Marine Corps component commander obtains host-nation support for Marine Corps forces based on the joint force commander’s directions and guidance. Commanders at all levels should identify capabilities that they cannot provide at their level and forward their requirements to the next higher commander. The Marine Corps component commander reviews the requirements and coordinates with the
Rear Area Operations

joint force commander to establish agreements with host
nations to provide the necessary support.

The rear area coordinator or rear area commander may be
tasked with managing host-nation support. Control of this
support is particularly important if host security forces are
called upon to support U.S. forces in rear operations. The
host-nation security plan must be integrated into the rear
area security plan to ensure coordination and supportability.

Normally, the senior combat service support unit directs the
use of host-nation support. The rear command post or oper-
ations center assists in identifying requirements and priori-
ties and in allocating support. The rear area operations
center may also be the focal point for the overall manage-
ment and introduction of host-nation forces into the com-
mander’s battlespace.
Appendix A

Rear Area Operations
Appendix Format

Rear area operations information is generally contained in Appendix 16 of Annex C, Operations. Depending on the mission, size, scope, and duration of the operation and the size of the assigned force, planners may need to create a separate annex for rear area operations (for example, Annex R). The following pages contain a sample format of appendix 16. MCWP 5-1, Marine Corps Planning Process, contains detailed information on the format and content of an operation plan or operation order.
APPENDIX 16 TO ANNEX C TO OPERATION ORDER
OR PLAN (Number) (Operation CODEWORD) ( )
REAR AREA OPERATIONS ( )

( ) REFERENCES:
   a. Any relevant plans or orders.
   b. Required maps and charts.
   c. Other relevant documents.

1. ( ) Situation. Summarize the overall operational situation as it relates to rear area operations.
   a. ( ) Enemy. Summarize the enemy situation, force disposition, intelligence capabilities, and possible courses of action. If applicable, reference intelligence estimates or summaries. Address any specific information that bears directly on planned rear area operations.
   b. ( ) Friendly. Summarize the situation of those friendly forces that may directly affect rear area operations. Address any critical limitations and any other planned rear area operations.
   c. ( ) Assumptions. List any assumptions made of friendly, enemy, or third-party capabilities, limitations, or courses of action. Describe the conditions that the commander believes will exist at the time the plan becomes an order. Omit in orders.
2. ( ) Mission. State the rear area mission in a clear, concise statement that answers the question: who, what, when, where, and why.

3. ( ) Execution

   a. ( ) Concept of Operations. Summarize how the commander visualizes the execution of the rear area operation from its beginning to end. Describe how rear area operations will support the command’s mission. Summarize the supervision, evolution, and termination of rear area operations. The concept of operations specifies the rear area functions controlled by the issuing headquarters and the rear area functions tasked to subordinate commands for execution.

      (1) ( ) The concept of operations may be a single paragraph or divided into two or more paragraphs depending upon the complexity of the operation.

      (2) ( ) When an operation involves various phases (e.g., peace, pre-hostilities, crisis, war, post-hostilities), the concept of operations contains subparagraphs that describe rear area operations for each phase.

      (3) ( ) Tabs A through H may be used as necessary to cover supporting concepts for each of the eight rear area functions.

   b. ( ) Rear Area Operations Tasks. Identify the major rear area functions assigned as tasks to subordinate commands.

   c. ( ) Coordinating Instructions. Address any mutual support issues relating to the elements of rear area operations.

4. ( ) Administration and Logistics. Address any administrative or logistic requirements relevant to rear area operations.
5. *( ) Command and Signal. List any command and control instructions relevant to rear area operations. State the command structure for rear area operations. Identify any special rear area operations communications and reporting requirements.

ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT

Name
Rank and Service
Title

TABS: (as appropriate)
A – Security
B – Communications
C – Intelligence
D – Sustainment
E – Area Management
F – Movements
G – Infrastructure Development
H – Host-Nation Support

OFFICIAL:
s/
Name
Rank and Service
Title

Page number

CLASSIFICATION
Appendix B

Glossary

Acronyms and definitions change over time in response to new operational concepts, capabilities, doctrinal changes and other similar developments. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, and MCRP 5-12C, Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, are the sole authoritative sources for official military acronyms and definitions.

——— Section I. ———

Acronyms

FM .......................................................... field manual
FMFM .............................. Fleet Marine Force manual
IPB ............... intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JP .......................................................... joint publication
LAAM ................................. light antiaircraft missile
LOC ................................. lines of communication
MAF ........................ Marine amphibious force
MAG ........................ Marine aircraft group
MAGTF ..................... Marine air-ground task force
MARFOR .................... Marine Corps forces
MAW ........................ Marine aircraft wing
MCDP ...................... Marine Corps doctrinal publication
MCPP ...................... Marine Corps Planning Process
MCRP ...................... Marine Corps reference publication
MCWP ...................... Marine Corps warfighting publication
MEF ......................... Marine expeditionary force
METT-T .................... mission, enemy, terrain and weather
troops and support available, time available
MOOTW ................... military operations other than war
MRAC ...................... Marine rear area coordinator
MRACOM ................... Marine rear area commander
MRACP ................... Marine rear area command post
MRAOC ................... Marine rear area operations center
OPLAN ..................... operation plan
OPORD ..................... operation order
OPT ................-------- operational planning team
RAC ........................ rear area coordinator
RACOM .................... rear area commander
RAOC ..................... rear area operations center
RACP ..................... rear area command post
UNAAF. ................. Unified Action Armed Forces
US ......................... United States

Section II. Definitions

A

area damage control—Measures taken before, during, or after hostile action or natural or manmade disasters, to reduce the probability of damage and minimize its effects. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of operations—An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

area of responsibility—1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. Also called AOR. (Joint Pub 1-02)
**B**

**base**—1. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. 2. An area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support. 3. Home airfield or home carrier. See also base of operations; facility. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**base cluster**—In base defense operations, a collection of bases, geographically grouped for mutual protection and ease of command and control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**base defense**—The local military measures, both normal and emergency, required to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of enemy attacks on, or sabotage of, a base, to ensure that the maximum capacity of its facilities is available to U.S. forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**base defense operations center**—A command and control facility established by the base commander to serve as the focal point for base security and defense. It plans, directs, integrates, coordinates, and controls all base defense efforts, and coordinates and integrates into area security operations with the rear area operations center/rear tactical operations center. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**battlespace**—All aspects of air, surface, subsurface, land, space, and electromagnetic spectrum which encompass the area of influence and area of interest. (MCRP 5-12C)
centers of gravity—Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command (command authority)—Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (Joint Pub 1-02)
command post—A unit’s or subunit’s headquarters where the commander and the staff perform their activities. In combat, a unit's or subunit's headquarters is often divided into echelons; the echelon in which the unit or subunit commander is located or from which such commander operates is called a command post. (Joint Pub 1-02)

communications zone—Rear part of theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) which contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coordinating authority—A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

force protection—Security program designed to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members,
facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

H

host nation—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, or to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)

host nation support—Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crisis or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

I

intelligence preparation of the battlespace—(see Joint Pub 1-02.) In Marine Corps usage, the systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment in a specific geographic area. Also called IPB. (MCRP 5-12C)

J

joint force commander—A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant com-
mand (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint rear area**—A specific land area within a joint force commander's operational area designated to facilitate protection and operation of installations and forces supporting the joint force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint rear area coordinator**—The officer with responsibility for coordinating the overall security of the joint rear area in accordance with joint force commander directives and priorities in order to assist in providing a secure environment to facilitate sustainment, host nation support, infrastructure development, and movements of the joint force. The joint rear area coordinator also coordinates intelligence support and ensures that area management is practiced with due consideration for security requirements. Also called JRAC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint rear area operations**—Those operations in the joint rear area that facilitate protection or support of the joint force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint rear tactical operations center**—A joint operations cell tailored to assist the joint rear area coordinator in meeting mission responsibilities. Also called JRTOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)
liaison—That contact or intercommunication maintained between elements of military forces or other agencies to ensure mutual understanding and unity of purpose and action. (Joint Pub 1-02)

line of communications—All the routes, land, water, and air, which connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

logistics—The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (Joint Pub 1-02)

movement control—1. The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. 2. An organization responsible for the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. Also called movement control center. (Joint Pub 1-02)
operational control—Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

rear area—For any particular command, the area extending forward from its rear boundary to the rear of the area assigned to the next lower level of command. This area is
provided primarily for the performance of support functions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**rear area operations center**—A command and control facility that serves as an area/subarea commander’s planning, coordinating, monitoring, advising, and directing agency for area security operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**rear area security**—The measures taken before, during, and/or after an enemy airborne attack, sabotage action, infiltration, guerrilla action, and/or initiation of psychological or propaganda warfare to minimize the effects thereof. (MCRP 5-12C)

**rear operations**—Military actions conducted to support and permit force sustainment and to provide security for such actions. (MCRP 5-12C)

**security**—1. Measures taken by a military unit, an activity or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, it is the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)
support—1. The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit which helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. 3. A part of any unit held back at the beginning of an attack as a reserve. 4. An element of a command which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (Joint Pub 1-02)

sustainment—The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

tactical combat force—A combat unit, with appropriate combat support and combat service support assets, that is assigned the mission of defeating Level III threats. (Joint Pub 1-02)

warfighting functions—The six mutually supporting military activities integrated in the conduct of all military operations are:

1. command and control—The means by which a commander recognizes what needs to be done and sees to it that appropriate actions are taken.
2. maneuver—The movement of forces for the purpose of gaining an advantage over the enemy.
3. **fires**—Those means used to delay, disrupt, degrade, or destroy enemy capabilities, forces, or facilities as well as affect the enemy’s will to fight.

4. **intelligence**—Knowledge about the enemy or the surrounding environment needed to support decision-making.

5. **logistics**—All activities required to move and sustain military forces.

6. **force protection**—Actions or efforts used to safeguard own centers of gravity while protecting, concealing, reducing, or eliminating friendly critical vulnerabilities. Also called WF. (MCRP 5-12C)
Appendix C

References

Joint Publications (JPs)

0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)
1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations
3-10 Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations
3-10.1 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Base Defense
4-0 Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations
4-01.3 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control
4-02 Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations
6-0 Doctrine for C4 Systems Support to Joint Operations

Marine Corps Publications

Marine Corps Doctrinal Publications (MCDPs)

1 Warfighting
1-1 Strategy
1-2 Campaigning
1-3 Tactics
2 Intelligence
3 Expeditionary Operations
4 Logistics
5 Planning
6 Command and Control

**Marine Corps Warfighting Publications (MCWPs)**

0-1 Marine Corps Operations (under development)
0-1.1 Componency
2-1 Intelligence Operations
2-14 Counterintelligence (under development)
3-33.1 MAGTF Civil Affairs (under development, currently FMFM 7-34)
3-37 MAGTF NBC Defense Operations
4-1 Logistics Operations
4-11.3 Transportation Operations (under development)
4-11.8 Services (under development)
4-12 Operational Logistics-Level (under development)
5-1 Marine Corps Planning Process

**Marine Corps Reference Publications (MCRPs)**

2-12A Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
5-12C Marine Corps Supplement to the Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms
Rear Area Operations  C-3

Army Field Manuals (FMs)

55-10  Movement Control
63-3   Corps Support Command
63-4   Combat Service Support Operations: Theater Army Area Command
100-5  Operations
100-7  Decisive Force: the Army in Theater Operations
100-16 Army Operational Support

Miscellaneous Publications

Joint Military Operations Historical Collection


