Chapter 5
Antiarmor Exercise

The following exercise is intended to demonstrate antiarmor capabilities of the MAGTF. The area of operations roughly approximates the Twentynine Palms, California desert terrain.

5001. General Situation

I MEF was directed to defend in zone the Kumri oil fields against possible enemy armor attacks. The GCE is composed of the following major units:

1ST MarDiv

1st Marines
5th Marines
7th Marines (rein)
-3rd Tk Bn (+)
-3rd AA Bn
11th Marines
1st Cbt Engr Bn
1st LAR Bn
1st Recon Bn

The enemy consists of a motorized rifle division (MRD) with three motorized rifle regiments (MRRs; 30 tanks per MRR), one independent tank battalion (40 tanks), and two artillery battalions (total 36 gun tubes).

5002. Special Situation #1

The GCE commander has two regiments forward defending in zone in relatively static positions and the LAR Bn in the security area. The 7th Marines--a mechanized regiment--possesses the entire tank force (41 tanks) and three AAV companies. The 7th Marines is the designated reserve (See fig. 5-1).



Figure 5-1. General Situation.

Without knowing the GCE Mission statement, would you consider the GCE to be in a mobile or position defense? (See chapter 4, par. 4105.)

The GCE commander will probably initially assign priority of fires to which major unit? (See chapter 4, par. 4403.)

The LAR Bn is approximately 30 kilometers forward of all friendly troops (including recon elements). The graphic control measure that would indicate the LAR Bn's location on a GCE or MEF overlay is called: FEBA, FLOT, or CFL? (See chapter 4, par. 4102.)

The LAR Bn may be assigned one of three missions in the security area--screen, guard, or cover. If assigned a guard or cover mission, LAR Bn would require reinforcement. What are some options available to reinforce the LAR Bn? (See chapter 4, par. 4201.)

The LAR Bn, when conducting security operations in the defense, will probably plan what type of operation to implement its mission statement? If the LAR Bn eventually returns through friendly lines while under enemy pressure, what control measure will it utilize to facilitate the transfer of responsibility for the security area and control of supporting arms to the units on the FEBA? (See chapter 4, secs. I and II.)

What options are available for flank security of the GCE? Does the use of LAR units in the security area relieve the regimental commanders of the responsibility of the area immediately forward of their positions? (See chapter 4, par. 4103 and sec. III.)

The GCE commander has directed that LAR Bn assume a guard mission forward of the FEBA and requested attack helicopters support for LAR Bn. LAR Bn has been designated as the GCE's main effort with priority of fires. LAR Bn has planned a delay in sector in successive positions. The GCE commander designated a HOL about 3 kilometers forward of the FEBA. The HOL will also define LAR Bn's final delay position. Regimental commanders designated security elements of TOW and Scout HMMWVs to provide immediate security out to the HOL (See fig. 5-2).



Figure 5-2. Situation #1.

5003. Special Situation #2

The MAGTF commander desires lo attack the enemy as far forward as possible with as much firepower as possible. What are some options that the MAGTF commander has to fight the *deep battle?* Is it necessary to use major GCE elements when attacking the enemy well forward of the FEBA? (See chapter 4, sec. IV.)

Who is the MAGTF commander likely to assign as *deep battle coordinator?* What organizations are likely to plan EAs deep into enemy territory? (See chapter 4, secs. lV and V.)

Is enemy armor most vulnerable to air strikes in a column or when it is fully deployed in an assault formation? (See chapter 2.)

The MAGTF commander has designated the ACE commander to establish EAs well forward of the FLOT. These EAs will be used by fixed-wing aircraft in DAS missions. SRIG and the ACE coordinated the insertion of Force Recon personnel and ground sensors at some of the designated EA sites.

5004. Special Situation #3

The LAR Bn anticipates first encountering the MRD's reconnaissance followed by its advanced guard or Forward Security Element (FSE). The main force of MRRs will follow. The enemy tanks are the T-72 model with spaced and reactive armor. (See chapter 2.) The LAR Bn, supported by attack helicopters, believes it can destroy the reconnaissance and FSE units prior to moving through the HOL.

What weapons found in the LAR Bn and on the attack helicopters are effective against enemy armor? (See chapter 3.)

During the initial delay against the reconnaissance and FSE elements, the LAR Bn plans on ambushing most of the enemy armor at ranges of 600 meters or closer. What is this engagement technique called? Against larger enemy armor formations with many T-72's, the LAR units will likely use what engagement technique to force the enemy to deploy as early as possible?

The EAs established during a delay operation will likely be forward or inside of the initial delay positions? (See chapter 4, sec. III.)

The TOW and Javelin missiles have a standoff range versus an enemy tank, terrain permitting. Which technique of engagement maximizes this attribute? (See chapter 3, sec. III.)

Considering that the T-72s are more heavily armored than the LAV antitanks (ATs) and that the LAR Bn is conducting a delay, what disengagement criteria would be appropriate for LAR units? (See chapter 4, sec. III.)

Once the LAR Bn has crossed the HOL, what other missions might it be assigned? Missions for the attack helicopters? (See chapter 4, par. 4103 and sec. IV.)

5005. Special Situation #4

The GCE assigned sectors to its regiments, thereby allowing each regiment to develop its own EAs. The GCE commander visualized his defense in terms of battalion positions and enemy avenues of approach accommodating a fully deployed MRB.

What are the primary antiarmor weapons within the regimental sectors? (See chapter 4, par. 4202.)

What are two offensive missions that may be assigned the mechanized regiment in reserve? (See chapter 4, par. 4108.)

What offensive mission may be assigned LAVs that have been bypassed forward of the HOL? (See Chapter 4. par. 4108.)

Neither 1st Marines or 5th Marines has tanks or LAVs. Both regiments are relying primarily on organic TOW, Javelin, Dragon, and LAW assets in the antiarmor role. As the GCE operations officer, you decide that each regiment needs a mobile reserve of some size. Which antiarmor weapon systems could fulfill the role of a mobile reserve? (See chapter 3.)

5006. Special Situation #5

1st and 5th Marine Regiments have each been reinforced with a tank platoon, a TOW platoon, and an AAV platoon. An engineer company is in direct support. See figure 5-3 for depiction of 1st Marine Regiment defensive positions.

Judging by the array of unit positions in figure 5-3, is the FA located within or forward of the FEBA?



Figure 5-3. 1st Marine Regiment Defensive Position.

At what distance away from the FEBA would an attacking Soviet type battalion desire to deploy into its assault formation? (See chapter 2.)

Which position would you expect to get the priority of engineer support? (See chapter 4, sec. V.)

The reserve for the regiment would most likely be an infantry company, a mech-heavy team, or a TOW section? (See chapter 4, par. 4203.)

The reserve is located in the regimental security area, main battle area, or rear area? (See chapter 4, sec. I.)
At the regimental level, an avenue of approach is defined as an area that can accommodate what size unit? (See chapter 4, sec. I.)

Assuming the enemy tanks are T-72s with reactive armor, we would expect this regiment to engage the tanks with its Dragons and LAWs from the flanks or the front? (See chapter 4.)

Given the same armored threat, would we expect this regiment to engage the tanks with its Javelins and Predators ffrom the flanks or the front.? (see chapter 4)

Considering the wide frontages and the open desert terrain, we would expect the TOWs to utilize which method of engagement--HAW-MAW-LAW or massed fire technique? (See chapter 4.)

Which technique--HAW-MAW-LAW or massed-fire--offers the likelihood of most first round kills? Gives away the friendly position the earliest? Minimizes enemy artillery? Provides most kills forward of the FEBA? (See chapter 4.)

5007. Special Situation #6

1st Bn 5th Marines is defending in sector with company sectors and platoon battle positions. This battalion has integrated a small village into its defense. (See fig. 5-4.)



Figure 5-4. 1st Bn 5th Marines in Built-Up Area.

The alternate platoon positions are normally a minimum of how many meters from the primary positions? Why? (See chapter 4, par. 4206.)

The small town functions as a battle position, sector, or strongpoint? Is it a cultural or reinforcing obstacle? (See chapter 4, secs. II and V.)

What offensive mission may be assigned LAVs that have been bypassed forward of the HOL? (See chapter 4, par. 4108.)

Neither 1st Marines or 5th Marines has tanks or LAVs. Both regiments are relying primarily on organic TOW, Javelin, Dragon, and LAW assets in the antiarmor role. As the GCE operations officer, you decide that each regiment needs a mobile reserve of some size. Which antiarmor weapon systems could fulfill the role of a mobile reserve? (See chapter 3.)

5008. Special Situation #7

What is the MEF organization that is likely to be responsible for directing and interpreting the intelligence data? (See chapter 4, sec. VI.)

What antiarmor resources does the GCE possess that may be used as an economy of force measure in protecting the rear area against an armor attack? What internal measures could the rear area establish to defend against an armor attack? (See chapter 4, sec I.)

The MRD is primarily an armored unit. The MAGTF is a more balanced unit. What inherent advantages does a MAGTF possess over a unit normally dedicated to one type or style of fighting? Night fighting probably favors which side? (See chapter 1.)

The enemy is constantly repositioning his tank reserves. What capability of the MAGTF is he probably trying to negate? (See chapter 4, sec. IV.)

Is it feasible to think of disrupting the enemy's forward forces by action in the enemy's rear? (See chapter 1.)

A turning movement would most likely involve what type MAGTF forces? (See chapter 4, par. 4108.)