MARINE CORPS ORDER P3000.18 W/CH 1

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps
To: Distribution List

Subj: MARINE CORPS PLANNER’S MANUAL (SHORT TITLE: PLANMAN)

Encl: (1) LOCATOR SHEET


2. Background. This directive provides perspective and direction to Marines involved in the preparation of warplans. It is published in order to standardize operational planning preparation procedures during deliberate or crisis action planning. Fleet Marine Forces Atlantic, Fleet Marine Forces Pacific, and Marine Expeditionary Forces contributed significantly in its development.

3. Action. Commanders shall ensure Marine Corps warplans are developed in compliance with this Order.

4. Recommendations. Recommendations for changes should be submitted to the Commandant of the Marine Corps (PP&O) through the chain of command.

5. Reserve Applicability. This Manual is applicable to the Marine Corps Reserve.

6. Certification. Reviewed and approved this date.

DISTRIBUTION: PCN 10203045800

Copy to: 7000110 (55) 7145004, 8145005 (2) 7000099, 7000144, 8145001 (1)
GENTEXT/REMARKS/1. PURPOSE. THIS MARADMIN PUBLISHES CHANGE ONE TO REF A. CHANGE ONE INCLUDES PUBLICATION RESPONSIBILITY SHIFT FROM CMC (PO) TO CMC (PL), ADDRESSES FORCE DEPLOYMENT ISSUES DISCUSSED IN REF C, DELETES SPECIFIC PUBLICATION SECTIONS NO LONGER APPLICABLE OR SUPERCEDED BY OTHER ORDERS/DIRECTIVES, AND UPDATES SECTION 4007 OF THE BASIC DOCUMENT.

2. BACKGROUND. PER REF B, CMC (PL) WILL ESTABLISH AND CHAIR A HQMC CORE LEVEL WORKING GROUP TO FACILITATE AND RESOLVE FORCE DEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND EXECUTION (FDP&E) ISSUES. THE HQMC CORE WORKING GROUP WILL CONSIST OF CMC (PL, PO, PR, LPO, AVN, C4 AND M&A), COMMARCORMATCOM, AND CG, MCCDC (TFS). ADJUNCT WORKING GROUP MEMBERS TO THE HQMC FDP&E CORE WORKING GROUP WILL INCLUDE THE MARFORS, MARCORBASESLANT/PAC, AND OTHER COMMANDS/AGENCIES AS REQUIRED. CMC (PL) WILL ESTABLISH A FDP&E WEBSITE TO PUBLISH CURRENT ISSUES, CONFERENCES, AND RESOURCES (HTTP://WWW.HQMC.USMC.SMIL.MIL/PLN/PLN_HOME.HTM).

3. ACTION.
3.A. RECORD THIS CHANGE ON THE RECORD OF CHANGES PAGE (PAGE LOWER CASE I).
3.B. LINE OUT ON COVER PAGE POC-30 AND REPLACE WITH PL.
3.C. MAKE FOLLOWING PEN CHANGES TO PAR 9003:
3.C.1. PAR 9003.4. DELETE CG FMFLANT AND CG FMFPAC AND REPLACE WITH COMMARFORS.
3.C.2. PAR 9004.5. DELETE CG MARRESFOR AND REPLACE WITH COMMARFORRES.
3.C.3. DELETE PAR 9005, 9006, 9007, 9008 AND 9009 IN THEIR ENTIRETY. REF D SUPERCEDED THESE PARAGRAPHS.
3.D. REPLACE CURRENT PAR 4007 WITH THE FOLLOWING PAR:

4007. FORCE PLANNING
4007.A. PURPOSE. THIS PARAGRAPH CONTAINS THE PURPOSE AND SHOWS RESPONSIBILITIES FOR MAINTAINING ACCURATE AND TIMELY UPDATES TO THE TYPE UNIT CHARACTERISTICS AND TYPE UNIT EQUIPMENT (TUCHA/TUDET) DATABASES. THESE DATABASES PROVIDE THE DATA NECESSARY FOR PLANNING, BOTH DELIBERATE AND CRISIS ACTION, AND MOVEMENT CHARACTERISTICS FOR PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT ASSOCIATED WITH OPERATIONAL USMC ACTIVE AND RESERVE FORCES/UNITS.

4007.B. BACKGROUND.


4007.B.2. TUCHA DATABASE DESCRIBES THE STANDARD PLANNING DATA ON MOVEMENT CHARACTERISTICS FOR PERSONNEL (FROM T/O) AND EQUIPMENT (FROM T/E) ASSOCIATED WITH DEPLOYABLE TYPE UNITS OF FIXED COMPOSITION.

4007.B.3. TUDET DESCRIBES THE EQUIPMENT’S DIMENSIONAL, WEIGHT AND CUBIC MEASUREMENT OF SPECIFIC PIECES OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT.

4007.B.4. TERMS OF REFERENCE.


4007.C. TASKS.

4007.C.1. CMC (PL). PROVIDES OVERSIGHT AND POLICY TO SUPPORT THE MARINE CORPS FORCE DEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND EXECUTION (FDP&E) PROCESS.

4007.C.2. CMC (POR). PROVIDES UPDATES PROVIDED BY MCCDC (TFS) TO THE CJCS STATUS OF RESOURCES AND TRAINING SYSTEM (SORTS) DATA WHICH UPDATES THE JOINT OPERATION PLANNING AND EXECUTION SYSTEM (JOPES) DATA BASE PER REF A. THIS WILL ENSURE JOES TUCHA DATABASE AND USMC TUCHA DATABASE ARE PROPERLY POPULATED AND SYNCHRONIZED.

4007.C.3. CMC (ASL).

4007.C.3.A. REVIEWS AND REVALIDATES ALL AVIATION EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS FILES PROVIDED BY NAVAL INVENTORY CONTROL POINT (NAVICP) AND NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND (NAVAIR) TO ENSURE THAT UTC ARE PROPERLY POPULATED WITH AVIATION EQUIPMENT. PROVIDE CORRECTIONS/UPDATES TO MARCORSYSCOM (CSIS) AND MCCDC (TFS) AS APPROPRIATE.

4007.C.3.B. IDENTIFY ITEM IDENTIFICATION/TAMCM AS REQUIRED TO UPDATE TUCHA FILES FOR MCCDC (TFS).

4007.C.3.C. COORDINATE WITH CMC (LPO, POR AND PL) AND MCCDC (TFS) TO DETERMINE CORRECT ITEM INVENTORY IN TUCHA FILE.

4007.C.4. CMC (LPO).

4007.C.4.A. REVIEWS AND VALIDATES GROUND EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS FILES PROVIDED BY MCCDC (TFS) TO ENSURE JCS CARGO CATEGORY CODES (CCC), SHIP CONFIGURATION DIMENSIONAL DATA AND CUBE ARE CURRENT AND PROVIDE CORRECTIONS/UPDATES TO MCCDC (TFS).

4007.C.4.B. IDENTIFY ITEM IDENTIFICATION/TAMCM AS REQUIRED TO UPDATE TUCHA FILES FOR MCCDC (TFS).
4007.C.4.C. COORDINATE WITH CMC (ASL, POR AND PL) AND MCCDC (TFS) TO DETERMINE CORRECT ITEM INVENTORY IN TUCHA FILE.

4007.C.5. COMMARCORSYS.COM.
4007.C.5.A. MARCORSYS.COM MAINTAINS ITEM DATA FILE (IDF) WITHIN TOTAL FORCE STRUCTURE MARINE CORPS (TFSMC) THAT IS THE SOURCE FOR THE TECHNICAL DATA FILE WITHIN THE MAGTF DATA LIBRARY (MDL).
4007.C.5.B. MARCORSYS.COM MAINTAINS THE MDL THAT SUPPORTS USMC FORCE DEPLOYMENT SYSTEMS.
4007.C.5.C. MARCORSYS.COM COORDINATES WITH MILITARY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT COMMAND (MTMC) TRANSPORTATION ENGINEERING AGENCY (TEA) TO CERTIFY DIMENSIONAL DATA FOR NEW GROUND EQUIPMENT AND THEN ENTER DATA INTO TFSMS.
4007.C.5.D. COORDINATES WITH CMC (LPO, ASL, POR AND PL), MCCDC (TFS) FOR DATA MANAGEMENT.

4007.C.6. CG, MCCDC (TFS).
4007.C.6.A. MAINTAINS TFSMC PERERENCE REF C. TFSMC IS THE MARINE CORPS AUTHORITATIVE DATA SOURCE FOR MANPOWER AND EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS.
4007.C.6.B. ESTABLISHES AND MAINTAINS UIC/UTC HEADER DATA FOR USE IN SORTS AND JOPES REPORTING. PROVIDES UIC/UTC UPDATES TO CMC (POR) FOR SORTS AND JOPES UPDATES PER REFERENCES A AND B.
4007.C.6.C. MAINTAINS UIC FOR U.S. MARINE CORPS UNITS AND ESTABLISHES OR DIS-ESTABLISHES UICS BASED ON MCBUL 5400 ACTION.
4007.C.6.D. MAINTAINS AND BUILDS THE TUCHA RECORDS A AND B WHICH DESCRIBES THE STANDARD PLANNING DATA ON PERSONNEL (T/O) AND EQUIPMENT (T/E) ASSOCIATED WITH DEPLOYABLE TYPE UNITS OF FIXED COMPOSITION. TUCHA RECORDS A AND B ARE THEN PROVIDED TO CMC (POR) TO VALIDATE WITH CJCS AND DEFENSE INFORMATION SYSTEM AGENCY (DISA) AND FOR INCLUSION INTO THE JOPES DATA BASE.
4007.C.6.E. PROVIDES CURRENT TUCHA/TUDET HEADER INFORMATION TO MARCORSYS.COM FOR INPUT INTO USMC FAMILY OF LOG AIS SYSTEMS TO SUPPORT FORCE DEPLOYMENT PLANNING AND EXECUTION.
4007.C.6.F. COORDINATES WITH CMC (LPO, ASL, POR AND PL) FOR DATA MANAGEMENT.

4007.C.7. COMMARFORS AND COMMARFORRES. PROVIDE RECOMMENDED T/O&E CHANGES TO MCCDC (TFS) AS REQUIRED.
LOCATOR SHEET

Subj:  MARINE CORPS PLANNER'S MANUAL (SHORT TITLE: PLANMAN)

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ENCLOSURE (1)
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Change Number</th>
<th>Date of Change</th>
<th>Date Entered</th>
<th>Signature of Person Incorporating Change</th>
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<tbody>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER
1 INTRODUCTION
2 OVERVIEW OF JOINT PLANNING
3 JOINT PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS
4 MARINE CORPS DEPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AND POLICY
5 C4I DURING PLANNING AND EXECUTION
6 OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR PLANNING SYSTEMS
7 DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS
8 CRISIS ACTION PLANNING
9 MARINE CORPS RESERVE AND FORCE ACTIVATION
10 DEPLOYMENT
11 EXECUTION: EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT
12 REDEPLOYMENT
13 LOGISTICS AND MAGTF SUSTAINMENT
14 MANPOWER PLANNING GUIDELINES

APPENDIX
A STANDARD CONSTRUCTION OF UNIT LINE NUMBERS AND FORCE MODULES
B GLOSSARY
C TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
D REFERENCES
E ORGANIZATION OF MARINE FORCES FOR COMBAT
F OPLAN DEVELOPMENT CHECKLIST
G INDEX
# CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATEGORIES OF PLANNING</td>
<td>1001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATION OF THIS MANUAL</td>
<td>1002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADMINISTRATION</td>
<td>1003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPLICABILITY</td>
<td>1004</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## FIGURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-1 CATEGORIES OF PLANNING</td>
<td>1-4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1000. **PURPOSE**

1. The purpose of this Manual is to provide all personnel involved in deliberate, contingency and exercise planning with essential information and direction necessary to carry out deliberate and crisis action or time sensitive, operations planning within the Marine Corps. This manual refines, amplifies and augments the general procedures prescribed in joint publications and the Joint Staff Officer’s Guide (AFSC Pub 1) and Command and Staff Action (FMFM 3-1). It provides the detailed planning tasks to be performed by commanders and staff officers at Headquarters Marine Corps; Headquarters Marine Corps component commands (MARFOR); Command Element, Marine Expeditionary Forces (MEF); MEF Major Subordinate Commands (MSC’s - Divisions, Wings and Force Service Support Groups (FSSG)); other Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) command elements and their Major Subordinate Elements (MSE’s); Marine Corps Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM); Marine Corps Reserve Forces (MARRESFOR); Marine Corps Logistics Bases (MARCORLOGBASES); and bases and stations.

2. The objectives of this manual are:

   a. To serve as an authoritative planning reference document that defines command and staff responsibilities and tasks throughout the planning process, and to complement and amplify the responsibilities, tasks, and planning procedures set forth in joint and service planning documents;

   b. To present an overview of the planning process with an emphasis on deliberate and crisis action/time sensitive operation planning aspects;

   c. To identify key reference documents;

   d. To specify planning responsibilities and tasks for: Headquarters Marine Corps, MARFOR, MEF, MSC’s of the MEF, other MAGTF’s, and their MSE planners;

   e. To amplify instructions contained in joint publications related to the preparation of Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) data bases that support regional contingency planning, routinely forward deployed MAGTF’s, and exercises;

   f. To provide information, guidance, policy, and procedures for the operational use of the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) within the Marine Corps.
1001. CATEGORIES OF PLANNING

1. The joint planning process is supported by the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Marine Corps planners are supported by a suite of computer systems called the Marine Air Ground Task Force II Logistics Automated Information Systems (MAGTF II/Log AIS). This software suite is a family of planning tools which can be used for either Deliberate Planning or Crisis Action Planning. In this Manual use of these systems is described during procedural phases of operation plan (OPLAN) development in chapter 6. The particular procedures used in joint planning depend largely on the time available to accomplish them. When time is not a critical factor, and an operation order (OPORD) is not required, deliberate planning methods are used. When time available is short, and the near term result is expected to be an actual deployment and/or employment of military forces, crisis action/time sensitive procedures are used. Overall, the processes for both deliberate and crisis action/time sensitive planning are similar, and are characterized as follows:

Figure 1-1 -- Categories of Planning
2. Joint planning is also categorized in terms of resources; the level of command, area of responsibility, and/or special areas of responsibility. The following definitions describe the different aspects of joint planning.

a. Resources View of Planning

(1) **Requirements planning** is based on a concept whereby planners attempt to identify all required forces and support to accomplish the mission. The command responsible for developing the plan analyzes an expected or actual enemy threat, then identifies the forces and the support needed to meet and overcome that threat.

(2) **Capabilities planning** is accomplished based on the forces and support currently available. The command responsible for developing the plan, plans for the efficient use of existing forces in a constrained environment against a current or projected threat.

(3) **Program Planning** measures future requirements against current capabilities and helps determine resource allocation decisions for the future through interface of the JSPS with the Planning Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS).

b. Level of Command and Area of Responsibility View of Planning

(1) **Regional planning** is the responsibility of unified or subordinate unified commanders and their staffs. In general, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) directs unified commanders to develop regional contingency plans based on a current national perspective of geopolitical situations in designated regions. For regional plans, combat units are multiply tasked. That is, they support more than one unified commander. Forces receive a tasking for each OPLAN to which they are apportioned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). In addition, unified commanders may develop regional plans that are not directed by CJCS but are deemed essential in response to potential problems within their respective areas of responsibility. In this latter case, apportionment for planning must be coordinated through the Joint Staff for forces not already allocated to the Commander in Chief (CINC).

(2) **Functional planning** is conducted by the functional staffs of a joint command. Each component staff concentrates on the planning in its assigned area of responsibility; i.e., Air Component Forces, Land Component Forces, Naval Component Forces, Special Operations Forces, etc. A service command that is assigned as a functional component of a unified/joint task force is responsible for functional area planning as well as service unique planning.

(3) **Service planning** focuses on service unique planning issues and is conducted by designated service commands or components within a unified commander’s operational chain of command. For example, the Commanding General, Marine Forces Atlantic (COMMARFORLANT) Service component of USCINCLANT would carry out Service planning.
responsibilities in support of all of USCINCLANT’s regional plans to which COMMARFORLANT forces are apportioned or allocated. These responsibilities include force and sustainment sourcing and force deployment support. When Marine forces are designated in a unified commanders OPLAN, a MEF is often tasked to accomplish all functional planning responsibilities for those forces, including any augmenting or attached forces. This MEF is called the principle planning agent when so designated (see chapter 7 for additional discussion on this topic).

c. Special area planning refers to detailed planning in a particular area within the overall deliberate planning effort. Examples are mobilization planning, deployment planning, employment planning, logistics planning, and sustainment planning. Staff planners at the unified, subordinate unified, component, and Service HQ levels may establish specialist working groups to address specific planning issues as mentioned above.

1002. ORGANIZATION OF THIS MANUAL. Chapters provide an aggregate view of the planning process. Emphasis is placed on the joint service deliberate planning process and its relationship to planning activities within the Marine Corps. The appendices provide detailed information which supports topics covered in this Manual.

1. Appendix A provides the standards for use of planning systems.

2. Appendices B and C provide a glossary of acronyms and abbreviations and a list of commonly used terms with associated definitions, respectively.

3. Appendix D is a listing of reference documents.

4. Appendix E provides an overview of the organization of the Marine Corps forces for combat.

5. Appendix F is a detailed tutorial on OPLAN development.

6. Appendix G provides an index for easy access to specific topics.

1003. ADMINISTRATION

1. For convenience, when a reference document is available to augment or enhance the detail of the subject being discussed, the "name" of the reference is provided at that point, vice the traditional method; (See reference (a)).
2. This Manual is useful to planners only if it is current. Marines at all levels within the Fleet Marine Force (FMF) are encouraged to forward comments, editorial corrections, and proposed changes in procedures to:

   Commandant of the Marine Corps
   (DC/S Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O))
   Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps
   2 Navy Annex
   Washington D.C. 20380-1775

1004. APPLICABILITY. This Manual is applicable to Headquarters Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force, Marine Component Commanders, the Marine Reserve Force, and the supporting establishment.
CHAPTER 2

OVERVIEW OF JOINT PLANNING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAGRAPH</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY</td>
<td>2-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD PLANNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES</td>
<td>2-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEY JOINT PLANNING DOCUMENTS</td>
<td>2-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KEY MARINE CORPS PLANNING DOCUMENTS</td>
<td>2-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS</td>
<td>2-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE

2-1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE | 2-4 |

2-2 PUBLICATIONS TO BE HELD AT HEADQUARTERS AND COMMAND ELEMENTS | 2-11
2000. **INTRODUCTION.** This Chapter gives an overview of the organization for national security, provides a thumbnail sketch of DOD Planning Systems and Policies, identifies joint planning documents and their Marine Corps parallels, and identifies the level at which these publications should be held.

2001. **ORGANIZATION FOR NATIONAL SECURITY.** A working knowledge of the elements of the national security structure is essential to understanding the role of each national and joint staff organization. As directed in the Constitution, the President has ultimate authority and responsibility for national defense. However, the appointees and organizations introduced in the following paragraphs, aid the CINC in the conduct of this specific obligation. The Marine Corps role in national defense is articulated in FMFM 1-2.

1. **National Command Authorities (NCA).** The NCA is composed of the President and the Secretary of Defense together, or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Both movement of troops and execution of military action must be directed by the NCA; by law, no one else in the chain of command has the authority to take such action.

2. **National Security Council (NSC).** The NSC is the principal forum where national security issues requiring Presidential decision are considered. The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the National Security Advisor) is responsible for the day-to-day functions of the NSC. The NSC presents its national security policy recommendations to the President for consideration and approval.

   a. The NSC has only four statutory members; the President, Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense.

   b. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Director of Central Intelligence serve as statutory advisers to the NSC.

   c. Other participants in NSC deliberations are invited by the President, and may include the Chief of Staff to the President, the Attorney General, the Secretary of the Treasury, and heads of executive departments or agencies.

3. **Department of Defense (DOD).** DOD was established in 1949 as a result of an amendment to the National Security Act of 1947. The head of the Department is the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The role of the Secretary of Defense has changed since the position was established in 1947. Today, he is the principal assistant to the President for all matters relating to the Department of Defense.
Moreover, the DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 makes clear his position in the operational chain of command. DoD Organization is illustrated at Figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1 -- Department of Defense

4. **Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).** The JCS consist of the Chairman, the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The collective body is headed by the Chairman, who sets the agenda and presides over JCS meetings. Responsibilities as members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take precedence over duties as the chiefs of military services. Moreover, the JCS have no executive authority to command combatant forces. This point was clearly established by the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986.
5. **Combatant Commanders.** The Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 states that the operational chain of command runs from the President, to SecDef, to the combatant commanders. Combatant Command (COCOM) authority resides only in unified and specified combatant commanders. (See Appendix C for definitions of unified and specified commands). Although a provision of the act allows that communications between the NCA and the combatant commanders pass through CJCS, the combatant commanders are, nonetheless, responsible to the NCA for the performance of their assigned missions.

2002. **DOD PLANNING SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES.** The purpose of joint operation planning is to effectively use the military arm of national power to protect U.S. interests or national policy. Joint planning is a process whereby a commander applies a systematic series of actions or procedures to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks. The following discussion will highlight only four of the systems used by DoD that affect joint planning and operations.

1. **Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS)**
   
a. The JSPS is a formal series of events, activities, and guidance, conducted on a biennial cycle, by which CJCS discharges his responsibility to:

   1. prepare strategic plans;
   2. assist the President in giving strategic direction to the Armed Forces;
   3. review Service programs and conduct risk assessments;
   4. set guidance and apportion resources for contingency planning;
   5. furnish planning continuity for the strategic planning process; and
   6. submit input to the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).

   b. A product of the JSPS process is the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). This is the key document used by commanders of unified and specified commands and the chiefs of the Services for the accomplishment of military tasks in the short-range period (2 years).

2. **Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS).** PPBS is the tool DoD planners use to ensure that the limited resources (total spending) available to DOD are best applied to the Services’ ability to train, support, and equip forces in order to best satisfy the future warfighting requirements of the Unified Commanders. PPBS is
the bridge that takes requirements generated within the JSPS through developing resource allocation decisions. In simplest form: the plan is analyzed, a program (for the next 6 years) is implemented, and annual budgets are developed to satisfy R&D, manpower, procurement (acquisition), and O&M decisions.

a. **CINC’s Preparedness Assessment Report (CSPAR)/Critical Items List (CIL).** The PPBS cycle begins when the unified commanders (CINC’s) analyze the current scenarios, tasks, and threat (outlined in the JSCP) as compared with the current resources (force structure) available in theater. The CSPAR and the CIL results from this analysis. The CINC’s play the single greatest role in the PPBS process since they are apportioned the warfighting forces from the Services for planning.

b. **Integrated Priority List (IPL).** Having determined critical shortfalls embodied within the JSCP, the Unified Commanders then develop future warfighting requirements (having solicited input from their respective components) and submit programming priorities in the IPL.

c. **Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).** The Secretary of Defense subsequently issues his Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which directs the Services to develop force programs.

d. **Fiscal Guidance.** Concurrent with the issuance of the DPG is the provision of DoD Fiscal Guidance which specifies the Total Obligational Authority (TOA) allocated by Military Department and Defense Agency across the 6 year program period.

e. **Program Objective Memorandum (POM).** Each Military Department develops its Program Objective Memorandum (POM), which lists its resource allocation objectives for forces, weapon systems, and logistic support across the 6 year program. The CINC’s annex to each POM illustrates the resources devoted to satisfying the CINC’s requirements.

f. **Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA).** The CPA contains the Chairman’s assessment of the POM force to assist the SecDef in decisions on the defense program after receipt of the POM’s. Based upon comprehensive assessments and prepared in consultation with the other members of the JCS, the CINC’s, and the Director Defense Intelligence Agency, the CPA presents the views of the Chairman on the balance and capabilities of the POM force and the support levels to attain national security objectives.

g. **Program Decision Memorandum (PDM).** After OSD reviews the Military Departments’ POM’s and considers the CPA, SecDef issues PDM’s that finalize the resource allocation decisions.

h. **Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP).** Once PDM’s are issued, the FYDP is developed as a detailed picture (by major force programs) of the next 6 years’ resource allocation.

2-6
3. **Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES).** JOPES is a DoD directed, JCS-specified system for executing joint planning. The system applies to both deliberate and crisis action planning of joint operations. It establishes functional relationships, specifies administrative requirements, and explains planning and ADP-support procedures. JOPES is described in Joint Pub 5-03.1.

   a. JOPES replaced two existing systems (Joint Operation Planning System III (JOPS III) and Joint Deployment System (JDS)).

   b. JOPES enables supported commanders, supporting commanders, the US Transportation Command, and other members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC) to manage the deployment of forces and follow on sustainment.

   c. Funding cuts have caused the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to halt further development of JOPES. Follow-on studies continue to examine requirements for a single DOD planning and execution system.

4. **Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS).** The WWMCCS is the system that provides the means for operational direction and technical administrative support involved in the function of command and control of U.S. military forces. The system’s goal is to establish effective connectivity among the members of the defense organization.

   a. The primary mission of WWMCCS is to support the national level command and control function. On a non-interference basis, the system is available to support combatant commanders in their command and control responsibilities.

   b. The basic WWMCCS requirement is to transfer information. To accomplish that requirement, the system provides several channels of secure communications.

   c. WWMCCS concept requires hardware and software components as well as ancillary support, for five basic elements: warning systems, communications, data collection and data processing, executive aids (documents and procedures), and WWMCCS command facilities.

   d. The WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) facilitates user communication, enables data review and update, and provides a means for transfer of data rapidly between remote WIN sites.

   e. Additional guidance on the capabilities and use of WWMCCS is provided in chapter 5.

2003. **KEY JOINT PLANNING DOCUMENTS**

1. **Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).** The JSCP is published biennially as planning guidance and is used by the JCS to initiate the JOPES deliberate planning process. The JSCP assigns military tasks
and apportions forces for planning to unified commanders based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense and projected military capabilities in the near-term period. It directs the development of plans to support national security objectives.

2. **Unified Command Plan (UCP).** The UCP provides the functions and general geographic areas of responsibility for commanders of unified and specified commands.

3. **Defense Planning Guidance (DPG).** The DPG is published by the Secretary of Defense as a forward-looking strategic plan for the development of the military capabilities needed to assure the nation’s security. It provides guidance to the Military departments and the Defense Agencies for force planning and programming and for the development of POM’s. The DPG is also published biennially.

4. **Joint Pub 0-2 Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).** Joint Pub 0-2 sets forth principles, doctrines, and military guidance to govern the joint activities and performance of the armed forces of the United States. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by commanders of unified and specified commands and other joint force commanders; prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training; and provides military guidance for the use by armed forces in the preparation of their respective detailed plans.

5. **Joint Pub 1-03.21 (Joint Reporting Structure, Joint Operation Planning System (JOPESREP)).** This publication contains details on the Joint Reporting Structure and is the basis for the data elements required for input into JOPES.

6. **Joint Pub 5-01 (Mobilization).** This publication identifies responsibilities and procedures for mobilization planning.

7. **Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Vol I) - Deliberate Planning Procedures.** This publication provides guidance and procedures for the development, coordination, dissemination, review, and approval of joint operation plans during peacetime. It prescribes standard formats and minimum content for operation plans, annexes, appendices, tabs, and exhibits. (Joint Pub 5-03.1 will replace this document).

8. **Joint Pub 5-02.2 (JOPS Vol II) - Supplementary Planning Guidance.** This publication provides planning guidance for specific plan annexes, as well as formats for classified subjects. A companion document, JCS Pub 5-02.21 is a classified supplement to JOPS Vol II.

9. **Joint Pub 5-02.3 (JOPS Vol III) - ADP Support.** This publication describes the WWMCCS that supports JOPS. ADP support in WWMCCS includes standard reference files, automated data processing application programs, and guidance for the reporting and exchange of data.

10. **Joint Pub 5-02.4 (JOPS Vol IV) - Crisis Action Procedures.** This publication provides guidance for joint deployment planning and execution during time sensitive situations. It provides the joint
community with a viable single source document for directing crisis response. (Joint Pub 5-03.1 will replace this document)

11. **Joint Pub 5-03.1 (JOPES Vol I) - Planning Policies and Procedures.** This publication describes the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) functions and the environments in which joint military operations are planned and executed. JOPES Vol I specifies the policies and procedures to be used across the spectrum of deployment, employment, mobilization, and sustainment activities as applied to the members of the Joint Planning and Execution Community (JPEC). The use of JOPES is directed across the operational continuum from peacetime operations to war.

12. **Joint Pub 5-03.2 (JOPES Vol II) - JOPES Planning Formats and Guidance.** Describes the operation plan formats and guidance for the conventional planning and execution process under JOPES.

13. **Joint Pub 5-03.21 (JOPES. Vol II Supplement) - JOPES Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance.** Describes classified OPLAN formats and guidance for the planning and execution process under JOPES.

2004. **KEY MARINE CORPS PLANNING DOCUMENTS.** Marine Corps doctrinal publications and operational handbooks serve as basic source documents for the development of plans and orders. The Doctrine Division (Publications Branch), Marine Corps Combat Development Command (Code 429), at Quantico, Virginia, (Phone DSN 278-3610) has cognizance of doctrinal publications and operational handbooks. The documents listed below have direct impact on Marine Corps planning.

1. **Command and Staff Action.** FMFM 3-1 remains the basic staff action document within the Marine Corps. Other procedures, such as those established for Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning, do not replace, supersede or otherwise relieve a staff of the responsibilities and functions established in FMFM 3-1.

2. **Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG) (formerly the Marine Corps Campaign Plan (MCCP).** The CPG, in broad terms, orients all Marines to the warfighting needs of our Nation and to the role of the Marine Corps. It does not detail specific actions, but lays the foundation for other plans, studies, and publications. The CPG captures the intent of the Corps for both today and tomorrow.

3. **Marine Corps Long Range Plan (MLRP).** The MLRP defines the goals of the Marine Corps of the future. It covers a projection of the world 10 to 20 years in the future. The goals developed in the MLRP help to shape the Marine Corps Master Plan.

4. **Marine Corps Master Plan (formerly the Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Master Plan).** The Marine Corps Master Plan (MCMP) establishes the operational foundation for the organization,
manning, equipping, training, and development of doctrine and operational techniques for Fleet Marine Forces.

a. The MCMP provides the single authoritative statement of MAGTF planning objectives and supporting actions necessary for their achievement.

b. Subordinate plans derive from the MCMP and provide the necessary detail to bridge the gap between planning and programming.

5. **Supporting Establishment Master Plan (SEMP)**. The SEMP defines the process by which Supporting Establishment programs and initiatives are identified and prioritized. This process tailors Marine Corps capabilities to the specific needs of supported forces, Marines and their dependents. With operating force participation, force requirements are identified and prioritized by installation and region.

6. **Marine Corps Capabilities Plan (MCP)**. The MCP is a planners guide to the organization, deployment and employment of Marine Corps forces. It is written for planners within the Marine Corps, as well as for planners on joint staffs.

7. **Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN)**. The MPLAN is the source document for Marine Corps mobilization. Within it are policies, procedures, and responsibilities for mobilization of the Marine Corps.

8. **Marine Corps War Reserve Policy (MCO P4400.39E)**. This Order provides policy guidance for supply classes I, II, III, IV, V(W), VIII and IX for personnel and ground equipment in support of air and ground units assigned to active and reserve forces. (Note: The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) manages Navy war reserve materiel under special project codes. Those project codes, which include allowances for forms, publications, flight clothing, aviation ground support equipment, ordnance support equipment and ordnance repair parts (COSAL) and liquid oxygen (LOX) equipment repair parts, also support Marine Aviation).

9. **Class V(W) Supply Rates for Combat Operations (MCO 8010.1D)**. Procedures for computing Class V(W) requirements are established in this Manual. The prepositioned war reserve (PWR) Marine Ammunition Requirements Support Order (PWRMARSO) provides information on authorized allowances for contingency ammunition. (Note: Class V(A) requirements are generated through the Non-nuclear Ordnance Requirements (NNOR) process, controlled and coordinated by CNO in concert with CMC).

2005. **RECOMMENDED PUBLICATIONS**. Figure 2-2 is a matrix identifying the publications to be held at Headquarters and Command Elements within Marine Component Headquarters.
## Recommended Publications

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Note: Full titles and publication control numbers are provided in Appendix D.

Figure 2-2 -- Publications to be Held at Headquarters and Command Elements
# JOINT PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT CONCEPTS

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## FIGURE

3-1 BUILD-UP PROCESS – RELATIONSHIP OF MAGTF TO ADAPTIVE PLANNING

3-5
3000. PURPOSE. This chapter gives an overview of joint deployment doctrine and policies. It will discuss the national strategy, reviews the adaptive planning concept (including the shift to regional planning), and discuss in detail the CINC’s roles as focal points for operational planning, and warfighting.

3001. NATIONAL STRATEGY. The President and the Secretary of Defense crafted a national defense strategy firmly based upon four foundations: strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. The National Military Strategy (NMS) implements our defense strategy using strategic principles outlined in detail in the JSCP. These principles are readiness, collective security, arms control, maritime and aerospace superiority, strategic agility, power projection, technological superiority, and decisive force.

1. Base Force. The NMS provides for our enduring defense needs. The Base Force was calculated as the force needed to execute the NMS and maintain an acceptable level of risk. The Base Force was subdivided into four conceptual force packages (Strategic Forces, Pacific Forces, Atlantic Forces, Contingency Forces) and four supporting capabilities (Space, Transportation, Reconstitution, Research and Development). This concept was a force sizing tool, not a blueprint for a new command structure.

2. Regional Focus

   a. Because of the changes in the strategic environment, the threats we expect to face are regional rather than global. We will deter and defend against strategic nuclear attacks as we have for the past 40 years. We will also retain the potential to defeat a global threat, should one emerge. However, our plans and resources are primarily focused on deterring and fighting regional rather than global wars.

   b. In peacetime our forward presence is the "glue" that helps hold alliances together, builds cooperative institutions, and helps regional countries work together. Forward presence helps to reduce regional tensions, to deter potential aggressors, and to dampen regional arms competitions.

3002. ADAPTIVE PLANNING

1. General

   a. To meet our unilateral and alliance responsibilities, the U.S. needs a diverse spectrum of military options. A smaller total force requires flexibility in planning, training, and employment, placing an
even greater premium on maintaining and enhancing technological superiority and the high quality of our total force.

b. The end of the Cold War and profound changes in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union call into question many of the traditional warning assumptions used for planning. Whatever warning time or response time is available is far more likely to be well used by key decision makers if they have a menu of options from which to choose. These options need to be pre-planned and gauged to a wide range of crises. This fundamental change to our military strategy is reflected in an adaptive planning process, through which planners develop multiple options keyed to specific crises.

c. Adaptive planning offers a range of pre-planned options, encompassing all the instruments of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, and military) to clearly demonstrate U.S. resolve, deter potential adversaries, and, if necessary, to deploy and employ force to fight and win, quickly and decisively.

2. Adaptive Planning Options. The spectrum of available options confronts any opponent’s leadership with uncertainty and risk should it contemplate aggression of any kind, including their use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. The military strategy offers a framework within which the combatant commanders -- the commanders in chief of the unified and specified commands (CINC’s) -- plan the use of military forces in their areas of responsibility and communicate their recommended military options for decisions by the National Command Authorities in times of crisis. There are four general categories of operations combatant CINC’s must plan for and be prepared to execute.

a. Employ strategic nuclear forces and strategic defenses to deter and respond.

b. Actively employ resources on a day-to-day basis to build military and alliance readiness; foster stability; promote peace, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; protect lives and property; help our friends, allies, and those in need of humanitarian aid. This includes evacuation of noncombatants, such as the 1990 operation SHARP EDGE in Liberia and EASTERN EXIT in Somalia in 1991.

c. Deploy and employ forces to deter and if necessary, rapidly and decisively resolve a regional military conflict. The 1989 Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama and the 1990-91 Operations DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in Southwest Asia are recent examples. Also in this category are more limited combat operations in support of national policy objectives. The 1986 raid on Libya, Operation EL DORADO CANYON, and Operation URGENT FURY in Granada are examples.

d. Deploy and employ reconstituted forces to counter the emergence of a global threat and defeat any that arise.

3. Adaptive Planning Guidance. The JSCP introduces the concept of adaptive planning and the premise that a crisis can arise under a
variety of circumstances that will, in turn, elicit a variety of likely or possible responses. Accordingly, the JSCP can assign planners the task of developing several response options keyed to a specific set of conditions at the onset of a crisis. Specific guidance to component commanders for development of specific response options (described below) will be provided by the supported CINC. Specific guidance on development of Marine Corps deployment options is contained in chapter 4, but as will be evident, the Marine Corps MAGTF is an ideal force option across the operational continuum. Figure 3-1 illustrates the relationship of the MAGTF to adaptive planning options.

a. Flexible Deterrent Option. Adaptive planning emphasizes the importance of early response to an emerging crisis. It facilitates early decision making by laying out a wide range of response paths that are carefully tailored to avoid the classic response dilemma of too much too soon or too little too late. These deterrent-oriented early response options are called Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO's).

(1) FDO's using military forces and resources should be combined with diplomatic, political, and economic options as well as military options. The intent is to give the NCA a wide range of options, encompassing all the elements of national power (diplomatic, political, economic, and military).
(2) All regional plans will have FDO’s. It is expected that FDO’s will have a regional flavor, uniqueness, and variation. MARFOR commanders should consider the MAGTF as the Marine Corps’ contribution to a supported CINC’s FDO menu. Chapter 4 provides more specific guidance on the development and deployment of FDO’s (previously called Crisis Action Modules or CAM’s). For the most part plans for FDO’s will use active duty in-place forces (to include those afloat) and theater lift assets. Generally a single FDO will be approximately a MEU or an ARG.

(3) In planning FDO’s, commanders should avoid placing forces in a position where they may be sacrificed if a potential adversary is not deterred. Marine Corps FDO’s should facilitate escalating to the deploy-to-fight response (described below) should it appear that signaling of resolve has not been effective. FDO’s should be capable of rapid de-escalation should the crisis appear defused. An example would be landing a MEU to secure a port or airfield for introduction of a MEF(FWD) (i.e. a MEB with command element augmentation from the MEF). This type of FDO can be rapidly expanded to a full MEF or de-escalated by reboarding amphibious shipping.

b. Deploy-to-Fight. If decision makers elect not to make a response or an adversary is not deterred by FDO’s, planners must prudently plan for later actions (less timely from a deterrent perspective) resulting from the receipt of unambiguous warning. These actions must include the rapid deployment initially of a sufficient and supportable warfighting force to the crisis region to defend U.S. interests, followed by decisive force to end the conflict quickly.

c. Counterattack. There is also the distinct possibility that a crisis would begin with an attack against U.S. forces or vital interests without prior warning or deterrent moves. U.S. force deployments would, therefore, not occur until after the conflict had been initiated.

3003. COMBATANT COMMANDER AS FOCAL POINT

1. Role. By examining and anticipating the potential for instability or crisis, the regional CINC’s develop plans for the employment of military assets (as well as examining the complementary economic, diplomatic, and potential options). These options, used singly or in various combinations, can be carried out with the intent of deterring or averting a crisis. They vary widely from large joint and combined operations and the deployment of task forces to small mobile training teams and low-level military-to-military contacts. Forward presence forces in Europe, Asia, Central and South America, and at sea, though reduced in size, are fundamental to this concept.

2. Planning. Planning is decentralized to the CINC’s to the maximum extent possible. Broad policy and strategy guidance, mission assignment, and final plan review are furnished by the Secretary of Defense. The assumptions, the concepts of operations, and specific forces to be employed are determined by the CINC’s and approved by the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in close coordination with the Services and defense agencies.

3. **Execution.** Execution of any operation must be approved by the President. Authority to move forces between the CINC’s to which they have been assigned, rests with the SecDef.

3004. **COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS.** Command relationships are expressed in terms of authority and responsibility as well as on the exercising of coordination and support. Relationships discussed below are reprinted from JCS Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). It addresses command relationships and provides guidance regarding exercise of Combatant Command (COCOM), Operational Command (OPCON), and Tactical Control (TACON) over combat forces.

1. **Assignment and Transfer of Forces.** In accordance with the direction of the Secretary of Defense, the Secretaries of the Military Departments assign forces to the CINC’s of the unified and specified combatant commands who exercise command authority over them. When forces are assigned or transferred, the gaining commander exercises one of the command relationships described in this subsection.

   a. Combatant Command (COCOM) is the command authority over assigned forces vested in the CINC’s by title 10, United States Code, section 164, and is not transferable.

   b. Operational Control (OPCON) of assigned forces is inherent in COCOM and is transferable within a combatant command by the CINC or between combatant commands by the Secretary of Defense.

   c. A force assigned to a combatant command may be transferred from that command only by authority of the Secretary of Defense under procedures approved by the President. Forces will be transferred between CINC’s by reassignment or attachment.

      (1) When transfer of forces between CINC’s will be permanent, or the broadest level of command and control is required or desired, forces are reassigned.

      (2) When transfer of forces between CINC’s will be temporary, forces may either be reassigned or attached. If attached, the establishing directive normally will specify that the authority the gaining CINC will exercise is OPCON. The parent CINC will retain responsibility for administration and logistic support for forces attached to another CINC. When OPCON is not appropriate, the Secretary of Defense may specify other command relationships, other command relationships are normally reserved for use by a CINC within his combatant command.

   (a) Within his command, the commander of a unified command may direct the attachment of forces of any assigned Service component to other subordinate commands.
(b) The Secretary of Defense may direct the attachment of forces of any of the Services to a specified command, and the commander of the specified command, in turn, may direct further attachments of forces within the command.

(c) When forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service, formation of a subordinate joint command, while not automatic, will be considered by the appropriate authority.

(d) The commander of a force, to the extent possible, should use attached units for the purpose for which they were attached.

d. CINC’s organize their commands and assign forces to subordinate commands as appropriate. Commanders of subordinate commands exercise OPCON over assigned forces and normally exercise OPCON over attached forces; however, the CINC in the establishing directive may specify other command relationships listed in this subsection as the appropriate command authority over attached forces.

2. Guidance on Exercise of Combatant Command

a. COCON is exercised only by commanders of unified and specified combatant commands. COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commander. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

b. COCOM includes the authority of OPCON described in paragraph 3004.4, below, and is the additional authority to:

(1) Exercise or delegate OPCON.

(2) Give authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics.

(3) Coordinate the boundaries of geographic areas with other CINC’s as necessary to prevent both duplication of effort and lack of adequate control of operations in the delineated areas.

(4) Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, function as the U.S. military single point of contact and exercise directive authority over all elements of the command in relationships with other combatant commands, DoD elements, U.S. diplomatic missions, other U.S. agencies, and agencies of countries in the area of
responsibility (AOR). Whenever a combatant commander undertakes exercises, operations or other activities with the military forces of nations in another combatant commander’s AOR, those exercises, operations and activities and their attendant command relationships will be as mutually agreed to between the commanders.

(5) Determine those matters relating to the exercise of COCOM in which subordinates must communicate with agencies external to the combatant command through the CINC.

(6) Coordinate with Service components and approve those aspects of administration, support (including control of resources and equipment, internal organization, and training), and discipline necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.

(7) Establish personnel policies to ensure proper and uniform standards of military conduct.

(8) Participate in the development and acquisition of the command’s command, control, and communications systems and direct their operation.

(9) Submit recommendations through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense concerning the content of guidance affecting the strategy and/or fielding of joint forces.

(10) Participate actively in the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), as follows:

(a) Submit to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, comments and recommendations to be used in planning the proposed DOD policy, strategy, and force guidance for programming.

(b) Provide guidance to Service component commanders on warfighting requirements and priorities for addressal in their program and budget requests to the respective Military Departments.

(c) Provide a separate, integrated priority list of essential warfighting requirements prioritized across Service and functional lines for consideration by the Secretaries of the Military Departments; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Secretary of Defense in developing the DoD program and budget.

(d) Review reports from Service component commanders on the degree to which their program and budget requests meet the warfighting requirements of the command. CINC’s may communicate directly with the Secretaries of the Military Departments; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, concerning their assessment of operational capability deficiencies associated with program and budget requests.

(e) Review and provide comments and recommendations to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense
through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the degree to which Service programs satisfy warfighting requirements.

(f) Assess the impact of OSD program and budget decisions and provide recommendations to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(g) As directed by the Secretary of Defense, prepare and submit to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, budget proposals for activities of the command.

(11) Concur in the assignment (or recommendation for assignment) of officers as commanders directly subordinate to the CINC and to positions on the combatant command staff.

(12) Convene general courts-martial in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).

c. Unless authorized by the Secretary of Defense, the commander of a unified command will not act as the commander of a subordinate command.

d. If the commander of a combatant command at any time considers his authority, direction, or control insufficient to command effectively any of the commands or forces assigned to the command, the commander will promptly inform the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

e. When authorized by the Secretary of Defense, the commander of U.S. elements of a combined command may exercise COCOM of those U.S. forces assigned to that command.

f. CINC's may exercise COCON:

(1) Through Service component commanders.

(2) Through functional component commanders, if established for a particular operational purpose.

(3) Through a commander of a subordinate unified command (unified command only).

(4) Through a single-Service force commander reporting directly to the CINC. Normally, missions requiring operations of a single-Service force will be assigned to the applicable Service component commander. Under exceptional circumstances, a CINC may establish a separate single-Service force.

(5) Through the commander of a joint task force who reports directly to the CINC.

(6) Directly over specific operational forces that, because of the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain
immediately responsive to the CINC.


   a. The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a CINC includes the authority to issue directives, including peacetime measures, to subordinate commanders necessary to ensure the following:

      (1) Effective execution of approved operational plans.

      (2) Effectiveness and economy of operation.

      (3) Prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.

   b. **This authorization of directive authority is not intended to:**

      (1) Discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support.

      (2) Discourage continuation of techniques of coordination by consultation and agreement.

      (3) Disrupt effective procedures, efficient utilization of facilities, or organization.

   c. Unless otherwise directed by the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments and Services continue to have responsibility for the logistic and administrative support of Service forces assigned or attached to joint commands.

      (1) Under conditions short of crisis or war, the scope of the logistic and administrative responsibilities exercised by the commander of a unified command will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, departmental policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Where these factors result in differences between CINC’s and Service component commanders, the comments and recommendations of the CINC, together with the comments of the Service component commander concerned, with normally be referred to the appropriate Military Department for consideration. If the matter is not resolved in a timely manner with the appropriate Military Department, it will be referred by the CINC, through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense.

      (2) Under crisis action or wartime conditions and where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic authority and responsibility of commanders of unified commands are expanded to authorize them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary, for the accomplishment of their missions during response to crisis or under the approved war plan being implemented. Joint logistic
doctrine developed by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, establishes wartime logistic support policies that will assist the commander of a unified command in conducting successful joint operations.

d. A CINC will exercise approval authority over Service logistic programs (base adjustments, force bed downs, etc.) within the area of responsibility that will have significant effects on his operational capability or sustainability. When the CINC does not concur with proposed Service logistic program action, the CINC or the Secretary of the Military Department may forward the issue through the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Secretary of Defense for resolution.

4. Guidance on Exercise of Operational Control

   a. OPCON may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. OPCON should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through the Service component commanders. OPCON normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. OPCON does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training.

   b. OPCON is the authority to:

      (1) Exercise or delegate OPCON, tactical control (TACON), and other command relationships, excluding COCOM.

      (2) Give direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training.

      (3) Prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.

      (4) Organize commands and forces within the command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.

      (5) Employ forces within the command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.

      (6) Assign command functions to subordinate commanders.

      (7) Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the action of subordinate forces.

3-12
(8) Establish plans, policies, and overall requirements for the intelligence activities of the command.

(9) Conduct joint training and joint training exercises required to achieve effective employment of the forces of the command as a whole, in accordance with joint doctrine established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and establish training policies for joint operations required to accomplish the mission. This authority also applies to forces attached for purposes of joint exercises and training.

(10) Suspend from duty and recommend reassignment of any officer assigned to the command.

(11) Define clearly the assignment of responsibilities to subordinate commanders for certain routine operational matters that require coordination of effort of two or more commanders.

(12) Establish an adequate system of control for local defense and delineate such areas of responsibility for subordinate commanders as deemed desirable.

(13) Delineate functional responsibilities and geographic areas of responsibility of subordinate commanders.

c. The Secretary of Defense may specify adjustments to accommodate authorities beyond OPCON when forces are transferred between CINC’s in the establishing directive. Adjustments will be coordinated with the participating CINC’s.

d. Guidance on the exercise of OPCON of Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) tactical aviation during sustained operations ashore is found in JCS Pub 3-01.2 and JCS Pub 3-56.23.

5. Guidance on Exercise of Tactical Control (TACON)

a. TACON may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TACON is the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks.

b. **TACON provides the authority to:**

   (1) Give direction for military operations.

   (2) Control designated forces.

c. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise these authorities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.
6. **Guidance on Exercise of Support**

   a. Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon but will normally be established below the level of combatant command. When the Secretary of Defense or a superior commander decides that one force should aid, assist, protect, or sustain another force, a support relationship will be established between the forces. This relationship is accomplished by directing that one force (referred to as the "supporting force") give support to (or operate "in support of") another force (referred to as the "supported force"). The degree of authority granted to the supported commander is specified by the superior commander in the establishing directive.

   b. Support is the action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action, or a unit in battle such as aviation, artillery or naval gunfire used as a support for infantry, or an element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat.

   (1) Mutual support is the action that units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.

   (2) General support is the action that is given to the supported force as a whole rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.

   (3) Direct support is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force’s request for assistance.

   (4) Close support is the action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fires, movement, or other actions of the supported force.

   c. Unless limited by the establishing directive, the commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.

   d. The supported commander should consider the accepted tactical practices of the Service of the supporting force. Normally, the supporting commander will be permitted to prescribe the tactics, methods, communications, and procedures to be employed by elements of the supporting force.

   e. The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported force and take such action to fulfill them
as is within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

f. The establishing directive will indicate the purpose, in terms of the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken. It should include:

(1) The strength of forces allocated to the supporting mission.

(2) The time, place, and duration of the supporting effort.

(3) The priority of the supporting mission relative to the other missions of the supporting force.

(4) The authority, if any, of the supporting force to depart from its supporting mission in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency.

(5) The general or special authority for any operational or other instructions to be issued by the forces being supported or by other authority in the action areas.

7. Guidance on Exercise of Coordinating Authority

a. A coordinating authority is a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. Coordinating authority may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters.

b. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations.
## CHAPTER 4

**MARINE CORPS DEPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AND POLICY**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>4000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING COMMUNITY</td>
<td>4001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS</td>
<td>4002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING ROLES AND MISSIONS</td>
<td>4003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLICIES GOVERNING DEPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE FORCES</td>
<td>4004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROVISIONAL SUPPORT BATTALION/MWSS BASE SUPPORT)</td>
<td>4005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADVANCED BASE FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS</td>
<td>4006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEVELOPMENT OF FORCE STRUCTURE</td>
<td>4007</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4000. **INTRODUCTION.** This chapter complements chapter 3 by providing a review of Marine Corps doctrine on the deployment and employment of forces. It identifies the command chain from the CINC to MARFOR to the MAGTF, discusses the roles of HQMC, MARRESFOR, MARCORSYSCOM, MARCORLOGBases and Bases and Stations, and sets forth key policies on deployment and employment of USMC forces (including our role as Naval Expeditionary Forces, Battle Staff arrangements for providing/augmenting MARFOR headquarters, MAGTF capability to provide nucleus of JTF, MARFOR as CINC’s Service Component Commander, JFACC, role of MARRESFOR in providing SMCR units and IRR’s, introduction of Provisional Support Battalion/MWSS (Base Support) concept as conceived by Reserve FSPG, etc.). Finally, it assigns responsibilities for development of standard UTC’s (including necessary non-T/E and T/O detachments), and maintenance of standard data.

4001. **PLANNING COMMUNITY**

1. **MAGTF Planners Military Occupational Specialty (MOS)**
   
   a. **MOS 9909, MAGTF Plans/Operations Officer**

   (1) MAGTF Plans/Operations Officers participate in preparation of joint operation plans supporting combatant commanders’ operational missions. This title and MOS is used to identify billets in joint T/O’s requiring the special MAGTF planning and development skills or experience.

   (2) This MOS is assigned as an additional MOS only. It is to be used as a billet designator in Marine Corps T/O’s requiring individuals with operational planning skills and experience (G-5 billets should be coded to reflect the need for planning experience).

   b. **MOS 9919, MAGTF Plans/Operations Specialist**

   (1) This title and MOS will be used to identify enlisted personnel who participate in preparation and execution of joint operation plans supporting combatant commanders’ operational missions. It is also used to identify enlisted billets in joint T/O’s requiring the special MAGTF planning and development skills or experience.

   (2) This MOS is assigned as an additional MOS only. It is to be used as a billet designator in Marine Corps T/O’s requiring enlisted individuals with operational planning skills and experience (enlisted assistant billets within the G-5 should be coded to reflect the need for plan execution experience).
2. **Training and Education.** Adequate procedural training and proficiency in the use of ADP systems used by Marines within the joint planning community is essential to ensure success in both deliberate and crisis action planning. This basic foundation of knowledge and training, coupled with regular use of ADP systems, provides the commander and his staff with the requisite knowledge and expertise to create, analyze, and validate force and non-unit records contained in the TPFDD. To be effective, training must be tailored to suit the appropriate usage level, and must be accomplished on a continuous basis.

   a. **General.** Commanders of MAGTF CE’s, MSC’s, and subordinate commands are responsible for ensuring that personnel, at all levels within the command, are appropriately trained regarding joint planning procedures and the use of ADP equipment. Force Commanders must make resources available to provide technical assistance to subordinants and liaison with higher headquarters as necessary.

   b. **Training for MAGTF Planners.** Formalized training is the preferred course of action within the FMF for those personnel assigned either primary or secondary duties as a MAGTF planner, especially those assigned to billets involving WwMCCS operations. Formal training opportunities are announced by HQMC (COB) as they become available. Specific questions regarding training courses may also be directed to HQMC (COB). However, requests for training quotas will be forwarded up the chain of command to the MARFOR Commanders. Quotas will then be requested via the unified commander chain or via the Service chain (HQMC (COB)). Special requests (i.e. unique class structure, MTT’s, or special topics) may be requested from HQMC (COB) via GENSER or in the MCOPSLOG teleconference.

      (1) Since formal training cannot be provided to everyone, it is essential that training and/or orientation packages are developed at each locale to accommodate training and familiarization within the local commands. Training/orientation packages will be developed at three general levels:

         (a) Senior officer level course which provides an overview of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, including ADP capabilities.

         (b) Action or watch officer/SNCO level course which provides comprehensive training, tailored for the specific level of application, for individuals who are involved in Joint Planning and Execution of OPLAN’s, OPORD’s, and TPFDD’s.

         (c) WWMCCS and MAGTF II/Log AIS clerk level course for those junior Marines directly involved in building TPFDD’s, oriented primarily toward the use of software and ADP equipment.

      (2) Local training will serve the additional purpose of honing basic skills learned during formal training.
(3) Local training will include training and orientation in the use of MAGTF II/Log AIS software.

c. Training in WWMCCS is NOT to be viewed as a requirement for "planners" only. Every officer and staff noncommissioned officer at Component HQ’s, MAGTF CE, and MSC levels must be familiar with basic concepts related to joint planning and execution and the capabilities of WWMCCS.

3. **Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Planner’s MOS**

   a. **MOS 9909. MAGTF Plans/Operations Officer**

      (1) Prior to assignment of this MOS, an officer must have a minimum of 1 year in a billet which included training and experience with the World Wide Military Command and Control Intercomputer Network (WIN) and joint planning systems. Officers must also possess a Top Secret security clearance.

      (2) The following courses of instruction are desirable for skill attainment. Courses may be taken either in residence at USTRANSCOM or Air Training Command, Keesler Air Force Base; or through mobile training teams (MTT’s) hosted by a supported combatant commander:

         (a) JOPES User Course

         (b) WIN Users Course

         (c) MAGTF II Users training (provided by MARCORLOGBASES ALBANY Code 815)

   b. **MOS 9919, MAGTF Plans/Operations Specialist**

      (1) Prior to assignment of this MOS, individual must have a minimum of 1 year in a billet which included training and experience with the World Wide Military Command and Control Intercomputer Network (WIN) and joint planning systems. Individuals must also possess a Top Secret security clearance.

      (2) The following courses of instruction are desirable for skill attainment. Courses may be taken either in residence at USTRANSCOM or Air Training Command, Keesler Air Force Base; or through MTT’s hosted by a supported combatant commander:

         (a) JOPES User Course

         (b) WIN Users Course

         (c) MAGTF II Users training (provided by MARCORLOGBASES ALBANY Code 815)
3. Duties

a. MOS 9909, MAGTF Plans/Operations Officer

(1) Analyzes joint mission assignments, planning guidance from higher headquarters, and force capabilities to determine options for deployment and employment of MAGTF’s in support of joint operations.

(2) Translates operational requirements into ADP system input and articulates MAGTF capabilities and requirements in operational and ADP terms.

(3) Operates the WIN workstation to pass data to and communicate with other headquarters possessing a workstation.

(4) Initiates, accesses, modifies, and manipulates files; uses the JOPES, other joint planning systems, and MAGTF II to create Marine Corps input to time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) files in support of combatant commander’s operation plans (CINC’S OPLANS).

(5) Accesses, modifies, and manipulates JOPES force modules to monitor deployment flow during execution. Advises Marine Component Commanders and MAGTF commanders on force deployment options.

b. MOS 9919, MAGTF Plans/Operations Specialist

(1) Operates the WIN workstation to pass data to and communicate with other headquarters possessing a workstation.

(2) Initiates, accesses, modifies, and manipulates files on the WWMCCS; uses the JOPES, other joint planning systems, and MAGTF II to create Marine Corps input to time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD) files in support of combatant commander’s operation plans.

(3) Extracts information used by operations officers in performance of planning duties.

4002. COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS. To be written by DC/S Plans, Policies and Operations.

1. Command Relationships During Planning

2. Command Relationships During Execution

4003. PLANNING ROLES AND MISSION

1. HQMC

   a. PP&O is the single point of contact for Marine Corps policy on joint or combined deliberate and crisis action planning (see paragraph 7002 for specific tasks assigned).

4-6
b. I&L is the single point of contact for Marine Corps policy on planning for ground logistics support during deliberate planning. Ground logistics policy will be coordinated by the Logistics Readiness Coordination Center (LRCC) through the HQMC Crisis Response Cell (CRC) in a crisis or during plan execution.

c. The DC/S for Aviation is responsible for coordination with supporting Navy activities during development of logistics plans and support for Marine aviation.

2. MARFOR
3. MAGTF
4. MARRESFOR
5. MARECORSYSWICOM
6. MARCORLOGBASES
7. Bases and Stations

4004. POLICIES GOVERNING DEPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT OF MARINE FORCES
To be written by DC/S Plans, Policies and Operations.

1. Naval Expeditionary Forces
2. Forming a Service Component Headquarters
   a. Structure
   b. Procedures
      (1) Battle Roster
      (2) MEF (Fwd)
3. Forming a Joint Task Force Headquarters
   a. Concept
   b. Procedure
   c. Required Augmentation
4. Role of MARRESFOR in providing Reserve Forces

4005. PROVISIONAL SUPPORT BATTALION/MARINE WING SUPPORT SQUADRON (BASE SUPPORT)

1. Provisional Support Battalion (PSB). PSB’s in the Marine Corps Reserve will be used to support the deployment of the FMF in time of
war. The Reserve Force Structure Planning Group (RFSPG) built upon the Base Support Battalion concept and developed a rough cut organizational structure.

a. The T/O development to date has approached the sourcing of the PSB's along the same lines as the detachments of the active FSSG's which are geographically separated from their parent FSSG's. Each detachment is task organized and its T/O mapped to its parent FSSG T/O. Marines are ordered to the detachments by HQMC and spend their entire tour with the detachment. Each detachment line number is coded on the parent battalion T/O to show where each billet is sourced. When required due to mission changes or contingency deployments the detachment line numbers are returned to the parent FSSG.

b. The two PSB Headquarters will stand up as a nucleus planning staff while the PSB detachments will be identified and coded on the appropriate 4th FSSG battalion T/O's. This will preclude the need for stand alone PSB's, provide flexibility of available 4th FSSG structure to fulfill a variety of missions, and not increase the I&I requirement. It preserves the CSS capability of 4th FSSG in case the PSB's are not needed and reinforces the ability to task organize.

c. In the event of mobilization it is likely that portions of the PSB's would be the first to be activated. Active unit personnel assigned to the Fleet Assistance Program which supports base and station functions would return to assigned FMF units and would require replacement. This requirement could be assigned to activated Reservists.

2. Marine Wing Support Squadron (Base Support). To be written by DC/S Aviation.

4006. ADVANCED BASE FUNCTIONAL COMPONENTS. To be written by DC/S Installations and Logistics and DC/S Aviation.

>CH 1 4007. FORCE PLANNING

Ref A. CJCSM 3150.24B, Type Unit Characteristics Report (TUCHAREP), Volume I, dtd 20 April 2001
B. CJCSM 3150.24B, Type Unit Characteristics Report (TUCHAREP), Volume II, dtd 20 April 2001
C. MCO 5311.1_, Total Force Structure Process

(Note: References shown below refer to references shown above not message references.)

a. Purpose. This paragraph contains the purpose and shows responsibilities for maintaining accurate and timely updates to the type unit characteristics and type unit equipment (TUCHA/TUDET) databases. These databases provide the data necessary for planning, both deliberate and crisis action, and movement characteristics for personnel and equipment associated with operational USMC Active and Reserve forces/units.

b. Background
1. The Joint Staff requires that all Services submit accurate updates of the TUCHA/TUDET data for notional planning quarterly (March, June, September, and December).

2. TUCHA database describes the standard planning data on movement characteristics for personnel (from T/O) and equipment (from T/E) associated with deployable type units of fixed composition.

3. TUDET describes the equipment's dimensional, weight and cubic measurement of specific pieces of military equipment.

4. Terms of Reference

   a. **Unit Identification Code (UIC).** A six-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each Active, Reserve and National Guard unit of the Armed Forces. (JP-02)

   b. **Unit Type Code (UTC).** A Joint Chiefs of Staff developed and assigned code, consisting of five characters that uniquely identify a type unit. (JP-02)

   c. **Tasks**

      1. **CMC (PL).** Provides oversight and policy to support the Marine Corps Force Deployment Planning and Execution (FDP&E) process.

      2. **CMC (POR).** Provides updates provided by MCCDC (TFS) to the CJCS Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) data which updates the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) data base per reference a. This will ensure JOPES TUCHA database and USMC TUCHA database are properly populated and synchronized.

      3. **CMC (ASL).**

         a. Reviews and revalidates all aviation equipment characteristics files provided by Naval Inventory Control Point (NAVICP) and Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) to ensure that UTC are properly populated with aviation equipment. Provide corrections/updates to MARCORSYSCOM (CSIS) and MCCDC (TFS) as appropriate.

         b. Identify item identification/TAMCM as required to update TUCHA files for MCCDC (TFS).

         c. Coordinate with CMC (LPO, POR and PL) and MCCDC (TFS) to determine correct item inventory in TUCHA file.

      4. **CMC (LPO).**

         a. Reviews and validates ground equipment characteristics files provided by MCCDC (TFS) to ensure JCS Cargo Category Codes (CCC), ship configuration dimensional data and cube are current and provide corrections/updates to MCCDC (TFS).
b. Identify item identification/TAMCM as required to update TUCHA files for MCCDC (TFS).

c. Coordinate with CMC (ASL, POR and PL) and MCCDC (TFS) to determine correct item inventory in TUCHA file.

5. COMMARCORSYS.COM

a. MARCORSYS.COM maintains Item Data File (IDF) within Total Force Structure Marine Corps (TFSMC) that is the source for the technical data file within the MAGTF Data Library (MDL).

b. MARCORSYS.COM maintains the MDL that supports USMC force deployment systems.

c. MARCORSYS.COM coordinates with Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA) to certify dimensional data for new ground equipment and then enter data into TFSMS.

d. Coordinates with CMC (LPO, ASL, POR and PL), MCCDC (TFS) for data management.

6. CG, MCCDC (TFS)

a. Maintains TFSMC Pererence reference c. TFSMC is the Marine Corps authoritative data source for manpower and equipment requirements.

b. Establishes and maintains UIC/UTC header data for use in SORTS and JOPES reporting. Provides UIC/UTC updates to CMC (POR) for SORTS and JOPES updates per references a and b.

c. Maintains UIC for U.S. Marine Corps units and establishes or dis-establishes UICS based on MCBul 5400 action.

d. Maintains and builds the TUCHA records A and B which describes the standard planning data on personnel (T/O) and equipment (T/E) associated with deployable type units of fixed composition. TUCHA records A and B are then provided to CMC (POR) to validate with CJCS and Defense Information System Agency (DISA) and for inclusion into the JOPES data base.

e. Provides current TUCHA/TUDET header information to MARCORSYS.COM for input into USMC family of LOG AIS systems to support Force Deployment Planning and Execution.

f. Coordinates with CMC (LPO, ASL, POR and PL) for data management.

7. COMMARFOR.S AND COMMARFORRES. Provide recommended T/O&E changes to MCCDC (TFS) as required.
### MARINE CORPS PLANNER’S MANUAL

#### CHAPTER 5

**C4I DURING PLANNING AND EXECUTION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAGRAPH</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>5-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS</td>
<td>5-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINE CORPS PLANNING SYSTEMS</td>
<td>5-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COORDINATING PLANNING</td>
<td>5-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COORDINATING EXECUTION</td>
<td>5-15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
5000. **INTRODUCTION.** This provides a concise review of the command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence systems available to support deliberate planning. It will discuss WWMCCS and JOPES as command and control medium to support Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN), telephone, and SATCOM during development and execution of plans. It will discuss the use of teleconferences (MCOPSLOG, LANTCAT, CCTLCF, etc.) as coordination tools. It will summarize the computer systems designed to support planning and execution (MAGTF II/LOG AIS family of systems, intelligence resources, etc.). Finally, it will place all the preceding C4I capabilities in the context of deliberate planning and execution, providing an overview of how each is used during the two phases.

5001. **COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS**

1. **Use of WWMCCS as a Communications Medium**

   a. **General.** This section describes the functional use of the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) as a communications medium within the Marine Corps.

   b. **Background.** Joint Staff Pub 0-1, UNAAF, defines WWMCCS as "the system that provides the means for operational direction and technical administrative support involved in the function of command and control of U.S. military forces." The system is designed to establish effective connectivity among the members of the defense organization.

   c. **WWMCCS is not a single system, nor are there plans for it to become one. It is a system of systems ranging from the national to the theater level. Component systems are designed, developed, and used to satisfy command and control requirements of the agencies, services, or commands that use them.**

   d. **The overarching communications bridge connecting WWMCCS applications and data bases is called the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network or WIN. With WIN, users may communicate with other users, review and update data at other WWMCCS locations, and rapidly transfer data between computers. The system enables real-time Top Secret high communications. There are three prominent capabilities:**

      1. **Telecommunications Network (TELNET).** TELNET is the link between each host computer which allows the user to gain access to any WIN host computer regardless of geographic location.

      2. **Teleconference (TLCF).** TLCF allows access to files of stored electronic messages for up to 1,500 participants who are granted access by the TLCF chairman on a need-to-know basis.
Analogous to a radio net, the TLCF may also be used to carry on an informal (textual) dialogue among participants.

(3) **File Transfer Service (FTS)**. FTS is used to exchange data files within WWMCCS. Electronic mail is sent instantly to one or multiple designated users. Unlike TLCF, FTS is user-to-user communications. Only the individual(s) possessing the userid(s) to which mail is sent have access to the message.

(4) **Time Sharing Subsystem (TSS)**. TSS is the host data storage medium. Users can transfer data stored in these files from host to host; user to user; or between the host computer and the user’s WWMCCS terminal.

2. **Use of WIN in the Marine Corps**

   a. **General**. Primarily a tool for operators, planners and logisticians, use of WIN within the Marine Corps will range from informal action officer communication to formal "command" correspondence.

   b. Each command with WIN access will maintain a joint crisis action team (JCAT) user ID for access into the system. Use of personal identification codes should be discouraged. Access to WIN files and databases is rigidly controlled in accordance with Joint Pubs 6-03 series. The local WIN Terminal Area Security Officer (WATASO) is charged to ensure all use of WIN is within the scope of these Joint Staff publications.

   c. The following is policy governing the use of WIN TLCF and WINMAIL for communications.

   (1) Commands having access to WIN will establish a primary point of contact for WIN related matters.

   (2) Establishment of and changes to the JCAT ID "command mailbox" will be announced by entering a message in the "MCOPSLOG" TLCF at the NMCC host.

   (3) Use of TLCF’s and WINMAIL to transmit command originated or informal message traffic will be governed by the procedures presented below.

3. **Procedures**

   a. **Formal WINMAIL**. Use of the WIN as a formal communications media within the Marine Corps will be governed by the following guidelines:

   (1) All record traffic will be handled in accordance with established procedures for AUTODIN.

   (2) Command messages are formal correspondence. They have the same import as AUTODIN messages/mailgrams.

5-4
Format will be the same as for AUTODIN traffic.

(4) Drafter and releaser must be annotated on the last line of each message.

(5) Messages will always be sent to the recipient’s JCAT "command" mailbox at their host site.

(6) Establish procedures for staffing and accountability of all command originated messages sent/received by WIN.

(7) Use WINMAIL, vice TLCF, to transmit "close hold", limited distribution, or "Personal For" messages.

b. Informal Messages. Informal messages may be used for rapid information dissemination, action coordination, informal document review, etc.

(1) Informal messages will not contain command taskings, policy, or otherwise be directive in nature. Lack of response to an informal message will be taken as meaning "no comment."

(2) WINMAIL or the "MCOPSLOG" TLCF will be the normal means of transmitting informal messages.

(3) Informal messages addressed to individuals but sent to "command mailboxes" need only be routed to the individual. No file copy is required.

c. Internal Message Handling Procedures. Each WIN capable command is authorized latitude to establish procedures for transmission, receipt, and distribution of WIN messages. However, adherence to standing classified material control procedures and policy and procedural guidance is mandatory.


5. JOPES. To be written by DC/S Plans, Policies and Operations.

6. Computer Hardware

a. WWMCCS. To be written by DC/S Plans, Policies and Operations.

b. MAGTF II/LOG AIS. To be written by DC/S Installations and Logistics.

c. Aviation Planning Systems Hardware. To be written by DC/S Aviation.

(1) TAMPS

(2) TAVB Logistics Planning System (TALPS)
5002. MARINE CORPS PLANNING SYSTEMS

1. Effective deployment of MAGTF’s requires detailed knowledge and application of appropriate AIS. MAGTF II/Logistics AIS family of systems, when coupled with other joint and USMC aviation systems, provides MAGTF’s with a powerful array of planning and execution tools. However, full utility of these automated tools cannot be realized without uniform standards and procedures for their use. Accordingly, this section identifies functions associated with operational planning and force deployment, prescribes standard tool(s) to be used for each function, and delineates appropriate staff agencies who will use the tool to perform function.

2. Although currently MAGTF II/LOG AIS and aviation planning systems do not exchange information, efforts are underway to allow that information exchange. Included in paragraph 5002.7 is a listing of aviation support systems will interface with the MAGTF II family of planning tools. Provided below is the policy for use of the MAGTF planning tools available today.

3. Planning and Deployment. The Marine Corps has traditionally excelled in deploying forces quickly and smoothly. However, current emphasis on regional conflict and crisis response dictates that we master all facets of deliberate planning and crisis action planning using joint systems such as the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). To this end Marines must be familiar with a range of systems which, when used in coordination with one another, greatly enhance our ability to plan for and deploy MAGTF’s in a joint environment. Recent history has demonstrated absolute need for standardization and consistent use of procedures and associated tools.

4. Standard Systems. Marine Corps planning systems are classified as either 1A (ones that support main frame systems) or 1C (stand alone AIS that provide Marine Corps wide support on small organic workspace computers). The following Class 1A and 1C systems are Marine Corps standard tools to support functions indicated:

   a. Deployment Planning and Execution

      (1) Function: Each FMF and SMCR unit must maintain a unit database containing all T/E equipment, supplies and table of organization personnel. Information in this database will be used to
develop and identify configuration for specific task organizations, with equipment, supplies, and personnel down to vehicle/package level. These databases form the basis for movement requirements.

(2) Standard System: MAGTF Deployment Support System II (MDSS II) is the Marine Corps Standard Class 1C system which provides unit level automated task organizing ability for deployment and execution. This is accomplished through use of the unit’s database which is the source of information for other MAGTF II/LOG AIS systems (CAEMS, CALM, MAGTF IT, TCAIMS). MDSS II replaces Standard Embarkation Management System (SEMS).

(3) Responsible Office

(a) Functional Manager: HQMC (LPO)
(b) System Sponsor: COMMARCORLOGBASES (815/70)
(c) MEF/MSC Level Functional Sponsor: G-4

(4) Standard Users

(a) MAGTF CE/MSC HQ/G/S-4: Training of subordinate units.
(b) Regiment/Group/Separate Battalion/Separate Squadron S-4 - For consolidating unit level deployment data prior to export into MAGTF II/TC AIMS.
(c) Battalion/Squadron/Separate Company: S-4, Development of sourced/refined deployment data in support of particular operation; development of shipping label information for input into LOGMARS format labels.

b. Operational Planning Including Development of JOPES TPFDD’s

(1) Function: Planners need system capability of providing all functionality of JOPES in garrison and while deployed. This includes building MAGTF movement requirements, estimating airlift and sealift, computing sustainment, sourcing sustainment through War Reserve System (WRS) And generating time phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). MAGTF’S also require means of uploading a TPFDD to and downloading a TPFDD from JOPES.

(2) Standard System: MAGTF planning system II (MAGTF II) is the standard Class IC system which provides MAGTF planners with automated means of selecting and tailoring MAGTF units/detachments using either data extracted from MDSS II or JOPES, or data generated within MAGTF II, assigning unit line numbers (ULN’s), calculating gross sustainment requirements, estimating strategic lift requirements, transmitting movement data to JOPES, and a means of manipulating JOPES data off line. MAGTF II replaces MAGTF I Lift Model.
(3) **Responsible Office**

(a) **Functional Manager:** HQMC (LPO)

(b) **System Sponsor:** COMMARCORLOGBASES (815/70)

(c) **MEF/MSC Level Functional Sponsor:** G-5

(4) **Standard Users**

(a) **MAGTF CE:** G-5/3/S-3, G/S-4 – Development of force deployment requirements; consolidation of MAGTF II imports from subordinate commands; calculation of sustainment requirements/development of sustainment deployment requirements; gross estimation of lift requirement, and import/export deployment data to/from JOPES.

(b) **MSC HQ:** G-3/4 – Transmitting force deployment requirement to subordinate HQ’s for detailed sourcing, tailoring and refinement; consolidation MAGTF II imports prior to providing data back to MAGTF CE; import/export deployment data to/from JOPES.

(c) **Regiment/Group/Separate Battalion/Separate Squadron S-3/4** – Receive planning data from MSC/MAGTF; consolidation of sourced and refined deployment data, developed in MDSS II at unit level, prior to providing to MSC HQ/MAGTF CE (as appropriate).

(d) **MARCORLOGBASES/MARRESFOR/MARCORSYSCOM:** As means of uploading/downloading JOPES information.

c. **Planning War Reserve Withdrawals**

(1) **Function:** Most materiel necessary to sustain MAGTF’s (excluding T/E and aviation) is normally held (or acquisition managed) by MARCORLOGBASES. MAGTF’S must plan in advance for movement of necessary sustainment to POE’s to support deployment, and have means of actually tracking movement of sustainment during execution.

(2) **Standard System:** War Reserve System (WRS) is the Standard Class 1A which provides a force planner with a automated tool to assist in developing war reserve withdrawal plans to support deliberate planning or crisis action planning. WRS also is means by which MARCORLOGBASES reviews and executes withdrawal plans. WRS is a system which has been in use for some time, but which has been upgraded to interface with MAGTF II.

(3) **Responsible Office**

(a) **Functional Manager:** HQMC (LPO)

(b) **System Sponsor:** COMMARCORLOGBASES (815/70)

(c) **MEF/MSC Level Functional Sponsor:** G-4

(4) **Standard Users**

5-8
(a) **MEF CE**: G-4 - to develop War Reserve Withdrawal plans and source from force-held PWR stocks, based on requirements generated by MAGTF II.

(b) **MARCORLOGBASES**: (807) - To validate and source War Reserve Withdrawal plans, and for execution of such plans.

d. **Air Movement Load Planning**

(1) **Function**: Units moving via strategic airlift must detailed produce aircraft load plans which are precisely balanced and meet ALCE requirements in accordance with FMFM 4-6.

(2) **Standard System**: Computer Aided Load Manifesting System (CALMS) is the standard Class 1C system which provides an interactive graphics tool for producing detailed aircraft load plans which meet aircraft constraints (less commercial aircraft), based on data imported from MDSS II. Capability has been used as standalone program for some time.

(3) **Responsible Office**

   (a) **Functional Manager**: HQMC (LPO)

   (b) **System Sponsor**: COMMARCORLOGBASES (815/70)

   (c) **MEF/MSC Level Functional Sponsor**: G-4

(4) **Standard Users**

   (a) **MAGTF CE/MSC HQ/Regiment/Group/Separate Battalions**
   Separate Squadron: G/S-4, Strategic Mobility Officer (SMO), Embarkation Officer - Training of subordinate units; consolidation of load plan information submitted by subordinate units for export to JOPES. MAGTF CE provides CALMS capability to airlift element (ALE) at a APOE to assist deploying units with last minute load plan changes/adjustments at a APOE.

   (b) **Battalion/Squadron/Separate Company**: S-4, Embarkation Officer - development of detailed aircraft load plans based on MDSS II data.

e. **Ship Movement Load Planning**

(1) **Function**: Planning of ship loads and creation of detailed ship load plans is critical during deployment, and is particularly demanding during crisis. Embark personnel require automated tool to assist in generating ship load plans which meet ship loading constraints.

(2) **Standard System**: Computer Aided Embarkation Management System (CAEMS) is Class 1C system which provides interactive graphics tool for producing amphibious and commercial ship load plans and associated reports using embarkation data imported from MDSS II.
CAEMS replaces Ship Load Planning System (SLPS). The T-AVB automated load planning system is being developed to facilitate real time changes that must be accommodated when the ACE aircraft notional mix is modified just prior to the ship load out. Of primary importance is the integration of this information with CAEMS so that the correct mobil facility shelter specifics are known relative to where it should be placed within the ship, its configuration code, and proper priorities established in transportation scheduling of the units.

(3) Responsible Office
   (a) Functional Manager: HQMC (LPO)
   (b) System Sponsor: COMMARCORLOGBASES (815/70)
   (c) MEF/MSC Level Functional Sponsor: G-4

(4) Standard Users
   (a) MAGTF CE/MSC HO/Regiment/Group/Separate Battalions
      Separate Squadron: G/S-4 - training of subordinate units; consolidation of ship load plan information submitted by subordinate units for export to JOPES. MAGTF CE provides CAEMS to (SLE) To assist team embark officers with last minute load plan changes/adjustments at SPOE.

   (b) Battalion/Squadron/Separate Company/Unit: S-4, Embarkation Officer - develop detailed ship load plans, based on MDSS II data, for amphibious/commercial ships.

f. Transportation Management

(1) Function: The force movement coordination center (FMCC) and parent units will plan and manage the transportation requirements of the deploying MAGTF. This includes determining the proper mode and departure/arrival time frames, managing available transportation assets, ensuring proper documentation and packing of unit equipment for deployment, and full manifesting and reporting movement to proper deployment authorities. Transportation management officers manage movement requirements. Units must effectively and efficiently manifest moves. Motor transport community must manage transportation assets efficiently to maximize throughput.

(2) Standard System: Transportation Coordinators Automated Information for Movement System (TCAIMS) is the Class 1C system which provides users with automated support for movement planning and execution of force movements from CONUS and overseas origin to POE, and from port of debarkation POD to destination. TCAIMS provides deploying MAGTF elements with the capability to identify transportation requirement (to include motor transport and material handling equipment support) to move units from origin to an SPOE/APOE and from an SPDO/APOD to destination. This capability allows a MAGTF CE or MAGTF components to manage/allocate organic transportation assets to meet internal transportation requirements. System also identifies transport requirements in excess of a deploying unit’s
capabilities for sourcing by MEF. TCAIMS provides vital link between unit movement data (MDSS II/MAGTF II/JOPES) and the Defense Transportation System (DTS)/MILSTAMP (Military Standard Transportation and Movement procedures) environment. This is new capability which fills a void not previously addressed by any USMC automated system. TCAIMS converts MDSS II data elements into MILSTAMP elements used by DTS. TCAIMS interfaces with USTRANSCOM’s Transportation Component Commands (TCCs): Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC) and Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC). In concert with MAGTF II/JOPES, TCAIMS provides access to intransit visibility (ITV) information on shipments.

(3) Responsible Office

(a) Functional Manager: HQMC (LPO)

(b) System Sponsor: COMMARCORLOGBASES (815/70)

(c) MEF/MSC Level Functional Sponsor: G-4

(4) Standard Users

(a) MAGTF CE: G/S-4 - Training of subordinate units, LMCC consolidates TCAIMS inputs from MAGTF CE/MSC’s/deploying units; reviews transportation movement control documentation (TCMD) For correctness/completeness; submits MILSTAMP data as required; determines transportation requirement/schedules convoys from origin to SPOE/APOE, ensuring arrival in time to accomplish preparations for embarkation aboard strategic carriers; and determines transportation requirement/schedules from POD to destination.

(b) MSC HQ: G-4 - Consolidate TCAIMS data from subordinate units prior to submission to LMCC (if appropriate).

(c) Regiment/Group/Separate Battalion/Separate Squadron S-4 - Deployment officer TCAIMS data to complete TCMD, based on MDSS II data developed by subordinate units, prior to submission to MSC HQ/LMCC (as appropriate).

(d) Base/Station: TMO’s generate shipping documentation and track shipments as requirement.

g. Unit Supply Management

(1) Function: Units in the FMF and selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) must account for and manage materiel assets. This includes identifying and requisitioning shortages, as well as maintaining accountability and visibility of on-hand assets.

(2) Standard System: Landing Force Asset Distribution System (LFADS) is the Class Ic system which provides a unit commander visibility and control of supply assets in garrison and during employment. LFADS is currently being converted to Asset Tracking, Logistics and Supply System (ATLASS), which will provide the same
functionality as LFADS, but will conform more closely to DoD software standards. LFADS/ATLASS replaces all deployable ground supply systems (PC SASSY, etc.) currently in use.

Note: Use of LFADS, a stand-alone PC-based system, does not negate the need for early deployment of the Deployable Force Automated Service Center (DFASC) to provide bulk data processing in expeditionary environment.

(3) Responsible Office
   (a) Functional Manager: HQMC (LPP)
   (b) System Sponsor: COMMARCORLOGBASES (815/70)
   (c) MEF/MSC Level Functional Sponsor: G-4

(4) Standard Users: LFADS/ATLASS will be used down to battalion/squadron/separate company level, and in CSSD’s as STANDARD tool for unit supply officers.
   (a) Battalion/Squadron/Separate Company: Supply officer.
   (b) AAOG During MPS/NALMEB Deployment: To account for MPS equipment distributed to units.

h. Standardization of Data

(1) Function: All the preceding functions must rely on common or compatible data to ensure interoperability. More importantly, equipment and basic unit data (table of organization and T/E) Must be standardized through the family of systems unless specifically changed for a specific purpose.

(2) Standard System: MAGTF Data Library (MDL) Is a Class 1C system which provides standard data to all MAGTF II/LOG AIS systems. MDL is a new capability.

(3) Responsible Office
   (a) Functional Manager: HQMC (LPS)
   (b) System Sponsor: COMMARCORLOGBASES (815/70)
   (c) MEF/MSC Level Functional Sponsor: G-4

(4) Standard Users: All of the previously mentioned systems (including WRS) will receive source data from MDL. Data will be distributed by the MARFOR G-4 or designated subordinate agency.

5-12
6. **Policy**

   a. Use of the aforementioned automated systems will be mandatory upon receipt of Version 3 of MAGTF II/LOG AIS family of systems. MARCORLOGBASES will coordinate training for MEF’s, during which, Version 3 will be delivered and installed.

   b. These systems will be used to support development of all CINC OPLAN’s and all operations and exercise deployments.

   (1) **Planning**

      (a) During normal garrison operations, units use MDSS II to identify on-hand equipment and personnel.

      (b) **Responsibilities**

         1 MAGTF Commander (MEF/MEU/SPMAGTF). Develops force deployment requirements in MAGTF II based on concept of operations/task organizations for a particular operation/exercise, and exports requirements to JOPES (distributes MAGTF II data as appropriate).

         2 MSC Commanders/CG MARRESFOR. Receive distribution of MAGTF II data or import requirements from JOPES to MAGTF II for detailed sourcing/refinement.

         3 MSC Commanders/CG MARRESFOR. Provide appropriate MAGTF II requirement data to regiments/groups/separate squadrons/separate battalions. Convert MAGTF II data to MDSS II and provided to battalions/separate company.

         4 Unit sources and refines deployment requirements using MDSS II. Unit level MDSS II input consolidated at regiment/group/separate squadron/separate battalion level, exported to MAGTF II and provided back to MSC Commander.

         5 MSC Commander consolidates MAGTF II inputs and provides to MAGTF Commander.

         (c) MAGTF Commander calculates total sustainment requirement in MAGTF II based upon sourced/refined force deployment requirement provided by MSC Commander’/CG MARRESFOR, and develops war reserve withdrawal plan using MAGTF II/WRS interface. The MEF Commander sources that portion of his sustainment that can be satisfied from force-held stocks, and exports all force/sustainment requirement (sourced and unsourced) back into JOPES.

         (d) CG MARCORLOGBASES and COMMACORSYSCOM import unsourced sustainment requirement from JOPES/WRS (as appropriate) and source from stocks/external agencies. Sourced data is exported back to JOPES.
(e) Final product is sourced TPFDD with accurate level four cargo detail resident in JOPES based on MAGTF II inputs from the deploying MAGTF and supporting establishment. MDSS II data developed at unit level is available to feed CAEMS, CALMS, TCAIMS, and LFADS for logistics, transport and embarkation planning/execution.

(2) Deployment

(a) At execution, Force Movement Control Center (FMCC) and base/station TMO use data from MDSS II exported to TCAIMS to plan and execute unit movements. TCAIMS also provides access to ITV information for shipments.

(b) During deployment FMCC uses MAGTF II as means of easily manipulating JOPES data (download/upload) to adjust movements. Deploying unit Plane Team Commanders use CALMS to create aircraft load plans, while Team Embarkation Officers and Port Operations Group (POG) use CAEMS to create ship load plans. DACG/POG assist in making last minute adjustments/corrections at POE. Deploying units use TCAIMS to generate appropriate shipping documentation (e.g. TCMD). LMCC consolidates TCAIMS input, reviews, and submits as required.

(c) Upon arrival, airfield or port reception party uses MDSS II to account for equipment arriving for specific unit. LFADS/Asset Tracking Logistic and Supply System (ATLASS) is materiel accountability tracking tool for MPS offloads.

(d) After deployment of MAGTF and accompanying supplies, base TMO’s use TCAIMS to identify movement requirements to Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) or Air Mobility Command (AMC) for movement through channels.

7. Aviation Support Systems. To be written by DC/S Aviation.
   a. SNAP II and SNAP III
   b. SUADPS, Release 3
   c. PC SUADPS
   d. NALCOMIS Phase II
   e. NALCOMIS Phase III
   f. SERMIS
   g. CAIMS
   h. TALPS
   i. ALTMS
   j. SALTS

5-14
5003. **COORDINATING PLANNING.** To be written by DC/S Plans, Policies and Operations. FMFM 3-1 (para 2316) discusses communication planning in relation to other staff actions and provides a basis for common actions to be taken by MAGTF CEO’s.

1. Teleconferences
2. **WWMCCS**
3. Planning Systems
4. **Other Communications Means**

5004. **COORDINATING EXECUTION.** To be written by DC/S Plans, Policies and Operations.

1. Teleconferences
2. **WWMCCS**
   a. **Deplovable WWMCCS**
   b. **Host Support**
3. Planning Systems
4. **Other Communications Means**
   a. **GENSER**
   b. **Phone**
   c. **INMARSAT**
   d. **SALTS**
   e. **NALISS**
   f. **ATAC+**
CHAPTER 6
OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES FOR PLANNING SYSTEMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAGRAPH</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>6000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROCEDURAL PHASES</td>
<td>6001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING PHASE</td>
<td>6002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPLOYMENT PHASE</td>
<td>6003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMPLOYMENT PHASE</td>
<td>6004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REDEPLOYMENT PHASE</td>
<td>6005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE

6-1 RELATIONSHIP OF DELIBERATE PLANNING TO CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCEDURES . . 6-3
6000. **INTRODUCTION**

1. The purpose of this chapter is to document procedures for the use of Marine Corps planning systems. Discussion of procedures within the joint planning community is normally done within the context of deliberate planning or crisis action planning, the Marine Corps planner must use a wider perspective. This perspective must encompass not only the planning of operations but execution as well. To this end, we discuss Marine Corps planning systems within the context of four procedural phases. These procedures address information data flow, system usage, and communication during the procedural phases. They provide end-users with the information and knowledge required to effectively and efficiently employ the MAGTF II/LOG AIS family of systems. This wider perspective is illustrated below and shows the relationship between deliberate planning, crisis action planning, and an operation’s procedural phases.

![Figure 6-1 -- Relationship of Deliberate Planning to Crisis Action](image-url)
2. Procedures described in this section are provided to augment system user manuals or guides. The primary intent is to show the information used, shared, and exchanged by systems and how and when such information is transferred or communicated between systems. It is important to remember that while the MAGTF II/LOG AIS family’s primary application will be in the FMF, these systems will also be used for non-FMF activities supporting the FMF and in training environments such as the Marine Corps University formal schools system or in LFTC PAC/LANT.

6001. PROCEDURAL PHASES

1. Introduction. On short notice, the Marine Corps must prepare and deploy task forces, tailored to mission requirements, in response to any world trouble spot. The task forces, termed Marine Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTF’s) range in size and capability from the powerful Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) capable of conducting operations of any level and intensity to the Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) configured to accomplish missions for which larger MAGTF’s are not appropriate. A vast number of tasks must be accomplished by each MAGTF in order for the MAGTF to deploy, accomplish its mission, and return to its home base(s). These tasks can effectively be apportioned to the procedural phases when they occur, although some tasks overlap, or continue, from one phase to another. The high level procedural phases are Planning, Deployment, Employment, and Redeployment. It is important to remember that the procedures described can be accomplished during any of the four procedural phases. It should also be noted that procedures described for a specific system during a particular phase may also be discussed for another system during the same or another phase. This is necessary in order to adequately address the procedures for each system.

   a. Planning. Planning is the phase during which a plan requirement is recognized; plan development responsibilities are assigned; and the plan is developed. Planning is accomplished in a deliberate mode or in a time-sensitive mode, which includes crisis action planning procedures. It is anticipated that the greater majority of future planning will be in crisis action scenarios. See chapter 7 for deliberate Planning and chapter 8 for Crisis Action Planning.

   b. Deployment. The deployment phase begins when forces start to move from home bases, or materiel from storage sites begin to move enroute to the assigned employment area (See chapter 10).

   c. Employment. During the employment phase, forces are operationally or tactically committed within the area of operations. This phase includes all levels of combat, humanitarian relief operations and other non-combat operations (See chapter 11).
d. **Redeployment.** Redeployment is the movement of forces out of the operations area and return to home domiciles, or the relocation of in-theater forces to another area of employment (See chapter 12).

2. **Information Sequence and Data Flow.** Information is data that has been collected and processed into a meaningful form. Each MAGTF II/LOG AIS system has the capability to collect data and process that data into information. The data is collected through interfaces with users and other systems. Interoperability among systems requires that the information created or modified in one system be passed to, or received from, other systems. This must be done in a sequence that allows that information to be accessed at the proper time for any authorized procedure or process (i.e., data manipulation or report generation). For example, the collection of data termed "plan information" is meaningful to users of MAGTF II. However, "plan information" serves its best purpose when it is passed to JOPES and/or MDSS II at the correct times for appropriate actions by users of those systems.

3. **Protection of Information.** The MAGTF II/LOG AIS systems use the Fleet Marine Force End User Computing Equipment (FMF-EUCE) and the Downsized EUCE (DEUCE). Both employ removable hard drives of various capacities, (i.e., 40 megabyte (MB), 100 MB). Users must understand the requirements for protection of classified material and must vigorously guard against classified data compromise when dealing with either the removable hard drives or computer diskettes used to transfer information among users (i.e., from hard drive to hard drive or from workstation terminals to hard drives and vice versa). Users must be continually security conscious. This is mandatory since the systems manipulate data up to the secret level. If compromised, data could be loaded to almost any IBM compatible computer.

4. **Composition.** MAGTF II Logistics Automated Information Systems (MAGTF II/LOG AIS) includes the following systems: the Marine Air-Ground Task Force II, the MAGTF Deployment Support System II, the Landing Force Asset Distribution System, the Computer-Aided Embarkation Management System (CAEMS), and the Transportation Coordinators’ Automated Information for Movements System. Chapter 5 contains detailed policy guidance on the use of each system.

6002. **PLANNING PHASE.** There are two planning modes that will be addressed: deliberate planning and crisis action or time-sensitive planning. Each of these planning modes has an established set of procedures. These procedures are set forth in the appropriate joint doctrinal publications and in the Armed Forces Staff College (AFSC) Pub 1, The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide 1991. Briefly, deliberate planning is based on an anticipated scenario that would require the use of forces to accomplish national objectives but for which no deployment is intended or expected in the near term. Procedures are described more fully in chapter 7. Crisis action planning is
accomplished when a situation requires forces to prepare for deployment. Crisis action planning may result in the actual deployment and employment of forces. Procedures are described more fully in chapter 7.

1. Marine Air-Ground Task Force II (MAGTF II)

    a. During the planning phase, MAGTF IT’s primary objectives, supported by its functional capabilities, are to create and/or modify force structures, establish force lift and movement requirements, and determine force sustainment requirements. A plan is the first element required to satisfy these objectives. Plans may be imported from JOPES or they can be created initially in MAGTF II.

        (1) In the first instance, the MAGTF planner downloads a JOPES plan, via the World Wide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)/WWMCCS Automated Data Processing (ADP) Modernization (WAM) workstation, to diskette and imports the plan to MAGTF II. It is not necessary for the MAGTF planner to have direct access to the workstation because the plan is downloaded to a diskette. Diskettes containing data extracted from JOPES can be transported via courier, or by mail if necessary (with required attention to security requirements), to any location.

        (2) In the second instance, the MAGTF planner creates a plan and develops the plan force structure in MAGTF II. This may be to develop force modules for "on the shelf" retention, or to develop a force structure for later inclusion in a combatant commander’s plan even if that plan is not currently available from JOPES.

        (3) In either case, the MAGTF planner develops its force structure in MAGTF II showing MAGTF Major Subordinate Elements (MSE’s), and if desired, a notional MSE force structure.

            (a) The MAGTF creates Force Modules (FM’s) for each MAGTF MSE. See appendix A, section 2 for more information on types of FM’s.

            (b) FM’s for each MSE are backed up on disk and provided to the appropriate MSE as well as the MSE’s parent Major Subordinate Command (MSC).

        (4) Each MSE, coordinating with its parent MSC and the MAGTF commander’s staff, uses MAGTF II to develop the MSE’s portion of the MAGTF force structure. This is done by creating force records by Unit Line Number (ULN) and using notional data from the Type Unit Characteristics File (TUCHA). This may result in changes to the MAGTF created force structure which must be coordinated with the MAGTF commander. Standard ULN construction is described in appendix A, section 1.

        (5) MSE’s enter Origin to Point of Embarkation (POE) movement (mode, source, and Ready to Load Date (RLD)) data for each ULN.

6-6
(a) Notional data (type units) provides first cut lift requirements for the MAGTF.

(b) Planners use MAGTF II to compute the MAGTF’s sustainment requirements. This is done to project the most accurate picture regarding lift requirements and accompanying supplies to be embarked with the MAGTF. MAGTF IT also creates additional ULN’s needed to quantify lift and movement requirements for sustainment.

(c) Data from the War Reserve System (WRS) is used for calculating and sourcing sustainment.

(6) MSE force structures are passed by disk to the MAGTF. They are restored to the plan and combined to form the force structure for the complete MAGTF.

(7) The MAGTF planner enters movement data for the remaining deployment legs (POE/Point of Debarkation (POD), POD/Destination (DEST), and interim stops if any are planned). Data includes:

(a) Mode, source, Available to Load Date (ALD), Earliest Arrival Date (EAD), Latest Arrival Date (LAD), Required Delivery Date at the Destination (RDD)/CTNC Required Date at the Destination (CRD)

(b) Data for intermediate stops if applicable.

(8) The MAGTF force structure is exported to JOPES by MAGTF II via WWMCCS; uploaded to JOPES via diskette; and, imported to the JOPES resident Operations Plan (OPLAN) using the JOPES(JDS) B3 merge functions. Procedures for this operation are more completely described in the MAGTF II User’s Manual.

(9) The MAGTF force structure is now contained in the combatant commander’s plan for review. The structure identifies lift and movement requirements for the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) to assign available air and sea lift.

b. Deliberate Planning. The plan will be reviewed and revised or updated as required based upon the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). Notional unit data used in deliberate planning will normally be configured to reflect MAGTF planning only. For example, TUCHA data for a company may be tailored to show a platoon, vice the entire company, or anticipated reinforcement. This remains notional because it is not sourced with Unit Identification Codes (UIC) and unit names, and it does not reflect any unit’s actual composition. Notional data is a close approximation of planned unit structure and lift requirements. During the review cycle, a combatant commander may require that the ULN be sourced. Sourcing will normally be accomplished in MAGTF IT as described below. However, if a high degree of precision for cargo and personnel data is required (i.e. level 4 detail), MDSS II should be used to provide sourcing. Once exported to JOPES and the review cycle is complete, the MAGTF may
retain the plan as a MAGTF IT file or back it up to disk for storage to use/review as required.

c. Crisis Action/Time-Sensitive Planning. If the situation requires crisis action planning and possible force deployment, the procedures described previously will be followed to begin initial planning. During this time, the MAGTF commander, combatant commander, and USTRANSCOM’s Transportation Component Commands (TCC) require accurate, up-to-date information concerning the deploying forces. This requirement is satisfied through the sourcing procedure.

(1) Sourcing consists of associating actual units to ULN’s by entering the unit’s UIC to the record. This process also causes the unit’s name to be added to the record.

(2) The plan contained in the MAGTF MSE’s MAGTF II system is exported and imported into MDSS II via diskette. MDSS II matches the UTC and unit name of the actual units assigned to each ULN (if known, UTC and unit name match can be done in MAGTF IT prior to exporting to MDSS II). Additionally, actual cargo and personnel data replaces the notional data previously contained in each ULN.

NOTE: MAGTF II possesses the capability to source units/ULN’s and tailor cargo and personnel details to reflect actual lift requirements. However, this is not the preferred method except in those cases where MDSS II may not be available.

(3) The sourced plan is exported from MDSS II and imported back to MAGTF II. Sustainment requirements are recalculated in MAGTF II based on the actual unit data now contained in the ULN’s and sourced using the WRS.

(4) The sourced plan is exported from MAGTF II to JOPES, providing the supported CTNC with actual information concerning the MAGTF.

NOTE: Virtually all deliberate planning is conducted by the MEF staff and the staffs of the MEF’s MSE’s/MSC’s (Division, Wing, and Force Service Support Group (FSSG)). The MSC’s may designate headquarters within their respective command structure to act as planning agents for certain plans. These planning sections will utilize MAGTF II the same way as a MAGTF MSE. The procedures described above may be repeated as often as necessary to modify and update plans.

2. MAGTF Deployment Support System II (MDSS II)

a. During the planning phase, MDSS II is employed to:

(1) Create the unit’s mountout list of equipment and supplies and the personnel mountout roster.

(2) Import a ULN force structure from MAGTF II; source each ULN by matching it to a UTC and unit name; replace notional TUCHA data
with actual unit lift data (cargo and personnel), and export the "sourced" force structure back to MAGTF II.

(3) Export embarkation planning data to CAEMS for ship load planning. For TAVB load planning, TALPS will be used. TALPS will feed directly to CAEMS.

(4) Export embarkation planning data to CALM for aircraft load planning.

(5) Export origin to POE movement data to TC AIMS for movement planning.

b. A primary objective of MDSS II is to provide the unit commander the means to create, maintain, and update the unit data base. This involves developing a Unit Equipment and Supplies List (UESL) and a unit roster (ALPHA Roster) in MDSS II. Detailed procedures for using MDSS II are provided in the MDSS II user’s guide.

c. MDSS II’s application for maintaining the unit database is not merely a procedure accomplished during the planning phase. It is an integral responsibility of each unit, once MDSS II has been fielded to that unit, to load its unit data to MDSS II and maintain that data to accurately reflect the unit’s embarkation status at any time.

d. In the case of a MAGTF, MDSS II may not be resident at all sites where it will be needed. The first priority is to ensure that MDSS II is available to the MAGTF Command Element (CE) staff and to each of the MSE staffs when assigned. The CE will use MDSS II to create its own database as personnel and equipment are assigned. The staff may utilize MDSS II to maintain an embarkation database for the entire MAGTF.

e. MSE headquarters may be formed from a regimental headquarters, a portion of a FSSG organization headquarters, or possibly from within the headquarters staff of an MSC. Since the MSE headquarters may be an ad hoc organization, MDSS II must be made available for use. (This is the case for all MAGTF II/LOG AIS components).

f. With regard to a specific MSE, each MSE commander will normally be responsible to the MAGTF commander for much of the planning. The MSE commander will also coordinate development of the MSE structure with the parent MSC and commanders of units assigned to the MSE.

g. Sourcing the Force Structure. During the planning phase of a deployment, the MAGTF commander develops the MAGTF’s force structure in MAGTF II. The MAGTF commander initially uses notional TUCHA data which may be tailored to more closely approximate the actual structure and lift requirements of the MAGTF. The force structure in MAGTF II reflects the force capabilities the MAGTF commander deems necessary to complete the assigned mission(s). Required capabilities are depicted by unit type; e.g., Electronics Maintenance Company, Maintenance
Battalion, FSSG, as indicated by the Unit Type Code (UTC) associated
to a ULN. However, as stated in the MAGTF II section, the initial
force structure does not show actual units (by UIC/unit name).
Moreover, it does not provide actual unit cargo and personnel data for
lift requirements determination.

(1) The proposed force structure (task organization),
developed by the MAGTF commander, is submitted to the MEF commander
for approval and tasking to the MSC’s to provide the appropriate
forces. MSC commanders designate a MSE commander and task subordinate
units (such as regiments, battalions, groups, etc.) to provide forces
to build the MSE as required to perform the assigned mission(s).
Units may be directed to report in total or to form detachments for
assignment. Based on explicit and implied tasks, each unit or
detachment employs MDSS II to develop a list of supplies, equipment,
and personnel to be deployed.

(2) Like MAGTF II, MDSS II is functionally capable of
developing a ULN force structure at any level of command where it is
installed. However, this capability will probably be used only in the
absence of MAGTF II availability. Determination of use is the
commander’s prerogative, though certain cautions are warranted if MDSS
II is used for this purpose. MDSS II’s user processes have not been
validated against the JOPES required information for OPLAN’s and does
not contain all of the required data elements for ULN’s or TPFDD’s.
In addition, certain data elements, if entered, require the plan to be
classified. ADP security regulations dictate that every screen
displaying classified data to show the data’s classification in
banners at the top and bottom of the computer screen. MDSS II is not
designed to do this which may pose a security risk. The overlap of
similar, but not exact, capability necessitates the publication of
specific, detailed policy for each system’s use to prevent misuse,
data corruption, and security risks.

(3) The ULN force structure for the plan developed in MAGTF II
portion of the force structure relating to a specific unit will be
imported into MDSS II by the unit. That is, a battalion which is a
component of the Ground Combat Element (GCE) will be provided only the
ULN’s for that battalion, its companies, and any attachments that may
be assigned to the battalion. The physical export and import
procedures are described in the user’s guides for MDSS II and
MAGTF II.

(4) When the ULN structure is imported into MDSS II, the unit
will update the ULN(s). The unit will follow the procedures in the
MDSS II User’s Guide to replace notional MAGTF II cargo and personnel
data with the accurate, up-to-date data contained in the unit’s UESL
and personnel roster. The notional ULN’s are sourced with the unit’s
actual UIC and unit name. The sourced force structure is exported to
MAGTF II for inclusion in the MAGTF total force structure. Both the
MAGTF commander and MSE commanders will issue specific guidance for MAGTF II/MDSS II force structuring and update procedures.

(5) Both the MAGTF commander and MSE commanders will issue specific guidance for MAGTF II/MDSS II force structuring and update procedures.

h. Embarkation Planning. MDSS II is the MAGTF’s and unit’s primary tool for recording and maintaining embarkation data and information. The basic building blocks of this information are the data representing individual items of equipment and supply, and the individual personnel assigned to the unit. This data is entered manually to MDSS II or imported from other systems.

(1) Equipment and supply information are imported from the Reporting Unit Allowance File (RUAF) of the Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY).

(2) Information regarding geographical prepositioned aviation support equipment is entered into MDSS II by downloading the required data from the Support Equipment Manager’s (Norway: 2nd MAW) Local Asset Management System (LAMS) and uploading into MDSS II. Information for the Maritime Prepositioned Ship’s (MPS) aviation support equipment is downloaded from Blount Island’s LAMS and fed into MDSS II. ASO, using the Naval Aviation Logistics Information Support System (NALISS), provides the data for aviation supplies into MDSS II for both MPS and geographical prepositioned parts. (For the ground side, COMMARLOGBASES ALBANY must first convert FILE 85.)

(3) Personnel information is derived from the Marine Integrated Personnel System (MIPS).

(4) In the future, unit ammunition data will be accessed/provided via the MDSS II/Ammunition Tracking System interface. Class V(A) is tracked via the Conventional Ammunition Integrated Management System (CATMS).

(5) With the availability of LOGMARS equipment, the capability exists to, create and update unit databases in MDSS II using this technology.

(6) Aviation logistics embarkation planning data can be obtained from a variety of sources including; NALISS, SUADPS, LAMS, and SERMTS.

i. At the unit, the MDSS II unit database is maintained and updated daily or as needed by the unit. When a unit is tasked to prepare for deployment, it creates a Unit Mountout List (UML) and Unit Mountout Personnel (UMP). As described above, the information contained in the UML and UMP is used to update the notional MAGTF II force structure.
j. During the planning phase, the UML developed for the deploying unit is entered into LFADS to build LFAD’s loaded unit allowance file (LUAF) and RUAF if separate unit organization procedures.

k. As units and detachments report to the MSE, they provide MDSS II embarkation databases which are combined to form an embarkation database for the MSE. The MAGTF develops its embarkation database by combining the MSE databases.

l. The MAGTF commander, in coordination with the combatant commander and the MSE commanders, determines the order in which units of the MAGTF should arrive in-theater. This is termed phasing. The MAGTF’s preferred phasing is reflected in the plan Time Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD) by assigning planned movement dates from/to Origin, POE, POD, and DEST to the ULNs in MAGTF II. Dates are expressed as "C-Days" with C-Day being the day force deployment commences. The importance of this process is that this information is the basis upon which transportation is planned and assets are allocated by USTRANSCOM’s TCC’s and the combatant commander.

m. Transportation allocations are communicated to the MAGTF commander who in turn assigns MAGTF assets to transportation assets (ships/aircraft).

   (1) Origin to POE movement planning consists of determining in MDSS II what, where, and when specific cargoes and/or personnel must be moved. This information is provided to movement support agencies via the MDSS II/TC AIMS interface. Movement support agencies plan the movement and inform moving units through the designated chain of command. Changes in requirements are communicated as required through the MDSS II/TC AIMS interface procedures.

   (2) Planning for cargo embarkation onto strategic lift assets is conducted in MDSS II and through MDSS II’s interfaces to CAEMS and CALM.

      (a) For ship load planning, embarkation teams (single ship) are formed in MDSS II. This information is passed to CAEMS where actual load planning is accomplished.

      (b) For aircraft, chalks (single aircraft load) are formed in MDSS II. This information is passed to CALM where actual load planning is conducted.

   (3) For MAGTF’s assigned Maritime Prepositioned Force (MPF) missions, a portion of FILE 85 will be loaded into MDSS II. Planned allocation of supplies and equipment aboard MPS should be directed by the MAGTF commander using MDSS II functionality. MDSS II to MDSS II peer communications would be employed to identify allocations to MSE’s and subordinate units.
n. **Planning Updates.** Throughout the planning phase, MDSS II provides the capability to efficiently keep the MAGTF and its subordinate elements up-to-date to any changes in near real-time. Its interfaces with other systems allows these changes to be automatically incorporated in other facets of planning that may be affected by the changes.

3. **Landing Force Asset Distribution System.** In the planning phase, supply personnel set up the Landing Force Asset Distribution System (LFADS) to provide asset visibility and supply support to the MAGTF. The MAGTF commander ensures that all appropriate units have LFADS loaded. The Combat Service Support Element (CSSE) will ensure that sufficient computer resources hardware/software (HW/SW) are available to furnish any Combat Service Support Detachment (CSSD) formed to provide direct supply support to other elements/units of the MAGTF (the CSSE provides general support to the MAGTF). Each MAGTF unit possessing LFADS will download deployment files from SASSY mainframe files to populate their respective LFADS data bases. When directed, MAGTF units will commence using LFADS for supply support functions.

   a. During the planning phase and after MSE’s and subordinate units have "chopped" to the MAGTF for operational control (OPCON), the MAGTF commander may use LFADS functionality to redistribute supplies and equipment among the MSE’s to ensure that each element has the material needed to perform its missions. Likewise, subordinate elements and unit commanders may effect redistribution within their organizations.

   b. LFADS extensively employs LOGMARS technology to conduct physical inventories and construct location files. Data collected with data collection devices (DCD) is downloaded into the LFADS computers via modem or physical link.

4. **Computer-Aided Embarkation Management System.** During the planning phase, MAGTF embarkation personnel use CAEMS to execute detailed ship load planning. This includes plotting planned stowage locations of MAGTF cargo aboard specific ships. TALPS will be utilized to plan the loading of TAVB’s. CAEMS will act as the window for the TALPS program to interface with MAGTF II/LOG AIS.

   a. The information required to employ CAEMS is imported from MDSS II. Although less desirable, cargo data can be entered manually if MDSS II is not available.

   b. After stowage has been planned, CAEMS provides MDSS II the planned cargo package locations and ship compartment data for each ship loaded. Proposed deck diagrams are plotted and submitted for load plan approval.

   c. Using CAEMS, ship load plans can be revised as needed to respond to situational changes.
5. **Computer-Aided Load Manifesting.** During the planning phase MAGTF embarkation personnel use CALM to execute detailed aircraft load planning. This includes plotting planned stowage locations of MAGTF cargo and passengers (PAX) aboard specific types and configurations of aircraft.

   a. The information required to employ CALM is imported from MDSS II. Although less desirable, cargo and PAX data can be entered manually if MDSS II is not available.

   b. Proposed aircraft load diagrams are plotted and submitted for load plan approval to the USAF Airlift Control Element (ALCE)/Military Airlift Wing scheduled to fly airlift missions.

   c. Using CALM, aircraft load plans can be revised as needed to respond to situational changes.

6. **Transportation Coordinators’ Automated Information for Movements System.** TC AIMS’ versatility will allow it to be used on a day-to-day basis not necessarily associated with planning or deployment. However, for purposes of this report, its procedural use during the four phases is outlined. Detailed procedures for using TC AIMS will be provided in the TC AIMS User’s Guide/Manual when published. Procedures and interfaces discussed herein are based on available documentation.

   a. In the planning phase TC AIMS’ primary role is to receive movement requirement input from users and other systems to provide movement support agencies the capability to plan for the MAGTF’s Origin to POE movement. TC AIMS is also employed during this phase to support pre-deployment movement requirements of the MAGTF and its subordinate elements. Movement support assets may include passenger and cargo carrying vehicles, materials handling equipment (MHE), and other support equipment such as floodlights.

   b. In order to properly use TC AIMS, users must understand the basics of arranging transportation support. During the planning phase, and even in the deployment phase discussed later, there are generally three methods by which users can move:

   (1) Use organic assets

   (2) Request support through the normal chain of command (battalion, regiment, division)

   (3) Request support through the MAGTF chain of command (unit, MSE, MAGTF)

   c. Prior to using TC AIMS, it is necessary to load support equipment assets into the system. For users with MDSS II, the MDSS II UESL is loaded to TC AIMS. TC AIMS automatically filters designated
support equipment from the UESL and creates an inventory listing in TC AIMS for later use in asset selection and tasking. Lists of equipment held by agencies without MDSS IT are manually entered to TC AIMS.

d. Requests for support, tasking units to provide support, and tracking are all functionally contained in TC AIMS if the support can be provided from within a MEF’s assets. In many cases however, support must be requested from non-FMF, and even non-Marine agencies.

e. To request actual support during the planning phase, TC AIMS will interface with the Marine Corps base/station Traffic Management Office’s (TMO) Transportation Management System (TMS) Freight Module. During planning, TC AIMS passes lift requests for troop movements not part of deployment operations to the TMO. TMO arranges commercial transportation normally based on standing contracts.

f. In planning for non-FMF movement of cargo and passengers during deployment, lift requirements may be pre-registered with the Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC).

(1) TC AIMS will receive input from MDSS II and create the Unit Equipment List (UEL) for transmission to MTMC. An interface to MTMC’s Automated System for Processing Unit Requirements (ASPUR) allows the MAGTF to provide data to MTMC for "unit move" cargo moving through MTMC operated ocean ports. This interface involves the UEL, the Military Standard Movement Procedures (MTLSTAMP) and the Defense Traffic Management Regulation (DTMR).

(2) TC AIMS will provide, via MTLSTAMP interface, information to the Air Mobility Command (AMC) Headquarters Operating System for Transportation (HOST) concerning unit moves. These unit moves will deploy via AMC through AMC and non-AMC airheads.

(3) The TC ATMS/AMC Passenger Reservations and Manifesting System (PRAMS) interface will enable the MAGTF to provide AMC Passenger Reservation Centers with the name/SSN data of passengers to deploy via AMC.

(4) TC ATMS/MTMC Group Operations Passenger System (GOPAX) interface will provide the coordination of continental United States (CONUS) movements of 25 or more PAX by Headquarters MTMC’s passenger directorate.

g. Currently, it is not certain that all the above interfaces will be instituted, or that pre-registering capability will be in place. However, it is anticipated that in the planning phase TC AIMS will provide the MAGTF and MEF Movement Control Centers (MCC) the ability to create and store information for transfer on demand.

h. During planning, TC AIMS will also be used to develop portions of the MAGTF’s Operational Orders (OPORD) such as appendix 4 (Transportation) to annex D (Logistics) and appendix 2 (Embarkation Plan) to annex R, (Amphibious Operations). The CSSE may also use TC
AIMS to develop appendix 14 (Transportation) to annex C (Operations) of the CSSE OPORD. Information for these procedures will be provided via the TC ATMS/MDSS II interface.

i. During the planning phase, TC AIMS will provide a capability to define, track, and respond to critical events. Critical event details are defined by the user and entered manually.

6003. DEPLOYMENT PHASE. This section describes the operational procedures for the use of the MAGTF II/LOG ATS components during the deployment phase. Deployment commences when the order is given to execute the OPLAN (the OPLAN becomes an OPORD at this time). The deployment phase discussed here encompasses those pre-deployment movements of forces directly relating to deployment and the movement of forces from origins to final destinations where employment of the force takes place.

1. Marine Air-Ground Task Force II. During the deployment phase, MAGTF II continues to perform those functions described in Section 5.4.1. As the need arises, MAGTF II developed force structures will be exported to MDSS II for updates to reflect changes in cargo and personnel assigned to deploying units. If necessary, changes to unit sourcing; i.e., UTC matching to a ULN may also be made. Similarly, relevant portions of JOPES plans are imported into MAGTF II for update/revision and then exported back to JOPES for review by the combatant commander and transportation agencies.

a. During this phase, MAGTF II, in concert with TC AIMS, keeps the combatant commander, TCC’s, MAGTF commander, and higher Marine CE/HQ apprised of the status of force deployment.

b. At the POE’s each ULN is recorded, by LOGMARS or manually, as it boards assigned carrier(s). This information shows what cargo and passengers from the ULN actually boarded ("manifested") on a specific carrier. The manifest data is passed to MDSS II via wireless modem or physical link. Upon completion of loading a carrier, MDSS II will export as-loaded cargo detail and number of passengers embarked to TC AIMS. TC AIMS then exports manifest data to MAGTF II (as well as to external systems).

c. After the manifest data is imported to MAGTF II the system will use the data in the following update processes:

(1) For ULN(s) loaded on a carrier, the actual manifested cargo and/or passengers (from TC AIMS) will be compared with the data for that ULN in MAGTF II. This level of detail cargo/passenger data will reflect the major end items and number of passengers manifested. When mismatches occur, the incorrect data will be replaced with the actual manifest data. For example, when a ULN that shows 5 HMMWV’s and 50 passengers in the TPFDD boards its carrier at the POE, it is recorded (manifested) as actually deploying 4 HMMWV’s and 55 passengers. When this data is imported into MAGTF II, the ULN will be automatically adjusted from 5 to 4 HMMWV’s and 50 to 55 passengers.

6-16
The MAGTF’s updated TPFDD, showing actual manifest data in MAGTF II, will be exported to the JOPES Requirements Subsystem. In JOPES, the updated ULN’s will replace their corresponding ULN’s in the combatant commander’s TPFDD. In addition to providing asset visibility, this procedure will ensure that when a ULN has fully deployed with all its assigned cargo and passengers it is accurately reflected in the TPFDD reports; i.e., the ULN will not show as partially manifested when it is in fact fully manifested.

(2) The second update involves updating the JOPES Scheduling and Movements Subsystem. The Scheduling and Movements Subsystem contains carrier itineraries and information concerning which ULN’s are scheduled for a specific carrier. The purpose for updating is to accurately depict the ULN’s, and the actual number of passenger and/or cargo short tons (airlift) or measurement tons (sealift), which deployed on a carrier. The JOPES Scheduling and Movements Subsystem EQ screen will be emulated in MAGTF II. JOPES itinerary and scheduling information for selected carriers will be imported into MAGTF II via the MAGTF II/JOPES interface. This information will be displayed, by carrier, on the MAGTF II EQ screen. Actually manifest data for each carrier will be imported from TC AIMS. In MAGTF II, the cargo and passenger manifest data will be “rolled up” to show Level 2 detail; i.e., passengers, short tons, or measurement tons. MAGTF II will perform a number of processes in the update procedure, the end product of which will be an accurate portrayal, by carrier and ULN, on the MAGTF II EQ screen of the numbers of passengers and cargo quantities manifested. The updated EQ screen data will be exported, via the MAGTF II/JOPES interface, to the JOPES Scheduling and Movements Subsystem EQ screen.

d. MAGTF II will then provide the MAGTF commander the capability to revise as necessary, schedules and ULN structures to get the right forces in theater when they are needed. The information also allows the combatant commander to keep abreast of inbound forces and direct changes to the flow if necessary. Additionally, this information allows USTRANSCOM’s TCC’s to make the most efficient use of scarce transportation assets.

e. MAGTF II can be used enroute to the POD/DEST, particularly if deploying by sea. For example, MAGTF II can be used to rapidly develop the force structure and determine sustainment requirements for a maritime raid force. Using ship’s communication assets, this force structure can be transmitted to the affected elements/units of the MAGTF. At the same time, MDSS II can be used to provide actual unit data if this information is not already available to MAGTF II users.

f. Upon arrival in-theater and prior to commencement of the employment phase, MAGTF II will continue to be employed to conduct planning functions. If needed, the MAGTF commander will use MAGTF II to revise force phasing, or even change the force structure to meet any situational changes that arise. Employing available means of communications, the revisions can be transmitted to the rear for
upload to JOPES and sent to interested parties via MAGTF II. The
MAGTF II/JOPES interface can be accomplished locally if WWMCCS is
available in-theater.

2. MAGTF Deployment Support System II. During the deployment phase
MDSS II continues to perform the functions described in Section
5.4.2. As required, plan force structures are imported from MAGTF II
and updated by replacing the previous unit data with the most current
unit data. Ship and aircraft load planning may still be conducted, or
previously developed plans may be revised. MDSS II will continue to
export movement requirements data to TC AIMS. During embarkation
operations, LOGMARS will be used to record loading and stowage of
cargo aboard ships. This data will be imported into MDSS II. The data
will also be used by CAEMS to provide as-loaded ships’ load plans and
deck diagrams and to produce Trim, Stability, and Stress Reports for
commercial type ships. For TAVB’s, the TALPS program will be
utilized. TALPS interfaces to MDSS II via CAEMS. TOMS/CMS
information will also be provided from the CAEMS module.

a. At Seaport of Embarkation (SPOE), cargo/container information
will be exported from MDSS II to the Navy’s Terminal Operations
Management System/Container Management System (TOMS/CMS). Upon
arrival at the Seaport of Debarkation (SPOD) TOMS/CMS will be used
during offload operations to maintain cargo visibility and of fload
selectivity. Both MDSS II and LFADS will be updated from TOMS/CMS.

b. During periods aboard ship, MDSS II may be employed to provide
unit data to MAGTF II. This may be done in situations such as the
development of a maritime raid force. In fact, MDSS II may be used to
accomplish the automated portion of developing the raid force in the
absence of MAGTF II.

c. Upon arrival at the POD/DEST, LOGMARS will be used to scan
cargo debarked from ships and airplanes. LOGMARS collected data will
be imported into MDSS II at locations designated by the MAGTF
commander. For example, debarking units may not be able to get
computing equipment set up before moving from POD to DEST. The MAGTF
commander may direct that LOGMARS data be downloaded to a disk at a
debarkation/movement control center and the disk provided to the
appropriate unit before it moves out. The unit would upload the data
to its MDSS II when the situation allows.

d. The MDSS II/LFADS interface will allow unit equipment and
supply information to be passed from one system to another. This
keeps each system’s data base updated and performing its functions
with the most efficiency and accuracy.

e. At seaports, beaches, and airheads, the LOGMARS/MDSS II/TC
AIMS interface will be employed to develop and forward requirements
for onward movement of forces to their respective destinations.

f. Personnel information will be updated as required in MDSS II.

6-18
NOTE: All of this data collection by MDSS II is extremely important to the commander whose unit may be deployed by different means at different times. The commander’s MDSS II UML and UMP will contain the details of cargo and personnel assigned to the deployed unit. As cargo and personnel arrive and debark, they are aggregated into the "arrival" database, giving the commander an accurate, up-to-date picture of the unit coming back together.

g. Effective use of MDSS II during the deployment phase will provide unit, MSE, and MAGTF commanders an accurate picture of the unit’s personnel, supplies, and equipment status prior to force employment.

3. Landing Force Asset Distribution System

a. Required SASSY files are imported to LFADS. The MAGTF CE account, Main Account (normally at the CSSE), CSSD account, and Using Unit Accounts are established during the planning phase. During the deployment phase, the flow of LFADS information within the MAGTF remains the same as in the planning phase. LFADS requisitioning procedures through SASSY and MTLSTRTP are unchanged. The primary difference in procedures between the phases are the communications media employed to submit LFADS transactions and receive transaction status. SUADPS/NALCOMIS provides the inventory and financial management, and maintenance management support, respectively, for "blue dollar" aviation logistics support.

b. During the deployment phase, as in the other phases, the MAGTF commander may use LFADS functionality to effect redistribution of assets within the MAGTF. This capability is also available to the MSE and subordinate unit commanders. Receipts, losses, and transfers of assets are recorded in LFADS and passed to MDSS II to update unit UESLs via the LFADS/MDSS II interface.

c. Upon arrival in-theater, MDSS II data collected (using LOGMARS as extensively as possible) during debark operations are imported to each units’ LFADS. While not yet clearly defined, it is anticipated that LFADS may import cargo information from TOMS/CMS during the ship of load progresses. In addition to ensuring reconciliation of the units status in both systems, LFADS uses the data to create transactions to report any changes in unit assets which may have occurred (losses, etc.).

d. Financial accounting is accomplished via the LFADS/SASSY interface. The SASSY Management Unit (SMU) imports LFADS transaction data into SASSY. SASSY accepts LFADS data and provides financial data for retrieval by the Marine Air-Ground Financial and Accounting System (MAGFARS). Although LFADS does not provide financial data directly to MAGFARS, it allows the MAGTF commander to extract financial information for review and to ensure that the MAGTF is operating in a fiscally sound manner.
e. MAGFARS is being replaced by the Standard Accounting and Budget Reporting System (SABRS). The procedures for reporting financial data to SABRS will be the same as those currently used for MAGFARS.

f. As mentioned in the MDSS II section, the procedures for the use of LFADS during MPS operations is currently being studied within the Marine Corps.

4. Computer-Aided Embarkation Management System

   a. In the deployment phase, the ships’ load plans developed in CAEMS are used for reference during embarkation operations. Additionally, planners continue to use CAEMS to develop ships’ load plans for newly assigned shipping and to revise pre-planned loads as required. During, and upon completion of actual ship loading, LOGMARS DCD’s are employed to record cargo stowage locations aboard ship. LOGMARS data is downloaded into MDSS II and then downloaded to CAEMS through the CAEMS/MDSS II interface to develop as-loaded load plans and deck diagrams for each ship.

   b. CAEMS may also be used by Marine Combat Cargo Officer/Assistant (CCO/CCA) personnel aboard Navy amphibious shipping to record stowage and manage Landing Force Operational Reserve Material (LFORM). The LFORM data contained in the CCO’s CAEMS will be exported to the embarkation team’s CAEMS suite allowing more precise automated stowage planning. CAEMS will also contribute to the efficient and effective management of LFORM through the interface with MDSS II wherein the CAEMS LFORM data will be exported to MDSS II providing the MAGTF commander a detailed view of LFORM status.

   c. Following debarkation at the POD, CAEMS load plans can be saved to disk for future use.

5. Computer-Aided Load Manifesting. During the deployment phase, the aircraft load plans developed in CALM are used for reference to conduct embarkation operations. CALM is also employed to develop load plans on the flight line as needed to respond to the changing airlift situation. Procedures for CALM during this phase are the same as described in Section 5.4.5.

6. Transportation Coordinators’ Automated Information for Movements System. In addition to the functionality provided by TC AIMS during the planning phase, there are a number of additional capabilities of particular use during the deployment phase. During the planning phase, TC AIMS is employed to establish/register transportation and movement support requirements with MEF movement support units as well as agencies external to the MEF. This section builds on those procedures by describing the TC AIMS procedures used during the deployment phase.

   a. When the order to deploy is passed, the MAGTF begins its movement to air and/or sea POE’s. (Some predeployment staging at
POE’s may already have been accomplished). The MAGTF commander will continue to use TC AIMS to generate "frag orders" that task and dispatch movement assets organic to the MAGTF. Fragmentary orders (frag orders) are fragments of a five paragraph order that omit the details not yet known (e.g. pick-up times). Issued as a warning to the supporting units, frag orders direct them to be prepared, on order, to provide movement support to a moving unit. The frag orders prepared in TC AIMS by the LMCC are released for execution by MEF units with the required movement support assets. Movement support requests pre-registered with base/station TMO’s, including locally contracted and MTMC coordinated assets, will be executed. MSC’s will provide support to the MAGTF MSE’s formed from subordinate units.

b. These movements are very dynamic, with frequent changes and revisions to requirements are the norm. TC AIMS will be used continually to send and receive newly created, modified or canceled requests and taskings of others. Units at nearly every level will use TC AIMS during the deployment phase not only to request support and/or receive taskings, but to monitor the status of the movement as well. Commanders will monitor critical events using TC AIMS. TC AIMS provides commanders visibility and status of equipment in near real-time using LOGMARS, inter-computer data transfer (TC AIMS to TC AIMS), and manual entry.

c. Designated support units will use TC AIMS functions to provide the MCC’s with constant updates on the status of movement support assets currently available and future asset availability. The MAGTF will conduct marshalling, staging, and convoying in accordance with the movement plan developed, in part, with TC AIMS. Changes responding to situations may be promulgated via TC AIMS.

d. Units will continue to update lift requirements via the TC ATMS/MDSS II interface until such time as the unit’s computing capabilities (equipment) must be packed for movement, requiring an alternate means to get information into TC AIMS.

e. During the movement to POE’s, TC AIMS will be used in conjunction with other technologies, such as LOGMARS, to provide in-transit visibility of personnel and cargo moving in convoy and separately by Marine as well as non-Marine commercial vehicles.

f. At the POE’s, LOGMARS will be used extensively to track MAGTF assets through staging and onto carriers. This information will be imported into TC AIMS and will provide asset visibility to deploying unit commanders during movement/staging.

g. LOGMARS or manual entry will be used to track the actual loading of ULN’s (cargo and passengers) aboard carriers. This information will be passed to MDSS II via wireless modem or physical link. After carrier loading is completed, MDSS IIT will export the as loaded cargo detail and number of passengers embarked to TC AIMS.

h. When the cargo and passenger manifest data is imported into TC AIMS, the data will be processed for export to the Defense
Transportation System (DTS). The information passed to DTS will provide movement information and intransit asset visibility to all concerned through the Global Transportation Network (GTN).

1. Additionally, cargo and passenger manifest data will be exported to MAGTF II. MAGTF II will import the data and process it for export to JOPES to accomplish the following updates:

   (1) Manifest data will update carrier schedules in the JOPES Scheduling and Movements Subsystem (EQ function) to show which ULN’s, and the actual number of passengers and Short Tons (airlift) or Measurement Tons (sealift), deployed on a specific carrier.

   (2) ULN’s whose actual loaded cargo and/or passenger detail differ from that shown in the plan TPFDD will be adjusted to show accurate quantities/details in the JOPES Requirements Subsystem.

j. When Marine units deploy through aerial ports of embarkation (APOE) operated by other Services, such as the USAF, the Marine TC AIMS will interface with that Service’s TC AIMS to reflect the flow of Marine units through the APOE. Likewise, when another Service deploys through a Marine APOE, a like interface will permit reporting of that Service’s flow through the APOE.

k. At POD’s, TC AIMS will be used to support the movement to DEST in the same manner as during the origin to POE movement. If a Common User Land Transportation (CULT) system has been established in theater, TC AIMS will interface to allow the MAGTF’s LMCC to request transport support. If available, TC AIMS may also interface with a theater airlift control center.

l. During the deployment phase, TC AIMS support will provide the required C2 for the most effective and efficient movement from origin to destination.

6004. EMPLOYMENT PHASE. During the employment phase, forces are operationally or tactically committed within the area of operations. This phase includes all levels of combat as well as humanitarian and other non-combat operations. This section discusses the use of the MAGTF II/LOG AIS systems during this phase.

1. Marine Air-Ground Task Force II. During the employment phase, MAGTF II will be used to develop force structures to support continued operations under the direction of the combatant or MAGTF commander. MAGTF II will also be used to develop the MAGTF’s redeployment structure. A distinct advantage of using MAGTF II to plan for the combatant commander’s redeployment or future operations during the Employment Phase is the ability to plan without immediate access to a WWMCCS/WAM workstation. The MAGTF’s plan can be developed in the field, downloaded to disk and delivered by the most expeditious means to the WWMCCS site.
a. Planning for force redeployment often commences while forces are currently employed in operations. During this phase, MAGTF II functions as previously described except for the calculation of force sustainment requirements not required for the development of redeployment plans. The MAGTF will develop its redeployment force structure and export to MDSS II for updating the currently held unit data. The force structure will be imported from MDSS II and exported to MAGTF II for upload to JOPES.

b. MAGTF II can also be used to develop force structures for operations to be conducted in-theater as well as to evaluate proposed courses of action (COA). In time constrained situations, or in the absence of MDSS II, MAGTF II will be used to tailor cargo and personnel detail, to reflect actual on-hand, for the MAGTF II developed forces.

2. MAGTF Deployment Support System II. During the employment phase, MDSS II is employed in much the same manner as depicted in Sections 5.4.2 and 5.5.2.

   a. In the employment phase, MDSS II is used to maintain the deployed unit’s database. The UESL is updated by LOGMARS and LFADS, through the LOGMARS/MDSS II, LFADS/MDSS II or user interface when necessary.

   b. Force structures developed in MAGTF II for force redeployment or future operations planning are imported into MDSS II to update changes in actual cargo and personnel data in the plan ULN’s.

   c. If MAGTF II is not available, force structures will be developed in MDSS II and exported to MAGTF II when circumstances permit.

3. Landing Force Asset Distribution System. During the employment phase, LFADS is the MAGTF commander’s primary tool for maintaining asset visibility, redistributing assets among MSE’s, and requisitioning supplies from Marine and non-Marine supply sources.

   a. As previously described, both MDSS II and TOMS/CMS will pass supply data to LFADS allowing units’ supply inventory files to be updated. Based on the data imported, LFADS will create the appropriate transactions to reflect gains and losses.

   b. During the employment phase, the MAGTF and unit commanders will be kept informed of the organizations’ status at their respective command levels through physical inventories and LFADS generated reports. LOGMARS technology will figure prominently in the inventory process as well as recording and passing to LFADS supply item location data.

   c. If, as in most cases, the situation warrants, the MAGTF commander will direct the CSSE to form CSSD’s to provide direct CSS support to using units (battalion, squadron, regiment, etc.). Supply support will be from the Main Account established at the CSSE to the
CSSD’s and then to the using units. The MAGTF gives direction and monitors. Requisitions are created in LFADS and flow from using units/CSSD’s to the Main Account via LFADS. The Main Account either issues the supplies or submits requisitions to Marine supply sources via the LFADS/SASSY interface or to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) via the MTLSTRTP interface. These requisitions may be filled in-theater from consolidated stock points by direction of the combatant commander.

d. Requisition status flows back to the original requester in the opposite direction of that taken by the requisitions.

e. LFADS will also be used at any level of command to create the transactions resulting from commanders’ redistribution directives.

4. Computer-Aided Embarkation Management System. During the employment phase, CAEMS procedures are the same as those described for the deployment phase.

a. During employment, CAEMS will be used to plan the ship embarkation for the redeployment of the MAGTF to Continental United States (CONUS). Additionally, there may be situations in which CAEMS is used to support the actual conduct of embarkation of forces for redeployment in-theater.

b. Redeployment in-theater could be the result of the combatant commander directing the embarkation of the MAGTF, or a portion thereof, to conduct an amphibious operation. It could be due to the combatant commander’s requirement to reposition the MAGTF in-theater.

5. Computer-Aided Load Manifesting. During the employment phase, CALM procedures are the same as those described for the deployment phase. Figure 2-17 provides CALM information flows during the employment phase.

a. In this phase, CALM will be used to plan aircraft embarkation for the redeployment of the MAGTF to CONUS. Additionally, during the employment phase, there may be situations in which CALM is utilized to support the actual conduct of air movement of forces for redeployment in-theater. Redeployment in-theater could be the result of the combatant commander’s requirement to reposition the MAGTF in-theater. This may be, for example, to gain a strategic advantage or to conduct an air assault operation.

b. CALM will also be used as needed to plan aircraft loads to support day-to-day operations.

6. Transportation Coordinators’ Automated Information for Movements System. TC AIMS will be one of the most utilized MAGTF II/LOG AIS systems during the employment phase.

a. TC AIMS will be employed to request, plan, task, coordinate, and monitor movement support operations of MAGTF forces and, as
directed, other forces assigned to the joint force. TC AIMS will also be used to conduct movement planning for the redeployment of the MAGTF for movement from the operations area to the Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) POE and from CONUS POD’s to force home bases and stations. Finally, TC AIMS will continue to provide critical events tracking during the employment phase.

b. During day-to-day and tactical operations, units will utilize TC AIMS while supporting themselves to the extent possible with organic movement assets. As required, requests for support will be forwarded to the MAGTF CSSE via TC AIMS. In accordance with the MAGTF commanders guidance, the CSSE will provide movement support.

c. Based on the TC AIMS Transportation Support Asset Inventory List (TSATL), updated regularly through the TC ATMS/MDSS II interface, the CSSE will determine the MAGTF’s ability to support itself with its own assets. If so, the appropriate MAGTF unit will be tasked. If not, a request for support will be prepared in TC AIMS and forwarded to the combatant commander via the TC AIMS/CULT interface. TC AIMS will also be capable of preparing documents to request host nation support (HNS).

d. TC AIMS may be capable of interfacing with the theater airlift control center, in which case requests for logistics airlift support will be prepared and forwarded via TC AIMS.

e. In supporting the redeployment planning effort, TC AIMS will import unit movement requirements from MDSS II. Information concerning ship’s berthing schedules and scheduled aircraft arrivals/departures will be entered into TC AIMS to develop the plan for marshalling, staging, and convoying. The CSSE/MAGTF LMCC will prepare frag orders for MAGTF movement support assets. Requests for CULT support and/or HNS will be prepared and pre-registered with the appropriate agency. As CONUS POD to home base/station movement requirements become known, requests for support will be prepared in TC AIMS and transmitted to the parent MEF (or MEF (Forward) in the case of Japan/Okinawa based forces) by the LMCC where TC AIMS will be employed to register support requirements with MEF movement support units or with non-FMF and commercial sources.

f. TC AIMS users at all levels will continue to utilize the critical events definition and tracking function of TC AIMS.

6005. REDEPLOYMENT PHASE. As previously mentioned, this chapter treats redeployment as the movement of forces out of the area of operations and return to home base(s). Superficially, redeployment would appear to be the duplicate of deployment, only in the other direction. Unfortunately, it is not that simple. Redeployment can be a very complex endeavor depending on the size of the joint force, the MAGTF, and the movement support available. Naturally, as the redeployment progresses, there will be fewer and fewer movement support assets available to the MAGTF. Communications among MAGTF II/LOG ATS systems and with external systems becomes more difficult as
assets are moved out of the area. The prudent use of MAGTF II/LOG ATS systems during this phase will assist in dispelling the natural tendency toward confusion both in-theater and on arrival in CONUS. This section addresses the procedures for use of the systems during the redeployment phase.

1. **Marine Air-Ground Task Force II.** During the redeployment phase, MAGTF II is procedurally employed as in the other phases.

   a. As the need arises, MAGTF II developed force structures will be exported to MDSS II for updates to reflect changes in cargo and personnel assigned to redeploying units, and even UTC modifications if there are changes to which redeploying units are assigned to a given ULN. Similarly, relevant portions of JOPES plans are imported to MAGTF II for update/revision and then exported back to JOPES for review by the combatant commander and transportation agencies.

   b. During this phase MAGTF II, in concert with TC AIMS, performs the very important function of keeping the combatant commander, TCC’s, the MAGTF commander, and higher Marine CE/HQ apprised of the status of force redeployment.

   c. At the POE’s each ULN is recorded, by LOGMARS or manually, as it boards assigned carrier(s). This information shows what cargo and PAX from the ULN actually boarded ("manifested") on a specific carrier. The manifest data is passed to MDSS IT via wireless modem or physical link. Upon completion of loading a carrier, MDSS II will export as-loaded cargo detail and number of passengers embarked to TC AIMS.

   d. MAGTF II will provide the MAGTF commander the capability to revise schedules and ULN structures. This is necessary to get the correct forces out of theater in the desired order. The information also allows the combatant commander to keep abreast of outbound forces and direct changes to the flow if necessary. Additionally, with this information, USTRANSCOM’s TCC’s can make the most efficient use of scarce transportation assets.

   e. MAGTF II can be used enroute to the CONUS or other POD, particularly if redeploying by surface. For example, MAGTF II can be used to rapidly develop the force structure and determine sustainment requirements for a force directed to suspend its redeployment and divert to another mission. Using ship’s communication assets, this force structure can be transmitted to the affected elements/units of the MAGTF with MDSS II being used to provide actual unit data if this information is not already available to MAGTF II users.

2. **MAGTF Deployment Support System II.** During the redeployment phase MDSS II continues to perform the functions described in previous sections. Redeployment plan force structures are imported from MAGTF II and updated by replacing the previous unit data with the most current unit data. Ship and aircraft load planning will probably continue, and previously developed plans will probably be revised. MDSS II will continue to export movement requirements data to TC AIMS.
a. During embarkation operations, LOGMARS will be used to record loading and stowage of cargo aboard ships. This data will be imported into MDSS II. The data will also be used to update CAEMS to provide as-loaded ships’ load plans and deck diagrams and to produce Trim, Stability, and Stress (TSS) reports for commercial type ships.

b. During periods aboard ship, MDSS II may be employed to provide unit data to MAGTF II for units comprising a force which is formed to perform a separate mission. In fact, MDSS II may be used to accomplish the automated portion of developing the force task organization in the absence of MAGTF II.

c. Upon arrival at the CONUS POD, LOGMARS will be used to scan cargo debarked from ships and aircraft. LOGMARS collected data will be imported to MDSS II at locations designated by the MAGTF commander. For example, debarking units will probably move almost immediately away from the POD to home bases/stations. Thus, data may not be entered to a unit’s MDSS II UESL at the POD, but rather at the unit area. The MAGTF commander may direct that LOGMARS data be downloaded to a disk at a debarkation/movement control center, and the disk provided to the appropriate unit before it moves out. The unit would upload the data to its MDSS II when the situation allows.

d. The MDSS II/LFADS interface will allow unit equipment and supply information to be passed from one system to another to keep each system’s data base updated and performing its functions with the most efficiency and accuracy.

e. At sea ports, beaches, and airheads, the LOGMARS/MDSS II/TC AIMS interface will be employed to develop/revise and forward requirements for onward movement of forces to their respective destinations.

f. Personnel information will be updated as required in MDSS II.

g. This collection of data by MDSS II is extremely important to the commander whose unit may have been redeployed by different means at different times. The commander’s MDSS II UML and UMP will contain the details of cargo and personnel assigned to the redeploying unit. As cargo and personnel arrive and debark they are entered to the "arrival" database. This provides the commander with an accurate, up-to-date picture of the unit coming back together.

h. As this report is being prepared, there are ongoing discussions within the Marine Corps to determine the best way(s) to incorporate MDSS II and LFADS functionality during MPS onload/reconstitution operations.

3. Landing Force Asset Distribution System. During the redeployment phase, LFADS remains the MAGTF commander’s primary tool for maintaining asset visibility, redistributing assets among MSE’s, requisitioning supplies from Marine and non-Marine supply sources, and for financial accounting.
a. During this period, the MAGTF and unit commanders will be kept apprised at their respective command levels of the organizations’ status through physical inventories and LFADS generated reports. LOGMARS technology will figure prominently in the inventory process as well as recording and passing to LFADS supply item location data.

b. Supply support from the Main Account is established at the CSSE through the CSSD’s and to the using units. The MAGTF gives direction and monitors supply support and requisitioning. Requisitions are created in LFADS and flow from using units/CSSD’s to the Main Account via LFADS. The Main Account either issues the supplies or submits requisitions to Marine supply sources via the LFADS/SASSY interface or to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) via the MTLSTRTP interface. While still in-theater, these requisitions may be filled from consolidated stock points by direction of the combatant commander.

c. Redistribution of assets among elements and units of the MAGTF during this phase could well be the return of assets to the original owners. Additionally, CSSD’s may be disestablished and their accounts and supplies rolled back into the CSSE Main Account.

d. The final event during the redeployment phase occurs when all units of the MAGTF have returned to home bases/stations, the LFADS files are exported to SASSY bringing the units back on line with the mainframe and the LFADS transactions are closed out or transferred to SASSY. Until this takes place, MAGTF units will continue to receive supply support through LFADS.

4. Computer-Aided Embarkation Management System. In the redeployment phase, the ships’ load plans developed in CAEMS are used for reference during embarkation operations. Additionally, planners continue to use CAEMS to develop ships’ load plans for newly assigned shipping and to revise pre-planned loads as required. During, and upon completion of, actual ship loading, LOGMARS DCD’s are employed to record cargo stowage locations aboard ship. This data is downloaded to MDSS II and then through the CAEMS/MDSS II interface. The data are imported into CAEMS to develop as-loaded load plans and deck diagrams for each ship.

a. It is anticipated that CAEMS will be used in conjunction with MDSS II to support reconstitution of MPS loads.

b. LFORM stowage and management also must be attended during the redeployment phase. Amphibious ships arriving to redeploy the force may have LFORM loaded. Additionally, if the MAGTF, or a portion of the MAGTF, is diverted to perform a mission enroute, LFORM may need to be used.

5. Computer-Aided Load Manifesting. During the redeployment phase, the aircraft load plans developed in CALM during the employment phase are used for reference to conduct aircraft embarkation operations. CALM is also employed to develop load plans on the flight line as needed to respond to the changing airlift situation.

6-28
a. The information required to employ CALM is imported from MDSS II. Although less desirable, cargo and PAX data can be entered manually if MDSS II is not available.

b. Proposed aircraft load diagrams are plotted and submitted to the USAF ALCE/Military Airlift Wing scheduled to fly airlift missions for load plan approval. When approval is received, aircraft loading commences.

6. Transportation Coordinators’ Automated Information for Movements System. In the redeployment phase, the planning conducted in TC AIMS during the employment phase is executed.

a. Revisions to plans and support requirements and requests are developed as needed.

b. In preparation for redeployment, TC AIMS is used during the employment phase to conduct OPAREA to OCONUS POE movement planning, prepare support frag orders for MAGTF movement support units, establish/register transportation and movement support requirements with the available in-theater CULT and HNS agencies and provide initial CONUS POD to home base/station movement support to the parent MEF’s FMCC/LMCC.

c. As the redeployment progresses, progressively fewer movement support assets will be available. Thus, TC AIMS automated support becomes more significant in maintaining asset listings such as the MAGTF’s TSAIL.

d. Once the redeployment order is given, and in accordance with the MAGTF commander’s plan, units begin to move to air and sea ports of embarkation.

e. Organic transportation/movement support will be used to the extent possible. Unit commanders will employ TC AIMS to track assets as well as create internal taskings. Requirements for additional support will be forwarded via TC AIMS to the appropriate MCC. Normally the MAGTF CSSE will form a LMCC to control and coordinate movement support and the actual movement activities.

f. The MAGTF commander will continue to use TC AIMS to task and dispatch movement assets organic to the MAGTF. The frag orders prepared in TC AIMS by the CSSE will be released for execution by MAGTF units with the required movement support assets. Movement support requests pre-registered with the combatant commander’s CULT and with HNS activities, if available, will be executed.

g. These movements are very dynamic, frequent changes and revisions to requirements are the norm. TC AIMS will be used continually to send and receive newly created, modified or canceled requests and taskings of others. Units at nearly every level will use TC AIMS during this period not only to request support and/or receive taskings, but to monitor the status of the movement as well. Commanders will monitor critical events, using TC AIMS. TC AIMS
provides commanders visibility and status of equipment in near real-time. LOGMARS, inter-computer data transfer (TC AIMS to TC AIMS), and manual entry.

h. Designated support units will use TC AIMS functions to provide the CSSE/LMCC with constant updates on the status of movement support assets currently available and future asset availability.

i. The MAGTF will conduct marshalling, staging, and convoysing in accordance with the movement plan developed in part with TC AIMS. Changes responding to situations may be promulgated via TC AIMS.

j. Units will continue to update lift requirements via the TC ATMS/MDSS II interface until such time as the unit’s computing capabilities (equipment) must be packed for movement, requiring an alternate means to get information into TC AIMS.

k. During the movement to POE’s, TC AIMS will be used in conjunction with other technologies, such as LOGMARS, to provide in-transit visibility of personnel and cargo moving in convoy and separately by Marine as well as CULT HNS vehicles.

l. At the POE’s, TC AIMS and LOGMARS will be used extensively to track MAGTF assets through staging and onto carriers. TC AIMS will provide asset visibility to deploying units’ commanders and update the units’ MDSS II UESL.

m. TC AIMS, with LOGMARS or manual entry, will track the actual loading of ULN’s (cargo and PAX) aboard carriers and transmit this data to MAGTF II for upload to the JOPES Scheduling and Movements Subsystem. MDSS II ship’s as-loaded information will be imported to TC AIMS to prepare Cargo Manifests for commercial shipping, including MPS. Ship’s cargo manifests will be provided to each ship’s master as well as be transmitted to MTMC. This TC AIMS interface with the Defense Transportation System (DTS) will provide movement information and in-transit asset visibility to all concerned through the Global Transportation Network (GTN). These interfaces are still under study.

n. At the CONUS POD, redeploying units of the MAGTF will stage and then move out to home bases/stations as directed by the MEF LMCC. Organic assets will be used within capabilities. The LMCC will employ TC AIMS to task MEF units to provide support. TC AIMS movement support requests pre-registered with base/station TMO’s, including locally contracted and MTMC coordinated assets, will be executed. MEF MSC’s will provide POD to base/station movement support to the MAGTF MSE’s formed from their respective subordinate units.

o. TC AIMS and LOGMARS will be used continually to track convoys and separately moving cargo. Critical events will be entered to TC AIMS, revised as the situation dictates, and will be tracked by TC AIMS.
## CHAPTER 7
### DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>7000 7-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERVIEW</td>
<td>7001 7-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES IN DELIBERATE PLANNING</td>
<td>7002 7-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TASKING AUTHORITY AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR PLANNING</td>
<td>7003 7-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE FIVE PHASES OF DELIBERATE PLANNING</td>
<td>7004 7-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAN MAINTENANCE AND CHANGES TO OPERATIONAL PLANS</td>
<td>7005 7-20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FIGURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7-1 FIVE PHASES OF DELIBERATE OPLAN DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>7-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-2 SAMPLE SERVICE PLANNING GUT DANCE FOR DELIBERATE PLANNING</td>
<td>7-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-3 FORMAT FOR A LETTER OF INSTRUCTION (LOI) INITIATING DELIBERATE PLANNING</td>
<td>7-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-4 PHASE I - INITIATION</td>
<td>7-22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-5 PHASE II - CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>7-23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-6 PHASE III - PLAN DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>7-24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-7 PHASE IV - PLAN REVIEW</td>
<td>7-27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-8 PHASE V - SUPPORTING PLAN DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>7-28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-9 ROLES AND AUTHORITIES IN WAR</td>
<td>7-29</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7-1
CHAPTER 7
DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS

7000. INTRODUCTION. This chapter provides the necessary bridge between generic deliberate planning and the way the Marine Corps implements those planning concepts. It begins with an overview of the process, and a description of the planning responsibilities and authorities at the various levels of command and support (JCS, CTNC, JTF, MARFOR, MAGTF, HQMC, Supporting Establishment). It provides specific policy on tasking authorities and command relationships for planning, and summary of the planning milestones (taskings, milestones, meetings, major deliverables). It next summarizes the phases of the deliberate planning process, and then provides step-by-step conceptual discussions of how MAGTF’s define requirements, and how they and the Supporting Establishment source those requirements. The chapter ends with a discussion of plan maintenance and the tie to the budgeting process.

7001. OVERVIEW

1. Deliberate planning is carried out during peacetime to develop and refine the nation’s war plans. Planning in this fashion allows for orderly and methodical command and staff participation in the preparation of a plan.

2. The deliberate planning process is a set sequence of steps that military commanders and staffs take to develop a complete operation plan. Organized into five phases, these steps prescribe a joint planning approach that offers a logical means for developing an operation plan. This process is graphically portrayed in figure 7-1. The joint process helps to coordinate the planning activities of many diverse commands.

3. This chapter discusses the deliberate planning process. It delineates the responsibilities of Headquarters Marine Corps, the Fleet Marine Force and the supporting establishment. For greater detail regarding the deliberate planning process, refer to Joint Pub 5-02.1.

4. Although the discussion herein deals with deliberate planning for JSCP directed OPLAN’s, the directed steps and procedures are also applicable to planning of exercise deployments.

7002. PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES IN DELIBERATE PLANNING

1. General. Two fundamental principles must be adhered to in the deliberate planning process. First, war planning must reflect the realistic capability of the forces involved. Assignments, tasking and
Figure 7-1 -- Five Phases of Deliberate OPLAN Development
responsibilities must reflect this precept. Second, the unit most likely to carry out a combat operation should carry out the planning. These principles underlie the planning responsibilities contained in this publication.

2. Planning Schedule and Planning Guidance. Component commanders will initiate deliberate planning with the force by publishing an LOI containing or referencing information and guidance provided by JCS, supported and supporting CTNC’s, Joint Task Force commanders, and/or the naval component commanders. Subordinate MEF’s will develop planning schedules and planning guidance to be issued to subordinate MAGTF CE’s, MSC’s, and/or MSE’s, as appropriate. Schedules and guidance will be published as an LOT for planning.

3. Assignment of War Planning Tasks. War planning tasks are assigned in accordance with figures 7-2 through 7-6. Rationale supporting the distribution of war planning tasks is based on the following premises:

   a. The tasking assignments incorporate the principle that the unit likely to execute a combat operation should plan it.

   b. Normally, the CTNC/JTF commander, or his service component (MARFOR) commander, assigns supporting plan requirements to the MAGTF commander.

   c. As the principle warfighting organization, the MEF must remain attuned regarding the planning efforts of combat forces (see section 7003.3).

   d. A MARFOR commander may review any plan containing his forces, including any supporting deployment database developed.

   e. The primary tasks of the supported MARFOR commander are coordination for the sourcing of forces and sustainment which come from outside the Force, and to provide general guidance to the MEF commander. Specifically, coordination of efforts between supporting and supported MEF’s. Direct liaison is normally authorized (DTRLAUTH) for planning purposes.

   f. Primary Tasks of HQMC

      (1) HQMC (PP&O)

         (a) Designate supporting and supported MARFOR/MEF’s when a combatant CTNC has been apportioned two or more MAGTF’s.

         (b) Form an OPLAN working group (OWG) to coordinate staff guidance to supported and supporting MARFOR/MAGTF commanders for plan development.

         (c) Provide representation, as required, to all combatant commanders OPLAN conferences.
(d) Schedule and host a recurring Worldwide Marine Corps Planner’s Conference (WMCPC) in conjunction with annual JOPES conferences and publish an ALMAR announcing the WMCPC.

(e) Publish updates to the MCO P3000._ (Marine Corps Planner’s Manual).

(2) **HOMC (M&RA)**. Establish replacement policy before TPFDD development begins. The principle planning agent (see paragraph 7003.3) must be provided with information detailing replacement operations (source, POD, time available, percent of casualties to be replaced, etc.).

(3) **HOMC (T&L)**. Develop logistics policy and supporting establishment guidance for the supported commander.

(4) **HOMC (T&L in conjunction with M&RA)**. Establish medical liaison points to facilitate tracking Marines evacuated through the joint medical regulating chain.

(5) **HOMC (AVN)**

   (a) Develop aviation logistics policy and support sourcing of Class V(A) during OPLAN preparation.

   (b) Assist the OWG in the development of the Environmental Support Annex (annex H) to the OPLAN.

   (c) Coordinate OPNAV, and associated ICP’s, for the movement of Class V(A) into theater, including TPFDD updates to reflect movement requirements.

(6) **OWG drafts/coordinates for PP&O release, a message providing OPLAN refinement conference dates, required attendees, HQMC points of contact, resolution of contentious issues, logistics factors, replacement/casualty estimation factors, and other Service issues. OWG composition must include PP&O, M&RA, I&L, MARCORSYSCOM, AVN, and other agencies as required.**

   g. **Primary tasks of supporting establishment.** To be written by DC/S Installations and Logistics and DC/S Aviation.

7003. **TASKING AUTHORITY AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS FOR PLANNING**

1. As stated in chapter 2, the JSCP apportions major combat forces to the unified and specified commanders (CTNC’s) for preparation of contingency OPLAN’s.

   a. With JSCP direction and authorization, CTNC’s commence their detailed deliberate planning for war.
b. An LOI and/or planning guidance is published by a supported or supporting CTNC, directing apportioned or assigned forces to formally begin deliberate planning. The LOI will contain specific information directing how TPFDD’s are to be constructed and establishing specific due dates for plan completion.

c. CTNC’s may exercise Combatant Command (COCOM) or Operational Control (OPCON) over supporting MAGTF’s. They may also delegate OPCON to subordinate unified commanders; a Joint Task Force (JTF) established by the unified commander; or to the naval component commander.

(1) Subordinate unified commanders and JTF commanders exercise OPCON over MAGTF’s when the MAGTF is designated as a separate component command (COMMARFOR) under the operational control of the JTF.

(2) The naval component commander may exercise operational control over the MAGTF when directed to do so by cognizant authority. This normally occurs when the MAGTF is an integral part of the Naval Component, as when amphibious operations are anticipated.

2. War planning command relationships vary according to each plan and/or unified commander supported. The mission assigned to the MAGTF in various OPLAN’s has the greatest bearing on command relationships. Therefore, command relationships must be gleaned from each OPLAN to which forces are apportioned.

3. Primary Planning Authority. The primary authority for plan development rests with the combatant commanders. Taskings from the combatant commanders flow to assigned force commanders as a requirement for supporting plans.

a. Planning authority exists at all echelons of command. In deliberate planning, within the joint planning community, the primary planning authority is the MARFOR (the Marine component commander).

(1) The MARFOR commander is the designated Service component of a combatant commander. As such, he has responsibilities for all Marine activity in support of the CTNC to which assigned.

(2) A MARFOR commander may assign some of his planning responsibilities (see figures 6-2 through 6-6) to a MEF commander. Units smaller than MEF are not normally staffed to adequately handle component planning responsibilities. In that case, the MEF becomes the principle planning agent and is authorized to speak for the MARFOR in development of the component part of the combatant commander’s plan. As MARFOR structure evolves to support component planning this practice should be used less frequently in order to allow the MEF commander to focus on the fight rather than the deployment.

b. When coordinating TPFDD development the supported MARFOR or his principle planning agent has authority for direct liaison with the
supporting MAGTF. Supporting MARFOR/MEF’s must be kept informed of all taskings to the assigned MAGTF.

4. Supporting Establishment Relationships. To be written by DC/S Installations and Logistics and DC/S Aviation.

7004. THE FIVE PHASES OF DELIBERATE PLANNING

1. Joint Pub 5-02.1 establishes a standard five-phase sequence to be followed in the development of an OPLAN (figure 7-1 depicts these steps). The remaining paragraphs in this section provide both an overview of the planning activities that take place during the deliberate planning process and the detailed steps within each phase; specific actions which must be taken, who takes them, how various automated tools are used to support those actions, and what specific deliverables are required (and to whom). This section contains necessary checklists and sample messages/orders/LOI’s to aid the planner in providing necessary guidance, coordination, and oversight. Appendix F contains additional guidance and checklists to assist planners in the development of supporting operation plans.

   a. Figures 7-4 through 7-8 provide amplifying descriptions of deliberate planning tasks and responsibilities for the command elements and headquarters staff sections within the Force. Within those tables many of the MARFOR responsibilities may be assigned to the principle planning agent if one is designated.

   b. Reference to MEF Major Subordinate Commands (MSC’s) refers to the MarDiv, the MAW, the FSSG, and the SRTG. Reference to supporting commands refers to:

      (1) Those commands external to the MARFOR, but which are tasked to provide deliberate planning support, and

      (2) Those commands within the MARFOR, other than MSC’s, which may provide information or support during deliberate planning.

2. Phase I - Initiation. In this phase, planning tasks are assigned, resources available for planning are identified, and the general groundwork is laid for planning.

   a. Joint Planning Activities

      (1) Resources for planning are identified by JCS and the Services in the JSCP.

      (2) JCS provides amplifying plan development guidance to the supported CTNC.

      (3) The supported CTNC issues planning guidance to its forces assigned for planning.
b. Service Headquarters Planning Activities. At an appropriate point after the publication of the JSCP, HQMC (PP&O) will, in coordination with other departments at HQMC, form an OPLAN Working Group (OWG) and publish service guidance for the upcoming deliberate planning cycle.

(1) **Purpose.** To provide overall planning guidance for deliberate planning cycle.

(2) **Medium.** GENSER message or MCOPSLOG TLCF.

(3) Sample service guidance for deliberate planning is found in figure 7-2. Initial guidance will be incomplete and should be updated in an interactive manner as information is developed or provided from joint staff sections.

**SAMPLE SERVICE GUIDANCE FOR DELIBERATE PLANNING**

FM CMC WASHINGTON DC//PP&O//
TO COMMARFOR___//G5/G4//
INFO COMMARFOR___//G5/G4//
CG ___ MEF//G-5/G-4//
COMMARCORLOGBASES//807//
COMMARCORSYSCOM//CS//
etc.
classification//_____//
MSGID/ADMIN/DCMC PPO/PL(_RB)//
SUBJ/MARINE CORPS SERVICE GUIDANCE IN SUPPORT OF OPLAN nnnn-yy//
REF/A/REFERENCE INITIAL CINC PLANNING GUIDANCE//
/B/REFERENCE SUBSEQUENT CINC PLANNING GUIDANCE//
POC/i.i. surname/rank/CALLSIGN:PL-__/PRIPHN:(DSN)224-nnnn/703-614-nnnn/FAX-nnnn(U)FAX-nnnn(S)/
RMKS/1. ()PER THE REF’S, (PROVIDE SPECIFIC INFO PROVIDED BY CINC), INCLUDING REFINEMENT CONFERENC DATES AND MC CMD'S WHO SHOULD ATTEND.
2. ()FOL DATA PROVIDED TO EXPEDITE DEVELOPMENT OF MARINE COMPONENT SUPPORTING PLANS DURING THE DELIBERATE PLANNING CYCLE FOR OPLAN nnnn-yy
   A. ()DESIGNATED FORCES (SUPPORTING AND SUPPORTED)
   C. ()LOGISTICS PLANNING GUIDANCE, T/E SERIES #, MEDICAL FACTORS PLANNING GUIDANCE, CLASS V(W), ETC.
   D. ()MANPOWER PLANNING GUIDANCE, T/O SERIES #, REPLACEMENT FACTORS, ETC.
   E. ()AVIATION LOGISTICS FACTORS (I.E. CLASS V(A), ETC.)
3. ()IRT USCINC__ OPLAN nnnn-yy, THE FOL USMC SERVICE-LEVEL PLANNING ISSUES ARE PENDING RESOLUTION:
   A. ()[tbd]
   B. ()[tbd]
4. THE FOL FUNC-SUBJ MATTER EXPERT POC ARE EST IOT ENSURE UNIFORM, POLICY ISO THIS OPLAN (READ IN FOUR COL):
   PL (PL-__) OPLAN nnnn-yy SPONSOR [rank/name/priphn]
   PO (POC-30) WIN,WWMCCS,MGTF II [rank/name/priphn]
   M&RA (MPP-60) T-O,MNPWR, REPL, RESV [rank/name/priphn]
   I&L (LPO-__) T-E, LOG AIS, SUSTAINMENT [rank/name/priphn]
5. ()REQ ALCON AKNLDG RCPT OF THIS MSG VIA R-AUTODIN MSG.//
DECLAS DDMMYY//

Figure 7-2 -- Sample Service Planning Guidance For Deliberate
c. **Component Commander Planning Activities.** The Force commander publishes general planning guidance for MSC’s which parallels that provided by the supported CTNC. The commander also provides:

1. Designation of the MAGTF to support the contingency.
2. Direction to the MEF commander to designate the MAGTF commander.

d. **MEF Planning Activities.** Based on the MARFOR guidance the MEF commander may designate a MAGTF commander and publishes initial guidance for planning for use by the MAGTF, to supporting commanders and MSC’s.

3. **Phase II — Concept Development.** Significant factors which could affect mission accomplishment are analyzed. A mission statement is deduced, subordinate tasks derived, the best course of action is determined, and the Concept of Operations developed.

a. **Joint Planning Activities**

(1) To develop the Concept of Operations, the CTNC accomplishes the following:

   (a) **CTNC Planning Message.** Each CTNC normally provides planning information for each of its assigned missions. This message normally identifies the plan number and the WWMCCS teleconference which will be used to coordinate planning. It may contain a mission analysis, from which a mission statement may be assigned or deduced.

   (b) **Provides Planning Guidance.** Planning guidance has two major objectives:

   1. Providing enough preliminary guidance to allow work to begin on staff estimates.

   2. Providing the same information to subordinate and supporting commanders through either a planning directive, or a planning conference.

   (c) **Commanders Estimate.** Uses the staff estimates generated as the foundation for the Commander’s Estimate and to assess the supportability of tentative courses of action. The Commander’s Estimate states the commander’s decision on a course of action to be followed.

(2) **CTNC’s TPFDD LOI.** Each CTNC will also publish a TPFDD LOI.

   (a) **Contents.** The LOI normally establishes milestones, assigns force modules, ULN, CTN and PTN ranges, and provides other relevant information necessary for planning.

7-10
FORMAT FOR A LETTER OF INSTRUCTION (LOI) TTTATTNG DELIBERATE PLANNING

Note: For this example, USCINCEUR is the "SUPPORTED CINC and the MAGTF commander is CO II MEF."

FM COMMARFORLANT//G-4/G-5//
TO CO II MEF//G-4/G-5//
INFO CMC WASHINGTON DC//PF&O//
USCINCEUR//J-3/J-5//
OTHER UNIFIED CDRS (as required) CINCUSNAVEUR//N-3/N-5//
SUB-UNIFIED CDR (as required)
COMPONENT CDRS OF SUB-UNIFIED OR JOINT TASK FORCE
(as required)
COMMARFOREUR//G-4/G-5//
COMMARFORPAC//G4/G-5// (if applicable)
CG SECOND MAW//G-3/G-4//
CG SECOND MARDIV//G-3/G-4//
CG MARRESFOR//G4/G-5//
CG FOURTH MARDIV//G-3/G-4//
CG FOURTH MAW//G-3/G-4//
CG FOURTH FSSG//G-3/G-4//
CG SECOND FSSG//G-3/G-4//
CG FOURTH MEB//G-3/G-4//
SECOND SRI GROUP//S-3//
CLASSIFICATION //N03100//
SUBJ: LETTER OF INSTRUCTION (LOI) FOR OPLAN XXXX-YR DELIBERATE PLANNING (U)
REF/A/JOINT STRATEGIC CAPABILITIES PLAN FY-YR//
/B/USCINCEUR OPLAN XXXX-YR PLANNING GUIDANCE MESSAGE//
/C//JCS PUB 5-02.1 -- DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCEDURES D. MARINE CORPS CAPABILITIES PLAN (MCP)//
/E/MARINE CORPS MOBILIZATION PLAN (MPLAN)//
/F/FMFLANT ORDER P3020.2C -- FMFLANT PLANS SOP//
/G/FORCE ORDER P3120.15 -- FMFLANT DEPLOYMENT SOP//
RMKS/1. PURPOSE. THE PURPOSE OF THIS LOI IS TO:
A. ASSIGN PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TIME PHASED FORCE DEPLOYMENT DATA (TPFDD) DEVELOPMENT FOR OPLAN XXXX-YR;
B. PROVIDE DEPLOYMENT GUIDANCE;
C. PROVIDE LOGISTIC GUIDANCE;
D. ESTABLISH PLANNING MILESTONES.
2. BACKGROUND.
A. REF A DIRECTS USCINCEUR TO ... (a brief overview of the JSCP tasking is provided as relates to this OPLAN).
B. FMFLANT FORCES APPORTIONED FOR THIS CONTINGENCY ARE IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF A.
C. REF B IS USCINCEUR’S PLANNING GUIDANCE. (Provide any amplifying details and specific guidelines in this paragraph that address valid assumptions for planning, contingency options, concepts of operations, Marine force apportionment for each option, preconflict measures involving early deployment of Marine forces, time phasing of forces into the area of operations, Marine forces available from a supporting CINC, and other pertinent factors that bear on the planned deployment and employment of FMFLant forces apportioned to the contingency plan).

7-3 -- Format for a Letter of Instruction (LOI)
Initiating Deliberate Planning 7-11
FORMAT FOR A LETTER OF INSTRUCTION (LOI) INITIATING DELIBERATE PLANNING

3. () ACTION. THE FOLLOWING PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES ARE ASSIGNED AND WILL BE CARRIED OUT IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFS B THROUGH G.

   A. CG II MEF IS THE SUPPORTED MEF AND IS THE PRINCIPLE PLANNING AGENT FOR FORCES APPORTIONED TO OPLAN XXXX-YR. THE ASSIGNMENT OF THIS RESPONSIBILITY INCLUDES BUT IS NOT LIMITED TO:
      (1) ESTABLISHING AN APPROPRIATE PLANNING CELL AND ASSIGNING DETAILED PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES TO SUBORDINATE MAGTF COMMAND ELEMENTS, MSC HEADQUARTERS, AND OTHER UNITS UNDER OPCON OF II MEF;
      (2) PUBLISH A DETAILED PLAN OF ACTION AND MILESTONES IN SUPPORT OF OPLAN XXXX-YR DELIBERATE PLANNING PROCESS;
      (3) ESTABLISHING LIAISON WITH SUPPORTED COMMANDERS (JOINT TASK FORCE AND/OR THE NAVAL COMPONENT);
      (4) PROVIDING USMC TASK FORCE PLANNING INFORMATION TO THE JOINT COMMANDER (OR THE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER) AS APPROPRIATE;
      (5) DEVELOP SET OF EXPANDED ASSUMPTIONS TO SATISFY THE PECULIAR SITUATION;
      (6) DEVELOP AND PUBLISH A CONCEPT OF DEPLOYMENT, CONCEPT OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT AND CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT;
      (7) PREPARING, OR COORDINATING THE PREPARATION OF SUPPORTING OPLANS DIRECTED BY THE JOINT COMMANDER (OR THE NAVAL COMPONENT COMMANDER) AS APPROPRIATE;
      (8) IMPLEMENTING THE PLANNING GUIDANCE CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 4 THROUGH 7 OF THIS LOI;
      (9) COORDINATING THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TIME PHASED FORCE DEPLOYMENT DATA (TPFDD) DATABASE BASED ON THE CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT;
      (10) COORDINATING WITH CG MARRESFOR TO IDENTIFY APPROPRIATE SMCR AUGMENTATION OF REINFORCING FORCES ALLOCATED TO THE CONTINGENCY PLAN IAW JSCP GUIDANCE, THE SUPPORTED CINC’S REQUIREMENTS AND THE MPLAN;
      (11) COORDINATING WITH OTHER ASSIGNED MEF’S REGARDING FORCE DEPLOYMENT AND REQUIREMENTS FOR TRANS ATLANTIC MOVEMENT OF FIXED WING AIRCRAFT;
      (12) PROVIDING THIS HEADQUARTERS WITH PERIODIC STATUS REPORTS ON THE PROGRESS OF THE DELIBERATE PLAN DEVELOPMENT AS OUTLINED IN THE COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS OF THIS LOI.

   B. COMMARFORxxx WILL SUPPORT OPLAN XXXX-YR DELIBERATE PLAN DEVELOPMENT BY:
      (1) PROVIDING AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING SUPPORT FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TPFDD DATABASE;
      (2) PROVIDING TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING LOGISTIC CONCEPTS, PRIORITIES, AND FORCE SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS;
      (3) COORDINATING SUSTAINMENT SOURCING FOR ALL CLASSES OF AVIATION AND GROUND SUPPLY;
      (4) ASSISTING CG MEF IN REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF THE MARINE PORTION OF THE TPFDD DATABASE;
      (5) COORDINATING WITH SUPPORTED AND SUPPORTING CINC’S, AS NECESSARY, ON MATTERS RELATED TO TPFDD DATABASE DEVELOPMENT;
      (6) ASSIST IN DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS OF REQUIRED SUPPORTING PLANS.
      (7) COORDINATING WITH CG MEF AS REQUIRED TO RESOLVE ISSUES THAT ARISE DURING PLAN DEVELOPMENT.

7-3 -- Format for a Letter of Instruction (LOI)
Initiating Deliberate Planning (cont.)

7-12
4. ()FORCE EMPLOYMENT GUIDANCE ... (If required, provide specific force employment guidelines based on CMC or component commander’s policy decisions. Such guidance might include reserve force augmentation, reinforcement planning factors, and other amplifying guidance which to assist the MEF in specifying the employment of forces.)
5. ()FORCE DEPLOYMENT GUIDANCE. DEPLOYMENTS WILL BE CONDUCTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE GUIDANCE PROVIDED IN the applicable force deployment SOP. (If required, provide information to amplify the basic guidance contained in th reference.)
6. ()LOGISTIC GUIDANCE. (The MAGTF Commander is tasked to develop a concept of logistics support, from which the component commander can ensure proper sustainment is provided. Also, the following may be included:
   A. IDENTIFICATION OF INTER-SERVICE SUPPORT AND GUIDELINES FOR ENTERING INTO AN INTER-SERVICE SUPPORT AGREEMENT (155A);
   B. APPLICABLE HOST NATION SUPPORT AGREEMENTS OR THE GUIDELINES FOR ENTERING INTO SUCH AGREEMENTS;
   C. JOINT SERVICE LOGISTIC PLANNING FACTORS, POLICIES, OR OTHER DIRECTIVES THAT AFFECT COMPAT SERVICE SUPPORT PLANNING.
7. ()SPECIFIC THFDD DEVELOPMENT PLANNING GUIDANCE. (Provide guidance and instructions which amplify the policies and procedures. Examples of amplifying guidance or instructions are:)
   A. DESIGNATION OF A PLAN IDENTIFICATION (PIE)) DATABASE FOR BUILDING THE FORCES TPFDD;
   B. FORCE MODULES THAT MUST BE CREATED TO FACILITATE DATABASE ANALYSIS.
8. ()PLANNING MILESTONES. (All milestones established by the CINC are identified, included completed action. Also included are the component commander directed milestones.)
9. ()COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS. (Provided will be information sufficient to ensure all commanders and planners know the extent of their tasks and responsibilities. Also, liaison authority and guidance will be provided.)
10. ()REQUEST ACKNOWLEDGE RECEIPT OF THIS LOI. (POC(s) and phone number for subject OPLAN will be provided.)

Figure 7-3 - Format for a Letter of Instruction (LOI)
Initiating Deliberate Planning (cont.)

(b) GENSER message or MCOPSLOG TLCF

(c) A sample CINC LOI is contained at figure 7-3.

(3) CINC’s Strategic Concept. The CINC publishes a strategic concept which outlines the basic elements and taskings necessary to accomplish the assigned mission. This is normally staffed to Service and MARFOR for comment.

   b. Service Headquarters Planning Activities. Issue Service planning guidance developed in the OPLAN working group (format provided at figure 7-2).
c. **Component Planning Activities.** The concept of operations is reviewed and comments are offered on courses of action (COA’s) and the concept of operation. Type commander and Service issues related to availability of forces, force structuring, deployment/employment and any special missions that may be assigned are typical areas of input.

(1) **MARFOR Guidance for Specific Plan.** Within 15 days of receiving the Service guidance and a CINC’s TPFDD LOI the appropriate MARFOR will publish guidance to the assigned MAGTF and supporting forces amplifying the general concepts contained in the Service guidance. It will be tailored specifically for the plan in question as described in the CINC’s strategic concept, TPFDD LOI and planning message.

(2) The plan development LOI will include:

(a) Planning guidance received from higher authority (referencing appropriate traffic).

(b) Planning guidance unique to the operational plan being developed.

(c) Planning guidance for logistics support and sustainment requirements.

(d) A suspense date for identification of those forces required which must be filled from outside the MARFOR.

(e) Tasking the MEF with overall responsibility for the development of the MARFOR portion of the plan.

(3) The MARFOR LOI will normally be entered in the appropriate FMF teleconference.

d. **MEF Commander Planning Activities.** See MAGTF Commander planning activities at paragraph 3e below.

e. **MAGTF Commander Planning Activities**

(1) Development of a sound and complete MAGTF Concept of Operations and Task Organization are the most important step in MAGTF war planning. FMFM 3-1, chapter 1, section IV provides detailed explanation of command and staff actions to follow in developing a Concept of Operations (see appendix F for detailed planning procedures and checklists).

(2) Develop a valid set of assumptions.

(3) Establish, as first cut, the force list required to carry out the Concept of Operations.

(4) Develop a Concept of Logistics Support.
Once the Mission, Concept of Operations, and Concept of Logistics Support are approved, formalize the task organization.

With the support of the MEF, supporting commands, and MSC’s, begin development of force deployment database to support the approved Task Organization.

Develop the Execution Checklist.

Submit proposed Concept of Operations the MEF Commander for review.

4. **Phase III - Plan Development.** The basic plan and supporting annexes are prepared.

   a. **Plan Development Process**

      (1) Force Planning
      (2) Support Planning
      (3) Nuclear Planning
      (4) Transportation Planning
      (5) Identification of Shortfalls
      (6) Transportation Feasibility Analysis
      (7) Plan Refinement
      (8) Plan Documentation

   b. **Sequence of Events During Plan Development**

      (1) **MEF Actions.** Based on the MARFOR LOT information, the MEF commander will designate a MAGTF commander if the designated force is less than MEF size, and publish to his MSC’s and the supporting commanders an LOI for planning for use by the MAGTF.

         (a) This LOI will include unit planning taskings, milestones, assignment of ULN and force module ranges, and points of contact.

         (b) Medium. FMF teleconference

         (c) Sample MEF Plan LOT to be written.

      (2) **MSC’S Develop Force Requirements.** To be written by DC/S Installations and Logistics.

         (a) General
(b) Defining Force Requirements

1 WHO
2 HOW
3 WHEN
4 TOOLS

(3) MAGTF Consolidates and Validates Force Requirements

(a) WHO
(b) TOOLS

(4) MAGTF Develops Sustainment Requirements to Support Force Structure

(a) General
(b) Defining Force Requirements

1 WHO
2 HOW
3 WHEN
4 TOOLS

(5) MAGTF Finalizes Requirements

(6) MAGTF Sources From Organic Assets

(a) General
(b) Sourcing Force Requirements
(c) Development of War Reserve withdrawal Plans
(d) MAGTF Passes Unsourced Requirements to Supporting Establishment

1 Determine Requirements
2 Record in TPFDD

(7) Supporting Establishment Sources Requirements

(a) General
(b) Sourcing From Service Held Stocks

7-16
(c) Sourcing From Other Service Owned Stocks
(d) Unsourced Requirements
(e) Recording in TPFDD

(8) CTNC Freezes TPFDD

(9) Forces/Logistics Conference
   (a) Purpose
   (b) Authority
   (c) Attendees
   (d) Actions

(10) MAGTF Continues TPFDD Refinement
    (a) Considerations
    (b) Update TPFDD

(11) USTRANSCOM Determines Transportation Feasibility

(12) Transportation Conference
    (a) Purpose
    (b) Authority
    (c) Attendance
    (d) Actions

(13) Refinement of Plan

(14) Plan Maintenance

c. Planning Activities
   (1) Joint Planning Activities. The supported CINC prepares
       his operation plan, including the deployment database. See JCS
       Pub 5-02.1, chapter III for a discussion of this phase.

   (2) Service Headquarters Planning Activities. To be written
       by DC/S Plans Policies and Operations.

   (3) MARFOR Planning Activities. Assist Combatant Commander
       with preparation of his operation plan. Review the CINC’s operation
       plan to ensure that the plan is consistent with Marine Corps policies
       and procedures for the deployment and employment of Marine Forces.
Coordinate development of deployment database by supporting commands and organizations outside the MEF.

(4) **MEF Commander Planning Activities**

   (a) Direct/ensure development and refinement of the MAGTF portion of the deployment database by appropriate subordinate MAGTF(s) and MSC’s.

   (b) Direct/ensure development of a Concept Plan (CONPLAN) for the employment and logistic support of the assigned forces.

(5) **MAGTF Commander Planning Activities**

   (a) Develop/refine MAGTF portion of Force Deployment Database.

   (b) Determine/refine required sustainment and enter Time Phased Lift Requirements into Force Deployment Database.

   (c) Develop Concept of Employment of Forces and Logistics Support for "most probable" mission assignment.

(6) **Supporting Establishment Planning Activities**

   (a) **MARCORLOGBASES Planning Activities**

   (b) **MARCORSYSCOM Planning Activities**

   (c) **Base and Station Planning Activities**

(7) **MARRESFOR Planning Activities**

5. **Phase IV - Plan Review.** In this phase, all elements of the supported commander’s Operations Plan are assessed and validated by the CJCS in coordination with the Services. For further discussion of this process, see JCS Pub 5-02.1, chapter IV.

   a. **Joint Planning Activities.** The operation plan is submitted to JCS for review and approval as a contingency plan that satisfies tasking assigned per the JSCP.

      (1) CJCS routes the Plan to the Services, the Joint Staff and Defense agencies for review and comment.

      (2) Upon completion of the review, the plan is returned to the supported commander for incorporation of directed changes, after which, the plan is approved.

   b. **Service Headquarters Planning Activities**

   c. **MARFOR Planning Activities.** Assist HQMC with review of the operation plan as required.

7-18
d. MAGTF Commander Planning Activities

(1) With the assistance of the MEF, supporting commands, and MSC’s, continue refinement of the deployment database.

(2) Continue development of MAGTF CONPLAN.

(3) Assist other operational commanders with preparation of supporting plans as necessary.

e. Supporting Establishment Planning Activities

6. Phase V - Supporting Plans. In this final phase, any required supporting plans are completed, documented, and validated. If required, supporting plans are submitted to the supported commander within 60 days after JCS approval of the basic plan.

a. Joint Planning Activities. The supported commander tasks subordinate components to prepare supporting plans as appropriate. Additionally, these commands may direct their subordinates to prepare supporting plans.


c. MARFOR Planning Activities. Prepare supporting plans as directed.

d. MEF Commander Planning Activities. Coordinate and review the planning activities of the Major Subordinate Commands and any subordinate MAGTF’s and their component elements.

e. MAGTF Commander Planning Activities

(1) If directed, develop a supporting operation plan for submission to the Service Component Commander or Joint Task Force Commander. The MAGTF CONPLAN will serve as the basis for development of this operation plan.

(2) Submit all draft supporting plans to component commander or parent MEF for review.

(3) Upon completion of MARFOR/MEF review, submit supporting plan to the tasking authority. Normally, submission of the supporting plan must occur within 60 days of tasking.

f. Major subordinate Commands (MSC’s) Planning Activities. The MSC’s support the MAGTF Commander by providing technical assistance and expertise in the development of OPLAN’s, OPORD’s, and TPFDD’s. When MEF Subordinate MAGTF’s are activated, the MSC’s provide similar assistance to the appropriate Major Subordinate Elements (MSE’s).

g. Supporting Establishment Planning Activities. To be written by DC/S Installations and Logistics.
7005.  PLAN MAINTENANCE AND CHANGES TO OPERATIONAL PLANS

1. The five phases presented above represent the formal process undertaken biennially. In reality, planning is a repetative process, with no definitive concluding point. Rather, continuous review and refinement of plans is both desirable and necessary. The dynamic nature of world affairs results in few operation plans and their associated TPFDD’s remaining current for the entire two year JSCP planning cycle. As such, the supported commander publishes changes to operation plans which:

   a. Correct errors in the plan that were discovered during an annual review of the plan;
   b. Incorporate changes to the plan, such as changing command relationships, Service force structure changes, the introduction of new weapon systems, etc.
   c. Comply with JCS guidance.

2. The supported commander may require a formal plan maintenance effort to incorporate changes to deployment data that have occurred since the original TPFDD was developed and refined.

   a. Updating force deployment data contained in the supported commander’s OPLAN TPFDD is the exclusive right and responsibility of the supported commander.
   b. Force commands shall not modify existing supported commander’s TPFDD’s without specific direction and/or approval from the supported commander.
   c. The supported commander will publish guidance on plan maintenance activities.
   d. When necessary, MARFOR commanders or their principle planning agents will establish "Working PID’s" which contain only component forces. Anticipated changes to a TPFDD can then be made without changing the original TPFDD. Once updated, the working PID is ready to be merged into the original TPFDD when directed by the supported commander.

3. Figures 7-4 through 7-8 identify the five phases of Deliberate Planning and various tasks to be completed during each of the planning agencies which has the Lead (L), provides Support (S), or Monitors (M) the Action. Figure 7-9 depicts roles and authority in various echelons of warplanning.

   a. Only one headquarters or command element may have the lead role. The lead for those tasks wherein both a MEF and the MAGTF are tasked as L/S will be determined by the MARFOR commander.
b. When a MAGTF smaller than a MEF is tasked within the deliberate planning process as lead, it should only be done in the context of a MEF (Forward).
### Phase I: Initiation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>HQMC</th>
<th>MARFOR</th>
<th>MEF</th>
<th>MEF MSE</th>
<th>MAGTF</th>
<th>LOGBASES</th>
<th>SYSCOM</th>
<th>RESFOR</th>
<th>BASES/STATIONS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prepare Service Planning Guidance, including logistics planning</td>
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<tr>
<td>Analyze Supported CINC requirements for MARFOR forces at the</td>
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<td>L</td>
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<td>beginning of the deliberate planning process to establish MAGTF</td>
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<td>Prepare planning guidance Letter of Instruction (LOI) assigning</td>
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<td>planning responsibilities, defining operational command and</td>
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<td>Coordinate with CINC on component matters (doctrine, unit</td>
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<td>capabilities, special requirements, etc) during plan initiation</td>
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Legend:
- L = Lead
- S = Provides Support
- M = Monitors Action
- C = Coordinates

Figure 7-4 -- Phase I - Initiation
## Phase II: Concept Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>HQMC</th>
<th>MARFOR</th>
<th>MEF</th>
<th>MEF MSE</th>
<th>MAGTF</th>
<th>LOGRASSE</th>
<th>SYSCOM</th>
<th>RESFOR</th>
<th>BASES/STATIONS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Analyze the mission assigned by the senior operational commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>(supported CINC, Naval Component Commander, or JTF Commander)</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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<td>to ensure clarity of the senior commander's intent to develop</td>
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<td>planning tasks for subordinates. Develop valid assumptions for</td>
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<td>Issue Commander's planning guidance to assist MAGTF staff, MEF MSE</td>
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<td>staffs, and supporting staffs in development of Staff Estimates</td>
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<td>Commander's Estimate, and Concept of Operations.</td>
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<td>Prepare Course of Action to satisfy mission requirements.</td>
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<td>Prepare Staff Estimates of Supportability for each Course of Action.</td>
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<td>Prepare Commander's Estimate and recommend Course of Action</td>
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<td>to accomplish assigned mission.</td>
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<td>Brief Commanding General on the Commander's Estimate and</td>
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<td>Courses of Action. Seek CO's guidance and approval for</td>
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<td>Develop Concept of Operations based on CO's guidance and selected</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Legend:**
- L = Lead
- S = Provides Support
- M = Monitors Action
- C = Coordinates

---

**Figure 7-5 -- Phase II - Concept Development**
### Phase III: Plan Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>HQMC</th>
<th>MARFOR</th>
<th>MEF</th>
<th>MEF</th>
<th>MAGTF</th>
<th>LOGBASES</th>
<th>SYSCOM</th>
<th>RESPOR</th>
<th>BASES/STATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prepare and distribute the Letter Transmittal for the Concept of Operations to ensure all planning elements understand the Concept of Operations for the plan.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L/S</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop an Annex A (Task Organization) based on the mission requirements and the Concept of Operations.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prepare initial concept for the deployment of the force that is consistent with the Concept of Operations. Include sufficient information on the time planning and routing of the deploying forces from their origin to their destination.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop UNL Force Record structure for the TPM-DD.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Using the MAGTF Warehousing System II/MDSS II/JOPES, develop force record data (personnel and equipment detail info) for force units/detachments specified in the Task Organization.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Using MAGTF II/MDSS II and other appropriate specified methodologies or tools, develop a maintenance requirements list for the force units/detachments specified in the Task Organization.</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Transfer force/maintenance record output data obtained from the MAGTF II/MDSS II to a JOPES database.</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>In JOPES enter time-phased routing data for each UNL force record based on the concept of deployment. Include mode and source data for each transportation leg from origin to destination.</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify the portion of the DoD DSS of MAGTF maintenance which can be sourced from the MSC's supply assets.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop concept of logistics support which specifies the time planning, modes and source for movement, and routing of CSS units DoD DSS of MAGTF maintenance, the requirements for HNS, and resupply support provided for CSS units.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L/S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Using MAGTF II compute DoD DSS of MAGTF maintenance for all classes of supply less aviation peculiar items such as Class W(A), V(A), and IX(A). MAGTF II or FWR models used to compute requirements.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Using MAGTF II prepare initial concept for Class W(W) requirements which identifies the number of DOA at assault and sustained rates. Compute V(W) requirements based on the concept of employment for entire MAGTF.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Legend:
- L = Lead
- S = Supports
- M = Monitors Action
- C = Coordinates

Figure 7-6 — Phase III - Plan Development
### Phase III: Plan Development (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>HQMC</th>
<th>MARFOR</th>
<th>MEF</th>
<th>MEF MSE</th>
<th>MAGTF</th>
<th>LOGBASES</th>
<th>SYBCOM</th>
<th>RESFOR</th>
<th>BASES/STATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Using MAGTF II Enter the 60 DOS of JOPES sustainment into the TP/FDD ensuring that the data is consistent with the initial concept for planning and routing of supplies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source that portion of the 60 DOS of MAGTF sustainment that cannot be sourced from MSC supply assets. Identify sustainment requirements that must be provided by sources external to MARFOR.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Using the JOPES MPM, develop the MEDAVAC and RETURNS TO DUTY personnel replacement requirements. Include the time planning and routing data for these personnel. Enter the data into the JOPES TP/FDD.</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>ID force shortfalls to be filled from outside force.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L/S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Coordinate sourcing of forces from outside force.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Run the WRS to compute sustainment requirements for supply to sustain the force beyond the initial 60 DOS of sustainment computed previously.</td>
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<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source sustainment requirements from force-held assets to the maximum extent possible.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pass withdrawal plans to MARCORLOGBASES for sourcing.</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pass unsourced Class V/W requirements to MARCORSYS/COM for sourcing.</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>M</td>
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<td>S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source unsourced sustainment requirements from service held or service owned stocks. Using MAGTF II/JOPES, frag and insert ULNs to reflect this sourcing.</td>
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<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
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<tr>
<td>Source unsourced Class V/W requirements from SMCA service owned stocks. Using MAGTF II/JOPES, frag and insert ULNs to reflect this sourcing.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Document force and supply shortfalls in preparation for the TP/FDD refinement conference.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Analyze TP/FDD using JOPES reports to verify personnel and equipment throughout at POEs and PODs, to check MAGTF movement requirements by amphibious, AMC, CINC with hold shipping, and MTMC; + check accuracy of force records.</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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</table>

**Legend:**
- L = Lead
- S = Provides Support
- M = Monitors Action
- C = Coordinates

Figure 7-6 — Phase III - Plan Development (cont.)
### Phase III: Plan Development (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
<th>HQMC</th>
<th>MARFOR</th>
<th>MEF</th>
<th>MEF</th>
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<th>LOGBASIS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conduct MARFOR/MAGTF CE Pre-Force/Logistics refinement conference to</td>
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<tr>
<td>coordinate Force Positions on deployment of MAGTF, to adjust TPFDD</td>
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<td>as needed, to review key JOPEX reports which detail force deployment,</td>
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<td>Attend supported CINC TPFDD Force/Logistics Conference.</td>
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<td>Take appropriate action to resolve planning and database issues</td>
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<td>resulting from the Force/Logistics Conference.</td>
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<td>Review existing planning guidance LOA/ILMO and adjust as necessary to</td>
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<td>keep planning cycle consistent with CINC's pre-Force/Logistics</td>
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<td>Conference wrap-up report.</td>
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Figure 7-6 -- Phase III - Plan Development (cont.)
### Phase IV: Plan Review

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<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
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<th>MARFOR</th>
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<th>MEF</th>
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<th>LOUBASES</th>
<th>SYSCOM</th>
<th>RESPOR</th>
<th>BASES/STATIONS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prepare documentation as directed by higher operational command HQ for inclusion in CINC or JTF plan.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review drafts of CINC and/or JTF draft plans to ensure their plans will be consistent with USMC doctrine and operational concepts.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide support as required to higher headquarters during JCS review of CINC's plan. Support HQMC during the JCS directed service review of CINC's plan.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support CINC as required to make plan adjustments by JCS review.</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Review JTF and/or Naval Component CIC's planning guidance LOB for preparation of their supporting plan to ensure the MAGTF mission, the broad concept of employment, support requirements, etc., are consistent with MEF command policy.</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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**Legend:**
- L = Lead
- S = Provides Support
- M = Monitors Action
- C = Coordinates

Figure 7-7 — Phase IV - Plan Review
### Phase V: Supporting Plans

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TASKS</th>
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<th>MARFOR</th>
<th>MEF</th>
<th>MEP MSE</th>
<th>MAGTF</th>
<th>LOGBASES</th>
<th>SYSCOM</th>
<th>RESFOR</th>
<th>BASES/STATIONS</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Review JTF and/or Naval Component commander planning guidance LOI for preparing of supporting plans to ensure MARFOR requirements are clearly specified and consistent with MAGTF employment concepts and policy.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support JTF and/or Naval Component commander as required during preparation of their supporting plans, i.e., preparation of resources/resource.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prepare LOI for preparation of the MAGTF supporting plan. Establish milestones, to include MARFOR review, in conformance with JTF or Naval Component directives/milestones.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Prepare MAGTF supporting plan IAW higher HQ directives.</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Conduct MAGTF CE review of MAGTF supporting plan.</td>
<td>M</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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<td>L/S</td>
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<tr>
<td>Submit and brief supporting plan to MARFOR. After CG's review of the plan, submit the plan to the appropriate headquarters.</td>
<td>S</td>
<td>L/S</td>
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Legend:
- L = Lead
- S = Provides Support
- M = Monitors Action
- C = Coordinates

Figure 7-8 -- Phase V - Supporting Plan Development
FLEET MARINE FORCE COMMANDERS/COMPONENT COMMANDERS

* Perform Force Commander tasks relating to general planning, directing and coordinating the operations, training, administration, deployment, and logistics support to assigned forces.

* Performs Service Component Commander tasks. Service component commander functions pertain to FMF force relationships with the unified Commanders.

* Performs Type Commander tasks. Type Commander functions pertain to FMF relationships with Fleet Commander.

* Performs Operational tasks. Operational functions relate to the deployment and employment of forces.

COMMAND ELEMENT. MEF

* The MEF is the principal warfighting organization of the Force.

MEF MSC’s

* MEF Major Subordinate Commands (MSC’s) are Marine Division, Marine Aircraft Wing, Force Service Support Group, and Surveillance, Reconnaissance, Intelligence Group. Their primary mission is to train and source combat, combat support, and combat service support forces to unified and Fleet Commanders, when directed by the MEF.

COMMAND ELEMENTS, MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNITS

* The command elements of the MEU’s are part of FMF’s rotational base of forces that deploy as Landing Force of a numbered fleet e.g. Sixth Fleet (LF6F).

BASES AND STATIONS

* COMMARFORLANT/PAC have authority to direct and coordinate the activities of bases and stations in those matters pertaining to the deployment of assigned forces during major exercises and actual commitments.

Figure 7-9 -- Roles and Authorities in War
## CHAPTER 8

### CRISIS ACTION PLANNING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAGRAPH</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PURPOSE</td>
<td>8000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL</td>
<td>8001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOINT GUIDANCE FOR CRISIS ACTIONS PLANNING</td>
<td>8002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCEDURES</td>
<td>8003</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### FIGURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8-1</td>
<td>8-4</td>
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</table>

8-1
8000. **PURPOSE.** This chapter provides guidance for the execution of Crisis Action/Time Sensitive planning procedures within the Marine Corps. Crisis Action planning is covered in greater detail in Joint Pub 5-03.1. In this publication Crisis Action and Time Sensitive planning are synonymous. Time sensitive planning is generally thought of as operations planning for rapid support in the absence of military crisis.

8001. **GENERAL**

1. Crisis Action planning (CAP) defines the process used by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CINC’s, Services, and defense agencies to develop timely recommendations and implement the decisions of the NCA concerning the deployment and employment of military forces. Crisis Action/Time Sensitive planning ensures:

   a. Logical and rapid exchange of information.

   b. Timely preparation of military courses of action for consideration by the NCA (including force deployment plans as appropriate) and may also ensure military support to agencies as directed by the NCA.

   c. NCA decisions are relayed to the CINC(s) and that those decisions are promptly executed.

2. Joint Pub 5-03.1 presents Crisis Action planning as being sequentially accomplished in a six-phase process. However, no time line is established for the planning sequence. Rather, the speed of transition from one phase to another depends on the tasks to be accomplished and the time available.

3. Joint Pub 5-03.1 accommodates the command and staff procedures outlined in FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action.

4. Command responsibilities regarding TPFDD development in Crisis Action/Time Sensitive Planning parallel those prescribed for deliberate planning; refer to figure 7-4 through 7-8 in chapter 7.

8002. **JOINT GUIDANCE FOR CRISIS ACTIONS PLANNING**

1. Although Joint Pub 5-03.1 JOPES Planning Policies and Procedures Vol I distinguishes between single and multiple crises, this manual will address only single crisis procedures. Procedures unique to multiple crises may be reviewed in chapter V of the Joint Pub.
2. Planners must remember that Crisis Action/Time Sensitive planning phases are not rigid steps requiring rote compliance regardless of circumstances. Rather, they must remain a flexible means of coordinating staff action. In certain situations, phases may be compressed, conducted concurrently, or eliminated altogether.

3. During all phases, the WWMCCS intercomputer network (WIN) will play a key role in the rapid collation and dissemination of information for decision making. Additional information on the use of the WIN during Crisis Action/Time Sensitive planning is provided in chapter 4.

4. The WWMCCS will also provide the capability to develop a timely and concurrent joint force deployment database for evaluation by the NCA and JCS. Procedural use of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) functions of WWMCCS are detailed in JOPES/JDS Procedure Manuals.

Figure 8-1 -- Crisis Action Procedures
5. Actions accomplished during deliberate planning may facilitate a timely response during Crisis Action planning. During a crisis, existing OPLAN’s and CONPLAN’s, as well as any associated TPFDD’s, may be expanded or otherwise modified to more rapidly develop OPORD’s and deploy forces. Phases of Crisis Action Planning are illustrated below in figure 8-1.

8003. CRISIS ACTION PLANNING PROCEDURES

1. **Phase I: Situation Development.** Begins with an event having possible national security implications and ends with the report of the event to the NCA and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When notified of the developing situation, activities within the FMF and subordinate commands include the following:

   a. Establishment of Crisis Action Centers (CAC) and activation of Crisis Action Teams (CAT).

   b. MARFOR commander requests permission to participate in the WIN Teleconference (TLCF) established by the supported CINC for the crisis. Permission will be requested for all appropriate component commands.

   c. Component commands possessing WWMCCS capability monitor the established crisis TLCF. As a backup, and as an internal component information exchange capability, the component TLCF will be monitored.

   d. Review applicable OPLAN deployment databases in preparation for refinement.

2. **Phase II: Crisis Assessment.** Begins with a report from the supported commander and ends with a decision by the NCA or the Joint Chiefs of Staff to direct development of possible military courses of action. Activities at Force and subordinate commands include the following:

   a. Coordination with higher, adjacent, and lower commands to confirm command POC’s, CAT Secure Voice Communications, backup radio communications, and WWMCCS availability.

   b. Activation of Crisis Action Teams.

   c. The component CAC ensures all essential planning information has been provided to subordinate commands; such as, the JCS Warning Order, Commander’s Assessments, intelligence reports, and critical OPREP’s.

   d. CG MEF designates the MAGTF commander if appropriate, and directs/ensures MSC support.

8-5
3. **Phase III: Course of Action Development.** Begins with a decision to develop possible military COA’s, normally transmitted by a JCS WARNING ORDER and ends when COA’s are presented to the NCA. Component command activities are as follows:

   a. Warning Order(s) received from higher authority.

   b. The component commander may publish additional guidance covering many of the topics addressed during deliberate planning.

   c. MAGTF begins developing COA’s, a concept of operations and task organization to support the overall mission and the supported CINC’s concept of operations. For planning, the MAGTF is authorized direct liaison with senior and adjacent operational commands.

   d. Refinement of a JOPES Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) database is initiated. The MAGTF commander has ultimate responsibility for development of the TPFDD. However, MEF MSC’s and supporting commands provide the bulk of the support for TPFDD development. Chapter 6 provides conceptual details for use of Marine Corps planning systems to develop the TPFDD.

4. **Phase IV: Course of Action Selection.** Begins when COA’s are presented to the NCA and ends when a COA is selected.

   a. Primary activity in this phase of crisis planning rests with the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NCA.

   b. Activities as described in Phases II and III continue. If applicable, the component commander issues a Planning Directive.

   c. The designated MAGTF, with support from MEF, supporting commands, and the MSC’s, continues to develop a concept of operations, refines plans and updates the deployment database.

5. **Phase V: Execution Planning.** Begins when a PLANNING ORDER or an ALERT ORDER is received and ends when a decision is made to execute an operation order (OPORD). Component command activities include:

   a. The component commander ensures the Alert Order is received by the MEF, the MAGTF commander, supporting commands, and MSCs.

   b. MAGTF commander submits his Concept of Operations and Task Organization to MARFOR via MEF (if appropriate) for review.

   c. CG MEF and COMMARFOR review the Concept of Operations and task organization and provide further guidance if necessary.

   d. The MAGTF, with support from the MEF, supporting commands, and the MSC’s, continues to update the deployment database. The deploying MAGTF commander issues guidance and approves all changes to his deployment database.
e. Planning assumptions are replaced with facts.

f. Review and update execution checklist.

g. The MAGTF commander and his subordinate commands prepare and issue their operation orders.

h. All units participating in the operation make final preparations for deployment.

6. Phase VI: Execution. Begins with the decision to execute an OPORD, normally transmitted by a JCS EXECUTE ORDER, and continues until the crisis is resolved. Functions include:

a. Deployment of the MAGTF in support of the supported commander’s OPORD.

b. The deploying MAGTF and supporting MSC commanders monitor and update the deployment database in accordance with JOPES procedures and the supported CINC’s instructions. This includes timely entry of ULN allocation to carriers to reflect load planning. ULN allocation normally is entered within 8 hours of receipt of carrier schedules from USCINCTRANS and/or supporting/supported CINC, but always 24 hours prior to arrival of the carrier at the POE.

c. If Marine forces are acting as JTF’s, MARFOR commanders should request the supported CINC direct all movement activity in support of the operation be reflected in JOPES. This provides commanders better visibility of both strategic and theater lift available. Without this formal request, much of a commander’s flexibility in force deployment remains hidden hampering his control over deploying units.
CHAPTER 9
MARINE CORPS RESERVE AND FORCE ACTIVATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAGRAPH</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>9000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL</td>
<td>9001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE ACTIVATION CONCEPT</td>
<td>9002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FORCE PLANNING RESPONSIBILITY WITHIN THE MARINE CORPS</td>
<td>9003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCES AVAILABLE</td>
<td>9004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS</td>
<td>9005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE ACTIVATION TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES</td>
<td>9006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXPANSION OF THE ACTIVE FORCE</td>
<td>9007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSIGNMENT OF NAVY PERSONNEL TO ACTIVE AND RESERVE UNITS</td>
<td>9008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOBILIZATION</td>
<td>9009</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

9-1
9000. **INTRODUCTION.** Reserve (SMCR) units, Individual Ready Reserve (IRR’s), and retirees are activated and deactivated. It summarizes the detailed information provided in the Marine Corps Mobilization Plan (MPLAN), and includes a brief summary of the mobilization authorities, the organization of the Marine Corps Reserve, and the role of reserve forces. It provides procedures on the steps required to activate and deactivate SMCR units, IRR’s, and retirees. Finally, it addresses coordinating actions necessary to ensure the Navy activates appropriate Navy personnel to support USMC forces (active and reserve).

9001. **GENERAL.** The term which includes all the activation options; Presidential Selected Reserve Call-up (PSRC) and any of the four categories of mobilization as codified in 10 USC.

9002. **FORCE ACTIVATION CONCEPT**

1. **Total Force Concept.** The Marine Corps as a total force consists of active forces, reserve forces, retired personnel, and civilian personnel. The Marine Corps Reserve provides trained and qualified units and individuals to be available for active duty in time of war to reinforce and augment, national emergency, and at such other times as national security may require.

2. **Mobilization Authorities**

   a. The term "force activation" options consists of:

   (1) Secretarial authority, Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC) and any of the four categories of mobilization (selective, partial, full, and total) defined in Joint Pub 1-02.

   (2) Secretarial authority, PSRC and the four categories of mobilization encompasses force activation options which provide the necessary level of manpower and material needed for war or national emergency. Mobilization categories and legal authorities have been established that allow for an incremental or graduated buildup.

   (3) The Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) is the ongoing process of providing a viable deterrent capability in order to meet a crisis/contingency at the lowest possible level. It is considered that Presidential Call-Up would occur first, with greater expansion dependent on the crisis’ impact on the security needs of the Nation.
b. Since the passage of the National Emergencies Act of 1976, the President can invoke selective authorities without declaration of a national emergency and without citing all authorities which will be necessary at the time the emergency is declared.

c. In a situation of rising tension, the Secretary of Defense with the advice and recommendation of the Military Department Secretaries and JCS, will recommend to the President the required level of mobilization. The level of authority is based upon the nature of the emergency or degree of mobilization deemed appropriate. The terms of service extension for active duty personnel (Stop-Loss) and requirements for activation of Reserves are some of the influencing factors.

d. The nature of Reserve personnel resources is consistent with this approach. The SMCR and Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) programs provide both organized units and individuals that are trained and equipped to allow for prompt response. The IRR contains pretrained individual manpower assets which can provide casualty replacements, fill critical wartime billets, or provide personnel for Force expansion.

e. Secretarial Authority

(1) The Service Secretaries may involuntarily order Selected Reserves to active duty for up to 15 days under 10 USC 672b. This authority is normally used for ordering Reserves to annual training and its 15 day limit makes it an option of limited utility for crisis response.

(2) The Service Secretaries may order a member of a Reserve Component under his jurisdiction to active duty or retain him/her on active duty with the consent of the member under 10 USC 672d. This authority is normally used for ordering Reserves to active duty work on special projects for 179 consecutive days or less. There is some utility within the authorization that can be applied to the SMCR, (i.e., Civil Affairs in support of operational objectives). This authority is likely to be used for mobilizing limited numbers of volunteers prior to partial or full mobilization.

(3) The Marine Corps Retired manpower pool is an integral part of the Total Force which can play a vital role in our mobilization and contingency plans. Retirees are available under 10 USC 688 (involuntary recall authority) for any purpose without any specific duration. Retirees can be designated as preassigned or non-preassigned on Wartime Series T/O’s. Preassigned Retirees participate on a voluntary basis without compensation, until mobilization.

f. Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up

(1) Although not a category of inobilization, PSRC has become synonymous with the term. The original intent of the PSRC was to provide forces to facilitate mobilization, send a clear signal to an
adversary and, if necessary, serve as a precursor to mobilization. Through changes to the law, increases in the number available under this authority (200,000), have made significant forces available which have undoubtedly contributed to the widespread misuse of PSRC as a mobilization category (as defined in Joint Pub 1-02).

(2) Sometimes referred to as the "200K Call-Up", this option is available to the President through 10 USC 673b to recall up to 200,000 selected Reservists to active duty for a period of 90 days without declaring a national emergency. An extension of 90 days may be authorized. The Marine Corps apportionment of the 200,000 authorization is contained in Annex N of the JSCP.

(3) Each Service’s apportionment of the 200K is determined through Service/Joint Staff action based on review of the CINC’s OPLAN’s requiring Reserve forces.

(4) Based upon its first use in the Persian Gulf conflict of 1990-91, this is likely to be the first response level used when the employment of the Total Force is determined by the National Command Authority (NCA) to be in the best interest of the Nation.

g. Mobilization Categories

(1) Selective Mobilization. A limited expansion of the active forces from action by the Congress (10 USC 672) or the President (10 USC 673). This level of mobilization is designed to provide additional units and individuals for domestic emergencies that do not involve a threat to national security.

(2) Partial Mobilization. An expansion of the active forces resulting from action by the president (10 USC 673) or Congress (10 USC 672) in response to an external threat. The President’s authority within Title 10 upon his declaration of a national emergency allows and may require involuntary recall of up to 1,000,000 Ready Reservists (selected and individual Reservists) for up to 24 months.

(3) Full Mobilization. An expansion of the active forces by the Congress and the President within existing force structure. This level of mobilization provides for recall of SMCR units, Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA’s), IRR’s, standby Reservists, and retirees (10 USC 672, 674, 675) for the duration of the war or emergency and for 6 months thereafter.

(4) Total Mobilization. An expansion of the active forces by the Congress and the President to generate additional units beyond the existing force structure.

h. Mobilization decisions by the NCA are governed and based upon recommendations forwarded to the JCS from the combatant commanders tasked to execute specific OPLANs or missions. In making the decision to mobilize, the NCA considers the effects on civilian manpower industrial preparedness, transportation, material equipment/facility
requirements, medical support, host-nation support, training expansion, command and control (C2), and funding.

3. Mobilization Procedures

a. Mobilization Planning

(1) The Marine Corps mobilization process supports current CINC OPLAN’s. Input from CG FMFLant and CG FMFPac to CMC (PL) identifies the augmentation/reinforcement requirements of the MEF’s to include deployment support from the Provisional Support Battalions (PSB’s). Supporting the CINC OPLANs is the primary focus which drives the need for individual manpower fillers for those committed active/Reserve units. The rapid buildup of the supporting establishment during mobilization is aided by the call-up of preassigned IRR’s/retired Marines and IMA’s.

(2) The Marine Corps mobilization process is tailored to support current combatant command OPLAN’s. Input from the COMMARFOR’s to CMC (PL) identify augmentation and reinforcement requirements for the supported MAGTF’s. Concurrently, deployment support requirements for the Provisional Support Battalions (PSB’s) will also be identified. The rapid build-up of the supporting establishment during mobilization will be accomplished by use of IMA’s, pre-assigned IRR’s, and pre-assigned retired Marines. Anticipated individual manpower requirements for the committed active and reserve units will determine the numbers and kinds of individual fillers necessary to support the particular OPLAN.

b. Mobilization Concept

(1) Mobilization is a time-phased process directed by NCA. The Marine Corps Crisis Response Cell (expanded in times of crises) at HQMC (PP&O) releases the mobilization order when authorized to do so. Additional information on actions by HQMC Departments and Divisions is contained in MPLAN Vol II.

(2) Each SMCR unit is assigned to a Station of Initial Assignment (SIA) when mobilized. The SIA provides support services for processing the Reserve unit(s) prior to shift in control from MARRESFOR to the gaining command. Preparations to assimilate SMCR units should make it possible for the gaining command to immediately involve the unit in pre-deployment training/operations. In any event, it is expected that the transition period during which time the Mobilization Processing Center (MPC) is supporting SMCR units will be no more than 2-3 days.

(3) Mobilization orders authorize CG MARRESFOR to mobilize specific SMCR units. Each unit moves to its assigned SIA via prearranged transportation plans. Units mobilized will take their training allowances to the SIA.

9-6
(4) There are nine SIA’s. The number of sites actually tasked with performing SIA functions will depend on the scope of the contingency. Some SMCR units (notably aviation) may be directed to bypass an SIA and deploy directly into theater.

(5) Operational sponsors will request the activation of those preassigned personnel (IMA’s, IRR’s, or retired Marines) in support of mobilization contingencies based upon the scope of the contingency and level of mobilization authorized. Requests to activate IMA’s, IRR’s, and retired Marines will be forwarded to CMC (MPP). Upon CMC (M&RA) approval, individual activation orders will be issued via mailgram by CMC (MMOS).

(6) When directed, IMA’s will be ordered from home to their gaining command. IMA’s are authorized to process through a Marine Corps Mobilization Station (MCMS) if they are unable to secure transportation to the gaining command. All IRRs, Standby Reserves and retired Marines will process through a MCMS. From the MCMS, they will be ordered to the SIA to complete processing and any required predeployment training prior to joining the gaining command.

(7) When directed by CMC, CG MARRESFOR activates the MCMS’s to conduct initial administrative processing of individual reservists/retired Marines, perform site maintenance, and provide limited family assistance duties. After initial individual processing, transportation to the SIA is arranged. Upon arrival at the SIA, mobilized Marines undergo final processing.

(8) When directed by CMC, bases designated as SIA’s support incoming Reserve personnel in the orderly accession to an active duty command. The MPC’s complete administrative processing of mobilized personnel, screen for disqualification, and provide liaison necessary to facilitate:

(a) Orderly reception and processing of personnel and equipment

(b) Storage/accounting of equipment arriving from Marine Corps Logistics Bases (MCLB’s)

(c) Uniting personnel/units with their gaining commands

(9) Individual replacement personnel (Active and Reserve) will be formed into Combat Replacement Companies (CRC’s) to function as trained replacement pools for late movement to the theater of operations. CRC’s will have a fixed T/E that will be held in the War Reserve System (WRS). When directed by CMC, SIA’s will activate and form CRC’s and COMMARCORLOGBASES will ship T/E equipment to the SIA.

   c. Specific tasks associated with the mobilization process can be reviewed in Section 2002 of MPLAN Vol I.
1. Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations (DC/S PP&O), HQMC, has overall staff cognizance for Marine Corps Total Force mobilization planning and execution.

2. Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs (DC/S M&RA), HQMC, has staff cognizance to ensure that systems and procedures are established to provide individual manpower to "flesh out" Active and Reserve units and the supporting establishment. This requirement will be driven by the level of mobilization directed by the NCA.

3. Deputy Chief of Staff for Installation and Logistics (DC/S, I&L), HQMC, is responsible for assessing the capability to equip and sustain deploying MAGTF's, and supporting the increased base support actions during mobilization.

> CH 1 4. COMMARFORS have primary responsibility for providing Marine forces and the appropriate time phased force and deployment data to the supported unified commander; identifying SMCR unit requirements; and planning for SMCR unit reception.

>CH 1 5. COMMARFORRES (4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 4th Force Service Support Group, and MCRSC) is responsible for training, organizing, and equipping the Ready Reserve; and for development and maintenance of accurate unit information utilizing standard Marine Corps planning systems (chapter 5 and appendix G discuss standard systems).

6. COMMARCORLOGBASES, Albany has primary responsibility for managing the Marine Corps' War Reserve Program (ground equipment and material); coordinating time-phased shipments with the Force Commanders; and coordinating transportation for movement of time-phased shipments through the US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM).

7. Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation (DC/S, AVN), HQMC, has staff cognizance to ensure that Navy systems, procedures, and support are developed to support the deployment, employment, and sustainment of Marine aviation.

9004. FORCES AVAILABLE. The process for planning the deployment of operating forces requires deliberate consideration of all the sources of manpower available within the Marine Corps. The base point from which to quantify the manpower needs begins with the current Marine Corps active duty strength. Expansion beyond the base point is predicated upon selectively drawing additional units and manpower from the Reserve and Retiree manpower pools based upon Secretarial Call-up,
Presidential Call-up or one of the four categories of mobilization (Selective, Partial, Full and Total). The following forces are available to augment and reinforce the active forces:

1. 4th Marine Division (SMCR)
2. 4th Marine Aircraft Wing (SMCR)
3. 4th FSSG (SMCR)
4. Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA)
5. Individual Ready Reserve (IRR)
6. Standby Reserve
7. Retirees (Includes Regular and Reserve)

>CH 1 DELETED PARA 9005; PARA 9006, PAGES 9-10 – 9-11; PARA 9007, PAGE 9-11; PARA 9008, PAGES 9-12 – 9-13; PARA 9009, PAGE 9-14
9006. **FORCE ACTIVATION TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES**

1. Upon notification of authority from the Secretary of the Navy, CMC (PP&O) will order execution for mobilization within the level authorized by the NCA.

2. **CMC (PP&O/M&RA)**
   a. Issue mobilization administration and policy guidance.
   b. Direct CG MARRESFOR to execute mobilization per the President’s Call-Up Order or the level of mobilization authorized.

3. **CG FMFLANT and CG FMFPAC**
   a. Ensure that comprehensive plans provide for the reception of Marine Reserve forces gained through mobilization.
   b. Ensure procedures are established for withdrawal of Prepositioned War Reserve (PWR).
   c. Maintain coordination with CG’s and CO’s of Stations of Initial Assignment (SIA’s) to ensure optimal outloading for deploying units.

4. **CG’s and CO’s of Stations of Initial Assignment (SIA’s)**
   a. When directed by CMC, activate the Mobilization Processing Center (MPC) to provide for the reception and expeditious processing of Reserve forces.
   b. Maintain liaison with the appropriate Force Commander to coordinate arrival of Reserve Forces, equipment and PWR.
   c. Coordinate with the nearest Personnel Support Detachment (PSD) to provide Navy administrative processing.

5. **Mobilization of Navy Reserve Personnel**
   a. CMC (RA) will request mobilization of Navy Reserve personnel in support of SMCR units to the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO).
   b. CNO tasks the Chief of Naval Reserve Forces (CNRF) to take activation action.
   c. CNRF directs the geographical Readiness Command (REDCOM) to take activation action.
   d. REDCOM tasks the applicable Naval Reserve Center to recall and process the Navy Reserves (NAVRES).
   e. Unit Commanders will provide a list of NAVRES shortfalls by number and Naval Enlisted Classification (NEC) to the gaining command
via appropriate channels during the SIA period. Fillers will be provided by the SIA’s current assets or requested from the CNRF.

f. T/E equipment for supporting NAVRES is to be issued prior to movement to the SIA or taken to the SIA if NAVPERS are required to meet the unit at the SIA.

9007. EXPANSION OF THE ACTIVE FORCES

1. Expansion of the Marine Corps’ operating forces and supporting establishment requires readily available forces. Upon receipt of proper authority, the Marine Corps will call up units and recall individuals to fulfill the requirement.

2. Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC). (Not a level of mobilization) provides the NCA with the means to activate a limited number of Reserve forces without declaring a national emergency. This Call-Up Authority has particular utility in situations where the escalatory signals of partial or full mobilization would not be in the best interest of national security. Forces made available by the Presidential Call-Up provide a tailored, limited response, or serve as a precursor to mobilization.

a. CMC (PP&O) will immediately notify the CG MARRESFOR (4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 4th Force Service Support Group, and MCRSC) of the SMCR units being activated under the Presidential Call-Up Authority. The CG will ensure expeditious notification and reporting of these units to their training centers for subsequent transportation to their designated SIA.

b. IMA’s will report in compliance with mailgram orders.

3. Should expansion beyond PSRC be needed, upon receipt of proper authority specifying the category of mobilization, the Marine Corps will call up units and recall individuals to fulfill the requirement. The process is similar to PSRC except that now pretrained individual manpower (PIMs) is also an available resource.

a. CMC (PP&O) will immediately notify the CG MARRESFOR (4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, 4th Force Service Support Group, and MCRSC) by the most expeditious means of those SMCR units to be mobilized. Units will report to their training center in preparation for onward movement to designated SIA’s. The administrative requirements to bring the unit to active duty will be accomplished at the unit level at the training center. Upon arrival at the SIA, the MPC’s will validate and complete unit processing as needed.

b. Based on the category of mobilization authorized and legal authorities invoked, individuals from such categories as the IRR, retired, and Standby Reserve may be recalled to active duty. Complying with their notification to report for active duty (mailgram), these individuals will travel to the designated
Marine Corps Mobilization Station (MCMS) as indicated in their mailgram orders and be expeditiously processed to the designated SIA.

c. At the SIA, activated units and/or individuals will be assimilated into the active forces and deployment from CONUS will be established by the appropriate FMF Commander.

4. **Unit Replacements.** Replacement units will be provided by CMC from the following assets when available:

   a. Active duty units not allocated to a CINC.

   b. SMCR units that are part of a residual of the CG MARRESFOR.

   c. Newly formed replacement units.

5. **Individual Replacements.** The main source of replacements will be via a centralized individual replacement system. CMC (M&RA) will push projected replacement manpower to replacement staging areas on each coast. FMF Headquarters request replacement personnel from the Replacement Pool Managers. Movement of replacements will be via Personnel Increment Numbers (PIN’s) established by the CINC and FMF Headquarters/Service component. This system is explained in detail in the MPLAN Vol I.

9008. **ASSIGNMENT OF NAVY PERSONNEL TO ACTIVE AND RESERVE UNITS**

1. **General.** Direct Navy personnel support of the FMF may be divided into three categories depending upon what command in the Navy provides the support. While all support is ultimately provided by the Chief of Naval Operations, there are three Navy commands which manage various Navy personnel. The Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery provides all medical personnel to support contingencies/mobilization requirements for the three active MEF’s. The Naval Reserve Personnel Center provides non-medical requirements for the three MEF’s. Additionally, all Navy support for 4th MarDiv, 4th MAW and 4th FSSG is provided by the Commander, Naval Reserve Force (COMNAVRESFOR).

2. **Navy Manpower Authorization.** The Navy Manpower Authorization (OPNAV Form 1000/2) is the definitive document on Navy personnel support (medical and non-medical) for the Marine Corps. It is essentially the Marine Corps’ T/O equivalent, providing an inventory of peacetime and mobilization billets. This document is maintained by CMC (MPC-59) and distributed to CG FMFPAC, CG FMFLANT, and all subordinate commands.

3. **Medical/Dental Personnel.** Medical/Dental personnel to support Marine units at peacetime levels are either serving directly with FMF units or are performing duties at Naval medical facilities. In either case the FMF commanders usually have these assets locally available. Medical personnel to man Marine Corps wartime billets are identified and are presently serving largely at Naval hospitals/clinics.
throughout the United States. Requests for these mobilization/contingencies medical personnel assets for augmentation should be directed to the Chief of Naval Operations (Copy to Chief, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery; Chief Bureau of Naval Personnel (OP-093); Enlisted Personnel Management Center and CMC (MED and NP)) via the operational chain of command.

4. Non-Medical Personnel for Mobilization/Contingencies. Non-medical Navy personnel to fill billets beyond peacetime structure are provided by the Chief of Naval Reserve based on the requirement stated in the OPNAV 1000/2.

   a. Marine Expeditionary Force Religious (MEFREL) support units are Program 9 assets, made up of Ready Reserve chaplains and Religious Program Specialists for the purpose of filling mobilization billets. The MEFREL are preassigned personnel to fill specific billets in a MEF and are expected to train with their gaining command on an annual basis. For mobilization, MEFREL assets are requested by gaining commands via Headquarters Marine Corps (REL), to Chief of Naval Operations (OP-095).

   b. Additional non-medical Navy personnel to support contingency requirements should be requested from the Chief of Naval Operations (Copy to Commander, Naval Reserve Force and CMC (MP)) via the appropriate chain of command.

5. Navy Support of 4th MarDiv, 4th MAW and 4th FSSG. Navy personnel support is provided by the Commander, Naval Reserve Force. Program 5 (4th MAW support) and Program 9 (4th MarDiv support) Navy reservists are considered preassigned to 4th MarDiv and 4th MAW at mobilization. Direct liaison by MARRESFOR is authorized with COMNAVRESFOR for obtaining and coordinating Program 5 and 9 support. Additional requirements for Navy personnel will be requested in accordance with paragraph 2d above.

6. Coordination

   a. All Marine component commands will include the specific procedures for obtaining Navy augmentation (OPNAV form 1000/2 Navy Manpower Authorization and paragraph e above, apply) in their respective mobilization plans (BUMEDINST 6440.3 (Medical Personnel Augmentation System) applies).

   b. CG MARRESFOR will conduct direct liaison with COMNAVRESFOR to ensure adequate Navy personnel support for 4th MarDiv, 4th MAW and 4th FSSG.

   c. Priorities of assignment of Navy personnel will be determined by CMC in coordination with the Chief of Naval Operations.

   d. CMC (MPC) will monitor the mobilization status of Navy personnel attached to 4th MarDiv and 4th MAW and initiate corrective actions, as required.

9-13
e. The Navy personnel detailing system is not compatible with the Marine Corps T/O system. The Navy requirement on the T/O’s must be reflected on the OPNAV 1000/2. Only then do active duty/reserve personnel flow to the activity at mobilization.

9009. DEMOBILIZATION

1. Demobilization planning is driven by the requirement to maintain certain force capabilities and readiness to meet worldwide commitments. Regeneration of the pre-mobilization force structure will be accomplished as a total force.

2. As with activations, unit releases will be at the direction of the CMC (PP&O). Release of individuals will be accomplished when directed, with retention on active duty authorized on an exception basis.

3. Valid requirements for keeping individual Selected Reserve units or members of the IRR and retirees on active duty must be submitted to CMC (M&RA) for approval. Use of reservists desiring to remain on active duty (volunteers) to meet requirements is the desired option.
CHAPTER 10

DEPLOYMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAGRAPH</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COORDINATION OF DEPLOYMENT</td>
<td>10001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AND POLICIES</td>
<td>10002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPLOYMENT PLANNING</td>
<td>10003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODES OF TRANSPORTATION</td>
<td>10004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVERALL DEPLOYMENT SEQUENCE, OPTIONS, AND INTEGRATION OF STRATEGIC MOBILITY ENHANCEMENTS</td>
<td>10005</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUPPORT OF DEPLOYMENT</td>
<td>10006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMAND AND CONTROL OF DEPLOYMENTS</td>
<td>10007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEPLOYMENT OF FOLLOW-ON SUSTAINMENT</td>
<td>10008</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE

10-1 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEPLOYMENTS AND TPFDDS | 10-4
10000. **INTRODUCTION.** This chapter provides policy and guidance on how the Marine Corps actually deploys forces. It describes the various agencies involved in coordinating such deployment, provides the steps associated with deploying forces and specifies responsibilities during deployment. Topics include procedures for deploying Service Component Headquarters, resolution of problems during deployment, and planning considerations during deployment (e.g., sequencing activation of mobility enhancement assets, activation of PSB’s and MWSS(ES), etc.).

10001. **COORDINATION OF DEPLOYMENT**

1. The Marine Corps, as a total force, consists of active duty operating forces and the supporting establishment, a Reserve Component (comprised of the Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR), Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), Fleet Marine Corps Reserve (FMCR) and Standby Reserve) and retired personnel. When mobilized, the Reserve Component of the total force provides trained units and qualified individuals required to bring the operating forces and the supporting establishment to full wartime capability. The Marine Corps role as a Force-in-Readiness supports national policy and acknowledges the inherent capabilities of sea power for power projection. Rapid deployment facilitates successful employment of forces. Accordingly, the Marine Corps, and forces assigned to the Fleet Marine Forces (FMF), maintain the ability to rapidly deploy to assigned forward operating areas.

2. MAGTF’s ordered to deploy accomplish a large number of tasks associated with pre-deployment preparation and deployment. Short notice deployments limit the time available to accomplish these tasks and large scale deployments are difficult for MAGTF’s to manage alone. Centralized control and coordination of the deployment effort exercised by the MAGTF commander and his staff provide for effectively managed deployments and simplify coordination of logistics efforts described in chapter 13. They also enhance communication with the supported commander, transportation component commands (TCC), the supporting establishment, and other CINC’s/commands. Figure 10-1 associates TPFDD reference points to these tasks and the actual deployment locations over time. Responsibility for TPFDD data entry and movement tracking is described below.
3. Deployment Responsibilities
   
a. MAGTF. To be written.

b. MARFOR. To be written.

c. USTRANSCOM. To be written.

d. COMMARRESFOR. To be written.

e. HQMC. To be written by DC/S Plans Policies and Operations.
   
   (1) Planner’s Working Group
   
   (2) Mobilization Working Group

f. M&RA. To be written by DC/S Manpower & Reserve Affairs.

g. LRCC. To be written by DC/S Installations and Logistics.

10-4
10002. DEPLOYMENT DOCTRINE AND POLICIES

1. MAGTF elements can deploy by a variety of means -- amphibious ships, strategic sealift, strategic airlift and self-deploying organic aircraft.

2. When deployed as an integral component of a fleet, MAGTF's provide the unique capabilities which bridge the gap between the capabilities of naval forces at sea and land forces ashore. Additionally, MAGTF's provide considerable utility in continental campaigns and land operations of lesser scope.

3. MAGTF's deployed as the landing force of an amphibious task force (ATF) provide the fleet and/or joint force commander with greatly enhanced flexibility related to introducing forces into a theater. It provides the capability to land against opposition or in "secure" areas in a variety of climatic and geographic conditions. Its sea-based nature allows for the controlled application of forces ashore.

4. Lift constraints or mission requirements may necessitate organizing a MAGTF's deployment in several movement groups involving various modes of transportation. Responsibility and authority resides with the MAGTF commander, who will ultimately employ/deploy the force in the most efficient manner possible.

5. The MAGTF commander is responsible for, and has been provided the authority to plan and execute his force. While he may be assisted by a variety of other FMF, supporting establishment, and external Marine Corps commands, he is the single individual accountable to the joint force or fleet commander for the deployment and employment of the MAGTF (unless assigned under a component command).

6. The Marine Corps prefers to accomplish the strategic deployment as well as tactical employment of our forces exclusively in amphibious ships to exploit their utility in the objective area. However, the limited numbers of amphibious ships available necessitate the resultant adoption of alternative methods of deployment, which concurrently serve to augment and optimize the use of amphibious shipping. There are also occasions when the rapid deployment of a MAGTF by air, either alone or in conjunction with an MPS, provides a more rapid force closure than the forcible entry capabilities of an amphibious task force.

   a. **Forward Deployment.** Routinely forward-deployed Marine expeditionary units (MEU) provide a multipurpose force which has utility in force building as well as in crisis intervention and peacekeeping operations. It may be used in various combat roles and provide initial theater command and control as well as providing limited security. The MEU is designed so that it can function as the forward element of a larger MAGTF, facilitating the introduction of the larger force (e.g., securing a beach/aerial port for introduction of a Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) or full MEF).
b. **Maritime Prepositioning.** This concept provides enhanced flexibility in global deployment through use of Maritime Prepositioning Ships (MPS), stocked with enough equipment and 30 days of sustainment to be used by a Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), deploying rapidly via strategic airlift. Specific information on the capabilities and limitations of MPF are contained in FMF 1-5, "Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations."

7. The expeditionary nature of the Marine forces makes them ideally suited for rapid deployment in various contingencies, even when amphibious operations are not envisioned. This is particularly true for low and mid-intensity conflict (LIC/MIC) scenarios. Geographical prepositioning, as in the Norway prepositioning program and the MPF’s, greatly decreases response time while conserving limited strategic lift.

10003. **DEPLOYMENT PLANNING**

1. **General.** The deploying MAGTF commander is responsible for planning and executing the MAGTF’s deployment. He works in conjunction with and is assisted by myriad commands and agencies, including FMF, fleet, supporting/shore establishment and joint commanders. The deployment planning process employs a "reverse planning" concept, whereby the tactical requirements for operations ashore drive development of an intricate and detailed landing plan. Basic amphibious doctrine is discussed in more detail in Joint Pub 3-02, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations," as amplified by other naval warfare/FMF publications (see appendix D). TACMEMO PZ 0057 00-1-88/OH 7-8, "Deployment of the Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE)," provides especially relevant material regarding integrating amphibious doctrine with joint deployments.

2. **Deployment of an Amphibious MAGTF**

   a. Amphibious operations are characterized by a planning process wherein the plan for landing drives development of time-phased force requirements. Those requirements drive marshaling, staging, embarkation, and movement plans. Execution of the landing plan is a two phase, ship-to-shore evolution:

   (1) The assault and initial unloading period which is primarily tactical in character and must be instantly responsive to landing force requirements ashore.

   (2) The general unloading period which is primarily logistic in character and emphasizes volume and speed.

   b. The landing is developed around two echelons of the landing force: the assault echelon and the assault follow-on echelon. Planners must also develop plans for deployment of the component headquarters in a joint warfighting environment.
c. Assault Echelon (AE)

(1) The AE includes those forces embarked in Navy amphibious ships that will conduct the assault of the force beachhead. These forces are specifically tailored and equipped for the mission and carry the maximum amount of sustainment (principally Classes I, III, and V) that can be loaded on assigned shipping.

(2) An advance force is a subordinate task organization of the amphibious task force (ATF) which precedes the main body to the objective area, with specific missions which prepare the objective area for the main landing force. Landing force elements that may be assigned to an advance force deploy with sufficient supplies to accomplish their mission and sustain units until subsequent forces arrive.

(3) Any element of a landing force that may be remotely positioned, such as landing force aviation assets, will deploy with sufficient supplies to sustain their requirements until arrival of the assault follow-on echelon.

d. Assault Follow-On Echelon (AFOE)

(1) The AFOE is that echelon of the assault troops, vehicles, aircraft, equipment, and supplies which, though not needed to initiate the assault, is required to support and sustain the assault.

(2) Regardless of the mode of transportation to the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA), the AFOE is an ATF responsibility. Units and unit equipment are marshaled and loaded in accordance with their deployment schedules. The materiel arriving from supply sources is aggregated at the Port of Embarkation (POE) under supervision of the deploying MAGTF commander.

(3) The AFOE requires prioritized loading since the concept of operations ashore will determine the required order of access to its contents. Load plans must be compatible with the overall landing plan. It may be necessary and desirable to use containers in the AFOE. The capability of the deploying MAGTF to containerize AFOE materiel will range from the present 30 percent up to 70 percent depending on source of accompanying supplies and lead time (more time would allow more containerization). As the fleet and deploying MAGTF are responsible for planning and executing embarkation, there will be limited reliance on civilian stevedores to perform the actual loading of strategic sealift ships. The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), will not be required to accomplish stow plans, cargo documentation, etc.

(4) Ship unloading is directed by the normal amphibious ship-to-shore control and support activities (primary control officer (PCO), helicopter direction center (HDC), helicopter logistic support center (HLSC), tactical-logistics group (TACLOG), etc.) as the operation progresses. The size and organization of these activities will change as the landing progresses. Additional cargo handling and
amphibious construction battalion personnel are needed to offload the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons (MPSRON). Additionally, developed seaports and aerial ports, as they become available, will be used to supplement traditional beach operations, and the normal ship-to-shore organization will be expanded to include them. For example, the Landing Force Support Party (LFSP) may have a beach operation, port operation, and aerial port all under its control. The Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) is responsible for unloading operations until termination of the amphibious operation (PHIBOP). At that time, the responsibilities for debarking may be passed to another offload organization designated by higher authority. The PHIBOP would not normally be terminated until the entire AFOE is ashore. Joint Pub 3-02 describes termination conditions/procedures.

(5) The AFOE is time-phased into the AOA not later than 5 days after the commencement of the landing.

(6) Annex J (Mobility) to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) requires that the supported CINC dedicate the shipping necessary to support the AFOE. Based on this JSCP guidance, those ships required for the AFOE will be deleted from the list of ships apportioned for movement of common-user sealift requirements.

(7) Concurrent with the submission of the time-phased force deployment data (TPFDD), the supported CINC will develop a list of ships used to form the AFOE. The list will include: type of ship, date ship is available, and the port at which the ship will be available. The list, along with TPFDD, will be provided to the joint staff, U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), the Services, and supporting unified commanders. This procedure allows for refinement of the ATF TPFDD. The list will also be published in annex D of the supported CINC’s operation plan (OPLAN). The priority of shipping assets being assigned to the AFOE makes it incumbent on planners to make maximum use of AFOE shipping.

(8) Finally, the terms "AE" and "AFOE" suggest a strict sequence of deployment. However, due to the requirement for early employment of select units in the AFOE, the near simultaneous deployment of the AE and AFOE must occur. The AFOE is actually loaded/deployed based on the availability of transportation and cargo at the POE’s.

e. Deployment of Service Component Headquarters. To be written by DC/S Plans Policies and Operations.

(1) Authority

(2) Procedures

(3) Activation Message

3. Organization for Landing. This organization is the specific tactical grouping of forces for the PHIBOP. It is built around ground combat elements (GCE) organized as battalion and regimental landing
teams (BLT/RLT), combat service support elements (CSSE), with an LFSP as its forward echelon, and aviation combat elements (ACE) organized to provide tactical air support and assault support under overall integrated control of the combined USN/USMC Tactical Air Command Center (TACC). The BLT, a reinforced infantry battalion, is the basic task organization for movement from ship to shore. The BLT is a combat unit which should be differentiated from the embarkation team, which is an administrative grouping of forces for movement by ship/aircraft. For clarity, the terms BLT or RLT should be used only in the context of the organization for landing during a PHIBOP.

4. **Organization for Embarkation.** This is the administrative grouping of forces for movement. It includes forces and supplies in each ship or aircraft (embarkation team) which are combined into embarkation groups/units.

5. **Organization for Movement.** This organization is based on the time-phased force requirements of the landing force, Navy task groups, and other Service units in the objective area. Based on the landing plan, the ATF organizes its ships, self-deploying aircraft, and airlift for embarkation and deployment.

   a. **Transport Groups.** Those elements that directly deploy and support the landing of the landing force are functionally designated as transport groups in the ATF task organization. Transport groups provide for the embarkation, movement to the AOA, landing, and logistic support of the landing force. They comprise all shipping and airlift in which the landing force is embarked. Navy landing craft and lighterage to be employed in the ship-to-shore movement are organic or attached to the transport groups. Transport groups are categorized as:

      (1) **Airlifted Groups.**

      (2) **Navy Amphibious Transport Groups.**

      (3) **Strategic Sealift Shipping Groups.** These groups consist of ships from the Military Sealift Command’s (MSC) nucleus fleet and the commercial charter fleet (including MPS, National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), the Ready Reserve Fleet (RRF), and ships in the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP)). They may be either withheld/CINC-dedicated ships for transport of the AFOE or common-user lift ships. These groups may include hospital ships (TAH), aviation logistics support ships (TAVB), and auxiliary crane ships (T-ACS), and offshore petroleum distribution system ships (OPDS).

   b. **Movement Groups.** Ships and aircraft in the transport groups are then organized for embarkation and deployment as movement groups. Movement groups are developed by dividing the ATF according to speed and characteristics of the airlift/sealift and according to the time the forces are required in the objective area. Thus, there may be a pre D-day movement group which comprises the advance force, required to be in the objective area prior to D-day. There may be a D-day movement group which comprises the transport groups scheduled to
arrive in the objective area after D-day, with their appropriate screen and support. Force modules are developed in TPFDD to allow for tracking the movement, at execution, of forces and equipment included in movement groups.

10004. MODES OF TRANSPORTATION

1. The time required in-theater, suitability of materiel for sea/airlift, and lift availability (in that order), will determine the mode of deployment transportation. Personnel and materiel will be assigned to ships and aircraft by the MAGTF commander as specified in the landing and embarkation plans.

2. The ability to mass personnel and materiel, and the flexibility to change the time and place of landing, usually dictates a heavy reliance on sealift. The AE is embarked in Navy amphibious ships equipped to conduct PHIBOPs. The AFOE, on the other hand, is normally embarked in strategic sealift ships or aircraft. This does not preclude the use of amphibious ships if available/necessary.

3. Strategic, theater, self-deploying and Air Mobility Command (AMC) Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) air assets may be used to move personnel and selected supplies and equipment. Airlift of personnel may be time and cost effective when used in conjunction with prepositioned or maritime prepositioning equipment/supplies. The airlift requirements for personnel and materiel are dictated by the MAGTF commander in the landing and embarkation plans.

4. The final intended employment of the force must govern load planning and assignment to shipping. When feasible, force modules will be developed and entered into plans to support redirection of these forces and associated airlift, strategic sealift, and self-deploying aircraft to new commitments. Finally, port loading must be considered in order to ensure the smooth, integrated flow of personnel and materiel into the objective area.

10005. OVERALL DEPLOYMENT SEQUENCE, OPTIONS AND INTEGRATION OF STRATEGIC MOBILITY ENHANCEMENTS

1. In order to achieve a rapid build up of combat power for tactical employment, regardless of transportation mode, thorough planning and integration of forces prior to and during the execution of the deployment is essential. Two basic options in formulating an ATF exist:

   a. The preferred option is where forces are organized, trained, marshaled, and deployed from the same geographical location.

   b. The other option requires compositing of forces in the objective area. This may be mandated by the need for rapid deployment, and/or coupled with unavailability or insufficient quantities of amphibious ships or to employ forward deployed forces.
The use of strategic mobility enhancements, such as MPS, may require independent deployment of the forces. This option, although more complex, is still governed by the same doctrinal precepts.

2. As introduced earlier, employment of a large landing force may necessitate deployment of forces through intermediate staging bases (ISB). At the ISB, the desired task organization for landing can be developed using forces which deployed to the ISB via strategic assets. This permits optimum tactical configuration of the forces to support the landing plan. ISBs also play a large role when facilities in the AOA do not support the basing and/or terminal requirements of the strategic lift required to move the landing force into the AOA. An ISB may also serve as the site of the landing force rehearsal. Further, once an ISB has been established, it may continue to serve as the operating base for the CSSE until termination of the assault. Forces deployed to an ISB, within the AOA, remain under operational control (OPCON) of commander, amphibious task force (CATF).

3. The deployment enhancements listed below improve force deployment responsiveness with limited transportation resources.

   a. **Forward Afloat Forces.** Forces deployed to forward areas can be used singularly or in combination with other forces to comprise an assault force that can move rapidly to an objective area. Forward deployed forces possess limited forcible entry capability and sustainability when employed alone. These forces may composite as part of the AE. The requirement for some strategic lift, both air and sea, can be reduced for the entire landing force since the forward-deployed forces may possess organic aircraft and lighterage for ship-to-shore movement. The use of an ISB may be required to enable the forward-deployed unit to be reconfigured to fit into the landing plan.

   b. **Prepositioning as an Enhancement**

      (1) **Geographic Prepositioning.** The positioning of equipment in strategically important areas of the world provides the ability to deploy forces more rapidly by eliminating the need to move large amounts of materiel to the objective area. Theater mobility resources, however, are needed to move the prepositioned equipment to potential employment areas/combat zones.

      (2) **Maritime Prepositioning.** The prepositioning of equipment and supplies on ships provides more flexibility than does geographic prepositioning. The mobility of ships permits early movement toward a trouble area. The need for airlift; however, and its underlying requirement for airfields, staging areas, and security, makes deployment of an MPF dependent upon supporting strategic mobility resources. The use of ISBs will be mandatory for reconstituting and reconfiguring the prepositioned materiel and the fly-in units to fit into an amphibious landing plan.

      (3) The use of prepositioning will reduce strategic airlift/sealift requirements, but may require intratheater lift. While specific unload requirements are situation dependent, there
would be no discernible division of the landing of the AE and AFOE—all of the landing force must be landed expeditiously. Generally, however, it is envisioned that strategic sealift ships with the AFOE would begin unloading no later than five days after initiation of the amphibious assault. Accompanying supplies should be phased ashore such that the MEF(FWD) has a 15 days of supply/ammunition (DOS/DOA) stockpile by fifteen days after the landing and a 30 DOS/DOA stockpile by thirty days after for a MEF. Sustainment is thereby ensured until the resupply pipeline can be established.

4. Configuration of Materiel for Deployment

a. Aggregation and Packaging of Materiel for Deployment

(1) Specific guidance regarding levels of supply to be associated with various size MAGTF’s as accompanying supplies is contained in chapter 13.

(2) The methodology for marshaling and embarking materiel with the landing force is contained in Joint Pub 3-02.2, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation", FMFM 4-6, and OH 7-8. In summary, all unit equipment and a prescribed load, sufficient to maintain units until the CSSE can establish a distribution system—normally about five days—should be deployed with each unit. Supplies and equipment should be mobile loaded on unit vehicles to the maximum extent possible. Allowance items (T/E equipment) not required initially in the operating area may be aggregated under control of a later deploying parent command or with the CSSE, if directed by the MAGTF commander, and deployed with the AFOE or as follow-up equipment. In case of a deployment of limited scope or duration, such materiel may be left at the home station provided control and security for it is coordinated with the non-deploying parent command, FMF headquarters, and home base/station.

(3) Packaging and preparing materiel for embarkation require the concerted and coordinated effort of the deploying unit, its parent command, the CSSE, and the home base/station. Procedures for such support must be incorporated in FMF support agreements.

(4) Unit equipment and supplies must be preserved to the level necessary to ensure its integrity during the expected duration of the deployment. Of course, the packaging and preservation must be coordinated with the expected requirement to rapidly place such materiel in service during tactical operations. Joint Pub 3-02.2 and other technical publications in the 4700 series provide detailed procedures and standards for packaging materiel.

(5) Accompanying supplies not in the unit prescribed load should be configured in manageable blocks by class of supply for rapid distribution by the CSSE or receipt by a host MAL. The configuration of this materiel must be based on the anticipated concept of operation ashore and may reflect requirements for floating dumps, on-call support packages, and planned aerial delivery of materiel.
b. **Containerization**

(1) **Background**

(a) Containerization planning is a critical element in support of force closure, throughput, and sustainment during MAGTF operations. Marine Corps container strategy includes the capability for commercial container warehousing and distribution systems inland from beach, port through-port and marshaling operations. Commercial containers will be used as field warehousing, care-in-storage and distribution assets for an employed MAGTF.

(b) The use of containerized cargo within the AFOE will provide the capability to efficiently transport vast amounts of general cargo and ammunition. All facets of container procurement, stuffing, transporting, offloading, movement over the beach, unstuffing (if required), and retrograde movement must be considered by logistical planners. Requirements determination must include an assessment of the following capabilities: container out-loading, PP&P facilities for cargo packing support, mobile/flexible materiel handling equipment (MHE), container transportation equipment, number of containers required, an automated container/cargo tracking capability within MAGTF II/Logistics Automated Information System (AIS) for asset visibility, and the ability to determine the number of containerships required to support the AFOE.

(2) **Policies**

(a) Amphibious ship-lifted unit general (bulk) cargo and (bulk) sustainability, not planned for stowage in tactical vans/shelters (e.g., aviation maintenance) or commercial vans will be planned for palletized/break-bulk cargo configurations as appropriate to end-use of the commodity.

(b) Equipment/commodities planned for airlift in support of any MAGTF, and not planned for stowage in tactical vans/shelters (e.g., aviation maintenance) or commercial vans will be planned for break-bulk or palletized packaging and movement, as appropriate to end-use of the commodity.

(c) All commercially-shipped containerizable or flat rack compatible cargo, not planned for stowage/movement in tactical vans/shelters (e.g., aviation maintenance) or commercial vans, will be subjected to detailed commercial International Standards Organization (150) container planning, consistent with the need to maintain a constant ready for issue (RFI) condition and employment of containerized assets without unnecessary download of contents prior to end-use.

(d) Containerization of geo-prepositioned MAGTF assets will be maximized where containerization will enhance the distribution, protection and control of those assets during storage and/or upon execution of related OPLAN’s.
(e) For MPF operations, container warehousing and distribution will be maximized upon reconfiguration of the MAGTF ashore.

(f) Bracing and shoring/internal configuration procedures for commercial 150 containers will, where necessary for care-in-storage and/or issue/replenishment, and without complete container down-load, accommodate selective cargo access.

(g) Container internal stowage policies will optimize containerized field warehousing/care-in-storage. The principle feature for those commodities wherein a single National Stock Number (NSN) will fill a container, the "cube-out"/"weigh-out" principle applies. For "multi-pack" containers (two or more NSN’s), provision will (where practical) be made for selective-access warehousing without container download.

(h) General support container handling equipment will be held within commands which, by virtue of their mission, are routinely responsible to handle containers which belong to other elements of the MAGTF, to include the handling of containerized sustainability.

(i) Units will hold pre-fabricated container bins, shelving and container-use PP&P consumables at the unit location.

1 FMF units who own commercial containers are required to preplan/preconfigure container loads for those containers prior to OPLAN execution.

2 PWRMF and PWRMI must be preplan/preconfigured for container-loads prior to OPLAN execution.

3 Bases/stations will receive, package and containerize PWRMS and/or units equipment in support of tenant commands when PP&P capabilities are exceeded within the Force.

(j) For the MEF remain-behind cargo, specific container sourcing plans will be derived through a detailed analysis of requirements for numbers and types of containers, vis-a-vis the unique characteristics of MEF remainder containerizable cargo.

(k) Within the AOA, off-load containers will be deployed to either a fixed location such as the Force Combat Service Support Area (FCSSA); a Combat Service Support Area (CSSA) in a forward support site; with a Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment (MCSSD); or with the combat support elements of the ground combat units. Container and materiel contents will be tracked via LOGMARS/MDSS II (see chapter 6). Containerized cargo along with self-contained offloading equipment will be transported directly to supported units, whenever feasible. Depending upon the CSS supply distribution plan within annex D of the MAGTF Operation Order, containerized cargo will be warehoused directly from containers to enhance security, care-in-storage and materiel serviceability or will be unstuffed by either CSS units or the supported units. Empty containers will flow to collection points/loading area, on a not-to-interfere basis with the forward flow.
of supplies and equipment, for consolidation and loading on available shipping for retrograde as specified by the appropriate supported unified commander.

(1) Within an AOA, aviation mobile facilities/containers can either remain aboard the TAVB or be off-loaded from the TAVB, or other container ship, to a host MALS to form a van support complex ashore.

(3) Procedures

(a) The Marine Corps will deploy AFOE accompanying supplies and equipment in standard (20’ x 8’ x 8’) USMC and 150 commercial containers to the maximum extent possible. Commanders at the using unit level must validate the types and numbers of containers required to store for shipment all unit containerizable AFOE supplies and equipment. Notional numbers of containers by class of supply are illustrated below and can be used for rough planning estimates.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Supply Class</th>
<th>MEF (FWD)</th>
<th>MEF</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II (A)</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II (W)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (W)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III (A)</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>V (A)</td>
<td>764</td>
<td>3,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>225</td>
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<td>VII (W)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VII (A)</td>
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<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX (W)</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX (A)</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>1,979</td>
<td>8,889</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) The MEF commander will request standard (20’ x 8’ x 8’) configured commercial containers through MTMC/MSC/USTRANSCOM. These containers are sourced from DoD and civilian leasing and shipping companies based on actual unit requirements provided to USTRANSCOM. Some containers may be purchased to meet specific needs (e.g., Norway prepositioning program/MPF). Containers may be purchased when it has been determined that MTMC/MSC/USTRANSCOM cannot source MEF commander requirements either in quantity, type or delivery to designated stuffing sites by a specific required delivery date. Approval from HQMC will be required to coordinate possible procurement or sourcing of USMC containers available from within the Marine Corps. However, the
Marine Corps will not purchase containers to support generic OPLAN requirements. Containers purchased will "belong" to the organization for whom they were purchased. MEF commanders will assume responsibility associated with ownership (e.g., storage, maintenance and repair). Container storage/maintenance will be performed by the owning organization to the extent that it is most practical. Services may be performed by civilian contract or Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA) when it is deemed most practical.

(c) The Logistic Movement Control Center (LMCC) will coordinate movement of containers from external sources as provided by MIMC/MSC/USTRANSCOM.

10006. SUPPORT OF DEPLOYMENT

1. Basic Policy. Just as the deploying MAGTF commander controls and orchestrates his deployment, within the authority of the naval component and unified commander, the FMF commander coordinates and oversees the Marine Corps’ Service support to the deploying MAGTF’s from all Service-related activities. This process includes assisting in identifying support requirements and arranging necessary support from bases, stations and other external agencies/commands. The CMC provides FMF commanders the authority to direct and coordinate this support from the FMF and the Marine Corps’ supporting establishment and to act as CMC’s coordinating authority for Service matters with appropriate unified commanders. As such, FMF commanders are authorized to source forces and supplies under their control, arrange for forces/supplies of other Marine Corps commands through direct liaison, direct and coordinate base and station support (in the name of the CMC) to include contracting and traffic management functions, enter directly into interservice/cross-service support agreements. Additionally, FMF commanders are authorized to participate and obligate authorized Service funds in international agreements in coordination with unified commanders for support with host nationals and allies. While such arrangements and the planning thereof are accomplished by the FMF commander, once established, the support shall be executed by the MAGTF’s directly with supporting commands and agencies except in unusual circumstances. SOP’s may be used in lieu of specific support plans if OPLAN unique agreements are not needed.

2. Sourcing of Forces and Materiel Under FMF Control. FMF commanders will source force and materiel requirements of MAGTF’s from organic assets as feasible. For example, organic vehicles will be used to move between origin and POE or port of debarkation (POD) and destination. Requirements in excess of FMF capabilities will be met through tasking of supporting base/station assets, or external sources using normal transportation/support procedures. Bases/stations may be tasked to plan and execute such external support arrangements.

3. Installation Outload Planning. Inclusive in the FMF supporting plan for each major OPLAN is the necessity for an installation outload plan. This plan, prepared by the individual base and station as an
annex to the FMF support plan, will include coordinated procedures for the following:

a. **Facilities**
   
   (1) Billeting of permanent and transient personnel and their families
   
   (2) Storage of personal effects (to include automobiles)
   
   (3) Warehousing/outside storage of unit equipment and supplies
   
   (4) Surge utility requirements (e.g., electricity and water)

b. **Materiel**
   
   (1) Receipt, temporary storage, aggregation into ship/ aircraft load-lots, and temporary accounting for FMF accompanying supplies
   
   (2) Supply support of ground/aviation tenant and transient units (to include SMCR/IRR)
   
   (3) Provision of corrective and preventive maintenance for FMF unit equipment, to include care-in-storage
   
   (4) Receipt, accounting, temporary custody, storage, and reissue of remain-behind-equipment (RBE)
   
   (5) Provision of calibration services
   
   (6) Garrison property issue and recovery
   
   (7) Packaging and preservation, to include container management/stuffing

c. **Services**
   
   (1) Messing
   
   (2) Laundry
   
   (3) Financial accounting
   
   (4) Legal services
   
   (5) Automated data processing support
   
   (6) Morale and welfare activities
   
   (7) Purchasing and contracting
   
   (8) Religious services
   
   (9) Trash and waste disposal
d. Transportation

(1) Reporting and management of unit and non-unit-related moves from USMC controlled origins to include interface with MTMC and transportation vendors

(2) Assembly and staging of deploying units

(3) Provision of garrison mobile equipment (GME) (motor transport and materiel handling equipment) augmentation for FMF moves

(4) Coordination, liaison, and management of reception, processing, and onward movement of SMCR/IRR personnel and SMCR equipment

(5) Aggregation and management of replacements and replacement draft

(6) Interface with regional, state, and local authorities (domestic and foreign) regarding convoys to/from sea/airports, air space control, search and rescue, and weather services

(7) On-base and proximate area traffic control

(8) Customs/Department of Agriculture support

(9) Port and terminal operations at designated seaports and aerial ports of embarkation (SPOE/APOE) to include provision of shoring and dunnage materials, liaison, and port operations group personnel

(10) Follow-up staging and throughput of materiel and personnel to deployed MAGTF’s

(11) Provision of station operating aircraft for liaison/command support

e. Counterintelligence and Security

f. Medical Services

g. Communications

(1) Message center

(2) Telephone

(3) Emergency/augmentation communications
(4) Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS)/WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN)

h. Public Affairs/Community Relations

i. Disaster Control/Emergency Recovery Operations

j. Personnel and Unit Training

(1) Refresher training for ground and aviation personnel

(2) Unit training for SMCR and newly formed units

(3) Conduct of formal schools

10007. COMMAND AND CONTROL OF DEPLOYMENTS

1. A MAGTF deploys at the direction of a fleet, joint force, or unified commander using a combination of tactical and strategic modes of transportation under the control of unified commanders, USCINCNTRANS, and fleet movement control agencies.

2. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), is a deployment information system that assists in developing and consolidating deployment data required for time-sensitive and execution planning, as well as monitoring of deployments upon execution. The system provides a comprehensive deployment picture to the National Command Authorities (NCA), JCS, and supported unified commanders, as well as deploying MAGTF commanders, in order to allow them to make timely decisions based on the evolving time-sensitive situation and force flow. The deployment data base may be built from an existing OPLAN TPFDD or may be built from "scratch" and is established in JOPES. See paragraph 4010 for information on automated Marine Corps planning systems.

3. The transportation requirements for deployment of a MAGTF are detailed in JOPES in order to provide a complete deployment picture for higher headquarters and to generate/activate requests for strategic lift assets that are essential to the deployment. When requirements are established in the JOPES, USTRANSCOM will provide strategic lift for the deployment in accordance with the JOPES Procedures Manual. Strategic sealift and airlift are assigned by USTRANSCOM in accordance with the supported CINC’s established priorities to meet the time-phased force and deployment requirements.

   a. Airlift. The Air Mobility Command (AMC) will develop and enter schedules in JOPES, and execute the airlift. The MAGTF, as the preponderant user of airlift in an ATF or MPF operation, may serve as the coordinating agent for ATF/MPF requirements/scheduling. Using his movement control agencies, the MAGTF commander will plan and monitor the airlift scheduling process to ensure integration with the sea movement. AMC airlift supporting the deploying force is controlled by
USTRANSCOM to meet required arrival times. Transport aircraft fall under OPCON of a CATF while in the AOA so that integration with the landing of sealifted forces is achieved and the unified air defense and air space control of the AOA is maintained.

b. Sealift

(1) Upon notification by competent authority, strategic sealift ships, including those JSCP apportioned MSC controlled strategic ships, will sail to their SPOE(s) as assigned by the supported and supporting unified CINC’s.

(2) At the SPOE, the MAGTF commander will assume responsibility for loading and for subsequently reporting of ship loading. Once loaded, the ships will deploy under control of the fleet.

(3) Control of all ships in the ATF during transit may be vested in CATF or another fleet organization. However, CATF is ultimately responsible for orchestrating the ships transit to arrive in the AOA as called for in the landing plan. While strategic sealift ships may be sailed in company with combatants, it is envisioned that in most cases MSC vessels will sail independently. The Naval Control of Shipping Organization (NCSO), under the control of the fleet CINC, will file Movement Reports (MOVREP’s) for ships, including MSC controlled ships, upon completion of loading and prior to sailing. The fleet CINC will enter movement data in JOPES.

(4) CATF will plan, schedule, and execute ATF ship movement. While in the AOA, MSC sealift ships are under control of the same control organization that controlled the assault landing. Should an MPF reinforce the PHIBOP, the MPSRON would be treated as assault echelon shipping and the MPF arrival and assembly organization is integrated into the overall ATF ship-to-shore control structure.

4. Port and Landing Support Operations in Theater

a. When supported by Navy elements, the MAGTF (through the CSSE) can operate aerial and sea ports. However, naval and expeditionary capabilities of the MAGTF may be required for subsequent PHIBOPs elsewhere. Accordingly, major communications zone port operations are best performed by U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, or U.S. Navy organizations specifically maintained to perform the port operations mission.

b. The MAGTF concept for arrival and reception generally envisions the employment of a task organized Landing Force Shore Party (LFSP) under the control of the CSSE, to effect throughput operations at ports and beaches. A shore party team can support up to a numbered beach; a LFSP supports up to two colored beaches (geographically restricted). It is a temporary task organization exclusively associated with amphibious operations, specifically ship-to-shore movement. Detailed information can be found in the NWP 22-Series.

5. Because of the tactical employment inherent in PHIBOPs, CATF must have OPCON of the strategic sealift and airlift, as well as the Navy
combatant ships as they enter the AOA. CATF exercises his control over the overall delegated authority of the supported CINC. Additionally, CATF must plan and direct the embarkation and movement of forces to the objective area through close coordination with supporting commands.

a. strategic airlift aircraft are under the combatant command (COCOM) of USCINCTRANS, a supporting commander. Those strategic aircraft used for airlift employment operations in the AOA will come under the OPCON of CATF for the duration of the employment mission. Liaison is established with the ATF through airlift control elements (ALCE) at APOE’s and APOD’s, and liaison officers provided by the landing force at the numbered Air Force HQ which is executing the airlift. Theater airlift aircraft are under the COCOM of the supported CINC. OPCON may be passed by him to CATF.

b. Coordination for movement of self-deploying aircraft and airlift aircraft is accomplished by the fleets through their type commanders. Transcontinental/oceanic movements are complex evolutions which must be thoroughly coordinated according to the priorities established by the unified commanders and with the Commander in Chief, Strategic Command (USCINCSTRAT) relative to strategic tanker support. The FMF’s or NAVAIRPAC/LANT monitor and execute these deployments in accordance with, and in support of, the ATF requirements. Deploying MAGTF commanders will ensure schedules of self-deploying aircraft are accurately entered into JOPES.

c. MSC/commercial ships are controlled by the fleet commander through his NCSO. This agency coordinates the movement of all merchant ships from the SPOE to the objective area. While CATF plans and monitors deployment of all movement groups, actual control may be vested in fleet task organizations in support of ATF requirements.

6. The deploying MAGTF interfaces with the JOPES and directs its deployment through its movement control organization. This organization includes the following elements/centers.

a. **Force Movement Control Center (FMCC).** The FMCC is the MAGTF commander's staff agency to control and coordinate all deployment activities. It also is the agency which coordinates with USTRANSCOM or, as authorized, its components concerning transportation requirements, priorities, and allocations, as required.

b. **Logistics Movement Control Center (LMCC).** The CSS units or the supporting establishment organize LMCC’s in each geographic area. The FMCC tasks the LMCCs to provide organic or commercial transportation, transportation scheduling, materiel handling equipment (MHE), and other support marshaling, movement and embarkation.

c. **MAGTF/Division/Wing/FSSG Unit Movement Control Center (UMCC).** Division, wing, and FSSG commanders provide forces to deploying MAGTF’s. Both they and the MAGTF commander control transportation and communications assets (trucks, MHE, radios) required to execute
deployments. On order, each command activates its UMCC to support deployment. The FSSG establishes two subordinate agencies. These are the departure airfield control group (DACG) and the port operations control group (POCG) at APOE’s and SPOE’s. Every deploying unit down to battalion/squadron/separate company level activates a UMCC to control and manage its marshaling and movement.

d. Base/Station Operations Support Group (BOSG/SOSG). Bases and stations from which FMF units deploy establish BOSG’s/SOSG’s to coordinate their efforts with those of the deploying units. Like major FMF commands, bases/stations have transportation, communications, and other assets useful during deployments.

e. Port Operations Control Group (POCG) and Departure Airfield Control Group (DACG). The FSSG task-organizes to support functions at the POEs. A POCG is formed for ship embarkation and a DACG is formed for airlift embarkation. Manning is normally sourced from the FSSG. Augmentation and liaison personnel may be sourced from the MEF as a whole or from bases and stations. Functions common to the POCG and DACG include:

1) Coordination with the LMCC to validate the number of personnel and type and quantity of cargo and scheduled arrival at the POE.

2) Coordination with the Unit Movement Control Center (UMCC’s) embarkation representatives, team embarkation officers, and plane team commanders to ensure readiness for embarkation.

3) Reception of troops and organization of cargo in the staging area(s) (SPOE) or the "alert holding area" (APOE).

4) Provision of support at the A/SPOE, beyond units’ organic capabilities; i.e., vehicle washing, de-fueling, emergency maintenance, inspection, MHE, lighting, food service, and first aid.

5) Providing assistance to ensure loads are complete, correctly and safely prepared, and that containers are optimally loaded.

10008. DEPLOYMENT OF FOLLOW-ON SUSTAINMENT. Deployment of nonunit related personnel and materiel resupply is coordinated by the FMF commander but accomplished, with few exceptions, through the use of standard Military standard Transportation and Movement Procedures (MILSTAMP) traffic management procedures in common-user lift. High priority and Service-unique requirements should be coordinated by the FMF commander and deployed via unified command channel sea or airlift. Shipping on which nonunit related personnel or materiel are deployed to support PHIBOP’s are called follow-up shipping, but are generally part of the overall unified command common-user lift sustainment flow.
CHAPTER 11
EXECUTION: EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAGRAPH</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>11-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXTENDED EMPLOYMENT OF USMC FORCES</td>
<td>11-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSTAINMENT</td>
<td>11-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 11

EXECUTION: EMPLOYMENT AND SUSTAINMENT EXECUTION

11000. INTRODUCTION  This chapter provides policy and guidance for employment and sustained operations of MAGTF’s. It specifically addresses sustainment (including resupply), personnel replacement policies, coordination agencies, and key action items.

11001. CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXTENDED EMPLOYMENT OF USMC FORCES. To be written by DC/S Plans Policies and Operations in coordination with DC/S Aviation.

11002. SUSTAINMENT. To be written by DC/S Installations and Logistics in coordination with DC/S Aviation.
# CHAPTER 12

**REDEPLOYMENT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAGRAPH</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>12-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCEPT</td>
<td>12-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESPONSIBILITIES</td>
<td>12-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISSUES</td>
<td>12-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
12000. INTRODUCTION. Redeployment planning begins when a force deploys (or before). This chapter provides guidance necessary for such planning, outlines the steps in that process, and specifically identifies policy on deactivation of units and rapid regeneration of sustainable warfighting capability (e.g., priorities for reloading/re-equipping MPS, PWR, NALMEB, LFORM, SMCR units).

12001. CONCEPT. To be written.

12002. RESPONSIBILITIES. To be written.

12003. ISSUES. To be written.
CHAPTER 13
LOGISTICS AND MAGTF SUSTAINMENT

INTRODUCTION .......................... 13000 13-5

SECTION 1: LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONCEPTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

PURPOSE ................................. 13100 13-7
CONCEPT OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT .... 13101 13-7
EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE MAGTF .... 13102 13-10
DELIBERATE AND CRISIS ACTION PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES .......................... 13103 13-12

SECTION 2: SUPPLY

GENERAL ................................. 13200 13-13
MATERIEL MANAGEMENT ................. 13201 13-13
SUPPLY SUPPORT ....................... 13202 13-14
LEVELS OF SUPPLY SUPPORT .......... 13203 13-15
PACKAGING .............................. 13204 13-15
REMAIN BEHIND EQUIPMENT ............ 13205 13-16

SECTION 3: MAINTENANCE

GENERAL ................................. 13300 13-17
ORGANIZATION FOR MAINTENANCE .... 13301 13-17

SECTION 4: TRANSPORTATION

GENERAL ................................. 13400 13-19
TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT ORGANIC TO THE MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE .......... 13401 13-19
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRATHEATER TRANSPORTATION</td>
<td></td>
<td>13402</td>
<td>13-20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTAINERIZATION</td>
<td></td>
<td>13403</td>
<td>13-21</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SECTION 5: DELIBERATE ENGINEERING

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>13500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINE CORPS ENGINEERING SUPPORT</td>
<td></td>
<td>13501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE (NCF)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13502</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENGINEER PLANNING, COORDINATION AND CONTROL</td>
<td></td>
<td>13503</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SECTION 6: HEALTH SERVICES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>13600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARINE CORPS ORGANIC MEDICAL SUPPORT</td>
<td></td>
<td>13601</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORWAY AIRLANDED MEB (NALMEB)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE (MPF)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASUALTY RECEIVING AND TREATMENT SHIPS</td>
<td></td>
<td>13604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOSPITAL SHIPS</td>
<td></td>
<td>13605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOBILE MEDICAL AUGMENTATION READINESS TEAM (MMART)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13606</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FLEET HOSPITALS</td>
<td></td>
<td>13607</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDICAL PLANNING MODULE (MPM)</td>
<td></td>
<td>13608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EVACUATION POLICY</td>
<td></td>
<td>13609</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILITARY BLOOD PROGRAM</td>
<td></td>
<td>13610</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SECTION 7: AVIATION LOGISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Paragraph</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GENERAL</td>
<td></td>
<td>13700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONTROLLING CUSTODIAN</td>
<td></td>
<td>13701</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13-2
MARINE AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT PROGRAM (MALSP) .......................... 13702 13-37
LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYING MAGTF’S .................................. 13703 13-39
MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE (MPF) AND AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT SHIP (TAVB) SUPPORT FOR MARINE AVIATION .............................................. 13704 13-42
AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS .............................................................. 13705 13-43
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FOR AVIATION UNITS ................................ 13706 13-45
AIRFIELDS .......................................................... 13707 13-47

SECTION 8: SUSTAINMENT

GENERAL ...................................................... 13800 13-51
PURPOSE OF SUSTAINMENT PLANNING ............................................. 13801 13-51
OVERVIEW OF SUSTAINMENT PLANNING PROCESS .............................. 13802 13-51
SUSTAINMENT PLANNING GUIDANCE .............................................. 13803 13-52
IDENTIFYING SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS .................................. 13804 13-52
THE SOURCING PROCESS ................................................. 13805 13-54
DEVELOPING REQUIREMENTS IN MAGTF II ..................................... 13806 13-55
AMMUNITION .................................................... 13807 13-58
RESUPPLY ...................................................... 13808 13-59
TPFDD CARGO GUIDANCE .............................................. 13809 13-60
EXECUTING WAR WITHDRAWAL PLANS ......................................... 13810 13-61

FIGURE
13-1 MALSP Task Organization ................................................. 13-41
13-2 FORMAT FOR A WAR RESERVE WITHDRAWAL PLAN ...................... 13-56
13-3 REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL OF WAR RESERVE PLAN ..................... 13-62
13000. INTRODUCTION. This chapter provides separate sections on the six logistics functions (supply, maintenance, engineer, transportation, health services, and services), each of which contains guidelines for logistics planning. Separate sections provide planning guidelines and background information on aviation logistics and identifying and sourcing sustainment requirements.
SECTION 1: LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONCEPTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

13100. PURPOSE. The purpose of this section is to describe logistics support concepts and responsibilities, giving particular emphasis to specialized Navy and Marine aviation functions which support the MAGTF.

13101. CONCEPT OF LOGISTICS SUPPORT. Marine Corps logistics planning is focused on providing combat ready MAGTF’s capable of self-sustained operations. MAGTF logistics encompasses accompanying supplies and resupply (sustainment), and organic CSS capabilities (enhanced as appropriate by judicious coordination with external agencies), beginning with execution planning and ending with withdrawal/ redeployment. Marine Corps logistics support comes from the sea; if planners anticipate extended inland operations, this fact must be addressed as a planning consideration.

1. Sources of Logistics Support. All MAGTF’s have enough inherent sustainability to be basically self-sufficient for preplanned periods. MAGTF sustainability increases in depth, and gains additional technical capabilities, as MAGTF’s get larger. MAGTF’s also use external support to enhance their organic sustainability. Navy organizations assigned to, or operating in support of, a MAGTF on an as-required basis provide certain specialized capabilities. If planned for during the pre-deployment period, MAGTF’s which are elements of naval/amphibious task forces can draw supply support for common non-aviation items as well as aviation-peculiar items from fleet support activities. Wartime host-nation support (WHNS) agreements and inter-service support agreements (ISSA’s) may be used to augment—not replace—organic MAGTF capabilities. Lastly, MAGTF’s may obtain cross-service support in-theater in accordance with CINC guidance on common-item supply/maintenance support.

2. Organic Sources. MAGTF CSSE’s, MALS, and Marine Wing Support Squadrons (MWSS) provide organic MAGTF ground and aviation logistics/CSS capabilities.

   a. Ground. CSSE’s are task organized to support MAGTF mission requirements from FSSG and, as appropriate, Marine aircraft wing (MAW) and Marine division resources.

   b. Aviation. MALS’s provide the ACE with aviation logistics (maintenance and supply) support. They are organic to the MAW and are task organized for the aircraft mix they support. MWSS’s are also organic to the MAW and provide the ACE aviation ground support (AGS).

3. MAGTF sustainment is deployed as a mix of accompanying supplies and resupply. The Marine Corps planning baseline for accompanying supplies is 60 ground DOS/days of ammunition (DOA), 90 DOS for aviation peculiar supplies, and 60 aviation DOA (drawn from prepositioned war reserve materiel stocks (PWRMS)). Resupply is planned for as required.
a. **Accompanying Supplies.** The supplies and equipment that deploy with a MAGTF provide the initial sustainment necessary for employment. Accompanying supplies are shown as unit line numbers in a TPFDD. Dedicated sealift and or airlift allows it to flow with the forces. Accompanying supplies may flow with both the Assault Echelon (AE) and the Assault Follow on Echelon (AFOE), but should not be considered AFOE. AFOE is a transportation echelon term. Accompanying supplies are an integral part of the apportioned/allocated MAGTF, and in virtually all situations will be transported on withheld shipping. If appropriate, MAGTF’s can deploy with less than the full planning baseline for accompanying supplies. Accompanying supply "minimum" guidelines have been established for such cases (see paragraph 13101.4a below). Normally, follow-on MAGTF’s (e.g., MEF (FWD) for a MEU, MEF for a MEF (FWD)) would then include in their accompanying supplies the balance of the forward-deployed MAGTF’s accompanying supplies baseline. Operational factors and/or supply availability may also make it necessary to adjust the balance between accompanying supplies and resupply. (The availability of aviation ordnance is theater-dependent, and usually below the 60 DOA level; the availability of ground material fluctuates around the baseline level due to supply system dynamics. Similarly, the availability of bulk class III is theater-dependent and usually below the 60 day target level.)

b. **Resupply.** MAGTF commanders plan for resupply support beyond the baseline sustainment requirements (and/or the level of accompanying supplies) to the end of the planning period established by the supported CINC.

c. **Special Situations.** Special Purpose MAGTF’s (SPMAGTF’s) require special sustainment planning considerations. Whenever operational constraints and/or CINC guidance permit, MAGTF commanders plan for resupply to make up the difference between the level of accompanying supplies and the baseline sustainment levels.

d. Cases for which it may be appropriate to deviate from the baseline/minimum supply levels discussed here should be coordinated with CMC (L).

4. The Marine Corps supply system (Marine Corps "green dollar" funded) and the naval supply system (Navy "blue dollar" funded) support a MAGTF’s ground and aviation requirements, respectively.

a. The Marine Corps supply system is designed to support MAGTF operations for 60 days with most classes of supply from on-hand assets. In order to meet operational requirements, MAGTF’s can configure supplies in "packages" of varying numbers of DOS and mixes of supply classes with relative ease. Minimum planning levels for MAGTF embarked Marine Corps’ "green dollar" accompanying supplies are:

(1) SPMAGTF - As required.

(2) MEU - 15 DOS
b. The naval supply system provides "blue dollar" aviation support assets to the ACE through MALS. This support can be specifically tailored for short or long duration aviation operations.

1. **Fly-in Support Package (FISP).** A FISP normally accompanies deploying aircraft in the fly-in echelon. Each FISP is configured to support a specific number and type/model/series aircraft for 30 days at combat flying hours. There is one FISP for each T/M/S aircraft in each active duty MAW.

2. **Contingency Support Package (CSP).** There are common and peculiar CSP’s. Each common CSP (CCSP) provides the common spares, support equipment, mobile facilities, and personnel needed to provide limited intermediate level support to sustain aircraft supported by either a fixed-wing or rotary-wing host MALS. Each peculiar CSP (PCSP) provides a host MALS with the intermediate level spares, support equipment, mobile facilities, and personnel that are unique to a particular T/M/S aircraft. Each type of CSP is built to sustain MAGTF ACE aircraft for 90 days at combat flying hours.

3. **Follow-On Support Packages (FOSP’s).** FOSP equipment consists of those items required to sustain the assault. Due to sealift and airlift constraints, FOSP material must be phased into a deployment area by use of Assault Follow-on Echelon or Follow-up shipping.

4. Aircraft forward deployed aboard an amphibious ship, as part of an amphibious MEU, will be supported by the ship. These ships are generally outfitted with the support equipment and spares to support embarked aircraft for 90 days at combat flying hours.

5. MAGTF’s are task organized for the missions assigned them, and each MAGTF in turn task organizes its CSS organizations to support the MAGTF mission and concept of operations. The MAGTF has extensive inherent capability and, if necessary, the MAGTF commander can use all the assets of the MAGTF to respond to broad ranges of unforeseen logistics requirements.

6. **Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program (MALSP).** Aviation logistics support concepts and definitions are discussed below. These concepts and definitions are being incorporated into doctrinal publications. Further discussion of the MALSP is contained in section 7 of this chapter.

   a. **Sources of Aviation Supply.** Carriers (CV’s), large deck amphibious ships (LPH/LHA/LHD) and Marine Aircraft Groups (MAG’s) are considered afloat units. All maintain Aviation Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL), Coordinated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL), Individual Material Readiness List (IMRL), and a variety of NAVAIR allowance list materials (e.g., Table of Basic Allowance). However, the manner in
which they receive and deploy/employ aircraft dictates different allowance structures. CV’s are outfitted for the aircraft they will receive and fight. The aircraft fly from their parent NAS’s to the CV--without having to bring their logistics support from their home base.

b. MAG’s, on the other hand, are not outfitted for the aircraft mix they will receive when they are tasked to form a MAGTF ACE. They must detach some of their aircraft and receive others (from other MAG’s) to form the composite, task-organized ACE required for combat.

c. To move the logistics support almost simultaneously with the aircraft requires that Marine aviation allowances be categorized to allow for the rapid identification and movement of the assets involved. Paragraph 13702.3 contains an explanation of the allowance categories that have been identified in the Weapon System Planning Document (NAVAIR Notices in the C13100 Series) for each T/M/S aircraft. It also explains how these allowances relate to one another and to the MPF and TAVB programs.

13102. EXTERNAL SUPPORT FOR THE MAGTF

1. Navy Support

   a. Navy Support Element (NSE). Amphibious or MPF operations will require augmentation and support from a variety of U.S. Navy units and activities. This support is critical during amphibious force operations and arrival and assembly of the MPF. The various Navy units and activities required for a particular operation are grouped under the descriptive heading of NSE. NSE assets available to support the assault forces in amphibious or MPF operations are listed below. The CNO apportions these forces to the Fleets through the Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan (NCMP), Annex O.

      (1) Naval Beach Group (NBG). The NBG is a command subordinate to the CATF, and is comprised of a commander, his staff, a beach master unit, an amphibious construction battalion, and an assault craft unit. This group or a team of this group is normally attached to the landing force as an integral element of the Landing Force Shore Party.

      (2) Sea, Air, Land (SEALS). The SEALS are Navy forces with an unconventional warfare capability. However, they also provide an ATF underwater reconnaissance, hydrographic survey, and demolition of natural or man-made obstacles.

      (3) Naval Cargo Handling Force. The Naval Cargo Handling Force is comprised of one Naval Cargo Handling Port Group (NAVCAPGRU), one Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Training Battalion, and 12 Naval Reserve Cargo Handling Battalions (NRCHB’s). Each of these units provides technical, supervisory, and general cargo handling services in support of both amphibious and MPF operations. Each MPS Squadron offload requires at least one (normally two) NCHB’s.
b. Naval Construction Force (NCF). The NCF includes the Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB), Naval Construction Regiment, underwater construction team, and the naval construction force support unit. These organizations are responsible for the construction of advanced bases and other shore and near-shore facilities. Elements of the NCF may be assigned to the NSE and/or to the MAGTF. See paragraph 13502 for further discussion of the NCF.

c. Other Fleet Logistics Activities. MAGTF’s attached to fleets are organic to those fleets until they are landed and control passes ashore. With appropriate planning, funding and coordination, the MAGTF’s can draw common-item logistics support directly from associated fleet support activities.

2. Wartime Host-Nation Support (WHNS)

a. Host nation support can augment MAGTF capabilities. Bilateral WHNS agreements can be an integral element of sustainability and mobilization planning. Marine Corps forces will use WHNS to enhance sustainability and support of MAGTF’s. However, WHNS does not normally substitute for essential MAGTF organic logistics/CSS capability.

b. The designated MAGTF commander is responsible for identifying to the FMF commander the WHNS desired by the MAGTF. Once support requirements have been identified, the FMF commander negotiates/coordinates with the host nation during the WHNS agreement development process. The MAGTF commander is responsible for executing WHNS arrangements when executing an OPLAN.

3. Interservice Support Agreement (ISSA)

a. Force Commanders negotiate ISSA’s during peacetime to support recurring training operations in accordance with unified commander or other DoD guidance. Such agreements normally reflect "single manager" support for various classes of supply or logistics functions by in-place "dominant users." The MAGTF commander is responsible for identifying support requirements, and FMF commanders are responsible for negotiating ISSA’s with other Service Components.

b. MAGTF’s can benefit by extending standing ISSA’s to support OPLAN execution. If peacetime support agreements have not been established, the MAGTF, or its representative (e.g., Force commanders), should negotiate wartime ISSA’s to provide previously provided levels. However, wartime ISSA’s will not be funded without approval by HQMC (LPO).

4. HQMC. Logistics support to the MAGTF takes many forms. HQMC must provide certain information.

a. I&L. Provide current TUCHA data to JCS quarterly. Notify planning community via the MCOPSLOG Teleconference when completed. Coordinate supporting establishment support.
b. PP&O. Coordinate assignment of supporting MAGTF’s.

c. M&RA. Develop non-unit replacement policy.

d. AVIATION. Coordinate aviation community support to the supported MAGTF commander.

13103. DELIBERATE AND CRISIS ACTION PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES. MAGTF’s have specific deliberate planning responsibilities and relationships. Crisis action situations may overlay deliberate planning responsibilities and relationships, or cause new assignments. In general terms, specific MAGTF’s will be directed to support designated unified commanders. Additional MAGTF’s (supporting MAGTF’s) may be assigned to assist the first MAGTF to deploy (supported MAGTF). Generally, this responsibility will not be assigned to forces smaller than MEF’s.

1. The supported MAGTF establishes planning guidance, general requirements, and milestones for itself and any supporting MAGTF’s. The supported MAGTF develops force and sustainment requirement TPFDD records, and source those requirements from its parent MEF/FMF, for its organic elements. The supporting MAGTF will develop its own force and sustainment requirement TPFDD records and source those requirements from its own parent MEF/FMF. In the same manner, each MAGTF identifies and plans for its own local deployment support requirements.

2. There are cases in which the MAGTF is responsible for planning and sourcing sustainment for assigned elements of the NSE and NCF. MAGTF planners must verify all arrangements with their NSE/NCF counterparts to ensure that needed sustainment is neither overlooked nor duplicated during planning. In general, when the NSE is supporting an amphibious operation, CATF will support it. During MPF operations, when a CATF is not designated, responsibility for supporting the NSE may fall on the MAGTF. The NCF normally deploys with minimum levels of sustainment, and MAGTF’s assigned an NCF should plan to make good any deficiencies.
SUPPLY SUPPORT. The Marine Corps and Navy supply systems, as parts of the DoD supply system, are designed to operate both in peace and in war. Characteristics of the systems include centralized management, decentralized distribution, maximum use of digital communications networks, and extensive automatic data processing systems.

1. Concept of Supply Support. The Marine Corps supply support concept, except for aviation peculiar support provided by the Navy supply system, provides for:

   a. Reliance on DoD Integrated Materiel Managers (IMM) for support of consumable items.

   b. Emphasis on support directly from supply source to user.

   c. Management emphasis on overall weapon systems support.

   d. Marine Corps ownership and control of prepositioned war reserve stocks and recognition of requirements provided to DoD IMM to be held as other war reserve materiel stocks.

2. Sources of Supply for Specific Items. Due to their peculiar characteristics or management requirements, the following commodities are furnished from other Service or agency wholesale sources:

   a. Subsistence (Class I). Subsistence items are normally obtained from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). War reserve requirements for "B" rations, however, are currently provided by the U.S. Navy.

   b. Bulk Fuel (Class III (Bulk)). Bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants (POL) operating stocks are obtained from the Defense Fuel Supply Center (DFSC). Bulk petroleum operating stock requirements are submitted to the Naval Petroleum Office (NAVPET) for consolidation and forwarding to DFSC. War reserve requirements are furnished to the appropriate CINC Joint Petroleum Office (JPO) for consolidation and forwarding to DFSC.

   c. Ground Ammunition (Class V(W)). Ground ammunition is managed and controlled by COMMARCORSYSCOM, as directed by CMC, until it is issued to MAGTF’s. Due to peculiar storage requirements, ammunition is stored worldwide in Army/Navy ammunition depots.

   d. Aviation Materiel. Aviation peculiar materiel, except for Class V(A), is provided directly to Marine Corps units by the naval aviation supply system. Class V(A) is stored in various locations afloat and ashore, worldwide, and is controlled by the Fleet CINC’s.

   e. Navy Publications. The Marine Corps supply system does not support the Navy publications and forms required for FMF Navy personnel administration and disbursing. Instead of using the supply
system, units must send off-line mail requisitions, with accounting
data, to the Navy Publications and Forms Center, Philadelphia,
Pennsylvania (Routing Indicator Code NFZ).

13203. **LEVELS OF SUPPLY SUPPORT.** Supply support is organized into
three levels: wholesale, intermediate retail, and consumer retail.
These levels distinguish between the supplies for which either
Service, MAGTF, or organizational funds are obligated.

1. **Wholesale.** Wholesale level supply support consists of support
provided by the two Marine Corps Logistics Bases (MCLB’s), Navy ICP’s;
the DLA; IMM’s; and, in some cases, field/theater depots and host
nation support.

2. **Intermediate Retail.** Intermediate retail level supply support for
Marine Corps funded assets is provided by the FSSG or the MAGTF CSSE.
Intermediate retail supply support for aviation peculiar assets is
provided by MALS’s.

3. **Consumer Retail.** Consumer retail level supply support is provided
by using units employing organic logistics/CSS assets. In this
context, the only aviation consumer level supply support consists of
pre-expended bin (PEB) materiel, limited quantities of POL and paint
type items, and day-to-day administrative support items.

13204. **PACKAGING.** All materiel packaging, whether planned or
accomplished during deliberate planning or in crisis response, either
in CONUS, or at intermediate support bases (ISBs) outside CONUS, will
conform with the following guidelines.

1. The dominant criteria for packaging is the MAGTF’s plans for using
the materiel.

   a. Break-bulk/palletized cargo will be maximized for AE and
   airlifted elements of the MAGTF.

   b. Containerization will be maximized for Assault Follow-On
   Echelon (AFOE) dry cargo.

2. All Marine Corps and Navy furnished materiel shall be afforded
packaging protection adequate to prevent corrosion, deterioration, and
physical/mechanical damage during storage and distribution.
Containerization is considered to be one of the highest potential
payoff areas for reducing packaging costs. Containerization will not
reduce or eliminate the requirement for appropriate levels of
protection for materiel being removed from the container and stored in
a field environment.

3. Non-containerized materiel will be provided appropriate military
levels of protection or equivalent commercial packaging. Packaging
protection may be reduced for containerized shipments when the items
are intended for immediate use, when the container is retained as a
storage and issue facility, or when it is known at time of shipment that favorable storage will be available upon receipt. Materiel previously packaged at a higher degree of protection will not be repacked for containerized shipments.

4. Cargo documentation for all MAGTF supplies will be prepared using automated methods such as LOGMARS, in addition to those manual or other automated methods imposed by the commercial shipper or by USTRANSCOM for overland, sea, or air movements.

13205. REMAIN BEHIND EQUIPMENT (RBE). RBE is any organic FMF equipment, regardless of class of supply, that remains behind when a force deploys to marry up with prepositioned equipment. The Force Commander and Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases (COMMARCORLOGBASES) use RBE to fill local and/or supply system shortages for active and reserve units, and to reduce transportation requirements.

1. Refer to MCO P4400.39 (War Reserve Policy Manual) for detailed instructions on handling ground RBE.

2. Aviation RBE items are identified as Follow-on Support Package (FOSP) items in allowance documents provided to the MALS. FOSP items will be phased into the employment area as they are required (see paragraph 5702.5).
13300. **GENERAL.** This section describes the levels of aviation and ground maintenance the Marine Corps is capable of performing. In general, MAGTF equipment-owning units perform as much ground maintenance as they can/are authorized at the organizational and, in some cases, intermediate levels. The MAGTF CSSE provides overflow ground organizational maintenance support and most intermediate ground maintenance support. Within the Aviation Combat Element, the owning squadrons perform "0-level" (organizational) and the MALs perform "I-level" (intermediate) aviation maintenance. The supporting establishment provides depot level ground and aviation maintenance support. Additional information on aviation maintenance is presented in section 7.

13301. **ORGANIZATION FOR MAINTENANCE**

1. **Ground.** During combat operations, ground equipment maintenance focuses on battle damage repair, removal/replacement of critical repair parts and components, and the performance of essential preventive maintenance services. The Marine Corps employs three levels of ground maintenance which are subdivided into five echelons. The Marine Corps employs three levels of ground maintenance which are subdivided into five echelons.

   a. **Organizational Level.** The organizational level (first and second echelon) of maintenance is performed by owning units. It consists of inspecting, servicing, lubricating, and adjusting equipment, and replacing parts, minor assemblies, and subassemblies. First echelon is operator maintenance, while second echelon includes minor repairs and preventive maintenance performed by trained maintenance personnel.

   b. **Intermediate Level.** In the MAGTF, the CSSE normally performs intermediate (third and fourth echelon) ground equipment maintenance, although some organizations are authorized to perform limited intermediate maintenance on specialized equipment they rate. Third echelon includes major repairs, while fourth echelon includes repair of secondary reparable items. Intermediate maintenance includes calibration, repair, and replacement of damaged or unserviceable parts, components, or assemblies. It may also include the emergency manufacture of unavailable parts. The primary method of providing intermediate level maintenance is to dispatch contact teams to effect on-site repairs; unserviceable/disabled equipment will be evacuated to mobile repair facilities when repairs cannot be accomplished on-site. Normally, secondary reparable items will only be replaced, not repaired, for the first 45 days of combat operations.

   c. **Depot Level.** Depot level maintenance (fifth echelon) is performed on materiel requiring major overhaul or complete rebuild of parts, subassemblies, assemblies, or end items, including the manufacture of parts, modifications, testing and reclamation. Depot level maintenance is performed by the MCLB’s at Albany, Georgia, and Barstow, California, and through depot maintenance interservice
support agreements (DMISSA’s) coordinated by HQMC. There is no depot level maintenance for Class VIII equipment.

2. **Aviation.** Organizational, intermediate, and depot are also the levels of aviation maintenance, but there are no sub-levels, and the aviation definitions vary slightly from the ground definitions. See section 7 for more a more detailed treatment of the subject.

   a. **Organizational Maintenance ("0-Level").** 0-level maintenance is the responsibility of, and performed by, a using organization (usually the reporting custodian) on its assigned aircraft and equipment. Its phases normally consist of inspecting, servicing, lubricating, adjusting, and replacing parts, minor assemblies, and subassemblies.

   b. **Intermediate Maintenance ("I-Level").** I-level maintenance is the responsibility of, and performed by, designated maintenance activities in support of using organizations. The I-level maintenance mission is to enhance and sustain the combat readiness and mission capability of the supported activities by providing quality and timely material support at the nearest location with the lowest practical resource expenditure. I-level maintenance consists of on- and off-equipment material support such as:

      (1) Performance of maintenance on aeronautical components and related support equipment.

      (2) Calibration (Type IV), by field calibration activities which perform I-level calibration of designated equipment.

      (3) Processing of aircraft components from stricken aircraft.

      (4) Technical assistance to supported units.

      (5) Incorporation of TDs.

      (6) Manufacture of selected aeronautical components.

      (7) Performance of on-aircraft maintenance when required.

   c. **Depot Maintenance.** Depot maintenance is performed on materiel requiring major overhaul or a complete rebuild of parts, assemblies, subassemblies, and end-items -- to include manufacturing parts, modifications, testing, and reclamation. Naval Aviation Depots (NADEPs), or commercial contractors, perform depot level maintenance in support of Marine aircraft and associated support equipment. In addition, each MAW has a Mobile Calibration Complex (MCC) which performs depot level type III Calibration of designated equipment, as specified by the Naval Warfare Assessment Center Metrology Engineering Center, Corona.
13400. **GENERAL.** Marine Corps organic transportation support consists of motor transport, aerial transport, landing support, and beach and terminal operations. Landing support and beach and terminal operations are included in this section due to their inherent capability to facilitate the transition between the transportation modes used for deployment and the modes used for employment (e.g., the shift from strategic air/sealift to tactical transport).

13401. **TRANSPORTATION SUPPORT ORGANIC TO THE MARINE AIR GROUND TASK FORCE**

1. **GCE Transportation Support.** The GCE possesses only limited tactical motor transport assets. The mobility assets in the LAI and artillery units are primarily for organic tactical mobility. The AAV Battalion and Truck Company of the Headquarters Battalion of the Marine Division also provide tactical mobility to other units within the GCE. If the tactical situation permits and sufficient assets are available, the GCE may assign its AAVs some logistics-support transportation tasks. Normally the CSSE must supplement the GCE’s ground transportation capabilities.

2. **ACE Transportation Support**

   a. The Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS) provides the ACE with organic ground transportation support at each airfield. Marine Air Control Group (MACG) units, in particular the Light Anti-Air Missile (LAAM) and Light Anti-Air Defence (LAAD) battalions, also possess organic motor transport. The CSSE can also supplement ACE ground transportation capabilities.

   b. The ACE helicopters (and KC-130’s, if assigned and their refueling mission commitments permit) provide the MAGTF with significant intratheater air transport capability.

3. **CSSE Transportation Support.** The CSSE provides motor transport support and landing support. The MAGTF commander normally centralizes control of movement by assigning responsibility for MAGTF movement control to the CSSE commander.

   a. **Motor Transport Support**

      (1) Motor transport is surface transportation using wheeled vehicles, and is the most versatile mode of transport. It links the aerial ports, ocean ports, supply centers, rail terminals, and inland waterway terminals. Motor transport units can move almost any type of cargo and can provide either local, limited line, or zonal hauls.

      (2) General use motor transport assets within the CSSE can include 5-ton tactical cargo trucks, logistics vehicle systems (LVS), SIXCON fuel and water modules, semi-trailer van refrigerators, and 40
and 70 ton trailers employed to transport cargo, equipment, fuel, water, and personnel over extended distances for a sustained period of time. Motor transport units are task organized to provide motor transport capability in the CSSE for supporting the MAGTF. The Motor Transport Battalion within the Force Service Support Group, provides the bulk of the MEF’s motor transport capability, including a limited container line-haul capability.

b. Landing Support

(1) Landing support operations encompass beach/port operations, aerial delivery support, departure/arrival airfield control, and air/sea terminal operations. Beach and terminal operations units, when directed and augmented, may assume beach/port functions during sustained operations ashore.

(2) The CSSE, augmented as necessary by the other MAGTF elements and by the Naval Beach Group (NBG), provides landing support to all elements of the MAGTF. For employment of a MEF, landing support assets are task organized into a Shore Party Group consisting of two Shore Party Teams and/or into a Helicopter Support Group consisting of two Helicopter Support Teams. Landing support organizations are critical to the management of the initial phases of the assault and subsequent movement inland. The Marine elements of the Shore Party Group prepare, mark, and control the landing beach or zone; locate and establish interim supply dumps; unload supplies from landing craft, ships, and helicopters; provide emergency maintenance; and evacuate casualties and prisoners of war.

(3) The Shore Party Group operates in the Beach Support Area. Its function diminishes as the scope of logistics operations extends inland. Elements of the Shore Party Group are attached to the assault forces for debarkation and landing. As the logistics support system develops ashore, the Shore Party Group organizations are modified. When no longer required for landing support functions, units attached to landing support organizations revert to parent unit control or are otherwise assigned, as appropriate. Upon establishment of the CSSE ashore, selected command and control elements of the Shore Party Group remain for continued landing support as required.

13402. INTRATHEATER TRANSPORTATION

1. Navy-Marine Corps forces are generally self-sufficient for ship-to-shore movement. Once established ashore, the MAGTF may require interservice or host nation transportation support/augmentation for requirements which exceed organic lift capabilities. Intratheater transportation encompasses the movement of equipment, cargo, and/or personnel from a point of origin to storage or staging areas, and subsequently to forward operating areas. This function spans all modes of transportation available: air, motor vehicle, rail, water, and pipeline.
2. When such augmentation or support is required, regardless of mode of transportation considered, the MAGTF Logistics Movement Control Center (LMCC) coordinates with the appropriate joint, Service or host nation transportation and movement control agency to register requirements and arrange support. In some cases the external transportation and movement control agency may be chartered to coordinate theater transportation down to the level of tactical convoys.

3. As part of its possible employment as the nucleus of a Joint Task Force headquarters, the MAGTF may be required to function as the nucleus of a joint transportation and movement control agency. This agency would coordinate designated transportation and transportation support operations for all Services.

13403. CONTAINERIZATION. ISO 8’X8’X20’ containers will generally not be used by Marine air contingency forces or in the assault echelon of Marine amphibious forces. The exception to this general rule is the MAGTF ACE, which uses standard containers—as mobile aviation maintenance facilities and aviation supply pack-ups—to a degree not yet achieved for the rest of the MAGTF and its ground/common supplies. Allowances for the aviation containers, identified as mobile facilities (MF’s), are contained within the NAVAIR Allowance List 00-35T-37-4.
13500. GENERAL. A MAGTF may have units from as many as four engineer organizations assigned to it. Normally, units from the division Combat Engineer Battalion (CEB), the MAW Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS), and the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) Engineer Support Battalion (ESB) are assigned. When required and available, Navy Construction Force (NCF) units may also be assigned to the MAGTF. The capabilities of each of these organizations are designed to complement each other and provide depth to MAGTF engineering capabilities. General capabilities are summarized below; for more detailed discussion of MAGTF engineering capability, see the references listed in Appendix B.

13501. MARINE CORPS ENGINEERING SUPPORT. MAGTF engineering support encompasses both combat support (CS) and CSS. Major engineering sub-functions include demolition and emplacement of obstacles, engineer reconnaissance, horizontal and vertical construction, bulk liquid storage, bridging, and utilities support.

1. GCE Engineering Support. The division CEB is the primary source for GCE engineering combat support. Depending upon mission and operational requirements, the CSSE may augment the CEB’s CS capabilities.

   a. Based on its current and planned/directed structure, the CEB can provide the following CS to the GCE:

      (1) Engineer reconnaissance and planning.

      (2) Emplacement and demolition of light obstacles.

      (3) Construction of field fortifications.

      (4) Emplacing of mine fields, and conducting hasty breaching of mine fields and fortifications.

   b. With augmentation from CSSE engineer units, the CEB can provide this additional CS:

      (1) Emplacement and demolition of major obstacles.

      (2) Clearing vertical take-off/landing (VTOL)/helicopter landing zones (LZ’s).

      (3) Construction of pioneer roads.

2. ACE Engineering Support. The MWSS performs CSS engineering tasks for the ACE. When ACE engineering requirements exceed MWSS capabilities, the CSSE and/or the NCF will be requested to provide additional support to the ACE. The MWSS has a limited capability to provide CS to the ACE. MWSS engineering support capabilities include:
a. Engineer reconnaissance and planning.
b. Limited emplacement and clearing of mines.
c. VTOL/helicopter LZ clearing and construction.
d. Emplacement of obstacles.
e. Construction of field fortifications.
f. Construction of unpaved roads and airstrips.
g. Limited camp construction and maintenance.
h. Expedient rapid runway repair.
i. Water and hygiene services.
j. Electrical power supply and distribution.
k. Bulk liquid receipt, storage and issue.

l. Maintenance and repair of aircraft forward operating bases (FOB’s).

3. **CSSE Engineering Support.** The CSSE is the primary source of CSS engineering support to the MAGTF. It provides depth to a MAGTF’s engineering capabilities by supporting GCE organic CS engineer organizations and ACE organic CSS engineer organizations. Its engineering capability is extensive (although largely restricted to dirt and wood construction) and includes the following:

a. Engineer reconnaissance and planning.
b. VTOL/helicopter LZ clearing/construction.
c. Emplacement and demolition of barriers and obstacles.
d. Construction of field fortifications.
e. Emplacement and clearing of mines and mine fields.
f. Construction of standard and non-standard fixed and floating bridges, and conducting ferry operations.
g. Construction of unpaved roads and airstrips.
h. Expeditionary airfield construction.
i. Camp construction and maintenance.
j. Beach improvements.
k. Electrical power supply and distribution.

13-24
1. Expedient rapid runway repair.

m. Construction design.

n. Bulk fuel receipt, storage and issue.

o. Potable water production and storage.

p. Explosive ordnance disposal.

13502. **NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE (NCF)**. NCF is a generic term applied to deployable naval organizations which have the capability to construct, maintain, and/or operate shore, inshore, and/or deep ocean facilities. The NCF provides additional capabilities not organic to the MAGTF, including concrete and metal construction. Administrative control and direct support of NCF units is provided by the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC) through its construction battalion centers and other principal support organizations. Operational control of deployed NCF units may be exercised by commands other than those which have administrative control.

1. NCF units are apportioned during the deliberate planning process. Generally, a Navy Construction Regiment (NCR) composed of three Navy Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCBs) and one Navy Construction Support Unit (NCSU) is assigned to support a MEF. Normally the NCF will be in direct support of the MAGTF; it may also be placed under operational control of the MAGTF commander. When an NCF is attached, the MAGTF is responsible for its logistics support. The assigned NCF deploys with limited organic sustainment, which varies by class of supply. The supported MAGTF will plan for and provide support required beyond organic NCF sustainment.

2. During deliberate planning, an engineer planning group composed of representatives from each MAGTF element must establish a prioritized list of those engineering tasks required to support the MAGTF mission/concept of operations. After tasks for the NCF have been prioritized, the necessary supplies and equipment must be identified. The MAGTF will obtain those supplies needed for selected projects.

3. The NCF units apportioned to a MAGTF, and transported in the AFOE, augment the landing force when construction requirements exceed the landing force engineer units’ capabilities. The NCF’s operational capabilities are addressed in The Naval Construction Force Manual NAVFAC P-315, in OPNAVINST C3501.2H, and in *The Naval Construction Force in Support of MAGTF Operations* (FMFM 13-4). After the landing beach is cleared, the first priority is the support of Marine tactical aircraft ashore. Subsequent NCF efforts include:


   b. Construction and maintenance of roads and bridges, helicopter landing pads and support facilities.
c. Upgrading and replenishment of assault fuel systems.

d. Construction of ammunition supply points, water facilities (including well points), cantonments, defensive structures, airstrips, expeditionary port facilities, and other tactical support facilities.

13503. ENGINEER PLANNING, COORDINATION AND CONTROL. The MAGTF engineer functions as a special staff officer to the MAGTF commander, and is responsible for planning, integrating and coordinating the engineer effort in support of the MAGTF. The MAGTF engineer, unless superseded in those instances where an engineer group is established, is responsible for prioritizing the engineering requirements based upon the MAGTF commander’s guidance, and assigning the proper engineer forces to accomplish the mission.
13600. GENERAL. This section addresses MAGTF medical capabilities, covering Marine Corps organic medical organizations and external sources of medical care that would be available to support MAGTF’s during contingencies.

13601. MARINE CORPS ORGANIC MEDICAL SUPPORT

1. General

   a. Mission. The mission of the health services support element in combat is to provide the medical and dental care required to maintain, preserve and restore the combat power of the force. Health Service Support functions include:

      (1) Health Maintenance
      (2) Casualty Collection
      (3) Casualty Treatment
      (4) Temporary Hospitalization
      (5) Casualty Evacuation

   Marine Corps medical capability is limited to Echelon I and Echelon II care as defined in FMFM 4-50.

   b. The Navy provides all medical and dental personnel to the Marine Corps.

   c. Medical personnel are organic to all combat and combat support organizations of battalion/squadron size or larger. Medical support capability above the battalion/squadron level is provided by health service organizations organic to the FSSG and the MWSG. The MAGTF CSSE provides medical material support for all combat, CS, and CSS medical organizations via detachments from the medical logistics company, supply battalion, FSSG.

   d. Historically during conventional non-nuclear warfare, combat--especially infantry--organizations incur the most casualties, closely followed by combat support organizations. Medical capability and evacuation facilities have been concentrated accordingly. However, nuclear and chemical warfare and/or terrorist activity may increase casualties within the rear areas, especially within command element and CSS organizations, and must be planned for accordingly.

2. GCE Medical Capability. Each regimental headquarters has a medical section composed of one medical officer and three hospital corpsmen organic to the headquarters company of the regiment. Each combat and combat support battalion assigned to the GCE has organic
medical personnel and the capability to establish one or more battalion aid stations. For example, in combat, infantry battalions are typically staffed with two Navy medical officers and 21 Navy corpsmen. This level of battalion staffing enables the battalion to establish two Battalion Aid Stations when required. Each company in the infantry battalion typically has 11 corpsmen. In situations where a battalion aid station is located near the infantry regimental headquarters, the regimental aid station may not be established; regimental medical personnel will then augment the battalion aid station, and regimental headquarters elements will use the combined facility.

3. **ACE Medical Capability.** When the aircraft wing or subordinate elements are committed to combat, medical support must be tailored from medical resources organic to group and separate squadron medical sections. Medical services provide for routine sick call, flight physical examinations, first aid for NBC and other mass casualty situations, air evacuation, and preventive medicine. The medical division of each MWSS has the organic medical personnel and equipment needed to establish an airfield aid station. Each flying squadron is also staffed with a flight surgeon. Provisions must be made for medical and dental service to support each independent tactical employment of various Marine aircraft wing elements with limited lab, X-ray, and pharmacy support. This is accomplished by providing each MWSS with personnel and equipment to establish airfield aid stations at fixed wing and rotary wing sites.

4. **CSSE Medical/Dental Capability.** Medical/dental support in the CSSE is designed to provide coordination, direct medical/dental services to the entire MAGTF, and coordinated medical/dental supply/maintenance support.

   a. **CSSE Aid Station.** The CSSE aid station is designed to provide medical and medical administrative support to the CSSE and the MAGTF Command Element (CE).

   b. **Medical/Dental Support Coordination.** The health services support unit (HSSU) located in the CSSE headquarters is capable of coordinating medical and dental support requirements for the entire MAGTF. Such coordination includes the review of OPLAN medical support requirements. In conjunction with the MAGTF surgeon and medical/dental units, the CSSE headquarters develops medical/dental support plans for operational requirements that are beyond the organic capability of MAGTF elements. Requirements are also coordinated for all medical/dental support demands in the amphibious objective area.

   c. **Medical Support.** The FSSG medical battalion is organized into an H&S company, four casualty collecting and clearing companies, and two surgical support companies. It is equipped and staffed to provide for a total of 18 surgical operating rooms and 540 casualty flow-through cots along with ancillary X-ray, laboratory, pharmacy support, and blood bank. The medical battalion medical capabilities encompass the following functions:
d. Dental Support. The CSSE dental capabilities are designed to support MAGTF operational readiness by providing a comprehensive program of dental support, contingency planning, and mass casualty medical assistance. MAGTF dental personnel will be utilized in support of medical efforts under the direction of cognizant medical authority.

e. Medical Logistics. The capabilities of medical logistics company, supply battalion, FSSG, encompass Class VIII supply support and intermediate (third and fourth echelon) maintenance support for MAGTF medical and dental equipment. Medical supply operations can function as a centralized effort, or they can be decentralized into multiple smaller units. Medical logistics also includes maintaining the MEF authorized medical allowance lists/authorized dental allowance lists (AMALs/ADALs). The Navy maintains automated listings of the net quantity of NSNs required to meet the SMCR’s total AMALs/ADALs requirements. These aggregated NSN requirements are registered with DLA by the Naval Medical Logistics Command (NAVMEDLOGCMD) in support of Naval Warfare Project Code PG-3 (see OPNAVINST 4080.11C). When required for a contingency DLA will release available stocks, shipped in bulk. The receiving site (or SMCR medical logistics company) must provide for assembly into deployable AMALs/ADALs and arrange PP&P and tactical/embarkation markings.

5. Medical Personnel Augmentation System (MPAS). The MPAS identifies and assigns trained active duty medical personnel in peacetime for deployment in contingency situations.

a. FMF peacetime medical manning levels are maintained below combat operation manning levels because of the difference between peacetime and combat medical workloads. In a contingency situation, FMF medical manning will be "rounded out" to full authorized levels with additional medical personnel.

b. The MPAS ensures that transportation can be provided through JOPES for delivery of pre-identified personnel from Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (BUMED) CONUS activities to the station of initial assignment (SIA). The system supports the sourcing of additional
medical requirements (i.e., fleet hospitals and hospital ships) and allows for incorporating Naval Reserve medical manpower assets into the Navy medical manpower pool. The MPAS is activated for contingency situations by request from FMF commanders to CNO via the operational chain of command.

6. Marine Corps Order 6700.2 (Medical and Dental (Class VIII) Material Support of the Fleet Marine Force) provides policies and procedures relative to medical and dental materiel support of the Marine Corps. This order defines the AMAL/ADAL minimum allowance requirements for a MEF, and provides policy guidance for medical inventory, dated and deteriorative items, surgical packs, medical/dental repair, and base support.

13602. NORWAY AIRLANDED MEB (NALMEB). Dedicated AMALs/ADALs have been stored in support of the NALMEB. The NALMEB AMAL/ADAL is considered additive to the 60 day MEF sustainment requirement currently maintained by the medical logistics company. NALMEB organic medical support consists of one collecting and clearing company, one surgical support company, and a detachment of medical personnel from the medical battalion H&S company, for a total of five operating rooms and 140 cots.

13603. MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE (MPF). Dedicated AMALs/ADALs are embarked aboard MPSRONs. Configured as an additive 30 DOS MEF (FWD) block (in excess of 60 DOS maintained by each medical logistics company), the MPF AMALs/ADALs can support one collecting and clearing company, one surgical support company, and a detachment of medical personnel from the medical battalion H&S company for a total of nine operating rooms and 280 cots.

13604. CASUALTY RECEIVING AND TREATMENT SHIPS. LHA’s and LPH’s of the amphibious fleet, assigned secondary missions as casualty receiving and treatment ships, have prepositioned medical equipment and supplies on-board. The planned medical capabilities of these ships (see below) are achieved with the assignment of Mobile Medical Augmentation Readiness Teams (MMART’s) for peacetime contingencies and by MPAS personnel under mobilization conditions. There are currently 12 of these ships, five LHAs and seven LPH’s, divided between LANTFLT and PACFLT. In addition, the new LHD-class ships are being configured to provide more operating room and bed capabilities than the LHA and LPH-class ships. LPHs are accessible only by helicopter; LHA’s and LHD’s have well decks which makes it possible for them to receive casualties conveniently via surface landing craft.
13605. **HOSPITAL SHIPS**

1. Hospital ships provide acute combat casualty care when activated and augmented by medical and medical support personnel. Like LPH’s, they are accessible only by helicopter.

2. Hospital ships represent a surgically intensive, stand alone medical support system that is 100 percent capable of providing medical care; however, once patient capacity is reached, patients must be evacuated to other treatment facilities such as the Communications Zone Fleet Hospital.

3. The USNS MERCY (TAH-19), OPCON CINCPACFLT, and USNS COMFORT (TAH-20), OPCON CINCLANTFLT, are maintained in reduced operating status by the MSC at Oakland, California, and Baltimore, Maryland, respectively. While the ships are in reduced operating status, a cadre crew of military medical technicians maintain the medical equipment.

4. The two ships are capable of deployment within five days of receiving orders. Medical personnel and associated supply support will initially be provided by Naval Hospital, Oakland, to the USNS MERCY, and by Naval Hospital, Bethesda, to the USNS COMFORT. The ships will deploy with 15 days of consumable supplies. Non-essential medical personnel and additional medical supplies will be airlifted to the theater of operations within 12 hours of ships arrival on station.

5. The hospital ships will be employed as CINC assets, not necessarily as MAGTF or CATF assets. Accordingly, it is possible for them to be assigned missions which would prevent them from supporting MAGTF operations.

13606. **MOBILE MEDICAL AUGMENTATION READINESS TEAM (MMART)**

1. NAVMEDCOMINST 6440.2 gives specific details on the mobile medical augmentation readiness system. The MMART mission is to serve as a response force of medical department personnel trained to rapidly augment elements of the operating forces during peacetime contingencies (but not during mobilization). The CINC’s request specific augmentation from BUMED which, in turn, tasks one of its MSCs to alert and task organize an appropriate MMART. MMART’s may be
employed as single teams, as individual units, or a combination of two or more units. The MMART is composed of the following type units which can be located afloat or ashore:

a. Surgical team (includes surgical unit, medical regulating unit, surgical support unit and ancillary support unit).

b. Specialist support team.

c. Disaster support team.

d. Preventive medicine team.

e. Special psychiatric rapid intervention team.

f. Resuscitation and stabilization team.

2. Individual teams/units are staffed and equipped to provide medical support for limited periods. Teams are not equipped for independent operations. Support must be provided by the commands to which the teams/units are attached when deployed. The nucleus of an MMART is the surgical team. surgical and specialist support teams will be employed on a contingency/emergency basis only.

3. Fleet surgical teams (FST’s) are occasionally, although incorrectly, thought to be part of, or even to be a replacement for, the MMART’s. In fact, FST’s are CINCPACFLT and CINCLANTFLT assets which are based in San Diego, California, and Norfolk, Virginia, respectively. FST’s have replaced surgical and specialist support teams on routine, peacetime deployments. FST’s are a less personnel-intensive method for meeting routine ARG deployment requirements; team members are permanently assigned (PCS) to the FST’s.

13607. FLEET HOSPITALS

1. Two types of fleet hospitals are available for support of the MAGTF: the combat zone fleet hospital and the communications zone fleet hospital. The combat zone fleet hospital and communications zone fleet hospital differ in size, amount of external support required, and use of tents in place of more permanent structures. The combat zone fleet hospital has only enough organic motor transport assets to displace a small medical echelon unit, less than five percent of the total hospital. The 500-bed communications zone fleet hospital does not contain any vehicles for tactical relocation and will depend entirely on other Navy advanced base assets for movement.

2. As MAGTF operations expand ashore, advancing away from the amphibious objective area coastline, additional casualty care capability will be required. This capability will be provided by the combat zone fleet hospital.

3. The 250/500-bed combat zone fleet hospital can be erected by organic staff and be ready to receive casualties within eight to ten
The hospitals will be prepositioned aboard ships and in CONUS and OCONUS for rapid contingency employment. The combat zone fleet hospital provides acute casualty care, returning the maximum number of casualties to duty within the established theater evacuation policy. Casualties requiring more definitive care and those evacuated from hospital ships will be received at the 500/1000-bed communications zone fleet hospitals.

4. All equipment selected for the fleet hospitals is commercially available off-the-shelf or DoD standard equipment which has been tested and operated in civilian or DoD hospitals.

5. For planning purposes the fleet hospital program provides the following designated advanced base functional components (ABFC’s):

M1E     500 Bed Communications Zone
M2E     500 Bed Combat Zone
M3E     250 Bed Combat Zone
M4E     1000 Bed Communications Zone (Medical Core)

a. The fleet hospitals are designated medical expeditionary ABFC’s, and as such are included in the CNO Special Project for Prepositioned War Reserve Stock (PWRS).

b. BUMED is responsible for updating the medical ABFC’s.

13608. MEDICAL PLANNING MODULE (MPM)

1. The MPM is one of several software modules in JOPES used for computing sustainment requirements. The MPM allows medical planners to determine gross medical support requirements based on a number of specified variables. These variables include the size of the force at risk or population at risk (PAT), expected casualty admission rates, combat intensity levels, and the commander’s evacuation policy. See paragraph 5610, below, for evacuation policy information.

2. The MPM calculates time-phased requirements for hospital beds and physicians, including general surgeons, orthopedic surgeons, anesthesiologists, other physicians, nurses, and enlisted personnel. It also generates requirements for Class VIII and blood/fluids.

3. The MPM generates a variety of output reports that list time-phased requirements. The model is designed to accept planner input, perform calculations, and produce output in JOPES-specified format for the medical services appendix to the OPLAN logistics annex.

4. The MPM, however, has limitations. It cannot determine the types of medical facilities that are actually required. Moreover, it cannot quantify the adequacy of existing medical facilities, nor does it fully consider Marine Corps-unique concepts of medical support,
particularly in view of Marine Corps tactical mobility considerations. It cannot react to anticipated changes in environmental conditions and predict the impact on casualty condition and treatment requirements. Therefore, MAGTF commanders are authorized and encouraged to adjust MPM planning factors and calculations, based on specific scenarios/service unique requirements, as desired.

13609. **EVACUATION POLICY.** Evacuation policy is a CINC decision. The policy is stated as the maximum period (in days) of non-effectiveness that patients may be held within a medical facility.

1. Patients who, in the opinion of medical officers, cannot be returned to duty status within the period prescribed are evacuated by the first available means, provided the travel involved will not aggravate their disabilities. The evacuation policy also assists planners in determining other levels of care required such as convalescent care, and where such care should be located, such as CONUS, OCONUS, communication zone, or elsewhere. Evacuation policies are developed based on numbers of beds available in-theater, the intensities of combat expected, the total populations at risk, and the projected availability of airlift and sealift.

2. Planning guidance is that force structure will be adequate for at least a 15 day evacuation policy. Specific policy will be provided in individual OPLAN’s. Evacuation planning should consider that a shorter evacuation policy has the major advantages of requiring fewer medical facilities and fewer medical personnel in-theater. Conversely, its major disadvantages are a great increase of personnel in replacement channels, increased loss of trained personnel, and increased transportation requirements. In general, for a longer evacuation policy, the reverse is true.

13610. **MILITARY BLOOD PROGRAM**

1. **Military Blood Program Management.** Each unified command has established or has provisions for establishing a Joint Military Blood Office (JMBO) designed to coordinate the blood program of the command and its components and serve as the single interface with the DoD Military Blood Program Office (MBPO). The unified commander establishes an area JMBO as required. Theater and area JMBO’s consolidate requirements for blood and blood products for the various service components and have the authority to direct redistribution of blood and blood products among those components. The joint force commander shall designate an officer within each service component to serve as the principal point of contact for blood matters. The ATF surgeon or his designee serves in this role during amphibious operations. The landing force surgeon or his designee coordinates blood program matters for the landing force during subsequent operations ashore.

2. **Operational Requirements.** The wide range of deployment and employment options precludes the establishment of one general set of
blood and blood product support plans. For information on blood planning factors, see section 8. Requirements which may have been previously identified in OPLAN’s should be reviewed in detail to verify that the quantities, delivery points, and time phasing remain consistent with OPLAN assumptions and planning guidance.

a. Fleet units with blood storage or blood processing capability must be prepared to deploy with blood supplies on board in order to provide blood support to other ships in their task force element and to provide initial support of landing forces ashore.

b. Forward deployed forces must have initial blood inventories on hand or must have made provisions for the rapid delivery of blood and blood products from specified sources.

c. For maritime and geographic prepositioning forces, provisions for rapid delivery of blood and blood products from specified sources must be planned for in advance. Maritime and geographic prepositioning forces do not have initial blood inventories and blood processing capability on hand.
13700. **GENERAL.** MAGTF organic aviation logistics support capability is developed by combining "building blocks" of aviation supply and aviation maintenance resources; i.e., by task organizing. Similarly, MAGTF ground logistics support capability is also developed by task organizing, and the "supply" and "maintenance" logistics functions are essentially the same for both ground and aviation requirements. However, the Marine ground CSS units from which MAGTF CSSE’s are formed are organized on a single-function basis, whereas Marine aviation logistics units are organized to provide both supply and maintenance as a single integrated function. Furthermore, the ACE has the capability to perform logistics tasks for itself which are unique in the MAGTF. This section supplements the supply and maintenance sections presented earlier in this chapter. It is provided to explain the wide range of MAGTF aviation logistics support and to highlight for planners the differences between ground and aviation logistics methodologies.

13701. **CONTROLLING CUSTODIAN.** The Commander, Naval Air Force, Atlantic (COMNAVAIRLANT); the Commander, Naval Air Force, Pacific (COMNAVAIRPAC); and the Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force (COMNAVAIRESFOR) are the controlling custodians for Marine Corps aircraft and support equipment. They exercise the administrative control (assignment), employment, and logistics support of aircraft and engines, as specified by the CNO.

13702. **MARINE AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT PROGRAM (MALSP)**

1. **MALSP Capabilities.** The MALSP provides a means for the commander to rapidly task organize aviation logistics assets to deploy by available means to support the ACE of a MAGTF. It provides an immediate contingency capability in the form of a Fly in Support Package (FISP). It supports a subsequent rapid phased build up of combat capability in the operating area through the use of Contingency Support Packages (CSP’s) and Follow on Support Packages (FOSP’s).

2. **MALSP Concept.** MALSP uses a building block concept. Each allowance is designed to complement other MALSP allowances. The commander stacks MALSP allowances like blocks to build the various types of support capability. MALSP includes support equipment, spare/repair parts, mobile facilities/shelters, and personnel.

   a. **Support Equipment (SE).** Support equipment includes test equipment, tools and ground support equipment specified in an Intermediate Materiel Readiness List (IMRL). An IMRL is a consolidated allowance list specifying authorized quantities of certain aviation SE items required by a particular activity to perform its assigned maintenance level functions. NAVAIR computes IMRL allowances to support deployed operations for 90 days based upon
combat flying hours. All Marine Corps and Navy aviation activities have IMRL's.

b. **Spares.** Spares are divided into Aviation Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL), Shore Consolidated Allowance List (SHORCAL) and Consolidated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL) items.

1. **Aviation Consolidated Allowance List (AVCAL).** AVCAL is an allowance of spare and repair parts authorized to a MALS by Aviation Supply Office (ASO), Philadelphia, PA. An AVCAL is designed to support a specific aircraft population for a period of 90 days based on combat flying hours. Each MALS has a series of allowances computed in accordance with ASO Field Instruction 4441.1.

2. **Shore Consolidated Allowance List (SHORCAL).** SHORCAL is an allowance of spare and repair parts authorized to support a specific aircraft population for a period of 30 days based on peacetime flying hours. Marine Reserve aviation units are supported by SHORCALs held by Naval Air Stations. In wartime, Aviation PWR augments the SHORCAL to provide reserve aviation units with a complete 90 day capability based on combat flying hours.

3. **Consolidated Shipboard Allowance List (COSAL).** COSAL is an allowance of spare and repair parts authorized to a MALS by the Ships Parts and Control Center (SPCC), Mechanicsburg, PA. A COSAL is designed to support specific aircraft weapon systems, and test and support equipment. A COSAL is designed to provide support for a period of 90 days based on combat flying hours.

4. **Allowance Requirements Registers (ARR’s), Allowance Lists (AL’s) and Tables of Basic Allowances (TBA) for Aeronautical Material.** ARR’s, AL’s, and the TBA are prepared by NAVAIR or by ASO under the joint direction of NAVAIR and NAVSUP. ARR’s list the repair parts, accessories, and other materials required to support aircraft maintenance and operations. AL’s list maintenance support equipment. The TBA lists the activity’s equipments and maintenance materials required to perform specific missions.

c. **Mobil Facilities/Shelters.** An MF is a specifically configured 8ft x 8ft x 20ft van outfitted to support Marine Aviation Contingency Support Packages in garrison or when deployed. There is a range of MFS with different capabilities, both working and storage spaces. A TBA specifies the quantity and types of maintenance facilities (MFS) authorized.

d. **Personnel.** Marine Corps Tables of Organization (T/O’s) specify the number, grade, and MOS of support personnel authorized by aviation units. Each squadron rates all the specialists unique to the type/model/series (T/M/S) aircraft it operates. The personnel trained to perform "O" level maintenance work in the squadron. Those who perform "I" level maintenance normally work at the MALS which has the requisite spares, support equipment, mobile facilities, and personnel for "I" level maintenance. Personnel who perform maintenance common to more than one T/M/S normally are on the MALS T/O.

13-38
3. Aviation Logistics for the Marine Corps Reserve. Support for Marine Reserve aviation activities is parallel to and easily integrated with the MALSP procedures described herein. Reserve squadrons have SHORCAL instead of AVCAL. For Reserves, the 90 day endurance level requirements will be sourced initially from 4th MAW and supporting air station assets, with the balance in Prepositioned War Materiel Stocks (PWRMS), where it is identified by project codes to particular T/M/S aircraft.

13703. LOGISTICS SUPPORT FOR DEPLOYING MAGTF'S. When not deployed, Marine aircraft squadrons of a particular (T/M/S) aircraft are generally consolidated and attached to only two or three Marine Aircraft Groups (MAG’s) in each Marine Air Wing. However, the Marine Corps—to fulfill contingency requirements prescribed in the JSCP—must be able to deploy and fight as task organized MAGTF’s. The aviation component of a MAGTF, the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), can consist of a mix of fixed and rotary winged aircraft formed into a squadron, a group, or one or more aircraft groups or wings, depending upon the size of the MAGTF.

1. Forming an ACE. Forming a MAGTF ACE requires that one or more fixed wing or rotary wing MAG’s reconfigure themselves into a task organized fighting unit. As part of an ACE, or as a source of aircraft for another MAG that is forming an ACE, a non-deployed MAG has to be able to rapidly identify what aircraft it must retain, detach to another MAG, and/or leave behind.

2. Supporting an ACE. To support the task organization and the formation of the ACE’s, the Marine Corps Aviation Logistics Support Program (MALSP) enables aviation logisticians to individually identify the people, the support equipment, the mobile facilities/shelters, and spares and repair parts needed to support each T/M/S aircraft that is part of a task organized ACE. Furthermore, the MALSP enables these logisticians separately identify the support requirements to sustain a MEF (FWD) or a MEF when it is associated with an Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPSRON) and an aviation logistics ship (TAVB), or when these assets are not available. (See paragraph 13704 for further discussion of MPF and TAVB utilization.)

3. Tailoring Aviation Logistics Assets. MALSP enables the commander to tailor aviation logistics assets into support packages which support the particular mix of T/M/S aircraft in the ACE. These support packages consist of personnel, support equipment, spares and TBA. A MALS provides the nucleus around which the logistics capability is built. The MALS provides the Common Contingency Support Package (CCSP), and the necessary Peculiar CSP’s are added to make up the required capability. Fly-in Support Packages deploy with the aircraft to provide support until the remaining capability can deploy to the operating area. Figures 13-1 and 13-2 depict the way MALSP assets are "stacked" to yield a deployable aviation logistics capability.
a. Fly-in Support Package (FISP)

(1) FISP’s are "O" level parts support packages designed to support the fly-in echelon (FIE) aircraft of an MPF/amphibious MEF (FWD) ACE. A FISP, flown with the fly-in echelon (FIE) aircraft, will be combined with the "O" level aviation support equipment, and "O" level parts to support the support equipment, off-loaded from MPF ships. This combination of assets is designed to provide readiness and sustainability for the deployed aircraft until the intermediate maintenance support capability arrives in the theater of operations aboard the TAVB.

(2) FISP allowances provide the supply parts normally removed and replaced at the squadron/detachment organizational maintenance level. The allowances are computed at combat hours to support a particular T/M/S and quantity of aircraft and are additive to AVCAL/COSAL allowances. Until activated in support of a contingency, a FISP is protected stock materiel, under the cognizance of the parent MALS aviation supply officer, and will not be drawn down (except to rotate stock in order to maintain proper shelf life and configuration control) without the approval of the MAW or MEF commander.

(3) There are currently only two FISP’s per T/M/S aircraft (generally one on each coast); however, FISP’s for the 1st MAW (WestPac) are being developed. If a FISP is used in other than an MPF scenario, it must be augmented by assets (i.e., AVCAL/COSAL items and support equipment) from the parent MAG/squadron.

b. Contingency Support Package (CSP)

(1) CSP’s consist of the common and peculiar "I" level logistical support required for the composited deployment of detachments/squadrons of particular T/M/S aircraft, with one exception. CSP AVCAL/COSAL allowances are the exception, because they provide the spares and repair parts to support both "O" and "I" level maintenance. The four distinct elements that make up a CSP are:

(a) personnel,

(b) support equipment,

(c) TBA, and

(d) AVCAL/COSAL.

For each element there are master allowance documents (i.e., squadron/MALS Tables of Organization (personnel), MAG master IMRL’s (support equipment), the Table of Basic Allowances, and the MAG master AVCAL/COSAL allowances (spares and repair parts)).

13-40
Because "O" level IMRL and MF allowances and personnel allocations are already, by their very nature, separately identified and rapidly deployable, they do not need to be incorporated into a CSP.

(2) CSP allowances are computed at the Combat Flying Hours (CFH) utilization rate for a 90-day endurance period, and they are supplemental allowances to those AVCAL/COSAL/IMRL/SE/MF allowances identified in master allowance documents. IMRL pre-positioned coded "P" and "E" and management code "L" items are also identified to the appropriate CSP allowance category (defined below). From the master allowance documents, CXP allowances, broken into the following subcategories, are derived:

(a) **Common Contingency Support Package (CCSP) Allowances.** CCSP allowances consist of those Marine common assets that the rotary wing (R/W) or fixed wing (F/W) host IMA of an ACE provides to support all, or the majority, of aircraft assigned. A F/W Marine common item is one that has application to at least the F/A-18 and AV-8B. A R/W common item is one that has application to at least the CH-53/E, CH-46E, and AH-1W. Weight, cube, cost, reliability, and supportability are the primary considerations in making this determination. Host IMA’s, one R/W and one F/W per ACE, are sourced from designated MAG’s. For planning purposes, it is assumed that the F/W and R/W IMA’s will
be geographically separated. CCSP’s contain organic computer systems (SUADPS) that allow resupply from the Naval supply system, and are thus sustainable indefinitely.

(b) **Peculiar Contingency Support Package (PCSP) Allowances.** The PCSP allowances consist of those peculiar items and personnel required to provide "I" level support for a specific T/M/S and quantity of aircraft, and associated support equipment, that a MAG provides to a MAGTF ACE. A peculiar item is an item that is peculiar to a specific aircraft/support equipment application.

c. **Training Exercise Support Package (TESP).** TESP’s are supplemental allowances designed to provide the "O" level spares/repair parts to support a specified number of a particular T/M/S aircraft for 15 days at peacetime flying hours. TESP allowances are sourced from and encompassed within a site's total AVCAL/COSAL allowance. A supplemental TESP allowance will be authorized only when a TESP requirement cannot be satisfied from a site’s total AVCAL/COSAL without impacting the readiness of the aircraft not deployed from the home site.

d. **Training Squadron Allowances (TSA).** TSA IMRL/AVCAL/COSAL/SE/MF allowances are designed to support [a] training squadron[s] attached to a MAG. TSA’s are built to support a 30 day endurance period at peacetime flying hours. TSA’s are additive to the allowances of a MAG and are to be distinctly identified as such in the allowance documents provided to MAG’s.

e. **Follow-on Support Package (FOSP) Allowances.** FOSP equipment consists of those items that, although not required to initiate the assault, are required to sustain the assault. These are items that, because of sealift and airlift constraints, must be phased into a deployment area in AFOE or follow-on shipping. Because FOSP assets are required to sustain the assault, the allowances to support these items are built to a 90 day endurance level. These are supplementary allowances that must be distinctly identified in allowance documents provided to each MALS.

13704. **MARITIME PREPOSITIONING FORCE (MPF) AND AVIATION LOGISTICS SUPPORT SHIP (TAVB) SUPPORT FOR MARINE AVIATION.** All active force aircraft that are part of any MAGTF ACE can be supported in combination by any one of the three MPSRON’s and one of the two TAVB’s. For additional information relating to the number of aircraft involved and the MPF/ACE support concept, refer to NAVAIRNOTE C52000, Maritime Prepositioning Ships, United States Marine Corps Aviation Combat Element Program Planning Document (latest edition). MPF program support considerations involve the following logistics requirements:
1. **Supply Support.** Each MPF ACE is authorized an "O" level FISP to support the ACE FIE until the TAVB arrives in the theater of operations. There are currently only three FISP’s authorized per T/M/S aircraft (FISP’s for 1st MAW aircraft are being developed).

2. **Support Equipment.** "O" level support equipment has been funded, procured, and prepositioned aboard the three MPSRONs for the present mix and configuration of ACE aircraft. In addition, the "O" level supply support for repair of embarked MPF support equipment will be contained in an embarked support equipment support package held aboard the MPSRON.

13705. **AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY PLANNING AND DEPLOYMENT/EMPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS.** The ACE G-4/S-4 or Aviation Logistics Department (ALD), in coordination with Marine Corps and Navy logistics support systems, will ensure the two systems work in coordination with each other.

1. **Special Purpose Force (SPF).** Support for SPF operations will be drawn from existing MALS assets. Generally, supply support will be provided by means of a pack-up with the minimum essential support equipment, mobile facilities, and personnel to sustain the aircraft assigned for the expected duration of the operation.

2. **Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).** "I" level support for the MEU ACE will be provided by the Aircraft Intermediate Maintenance Department (AIMD) of the air capable ship (LPH/LHA/LHD) upon which the MEU ACE is embarked. If the AIMD does not have the capability to support particular MEU aircraft, the parent MALS will augment the ship’s organic support with the necessary personnel, support equipment, and spares/repair parts required. If the reinforced squadron of the MEU is directed ashore, "I" level support can be provided in one of the following ways:
   
   a. From the air capable ship operating offshore.

   b. By MEF (FWD) MALS already ashore. This requires that the MALS ashore possess a CSP allowance for the quantity and T/M/S aircraft that will be attached. Since most of the support aboard an air capable ship is organic to the ship and since the pack-up provided to augment the ship’s AIMD is relatively small and difficult to offload, ACE logisticians must plan in advance for a CSP to accompany the MALS ashore (to support the aircraft coming off the ship).

3. **Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (MEF (Fwd)).** To sustain a MEF (FWD) ACE requires intermediate level maintenance and supply support. This support must be able to sustain the deployment of aircraft to two separate locations—one capable of supporting fixed wing aircraft and the other rotary wing aircraft. Each location requires an independent IMA support capability. At each location, a
designated IMA (provided from existing MAG’s) will act as the "host" for the aircraft that it receives. At each location, IMA support must be tailored to the particular aircraft assigned. The host IMA can provide common "I" level support to all assigned aircraft; however, peculiar support (i.e., personnel, support equipment, mobile facilities, and spares/repair parts) must come from CSP’s provided by the "parent" MAG that provides the aircraft. The exact make-up of the MEF (FWD) will affect when and how both "O" and "I" level support is established.

a. MPF MEF (FWD). An MPF MEF (FWD) ACE receives maintenance and supply support through a combination of means: MPS ships, a TAVB, FISP’s, and CSP’s. The aviation support equipment aboard the MPS’s, combined with the "O" level "remove and replace" spares provided in the FISP, are designed to— in combination— sustain ACE aircraft until "I" level capability arrives in the theater of operations. A FISP for a particular T/M/S is designed to support a specific number of aircraft for a finite period of time at a preestablished sortie rate. Partial "I" level capability could arrive in theater aboard a TAVB, while the remainder could be transported by other means. The CSP’s to support the "I" level repair for a particular T/M/S aircraft, as well as the common, may be split between the TAVB and other available means of transportation. Considerations:

(1) A FISP is only capable of supporting aircraft for a relatively short period of time. When a FISP is used without an MPF ship in support, the squadron supported will have to bring with it the support equipment that would have been provided by the MPF ship. Further, if a FISP must support a particular T/M/S for a longer period or a greater number of flight hours than the FISP is designed to support, the parent MAG(s) must augment the T/M/S FISP with additional AVCAL/COSAL assets. At some point there will no longer be sufficient AVCAL/COSAL assets to support the remove and replace maintenance approach FISP’s support. At that time, "I" level support will have to be available.

(2) MPF ships do not contain all of the support equipment required to support organizational level maintenance for a particular T/M/S aircraft. Those items not aboard ship must be identified and brought in the MPF Fly-In Echelon.

(3) The TAVB only provides a limited "I" level capability for the ACE as a whole. When operating "in stream," approximately 186 vans of the approximately 300 aboard can be operational. However, not all the parts aboard the ship are accessible and therefore the range of "I" level support is limited. The TAVB can transport as many as 684 vans, provided none are required to be operational. In either mode, the ACE may require additional strategic lift to bring the remainder of the "I" level support (i.e., CSP’s) into theater.

(4) When planning for the use of Marine aviation, planners must consider the number of aircraft a CSP or FISP is designed to support and where this support is located in garrison. Using more aircraft, or flying them more than the packages the CSP or FISP is
designed to support will require that additional logistics support elements be added in order to reconfigure these packages, which is time consuming and difficult to do quickly. Some CSP’s and FISP’s will have to be transported from one coast to the other, which requires time and transportation assets that planners must consider. Also, those mobile facilities which require air-cushion vehicles/platforms for movement require special consideration.

(5) The MALSP has been fully funded for AVCAL and COSAL allowances. The IMRL program is in the process of being implemented throughout the fleet.

b. **Norway Airlanded MEB (NALMEB).** Norway prepositioned materiel in support of Marine aviation is extremely limited. It provides the capability to support the reception and flight line service of arriving and departing aircraft. The capability to sustain these aircraft is not prepositioned and, therefore, must be brought with the ACE via strategic lift.

c. **Amphibious MEF (Fwd).** A MEF embarked on amphibious shipping will generally have to bring ACE supply and maintenance support ashore, unless the amphibious ships remain in the AOA throughout the battle to provide support. If Navy amphibious shipping does leave the AOA, the support ashore must be provided by the use of CSP’s. The number and type of CSP’s for each T/M/S aircraft, the number of aircraft each CSP is designed to support, and the MAG’s holding those CSP’s are identified in the MALSC Allowance Table. If a TAVB is used in an amphibious MEF (FWD) scenario, the "O" level support equipment (IMRL) that would have been provided by MPF ships in an MPF MEF (FWD) scenario will have to be brought by the squadrons.

4. **Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF).** Support for a MEF ACE is developed by combining the building blocks described above for supporting MEU- and MEF (FWD)-sized MAGTF’s.

13706. **COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT FOR AVIATION UNITS**

1. **General.** Support requirements for aviation operations create special planning and coordination considerations. These factors have a potentially significant impact upon Combat Service Support (CSS) operations in support of the MAGTF.

2. **Organic CSS Support.** Organic CSS support within the ACE is defined as Aviation Ground Support (AGS). Most organic AGS capabilities are resident in the Marine Wing Support Squadrons of the Marine Wing Support Group. The MWSS’s provide support in the six functional areas of CSS: supply (Marine Corps), maintenance (ground equipment), transportation, deliberate engineering, health services, and services.
a. **Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS).** The MWSS, both fixed wing (FW) and rotary wing (RW), are the primary organizations that provide AGS for the ACE.

(1) The Squadron HQ section, S-1, and S-2, provide command and control, administrative support and intelligence support for the squadron.

(2) The S-3 Department is composed of an Operations Section that provides: the control and administration for the Department, an NBC Branch, a Communications Branch to provides internal airfield communications support, an Airfield Operations Division, a Motor Transport Operations Division, and an Engineer Operations Division.

(a) **Airfield Operations.** The Airfield Operations Division consists of: a Photographic Branch, a Weather Services Branch, an Expeditionary Airfield (EAF) Services Branch that provides arresting gear, airfield lighting, AM-2 matting accessories and EAF installation plans, a Crash/Fire/Rescue Branch for aircraft and structural fire fighting support; a Fuels Branch providing TAFDS and HERS, and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Branch.

(b) **Motor Transport Operations.** The Motor Transport Operations Division consists of a Light/Medium Motor Vehicle Branch and a Heavy Motor Vehicle Branch. The Division provides motor transport support for ACE units in and around the airfield, including the transportation of fuel, ammunition, engineer assets, cargo and supplies.

(c) **Engineer Operations.** The Engineer Operations Division is composed of: a Drafting and Survey Branch, a Heavy Equipment/Material Handling Equipment (MHE) Branch, a Utilities Branch, an Electrical Branch, a Refrigeration Branch, a Water Supply Branch, and a Construction Branch.

(3) The S-4/Logistics Department is composed of a Logistics Section, a Maintenance Management Branch, an Armory Branch, a Food Services Division, a Medical Division, a Chaplain Division, and a Supply/Fiscal Division.

(4) The Equipment Maintenance Department consists of both a Motor Transport Maintenance Division and an Engineer Maintenance Division. Maintenance Department performs second echelon maintenance on all motor transport and engineer equipment assigned to the MWSS. It can provide limited second echelon support on motor transport and engineer equipment assigned to other ACE units, exclusive of the Marine Air Control Group.

(5) The Military Police Department provides security and law enforcement services for the ACE, to include: security for the flight line, ammunition, fuel storage, and air traffic control facilities, traffic control and enforcement, convoy escort, traffic accident investigations, straggler collection and refugee control, criminal...
investigation capabilities, physical security surveys, and related activities.

b. MWSS/MATCS Relationship. When deployed to a Forward Operating Base (FOB), the Marine Air Traffic Control Squadron (MATCS) Detachment remains under the administrative and operational control of the MACG. The MATCS Det OIC serves as a special staff advisor to the Airfield Operations Officer within the MWSS S-3.

3. External Support

a. The CSSE of the MAGTF provides that CSS which exceeds the organic capabilities of the ACE in the areas of supply, maintenance, ground transportation, deliberate engineering, health services, and services. The ACE G-4 coordinates with the MAGTF G/S-3 and G/S-4 for the planning and integration of organic ACE CSS capabilities and requirements with those of the CSSE.

b. Navy Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB’s) are used to augment Marine Corps deliberate engineering capabilities at ports, airfields, and other areas (as required). The MAGTF G/S-3 coordinates MAGTF requirements for additional deliberate engineering support (as needed).

13707. AIRFIELDS

1. Forward Operating Bases (FOB). The current Marine aviation concept regarding the establishment of Forward Operating Bases (FOB’s) is:

   a. Friendly host government airfields will be used to the extent available, possible and tactically acceptable.

   b. If unavailable, the use of abandoned or captured airfields will be pursued to minimize equipment deployment requirements.

   c. If any of the above are not available in sufficient quantity or are not located in a suitable location, utilization of suitable roadways or highways will be attempted.

   d. As a last resort, the employment of expeditionary airfield construction material would be utilized.

2. The MAGTF FOB concept enhances responsiveness through basing flexibility, dispersal of aircraft and reduced distances to the supported area. In order to provide a common knowledge or understanding of the basing concept, airfields have been categorized by function as: Main Airbase, Air Facility, Air Site, and Air Point.

   a. Main Air Base. A main air base is a secure airfield that is capable of handling all types of aircraft, up to and including theater lift assets. Support agencies and facilities will be determined by task organization requirements, but should include at least IMA
support and engineering functions required to support current and anticipated needs.

b. **Air Facility.** "An installation from which air operations may be or are being conducted." (DoD) A secure airfield capable of supporting a detachment or squadron of aircraft and the associated organizational maintenance activity (OMA) to sustain operations at a combat sortie rate as well as provide the support required to initially stage and later replenish forward sites. Capabilities of the OMA include: basic troubleshooting and repair, daily turnaround, inspections, refueling, weapon loading/downloading, and weapon arming and dearming. Major maintenance functions, such as engine changes and phased inspections are not accomplished at a facility unless bringing a spare engine and support equipment is more advantageous than returning the aircraft to the rear main base or sea base. Aviation ordnance is stored in the open utilizing accepted procedures. Support equipment, with rough terrain capability, should be provided at each facility to move, load, and maintain aircraft. This facility might be an airfield, road segment, matted runway, or in the case of helicopters, flat ground.

c. **Air Sites.** An air site is a secure location where combat aircraft are pre-positioned to enhance response time. It is suitable for a fully loaded and armed aircraft to land and await a mission, either pre-planned or on-call. Ideally, fuel and ordnance could be staged at sites; however, the site will not routinely require logistics support and only a minimum number of personnel. The potential exists to expand a site's capability to meet operational requirements. Upon completion of a mission from an air site, aircraft would normally return to a facility or main air base for refueling, weapon loading, and accomplishment of required maintenance. During normal operations, the site requires minimal logistics support since operations are limited to receiving and launching previously loaded aircraft. Personnel required to accomplish site maintenance consist of a plane captain or crew chief per aircraft and nominally one ordnance man per site for arming and dearming aircraft. Under normal conditions only hand-carried support equipment and tools are required.

d. **Air Points.** Tactical designations applied to a predetermined geographical location that will support a specific tactical mission. Air points are: Forward Arming and Refueling Points (FARP's) and Lagger Points.

   (1) **Forward Arming and Refueling Point.** "A temporary facility which is organized, equipped, and deployed by an aviation commander, and normally located in the main battle area. It is closer to the area of operation than the aviation unit's combat service area to provide fuel and ammunition necessary for the employment of aviation maneuver units in combat. The forward arming and refueling point permits combat aircraft to rapidly refuel and rearm simultaneously. Also called FARP." (DoD) FARP's are temporary, transitory in nature, and are established for a specific mission. The ultimate objective of the FARP is to minimize flight time to and from the refueling and rearming area by locating the FARP as close to the objective area as METT.
allows. Support for the FARP should be minimized to the greatest extent possible. Normal support personnel include refuelers, ordnance technicians, and communicators (when AV-8B’s are utilized, plane captains are required). Aviation maintenance should be restricted to minor repair and adjustments that can be accomplished by the plane captains/crew chiefs. Equipment requirements should be minimal and limited to that equipment which directly supports FARP operations (e.g., HERS, SATS Loaders, and LIGHT equipment).

(2) Lagger Point — Secure locations designated by aviation units to be utilized for the rendezvous, marshalling, or positioning of flights of aircraft between missions or awaiting completion or activation of an assigned mission. Other than communications, no other support should be required. Lagger Points can be isolated and independent or they may be adjacent to airfields, facilities, sites, or FARP’s.  

3. Extensive confusion has surrounded the defining of FOB’s. This confusion is due in part to a misunderstanding of the term Expeditionary Airfield (EAF). EAF is a construction concept that utilizes prefabricated material and should not be confused with the Marine Aviation employment concept.

4. Expeditionary Airfield System. The concept for Marine Aviation employment, as related to the establishment of Forward Operation Bases (FOB’s), paragraph 1507, is:

   a. Friendly host government airfields will be used to the extent available, possible and tactically acceptable.

   b. If unavailable, use of abandoned or captured airfields will be pursued to minimize equipment deployment requirements.

   c. If any of the above are not available in sufficient quantity or are not located in a suitable location, utilizing suitable roadways or highways will be attempted.

   d. As a last resort, the employment of expeditionary airfield construction material would be utilized.

6. Expeditionary Airfield (EAF). The EAF system is a flexible, reusable, aircraft operations support system that provides minimum austere airfields which can be task organized to accommodate the entire spectrum of aircraft types and missions:

   a. Single aircraft site. Specific operational requirements for support of AV-8’s and helicopters can be supported with VTOL pads (29 X 29 m or 96’ X 96’).

   b. Airfield upgrades. EAF materials may be utilized to repair an airfield or expand runways and parking areas.
c. **Bare base.** Utilize available roads as the runways, augmented (as required) with EAF materials for airfield lighting, for a 2.4 km X 46 m (150’ X 8000’) runway, aircraft parking and maintenance areas.

d. **EAF 2000.** Construction of entire airfields for supporting AV-8 rolling take-offs (allows for a higher aircraft gross weight/payload), conventional tactical aircraft (75 parking spots), C-130 transport aircraft (3 parking spots) and a ramp for two transient C-130 or C-17 aircraft. Runway size is 22 m X 1.1 km (72’ X 3840’). The runway can be extended to support larger theater lift and wide body commercial aircraft, if required.

e. Major components of the EAF system are: airfield lighting, visual landing aids, arresting gear and airfield matting.

5. **Capabilities.** Each Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) has the capability to construct and operate two Expeditionary Airfields (EAF), two Bare Base airfields and multiple Vertical Take-Off/Landing (VTOL) pads.
13800. GENERAL. This section outlines sustainment planning procedures in detail.

13801. PURPOSE OF SUSTAINMENT PLANNING. Sustainment planning is the means by which the MAGTF Commander:

1. Ensures the Commander has the materiel necessary to accomplish his assigned mission.

2. Ensures that materiel deficiencies are identified so the MAGTF Commander or CINC may consider another course of action.

3. Identifies transportation requirements to ensure that adequate transportation assets are available to support movement of the materiel into theater when it is required by the CINC.

4. Ensures the Marine Corps recognizes materiel deficiencies in order to correct them during the Marine Corps programming and budgeting process.

13802. OVERVIEW OF SUSTAINMENT PLANNING PROCESS. In order to understand how the detailed pieces of the sustainment process interact, a basic understanding of the sustainment process is required. The following paragraphs provide a simple framework.

1. The CINC or JTF Commander provides planning guidance to his service components. This guidance specifies, service component missions, among other things, the length of the plan, responsibilities for providing dominant user support, the estimated time the lines of communication will be established to allow the flow of resupply cargo, and specific guidance about use of JOPES to reflect sustainment requirements.

2. With mission and commander’s planning guidance in hand, the MAGTF Commander determines, builds, and requests sustainment to support a warfighting CINC’s OPLAN. Each MAGTF Commander must plan for a specific a specific number of days of sustainment. There may be situations when the MARFOR or HQMC (LP) will direct a MAGTF Commander without an employment mission to build a sustainment block for specified classes of supply and for a specific period of time.

3. Once sustainment requirements have been determined, the MAGTF Commander sources from force held assets to the maximum extent possible. He can also task supporting MAGTF’s to identify requirements and source them from organic assets.

4. The MAGTF Commander passes all unsourced requirements to the MARFOR for action. The MARFOR passes remaining unsourced requirements to the appropriate supporting agency (COMMARCORSYSCOM for class V(W),
COMMARCORLOGBASES in the case of all remaining non-aviation items, and COMNAVAIRSYSCOM or AIRPAC/AIRLANT for aviation related items). MARFOR also passes common item support requirements to the appropriate service component(s) for processing.

5. The supporting agencies source requirements from Service-held stocks or coordinate sourcing from Service-owned stocks (e.g., MRE’s held by DLA). Remaining requirements are passed to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) or the appropriate item manager for sourcing.

6. The MAGTF Commander reviews the items which cannot be sourced, and assesses the risk associated with not having those items available. If the risk is not acceptable, the MAGTF Commander must work through the operational and service chains to reduce the risk, either by obtaining additional resources or by changing the operational concept to reduce the requirement.

7. The unsourced requirements become shortfalls.

13803. SUSTAINMENT PLANNING GUIDANCE.

1. Timing for development of sustainment requirements is derived from each CINC’s OPLAN guidance and TPFDD Letter of Instruction (LOI). These documents provide key planning information such as length of plan and required safety levels, which are critical to determining sustainment requirements. These documents are the best source of information for TPFDD requirements. Effective sustainment planning requires clear and adequate guidance from the CINC concerning level of sustainment required. This information can generally be found in the Strategic Concept and TPFDD LOI during deliberate planning and in annex D of the Operations order in crisis action planning.

   a. Planning guidance may specify the number of days of supply the CINC requires available at any one time (safety stock). It may also, if the MAGTF Commander has the preponderance of forces in theater, task him provide support to other Components or Allies for a specific period of time. This is would be an appropriate mission for the MARFOR or Marine Component Commander of the JTF.

   b. The MAGTF Commander cannot delegate his responsibility for identifying sustainment requirements. He will require input from the MAGTF element commanders to ensure that all requirements are met. The G-4/S-4/ALD is normally the staff section tasked with coordinating requirements with senior, adjacent, and subordinate commands. In the event that the MAGTF has logistics responsibilities to external forces, then it must aggressively solicit requirements and adjust its organic structure to meet those requirements.

13804. IDENTIFYING SUSTAINMENT REQUIREMENTS.

1. General. Identifying sustainment requirements requires that the MAGTF Commander determine three things: the force to be supported,
the duration for which that support is required, and other planning
guidance (e.g., safety levels, external support available, and support
responsibilities). With this information in hand, the MAGTF Commander
and his staff can compute, by class and sub-class of supply, the
sustainment required and the phasing necessary to support the
operational concept.

2. Guidance for Sustainment Planning. The MAGTF Commander receives
guidance from many sources in the deliberate planning cycle. One
vital source is the TPFDD LOI. The TPFDD LOI provides the MAGTF
Commander with technical directions and procedures for the
development, submission, and review of his forces and sustainment.
Under the paragraph labeled General Instructions, the MAGTF Commander
will find an essential element of information in determining the
sustainment requirements: the length of the plan. This period,
specified by the CINC or JTF Commander for each OPLAN, ranges from 30
to 120 days. The length of plan has a profound effect on the sourcing
process.

3. Policy. MAGTF commanders with employment missions will plan to
sustain the force for the period of the MAGTF’s employment. The MAGTF
commander determines the sustainment requirement for the force he is
employing. Each MEF providing forces to the MAGTF sources the
sustainment requirements from force held assets based on guidance from
the MAGTF Commander. Unless otherwise specified by HQMC (Code LPO),
the amount of sustainment is commensurate with the size force provided
to the supported MAGTF commander. However, the responsibility for
sustaining the force rests with the supported MAGTF commander.

4. Methodology. The Marine Corps uses Day of Supply (DOS) and Day of
Ammunition (DOA) as measures of effectiveness for sustainability. The
Marine Corps planning baseline for sustainability is 60 days of
supply/ammunition for the MAGTF. Marine Corps policy requires
procurement of 60 DOS for a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), subject
to funding constraints. This sustainment includes sufficient
sustainment to deploy MEF (Forwards) with 30 DOS/DOA and Marine
Expeditionary Units (MEU’s) with 15 DOS/DOA. Special Purpose MAGTF’s
deploy with sustainment commensurate with the scope and duration of
their mission. For Class V(A) the sustainment methodology is
predicated on theater and Type/Model/Series (T/M/S) aircraft for a
given OPLAN. The NNOR provides the factors for determining
requirement/sustainability. OMIS also provides this data.

   a. The Marine Corps objective is to position the full level of
sustainment with the active forces for use with the different types of
MAGTF’s. The unit’s T/E and operating stocks form the bulk of this
requirement. The remainder is termed war reserve materiel requirement
(WRMR). However, funding, management and storage limitations normally
dictate prepositioning less than the total WRMR in the active forces
if COMMARCOLOGBASES and the IMM’s at DLA can provide materiel
resupply in a manner that will meet OPLAN execution schedules. Such
stocks are termed War Reserve Materiel-Stores (WRMS). Stocks held by
the FMF are termed War Reserve Materiel-Force-Held (WRMF). The Marine
Corps does not purchase or stock materiel required from day 61 through day 180. Such requirements are identified as (Other War Reserve Materiel-Stores (OWRMS)). OWRMS is not normally funded. However, the requirements are computed by the COMMARCORLOGBASES Albany.

b. The Marine Corps calculates sustainment requirements using MAGTF II, the War Reserve System (WRS), and limited modeling techniques. The MARFOR/MAGTF uses MAGTF II to generate a force structure/equipment list and uses this data in the WRS to develop tailored numbered war reserve withdrawal plans which support a specific OPLAN. WRS is also the primary means by which COMMARCORLOGBASES sources sustainment. WRS addresses classes I, II, III, IV, VI and IX, but excludes all aviation items and classes V, VI and VIII, which are computed separately. Note that the interface between MAGTF II and the War Reserve Interface enables the MAGTF Commander to use data on actual forces and equipment deploying instead of relying on notional T/E data which may not be current.

13805. **THE SOURCING PROCESS.** Once the MAGTF Commander has determined the requirements, the sourcing process begins. The MAGTF Commander’s total sustainment requirement is filled from what he has available and what the Supporting Agencies have available. The following steps describe the process:

1. **Source from Organic Assets.** The MAGTF Commander determines which requirements he can meet from organic assets. He sources these assets by fragging and inserting in MAGTF II. The MAGTF commander must look first to his own assets to satisfy the total requirement before turning to external sources. The following assets are available to the MAGTF Commander from In-force assets.
   a. Class 1(B).
   b. Class II(All Subclasses).
   c. Class III(A) and (W).
   d. Class IV (B).
   e. Class V (A) and (W).
   f. Class VII(W).
   g. Class VIII.
   h. Class IX(W).

   The MARFOR Commander must identify items sourced internally to the supporting MARFOR Commander so that the planning effort is consistent for all MAGTF’s employed.

2. **Source from MARFOR Assets.** The MAGTF Commander identifies to the MARFOR Commander all unsourced requirements. The MARFOR Commander
attempts to source these items from assets held in or owned by the MARFOR. The MARFOR frags and inserts ULNs to reflect sourcing at the MARFOR level. If the MARFOR is satisfied that the requirements are correctly identified, the unsourced requirements are passed to COMMARCORLOGBASES Albany for sourcing as a registered war reserve plan (See Figure 13-2). The MARFOR registers a plan by transmitting a message both by GENSER and the MCOPSLOG teleconference, which includes HQMC (LPO/POC), the appropriate force commander, and the supported MAGTF (normally MEF (G-4)) as information addressees. Once all withdrawal plans are registered, the supported MAGTF Commander prioritizes the final sequence of the various withdrawal plans based on his logistic concept of operations. This information will be sent via separate classified message to COMMARCORLOGBASES so that subsequent sourcing actions may begin.

3. **Source from MARCORLOGBASES Assets.** MARCORLOGBASES sources the requirement for Classes I, II(W), III(W) (packaged), IV(B) (field fortification), VII, and IX from Marine Corps owned In-Stores assets. This is accomplished through the use of the Integrated Materiel Managers (IMM’s). If the asset is not physically in the custody of COMMARCORLOGBASES, they request information from IMM’s of USMC owned stocks located at other DLA storage facilities. If the Marine Corps does not possess the requisite amount of materiel required in stores, the unsourced requirement is passed to external logistic agencies for sourcing.

4. **Source from DLA/Item Managers.** External sourcing agencies receive the unsourced requirements from all components involved in the plan. The Marine Corps and the Army are the only Services that identify requirements down to the National Stock Number (NSN) level. The Air Force and the Navy only represent the requirement in terms of pounds per man per day. The aggregate requirements of the Marine Corps and Army are matched against DoD stocks and a decision is made whether the requirement is sourced or unsourced. The disadvantage to this system is that the other Services do not item level source. It is quite possible that shortfalls will exist upon execution of the Plan as the Navy and Air Force begin to identify actual item requirements.

5. **Identify Unsourced Items.** As each sourcing agency completes sourcing actions, COMMARCORLOGBASES ensures that the TPFDD reflects the origin and associated transportation data of each shipment. COMMARCORLOGBASES (or COMMARCORSYSCOM) will report to the supported MARFOR the results of sourcing actions, indicating the ULN’s which contain requirements remaining to be sourced. The MARFOR will assess the risk associated with the lack of the specified items.

6. **Class V(W).** The computation of ammunition sustainment is different than the procedure described above.

13806. **DEVELOPING REQUIREMENTS IN MAGTF II.** Planning is the phase during which a plan requirement is recognized, plan development
FORMAT FOR A WAR RESERVE WITHDRAWAL PLAN

FM COMMARFOR____//G-4//
TO CMC WASHINGTON DC//LP//
INFO: COMMARFOR____//G-4//
   CG I MEF//G-4//
   CG II MEF//G-4//
   CG III MEF//G-4//
   COMMARCORLOGBASES//807//
   COMMARCORSYSCOM//CS//
UNCLAS//NO4000//
SUBJ: REQ FOR WITHDRAWAL OF WAR RESERVE PLAN #75 IN SPT OF OPN____
REF/A/CINCXXX/DDHHMMZ MMM YY//
NARR/REF A IS EXECUTE ORDER FROM CINC/REF B IS ANNEX D OF THE OPORDER//
1. (U) PER THE REF’S, REQUEST WAR RESERVE WITHDRAWAL BE APPROVED TO
   SUPPORT OPERATION_______
   A. (U) WITHDRAWAL PLAN(S): 40, 41, 42, AND 43
   B. (U) TITLE: 40 - AMPHIB MEF (FWD) (1ST 30 DAYS)
      41 - MPF (CL II/VII-1ST 30 DAYS)
      42 - AMPHIB MEF (FWD) (SMCR INITIAL ISSUE)
      43 - AMPHIB MEF (FWD) (2D 30 DAYS)
   C. (S) OPLAN SUPPORTED: OPLAN #
   D. (U) PERIOD OF SUPPORT: D+30 (SPT PERIOD 1) OR D+60 (SPT PERIODS 1
      AND 2)
   E. (U) SMCR INVOLVEMENT: YES/NO
   F. (U) SPT OF ASSIGNED NCF CONSIDERED: (YES OR NO)
   G. (U) TPFDD ULN STRUCTURE: IF PROVIDED, CITE REFERENCE IF NOT,
      PROVIDE: - FORCE MODULE TO USE
      - ULN STRUCTURE
      - POE (INCLUDE GEOLOC)
      - POD (INCLUDE GEOLOC)
      - PRIORITY/DESTINATION
      - RDD AT POD
      - EAD/LAD
      (NOTE: REFER TO MCO P4400.39 WAR RESERVE MANUAL AND MCO 4420.4H DODAAC
       DIRECTORY FOR A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION)
   H. (U) DATE SENT MCDN: DD MMM YY
   I. (U) DATA SET NAME: CPEN1.BULK.A44L6AOL
      WRALBOUT.G243
      VOL SER NR: A67247
   J. (U) RBE WAS CONSIDERED IN WITHDRAWAL DEVELOPMENT: YES OR NO
   K. (U) DATE TPFDD DATA REQUIRED: DD MMM YY
   L. (U) POINT OF CONTACT:
   2. MESSAGE SHOULD BE SENT BY BOTH GENSER AND THE MCOPSLOG TLCF. HQMC
      (LPO/POC), THE APPROPRIATE FORCE COMMANDER, AND THE SUPPORTED MAGTF
      (NORMALLY--MEF (G-4)) ARE TO BE INFO ADDRESSES. ONCE ALL WITHDRAWAL
      PLANS ARE REGISTERED, THE SUPPORTED MAGTF COMMANDER WILL PRIORITIZE
      THE FINAL SEQUENCE OF THE VARIOUS WITHDRAWAL PLANS BASED ON HIS LOGISTIC
      CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. THIS INFORMATION WILL BE SENT VIA SEPARATE
      CLASSIFIED MESSAGE TO COMMARCORLOGBASES SO THAT SUBSEQUENT SOURCING
      ACTIONS MAY BEGIN.

Figure 13-2 -- Format for Registering a War Reserve Withdrawal Plan

13-56
responsibilities are assigned, and the plan is developed. Planning is accomplished in a deliberate mode or in time sensitive mode, which includes crisis action planning procedures. It is anticipated that the greater majority of future planning will be in a crisis action scenario. The following overview provides an insight as to how requirements are developed within MAGTF II.

1. Once the force list for the MAGTF has been determined and the MAGTF Commander determines the sustainment requirements, the sustainment for the force can be developed. The logical place to begin is to review the T/E of the MAGTF. Once this has been reviewed against unit mechanized allowance lists, the requirements are exported from MAGTF II into the War Reserve System. The interface between MAGTF II and the War Reserve System allows for actual asset sustainment building instead of using notional TUCHA data. This provides an accurate sustainment package. The War Reserve System uses Combat Replacement Factors (CARF’s) as the multiplier for determining the total requirement. For example, if the total number of M1AI tanks for a particular plan is 120 and the CARF is .221 for the sustainment period, a total of 26 tanks is required for the period. The average length of a sustainment period is normally 30 days.

2. Requirements are phased into the theater of operations based on the requirements established by the MAGTF Commander. To establish EAD’s and LAD’s, the MAGTF Commander uses the RDD he wants for the material in a specific (theater) port. Once this RDD has been established, and ports have been identified for embark of the materiel, COMMARCORLOGBASES Albany in coordination with the MARFOR, determines the ship time from the port to the theater port. Once this is determined, this information becomes part of the sourced ULN’s and part of the information passed to external agencies to meet unsourced requirements.

3. Reserve Requirements.

   a. Reserve forces are augmentation forces for all OPLAN’s (The Reserves are apportioned to various OPLAN’s Volume III of the Marine Corps Mobilization Plan (MPLAN)). Because SMCR units do not have a discrete employment mission, they do not determine their own sustainment requirements. Sustainment requirements for Reserve forces are determined by the MAGTF Commander who will employ the forces.

   b. The following sub-paragraphs provide an overview of the Reserve sustainment process.

      (1) The Reserves only maintain a portion of their T/E, called their Training Allowance (TA). This portion is maintained at numerous reserve centers throughout the United States. The balance of the their T/E is held In-Stores by COMMARCORLOGBASES. Those items that are shortfalls at Albany are sourced from the RBE at the gaining MEF.

      (2) Sustainment for the reserve forces is predicated on the requirements of the gaining MAGTF Commander. When the MAGTF Commander
is determining his force, he builds the TPFDD which includes reserve forces and their T/E. This information is exported into the WRS and identified to Albany as a unsourced requirement. These unsourced requirements are filled by In-Stores assets or identified as a MEF shortfall.

(3) Detailed requirements for reserve sustainment methodologies are contained in the Marine Corps War Reserve Order.

4. Navy Requirements. To be written.

5. Aviation Requirements. To be written by DC/S Aviation.

13807. AMMUNITION

1. Ammunition within the Marine Corps is divided into two separate categories. There is Class V(W) (ground) and Class V(A) (aviation). The following paragraphs discuss sustainment planning for both subclasses:

a. Class V(W). MAGTF II is the source for determining the weapons types and densities that will be employed by the MAGTF. Personnel and weapons density multiplied by the combat planning factor (CPF) equal the sustainment. There are four CPF’s. These are Infantry Heavy Threat (IHT), Armor Heavy Threat (AHT), Light Infantry Threat (LIT), and the Weighted Average. The MAGTF commander selects the rates that he requires for the total force or uses different rates for each element of the force. (Example: He may use a IHT for the GCE, an AHT for the ACE, and a weighted average for the CSSE.) The Marine Corps only maintains a 45 DOS for class V(W) due to funding limitations. The sustainment requirement is based on the T/O of the MAGTF and the type of conflict (i.e., IHT, AHT, LIT) envisioned. Once the total requirement is determined, the MAGTF commander sources what he can from retail stocks (In-force). Those assets he does not possess are passed to COMMARCORSYS5COM for sourcing (In-Stores). COMMARCORSYS5COM sources this requirement through Single Manager Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) Marine Corps stocks world wide. Those assets that are not available are considered unsourced requirements.

b. Class V(A). The NNOR is the source for determining ordnance requirements. It was developed for 4 theaters for each Type/Model/series (T/M/S) aircraft. Ordnance is "pulled" by the activity with requisitioner authority. The requisition is validated and provided to the requisitioner and the information loaded to the TPFDD. Assets are sourced by either the CINC or the NOC from "fairshare" stocks. Unsourced assets are referred to the NOC or wholesale activity. The NOC serves to break "fairshare" or identify shortfalls. A shortfall is sourced from their wholesale support activity.

2. Once the total requirement has been established for ground ordinance, the MAGTF (MEF) ammo officer examines assets held In-force.

13-58
Assets that are not available are passed to MARCORSYSCOM for sourcing from USMC stocks worldwide. Those assets that MARCORSYSCOM cannot source are converted into MILSTRIP documents and passed to the Single Manager Conventional Ammunition (SMCA).

3. SMCA sources the MILSTRIP requirement based on the MAGTF Required delivery date (RDD). All of the Service component requirements are merged and source together. SMCA delivers CIN’s back to the Marine Corps and MARCORSYSCOM converts those CIN’S to ULN’s. In cases where the requirement remains unsourced and the ammo is necessary to support the MAGTF until plan end, unsourced ULN’s are created. In cases where the length of plan exceeds the organic capability of the Marine Corps, CIN’s are created and RLD’s and EAD’s, reflect the shipping necessary to meet the MAGTF Commander’s RDD.

13808. RESUPPLY

1. Resupply. The requirement for logistical planning during deliberate planning cycles is to determine and source the resources required to support the USMC component in accordance the CINC’s concept of operations. The following items are critical in pursuing this task:

   a. Identification of logistic shortfalls which can be identified and prioritized in budgets ad programming.

   b. Producing an accurate sustainability assessment as required by the JSCP.

   c. Identifying sourcing agencies in order to ascertain stock availability and estimation of wartime workloads.

2. The overall umbrella of sustainment encompasses both accompanying supplies and resupply. Resupply is the supplies and equipment that provide a MAGTF extended sustainment capability (staying power) after accompanying supplies are exhausted. Material that makes up resupply may come from a combination of remaining marine corps assets, other theater service components tasked to provide common item support (CIS) by the CINC, and/or stocks held by material manager such as DLA. Resupply is shown under cargo increment numbers (CIN’S) in a TPFDD as a non-unit record and its movement is via common user channels, not by craft dedicated solely to the Marine Corps to move accompanying supplies. Planning for resupply is direct benefit in terms of our identifying both transportation and supply requirements to the CINC and supporting agencies. The vehicle for accomplishing this is the CIN.

3. The responsibility for determining the total sustainment requirement rests with the MAGTF Commander with an employment mission. CIN’S will be provided in the Marine Corps TPFDD along with other ULN’s reflecting accompanying supply requirements directed by the CINC’s TPFDD LOI for the specific plan.
4. CIN’S are required when the plan length exceeds the capability of the MAGTF’s accompanying supplies by more than ten (10) days. For example, if a plan length is 60 days and the CINC requires the Marine Component (in this case a MEF FWD with 30 DOS) to be in place by day 20, the MAGTF Commander will be responsible for 10 days of CIN requirements. Additional example: If the plan length is 120 days and the MAGTF (in this case a MEF with 60 DOS and arrives at any time earlier than day 50) CIN’S will be required in the Marine TPFDD of that OPLAN to cover the 10 days of requirements.

5. CIN’S have no value when the TPFDD is executed because they do not reflect unit requirements. However, CIN’S provide the following positive benefits:

   a. Form the basis for sizing the transportation channels required to support the CINC’s concept of operations.

   b. Identify resupply requirements to be provided by the supporting agencies (DLA, AMC, and IMM’s).

   c. Force the discussion of and assignment of common item support.

6. COMMARCORLOGBASES Albany receives the unsourced requirements from the MAGTF commander via a WRS withdrawal plan, and coordinates with external agencies to source these assets. COMMARCORLOGBASES is in the best position to develop CIN’S, based on the war withdrawal plans provided by the MAGTF. Accordingly, COMMARCORLOGBASES will construct CIN’S based on the USMC component commander’s guidance for the MAGTF/MAGTF’s that meet the requirements in paragraph 13808.3. These CIN’S will become part of the part of the TPFDD.

13809. TPFDD CARGO GUIDANCE

1. MAGTF Commander

   a. Will develop FRN’s and CIN’s that show the class of supply and type and degree of sustainment in the Force Description Field of the record. For example:

   CLASS I MRE’s (32,000 MEALS) or (15 DOS)
   CLASS I B-RATIONS (30 DAYS)
   CLASS III PACKAGED (15 DOS)
   CLASS III DIESEL – BULK/DRUM (18,000 GAL)
   CLASS IV FIELD FORTIFICATION
   CLASS V GROUND – (20 DOA)
CLASS V AVIATION - THREAT or LOE (10 DOA)  
CLASS IX BATTERIES (30 DOS)  

b. Will show in the Service Reserved Force Description field of the FRN’s and CIN’s, the general location of these assets (e.g. LFORM, MPS, FORCE, MLA, etc.). The exception to this will be ground Class V sourced from SMCA. The CIN’s, developed by SMCA during the sourcing process, that will be converted by the MAGTF commander to FRN’s shall have the original CIN reflected in the Service Reserve Field to permit sourcing agencies to track the materiel back through the associated requisition documents.

2. Commander, Marine Corps Logistics Bases, Albany  
   a. For designated classes of supply, in coordination with the FMF commander, will use the FRN’s developed by the forces to show assets held in-stores to support force requirements.
   
   b. Will coordinate actions to ensure registration of unsourced requirements for each OPLAN with the applicable IMM and that appropriate sourcing data is developed for the FRN’s.
   
   c. MARCORLOGBASES will identify problems encountered with the IMM’s on this matter for resolution, when required.

13810. EXECUTING WAR WITHDRAWAL PLANS. HQMC (LP) must approve all withdrawals from war reserve. Accordingly, when a MAGTF receives a mission with requires execution of a war withdrawal plan, it will request authority to execute a withdrawal. Figure 13-3 is a sample form from a MEF requesting the execution of a withdrawal plan. Complete and accurate information will ensure the quickest response to a request for withdrawal of a specific plan. Specific withdrawal procedures are contained in MCO P4400.39._.
REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL OF WAR RESERVE PLAN

FM COMMRFOR_____/G-4//
TO CMC WASHINGTON DC//LP//
INFO: COMMRFOR_____/G-4//
    CG I MEF//G-4//
    CG II MEF//G-4//
    CG III MEF//G-4//
    COMMARCORLOGBASES//807//
    COMMARCORSYSCOM//CS//
UNCLAS//NO4000//
SUBJ: REQ FOR WITHDRAWAL OF WAR RESERVE PLAN #75 IN SPT OF OPN____
REF/A/CINCXXX/DDHHMMZ MMM YY//
NARR/REF A IS EXECUTE ORDER FROM CINC/REF B IS ANNEX D OF THE OPORDER/
1. ()PER THE REFS, REQUEST CMC APPROVE WAR RESERVE WITHDRAWAL FOR
   OPERATION _______.
2. ()FOL DATA PROVIDED TO EXPEDITE THE WAR RESERVE PLANS ALREADY
   REGISTERED DURING THE RECENT DELIBERATE PLANNING CYCLE:
   A. ()PRIORITY:
   B. ()WITHDRAWAL PLAN:
   C. ()TAC 2 ADDRESS: (INCLUDE POD AND AIR TERMINAL IDENTIFIER (ATI)
      IAW REF D.)
   D. ()SMU AAC: XXXXXX
   E. ()JOPES ULN’S FOR MOVEMENT OF REQUESTED ACCOMPANYING SUPPLIES:
      (PROVIDE A BLOCK OF ULN’S)
   F. ()MATERIAL REQUESTED: (LIST CLASS, NUMBER OF DAYS REQUESTED, AND
      THE DATE REQUIRED IN THEATER. THIS IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT FOR ALBANY IN
      DETERMINING WHEN THEY NEED TO SHIP THE ACCOMPANYING SUPPLIES. LIST ANY
      PECULIAR REQUIREMENTS FOR EACH CLASS OF SUPPLY E.G., SHIP ALL B-TAMNS
      EXCEPT B2345..)
      (1) () CLASS I
      (2) () CLASS II ... ETC.
3. ()REQUEST CONFIRM RECEIPT.
DECLAS/YYMMDD//

Figure 13-3 -- Request for Withdrawal of War Reserve Plan

13-62
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARAGRAPH</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>14000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FORCE MANPOWER DEMAND</td>
<td>14001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL FORCE MANPOWER ASSETS</td>
<td>14002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASUALTY ESTIMATES</td>
<td>14003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CASUALTY REPORTING PROCEDURES</td>
<td>14004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NONUNIT TPFDD DEVELOPMENT</td>
<td>14005</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
14000. **INTRODUCTION.** This chapter provides guidance for computing and recording manpower requirements, sourcing those requirements, and using the appropriate automated tools.

14001. **TOTAL FORCE MANPOWER DEMAND**

1. **General.** The needs of the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), the supporting establishments and joint billets, and all other Marine Corps activities drive the demand for manpower. The support of operational forces will be assigned the highest priority for manpower assignments during wartime.

2. **FMF Table of Organization (T/O).** The FMF T/O’s display the Marine Corps wartime mission requirements in terms of grade and MOS spaces (structure). During peacetime, manning the FMF is based upon current authorized strength, actual inventory, policies, and staffing precedence (matching faces with spaces). Manpower planners at HQMC will generally staff the structure of the FMF at 90 percent.

3. **Manpower Mobilization Assignment System (MMAS).** The MMAS is the collection of systems, processes, and procedures used to provide an adequate manpower surge capacity for the USMC. Assignment of Total Force manpower will occur as a result of executing the MMAS. This system mirrors the peacetime manning level process/staffing process except that the Table of Manpower Requirements (TMR) used is expanded to include the "W" Series T/O’s, T/O’s for Combat Replacement Companies, and SMCR units for a specific OPLAN.

   a. **Troop List.** The Troop List is the planning and execution document of the manpower process. It is developed by the structure sponsors and published by DC/S for Requirements and Programs and lists units/name, T/O number, Program Element Number (PEN), Monitored Command Code (MCC)/Reporting Unit Code (RUC), T/O Structure (Officer and Enlisted), and Manning of T/O (Officer and Enlisted). When totaled it equals the Marine Corps structure and manning. For mobilization a troop list is developed from both the active and SMCR units (Total Force).

   b. **Wartime Authorized Strength Report (WASR).** The WASR identifies the Marine Corps’ manning requirements planned to be staffed by grade and MOS within each Monitored Command Code (MCC). The structure requirements shown in the Active, SMCR, and "W" Series T/Os is the Total Force during mobilization. It is from this structure requirement that the manning level is determined. The WASR, as in peacetime, displays the manning level by grade, MOS, and MCC.

14-3
c. Casualty Estimation Model (CASEST). CASEST is an automated tool which can be used to evaluate combat scenarios. Estimates made are of conventional, NBC, and DNBI casualties and used to stratify the results by rank/grade and MOS for manpower planning purposes. The model operates as a stand alone module on an IBM-compatible microcomputer.

d. Priority of Fill (POF) Table. The POF Table provides a means of defining the windows and priorities for assignment of Marines during a mobilization. The POF Table integrates the Time-Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD), the Troop List, and the Station of Initial Assignment (SIA) for each unit in the Marine Corps at the Monitored Command Code (MCC) level.

e. Wartime Verification Extract File (WVEF) Build System. The WVEF Build System is used to create a consolidated inventory of Marines available for assignment in the event of mobilization. This system generates a master file of all active duty, reserve and retired Marines eligible for assignment to satisfy the defined manpower requirements. The WVEF Build System selects records based on user-supplied parameters, converts the records to a single data structure, and reports the contents of the WVEF.

f. Officer Staffing Goal Model (OSGM) and Enlisted Assignment Model (EAM). The OSGM and EAM are used in selecting the best qualified individual to fill authorized billets throughout the Marine Corps.

g. Mailgram Orders System. The Mailgram Orders System is used to create individual orders for recalled Marines to fill specific billets and to send the orders via Mailgram in the event of partial or full mobilization. The Mailgram Orders System produces a tape of orders for Marines to be recalled for duty. The program processes assignment files and generates orders which are sent to a mailgram vendor for transmission and delivery.

3. Wartime Series Table of Organization (W-Series T/O’s).

a. W-Series T/O’s provide the supporting establishment with a framework for determining the manpower resources necessary to meet wartime mission requirements. W-Series T/O’s are maintained in the Table of Manpower Requirements (T/MR) system. Responsibility for managing and controlling manpower resources is a cooperative requirement in which CMC and the commands and activities have complementary roles. The governing principle is the accurate determination of the minimum manpower required to perform the assigned wartime mission effectively. The Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan (MPLAN) Volume I delineates specific responsibilities.

14002. TOTAL FORCE MANPOWER ASSETS

1. General. The Marine Corps has the capability to accomplish its mission in conventional operations short of general war at its current
force level. In general war, mobilization of additional manpower assets, to include pre-trained individual manpower and new accessions, is required to meet wartime force level demands. In the event of a developing wartime scenario before conscription, only a highly leveraged recruiting service can accommodate major increases in new accessions. Even with a well-resourced recruiting force, the Marine Corps must plan on a lead-time of at least 180 days to realize sizable increases in new accessions without a draft.

2. Current and Wartime Levels

   a. Current Force Level. The current force end-strength is primarily a reflection of fiscal constraints and does not support the expanded requirements of the Marine Corps in general war.

   b. Wartime Force Level. The Force Generation Tables list the wartime force levels for the three active MEF’s and Marine Corps Reserve Forces (MARRESFOR). The Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) will augment and reinforce the MEF’s upon mobilization, while pre-trained individual manpower (PIM) will fill the Active FMF and supporting establishment to meet the wartime force levels. New accessions will sustain the force by filling vacancies and meeting the anticipated requirement for replacements. As mentioned earlier, the Marine Corps relies on a strong recruiting posture with a robust pool to help meet these demands.

3. Pre-trained Individual Manpower (PIM). In addition to units of the SMCR, there are individual reservists and retirees available to expand the current force to the wartime force levels and serve as fillers and replacements.

   a. Reserve Component

      (1) Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The IRR may be called to active duty in time of war, national emergency proclaimed by the President or declared by Congress or when otherwise authorized by law. Members of the IRR will be used as individual fillers for the active MEF’s, the 4th Marine Division and 4th MAW, as prearranged individuals in wartime series tables of organization and as replacements.

      (2) Standby Reserve. Members of the Standby Reserve can only be ordered to active duty after the Secretary of the Navy has determined there are not enough qualified members in the Ready Reserve in the required category, who are readily available.

   b. Retired Component

      (1) Category I Retirees. Category I retirees are non-disability Marine retirees under the age of 60 who have been retired for less than five years. This is the primary population of retirees that would be recalled to active duty upon mobilization. They would not only be utilized to expand the CONUS supporting bases, but they could also be employed in noncombatant billets in the FMF if suitable
individual reservists are not available. These retirees are available for pre-assignment to wartime billets.

(2) **Category II Retirees.** Category II retirees are non-disability Marine retirees under the age of 60 who have been retired 5 years or more. They are assigned to billets the same as Category I retirees.

(3) **Category III Retirees.** Category III retiree classification is comprised of any Marine retiree, over age 60 including those retired for disability, other than Category I and II. This mobilization asset will be called only after it is clear that there are no other available resources. With few exceptions, these retired Marines will be used only in the CONUS supporting bases and stations.

14003. **CASUALTY ESTIMATES**

1. In the process of developing casualty estimates, the planner must consider the combat intensity level of the conflict and the size of MAGTF that will be committed. The methodology contained in this chapter provides a systematic approach and a common baseline to developing casualty estimates for MAGTF’s of varying sizes. The methodology can also be used to prepare inputs to the Joint Planning and Execution System (JPES) Medical Planning Module (MPM), which is used to estimate medical logistics requirements, and in evaluating actual operation plans or exercise scenarios.

2. **FM 101-10-3** and the Nuclear/Chemical Warfare Casualty Planning Data tables on pages II-CS-13 and II-CS-14 of the classified supplement to the MCP should be used for casualty projections related to NBC warfare.

3. Replacement planning data casualties must be broken down into occupational field for further stratification by MOS depending on the size of the force and the mission assigned. To determine replacement planning for a specific occupational field, obtain the vulnerability rate for that occupational field from the vulnerability tables on pages II-CS-5 and II-CS-6 of the classified supplement to the MCP and multiply this rate by the total number of casualties.

14004. **CASUALTY REPORTING PROCEDURES**

1. Prior to M-Day, CMC (MH) will promulgate specific casualty reporting chains and instructions, via ALMAR, if other than the standard reporting chain and instructions contained in MCO P3040.4___Casualty Procedures Manual, based upon specific OPLAN(s) executed.

2. The casualty reporting chain will be from in-theater. FMF units report directly to CMC (MHP) with appropriate operational headquarters as info addressees - CMC//MP/MM/MH/COB/>. Additional action
addressees will include the recruiting service district headquarters for the appropriate Casualty and Family Assistance Team (CASFAMTM) to make notification to next of kin. Other action/info addressees are as required by MCO P3040.4.

3. Reporting and notification procedures are set forth in NAVMEDCOMINST 5360.1 and MCO P3040.4.

4. Marine Corps Districts will use local personnel resources until CASFAMTM’s are joined and operative.

5. Personnel sections of daily situation reports will be used. WWMCCS Intercomputer Network (WIN) may be used to provide additional information.

6. Casualty reporting data will be used for initial personnel management decisions and as a precursor to follow on replacement demand requests.

14005. NONUNIT TPFDD DEVELOPMENT. This section outlines planning procedures/responsibilities for the CINC Medical and Personnel Planners, Marine Corps Component Commander, Marine Corps Principal Planning Agent (PPA), and HQMC (M&RA) prior to, during, and after OPLAN Forces/Logistics Refinement Conferences.

1. Developing the Medical Working Files (MWF)

   a. The CINC (Surgeon General/Medical Planner) provides casualty planning guidance to the planning community then tasks the Marine Component Commander (COMMARFOR) Force Surgeon (G-4) who generally designates a Marine Corps PPA (I MEF/II MEF/III MEF) to run a JOPES sub-system called the Medical Planning Module (MPM). For each OPLAN the Marine Corps Component Commander will inform HQMC (MPP-60) whether the Component Commander or the Principal Planning Agent will assume MPM responsibility.

   b. The Component Commander or his PPA runs the MPM and sends an MPM tape # to the CINC Medical Planner. The CINC Medical Planner completes Medical annex Q to OPLAN.

   c. The PPA obtains CINC verification/validation of Medical Working File (MWF) data from component runs.

   d. HQMC (MPP-60) provides the following planning factors to the PPA:

      (1) percent not replaced
      (2) personnel filler policy, and
      (3) Stations of Initial Assignment (SIA)
e. The PPA runs a JOPES sub-system called Nonunit Personnel Generator (NPG) after the CINC validates MPM output. The NPG run updates the Ports of Support File (POSF), develops a Personnel Working File (PWF), and generates a nonunit TPFDD.

f. The PPA sends the NPG tape # to the CINC Personnel Planner. The CINC consolidates all component input and generates a nonunit TPFDD for the OPLAN.

g. After the CINC verifies the personnel increment numbers (PIN’s), they are merged into the OPLAN TPFDD.

h. The PPA provides HQMC (MPP-60) with requirements (nonunit TPFDD) generated from the NPG so they can source nonunit personnel requirements. MPP-60 reviews Marine Forces in the TPFDD and analyzes the numbers, and when, and where personnel are needed.

i. MPP-60 provides sourced TPFDD to the PPA (indicating sourcing and shortfalls).

2. Creating or maintaining the Ports of Support File (POSF). Use CSM UM 199-92, "Movement Requirements Generator (MRG)", as reference. The MRG generates the time-phased nonunit related personnel and material movement requirements for an OPLAN; it is not mated to the Medical Planning Module (MPM). This lack of linkage provides inaccurate results (i.e. manipulation of factors in the MPM changes the number of casualties predicted but does not change the number of replacements required). These movement requirements specify the numbers of replacement personnel and amounts of equipment and material necessary to support the OPLAN within its stated operation time frame. Function M01 of the MRG provides the planner with the ability to create or maintain the POSF (See page A1-1 for steps describing the process for function M01 execution). The POSF provides ports of support (air, sea, ammunition and petroleum, oil, and lubricant by Service and destination geolocation code (GEOCODE)). The Marine Corps Component Commander or Principal Planning Agent in conjunction with CMC (MPP-60) enters GEOCODES for Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD), Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE), and Origin into Function M01. This file is used by the NPG to develop the nonunit TPFDD for replacement personnel.

3. Running the Nonunit Personnel Generator (NPG). Use CSM UM 311-92, Nonunit Personnel Generator (NPG), as reference. The NPG offers an automated capability to generate Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) records for the movement of nonunit replacement personnel. Nonunit replacement personnel are required for all casualties, for example, those killed in action, taken as prisoners of war, missing in action, and administratively lost. Generally, the replacement is needed in theater when the casualty occurs, and the NPG determines the simulated loss and identifies the replacement. The NPG computes
predicted casualties and generates time-phased requirements and 
movement routing for replacement personnel using the following inputs:

Personnel Working File (PWF)

Medical Working File (MWF)

Ports of Support File (POSF)

MFM on-line medical data base

The NPG then writes this information to tape in the format of TPFDD
nonunit personnel records. The NPG may be accessed by any authorized
JOPES user at the user’s Worldwide Military Command and Control System
(WWMCCS) host site.
1. ULN's may be thought of much the same as a landing serial used in the amphibious assault. The ULN identifies a force requirement (grouping of personnel, supplies, and/or equipment) moving from the same origin, at the same time, via the same transportation mode and source, to the same destination.

2. ULN's may be up to seven characters long, embodying the three parts identified below. Figure A-1 provides "rules" regarding allowable characters for each position of the ULN structure.

Figure A-1 -- ULN Structure and Rules For Development
a. **Force Record Number (FRN).** The FRN is the primary component of the ULN and is comprised of the leading five characters, including any blank spaces. (Note: The leading three characters of any FRN are referred to as "the BASIC FRN."

b. The FRAGMENTATION segment of the ULN is comprised of the sixth character.

c. The INSERT segment of the ULN is comprised of the seventh character.

3. The following information further defines the three parts of a ULN.

   a. **FRN.** The FRN part of the ULN identifies a specific force requirement. It identifies the one requirement in total and is unique to that one requirement. There are five categories of FRN’s, each discussed below with an example of how it is used:

      (1) **Grouping Force Category.** In this category, the FRN is two characters long (3 blank spaces).

      
      P 1 __ __

      (a) It functions as a parent ULN.

      (b) It shows a hierarchial force structure

      (c) It is completely defined by including all ULN’s falling within the Grouping Force Category. (In this example, all ULN’s beginning with P1.)

      Example usage: II MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE

      (2) **Independent Force Category.** In this category, the FRN is three characters long (2 blank spaces).

      
      P 1 A __ __
(a) It is wholly defined by a single UTC.

(b) It may not be subordinate to a Primary Force Category or Secondary Parent Force Category.

(c) It must have a single destination.

(d) If moving in Split-Shipment mode, two unique FRN’s must be used. The basic FRN’s are identical, however, one ULN will contain a "C" in the 5th position denoting the cargo movement, while the second ULN contains a "P" in the 5th position denoting the personnel movement.

\[
\begin{align*}
P & 1 \ A \ \_ \ C \\
P & 1 \ A \ \_ \ P
\end{align*}
\]

Example usage: 4TH MARINE EXPEDITIONARY BRIGADE

(3) **Primary Parent Force Category.** In this category, the FRN is three characters long (2 blank spaces).

\[
P \ 1 \ B \ \_ \ \_ 
\]

(a) It shows a hierarchical force structure.

(b) It consists of either Secondary Parents or Subordinates, or both.

(c) It uses a Parent Indicator Code (PIC) To indicate that: None of the subordinates are split (PIC = X); all of the subordinates are split (PIC = A); or that some of the subordinates are split (PIC = P).

(d) A blank PIC indicates the FRN is not a parent.

Example usage: II MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE COMMAND ELEMENT

(4) **Secondary Parent Force Category.** In this category the FRN is four characters long (1 blank space).

\[
P \ 1 \ B \ A \ \_ 
\]
(a) It shows hierarchial force structure.

(b) It is subordinate to a primary parent.

(c) Further subordination is required. However, the subordinates may not be further subordinated.

(d) Subordinates may not be deployed in a Split-Shipment mode.

(e) Fourth position reserved characters are "W", used for USAF weather teams, and "X" and "Y," both of which are used for USAF TACPs supporting Army units.

Example usage: 2D MARINE AIRCRAFT WING

(5) **Subordinate Force Category.** In this category, the FRN is four or five characters long (1 or no blank spaces).

P 1 B A 1

(a) It is subordinate to a Primary or Secondary Parent. Primary FRN subordinates have identical Basic FRN’s and unique 4th characters. Primary subordinate FRN’s may deploy in Split-Shipment mode. Secondary Parent subordinate FRN’s have identical characters in the leading four positions with a unique 5th character. Secondary Parent subordinates may not be deployed in Split-Shipment mode, therefore they cannot have an "E" in the 5th position.

(b) It has no subordinates.

(c) It has a single destination.

(d) It is identified by a single Unit Type Code.

Example usage: VMFA-115 (12 F/A-18s)
b. Fragmentation (Frag) And Insert. Although separate parts of the ULN, Frag and Insert will be discussed together since they are inextricably linked. Figures A-2 and A-3 show the use of Frag and Insert codes attached to the FRN.

Figure A-2 -- ULN Development

(1) If only one set of unit identification data is submitted for a single force requirement, both the Fragmentation and Insert codes must be blank.
Example usage: The squadron, VMFA-115 from the above example, deploys from POE to DESTINATION in one increment ... that is, no separate movement groups due to various transportation modes and/or sources, phasing, or routing.
(2) If more than one set of unit identification data is submitted, the Frag and Insert positions must have values other than blank. In other words, if the five character FRN (including any blank spaces) identically appears in two or more ULN’s, there must be a FRAG and INSERT code entered.

P 1 B A 1 A 0

(3) The final destination of each Frag and Insert must be the same, and the combined force records must always represent only one force requirement; e.g., when combined, the data within ULN’s P1ABA1A0 through P1ABA1C3 equal the entire squadron.

(4) If the Fragmentation position is not blank, the Insert position must also be not blank.

(5) Insert codes of zero (0) indicate that no further fragmentation of the ULN will occur.

Example usage: The squadron, VMFA-115 from the above example, deploys from POE to DESTINATION in more than one increment. As depicted in Figures A-2 and A-3, ULN P1BA1A0 represents the organic movement of the 12 aircraft the squadron holds. Subsequent ULN’s, P1BA1B0 and P1BA1C1 through P1BA1C3, reflect the movement of the remaining assets of the squadron (cargo and personnel).

3. Fragmenting and inserting ULN’s provides a greater degree of flexibility to exploit all deployment means available to the MAGTF commander, while retaining visibility of each FRN. An explanation of figures A-2 and A-3 is provided to elaborate this point.

a. The examples at figures A-2 and A-3 shows an F/A-18 squadron (VMFA-115) which has been identified for deployment by the MAGTF commander. During initial planning phases, an FRN of P1BA1 was assigned by MAGTF planners to the squadron.

(1) Fragmenting and inserting for this requirement would not be required if the entire squadron were to move in one increment from origin to destination while utilizing the same mode and source of transportation.

(2) However, factors such as the commander’s needs, direction from supported commanders, lift constraints, self-deploying capability, etc., determine that portions of a requirement move by different modes and/or sources, at different times, etc.
b. In this example, the commanders’ guidance and constraints regarding available transportation, direct that the squadron move in multiple increments. Since the destination for all increments is the same, entering Frag and Insert codes to the original FRN is allowed.

(1) The first Frag/Insert (ULN P1BA1A0) represents the movement of the ‘self-deploying’ assets (12 F/A-18 aircraft and the pilots). Since the origin and the POE are the same for this ULN, the mode/source from origin to POE is X/X (not required). The mode/source from POE to the Destination is A/H (air, via organic assets).

(2) The second Frag/Insert (ULN P1BA1B0) represents the movement of cargo required to support the squadron. Movement of this ULN from POE to POD is via MSC Withhold shipping (SW). Therefore, the cargo must be moved from its origin (MCAS) to a seaport for embarkation. This movement is reflected by the mode/source L/M (Marine Corps provided ground transportation). At the POD, the cargo is offloaded from the ship and moved to the destination by mode/source L/D (ground transport provided by the supported CINC).

(3) The third Frag/Insert (ULN P1BA1C0) includes all remaining personnel (pilots are with ULN P1BA1A0) requiring transportation. As depicted in Figures A-2 and A-3, ULN P1BA1C0 is further fragmented into three additional ULN’s (ULN’s P1BA1C1 through P1BA1C3). Further fragmenting is necessary because all remaining personnel are not moving in one increment.

(a) ULN P1BA1C1 depicts those personnel which move from POE to their Destination via air assets provided by the Strategic Airlift Command (SAC), mode/source of A/S. These personnel are those embarked in KC-10 aircraft used in dual-role missions (tankers which also carry personnel/cargo).

(b) ULN P1BA1C2 depicts those personnel which move from POE to Destination via air assets provided by the Military Airlift Command (MAC), mode/source A/K.

(c) ULN P1BA1C3 depicts those personnel which move from POE to POD on MSC Withhold shipping, mode/source S/W. From the POD to their destination, they are transported by ground transportation organic to the Marine Corps; mode/source is L/M.

c. When all personnel/cargo requirements of ULN’s P1BA1A0, P1BA1B0 and P1BA1C1 through P1BA1C3 are summed, the totals equal that which was originally required in the base FRN P1BA1. Therefore, if the original FRN and the fragged/inserted ULN’s which derived from it are included in the TPFDD, the stated requirement would be doubled. Thus, only the Fragged/Inserted ULN’s are included in the TPFDD. Likewise, since P1BA1C0 was further fragmented, only derived ULN’s (P1BA1C1 through P1BA1C3) are included in the TPFDD.
4. In summary, ULN's provide numbers of personnel and dimensional data for cargo, as well as the mode and source of transportation required, thus enabling transportation agencies to plan for, schedule, and provide transportation to move the MAGTF.
SECTION 2: STANDARD INFORMATION FOR FORCE MODULES

1. Force modules (FM’s) are planning and execution tools that use current JOPES or MAGTF II/LOG AIS software (detailed information on construction and manipulation of force modules is contained in the JOPES Users Manual, Vol 2 and MAGTF II Users Manual). Force modules link major service-defined combat units with supporting units and sustaining supplies. Movement for the entire package is phased. The force module concept permits rapid construction of a combat force’s TPFDD. Many force and support requirements can be added to a plan’s data base (TPFDD) with a three-character force module identifier (FMID). There are three types of force modules:

   a. The Service/joint force module is built using doctrinal arrangements of combat forces and their supporting elements. It is the basic building block to aid the planner in quickly creating a force list. These modules combine combat (C), combat-support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) components with their associated sustainment. The force modules contain type units and a Service computed estimated of the sustainment required to support the unit. Additional guidance on sustainment is found in section 8 of chapter 13.

   b. The second type of force module is the OPLAN-dependent force module. Like the first type, this one groups C, CS, CSS elements but it is developed by a CINC to maintain the specific demands of a particular OPLAN. It may begin as a Service/Joint force module that may be modified, or it can be created independently by the CINC or MARFOR commander to respond to a specific planning task. These force modules recognize theater-specific conditions: anticipated weather conditions, expected host nation support contributions, intensity and nature of conflict, etc. Generally, these modules are sourced with actual units assigned against force requirements, since they have been developed in a response to a CINC’s actual task assignment. Often these force modules are created after the force requirements are identified in an OPLAN; in this situation the planner goes through the TPFDD to organize into modules supporting groups of forces and supplies.

   c. The third type of force module is a force tracking force module. This type of force module is OPLAN dependent and consists of major Service units and accompanying supplies. They are required for all OPLAN’s. This type is the most common FM. MARFOR commanders must at a minimum develop two kinds of force tracking force modules before providing a sourced TPFDD to a supported CINC.

(1) A component FM (generally described as "All Marine Forces").
(2) Organizational FM’s (generally described as "Command Element", "Ground Combat Element", "Aviation Combat Element", "Combat Service Support Element", and if applicable subordinate task forces under the MARFOR command such as "Task Force XX"). Additionally, the MARFOR commander must develop a single FM for all sustainment unit line numbers.

d. Administratively, these force modules are extremely convenient for identifying and monitoring groupings of forces. They are valuable because they allow the planner to manipulate data in the module, display large amounts of information about the forces and cargo, retrieve and print records, and identify force modules in which units are contained. In many cases specific force tracking modules will be specified in either the JSCP or in the CINC TPFDD LOI.
## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABBREVIATION</th>
<th>LONG TITLE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A/DACG</td>
<td>arrival/departure airfield control group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAA</td>
<td>Arrival and Assembly Area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AADC</td>
<td>Area Air Defense Coordinator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AAOG</td>
<td>assembly area operations group</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABFC</td>
<td>advanced base functional component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>Airspace Control Authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACCHAN</td>
<td>Allied Command Channel (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>aviation combat element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACCE</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACL</td>
<td>allowable cabin load</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACLANT</td>
<td>Allied Command Atlantic (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADAL</td>
<td>Authorized Dental Allowance List</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADCON</td>
<td>administrative control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>automatic data processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AE</td>
<td>assault echelon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AEL</td>
<td>Allowance Equipment List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCENT</td>
<td>Allied Forces Central Europe (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFFIS</td>
<td>Air Facilities File Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFLANT</td>
<td>Air Forces Atlantic (USAF component under USCINCLANT)</td>
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<td>AFOE</td>
<td>assault follow-on echelon</td>
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<td>AGFSOUTH</td>
<td>Allied Forces Southern Europe (NATO)</td>
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<td>AGS</td>
<td>aviation ground support</td>
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<td>AGSE</td>
<td>aviation ground support equipment</td>
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<td>AIG</td>
<td>address indicator group</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>automated information systems</td>
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<td>AIMD</td>
<td>aircraft intermediate maintenance department</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AIS</td>
<td>automated information system</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCC</td>
<td>airlift control center</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALCE</td>
<td>airlift control element</td>
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<td>ALCON</td>
<td>all concerned</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALD</td>
<td>available-to-load date at the POE</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMAL</td>
<td>Authorized Medical Allowance List</td>
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<tr>
<td>AMC</td>
<td>Air Mobility Command (previously MAC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ANMCC</td>
<td>Alternate National Military Command Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOA</td>
<td>amphibious objective area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APF</td>
<td>afloat prepositioning force (NTFF + MPS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>APL</td>
<td>allowance parts list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOD</td>
<td>aerial port of debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APOE</td>
<td>aerial port of embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APORTS</td>
<td>Aerial Ports and Air Operating Bases File</td>
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<tr>
<td>ARCENT</td>
<td>Army component under USCINCENT</td>
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<td>ARG</td>
<td>amphibious ready group</td>
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<td>ARLANT</td>
<td>Army component under USCINCLANT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASBPO</td>
<td>Armed Services Blood Program Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASL</td>
<td>authorized stockage list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASPUR</td>
<td>Automated System for Processing Unit Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASM</td>
<td>automated scheduling message</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT</td>
<td>annual training (formerly ATD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATAF</td>
<td>Allied Tactical Air Force (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATCMD</td>
<td>Advanced Transportation Cargo Movement Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>amphibious task force</td>
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<td>AUTODIN</td>
<td>Automatic Digital Network</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVCAL</td>
<td>Aviation Consolidated Allowance List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BA</td>
<td>basic allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BLT</td>
<td>battalion landing team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOSG</td>
<td>base operations support group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSSG</td>
<td>brigade service support group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BUMED</td>
<td>Bureau of Medicine and Surgery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-day</td>
<td>day specified by JCS when deployment begins</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2F</td>
<td>Commander, Second Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C3</td>
<td>command, control, and communications</td>
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<td>C4I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence</td>
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<td>command, control, communications computers, intelligence, and interoperability</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAEMS</td>
<td>Computer-Aided Embarkation Management System</td>
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<td>CAM</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Crisis Action Procedures</td>
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<td>CARF</td>
<td>combat active replacement factor</td>
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<td>CAT</td>
<td>crisis action team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CATF</td>
<td>commander, amphibious task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBBLS</td>
<td>hundreds of barrels (POL)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
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<td>CESP</td>
<td>Civil Engineering Support Plan</td>
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<td>CFH</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CLF</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Commandant of the Marine Corps</td>
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<td>CMPF</td>
<td>Commander, Maritime Prepositioning Force</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Chairman’s Net Assessment for Strategic Planning</td>
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<td>CNO</td>
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<td>COA</td>
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<td>ABBREVIATION</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
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<td>COMCAB</td>
<td>commander, Marine Corps air bases</td>
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<td>CSA</td>
<td>container storage area</td>
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<td>CSPA</td>
<td>CINC’s Strategic Priorities Assessment</td>
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<td>CINC’s Preparedness Assessment Report</td>
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<td>departure airfield control group</td>
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<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs</td>
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<td>DCA</td>
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<td>destination</td>
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<td>Defense Logistics Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNBI</td>
<td>disease/non-battle injury</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOA</td>
<td>day(s) of ammunition</td>
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<td>DODIC</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>day(s) of supply</td>
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<td>died of wounds</td>
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<td>Defense Planning Guidance</td>
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<tr>
<td>EAF</td>
<td>Equipment Allowance File/expeditionary airfield</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELINT</td>
<td>electronic intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERO</td>
<td>engines running onload/offload</td>
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<td>ESB</td>
<td>enroute support base</td>
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<td>ESI</td>
<td>essential sustainment items</td>
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<td>electronic warfare</td>
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<td>F-hour</td>
<td>time mobilization begins</td>
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<td>F/W</td>
<td>fixed wing</td>
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<td>FAP</td>
<td>fleet assistance program</td>
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<td>FAST</td>
<td>fleet antiterrorism security team</td>
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<td>FEBA</td>
<td>forward edge of the battle area</td>
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<td>FISP</td>
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<td>FM</td>
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<td>FMFPac</td>
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<td>FOB</td>
<td>forward operating base</td>
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<td>FST</td>
<td>fleet surgical team</td>
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<tr>
<td>FTS</td>
<td>File Transfer Service (WINgrams) or full-time support</td>
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<tr>
<td>GCE</td>
<td>ground combat element</td>
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<td>GELOC</td>
<td>standard specific geolocation code</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEOCODE</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEOFILE</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEOLOC</td>
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<td>GEOREF</td>
<td>geographic reference system</td>
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<td>GFOAR</td>
<td>global family of OPLANS assessment report</td>
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<td>Graphic Information Presentation System</td>
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<td>GME</td>
<td>garrison mobile equipment</td>
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<tr>
<td>H-hour</td>
<td>time an operation commences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDC</td>
<td>helicopter direction center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIC</td>
<td>high-intensity conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLC</td>
<td>heavy lift (and dimension) code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HLSC</td>
<td>helicopter logistic support center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATION</td>
<td>LONG TITLE</td>
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<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQMC</td>
<td>Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps</td>
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<tr>
<td>HTC</td>
<td>home training center</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
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<td>IAS</td>
<td>Intelligence Analysis System</td>
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<td>ICP</td>
<td>inventory control point</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMA</td>
<td>Individual Mobilization Augmentee/intermediate maintenance activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMM</td>
<td>integrated materiel manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMRL</td>
<td>individual material readiness list</td>
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<tr>
<td>IPL</td>
<td>Integrated Priorities List</td>
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<td>IRR</td>
<td>Individual Ready Reserve</td>
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<td>ISB</td>
<td>intermediate staging base</td>
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<td>ISSA</td>
<td>InterService Support Agreement</td>
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<td>JANAP</td>
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<td>JDC</td>
<td>Joint Deployment Community</td>
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<td>JDS</td>
<td>Joint Deployment System</td>
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<td>Joint Force Air Component Commander</td>
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<td>JLRSA</td>
<td>Joint Long-Range Strategic Appraisal</td>
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<td>JMBO</td>
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<td>JOGS</td>
<td>Joint Operation Graphics System</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<td>JOPS</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning System</td>
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<td>JOPSREP</td>
<td>JOPS Reporting System</td>
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<td>Joint Planning and Execution Community</td>
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<td>JPO</td>
<td>Joint Petroleum Office</td>
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<td>Joint Reporting System</td>
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<td>JSAM</td>
<td>Joint Security Assistance Memorandum</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSEAD</td>
<td>joint suppression of enemy air defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>JSOC</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>Joint Special Operations Task Force</td>
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<td>JSPD</td>
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<td>killed in action</td>
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<td>LAD</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCAC</td>
<td>landing craft, air cushioned</td>
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<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATION</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>LF6F</td>
<td>Landing Force 6th Fleet</td>
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<td>Landing Force Operational Reserve Material</td>
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<td>LHA</td>
<td>amphibious assault ship (general purpose)</td>
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<td>LHD</td>
<td>amphibious assault ship (multipurpose)</td>
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<td>low-intensity conflict</td>
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<td>Logistics Management Information System</td>
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<td>LMCC</td>
<td>Logistics and Movement Control Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOE</td>
<td>level of effort</td>
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<td>LOI</td>
<td>letter of instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>LPD</td>
<td>amphibious transport, dock (landing platform dock)</td>
</tr>
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<td>LPH</td>
<td>amphibious assault ship (landing platform helicopter)</td>
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<td>amphibious ship, dock (landing ship, dock)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M-day</td>
<td>the day mobilization begins</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAC</td>
<td>Military Airlift Command (now called AMC)</td>
</tr>
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<td>MACG</td>
<td>Marine air control group</td>
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<td>MAFC</td>
<td>MAGTF All-Source Fusion Center</td>
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<td>MAG</td>
<td>Marine aircraft group</td>
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<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGTF II</td>
<td>MAGTF War Planning System II</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGTF II/Log AIS</td>
<td>Marine Air-Ground Task Force Lift Model</td>
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<td>MALSC</td>
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<td>Marine Ammunitions Requirements Support Order</td>
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<td>MAW</td>
<td>Marine air traffic control squadron</td>
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<td>MBBLIS</td>
<td>thousands of barrels</td>
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<td>MBPO</td>
<td>Military Blood Program Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCAS</td>
<td>Marine Corps air station</td>
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<td>MCB</td>
<td>Marine Corps base</td>
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<td>MCC</td>
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<td>Marine Corps Combat Development Command</td>
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<td>Marine Corps Mobilization Station</td>
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<td>Marine expeditionary force</td>
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<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary unit</td>
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<td>MF</td>
<td>mobile facility</td>
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<td>LONG TITLE</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFL</td>
<td>Master Force List (JDS) or Major Force List (JOPS)</td>
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<td>material handling equipment</td>
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<td>MIA</td>
<td>missing in action</td>
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<td>MIC</td>
<td>mid-intensity conflict</td>
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<td>MILSTAMP</td>
<td>Military Standard Transportation and Movement Procedures</td>
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<td>Mobile Medical Augmentation Readiness Team</td>
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<td>memorandum of agreement</td>
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<td>mobilization designee</td>
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<td>MPM</td>
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<td>Maritime Prepositioning Ship</td>
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<td>MRG</td>
<td>Movement Requirements Generator</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Sealift Command/major subordinate command</td>
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<td>MSSG</td>
<td>MEU Service Support Group</td>
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<td>medical treatment facility</td>
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<td>MTMC</td>
<td>Military Traffic Management Command</td>
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<td>MTON/MT</td>
<td>measurement ton (40 cubic ft)</td>
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<td>Marine wing support group</td>
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<td>NALMEB</td>
<td>Norway Airlanded MEB</td>
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<td>Naval Facilities Engineering Command</td>
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<td>NAVWARP</td>
<td>Navy War Reserve Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>nuclear, biological, and chemical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NBG</td>
<td>naval beach group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCF</td>
<td>naval construction force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCMP</td>
<td>Navy Capabilities and Mobilization Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCSO</td>
<td>Naval Control of Shipping Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDRF</td>
<td>National Defense Reserve Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCCB</td>
<td>naval mobile construction battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMCC</td>
<td>National Military Command Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>national military strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATION</td>
<td>LONG TITLE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>NNOR</td>
<td>nonnuclear ordnance requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPS</td>
<td>non-prior service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRC</td>
<td>non-unit related cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>non-unit related personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSE</td>
<td>Navy Support Element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>outside the continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OH</td>
<td>operational handbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORF</td>
<td>operational readiness float</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSGM</td>
<td>Officer Staffing Goal Model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OWRMS</td>
<td>Other War Reserve Materiel Stocks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAR</td>
<td>population at risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>primary control officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>permanent change of station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCSP</td>
<td>peculiar contingency support package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEB</td>
<td>pre-expended bin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHIB</td>
<td>amphibious</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHIBGRU</td>
<td>amphibious group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHIBOP</td>
<td>amphibious operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PHIBRON</td>
<td>amphibious squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIM</td>
<td>pretrained individual manpower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLAD</td>
<td>plain language address</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POCG</td>
<td>port operations control group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>port of debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POE</td>
<td>port of embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POG</td>
<td>port operations group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>petroleum, oils, and lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWR</td>
<td>prepositioned war reserves</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWRMRR</td>
<td>prepositioned war reserve materiel requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWRMRF</td>
<td>Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel Requirement \ Field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWRMRS</td>
<td>Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel Requirement Stores</td>
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<td>PWRS</td>
<td>prepositioned war reserve material stocks</td>
</tr>
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<td>PWRS</td>
<td>prepositioned war reserve stock</td>
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<tr>
<td>R/W</td>
<td>rotary wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RBE</td>
<td>remain-behind-equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCW</td>
<td>ration, cold weather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDD</td>
<td>required delivery date at destination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RDMF</td>
<td>rapidly deployable medical facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLD</td>
<td>ready-to-load date at origin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RLT</td>
<td>regimental landing team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Ready Reserve Fleet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATION</td>
<td>LONG TITLE</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEACOP</td>
<td>Strategic Sealift Contingency Planning System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SELF</td>
<td>strategic expeditionary landing field</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHORCAL</td>
<td>Shorebased Consolidated Allowance List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIA</td>
<td>station of initial assignment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>signals intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMCA</td>
<td>Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMCR</td>
<td>Selected Marine Corps Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMU</td>
<td>SASSY Management Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>special operations capable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standing operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SORTS</td>
<td>Status of Resources and Training System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOSG</td>
<td>station operations support group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPF</td>
<td>special purpose force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOE</td>
<td>seaport of embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRO</td>
<td>Standing Routing Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRP</td>
<td>Sealift Readiness Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>NATO Standardization Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STOL</td>
<td>short takeoff and landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUADPS</td>
<td>Shipboard Uniform Automated Data Processing System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/A</td>
<td>table of allowances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T-ACS</td>
<td>auxiliary crane ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACLOG</td>
<td>tactical-logistics group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACMEMO</td>
<td>Tactical Memorandum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAH</td>
<td>hospital ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAM</td>
<td>table of authorized material</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAVB</td>
<td>aviation logistics support ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC-AIMS</td>
<td>Transportation Coordinators’ Automated Information for Movement System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>transportation component command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TDS</td>
<td>tactical data systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/E</td>
<td>table of equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TECHCON</td>
<td>technical control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TESP</td>
<td>Training Exercise Support Package</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFE</td>
<td>Transportation Feasibility Estimator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TLCF</td>
<td>teleconference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/M/S</td>
<td>type/model/series</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T/O</td>
<td>table of organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOMS</td>
<td>Terminal Operation Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSA</td>
<td>Training Squadron Allowance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSR</td>
<td>telecommunications service request</td>
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<tr>
<td>TUCHA</td>
<td>type unit data file</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TYCOM</td>
<td>type command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABBREVIATION</td>
<td>LONG TITLE</td>
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<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIC</td>
<td>unit identification code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULN</td>
<td>unit line number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAFF</td>
<td>Unified Action Armed Forces (Joint Pub 0-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMCC</td>
<td>Unit Movement Control Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UTC</td>
<td>unit type code</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V/STOL</td>
<td>vertical/short takeoff and landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VTOL</td>
<td>vertical takeoff and landing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WAM</td>
<td>WWMCCS ADP Modernization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WASR</td>
<td>Wartime Authorized Strength Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHMF</td>
<td>Wartime Headquarters Master File</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHNS</td>
<td>wartime host-nation support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIA</td>
<td>wounded in action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WIN</td>
<td>WWMCCS Intercomputer Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRM</td>
<td>War Reserve Materiel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRMR</td>
<td>War Reserve Materiel Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRS</td>
<td>War Reserve System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSGT</td>
<td>WWMCCS Standard Graphics Terminal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSPD</td>
<td>Weapon System Planning Document</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWMCCS</td>
<td>Worldwide Military Command and Control System</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>DEFINITIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acceptability</td>
<td>The course of action identified will be worth the cost in manpower, material, and the time involved. (AFSC Pub 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accompanying Supplies</td>
<td>The supplies and equipment that deploy with a MAGTF providing the initial sustainment necessary for employment. Accompanying supplies are shown as unit line numbers in a TPFDD. Dedicated sealift and or airlift allows it to flow with the forces. Accompanying supplies may flow with both the Assault echelon (AE) and the Assault follow On Echelon (AFOE), but should not be considered AFOE. AFOE is a transportation echelon term.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive Planning</td>
<td>Response options keyed to specified conditions of crisis onset. Adaptive planning guidance which describes the conditions is provided in the JSCP (adapted from AFSC Pub 5).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequacy</td>
<td>The scope and concept of a planned operation are sufficient to accomplish the task assigned. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Landing</td>
<td>Cargo space without regard to tactical employment. Equipment and supplies must be unloaded and sorted before use (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aerial Port</td>
<td>An airfield that has been designated for the sustained air movement of personnel and material and to serve as an authorized port for entrance into or departure from the country where it is located. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Mobility Command</td>
<td>Single manager operating agency for designated airlift service. Previously referred to as Military Airlift Command (MAC) (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Movement</td>
<td>Air transport of unit, personnel, supplies, and equipment, including airdrops and air landings. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**SUBJECT**

**DEFINITIONS**

Airhead: A designated location in a hostile or threatened territory, which, when seized and held, ensures the continuous airlanding of troops and material and furnishes the maneuver space needed for projected operations. Also, a designated location that is used as a base for supply and evacuation by air in an area of operations.

Airlift Control Element: A functional airlift organization (provisional) established to control and support designated airlift operations. Normally, it includes an operations function such as movement control and communications, a support function which relates to the air facility itself, and a liaison with appropriate airborne or other air and ground forces units. (FMFM 4-6)

Airlift Requirement: The total number of passengers and/or weight/cubic displacement of cargo required to be carried by air for a specific task. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Alert: An order issued by competent authority to initiate execution planning. (JDS Procedures Manual)

Alert Order: A crisis action planning directive from the Secretary of Defense, issued by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that provides essential guidance for planning and directs the initiation of execution planning following a decision by the NCA that U.S. military forces may be required to conduct military operations. (Joint Pub 5-03.1)

Alert Status: The level of preparedness directed by competent authority to be attained by deploying units. (Joint Pub 5-02.4)

Allocation: The resources given to the commander of a unified or specified command by the Joint Chiefs of Staff for execution planning or actual execution. (Joint Pub 5-03.1)

Allowable Cabin Load: The amount of cargo and passengers determined by weight, cubic displacement, and distance to be flown, which may be transported by specific aircraft. (FMFM 4-6)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Amphibious Lift</td>
<td>The total capacity of assault shipping utilized in an amphibious operation, expressed in terms of personnel, vehicles, tons of supplies. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apportion</td>
<td>To make resources available to the commander of a unified or specified command for deliberate planning. Apportioned resources are used in the development of operation plans and may be more or less than those allocated for execution planning or actual execution. (Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Apportionment</td>
<td>The resources made available to the commander of a unified or specified command for deliberate planning. Apportioned resources are used in the development of operations plans and may be more or less than those allocated for execution planning. (JSCP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrival Airfield</td>
<td>The organization that receives transported units from the Air Force carrier and controls them until released to their parent unit. (FMFM 4-6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control Group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arrival Estimate</td>
<td>The estimated time required for the first element of a designated force module to arrive at the designated POD. (Expressed in days and hours from the time the force module is notified to deploy.) (JCS Pub 5-02.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(First Element)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assembly Area</td>
<td>An area where a command is assembled in preparation for future action (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Augmentation Forces</td>
<td>Forces to be transferred to the operational command of a supported commander during the execution of an operation. (Joint Pub 5-02.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authorized Personnel</td>
<td>The personnel strength that satisfies the specific force requirements after arrival in the objective area. For standard force requirements, personnel strength is wholly defined by UTC. For nonstandard force requirements, personnel strength is either established for a nonstandard UTC or a change to a standard UTC for use in a particular OPLAN. Personnel strength in objective area is used to determine non-unit-related cargo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SUBJECT</strong></td>
<td><strong>DEFINITION</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Automated Scheduling</td>
<td>Autodin messages that provide schedule and requirements allocation information to JDC users who may not have direct access to JDS via WIN. Providing organizations determine ASM generation and distribution by establishing addressees in the Plain Language Address (PLAD) file in JDS. (JDS Procedures Manual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Available to Load Date</td>
<td>The day the unit will be ready to begin Load Date outloading at the POE. (Joint Pub 1-03.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aviation Ordnance</td>
<td>Ordnance which is designed to be delivered from aircraft.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Case</td>
<td>A method of planning that attempts to resolve in advance possible conflicts over use of resources in more than one OPLAN.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Allowance</td>
<td>The allotment of ammunition designated for each individual ground weapon system within the Marine Corps. The basic allowance is part of the MAGTF’s accompanying supplies and is not additive to the MEF’s 60 DOA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Load</td>
<td>The quantity of supplies required to be on hand within, and that can be moved by, a unit or formation. It is expressed according to the wartime organization of the unit or formation and maintained at the prescribed levels. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Plan</td>
<td>The part of an operation plan that forms the base structure for annexes and appendices. It consists of general statements about the situation, mission, execution, administration and logistics and command and control (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.2). (JOPS Vol II)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beachhead</td>
<td>A designated area on a hostile shore that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and material, and furnishes maneuver space for subsequent projected operations ashore. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Breakbulk</td>
<td>Any commodity that, because of its weight, cargo dimensions, or noncompatibility with other cargo, must be shipped by mode other than MILVAN or SEAVAN. (AR 55-9/NAVSUPINST 4600.79/AFR 75-10/MCO 4610.31)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulk Cargo</td>
<td>Material generally shipped in volume where the transportation conveyance is the only external container, such as liquids, ore, or grain. (Joint Pub 1-02) Also, in JOPS ADP or JDS, cargo with dimensions less than oversize cargo; cargo that will fit on a 436L pallet (adapted from JDS Users Data Element Dictionary).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-Day</td>
<td>The unnamed day on which movement from origin begins or is to begin. The deployment may be movement of troops, cargo, weapons systems, or combination of these elements using any or all types of transportation. For execution, the actual day is under the authority and direction of the Secretary of Defense. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Plan</td>
<td>A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to accomplish a common objective, normally within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capabilities Planning</td>
<td>Planning that attempts to meet the threat based on the forces and support that have been funded by Congress in the current budget cycle. This level of forces, equipment, and supplies is available now or expected to be available in this planning cycle (adapted from CJCS MOP 7, 30 Jan 1990).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Category</td>
<td>A three character alphanumeric code that identifies the kind Code of cargo. (Joint Pub 1-03.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Description</td>
<td>Free-form description of the item of equipment described in the record. (Joint Pub 1-03.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cargo Increment</td>
<td>A seven-character alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a nonunit cargo entry (line) in a JOPS III TPFDD. (JDS Users Number Manual Volume 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>DEFINITION</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBBLs</td>
<td>The total amount of bulk POL expressed in hundreds of barrels. (JCS Pub 1-03.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC’s Forces Required Date</td>
<td>The original date specified by the CINC for arrival of or cargo at the destination; shown in the TPFDD to assess the impact of later arrival. (Joint Planning Systems Newsletter, Jan 1988)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close-Hold</td>
<td>Extremely limited availability of OPLAN information to Access specific personnel and terminals at WWMCCS sites as the plan is being developed (adapted from JDS Users Manual Volume 1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Active Replacement Factors (CARF)</td>
<td>Percentages used to determine anticipated losses/consumptions of equipment during combat. These factors are used as mathematical tools to calculate replacement requirements for class II, IV, and VII principal and secondary items. The CARF is the percentage of the density of an item that is expected to require replacement during a thirty day period.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Forces</td>
<td>Forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Support</td>
<td>Units or organizations whose primary missions are to furnish operational assistance for the combat forces (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatant Command</td>
<td>Command Authority. Non-transferable command authority established by title 10, United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands. Combatant Command (command authority) is the authority of a Combatant Commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant Command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally this authority is exercised through the Service component commander. Combatant Command (command authority) provides full</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>DEFINITION</td>
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<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>authority to organize and</td>
<td>authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the CINC considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Also called COCOM. (JCS Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>employ commands and forces</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>as the CINC considers</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>necessary to accomplish</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>assigned missions. Also</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>called COCOM. (JCS Pub 1-02)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>Describing a military activity, operation, or organization composed of elements of two or more allied nations (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel equipment, communication facilities, and procedures that are employed by a commander planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. (JCS Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>The procedures, facilities, equipment, communications, data processing systems, and for personnel essential to a commander planning, directing and controlling operations of assigned forces pursuant to missions assigned. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Completeness</td>
<td>Each course of action must be technically complete and answer the questions: who, what, when, where, and how. (AFSC Pub 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component Command</td>
<td>The Component commander and all individuals, units, detachments, organizations or installations under the Component commander's military command that have been assigned to the operational command of the commander of the unified command. (Joint Pub 0-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component Commander</td>
<td>The senior officer of each service assigned to a unified command (except for the unified commander and members of his joint staff) and qualified for command by the regulations of his service, unless another officer is so designated by competent authority. (Joint Pub 5-2)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Concept of Operations</td>
<td>A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations is often embodied in campaign plans and operation plans. The concept of operations is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>An operation plan in an abbreviated format that would require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. A CONPLAN contains the combatant commander’s strategic concept and the annexes and appendixes considered necessary to complete planning. Generally, detailed support requirements are not calculated and TPFDD files are not prepared. (Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume I))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contingency Plan</td>
<td>A plan for major contingencies which can reasonably be anticipated in the principal geographic subareas of a command. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coordinating Authority</td>
<td>A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Services or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. If essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter will be referred to the appointing authority. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Course of Action</td>
<td>A possible plan open to an individual or commander that accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of, a mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crisis Action Procedures</td>
<td>A system specified in Joint Pub 5-02.4 that gives guidance and procedures for joint operation planning by military forces during emergency or time-sensitive situations. The procedures are designed to give the Joint Chiefs of Staff information to develop timely recommendations to the National Command Authorities for decisions involving the use of U.S. military forces. (Joint Pub 5-02.4)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Critical Items List (CIL)</td>
<td>An essential item which is in short supply or expected to be in short supply for an extended period. The MARFOR’s submit a list of items that they deem Critical items, to the assigned combatant commander for the plans that they are involved in. HQMC publishes a CIL and provides this input to the Joint Staff J-4. The CIL is a short range look at requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Resupply</td>
<td>Items that are needed to sustain the initial combat capability or that must compete for transportation assets while the force module (including combat support and combat service support) is still closing the objective area. (JCS Pub 5-02.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D-Day</td>
<td>The unnamed day on which a particular operation (assault, strike, etc.) commences or is to commence. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data Elements</td>
<td>A basic unit of information having a unique meaning and subcategories (data items) of distinct units or values. Examples of data elements are military personnel grade, sex, race, geographic location, and military unit. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debarkation</td>
<td>The unloading of troops with their supplies and equipment from their ship or aircraft. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Planning Guidance</td>
<td>The Secretary of Defense’s guidance to the Services and defense agencies on the development of their Program Objective Memorandums. (DoD Inst 7045.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Readiness Conditions</td>
<td>A uniform system of progressive alert postures for use between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the commanders of unified and specified combatant commands and for use by the Services. Conditions are graduated to match situations of varying military severity or status of alert. They are identified by short title: DEFCON (5), (4), (3), (2), and (1) as appropriate. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate Planning</td>
<td>Operation planning tasks as assigned by JSCP or other directive procedures outlined in JCS Pub 5-02.1, .2, and .3. (Joint Pub 5-02.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Deployability Posture

The state or stage of a unit’s preparedness for deployment to participate in a military operation, as defined in 5 levels as follows:

- Normal Deployability Posture (ND). Unit conducting normal activities. Commanders monitoring the situation in an area of tension and reviewing plans. No visible overt actions being taken to increase deployability posture. Units not at home station report their scheduled closure time at home station or the time required to return to home station if ordered to return before scheduled time and before desired mode of transportation are available.

- Increased Deployability Posture (ID). Unit is relieved from commitments not pertaining to the mission. Personnel recalled from training areas, pass, and leave to meet the deployment schedule. Preparation for deployment of equipment and supplies initiated. Predeployment personnel actions completed. Essential equipment and supplies located at CONUS or overseas installations identified.

- Advanced Deployability Posture (AD). All essential personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies checked, packed, rigged for deployment, and positioned with deploying unit. Unit remains at home station. Movement requirements confirmed. Airlift, sealift, and intra CONUS transportation resources identified, and initial movement schedules completed by the TCC’s.

- Marshaled Deployability Posture (MD). First increment of deploying personnel, mobility equipment, and accompanying supplies marshaled at designated POE’s but not loaded. Sufficient strategic airlift or sealift assets positioned at, or enroute to, the POE either to load the first increment or to sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Adequate supporting ALCE’s, stage aircrews (if required), and support personnel to sustain the airlift flow at onload, enroute, and offload locations will be positioned.

- Loaded Deployability Posture (LD). First increment equipment and accompanying supplies loaded aboard ships and as prepared for departure to designated objective area. Personnel prepared for loading aboard aircraft on minimum notice. Follow-on
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<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
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<td>increments of cargo and personnel enroute or available to meet projected loading schedules. Sufficient airlift positioned and loaded at the POE to move the first increment or to initiate and sustain a flow, as required by the plan or directive being considered for execution. Adequate supporting ALCE’s, stage aircrews (if required), and support personnel to sustain the airlift flow at onload, enroute, and offload locations will be positioned.  (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
<td>Deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The relocation of forces/equipment to desired areas of employment. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
<td>Deployment Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The JDS data base containing the necessary information on forces, material, filler personnel, medical evacuees, and replacement personnel movement requirements to support execution. The data base reflects information contained in the refined TPFDD or developed during the various phases of the crisis action procedures and the movement schedules or tables developed by USTRANSCOM to support the deployment of required forces, personnel, and material. (Joint Pub 5-02.4)</td>
<td>Deployment Database</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The estimated time required for all the ULNS/CIN’s/PIN’s of a JDS deployment data base to arrive at the POD(s). (Expressed in days and hours from the time of notification to deploy.) (Joint Pub 5-02.4)</td>
<td>Deployment Estimate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>That part of operation planning concerned with relocation of forces to the desired area of operation. (JDS Users Manual Volume I)</td>
<td>Deployment Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An order issued by competent authority to prepare forces for movement or to move forces, for instance, to increase deployability posture of units. (Joint Pub 5-2.4 (JOPS Volume Order IV))</td>
<td>Deployment Preparation/Deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The terminal geographic location in the routing scheme for forces only. (Resupply and replacement personnel are routed to a Port of Support.) The destination identifies the station or location in the objective area at which the unit will be employed. Destination may be the same as its POD. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
<td>Destination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Deterrent Option</td>
<td>A course of action, developed on the best political and military judgement, designed to dissuade an adversary from a current course of action or contemplated operation. (Joint Pub 5-02.1 (JOPS Volume 1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Earliest Arrival Date</td>
<td>A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as the earliest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can be accepted at the port of debarkation during a deployment. Used with the latest arrival date (LAD), it defines a delivery window for transportation planning. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Embarkation</td>
<td>The loading of troops with their supplies and equipment into ships or aircraft. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment</td>
<td>The strategic or tactical use of forces and material within an area or theater of operations. (JOPES Procedures Description)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Estimate</td>
<td>The expected time expressed in hours, and based on the deployment estimate, when combat forces or portions of combat forces can be employed in an objective area. The estimate is reported by the supported commander as part of the Commander’s Estimate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estimate Departure Date</td>
<td>In TFE simulation, an estimate of the earliest date after the available-to-load date (ALD) on which each movement requirement could leave the port of embarkation. (JDS Users Manual Volume 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution Order</td>
<td>An order issued by competent authority to initiate operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Execution Planning</td>
<td>The phase of the crisis action system in which an approved operation plan or other National Command Authority-designated course of action is adjusted, refined, and translated into an operation order. Execution planning can proceed on the axis of prior deliberate planning, or it can take place under a no-plan situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-Hour</td>
<td>The effective time of announcement by the Secretary of Defense to the military departments of a decision to mobilize Reserve units. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
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C-12
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<th>DEFINITION</th>
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<tr>
<td>F11D Report</td>
<td>FIID report provides a summary of movement requirements (with associated identification), the port of debarkation (POD), and destination data. (JDS Users Data Element Dictionary) F11E Report The F11E report provides a more comprehensive listing of movement requirements showing the full planned itinerary and summary cargo information by either tonnage or square feet of deck space required. (JDS Users Data Element Dictionary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F11W Report</td>
<td>The F11W report provides cargo detail for force requirements. (JDS Users Data Element Dictionary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasible Arrival Forecast Date</td>
<td>In TFE simulation, the earliest computer date after the designated earliest arrival date (EAD) when each movement requirement would be unloaded at the port of debarkation (POD). When the FAD is later than the latest arrival date (LAD), a transportation shortfall exists. (JDS Users Manual Volume 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility</td>
<td>A test to determine whether or not a plan can be accomplished using available resources. (Joint Pub 5-02.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexible deterrent Options</td>
<td>A new planning construct intended to facilitate early decisions by laying out a wide range of interrelated response paths that begin with deterrent-oriented options carefully tailored to send the right signal. These options should include limited military forces (primarily active duty, brigade or group size) and preplanned requests for economic, diplomatic, and political actions gauged to particular military actions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Record</td>
<td>A description of the TPFDD unit composed of three parts: (1) force requirement routing data composed of force description information, such as FRN, UTC, unit level code (ULC), personnel strength, ILOC, POD, DEST, load configuration, movement dates, preferred mode and source of transportation; (2) force unit identification incorporating UIC, unit name, ORIGIN, RLD, POE, ALD,</td>
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SUBJECT DEFINITION

preferred transportation mode; and (3) force
movement characteristics, including
passengers and cargo (e.g., accompanying
supplies) of a type unit define by TUCHA file
data for the standard UTC. (Joint Pub
1-03.16)

Force Closure
The point in time when all elements of a unit
are in place or a commander determines he has
sufficient personnel and equipment to carry
out assigned tasks. (JOPES Procedures
Description)

Force List
A list of the total forces required by an
operation plan, including assigned forces,
augmentation forces, and other forces to be
employed in support of the plan. (Joint Pub
1-02)

Force Module
(1) Any grouping of combat, combat-support,
and combat service support forces, with or
without their appropriate non-unit related
personnel and accompanying supplies usually
for thirty days. The elements of force
modules are linked together or uniquely
identified so that they may be extracted from
or adjusted as an entity in the TPFDD to
enhance flexibility and usefulness of the
operation plan during a crisis. (Joint Pub
5-02.1) (2) The force module was conceived
to increase the speed and flexibility of
joint operation planning by grouping key
combat units with their associated support
and sustainment. There are two types of
force modules. The first type, the Service
Module, is a notional force module built in
accordance with Service doctrine. These
modules contain type combat unit units and
the combat support and combat service support
required to accomplish the designed function.
Sustainment for a minimum of 30 days is also
estimated. Service modules are used to
develop courses of action quickly in
time-sensitive planning. They are also used
in deliberate planning as building blocks for
the second type of force module, the
Operation Plan (OPLAN) Dependent Module.
These OPLAN-Dependent Modules are actually
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<th><strong>SUBJECT</strong></th>
<th><strong>DEFINITION</strong></th>
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<tr>
<td>Service Modules that have been tailored by the supported commander and components to fit a specific planning task - they are no longer notional but sourced modules. (JDS Users Data Element Dictionary)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Requirement Generator</td>
<td>The JOPS ADP application program that is used by a planner to originate, analyze, delete or change a time-phased force list (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.4). (JOPS Volume IV)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Force Requirement Number</td>
<td>A FRN uniquely identifies a force requirement and provides unique force identification within each OPLAN. A FRN Number consists of five alphabetic or numeric characters with special rules for various character positions. The first three characters are the basic FRN. (Joint Pub 1-03.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fragmentation</td>
<td>A one-character code, the second of three Code parts of a unit line number (ULN). It is used to uniquely identify subordinate units, fragmentations, or increments of a single force requirement (adapted from the JDS Users Manual Volume 1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Functional Component Command</td>
<td>A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Services, which may be established in peacetime or war to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Transportation Feasibility</td>
<td>A determination made by the supported commander that a draft OPLAN can be supported with the apportioned transportation assets. This determination is made by utilizing the transportation feasibility estimator to simulate movement of personnel and cargo from POE to POD within a specified timeframe. This permits submission of a draft OPLAN and supporting deployment data base to JCS and appropriate agencies for review prior to the Phase I deployment data base refinement conference. (Joint Pub 5-02.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H-Hour</td>
<td>The specific hour on D-day at which a particular operation commences.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Host Nation</td>
<td>Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, times of crisis/emergency, or wartime under agreements mutually concluded between the nations. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insert Code</td>
<td>A one-character code that is the third of three parts of a unit line number (ULN). It is used to show another level of unit fragmentation below that indicated by the FRAG code. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Materiel Manager</td>
<td>The individual in DoD responsible for computing requirements, funding, budgeting, storing, issuing, cataloging, standardizing, and procuring a specific item within the supply system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Priority</td>
<td>A list of high-priority needs given by each CINC to the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered by priority across Service and functional lines and with consideration of reasonable fiscal constraints. (DoD Instruction 7045.7) The IPL is a long range look at programming priorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intensive Management</td>
<td>The continuous process by which the JDC, the supported and supporting commanders, the Services, TCCS, and appropriate Defense agencies insure that movement data in the JDS deployment data base for the initial days (approximately the first 15 days) of deployment/mobilization are current to support immediate execution. (Joint Pub 5-02.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate Location</td>
<td>An intermediate stopping point in the routing of a deploying unit, used to lay over the force for a specified time, normally longer than one day. It is often used to unite the personnel and cargo of split shipments. This point may occur between the ORIGIN and POE, the POE and POD, or the POD and DEST. The TFE can accept only one intermediate location during the deployment of a unit. (JDS Users Manual Volume 1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDS Information</td>
<td>A generalized JDS retrieval system that displays JDS information directly to the display terminal. (JDS Users Data Element Dictionary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Deployment Community</td>
<td>Those headquarters, commands, and agencies involved in training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operation or objective area. The JDC usually consists of the JCS Joint Staff; Services and certain of their major commands, for example the service wholesale logistic commands; unified and specified combatant commands their subordinate commands, that is joint task forces, component commands, subordinate unified commands, etc; and the defense agencies, such as DLA, DIA, etc., as may be appropriate to a given scenario. (JDS Procedures Manual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Deployment Systems</td>
<td>A system that consists of personnel, procedures, directives, communications systems, and electronic data processing to directly support time-sensitive planning and execution and complements peacetime deliberate planning. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Forces</td>
<td>A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements of the Army, the Navy and or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, operating under a single commander authorized to exercise unified command or operational control over joint forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Operational Planning Process</td>
<td>A coordinated joint staff procedure used by a commander to determine the best method of accomplishing assigned tasks and to direct the action necessary to accomplish the mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Operational Planning System</td>
<td>The DoD-directed, JCS-specified system used in planning global and regional joint military operations, except SLOP. (Joint Pub 5-02.1)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Operational Planning and Execution System</td>
<td>A total system planned to be the successor to JOPS/JDS. It will support integrated planning and command and control of mobilization, deployment, employment, and sustainment activities using an improved information system. (JOPES Procedures Description)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Planning Execution Community</td>
<td>The headquarters, command, and agencies involved in training, preparation, movement, reception, employment, support, and sustainment of military forces assigned or committed to a theater of operations. The JPEC usually consists of the Joint Staff; Services and certain of their major commands for example, the Service wholesale logistic commands and their subordinate commands, that is, joint task forces, component commands, subordinate unified commands, etc.; and the defense agencies, such as DLA, DIA, etc. as may be appropriate to a given scenario. Previously known as the Joint Deployment Community (JDC) (adapted from Joint Pub 5-03.2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
<td>The JSCP contains the strategic concept to support the national security objective and military objectives derived therefrom and gives guidance to the CINC’s and Chiefs of the Services for accomplishment of military tasks, based on projected military capabilities and conditions during the short-range period. It apportions forces and lift assets available for planning. (AFSC Pub 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Strategic Planning System</td>
<td>The primary means by which the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the CINC’s, carries out his statutory responsibilities to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in giving strategic direction to the Armed Forces; advises the President and the Secretary of Defense on requirements, programs and budget; and furnishes net assessments of the capabilities of the Armed Forces of the United States and its allies as compared with those of the potential adversaries (adapted from CJCS MOP 7).</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Tactics, Techniques Procedures</strong></td>
<td>The actions and methods published by the Chairman, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that implement joint doctrine and describe how forces will be employed in joint operations (adapted from Joint Pub 0-2).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPS ADP</strong></td>
<td>The WWMCCS standard computer-based system consisting of standard data files, standard ADP programs, and instructions for the reporting and exchange of data used to develop, analyze, refine, review and maintain joint operation plans. (Joint Pub 5-02.3 (JOPS Volume III))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint Task Force</strong></td>
<td>A force composed of assigned or attached elements of the Army, the Navy and/or the Marine Corps, and the Air Force, or two or more of these Services, that is constituted by the Secretary of Defense or by the commander of a unified or specified command, subordinate unified command, or an existing joint task force (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>L-Hour</strong></td>
<td>The specific hour on C-day at which a deployment operation commences or is to commence. L-hour is 0000Z unless otherwise specified. (JDS Procedures Manual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Latest Arrival Date</strong></td>
<td>A day, relative to C-day, that is specified by a planner as the latest date when a unit, a resupply shipment, or replacement personnel can arrive at the port of debarkation and support the concept of operations. Used with the earliest arrival date (EAD), it defines a delivery window for transportation planning. (Joint Pub 1-03.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level of Detail</strong></td>
<td>Within the current joint planning and execution system, movement characteristics are described at four distinct levels of detail. These levels are: Level I. Aggregated level. Expressed as total number of passengers and total short tons and/or measurement tons by ULN, CIN, and PIN. Level II. Summary level. Expressed as total number of passengers by ULN and PIN and short tons an/or measurement tons of bulk, oversize, outsize and non-air transportable cargo by ULN and CIN. Level III. Detail by</td>
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<td>cargo category. Expressed as</td>
<td>total number of passengers by ULN and PIN and short tons and/or measurement tons of cargo as identified by the ULN and CIN three position cargo category code. Level IV. Detail by type of equipment. Expressed as number of passengers by ULN and PIN and by dimensional (height, width, and length) characteristics, short tons and/or measurement tons of cargo by equipment type (TAMCN and model Number) by ULN, with similar dimensional characteristics and weight in short tons.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limiting Factor</td>
<td>A factor or condition that, either temporarily or permanently, impedes mission accomplishment. Illustrative examples are; transportation network deficiencies, lack of in-place facilities, malpositioned forces or material, extreme climatic conditions, distance, transit/overflight rights, political conditions, etc. (JCS Pub 5-02. 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Line of Communication</td>
<td>All the routes, land, water, and air, that connect an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move (adapted from FM 100-5.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics Management</td>
<td>A series of automated files which are designed to support the automated information requirements of HQMC. Data contained in LMIS are considered official for the purposes of determining ground materiel requirements, to include the development of inventory objectives for all end items of equipment and ground Class V. Supports the management information requirements of the I&amp;L staff and other users in acquisition control of equipment and the PPBS system. Also, it manages the allowance process of FMF and post and station units by publishing T/E, TAM, and modifying allowances.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information System (LMIS)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-Day</td>
<td>The day on which mobilization commences or is to commence. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Air-Ground</td>
<td>A system that allows Marine planners to select and tailor a MAGTF for any OPLAN; determine the sustainment required to support that MAGTF for a specified scenario;</td>
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<td>Task Force (MAGTF) II</td>
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<td>determine the lift required to move the MAGTF; and then transmit TPFDD data to JOPES electronically. Additional modules (LOG AIS) will assist in tracking assets from garrison bases to the objective area, load planning for ships and aircraft, and providing supply support similar to, and fully compatible with garrison systems. This latter capability provides supply system functionality until standard systems are established in the objective area.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major NATO Commanders</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT), Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), and Allied Commander in Chief Channel (ACCHAN). (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Subordinate Command</td>
<td>Generally used to describe the component elements of the Marine Corps MEF (i.e. Division, Wing, and FSSG).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Major Subordinate Commanders</td>
<td>The designation assigned to NATO commanders operationally responsible to SACEUR and SACLANT for an allocated geographical area or function, for example, Commander, Allied Forces Central Europe, under Supreme Allied Commander Europe. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marshaling Area</td>
<td>The geographic location where a deploying unit will assemble, hold, and organize supplies and/ or equipment for onward movement (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Master Force List</td>
<td>A file that contains the current status of each requirement for a given operation plan. The MFL is made available for transfer by the File Transfer Service to other WWMCCS activities from a file produced from the JDS deployment database. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Measurement Tons</td>
<td>The unit of volumetric measurement of equipment associated with surface-delivered cargo. Measurement tons equal total cubic feet divided by 40. (1 MTON = 40 cubic feet) (AFSC Pub 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Planning Module</td>
<td>The JOPS ADP application program used by the planner to determine the impact of an operation on the medical system. The MPM</td>
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<tr>
<td>interfaces with the TPFDD to determine the</td>
<td>amount of medical support needed, including bed, medevac, and blood/fluid requirements. The module also produces detailed reports. (AFSC Pub 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Airlift Command (MAC)</td>
<td>Old name for the Air Mobility Command.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Objectives</td>
<td>The derived set of military actions to be taken to implement NCA guidance in support of national objectives. Defines the results to be achieved by the military and assigns tasks to commanders. (JOPES Procedures Description)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Options</td>
<td>A range of military force responses that can be projected to accomplish assigned tasks. Options include one or a combination of the following: military presence, show of force, demonstration, quarantine, blockade, force entry. In addition, special operations such as psychological operations, unconventional warfare and civil affairs can be employed. (JOPES Procedures Description)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Sealift Command</td>
<td>The single manager operating agency for designated sealift service. Also referred to as MSC. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Traffic Management Command</td>
<td>The single manager operating agency for traffic, traffic, land transportation, and common-user ocean terminals. Also referred to as MTMC. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization</td>
<td>The process by which the Armed Forces or part of them are brought to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency. This includes activating all or part of the Reserve components, as well as assembling and organizing personnel, supplies and material. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobilization Deployment Planning</td>
<td>The act of using authorized systems and measures for planning, coordinating, and monitoring movements and deployments of mobilized forces and material necessary to meet military objectives. (JDS Users Manual Volume 1)</td>
</tr>
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C-22
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<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Module</td>
<td>A collection of one or more software programs that accomplishes major functions in an application program or subsystem. For example JOPS module F10 is a collection of software programs F10, FLOA, FLOB, and FLOC, each of which accomplishes a specific function and contributes to the overall function of the module F10, OPLAN identification (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.3). (JOPS Volume III)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement</td>
<td>The JOPS ADP application program that computes and time-phases non-unit-related requirements for resupply based on the size of the force to be supported and the duration of the planned operation (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.3). (JOPS Volume III)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Requirements</td>
<td>A JOPES subsystem that provides support planning by calculating notional requirements for resupply on service-provided planning factors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Generator</td>
<td>A schedule developed to monitor or track a separate entity whether it is a force requirement, cargo or personnel increment, or lift asset. The schedule reflects the assignment of specific lift resources (such as an aircraft or ship that will be used to move the personnel and cargo included specific movement increment). Arrival and departure times at POE, etc., are detailed to show a flow and workload at each location. Movement schedules are detailed enough to support plan implementation. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement Schedule</td>
<td>A table prepared by the TCC’s for each force requirement and each non-unit-related personnel or cargo increment of the deployment data base concerning the scheduled movement from the origin or POE, intermediate location, and POD or destination. It is based on the estimated or planned availability of lift resources and, hence, is not an execution document. (JDS Users Manual Volume 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N-Day</td>
<td>An unnamed day before C-day. (N002 = 2 days before C-day); or, the day a unit is notified for deployment or redeployment. (Joint Pub 1-03.21)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Command Authority</td>
<td>The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Commonly referred to as NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Military Command System</td>
<td>The component of the Worldwide Military Control designed to support the National Command Authorities in the exercise of their System responsibilities. (Joint Pub 0-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Air Cargo</td>
<td>Cargo that exceeds any of the following dimensions: 1,45311 Transportation x 21611 x 15611, or a height between 11411 and 15611 and a width that exceeds 144&quot;. (JDS Users Data Element Dictionary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Unit-Related Cargo</td>
<td>All equipment and supplies requiring transportation to an area of operations, other than those identified as the equipment or accompanying supplies of a specific unit (e.g., resupply, military support for allies, and support for nonmilitary programs, such as civil relief). (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Unit-Related Personnel</td>
<td>All personnel requiring transportation to or from an area of operations, other than those assigned to a specific unit (e.g., filler personnel, replacements, temporary duty/temporary additional duty, (TDY/TAD) personnel, civilians, medical evacuees, and retrograde personnel. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirements</td>
<td>A collection of basic elements of Naval Warfare Planning for Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirements which serves as a central (NNOR) reference for all of the fundamental planning assumptions in the NNOR process. (CNO ltr 8011 Ser 703/75349624 of 23 Dec 87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noncombatant Evacuation Operations</td>
<td>Operations involving the movement of DoD sponsored personnel, Department of State sponsored personnel, other U.S. Government sponsored personnel, and U.S. citizens and designated aliens from a threatened geographic area or theater of operations. (JSCP)</td>
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C-24
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<tr>
<td>Nonstandard Unit</td>
<td>A force requirement identified on an OPLAN for which movement characteristics have not been described in the TUCHA file. The planner is required to submit detailed movement characteristics for these units. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nonunit Record</td>
<td>A TPFDD file entry for cargo or personnel not related to specific units but requiring transportation to the objective area; characteristics include using and providing organization, type of movement, routing data, cargo category, weight, volume, area required, and number of personnel requiring transportation (adapted from Joint Pub 1-03.16).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOPLAN</td>
<td>A contingency for which no operation plan has been published. (AFSC Pub 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Access</td>
<td>The availability of OPLAN information to most JDS users; however, functional access is limited to individuals and based on operational requirements of the job (adapted from JDS Users Manual Vol 1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normal Operations</td>
<td>Generally and collectively, the broad functions that the commander of a unified combatant commander undertakes when assigned responsibility for a given geographic or functional area. Except as otherwise qualified, &quot;normal operations&quot; of a unified command commander include planning for and execution of operations in contingencies, limited war, and general war; planning and conduct of cold war activities; planning for and administration of military assistance; and maintaining the relationships and exercising the directive or coordinating authority prescribed in Joint Pubs 0-2 and 4-01, and Admin Pub 1.1. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Order</td>
<td>A directive issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Operation Plan</td>
<td>A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions and is in the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation &quot;plan&quot; is usually used instead of &quot;order&quot; in preparing operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes an operation order. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Plan Concept Format</td>
<td>An operation plan in an abbreviated format in that would require considerable expansion into an OPLAN or OPORD. (Joint Pub 5-02.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation(s) Planning Report</td>
<td>This report is used to describe planned operations for specific situations. The exact time period covered, content, and format will be specified in the implementing directive. (Joint Pub 1-03.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation(s) Start Report</td>
<td>This report is used to execute a plan or fragment of a plan or to advise, in conjunction with an OPREP-1, that an operation has started. Additionally, it can describe an operation when time did not permit receipt of an OPREP-1 by the NMCC prior to the start of an operation. (Joint Pub 1-03.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation(s) Stop/Results</td>
<td>This report is used to report completing an operation or phase of an operation and to pass results or estimated Report results. The OPREP-4 is oriented and designed to satisfy the immediate requirement for operational information for command center briefings. Accuracy of reporting is stressed, but timeliness is paramount. (JCS Pub 1-03.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation(s) Summary Report</td>
<td>This report is designed to provide summarized statistical data. (Joint Pub 1-03.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Command</td>
<td>The authority to perform those functions of command involving the composition of subordinate forces, assignment of tasks, designation of objectives, and authoritative</td>
</tr>
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C-26
direction necessary to accomplish its mission. Operational command includes directive authority for logistics and joint training. Operational command should be exercised through the commanders of assigned normal organizational units or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational command. Operational command provides full authority to organize forces as the operational commander deems necessary to accomplish assigned missions, and to retain or delegate operational control as necessary. Operational command does not, of itself, include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, logistics and control, and unit training. Operational command is exercised solely by the commanders of the unified and specified commands. Also called OPCOM, the term is still used in NATO, but is replaced in Joint planning by COCOM. (JCS Pub 0-2)

Operational Control

The authority delegated to a commander to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving composition of subordinate forces, the assignment of tasks, the designation of objectives, and the authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes directive authority for joint training. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of normal organizational units or through the commanders of subordinate forces established by the commander exercising operational control. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize forces as the operational commander deems necessary to accomplish missions, and to retain or delegate operational control or tactical control as necessary. Operational control may be limited by function, time, or location. It does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization, logistic and control, and unit training. Also called OPCON. (JCS Pub 0-2)
<table>
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<tr>
<td>Operational Environment</td>
<td>A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences which affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are: a. permissive environment - Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. b. semi-permissive environment - Operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended area of operations. c. non-permissive environment - Operational environment that is under control of hostile forces that have the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN-Dependent Module</td>
<td>An actual Service force module that has been tailored by the supported commander and components to fit a specific Force planning task. OPLAN-dependent force modules usually include sustainment based on theater planning factors and sourced force records (adapted from JDS Users Manual Volume 1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organic Transportation</td>
<td>Transportation resources that are assigned to a unit and can provide the lift capability for all or part of that unit’s movement requirements. Therefore, that unit may require no transportation support or only partial transportation support from the TCCS. Source code for organic transportation in JCS Pub 1-03.21 is &quot;HII&quot;. (JDS Users Data Element Dictionary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>The Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is an element within the Department of Defense that includes the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Staff Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the directorates and agencies designated as Joint Staff, or as supporting agencies or special offices of the organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also known as the OJCS. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
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<td>DEFINITION</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Origin</td>
<td>The beginning point of a deployment. The point or station at which a movement requirement is located. For hypothetical requirements, the origin will be the most likely station at which the requirement will originate. (JDS Users Manual Volume 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other War Reserve Materiel Stocks</td>
<td>All classes of supply that are required after accompanying supplies are exhausted. The day is based on 5-day which is the date when the MAGTF begins to consume its accompanying supplies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outsized</td>
<td>Cargo that exceeds 1,090&quot; x 117&quot; x 105&quot;, that is, cargo too large for a C-130/C-141 aircraft. (JDS Users Data Element Dictionary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oversized</td>
<td>Cargo that exceeds the usable dimension of a 463L pallet, Cargo 104&quot; x 84&quot; x 96&quot;, or a height set by the particular model of aircraft. (JDS Users Data Element Dictionary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Permanent File</td>
<td>This is a term used to identify disk storage that remains available to the user at all times. JOPS ADP files that are stored on permanent files include APORTS, PORTS, GEOFILE, TUCHA, ASSETS, and CHSTR. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personnel Increment Number (PIN)</td>
<td>A seven-character, alphanumeric field that uniquely describes a nonunit entry in a TPFDD. (Joint Pub 5-02.1,(JOPS Volume I))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan Identification Number</td>
<td>The PID is expressed as a command-unique four-digit number and a four-digit suffix of the fiscal year of the JSCP for which the plan is written or reprinted. (JOPES Procedures Description)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan Maintenance</td>
<td>The process that allows a supported commander to incorporate changes to deployment data bases that have occurred since their refinement. Plan maintenance is conducted by teleconference via the WWMCCS Intercomputer Network. At a minimum, the initial portion of the deployment data base for JCS/JSCP submission in lieu of refinement.</td>
</tr>
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<td>SUBJECT</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plan Summary</td>
<td>A required element of an operation plan that gives a brief description of the mission, the general situation, the concept of operations, the major forces required, command arrangements, and the commander’s appraisal of logistic feasibility. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Factor</td>
<td>A multiplier used in planning to estimate the amount and type of effort involved in a contemplated operation. Planning factors are often expressed as rates, ratios, or lengths of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Force</td>
<td>The force level required to give reasonable assurance of successful execution of the national strategy. It is sized for a specific scenario presented in the JSPD-Planning Guidance and is keyed to the projected threat in the last year of the planning period. It is developed from the Minimum Risk Force by establishing mission priorities, sequencing force employment, and accepting a higher level of risk. It is not constrained by fiscal, manpower, logistics, mobility, basing, or similar limitations (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Order</td>
<td>An order issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to initiate execution planning. The order normally will follow a COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE and will precede the JCS ALERT ORDER. NCA approval of a selected course of action is not required before a PLANNING ORDER can be issued. (JCS Pub 5-02.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planning Programming and Budgeting</td>
<td>The cyclic process that produces the DoD portion of the President’s budget submission to Congress (adapted from DoD Instruction 7045.14).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Debarkation</td>
<td>The geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. May be a seaport or aerial port of debarkation. For unit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the destination. For non-unit-related requirements, the port of support for a specific type of shipment will be designated. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Embarkation</td>
<td>The geographic point in a routing scheme from which cargo or personnel depart. This point may or may not coincide with the origin. (JDS Users Manual Volume 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port of Support</td>
<td>The geographic point (port or airport) in an objective area that is the terminal point for strategic deployment for non-unit-related supplies and replacement personnel. Each component designates ports of support for four categories of resupply: general cargo, ammunition, POL, and air deliveries (adapted from the JDS Users Manual Volume 1).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepositioned War Reserve Material Requirement</td>
<td>The portion of the War Reserve Material Requirement (WRMR) designated for positioning at or near the intended point of shipment or use. (OPNAVINST S8010.12E) (The intent is to reduce reaction time and to assure timely support of a specific force/project until replenishment can be effected. For aviation peculiar materiel, requirements are computed to support 90 days of combat flying hours. War reserve materiel for aviation and AMAL’s/ADAL’s for the Marine Corps Reserve is managed through the Navy War Reserve Program (NAVWARP) under the cognizance of the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel Requirement Field</td>
<td>That portion of the MEF 60 days of accompanying supplies held at the forward MEF location or other designated sites.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepositioned War Reserve Materiel Requirement Stores</td>
<td>The portion of the MEF 60 day sustainment held at COMMARCORLOGBASES Albany or by the IMM’s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Principle Planning Agent</td>
<td>The command designated by a component commander as the agency with authority to develop component plans for contingency operations. This command has principle planning authority, that is he may speak for and make decisions for the component commander in OPLAN development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PWR Stocks</td>
<td>The assets that are designated to satisfy PWR. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Psychological Operations

Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objectives reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign government, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP’s is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

Ready To-Load Date (RLD)

The date when a unit will be ready to move from origin. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)

Record

A collection of data elements pertaining to one logical subject. In JOPS, for example, all the data elements used to describe a force requirement and its routing are stored in the "force record." For resupply and replacement personnel, all the data elements are stored in non-unit-related cargo records and non-unit-related personnel records. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)

Redeployment

The transfer of a unit, an individual, or supplies deployed in one area to another area, to another location within the area, or to the zone of interior for the purpose of further deployment. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)

Required Delivered Date

A date, relative to C-day, when a unit must arrive at its destination to properly support the concept of operations. (JCS Pub 1-03.21)

Resupply

The supplies and equipment that provide a MAGTF extended sustainment capability (e.g., staying power) after accompanying supplies are used. Material that makes up resupply may come from a combination of remaining Marine Corps assets, other theater service components tasked to provide common item support by CINC, and/or stocks held by material managers such as DLA. Resupply is shown as CIN’s in the TPFDD, and its movement is via common user lift, not dedicated shipping. Note the similarity between the ground and aviation supply processes; note also that the CSSE is the focal point for ground material only, and the ACE is the focal point for aviation-peculiar material.
<table>
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<tr>
<td>Class III bulk</td>
<td>only.) Class III bulk is a special case. The amount of Bulk Class III actually held by the MAGTF as accompanying supplies or PWRMS varies depending upon the theater in which the MEF is operating. As a result, resupply of class III bulk begins at an date normally earlier than D+60.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Short Tons</td>
<td>The unit of measure (2,000 lbs) for equipment or supplies other than Class III. (JDS Users Manual Volume 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shortfall</td>
<td>(1) The lack of forces, equipment, personnel, material, or capability identified as a plan requirement that would adversely affect a command’s ability to accomplish its mission. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1) and (2) unsourced requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sourcing (Force)</td>
<td>The identification of the actual units, their origins, POE’s, and movement characteristics to satisfy the notional force requirements in the TPFDD. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sourcing (Logistics)</td>
<td>The identification of the origin, and determination of the availability, of the non-unit-related logistics requirements in the TPFDD. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sourcing Sustainment</td>
<td>The identification of the actual supplies, their origins, POE’s and movement characteristics to satisfy the planned sustainment requirements in the TPFDD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Orders</td>
<td>Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DoD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national objectives. Conducted during either hostilities or peace, they can support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when conventional force is inappropriate or infeasible. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Unit</td>
<td>A type unit whose UTC and movement characteristics are as described in the TUCHA file. (AFSC Pub 1)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Reserve</td>
<td>An external reinforcing force that is not committed in advance to a specific NATO MSC, but that can be deployed to any region for a mission decided at the time by the MNC. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Sealift Force</td>
<td>Common-user sealift assets of the MSC force, including fast sealift ships and prepositioned ships on completion of their mission and release, that furnish the capability to deploy and sustain military forces. The normal peacetime force may be augmented by shipping from the Ready Reserve Fleet and National Defense Reserve Fleet and from U.S. and allied merchant fleets. (Joint Pub 1-01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subordinate Command</td>
<td>Command consisting of the commander and all individuals, units, detachments, organizations, or installations that have been placed under the command by the authority establishing the subordinate command; in JOPS normally a service component command, a subordinate unified command, or subordinate joint task force. (JCS Pub 0-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary Reference File</td>
<td>JOPS III file containing information that expands requirements data contained in JOPS TPFDD. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported Commander</td>
<td>The unified or specified commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) or otherwise assigned: the commander who originates operations plans in response to requirements of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (AFSC Pub 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Commander</td>
<td>A commander who furnishes augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan; this includes the commanders of transportation operating agencies (TCC’s), as appropriate. (AFSC Pub 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporting Forces</td>
<td>Forces stationed in, or to be deployed to, an area of operations to support the execution of an OPORD approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Operational command of supporting forces is not passed to the supported commander. (AFSC Pub 1)</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>Supporting Plan</td>
<td>An operation plan prepared by a supporting commander or a subordinate commander to satisfy the requests or requirements of the supported commander’s plans. (Joint Pub 5-02.1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>The ability to provide and maintain those levels of forces, manpower, material, and consumables necessary to support a military effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Threat Weapons</td>
<td>Ordnance used against targets which are limited in numbers and cannot be easily reconstituted; enemy aircraft, submarines, and surface ships. (CNO ltr 8011 Ser 703/75349624 of 23 Dec 87)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Throughput</td>
<td>The estimated traffic (expressed as an average daily capability of measurement tons, short tons, and/or passengers) that can be moved into and through a port/aerial port. The total port/aerial port movement capability is a function of reception, discharge, and clearance—the smallest of these is the estimated throughput. (Joint Pub 5-02.1)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data        | The computer-supported data base portion of an operation plan, it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including:  
  a. In-place units.  
  b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation.  
  c. Routing of forces to be deployed.  
  d. Movement data associated with deploying forces.  
  e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces.  
  f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (JCS Pub 1-02)                                                                                                                                                                                                 |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT</th>
<th>DEFINITION</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time-Phased Force Deployment List</td>
<td>Appendix 1 to annex A of the operation plan. It identifies types and/or actual units required to support the operation plan and indicates origin and ports of debarkation or ocean area. It may also be generated as a computer listing from the time-phased force and deployment data. (Joint Pub 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD Maintenance</td>
<td>The process that allows a supported commander to incorporate changes to Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data that have occurred since TPFDD refinement (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1). (JOPS Volume 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD Refinement</td>
<td>For regional plans, a two-phased process that identifies specific forces, incorporates accurate movement requirements for the first 90 days of a TPFDD, and ensures that the deployment transportation requirements for the TPFDD are within the capabilities defined in JCS guidance. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Sensitive Planning</td>
<td>Similar to Crisis Action Planning in its approach to OPLAN development. Consists of operational planning tasks necessary to develop an OPORD and TPFDD in a time constrained environment. The term is generally applied to situations which do not require offensive combat (e.g. deployments to areas devastated by natural disasters or riots, humanitarian relief ops, etc.).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmittal Document</td>
<td>A general term for the document published at the conclusion of the planning to convey the CINC’s concept of operations, concept of support, and other planning information to the JDC. The format is not specified but may take one of several forms: an outline plan, a letter of instruction (LOI), a plan directive, or a draft OPLAN (adapted from Joint Pub 5-02.1). (JOPS Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Feasibility</td>
<td>The JOPS ADP application program that simulates the strategic deployment of movement Estimator requirements in the TPFDD on the common-user (TFE) lift assets apportioned for the operation. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>DEFINITION</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type Unit</td>
<td>A hypothetical organizational entity established by the Armed Forces and described by the approximate physical and movement characteristics of all real-world units of a similar type that it represents. It is identified by a unique five-character alphanumeric unit type code (UTC) and is included in the Type Unit Data File (TUCHA) (adapted from the JDS Users Manual Vol 1). Type Unit A file (from Type Unit Characteristics File) which File Data gives standard planning data on movement characteristics for personnel, cargo, and accompanying supplies associated with deployable type units of fixed composition. The file contains the weight and volume of selected cargo categories, physical characteristics of the cargo, and the number of personnel requiring nonorganic transportation. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unified Command</td>
<td>A command with a broad and continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Services, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or, when so authorized by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by a commander of an existing unified command established by the President (adapted from Joint Pub 1-02).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Designation List (UDL)</td>
<td>A list of actual units by UIC designated to fill requirements of a force list. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Identification Code</td>
<td>A six-character, alphanumeric code that uniquely identifies each active, reserve, and National Guard unit of the Armed Forces. IAW Joint Pub 1-03.21, only valid UIC’s registered per Joint Pub 1-03.3 will be used. (JDS Users Manual Vol 1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Line Number</td>
<td>The ULN is comprised of the five-character Force Requirement Number (FRN), along with the Fragmentation and Insert Codes that are one-character each. (Joint Pub 1-03.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECT</td>
<td>DEFINITION</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit Type Code</td>
<td>The five character alphanumeric code which is associated with each type unit and allows the organization to be categorized into a class having common distinguishing characteristics. The code that identifies the type of units for which the force requirement is stated. (Joint Pub 1-03.21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unit-Related Equipment and Supplies</td>
<td>All equipment and supplies that are assigned to a specific unit or that are designated as accompanying supplies. The logistic parameters of these items are contained in the TUCHA standard reference file. (JDS Users Manual Vol I)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warning Order</td>
<td>An order that initiates development of course(s) of action, and requests that a COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE be submitted. (JDS Procedures Manual)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Reserve Material Requirement</td>
<td>A listing of the Non-Nuclear Ordnance Requirement (NNOR) to support the entire combat ordnance required by Navy and Marine Corps (air) forces. (OPNAVINST S8010.12E)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War Reserve System</td>
<td>A system that supports the Marine Corps program for the requirements determination, acquisition, management, and distribution of War Reserve Materiel (WRM) (Classes I, II, III-Packaged, IV, VII, VIII, and IX). Logistics planning factors are extracted from the LMIS to support this system. The WRS does not support aviation peculiar material computations. WRM for aviation and AMAL's/ADAL's for the Marine Corps Reserve is managed through the Navy War Reserve Program (NAVWARP) under the cognizance of the Commander, Naval Supply Systems Command.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CG, MCCDC (C 42) Quantico, VA publishes MCBul 5600 "Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication Status" semi-annually. This bulletin lists all doctrinal publications in use in the Marine Corps and their current status (under development, test pub, etc.). Publications are distributed within the Marine Corps by assigning a Publication Control Number (PCN) to all pubs. Each PCN is comprised of a group of Individual Activity Codes (IAC’s). Ordering pubs has been automated within the Marine Corps through use of the Marine Corps Publications Distribution System (MCPIDS) on the Marine Corps Local Area Network (LAN). MCPIDS provides individual commands the opportunity to request publications and modify unit distribution. Questions regarding publication distribution should be directed to the command adjutant or S-1.

1. Joint Publications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLICATION</th>
<th>TITLE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFSC Pub 1</td>
<td>The Joint Staff Officer’s Guide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFSC Pub 5</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 1-02</td>
<td>Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 0-2</td>
<td>Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 3-01.2</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine for Theater Counterair Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 3-02</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 3-02.1</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine for Landing Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 3-02.2</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 3-06</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine For Riverine Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 4-0</td>
<td>Logistics Support of Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 4-01.1</td>
<td>JTTP for Airlift Support of Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 4-01.2</td>
<td>JTTP for Sealift Support of Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 4-01.3</td>
<td>JTTP for Movement Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 4-01.7</td>
<td>JTTP for Use of Intermodal Containers in Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 4-05</td>
<td>Joint Doctrine For Mobilization Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 5-0</td>
<td>Doctrine For Planning Joint Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 5-02.1</td>
<td>JOPS, Vol I Deliberate Planning Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 5-02.2</td>
<td>JOPS, Vol II Supplementary Planning Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 5-02.3</td>
<td>JOPS, Vol III ADP Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 5-02.4</td>
<td>JOPS, Vol IV Crisis Action System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 5-03.1</td>
<td>JOPES, Vol I Planning Policies and Procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 5-03.2</td>
<td>JOPES, Vol II Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 5-03.21</td>
<td>JOPES, Vol II (Classified Supplement) Planning and Execution Formats and Guidance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Pub 5-03.3</td>
<td>JOPES, Vol III ADP Support</td>
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</table>
2. **USMC Publications.** These publications are available for Navy/Marine commands through the distribution system and for all other commands by request from:

Commandant of the Marine Corps  
(Code AREB)  
Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps  
2 Navy Annex  
Washington, D.C. 20380-1775

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PUBLICATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MCM</td>
<td>Marine Corps Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCMP</td>
<td>Marine Corps Master Plan</td>
</tr>
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<td>MCP</td>
<td>Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, Volumes I, II and CS (S)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLAN</td>
<td>Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan, Volumes I, II and III (S)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMFM 0-3</td>
<td>Doctrinal Publications Guide</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMFRP 0-14</td>
<td>Marine Corps Supplement to the DoD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 1</td>
<td>Warfighting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 1-1</td>
<td>Campaigning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 1-2</td>
<td>The Role of the Marine Corps in the National Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 1-3</td>
<td>Tactics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM/OH 1-4</td>
<td>Assault Follow-on Echelon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 1-5</td>
<td>Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 1-7</td>
<td>Supporting Arms in Amphibious Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 1-8</td>
<td>Ship-to-Shore Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFRP 1-11</td>
<td>Fleet Marine Force Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 1-14</td>
<td>The Amphibious Task Force Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 2</td>
<td>MAGTF Operations (Draft)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 2-6</td>
<td>MAGTF Rear Area Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 2-7</td>
<td>Fire Support in MAGTF Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 2-12</td>
<td>MAGTF: A Global Capability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM/OH 3</td>
<td>Command and Control of MAGTF Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 3-1</td>
<td>Command and Staff Action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 3-20</td>
<td>Commander's Guide to Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 3-21</td>
<td>MAGTF Intelligence Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 3-22</td>
<td>Surveillance and Reconnaissance Group (SRIG)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFRP 3-28</td>
<td>Tri-MEF SOP for Field Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFRP 3-30</td>
<td>Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFRP 3-32</td>
<td>Tri-MEF Standing Operating Procedures for Communications and Computer Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCT3A Handbook 8000</td>
<td>Joint Connectivity Handbook</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRISP</td>
<td>Mid-Range Information Systems Plan (current edition)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 4</td>
<td>Combat Service Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 4-1</td>
<td>Combat Service Support Operations</td>
</tr>
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D-2
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<tr>
<td>FMFM 4-3</td>
<td>Landing Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 5</td>
<td>MAGTF Aviation Combat Element (ACE) Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 5-1</td>
<td>Organization and Functions of Marine Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 5-30</td>
<td>Assault Support Helicopter Tactical Manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 5-40</td>
<td>Offensive Air Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 5-41</td>
<td>Close Air Support (CAS) and Close-in Fire Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 5-42</td>
<td>Deep Air Support Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 5-50</td>
<td>Antiair Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 5-60</td>
<td>Control of Aircraft and Missiles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 6/OH 6-1</td>
<td>Ground Combat Operations D-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 6-1</td>
<td>The Marine Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 6-2</td>
<td>The Marine Infantry Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 6-3</td>
<td>The Marine Infantry Battalion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 6-9</td>
<td>Marine Artillery Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 6-11</td>
<td>Mechanized Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 6-18</td>
<td>Techniques and Procedures for Fire Support Planning and Coordination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 6-21</td>
<td>Tactical Fundamentals for Helicopterborne Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFMRP 6-30</td>
<td>Light Armored Infantry Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 7-5A</td>
<td>MAGTF Riverine Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 7-7</td>
<td>Advanced Naval Base Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 7-14</td>
<td>Combatting Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 7-14A</td>
<td>Individual’s Guide for Understanding and Surviving Terrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM/OH 7-30</td>
<td>Counterinsurgency Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMFM 13</td>
<td>MAGTF Engineer Operations</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ORGANIZATION OF MARINE FORCES FOR COMBAT

SECTION 1: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MARINE AIR-GROUND TASK FORCES (MAGTF)

1. General

a. The scope of this section is limited to a brief description of the major components in the organizational structure of a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF). It also addresses command relationships and describes organizational characteristics of elements comprising MAGTF’s, and when used in conjunction with section 2, provides a general description of a particular type of MAGTF.

b. The term "element" is used in this chapter to denote an essential component in the task organization. Its use in this chapter is restricted to those major organizations which report directly to the commander of the MAGTF.

c. A MAGTF is comprised of four elements: the Command Element (CE), the Ground Combat Element (GCE), the Aviation Combat Element (ACE), and the Combat Service Support Element (CSSE).

2. The Command Element

a. The commander of a MAGTF is designated by appropriate authority. In the amphibious operation, the commander of the MAGTF serves concurrently as the Commander of the Landing Forces.

b. Organization for Landing and execution of operations. The command element is structured for the conduct of operational functions and is tailored to the mission and task organization of the MAGTF.

c. Within the MAGTF, principal reliance is placed on direct liaison among the MAGTF elements to achieve the necessary coordination of air and ground operations. The capabilities of the MAGTF command element extend and complement the capabilities of the command section of the elements of the MAGTF, but do not duplicate them under normal circumstances as illustrated by the following examples wherein there is only one ground combat element:

(1) All artillery is organized under the ground combat element commander.

(2) The MAGTF commander normally does not establish a Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) but delegates the authority for that establishment to the commander of the ground combat element. In cases when there is more than one GCE assigned to the MAGTF; or a GCE and a separate MAGTF is assigned; or when the MAGTF is serving as a Joint Task Force (JTF); the MAGTF commander could establish a separate FSCC. The Direct Air Support Center (DASC) will normally collocate
with the senior FSCC. There may be unique circumstances, as described above, which require special task organizations such as the Air Support Liaison Team (ASLT) to accomplish needed air support coordination with the individual GCE’s or separate MAGTF’s FSCC.

d. The formation of a separate air-ground-logistics command element permits subordinate commanders within the MAGTF to direct their attention primarily to the command of their respective elements. For this reason a substantial portion of the staff effort of the MAGTF command element is concerned with matters involving higher, adjacent, and supporting commands. However, the commander makes provisions for direct liaison between these commands and designated subordinate commanders of the MAGTF for specific activities which do not require intervention of the MAGTF command element.

e. In the amphibious operation, the air-ground-logistics command element serves concurrently as landing force command element. This arrangement enhances the direct relationship of the Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the Commander, Landing Force (CLF). The CLF exploits the capabilities of his major subordinate commanders in accomplishing the detailed planning required for the amphibious operation. To this end, he normally assigns them appropriate portions of the landing force plan for preparation. He may also augment the landing force staff temporarily, particularly for tasks concerned with landing force control agencies.

f. The major organizational limitation of the separate air-ground logistics command element is derived from the fact that it may not be a permanent command element. Commanders minimize the adverse effects of this limitation by such measures as the permanent assignment of key personnel on an additional duty basis, compilation of files and SOP’s, periodic activation of the staff for planning or CPX’s, the designation and frequent inspection of command element equipment, and embedding (discussed in further detail in section III).

3. The Ground Combat Element

a. The ground combat element is a task organization tailored for the conduct of ground operations. It is constructed around an infantry unit, varies in size from a rifle company to a reinforced division or divisions, and includes appropriate combat support and combat service support units.

b. Under normal circumstances, there is only one ground combat element in the MAGTF. FMFM 3-1 (paragraph 2312j) discusses procedures for fire support coordination when two GCE’s are assigned. When exceptional situations require more than one ground combat element, the MAGTF commander directs and controls ground operations. Under this condition the MAGTF command element must be structured to accommodate this increased span of control and the attendant command and coordination requirements.
4. The Aviation Element

a. Normally, there is only one aviation combat element in a MAGTF, although in certain circumstances several such elements may be required. This element is task organized and tailored for the conduct of tactical air operations. As the ACE is a task organized element, it is not necessary to include all six functions of Marine aviation. Only those functions that are required to accomplish the mission should be included. It includes those aviation command (including air control agencies), combat, combat support, and combat service support units required from the various aviation resources of a Marine aircraft wing and appropriate FMF units.

b. Both helicopter and fixed-wing aviation capabilities are included in the aviation combat elements of a MEU, MEB, and MEF. Normally, only helicopter aviation capabilities are included in the ACE of a special purpose force, but in some situations V/STOL attack aircraft may also be included.

c. Air operations of the Marine air-ground task force are conducted under the principle of centralized control at the MAGTF level. When the commander of the MAGTF assumes responsibility for control of air operations, he exercises control through facilities provided by the ACE. He normally designates the commander of the aviation combat element to perform this function as the tactical air commander of the MAGTF.

5. The Combat Service Support Element. This element consists of combat service support units that support the command element, the ground combat element(s) and the aviation combat element(s). Other combat service support units may be grouped in this element for organizational efficiency although they may support only one of the other major organizations of the MAGTF.

6. Variations. In situations where employment of readily available forces require bringing together two MAGTF’s originally formed for separate and independent operations, a higher MAGTF command element will be formed. Moreover, if two Amphibious Task Forces tasked with the same objective in the same local area are placed under the same Navy commander, embarked MAGTF’s will be reorganized into a single MAGTF with a single command element. Navy and Marine Corps commanders so designated will be of equivalent grade (e.g., Navy flag officer/Marine general officer with a MEB as a minimum command element). This should not be construed to mean that multiple MEU’s make a MEB or that multiple MEB’s make a MEF. Rather, emphasis is directed to the fact that MAGTF’s are flexible organizations capable of smoothly compositing into a larger MAGTF if required.

7. Command Relationships

a. MAGTF’s are capable of acting as the command element of a joint task force and are fully interoperable with all national assets and agencies. Appropriate command relationships between the MAGTF commander (CLF) and commanders of Navy forces are essential to
successful MAGTF operations. In executing amphibious operations, the requirement of the appropriate fleet commander, the provisions of Joint Pub 3-02, "Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations", and all applicable Tactical Memoranda (TACMEMO) must be observed, in order to ensure adherence to established doctrine for amphibious operations and in amplification of Joint Pub 3-02, it is necessary to address the following issues:

b. The forward afloat MAGTF commander retains co-equal command status with the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) commander of the ships upon which he is embarked.

c. Since ARG is strictly a Navy administrative term designating the task organization of specified amphibious shipping, the use of such terms as ARG and MARG, as inclusive of both the embarked MAGTF (landing force) and the Amphibious squadron/group/etc. (ATF), is incorrect.

d. The forward afloat MAGTF should not routinely be placed under the operational control of the ARG commander. Such operational control is vested in the ARG commander only after the publication of an initiating directive by the common senior of these forces, directing the conduct of a specific amphibious operation/exercise and specifying the ARG commander as Commander, Amphibious Task Force (CATF). Such authority ceases upon termination of the operation/exercise under the conditions specified in the initiating directive.
1. General. This section describes organizational characteristics associated with each type of MAGTF. It amplifies section 1 and should be used in conjunction with that section to obtain a general description of a particular type organization.

2. Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF)

   a. The SPMAGTF is a task organized, small MAGTF configured to accomplish specific missions for which even the MEU would be too large. This can include specific tasking requiring only a small MAGTF or "shoe-horning" a small, capable MAGTF when there is insufficient amphibious shipping or strategic airlift to accommodate a larger force. It can be configured, trained, and equipped to conduct a wide variety of expeditionary operations. Special purpose forces have been employed in the Persian Gulf, Panama, in support of the Exxon Valdez oil spill containment operation, and along the southwest border of the United States.

   b. The ground combat element of a SPMAGTF would normally be a rifle company or a rifle platoon.

   c. The aviation combat element of a SPMAGTF would normally be a detachment of appropriate helicopters with associated support functions. If necessary, V/STOL attack aircraft could be included.

   d. The combat service support element of a SPMAGTF would be a task organized detachment from the Force Service Support Group (FSSG) tailored to the mission requirements of the ACE and GCE.

3. Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU)

   a. The MEU is a task organized MAGTF built around a reinforced infantry battalion, a reinforced helicopter squadron, and a MEU service support group. It is commanded by a colonel and is routinely deployed aboard an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) to form a forward deployed, sea-based, Navy/Marine Corps expeditionary force. As this force, it is a contingent of the U.S. presence at forward deployed locations. It is capable of conducting amphibious operations of limited duration; acting as an advance force for a follow-on larger MAGTF (e.g., MEB); and providing an immediate response capability across a wide spectrum of crises/contingencies by conducting maritime-oriented missions. The MEU capabilities in intelligence, command, control, communications, and combat power are enhanced by significant augmentation with FMF assets. The MEU can sustain itself for 15 days with organic supplies.

   b. The ground combat element of a MEU is a reinforced infantry battalion. These reinforcements include artillery, engineers, light armored vehicles (LAV), assault amphibious vehicles (AAV), and division reconnaissance assets.
c. The aviation combat element of a MEU is a composite squadron. This squadron is comprised of heavy helicopters, light helicopters, attack helicopters, V/STOL attack aircraft, a significant detachment from the Marine Air Control Group (MACG), a light anti-air defense (LAAD) section, a detachment from the Marine Wing Support Group (MWSG), an aerial observer, and may be reinforced ashore with aerial refueler/transport aircraft.

d. The combat service support element of a MEU is a MEU Service Support Group (MSSG) formed from the FSSG.

4. Marine Expeditionary Force (FORWARD)

a. The MEF (FWD) a task organized MAGTF normally built around an infantry regiment, an aircraft group, and a Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG). As an expeditionary force it is capable of rapid deployment and employment via amphibious shipping, strategic airlift, or marrying with pre-positioned equipment. It is capable of conducting limited combat operations. The majority of situations in which sustained combat is anticipated will eventually require a larger MAGTF. Accordingly, the MEF (FWD) normally acts as the lead element of the MEF. The MEF (FWD) can sustain itself for 30 days.

b. The ground combat element of a MEF (FWD) is tailored to accomplish the assigned mission. It is normally an infantry regiment reinforced with selected assets from the Fleet Marine Force (FMF).

c. The aviation combat element of a MEF (FWD) is a task organized Marine aircraft group. This group has substantially more varied aviation capabilities than the normal helicopter/attack/fighter/control group. It contains those anti-air warfare capabilities required by the situation. Unlike the MEU, the entire aviation combat element of a MEF (FWD) is usually organized and equipped for early establishment ashore in the landing area as airfields are developed or expeditionary airfields are established.

d. The combat service support element of a MEF (FWD) is a Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG) formed from the FSSG.

5. Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF)

a. The MEF is the primary MAGTF from which all others (of any size) are derived. There are three standing MEF command elements in the FMF; I MEF and III NEF (COMMARFORPAC) and II MEF (COMMARFORLANT).

b. The MEF is a task organized MAGTF capable of conducting a wide range of expeditionary operations, amphibious operations, or sustained operations shore. It can be tailored for a wide variety of combat missions in any geographic environment. It is normally built around a division/wing/FSSG team and commanded by a lieutenant general. A MEF can sustain itself for 60 days.

c. MEF’s support combatant command’s (CINC’s) OPLAN’s per taskings contained in the classified supplement of the Marine Corps
Capabilities Plan (MCP). Augmentation and reinforcement is obtained, when authorized, from Commander Marine Reserve Force (MARRESFOR) (4th Marine Division, 4th Marine Aircraft Wing, and 4th FSSG).

   d. The ground combat element of a MEF is normally a Marine division reinforced as required from other FMF units.

   e. The aviation combat element of a MEF is a Marine aircraft wing, task organized to conduct all types of tactical air operations. The wing is organized and equipped to facilitate its early establishment ashore in the amphibious operation and is designed for operation in an expeditionary environment.

   f. The combat service support element of a MEF is the Force Service Support Group (FSSG). The combat service support capabilities of a MEF provide support for sustained combat operations.

   g. A MEU may be included as a separate element in the MEF task organization to conduct combat operations separated sufficiently in space or time from other MEF elements to preclude MEF command and control. Such operations are normally of limited duration.
The following guide is provided to aid planners in developing comprehensive OPLAN's in support of assigned missions. The sequence runs a reader through ten steps of the planning sequence (illustrated in figure F-1), expands, explains and reminds the reader of essential questions to be asked in each phase of OPLAN preparation. The checklist follows staff planning guidance contained in FMFM 3-1, Command and Staff Action.

Figure F-1 -- Command and Staff Planning Sequence

F-1
SECTION 1: RECEIPT OF MISSION

Define: Mission is the task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason for taking it. (AFSC Pub 1 pg. 1-23)

What: This is the authority granted by the higher headquarters that authorizes the assembly, movement, and subsequent actions necessary to execute the mission and defines the reason for taking these actions. It initiates the planning process.

Who: The higher headquarters issues the mission to the commander who acknowledges and initiates the planning process.

When: When issued.

How: The mission may be delivered formally in writing, addressing very specific details, or may be very informal via phone or verbal communications over a period of time that is primarily deduced by the commander.

NOTES: In amphibious operations this may be the Initiating Directive. There are any number of ways the modern commander could be given a mission. SATCOM, FAX or messenger are all viable alternatives. There may be some critical tasks in this mission statement that will jump out at you which require immediate attention. These tasks should be attended to immediately. Source: FMFM 3-1 paragraph 1402.b(1)

Before proceeding, review the mission and higher intent provided to you or the one you deduced.

* Did your commander provide:
  - his intent -- also his superior’s intent?
  - concept of Ops? - a designated main effort?
  - an overlay -- or at least a description the area of operations?

* Depicted an AOR?
  - Battlefield geometry?
  - Deep, close, rear area?
  - FSCL or other fire support coordination measures?
- Boundaries?
- A common theme on enemy intentions/strengths, etc.?
- A table of organization or force list?  (Forces Available)
  * Resources; i.e., air, artillery, engineers, intelligence.
  * What the time constraints are - how soon you need to act?

If not - Ask now before proceeding.

You probably need to have your staff draw the CONPLAN or OPLAN and the TPFDD and begin to analyze it.

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RECEIPT OF MISSION

1. **General.** The commander does not know precisely when he will be given a tactical mission to perform. The staff is often engaged in planning for likely missions before a specific mission is received. The staff makes preliminary estimates based upon potential missions; this reduces the time required to arrive at a decision, when a specific mission is received.

2. **Planning Sequence**

   a. The key element of every plan or order is the mission. The mission states both the task to be accomplished and the purpose behind it. The mission must be absolutely clear to each subordinate commander; there must not be the slightest doubt in a commander’s mind what his mission is. The mission must be practical and realistic; it must be possible to accomplish with the forces and resources allocated and within the time allotted.

   The Receipt of the Mission initiates the planning process. The mission is assigned by higher headquarters or is deduced or developed by the commander, from the existing situation.

   b. Upon receipt of the mission, the commander begins a process in which he works with his staff to Analyze the Mission, and to **determine what additional information is required.**

      (1) The commander and staff must Analyze the Mission in order to develop the tasks required to accomplish it. Some of these tasks (specified tasks) will be found in the operation order or plan or specifically stated in the mission when it is received. Others must be deduced from the analysis (implied tasks). Implied tasks may be gleaned from any part of the order.

      (2) During this analysis the commander begins to determine what additional information is necessary to enable meaningful planning to continue.
3. **Analyze Mission and Tasks**

   a. **Definitions**

      (1) **Mission.** Both UNAAF and the DoD Dictionary define mission in three ways.

         (a) "The task, together with the purpose, which clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore."

         (b) "In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task."

         (c) "The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task."

      (2) **Task.** Task is NOT defined in either UNAAF or the DoD Dictionary.

   b. **Confusion Exists.** Joint publications are not very clear on the distinction between missions and tasks. The definitions tend to indicate that the terms are almost synonymous, and many people use these terms interchangeably. The situation is further complicated by the differing definitions of the same words in different Service documents. For example, the Army Dictionary defines tasks but not missions.

   c. **Command and Staff College Definitions.** A hierarchy of guidance does exist and is important in understanding how command is transmitted. In order to get a better grasp on the command process, C&SC provides the following definitions and holds to them throughout the curriculum:

      (1) **Task.** A job or function assigned to a subordinate unit (command) by higher authority either directly or by implication.

      (2) **Mission.** A statement of the tasks, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates that action to be taken and the reason for the action. Joint Pub 1-02 The mission of a unit (command) is developed based on the analysis of the task(s) assigned by higher authority. Any other task(s) deduced by him, and other factors/information considered appropriate.

   d. **Discussion.** A key reason for these definitions is recognition that the task or tasks assigned by higher authority serve as the basis for the mission of a subordinate unit (command). This distinction may appear to be somewhat artificial; however, adherence to it will preclude any misunderstanding based on semantics. This distinction between missions and tasks is also consistent with the format prescribed for joint operations plans and orders as well as Service plans and orders. A task should be phrased in language that clearly conveys the "what," "where," "when," and "who" of an operation. The "why" and some of the "how" may be included. However, the absence of
the answers to any of these questions does not necessarily invalidate
the task as one or more of them may be obviously implied and may serve
to allow the subordinate commander more leeway in the development of
his mission. Special care must be taken to avoid being too specific
with regard to the "how." Only in unusual circumstances will a
commander prescribe all the elements of the "how" to a subordinate
commander. Generally, the higher the echelon of command, the more
general the wording of assigned tasks. At the joint command level, it
may be necessary for the commander (and his staff) to deduce many
implied tasks. Whether the tasks are assigned or deduced, they must
be clearly and succinctly stated from the outset of the planning
process. They must be understood by all members of the staff and
approved by the commander. In this regard, the commander may desire
to reword the mission statement for clarity and completeness.

e. Mission Analysis. The purpose of Mission Analysis is to
insure that the commander fully understands his mission and allows him
to develop those tasks that are essential to the accomplishment of the
mission. The commander performs his mission analysis by identifying
the specified and implied tasks, the higher commander’s intent, and
any constraints or restraints (collectively called "limitations").

(1) Specified tasks are stated in the higher headquarters
order or plan. They come primarily from paragraphs 2 and 3 but may be
found elsewhere, such as in the coordinating instructions or annexes.
Any task that pertains to any element of the unit should be identified
and recorded.

(2) Implied Tasks are those tasks not specifically stated in
the order or plan that must be accomplished to satisfy the overall
mission or to satisfy any of the specific tasks. Implied tasks come
from further analysis of the order (reading between the lines) and
analysis in conjunction with the known enemy situation and terrain.
Examples are river crossings, passage of lines, and clear a built-up
area.

(3) Higher Commander’s Intent. A statement by the higher
commander that explains why he has undertaken the mission. It may
include his "vision" of the battlefield. Understanding higher intent
helps subordinates make timely and accurate decisions because they
understand the desired results of his actions.

(4) Limitations

(a) Constraints. Things you must do; i.e., "You must use
the airfield at Kodiak."

(b) Restraints. Things you can’t do; i.e., "For political
reasons, you cannot use highway 5 for convoys."

(5) Assumptions. A supposition on the current situation or a
presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed
to be true in absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation.

(6) Critical Vulnerability (CV): A weakness in an opposing military force’s assets, tactics, or strategy that can result in that force’s defeat if that weakness is exploited.

(7) Center of Gravity (COG): (For the purpose of MEF employment). The characteristic, capability, or locality from which a military force derives its freedom of action, military power, or will to fight.

f. A mission statement follows the mission analysis; it may include the tasks and the commander’s initial intent. Multiple tasks are described in the sequence in which they are to be accomplished.
SECTION 2: MISSION ANALYSIS

Define: To evaluate the mission in order to determine the specific tasks required to accomplish the mission and insure understanding. It includes identifying specified, implied, and subsidiary tasks, the higher commander's intent, the forces available, constraints and restraints.

What: The commander develops a concise specified mission statement for his unit based on the assigned, and implied tasks determined in his analysis of the mission received from higher headquarters.

Who: The commander and members of his staff complete the analysis.

When: Upon receipt of the mission.

How: The commander uses the steps in the analysis to thoroughly analyze the mission.

Commander's intent: The reason or intent of a mission that continues to guide the subordinate commander's actions even though the situation changes or the mission is overcome by events. (FMFM 1 page 71)

Source: FMFM 3-1 1402.b(2)

Editor's Note: "Focus is important. Focus on the enemy or on that specific item the commander identifies in his intent. Proper focus will allow the staff to quickly render an evaluation of the mission."

Remind the staff of "OODA" loops at this point. There are OODA loops at work all over the battlefield. Your mission should catch the enemy's OODA loop at an "off" moment. Creating a disruption or acting faster than your enemy can react will ultimately give you the success you seek if you have analyzed the situation and are prepared to capitalize on opportunities.

MISSION ANALYSIS

1. Introduction. Tactical decision making is a continuous process. Until receipt of a mission, staff members continually conduct situation updates in their respective areas of responsibility. The receipt of a new mission, either through an order from a higher
headquarters or the deduction of a mission through the analysis of the current operation, provides new direction to this continuous process for that particular operation. Mission analysis is the second step of the tactical decision making process. It consists of command and staff actions related to:

a. Gathering facts (current status or conditions).

b. Making assumptions (substitute for facts if information is not known).

c. Analyzing higher mission and intent (what tasks are required to accomplish the mission).

d. Issuing commander’s guidance (focus for subsequent staff planning).

2. Facts. The various staff members determine the following facts:

a. The G-1 provides a current report on the personnel status of the organization, its subordinate units, and attached and supporting elements. The personnel status includes assessments of the following tangible and intangible factors in accordance with (IAW) the format for the personnel estimate in FMFM 3-1, or FM 101-5:

* Unit strength maintenance.
* Replacements.
* Non-combat matters.
* Personal readiness.
* Service support.
* Organizational climate.
* Commitment.
* Cohesion.
* EPW.
* Reporting Procedures.
* Military Law/Discipline.

The G-1 then projects the current information into the future, based on the current operation, to estimate the status of personnel before, during, and after the operation being planned.

b. The G-2

(1) Battlefield Area. The area of interest is a notional area developed jointly by the G-3 and G-2 and based on the commander’s guidance. The area is dynamic in nature, measured in four dimensions: depth, width, height, and time. It is not always depicted on a map. It includes all factors capable of affecting the unit’s operations in the near future. It is at least as large as the area of operations and normally considerably larger. It is designed to focus information collection so the commander can "read the battlefield" and make proactive decisions. During analysis of courses of action, the G-2 and G-3 use the area of interest to identify where intelligence
collection will be required. A way to determine an area of interest based on the commander’s decision cycle and enemy movement capabilities will be discussed later.

(2) **Terrain Analysis**

(a) **Operational View.** Each level of command must appraise the terrain information to gain a view that supports the battle at that level and not become confused with considerations for a lower level. The operational commander and staff must fully appreciate the opportunities and limitations afforded by major terrain features, transportation networks, and built-up areas within the battlefield area. They must recognize the inherent structure of the battlefield and fit an operational concept to that environment. (annex D, FM 34-130 provides an operational level IPB).

(b) **Tactical View.** The G-2, using so much of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process as time allows, evaluates the battlefield area in terms of the military aspects of the terrain. These aspects are observation and fields of fire, cover and concealment, obstacles, key terrain, and avenues of approach (OCOKA).

NOTE: OCOKA may be appropriate at division/regiment and battalion level and is a handy reference guide. At MEF and higher levels this simplistic view is absorbed into the terrain analysis process. Commanders and staff officers must be familiar with terrain analysis to be able to properly direct subordinates. (Terrain analysis and the IPB process are covered in more detail in FM 34-130.)

This evaluation provides a variety of information to the planning headquarters including avenues of approach (location and trafficability), zones of entry (deep, close, rear), and key and/or decisive terrain.

The most important information for the tactical commander pertains to the avenues of approach, both ground, sea and air, for friendly and enemy uses. This is the information the headquarters will focus on to plan its operation.

(3) **Current Weather.** Weather and visibility conditions create advantages and disadvantages for opposing forces. Commanders and their staffs must acquire weather information about the entire battlefield area and know how to exploit the opportunities the weather offers while minimizing its adverse effects. Because weather is a major factor affecting both personnel and all battlefield systems, its influence must be recognized.

(4) **Known Enemy Information.** The G-2:

(a) takes the lead, and begins to look forward;
(b) plots and maintains known enemy units and locations within the area of interest, including committed, reinforcing, and supporting forces;

(c) develops the enemy order of battle, (Doctrinal Template if available);

(d) prepares a summary of known enemy weaknesses and peculiarities that will favorably or unfavorably influence the combat effectiveness of his forces;

(e) identifies known enemy activities and capabilities that might affect future operations; and

(f) summarizes the recent and present enemy activities that may indicate future actions.

Editor’s Note: The G-2 must take the load. The effort to determine what you know and do not know is critical and the G-2 must be in "the driver’s seat." He should be able to task other staff and subordinate elements to ensure the requisite actions shed light in critical enemy areas in a timely manner.

c. The G-3

(1) Mission and Commander’s Intent (one and two levels up).

(2) Current Task Organization (two levels down).

(3) Current Unit Status (See list of unit types under assumptions).

  * Unit locations.
  * Unit combat capabilities (including level of training, effectiveness of command and control, degree of mobility, type of equipment, availability of nuclear and/or chemical ammunition, limitations).
  * Unit activities.

(4) Other Services’ Combat Support; i.e., air support, naval surface fire support, Army long haul assets.

(5) Other Unit Information. Location, status, and mission of flank units, supporting units, and higher headquarters uncommitted units.

(6) Area Radiation Exposure Status (before, during, and after the operation).

(7) Time. In-depth analysis of available time should be based on reverse planning. Based on the operation to be conducted, present location, and distance from the area of operations, the G-3 should be able to determine the amount of time it will take to move to the point F-10
of departure. This time combined with the unit’s known decision cycle time will give an initial indication of the amount of time available for any other actions desired by the command.

d. The G-4. The G-4 provides an accurate and current assessment of the logistic situation of the organization, subordinate units, and attached and supporting elements in the following functional area IAW the logistic estimate format in FMFM 3-1 p166, or FM 101-5:

   * Maintenance.
   * Supply.
   * Services.
   * Transportation.
   * Labor.
   * Facilities and construction.
   * Other.

3. Assumptions. Having identified the facts available, the staff must now develop assumptions to replace necessary but missing facts. Assumptions may also be required for facts that change due to the time difference between receipt of the mission and the time of execution. The greater the time difference, the more likely facts might change and assumptions will be needed in place of them.

   a. G-1 for each course of action, personnel factors in paragraph 2a above will be considered and assumptions will be made about those that will change. These can include:

      * Percent fill of force as a whole and identification of units with critical shortages one and two levels down.
      * Status of critical MOS’s of force as a whole and identification of units with critical shortages one and two levels down.
      * Replacement flow.
      * Medical evacuation capability.
      * Hospital support capability.
      * Human factors.

   b. G-2

      (1) Terrain. Conclusions about the terrain include best avenues, best defensible ground, proposed forward edge of the battlefield area and line of departure (FEBA/LD), and the effects of terrain on both enemy and friendly courses of action.

      (2) Weather. The planner should consider the potential effects of forecast weather on own and enemy operations.

      (3) Enemy Forces. Through the IPB process, the G-2 will:

         (a) Develop possible enemy courses of action based on known enemy location and activities, terrain analysis, and the doctrinal templates.

F-11
(b) Determine enemy capabilities that could affect own operations. As a minimum, capabilities should include electronic warfare, counterintelligence threat, artillery, air defense artillery, and nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC).

(c) Develop as many enemy courses of action as planning time will allow to help the commander identify the probable courses of action. The identified courses of action are more extensive when higher levels of command are conducting the estimate. The identification of these additional enemy courses of action becomes the basis for the friendly branches and sequels developed when developing courses of action.

(d) To have a firm understanding of the enemy and to be able to plan and operate inside the enemy decision cycle, the staff should anticipate the enemy’s objectives and intentions (will he - Defend, Reinforce, Attack, Withdraw, Delay). The intentions should include an estimate by the G-2 as to the possible and probable use of NBC weapons.

(4) Enemy Vulnerabilities. These assumptions include estimates of personnel strength, combat effectiveness, and logistical capabilities.

(5) Own Capabilities. These include status of intelligence support, organic and supporting collection assets, effects of intelligence considerations on possible operations, effects of the area of operations on possible courses of action, and addition and subtraction of assets. Review the TPFDD to determine when your assets will arrive in Theater.

c. G-3 Status of Own Forces. The G-3 makes assumptions about the status of forces at the time of the operation and the general ability of the unit to conduct the mission. The G-3 is concerned with the following:

(1) Status of Maneuver Units (including leadership and ability to conduct Deep Ops).

(2) Status of Combat Support Units.

(a) Fire support units, including tactical air support, field artillery (including nuclear and chemical capabilities), Sister Service support, and target acquisition assets.

(b) Air defense support, including organic and supporting assets and coverage, airspace command and control, and Sister Service support.

(c) Chemical, including decontamination assets and offensive support.

F-12
(d) Engineer Support; mobility, countermobility, and survivability.

(e) Electronic warfare (EW) support, including organic and supporting offensive EW assets.

(f) Aviation support (less combat elements).

(g) Military police (MP) capabilities, including battlefield circulation control and security of main supply routes (MSR’s), enemy prisoners of war (EPW’s), rear area operations center (RAOC), and command posts (CP’s).

(h) Signal capabilities, including mobile subscriber equipment nodes, tactical satellite (TACSAT), and multichannel.

(i) Time. Based on the information collected during facts and assumptions, the G-3 must evaluate the time originally determined during mission analysis and make adjustments. Most important is the evaluation of time relative to when the unit must begin movement to accomplish the mission. During initial theater-wide buildup-force flow into the theater may require additional time to be ready to fight.

d. G-4. The G-4 discusses significant differences between the current logistic status in the functional areas identified above and the anticipated status of the organization at the time it begins the operation (to the extent that information is available).

4. Analysis of Higher Mission and Intent

a. The chief of staff organizes the staff to analyze the higher mission and intent. His guidance includes the amount of time the staff will have for the analysis and where and when he will be briefed on the results of the analysis.

b. Each staff member has a role to play. The staff should have received copies of the higher headquarters operation order or plan. All staff members continue situation updates focused on the new mission and simultaneously begin the analysis in their respective areas of responsibility. Each principal staff officer must understand what is essential to the commander and the other principal staff officers. This can be achieved only after team training and experience so everyone understands the personality of the commander and characteristics of the staff. Once what is essential is known, the principal staff member has his staff section focus on that information and keep him apprised of changes so he can evaluate their impact and advise the commander and the rest of the staff (FMFM 6-1A).

c. Analysis of higher mission and intent includes the following:
(1) Purpose of the higher headquarters mission (understanding the WHY of the mission).

(2) Intent of the higher commander and the commander two levels up.

(3) A review of the area of operations to understand the higher headquarters mission and intent.

(4) A review of the higher commander’s overall deception plan, the deception target and objective of the commander two levels up.

(5) Identification of tasks to be performed: specified and implied.

(6) Assets available (additions and/or deletions from current task organization).

(7) Acceptable levels of risk.

(8) Initial time analysis.

d. Information may be found in all portions of the higher order or plan. Much of this information is required in later steps of the decision making process; however, it must be identified during mission analysis to determine its impact on the mission.

(1) To plan properly, the staff must know the intent of the commanders two levels up. Therefore, the order must contain the intent of the issuing headquarters commander as well as that of the commander one level higher. (paragraph 1) Knowledge of the intent is necessary to allow commanders to develop plans that support the overall operation. (See FMFM-1 p. 71)

(2) Area of Operations. That area identified in the higher order or plan, normally on the operation overlay, as the responsibility of the unit. The area might be further defined in paragraph 3 of the order. Personnel of the G-3 section identify and post it on the unit operations map. For deduced missions, the area is determined based on the commander/G-3 estimate of the area necessary to accomplish the mission.

(3) Deception. The deception objective and target of the commander two levels up and the overall deception program (objective, target, story, plan, and activities) of the next higher commander must be reviewed. This review ensures that none of the unit’s planning compromises any higher deception efforts. When higher commands have not developed deception plans or have very simple plans, greater planning flexibility is possible. A deception is normally planned at JTF or CINC LEVEL, but may be appropriate at other levels.

(4) Tasks. Tasks that must be identified are specified and implied tasks.
(a) **Specified Tasks.** The tasks stated in the higher headquarters order or plan. They come primarily from paragraphs 2 and 3 but may be found elsewhere, such as in coordinating instructions of annexes. Any task that pertains to any element of the unit should be identified and recorded.

(b) **Implied Tasks.** Those tasks not specifically stated in the order or plan that must be accomplished to satisfy the overall mission or to satisfy any of the specified tasks. Implied tasks come from further analysis of the order (reading between the lines) and analysis in conjunction with the known enemy situation and the terrain. Examples of implied tasks include river crossing, passage of lines, and clearing built-up areas. Inherent, zoutine, or SOP tasks are not included in the list of tasks. Examples include establish liaison, maintain roads in sector, refuel, etc. Another planning consideration is the identification of limitations. Limitations are restrictions placed on a commander specifying things that cannot be done and/or things that must be done (restraints/constraints). Limitations, in most cases, prescribe some detail of force organization, maneuver, or rules of engagement. For example, .. move not later than;.. retain two battalions in reserve;.. no unobserved indirect fire authorized, etc.

(5) **Assets Available.** Assets allocated in the task organization are discussed in organizations for combat in paragraph 3. More importantly, the relationship between mission and assets is critical. The folding together of time, space, and assets is critical to the success of a mission.

(6) **Time Analysis.** The element of time is not clearly identified for analysis in any of the staff estimates. However, time analysis must be an integral part of mission analysis, and must be conducted continuously until the mission is accomplished. The commander must balance detailed planning against gaining speed and surprise by immediate action. The analysis of time uses the following guidelines:

(a) **Determine Time Available.** Time available begins with receipt of the mission and ends with the time of execution and completion of the scheme of maneuver stated in the order. **The crux of the issue is Time Available or Time Required.** The commander must weigh these and sometimes go back to higher HQ for additional time. Rehearsals are very important and time should be budgeted for them at each level.

(b) **Know the Decision Cycle.** A decision cycle is the total time required from the time the commander obtains information to process it, make a decision, issue orders, and have subordinates execute the operation. This is a necessary tool to properly plan time allocation.

(c) **Time Allocation.** Once a commander has a general understanding of his mission and the time available, he must allocate
the time for the various phases of the operation. This allocation is often done by reverse planning. Knowing the time to execute the operation, the commander must consider the amount of time needed for the unit to move to the point of execution; he must then allocate time for rehearsal if applicable, and finally for planning. Since subordinate units also require planning time, the amount of time available for their planning must also be allocated. The commander should consider the 1/3 - 2/3 Rule. Each headquarters should use roughly one third of the planning time available and allow two-thirds of the time for subordinate units. Each unit should use only the minimum amount of time necessary to plan an operation. The allocation of planning time must take into consideration the decision cycle of the unit doing the planning and that of the enemy.

d. The commander can maximize planning time available by using timely warning orders, making sound assumptions, issuing complete guidance, and ensuring close coordination between units and staffs. Once the time is allocated, the commander must communicate his decision to the staff.

e. Throughout this analysis, the staff considers information that could affect the operation. Time is critical. During this step a lack of information might cause a poorly trained staff to delay and thus waste time. When information is not available, the staff must develop assumptions to take the place of the missing information and clear them with the commander. Additionally, the staff must identify necessary information requirements and obtain the information. The important thing here is not to waste time waiting for unavailable information but to continue the process.

f. Review constraints and restraints to ensure compliance.

g. Although the commander is responsible for the identification of the essential tasks and the mission, the staff develops a tentative list of essential tasks and a preliminary restated mission statement.

(1) Essential Tasks. From the list of specified and implied tasks identified earlier, those tasks that define the success of the mission are identified as essential. To properly identify the essential tasks, the staff and commander must be aware of the intent of the commander ordering the mission and that of his superior.

(2) Restated Mission. The restated mission will be the mission statement for the unit conducting the analysis. It contains all the elements of a mission statement (WHO, WHAT, WHEN, WHERE and WHY). The element of WHAT is the essential task(s), the accomplishment of which define(s) mission success. If there are multiple tasks, they are listed in the sequence in which they are expected to occur. At this stage, the restated mission should not be changed. It may change, however, if an error in analysis is discovered or the mission is changed by higher authority. The commander approves the results of the mission analysis. He makes the
final decision on what tasks are essential and provides the restated mission. This mission statement provides the focus for subsequent staff planning.

5. The Armed Forces Staff College PUB 1 says this about assumptions:

a. The DoD Dictionary defines an assumption as

"a supposition on the current situation or a presupposition on the future course of events, either or both assumed to be true in absence of positive proof, necessary to enable the commander in the process of planning to complete an estimate of the situation and make a decision on the course of action."

b. An assumption normally covers the issues over which the commander has no control and is used to fill in a gap in knowledge. It should be stated as if it were a fact. Subordinate commanders and supporting commanders treat the assumptions of the higher echelon commander as facts and often do not plan for the possibility that they are not. Therefore, the statement of assumptions is a critical element in the development of the concept.

c. Assumptions have a significant impact on the planning process. If the assumption is later discovered to be incorrect, an alternate operation plan is generally needed. Because of their influence on planning, the fewest possible assumptions are included in an operation plan. A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue.

d. Assumptions are made for both friendly and enemy situations. For example, planners can assume the success of friendly supporting operations that are essential to the success of their own plan, but cannot assume the success of their own operation. For instance, COM5THFLEET included this assumption in his OPLAN for the capture of Okinawa in 1945, "...that the assault shipping, supporting naval forces, and army troops to be used in the operation are released promptly from Philippine operations."

e. Planners should assume the worst-case scenario. The planner should not assume that the enemy will not use every capability at its disposal and operate in the most efficient manner possible. To dismiss these enemy possibilities could dangerously limit the depth of planning. Again, planners should not assume away an enemy capability.

f. Planners cannot assume a condition simply because of a lack of accurate knowledge of friendly forces or a lack of intelligence about the enemy.

g. As planning proceeds, additional assumptions may be needed, some early assumptions may prove to be faulty, and still others in the light of new information may be replaced with facts gained during the planning process. The use of assumptions is more prevalent for operations planned far into the future; the situation is less certain.
and assumptions must be made to complete the planning. In fact, an operation order (OPORD) that directs military operations in an actual contingency will not normally include any assumptions.

h. We recommend all assumptions be forwarded to your higher HQ Staff to be validated. This will allow your seniors to ensure validity, and provide what information/help as may be available concerning your assumptions. At the very least, the higher staff can visualize how you are approaching the mission.

TESTS FOR ASSUMPTIONS

1. ARE THEY LOGICAL?
2. ARE THEY REALISTIC?
3. ARE THEY ESSENTIAL FOR PLANNING TO CONTINUE?
4. DO THEY ASSUME AWAY AN ENEMY CAPABILITY?
5. HAS THE ASSUMPTION BECOME AN EE1 OR OIR?

Editor’s Note: Assumptions are never static. They must be continually checked, revalidated, and changed until they are proven to be fact, or are overcome by events.
SECTION 3. INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS/EXCHANGE

Define: The commander determines the information and intelligence requirements in the area of operations needed to execute mission.

What: Basic information, Essential Elements of Information (EEI's), Other Intelligence Requirements (ORI's), and target information are some of the requirements that may be requested.

Who: The COMMANDER IS RESPONSIBLE for obtaining the information but has the assistance of his staff officers. During this phase, the intelligence officer will gather the basic requirements from his files and work closely with the commander to obtain information from higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands. The "2" and Commander form a team to "see" the battlefield from the intelligence perspective.

When: This process begins upon the receipt of the mission.

How: The information request may be formal or informal. Some specific requests may only be made via higher headquarters. Direct requests may be authorized with the mission statement or may be expedited by further action/direction from higher headquarters upon request by the commander.

Assumptions: Much of the requested information needed for planning purposes will not be readily available. Planners can make assumptions to cover the issues over which the commander has no control and to fill in a gap in knowledge. A valid assumption has three characteristics: it is logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue. Assumptions are treated by subordinate and supporting commanders as fact. During the planning process, assumptions may be proven valid and replaced with facts; or faulty and used to redirect the planning process.

Essential Elements of Information (EEI's): "The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed "...in order to assist in reaching a logical decision." (JCS Pub 1)

Other Intelligence Requirements (ORI's): Less critical items of information required by the commander’s staff to complete their planning necessary for the successful execution of an operation. (See FMFM pgs. 3-20, 3-21).
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD (IPB)

Some Cautions and Hints.

1. The only command level which has a potential to conduct IPB doctrinally is at the MEF. The IPB process must have personnel and intelligence support which is only reasonably available at a MEF. Division commanders may try, but generally do not have adequate resources to properly conduct IPB. Every level of command does as much of IPB as possible.

2. The commander has to be personally involved to make the IPB work.

3. The USMC recommends the event template be the responsibility of the G-3, not the G-2 as presented in U. S. Army manuals.

4. IPB is a process not a product. The aim is to improve staff integration.

5. Doctrinal templates exist in detail for only two nations. Every other potential enemy uses a combination of tactics and equipment from a variety of sources that are not readily templated. We must expect our G-2 to use the doctrine and tactics templates for the templated nations, and modify according to the Third Nation’s history, culture, and recent operations to provide us a reasonable enemy template. The more time allocated the more accurate this template should become.

6. Planners from the G-3/4 should ask if the enemy situation they see depicted on a map or overlay is "real", that is, confirmed locations, or "templated", that is guesses based on templating. There is a very real difference.

7. Our goal is to win, accomplish the mission, or some other similar statement. The goal of the intelligence effort is to give you, the commander, as accurate picture of the enemy as possible. This will allow you to develop your plan to the extent that the enemy cannot execute his plan. OODA loops are real, and exposing the enemy’s plan to the commander via intelligence gives you the upper hand.

8. EEI’s are the Commander’s guidance to the G-2 and the collection agencies.
INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

1. Determination of Information and Intelligence Requirements

   a. Objective. During the course of his mission analysis, the commander determines the information requirements (step 3) on the area of operations, on the relative combat power of friendly and enemy forces, and on enemy capabilities. That which is not available must be collected and integrated into the estimate process.

   b. Early Determination Essential. Early determination of the intelligence requirements is essential because of the time lag between the request to the proper collection agency and the receipt of the information requested. Key to determination is the action necessary to gather the information. This is proactive -- go after the information -- don’t wait for it. This may require tasking your assets.

2. Sources of Information

   a. Maps, Charts, and Terrain Models. Maps, charts, and terrain models are basic sources of information used by the intelligence officer in making studies of the terrain, hydrography, and weather, and in relating the enemy to the area of operations. The accuracy and completeness of maps and charts are directly related to the quality and timeliness of the aerial photography and geodetic control upon which they are based. The accuracy of maps becomes increasingly important as the range of weapons increases.

   b. Imagery. Imagery is, collectively, the representation of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices, or other media. Aerial imagery comprises a prime source of information on the enemy and conditions in the objective area. Included in this category are photographic, Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR), and infrared sensor systems. The proper use of these three sources can provide the intelligence officer with a near all-weather, night-and-day reconnaissance capability. Aerial imagery is particularly valuable prior to the assault phase of an operation.

   c. Ground Sensors. Ground sensors, both air delivered and hand emplaced, include electromagnetic, optical, seismic, magnetic, infrared, and acoustic devices which are capable of detecting enemy activity. The ground sensor system provides the intelligence officer with a surveillance and target acquisition capability for continuous, all-weather, day-and-night coverage of the objective area.

   d. Enemy Activity. Enemy activity is the major source of information for the production of combat intelligence. Information that the enemy has not engaged in certain activities can be just as important as information as to what he is doing or has done. However, enemy activity may be camouflaged or concealed, simulated, or
intentionally deceptive. You must have a "agent"/active operation to be truly effective at gathering this information.

e. **Enemy Military Personnel**

(1) Enemy military personnel under friendly control, whether captured or deserters, are lucrative sources of information, not only on their respective parent units, but on other units of which they have knowledge. Prisoners may be the best source of information concerning enemy nuclear delivery means, particularly surface-to-surface means, since the latter can easily be concealed from friendly collection efforts.

(2) Information that can be obtained from prisoners of war includes troop identification and disposition, combat efficiency, status of supply, and future capabilities. Information derived from prisoners, however, may not be timely, and a single prisoner may be the source of only limited information. Interrogation of considerable numbers may be necessary in order to develop fully a particular aspect of a situation. Maximum results also depend upon skillful interrogation and careful handling of prisoners.

(3) Enemy deserters are segregated from other prisoners of war, otherwise they are handled in the same manner. Since the enemy may plant false deserters, reports of interrogation from deserters are clearly marked as "information from deserter." Enemy wounded are often more responsive to interrogation than non-wounded prisoners of war. Documents and marks of identification found on both wounded and dead provide order of battle and other information.

f. **Enemy Documents.** An enemy document may be any form of recorded information regarding enemy forces or areas. Provided the documents are authentic, they may provide more reliable information than prisoners of war because documents are usually not biased. The possibility of obtaining information of immediate tactical, as well as strategic value, warrants meticulous exploitation of this source.

g. **Enemy Materiel.** Information of technical, tactical, and strategic value can be obtained from items of enemy equipment captured by our forces. Captured documents and captured materiel may have limited direct or immediate combat intelligence value, but have the greatest value for strategic intelligence purposes. There are occasions when enemy materiel will provide information that can be exploited tactically. For example, capture of stocks of chemical shells at an enemy artillery position may alert a command to the possibility of a chemical attack.

h. **Indigenous Personnel.** Indigenous personnel who have been within enemy controlled areas may be valuable sources of information, particularly concerning terrain. They also may have knowledge of enemy installations and activities. Enemy civilians in recently captured areas often give information readily. Many disclose information in consideration of their own self interests. Generally,
the longer the delay in questioning civilians, the less valid is the information obtained. Civilians from enemy controlled areas are carefully screened in order to detect line crossers and stay-behind enemy agents. Civilian sources may also provide data on climate, economics, sociology, and local resources. Local law enforcement agencies may provide information on guerrilla and other dissident forces, line crossers, and stay-behind elements. Local civilians are particularly valuable sources of information in situations short of war and information of immediate areas of operations for divisions, wings, and smaller units.

i. Friendly Personnel. Military and civilian personnel of our own and allied forces who have evaded capture and escaped from enemy territory normally owe their return to having successfully avoided contact with the enemy. They may, nonetheless, be able to furnish information on natural conditions in the area and limited information on enemy forces. They may be unable to supply data as to exact location and times of observation. Liberated civilians, refugees, displaced persons, and cooperative enemy nationals ordinarily are not trained military observers. However, they may have information of combat intelligence value. Personnel of these categories are screened carefully by interrogators in conjunction with counterintelligence and civil affairs personnel in order to detect and apprehend line crossers and enemy agents. Pilot debriefs, patrol reports, and special forces reports will provide current information.

j. Enemy Signal Communications. Intercepted enemy signal communications provide information on enemy identifications, locations, dispositions, and contemplated operations. Enemy communications can be a source of information of immediate value to the tactical commander, particularly since, at lower levels, voice transmission is commonly employed.

k. Enemy Electromagnetic Emissions. Detection, interception, and analysis of enemy electromagnetic emissions provide information on the location, range, characteristics, and zone of coverage of enemy radar missile control and guidance systems, electronic fuzes, and enemy electronics countermeasures devices. From these signals, information can be developed on enemy defense capabilities, guided missile capabilities, and electromagnetic capabilities.

l. Effects and Residue of Enemy Projectiles and Chemical and Biological Agents. Duds, missiles, and shell fragments are sources of information on the type and caliber of enemy supporting weapons. Crater analysis helps in target acquisition by leading to the locations of enemy weapons. Examination of areas contaminated by toxic chemical and biological agents helps identify the agents used, develop countermeasures, and evaluate enemy capabilities. Information of areas contaminated by nuclear radiation is required in determining use of terrain and for troop safety.
m. Weather Forecasts. Weather, as differentiated from climate, is the day-to-day changes in atmospheric conditions. Climate refers to the average conditions encountered over an extended period. The effect of weather on an amphibious assault is a major consideration.

A weather forecast is a prediction of future weather at a point, along a route, or within an area for a specified period of time. Weather forecasts are based on simultaneous observations, made over a wide area, of the more important meteorological elements: free air temperature, barometric pressure, winds, humidity, precipitation, and visibility. Data is plotted on weather maps and is analyzed as a basis for predicting the movement and alternation of weather systems.

The accuracy of a forecast depends on a variety of factors, particularly the duration of the forecast, the amount and reliability of the weather data, the geographical location of the area, the terrain, the season, the detail required, and the experience of the forecaster. Weather forecasts usually cover 6, 12, and 24-hour periods. Longer range forecasts, which are not as accurate, cover 2, 3, and 5-day periods. Marine ground elements must depend on Navy, Army, Air Force, or Marine aviation units for weather information. In Marine aviation units, weather forecasts are prepared by the forecasters attached to MWSS units.

n. Intelligence Documents. Intelligence documents refer to studies, estimates, publications, and other (encyclopedic) documents issued for the purpose of providing intelligence information concerning an enemy (actual or potential) or an area. These documents are prepared at the national, departmental, area, and operational force level.

3. Collection Planning. Collection planning should proceed backwards. Decide what information is needed, then plan backwards.

a. General

(1) The Commanders Essential Elements of Information (EEI’s) and Other Intelligence Requirements (OIR’s) have been determined and the intelligence officer will have a good grasp of information gaps that exist. He should now focus on his collection planning. The G-2 may take the lead at this stage of the planning process.

(2) The intelligence officer has the staff responsibility for developing plans for his commander relative to the collection of intelligence information. Intelligence requirements are not static but change as the situation changes; consequently, the collection effort must quickly respond to developing requirements. The intelligence officer constantly anticipates the requirements for his commander and the requirements of subordinate units. He closely monitors the progress of the collection effort.

(3) Essential to the collection planning is a continual study leading to extensive background knowledge of the enemy, area of operations, and collection resources available to the command. The intelligence officer will now be able to determine the various enemy
activities that indicate the adoption or rejection of a particular Course of Action. Similarly, he must continuously study the characteristics of the objective area, with particular regard to the tactical effects of weather, terrain, and hydrography on operations of both enemy and friendly forces. The intelligence officer must also be completely familiar with the availability, capabilities, and limitations of the sources and agencies available to the command for accomplishment of the collection effort.

(4) The collection effort is continually focused on acquiring essential information. The commander takes calculated risks in the employment of collection means. This calculated risk can be reduced to acceptable proportions only if the planning effort is meticulous, imaginative, purposeful, and based on current and anticipated requirements.

(5) The commander also provides for the intelligence which his subordinates need and which is beyond their capabilities to produce. In an amphibious operation, planning is based in a large measure on intelligence provided by higher echelons. At each echelon, intelligence collection planning reflects the announced or deduced intelligence requirements of the commander and higher, adjacent, and subordinate commands. In joint operations, the commander provides such intelligence as he may receive from the joint intelligence center (JIC).

b. Indications

(1) Indications consist of information in various degrees of evaluation, all of which bear on the intention of a potential enemy to adopt or reject a course of action. An indication is any evidence, positive or negative, which will assist in satisfying an intelligence requirement.

(2) The analysis of an EEI relative to the area of operations is generally relatively simple. For example, an EEI may be "Determine locations suitable for helicopter landing zones within 5 miles of Objective 1."

(3) Analysis of intelligence requirements relative to enemy capabilities is a much more complex process. Essentially, the intelligence officer determines what evidence is likely to be forthcoming if the enemy prepared to adopt or has adopted a particular capability or Course of Action.

(4) Intelligence requirements concerning enemy vulnerabilities are analyzed by determining the indications which are likely to exist when any particular enemy vulnerability develops. For example, failure to intercept strikes approaching from a certain direction or lack of electronic reconnaissance intercepts in a sector may indicate a lowering of morale.
At the initiation of planning for an operation, the intelligence officer depends largely on basic order of battle studies prepared at national, area, and fleet levels for the background information on enemy forces which is needed to develop indications. Once the assault commences, the intelligence officer at every echelon analyzes actual enemy operation in the field. An analysis of this nature is disseminated to all interested units in order to augment the reliability and accuracy of interpretation at each echelon.

There is no standard list of indications that will satisfy a particular EEI or other intelligence requirements concerning the enemy. The intelligence officer develops his indications to fit the particular enemy at the particular time and in the particular area of concern.

c. **Tactical Effects of Terrain, Hydrography, and Weather.** The considerable influence that terrain, hydrography, and weather exert on military operations affects collection planning in two ways. Certain key aspects of the terrain, hydrography, and weather may be included in the list of EEI’s and other significant intelligence requirements. The enemy’s knowledge and use of terrain, the characteristics of the objective area (as they affect both friendly and enemy operations) are analyzed for their effects on the collection effort.

d. **Civilian Populace**

1) The population density within the objective area and attitudes of the local populace toward both the friendly and enemy forces can have an effect on the collection effort.

2) Psychological operations have a direct influence on the civilian populace and must be closely coordinated with collection planning. Psychological operations units as well as other friendly informational agencies are important collection agencies because of their access to the civilian populace and knowledge of the attitudes of the civilian populace.

e. **Issuance of Orders and Requests.** Implementation of the direction effort requires preparation and issuance of suitable orders to subordinate units, and requests to higher and adjacent commands for specific information collection tasks. In this regard the G-2 properly drives the G-3.

1) **Orders to Subordinate Units**

(a) Orders to subordinate units for the collection of intelligence information are disseminated in two ways; in paragraph three of the intelligence annex and as fragmentary orders and requests.

(b) Regardless of the method of dissemination, orders for collection tasks must embody the form of any good order. They must
set forth the who, when, what, where, and why as necessary for a complete understanding.

(c) The intelligence officer has primary staff responsibility for the preparation of orders for information collection tasks. He closely coordinates with other staff officers in the preparation of such orders for the commander. The operations officer may prepare detailed orders for information collection missions when the activities of the unit conducting the mission must be carefully coordinated with operations of other combat units or integrated with plans for the employment of supporting arms. The intelligence officer participates directly in the preparation of such orders. Close liaison is maintained with the collection agencies to obtain advice on the feasibility of tasks, and to alert them to possible missions.

(2) Requests to Higher, Adjacent and Supporting Commands
The intelligence officer coordinates and prepares requests to higher, adjacent, and supporting commands for the collection of information. They are disseminated in whatever form is most convenient - letter, message, or oral requests. Such requests must be specific as to exactly what is desired and by what time.
SECTION 4: INITIAL STAFF ORIENTATION

Define: The staff briefs the commander on the mission. Initial briefings on such subjects as terrain and hydrography of the area of operations, enemy capabilities, forces available, logistics support, and other areas are vital to the staff early in the planning process. Normally these initial briefings are prepared and presented by the appropriate staff officer.

Who: The commander.

What: Receives available information from his own staff and from higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. Any information not available from these sources must be collected and integrated into the estimate process. During the planning process, information not available is assumed and must be validated as the collection process provides more current data.

When: The initial staff orientation is conducted very early in the staff planning process. It will be the basis for the commander’s planning guidance and the staff’s planning.

How: This is usually conducted as a briefing with each member of the staff presenting information from sources available to them that supports the assigned mission.

INITIAL ORIENTATION

The step described in this section may be preceded by a restatement of the mission by the commander.

1. Relationship to Planning Guidance and Commander’s Estimate

   a. The relationship among initial staff orientation, the commander’s planning guidance, the staff estimates, and the commander’s estimate requires special comment. We have already noted that the steps of the sequence of command and staff action are not distinct and separate; nowhere is this more true than these four steps.

   b. The preliminary staff orientation is an early and usually incomplete statement of staff estimates. Whether written, briefed in a conference, presented by the commander himself, or by staff members; identifying important terrain and hydrography features, enemy capabilities, logistics support, available forces and resources, deployment constraints, and other such factors constitutes an important example of how the commander’s planning guidance and staff estimates blend together.
c. The preliminary orientation, which may be given with the commander’s planning guidance, is of considerable help. Here the S-3 or G-3 of both the commander’s staff, subordinate commanders, and subordinate staffs can gain an early picture of the problem the command and its components face and can begin to formulate possible courses of action. The Commander’s Guidance also paints his view of the situation, and gives all concerned a common view of the enemy or problem. In most cases the S-3 or G-3 should be able to propose definite courses of action well before the staff estimates reach their final stage.

d. Perhaps the best way to envision this complex relationship is to think of the staff as continually estimating and re-estimating the situation as the planning process proceeds. The process is repetitive, with better information and a more secure position being established with each repetition. These revised estimates are frequently given as oral briefings to the rest of the staff and, in the beginning, emphasize information collection more than analysis. Only in the later stages of the process is the G/S-1 or G/S-4 expected to indicate which proposed courses of action can best be supported.

e. Inevitably, the point comes when a decision must be made as to whether the staff estimates should be committed to smooth written form. The disadvantage is that such a move makes further refinement of the estimate less likely; the advantages are that written estimates are usually more precise and can easily be transmitted to subordinate staffs and other interested commands and agencies for their use and guidance. Generally, time, the level of the echelon and the size and complexity of the operation determine whether staff estimates are finally reduced to smooth written form. Staff estimates may be prepared in final written form after the commander’s estimate is complete, and the planning process is past the staff estimate step. However, written staff estimates must reach subordinate staffs in time to be of some value for coordinating and for developing annexes.

f. **Estimate of the Situation:** Those continuous actions of a general nature with respect to the enemy/our situation by functional area to aid in decision making.

g. **Estimate of Supportability:** Those staff actions or positions which support a course of action. (Source FMFM 3-1 1402.b(4))

2. **Initial Staff Orientation.** The commander receives information available (step 4) from his own staff and from higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. Information which is not available from these sources must be collected and integrated into the estimate process. When writing an Operation Plan, gaps in information at this early stage are covered by making assumptions. (See preceding chapter for discussion on making valid assumptions). These assumptions must be validated as-planning proceeds, through the receipt and evaluation of new information. Collecting information is normally begun concurrently with the processes described in steps 2 and 3 (FMFM 3-1, p. 48).
SECTION 5: COMMANDER’S PLANNING GUIDANCE

Define: Guidance provided by the commander to his staff (and on some occasions to his subordinate commanders) in giving them direction as they prepare and revise their estimates.

What: Information derived from the commander’s analysis of the mission and consideration of the information available (or what is not available) at this time. It may include such items as his analysis of the mission, its purpose, tactical determinations, (type of defense/offense) phasing instructions, tentative courses of action, deep operation instructions, methodology (off pertinent assumptions, employment of nuclear or chemical agents, and any other information that is pertinent to the task). Many potential conflicts between organizations can be avoided by this early exchange of information.

Who: The Commander with his staff, his subordinate commands, and his supporting units.

When: His initial guidance should precede the staff’s preparation of their staff estimates. There is not a specific time nor limit to the number of times the Commander offers his guidance. The availability of information should improve and allow the commander to offer more complete and detailed guidance.

Where: The commander may choose to provide this information in a briefing to the group or may choose to individually meet with each staff officer or subordinate unit commander as the situation and information dictates.

How: The Commander may choose to deliver his guidance in a written or oral form. In large operations, the commander may elect to convene a conference and bring as many of the subordinate and supporting commanders together to meet face-to-face.

Source: FMFM 3-1, 1402.b(5)

COMMANDER’S PLANNING GUIDANCE

1. Definition. The commander provides planning guidance to the staff (step 5) and, on occasion, to subordinate commanders. The guidance is derived from his analysis of the mission and consideration of the information available (and not available) at this stage. This is his assistance to his staff in preparing or revising their estimates. Planning guidance may include the commander’s analysis of the mission, his general plan for using nuclear weapons or chemical agents, and any other factors which he considers important. The amount of planning
guidance varies with each mission, the volume and validity of the information, the situation, and the experience of the commander and his staff. The amount of planning guidance required also varies with the units, the area of operations, the enemy, and the commander. The commander's initial guidance is usually incomplete, but is developed and expanded as more information is obtained. It is not limited to one specific step in this sequence, but initial guidance should precede the preparation of staff estimates.

2. **Scope.** The commander bases his planning guidance on his mission analysis, consideration of weather and terrain, knowledge of the enemy, and his own situation. The latter factors lead him to a judgment regarding relative combat power, a vital consideration. The amount of detail included in the commander's planning guidance depends to a large degree upon the commander's assessment of the abilities and effectiveness of his staff. Generally, his guidance should be sufficiently precise to give clear direction and to preclude superfluous effort. Simultaneously, it should be broad enough to allow for his staff to exercise optimum initiative and imagination.

3. **Form.** No format is prescribed. However, a logical arrangement of ideas minimizes misunderstanding and enhances clarity and effectiveness.

4. **Content.** The commander's planning guidance may include any information which assists the staff in completing its estimates.
   
   a. The commander may seek assistance from his subordinate commanders in formulating this guidance. On completion of staff briefings and after the commander approves the analysis and issues his restated mission, he provides planning guidance to the staff. The commander may continue to issue guidance throughout the decision making process; however, to focus the attention of the staff, some initial guidance should be given. His planning guidance is important since it provides a common starting point for course of action development. The commander's planning guidance must include his initial intent. The guidance may also include:
   
   - Constraints
   - Restraints
   - Purpose of Operations
   - ENDSTATE
   - Method (Phasing, forms of maneuver, or form of defense)
   - Preconditions

   (1) Broad course(s) of action the commander may wish developed or not considered by the G-3. The commander's guidance forms the latitude the G-3 has to develop courses of action. The guidance may be very explicit, or it may be minimal providing a wide latitude for the G-3 to develop course(s) of action. The commander must exercise caution so his guidance does not stifle the staff's initiative or mislead them.
(2) Preliminary guidance for use of nuclear and chemical weapons. This could be in the form of any or all of the following:

(a) Desired results from the use of nuclear or chemical weapons.

(b) Defeat criteria expressed in terms of coverage of the target area with a specified level of material damage or personnel ineffectiveness.

(c) Concept of subsequent use of weapons if the initial effort does not accomplish the desired results.

(d) The risk the commander is willing to accept for his own troops. Guidance will be in the form of the troop safety criteria and operational exposure guidance.

(e) Criteria for avoiding collateral damage.

(f) Intelligence collection and target acquisition guidance in terms of the commander’s concerns about enemy, weather, and terrain.

(3) Preliminary guidance on time/timeline for conducting operations.

(4) Political considerations if appropriate.

(5) Preliminary guidance on deception planning, such as stating the target and objective, if appropriate.

(6) Command and control arrangements. The same caution must be exercised as with guidance on courses of action.

(7) Specific guidance on a portion of the battlefield. Rough location of defense.

(8) Assumptions.

(9) Size, type, position, or composition of reserve/use of reserves or counterattack forces.

(10) Critical information requirements (CIR).

(11) Combat service support instructions.

The guidance may also include any other information the commander wants the staff to consider during the remainder of the process.

b. Once the commander approves the restated mission, the G-3 may issue a warning order (see FMFM 3-1 p. 63) or he may wait until after the commander’s guidance and initial intent. A warning order informs the command of a pending operation with the understanding that more
information will follow in a fragmentary order after the course of action has been selected. The warning order is sent to all subordinate units, affected adjacent units, and to the higher headquarters if the mission was deduced. Subordinate commands can begin planning.

c. After receiving the restated mission and the parameters under which they should proceed, the staff continues to analyze the developing situation through recurrent collection and review of information. Course(s) of action development proceeds following the commanders planning guidance and intent.
SECTION 6: COURSE OF ACTION

Define: A possible plan open to a commander which may lead to the accomplishment of his mission. It is normally expressed in a general statement or even a sketch which describes the type of operation contemplated.

Prior to Proceeding:

The planning staff should review a written restated mission, and Commander’s intent and planning guidance. A thorough review of the force flow (TPFDD) into theater also will dictate what is/is not possible until this entire force is in theater. A thorough review of enemy disposition, strengths, intentions, and capabilities as well as a review of the operations area is clearly in order.

TESTS FOR COURSE OF ACTION

SUITABILITY. Will the course of action actually accomplish the mission when carried out successfully? In other words, is it aimed at the correct objectives?

FEASIBILITY. Do we have the required resources; i.e., the personnel, the transportation, the resupply, the facilities, etc.? Can the resources be made available in the time contemplated?

ACCEPTABILITY. Even though the action will accomplish the mission and we have the necessary resources, is it worth the cost in terms of possible losses? Losses in time, materiel, and position are weighed in addition to purely military losses.

VARIETY. There are military operations in which only one feasible course of action exists. Generally, in joint operations this is not likely. The Commander’s Estimate analyzes and compares substantially different courses of action. Listing alternative, but only superficially different, COA’s pre-empts the CINC’s decision and eliminates an important and useful purpose of the Commander’s Estimate.

COMPLETENESS. When the COA’s have been reduced to a manageable number, a last check is given to confirm that they are technically complete. Does each retained course of action adequately answer.

- Who (what forces) will execute it?
- What type of action is contemplated?
- When it is to begin?
- Where it will take place?
- How it will be accomplished? There is no inhibition to clearly explaining how the COA will be executed. The refined COA’s are used by the CINC in his final decision; they must be explicit to allow sound judgments to be made. Care is shown not to usurp the initiative and prerogative of subordinate commanders by including too much of the "how."

COURSE OF ACTION

1. Introduction

   a. A course of action is a possible plan open to the commander that would accomplish the mission. A course of action is usually stated in broad terms with the details determined during war gaming. To develop courses of action, the staff must focus on key information necessary to make decisions and assimilate the data in mission analysis. While developing courses of action, the staff goes through several steps. These steps are-

      * Review indication and warnings from G-2
      * Review a written mission, intent and guidance
      * Analyze relative force ratios.
      * Array initial forces.
      * Develop the scheme of maneuver.
      * Determine command and control means and maneuver control measures.
      * Prepare course of action statement(s) and sketch(es).

   b. The course of action may be revised, modified, or changed during wargaming. Courses of action are developed for all staff members to analyze.

   c. The number of courses of action developed should be manageable. The ultimate goal is to develop several feasible courses of action for every enemy course of action developed by the G-2 in assumptions. If time is limited, the G-3 or the commander through his guidance must decide on the number of courses of action to be developed and which enemy courses of action will be addressed. The G-3 must comply with any guidance received from the commander about specific courses of action. The G-3 should not waste time developing a course of action the commander directed not to be considered. Often, courses of action are combined or desirable elements moved from one to another.

   d. A course of action should include the five elements listed below as they relate to the battlefield framework.

      * WHAT - The type action.
      * WHEN - The time the action will begin (on order; D-day, H-hour; or a specified date-time group; i.e., 180500ZJAN93).
      * WHERE - The assigned sectors (defense) or zones (offense).
2. Determine Possible Courses of Action

   a. The commander may have proposed a course of action for consideration. Other courses of action are derived by brainstorming. During brainstorming, the G-3 should avoid eliminating or judging courses of action and maintain an unbiased, open minded attitude.

   b. A seemingly bizarre course of action may be better, due to the surprise effect, than a more traditional, conservative but familiar approach. "Two up and one back" is not always the best course of action. Imagination and creativity are required (FMFM-1 p. 33). The G-3 should avoid the common pitfall of developing one good course of action and other throwaway courses of action that are not really viable alternatives. The following items, if not considered during course of action development, will probably result in incomplete courses of action. These items will also help identify advantages and disadvantages in each course of action for later use in comparison. They include enemy’s reaction, commander’s intent, commander’s guidance, principles of war, essential tasks, effective use of command and control, and use of nuclear or chemical weapons by either side.

   c. There may be other considerations determined during development of courses of action. Each course of action developed must be significantly different from any others. Significant difference is normally identified in one of several areas. These are:

      * Use of reserves.
      * Task organization.
      * Main effort.
      * Scheme of maneuver.
      * Weighing of fire support assets.

3. Steps Used to Develop a Course of Action

   **Step 1. Analyze Relative Force Ratios**

   a. Relative force ratios are the overall relationship of the combat power of friendly versus enemy forces including significant strengths and vulnerabilities. Analyzing relative force ratios provides conclusions about friendly capabilities pertaining to the operation being planned. It indicates what types of operations may be possible from the enemy and the friendly points of view. It also helps determine enemy weaknesses. Do not compare this process to the mathematically substantiated correlation of forces computations done by the Soviets. This is only an estimate since much of the enemy data will be based on the IPB process.
b. The basic units compared are maneuver units and supporting fire units. Other combat multipliers may also be used.

c. At division level and above, the commander or G-3 avoids making a detailed study of personnel or weapons on either side. Having an idea of the fighting capabilities of friendly and enemy units, the planner deals in rough ratios two levels down. At the MEF level, the planner needs an appreciation of the gross numbers of friendly regiments/brigades versus threat regiments. At the division level, the analysis compares all types of combat battalions. Conclusions are based on a general impression of the capabilities of both forces. The planner establishes comparison values, then computes the relative figures, and finally, evaluates the results.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Corps</th>
<th>Enemy Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Div</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACR</td>
<td>IMRR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avn Bde</td>
<td>Atk Helo Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FA Bde</td>
<td>FA Regt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AT Regt</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>U.S. Corps</th>
<th>Enemy Army</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 Ground Regt = 9</td>
<td>16 Ground Regt = 16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 DIV ARTYs = 3</td>
<td>4 Arty Regt = 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Avn Bdes (Div) = 3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 ACR = 1</td>
<td>1 IMRR = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 An Bde (corps) = 1</td>
<td>1 Atk Helo Regt = 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 FA Bdes = 4</td>
<td>1 AT Regt = 1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTALS 21 26

RATIO=21:26= 10:12 by total unit

Figure F-2 - Examples of Relative Force Ratios as Provided by U.S. Army
d. Using a table like the sample in figure F-2, planners can make a rough estimate of relative force ratios. Since many factors that determine actual combat capabilities of units cannot be shown quantitatively, more numerical precision than what is shown would be problematical.

e. Obviously the Marine Corps would find the above analysis difficult due to the size of our Corps. This is provided to show you a way of conducting the analysis for joint operations. For smaller operations a MEF’s regiments and below could be used as a basis for analysis.

f. When the computations are finished, the staff draws conclusions about friendly and enemy relative capabilities and limitations as they pertain to the tactical situation. These computations are designed to give the staff a feel for the relative strengths and weaknesses, not an absolute mathematical answer as to what he or his enemy could do. Combat unit comparison values do not consider the human factors of warfare. The staff must consider these and integrate them in their comparison. Many times these human factors may be more important than the number of tanks or tubes of artillery found on the battlefield.

CAUTION: The ratios themselves should not paralyze a staff. Consider in your courses of action the possible alternatives of the enemy taking the initiative first.

g. Using the planning ratios for various combat missions found in figure F-2, and giving careful consideration to the terrain and enemy templating assumptions, the planner can make some general conclusions about the type of operations he can conduct. He might also get the beginning indication of where the operation might take place.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FRIENDLY MISSION</th>
<th>FRIENDLY ENEMY</th>
<th>NOTES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DELAY</td>
<td>1:16</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFEND</td>
<td>1:3</td>
<td>PREPARED OR FORTIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFEND</td>
<td>1:2.5</td>
<td>HASTY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTACK</td>
<td>3:1</td>
<td>PREPARED OR FORTIFIED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATTACK</td>
<td>2.5:1</td>
<td>HASTY POSITION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNTERATTACK</td>
<td>1:1</td>
<td>FLANK</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure F-3 - U.S. Army Historical Planning Ratios for the Array of Friendly Units

F-38
h. In the defense, comparing force ratios allows the commander to determine whether the enemy has the overwhelming forces necessary to conduct a successful frontal attack, requiring the commander to rethink defensive forces along his entire sector, or whether the enemy will have to conduct a penetration, enabling the commander to plan his defense against the more probable avenue(s) of approach.

i. In the offense, a comparison tells the commander whether he has sufficient forces to conduct a successful frontal attack, which means he can also accomplish other options; whether he must conduct a penetration; or whether the enemy has left a weak area suitable for conducting an envelopment.

j. In the example shown in figure F-2, the Army planner determines that his unit does not have the overwhelming odds that would give him the flexibility to conduct any type operation he desires. He also knows the enemy does not have the capability. In a defensive situation, the planner would know the enemy must conduct a penetration. In an offensive situation, the planner would know he cannot conduct offensive operations without massing his forces and accepting risk in some area. The planner would be able to use this information when he begins developing a scheme of maneuver.

k. If the computations identified a ratio that was closer to one of the other planning ratios, the planner could draw other conclusions that would indicate the type of operation he could consider.

l. There is no direct relationship between force ratios and attrition or advance rates. Force ratios are not necessarily an indication of the chance of success. Do not let the ratios paralyze you into inactivity. The essence of maneuver is overcoming such ratios at a place and time of your choosing. G-3’s should remember Jomini’s statement that war is "an impassioned drama and in no way a mathematical operation". This step provides the planner with a notion of "what to" and not "how to".

Step 2. Array Initial Forces

This step determines the forces necessary to accomplish the mission and provides a basis for the scheme of maneuver. During this step, the planner must consider the mission, intent and the commander’s guidance, the avenues of approach, and as many possible enemy courses of action as time permits, starting with the most probable or the most dangerous. Remember the enemy has initiative, too, and will prevent you from doing what you want to do if he can.

a. Determine the ratio of friendly units required. (The ratios are for developing courses of action only and not for actual combat.) Historical experience has shown that a defender has approximately a 50-50 probability of successfully defeating an attacking force approximately three times his equivalent strength. The defender has
many advantages: full use of cover and concealment, selection of the
ground on which to fight, weapons sighted for maximum effectiveness,
choice of firing first, and use of obstacle value of the terrain.
Historically at the tactical level, the attacker must possess a 5-to-1
or 6-to-1 ratio of combat power to be successful. Therefore, as our
start point, we will attempt to defend on each avenue of approach
with, roughly, a 1-to-3 force ratio expressed as a US unit defending
against the next higher level enemy unit. For example, a US battalion
would defend against an enemy regiment. These are only tools for the
planner. Figure F-3 shows the preferred minimum planning ratios used
to initially array forces.

b. Determine the size of the unit to be arrayed. Figure F-4
shows the size units to be arrayed at the various planning levels and
the size avenue of approach the planning level will array against.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Planning Level</th>
<th>Avenue Size</th>
<th>Array Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEF/Corps</td>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Brigades/Regiment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Division</td>
<td>Regiment/Brigade</td>
<td>Battalions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brigade/Regiment</td>
<td>Battalion</td>
<td>Companies</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure F-4 - Planning Guide for Level of Unit to be Arrayed

Other operations, such as pursuit, exploitation, and movement to
contact, require no particular ratio; however, for planning, a ratio
of 1:1 can be used. These ratios consider terrain and mission but not
weather, initiative, surprise, logistics, or combat effectiveness
intangibles (leadership, training, morale, and skill). These ratios
are a start point only and will often be adjusted as the course of
action is developed further.

c. Determine a proposed FEBA (defense) or LD/LC (offense).
Orders from higher headquarters should indicate the desired location
of the FEBA/LD. The initial G-2 terrain analysis should attempt to
validate the selection or determine a recommended change which must be
resolved with higher headquarters.

d. Develop the deception story (if appropriate). The deception
story is the information that must be presented to the deception
target’s intelligence system to cause him to execute the action stated
in your commander’s deception. Since aspects of the story may
influence the positioning of units, the major elements of the story
must be conceived before developing any courses of action.
Formulation of a plausible deception story requires close cooperation
between the operations officer and the intelligence officer. For more
details see FM 90-2, Battlefield Deception, chapter 4.
e. Make initial array of forces. The initial array of forces begins at the expected point of initial contact. The array of ground forces is done two levels down. Consider force ratio requirements for each task (in a gross sense, how much combat power will it take to attack, defend, delay; etc., along each avenue of approach).

f. The initial array focuses on generic ground maneuver units without regard to a specific type. At division level the array is done with generic battalions without regard to whether they are infantry, mechanized or armor. At MEF level, the array is also made two levels down using regiments and appropriate combat support and combat service support.

g. The initial array is made without regard to task organization as task organizing of the units being arrayed is done by subordinate headquarters one level down.

h. During this step, the planner does not assign missions to these units but merely gains an appreciation of what forces should be allocated to accomplish the mission.

i. In the defense, begin the array by placing ground maneuver forces to block enemy avenues of approach that can enter the unit’s area.

j. Recalling the ratio required to defend (1:3), the planner arranges forces in the main battle area first and then the covering force area. He arranges forces in each area without regard to the other. Having completed the array against the avenues, the planner arrays additional forces based on the enemy and terrain analysis to cover gaps identified between those forces astride enemy avenues or based on commander’s guidance.

k. The initial array should provide a cohesive defense. Attempt to position forces along the forward edge of the covering force (security zone) area and along the FEBA as well as in depth throughout the area of operations.

l. In the offense, the initial array begins by allocating forces to all avenues of approach. The allocation is based on the enemy units positioned to affect those forces moving on the avenues of approach. The array should be conducted along each avenue of approach from initial contact to the objective. This array will give the wargamer an understanding of the total forces necessary to accomplish attacks along all avenues. It will also give him an understanding of the possible enemy force present in zone that he will have to consider while developing courses of action and branches.

m. The completed initial array helps the wargamer identify the total number of units required to be allocated. If the number required is less than the number available, the additional units should be placed in a pool to be used during the development of a scheme of maneuver. If the number arrayed is greater than the number
available, the wargamer can estimate the shortfalls and possible requirements for other resources. Most importantly, the wargamer has identified force requirements and developed a base of knowledge from which decisions can be made on items such as reducing the number of troops in certain areas (economy of force) and accepting risks. Alternate methods of dealing with the enemy will be identified during the development of a scheme of maneuver.

**Step 3. Develop the Scheme of Maneuver**

The scheme of maneuver is the narrative description of how the forces arrayed in the previous step will accomplish the commander’s intent. The scheme must describe how the organization will arrive at the endstate which the commander articulated. Several schemes of maneuver should be prepared for any mission. Include intended use and positioning of reserves.

a. Develop a scheme of maneuver by taking the initial array from step 2 and refining it to encompass the actions determined appropriate to address the various elements of the battlefield framework (deep operations, covering force/security, close operations, rear operations, and reserve). This is done by:

* Reevaluating the terrain and enemy.
* Reevaluating the force ratio.
* Considering the impact of shortages and/or use for forces uncommitted during the array of initial forces.
* Evaluating type(s) of operations identified as possible during the relative combat power analysis.
* Determining the defeat mechanism including locating objectives and identifying specific targets; e.g., an independent tank regiment.
* Determining the location of objectives and counterattack objectives.
* Determining the location of the main effort and supporting effort(s).

b. **Address all Maneuver Forces by**

(1) Array Additional Forces. Any forces remaining from the initial array should be used when developing the scheme of maneuver to provide depth to the battle, provide security, or act as a reserve.

(2) In the defense, additional forces should be allocated first to provide depth to the initial defensive units. An examination of the follow-on forces on each potential enemy avenue of approach will indicate what additional forces may be required to hold the enemy, to maneuver to a flank or rear, or to destroy the enemy. As they array additional forces, the commander and the G-3 may attempt to seize the initiative by accepting risk, perhaps by planning an economy of force mission in one area to allow the concentration of forces in
another. The scheme of maneuver is expressed in terms of positioning major subordinate commands (MSC’s) in depth throughout the area of operations. It includes the maneuver of all ground, air, and reserve forces against the enemy as he approaches and enters the unit’s defensive position.

CONSIDER METT-TSL

(3) In the offense, additional forces are arrayed in depth along the avenue of approach based on the enemy and the terrain. The avenue of approach designated as the main effort should receive priority of forces and should contain sufficient forces to defeat or block enemy forces that may attempt to move against the attacking forces. The scheme of maneuver is expressed in maneuvering MSC’s through or around the enemy to seize an objective or destroy the enemy. Consider METT-TSL.

IF U.S. ARMY ATTACK HELICOPTERS ARE ALLOCATED

(4) Attack helicopter units are maneuver forces that are allocated during the development of a scheme of maneuver. The inherent limitations and capabilities of attack helicopters must be considered to make the best use of this unit. Because they cannot hold terrain without augmentation, the following are some of the missions they may be assigned: deep operations, reserve, reinforcement of committed units, attack missions with appropriate area of operations (engagement areas), and rear operations.

(5) The planner must consider how fires will support the maneuver forces in the various elements of the battlefield. If there are insufficient maneuver forces, the scheme should consider the use of combat support assets to assist the maneuver forces. The specifics of support will not be addressed until the wargaming/course of action analysis; however, the scheme of maneuver must address the use of combat support to accomplish a particular portion of any of the battlefield elements.

b. Converting Generic Forces. Converting generic forces arrayed during step 2 to type specific forces is a conscious decision by the planner to identify which type of forces will be allocated for the identified missions. To accomplish this conversion, the planner considers the terrain, the enemy, and the mission of the arrayed forces. Because forces are task organized by the MSC commanders, the conversion uses only pure forces. This conversion is the initial step in identifying the task organization of the unit. Final decisions will be made during the wargaming.
Step 4. **Determine Command and Control Means and Maneuver Control Measures**

Although two separate actions, they must be combined into one step.

1. Determine command and control means by allocating major subordinate headquarters over the forces. During the allocation of major subordinate headquarters, the planning headquarters ensures the span of control is not exceeded. As a starting point, a major subordinate headquarters should control at least two subordinate units but normally not more than five. If additional headquarters are needed, the shortage is noted and can be resolved later, possibly by placing maneuver units under the control of the deputy commander and by allocating command and control assets.

2. Determine those maneuver control measures necessary to synchronize battle, without arresting subordinate initiative, by selecting the desired graphics to control the MSC’s during the operation. Maneuver control measures are based on the establishment of command and control means and the scheme of maneuver (FM 101-1).

Control measures are the minimum required to control the operation. Each course of action may have different central measures. They include boundaries, axes of advance, objectives, maneuver control phase lines, assembly areas, LD/FEBA, fire control measures, etc. The control measures should not normally split avenues of approach or key terrain, but should allow one unit to have responsibility for the area. In addition, space should be provided on the flanks of each avenue of approach to allow for maneuver and fires. The sector or zone designated as the main effort may be narrower than others, which adds weight to that sector. Sectors or zones for a secondary effort or economy of force may be wider than that of the main effort. Phase lines are also developed at this time to implement expected branches and sequels or facilitate change.

Step 5. **Prepare Course of Action Statement(s) and Sketches**

(Figures 1 and 2)

The G-3 prepares a course of action statement and supporting sketch for each course of action developed. The statement and sketch cover; WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW, and WHY as they relate to the battlefield framework. They clearly and briefly state the purpose of the operation, the main effort or main attack, and the scheme of maneuver, including what the criteria for success is. The course of action statement provides the HOW of the operation. The sketch provides a generic picture of the statement. In a tactical situation, the sketch will probably be an acetate overlay on the operations map that can be transcribed as a sketch on plain paper for use by other staff officers in analyzing the course of action.

F-44
The sketch is the outline of the operation overlay. At a minimum, the sketch should include:

* Avenues of approach, major terrain features, and major obstacles.
* Unit boundaries.
* Control measures such as phase lines, zones of attack or defense sectors, assembly areas, engagement areas, strong points, battle positions, objectives, FEBA/LD, and the main effort designated in the offense.
* Allocated forces. Allocating forces provides a clearer picture of the scheme of maneuver.

In both the defense and offense, show the type, composition, and general location of the allocated ground and air forces. Positioning of the allocated forces is accomplished against enemy avenues of approach; therefore, when the general location is displayed on the sketch, it provides a clear picture of the course of action. Internal boundary lines on the sketch define the composition of the MSC's by grouping allocated/positioned forces. Consider METT-TSL.

In the offense, show the composition of the MSC’s. Positioning applies to the MSC’s, not to the allocated forces. Therefore, the positioning will be throughout the area of operations corresponding with the other control measures/boundaries used. The sketch may be drawn identifying units by type or by using decision graphics. Unit SOP’s should be followed to ensure clarity. Examples of decision graphics are given below. For more information about decision graphics, see FM 101-1, Operational Terms and Symbols, chapter 3.

For clarity, the sketch could be enhanced with identifying features (cities, rivers, etc.) to help orient the course of action to the ground for those who will use the sketch in their analysis.

The combination of a course of action statement and a course of action sketch must provide a clear picture of HOW the unit will defeat the enemy.

The HOW should address key elements of the battlefield framework. Additionally, it must specifically explain the scheme of maneuver by outlining how generic MSC’s accomplish the mission. It should identify the main effort and supporting effort(s). If a significant risk has been identified during the development, the amount of risk should be identified in the statement.

The WHO (specific subordinate units) is not necessarily stated unless dictated by some overriding reason. If the commander in his initial guidance specified the WHO, then it will be included. If, due to the geographic dispersion, status of personnel, equipment, logistics, readiness, training, morale, or leadership, a particular subordinate unit must be used, then that unit should be included in the statement.
In many plans, additional course of action sketches may be desired. Some examples include:

* A description of the end state.
* A description of the deception plan.
* A description of branches and sequels.

Much of this appendix was taken from the Marine Corps Command and Staff MAGTF Education course materials. It in turn was derived from the Army’s Command and General Staff College Pub 100-9. There are many issues in magnitude of forces which cannot be directly translated to Marine Corps like-sized units so exercise care in application of the advise provided here.
SECTION 7: OPERATIONS STAFF ESTIMATES/ESTIMATES OF SUPPORTABILITY

Define: Staff estimates are the foundation for the commander’s decision to select a course of action. In this step, the staff analyzes and refines each COA to determine its supportability. The thoroughness of these staff estimates may determine the success of the military operation.

What: Each staff reviews the mission and situation from its own perspective; examines the factors for which it has the responsibility; analyzes each COA from its functional perspective; compares each COA based on its functional analysis; and concludes whether the mission can be supported and which COA can best be supported.

Who: The commander’s staff, including the special staff and significant supporting elements. Subordinate commanders may participate if available.

When: Staff estimates are a continual element of the deliberate planning process. Initially, the formal estimate is developed, presented, and incorporated in the staff planning documents.

How: The staff may present their estimates orally but in most cases it will be written. For some staff officers and supporting elements, the estimate constitutes an element of the order being drafted.

Process: It is absolutely vital to success of the planning process that all members of the staff, subordinate units, and supporting units be kept informed of any significant information discovered. The planning process is not a step by step process where facts are presented, decisions made, and further research of the fact is dropped. The plan evolves from receipt of the mission through the final draft for signature. The greatest changes will occur during this phase of the staff preparing estimates.

Source: FMFM 3-1 para. 1404.b, 1401406 and AFSC PUB 1 para. 610

Note: One way to help with these estimates, as well as synchronize your effort is "wargaming."

STAFF ESTIMATES OF SUPPORTABILITY

1. Based on the mission and the commander’s planning guidance, the staff officers prepare their estimates. These staff estimates are coordinated among the staff sections and result in staff recommendations on what actions the commander should take to accomplish his mission.
2. Because of time limits, many staff estimates are presented orally or in abbreviated form. Regardless of the method of presentation, the entire format should be used in each staff officer’s thought process as a means of organizing his thinking and ensuring that he does not overlook anything of importance.

3. Staff estimates provide the foundation and substance from which the commander draws his estimate and, later, his concept of operations.

4. The degree of completeness of staff estimates is the best measure of the thoroughness and depth of the planning process. However, not every planning sequence needs a lengthy effort. Conceivably, only a brief review of the assigned task, quick oral briefings, a decision, and writing a message-type operation order can complete the entire process. (Frag Order)

5. It may seem a duplication of effort for the staff to formally present estimates after wargaming. The purpose of wargaming is for Commanders and staff to interact. The formal estimate serve as a "safety net" for planning considerations and provide a written product for such purposes as they may later serve.

   FMFM 3-1: PROVIDES MANY EXAMPLES OF ESTIMATES
   FMFM 1: APPENDIX A PROVIDES ACE ESTIMATES
   FMFM 18: PROVIDES FIRE SUPPORT ESTIMATES
   OH 4-1: PROVIDES CSSE ESTIMATES

Note: FMFM 2-1 recommends the Commander and subordinate Commanders and their staffs participate as a group. If you choose this method of obtaining staff estimates, insist on some written estimates if possible.
SECTION 8: COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

Define: The commander, through a logical process of reasoning, considers all circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission.

What: This is the document that clearly states the commander’s decision and summarizes the rational for that decision. It is not a document to convince the reader of the wisdom of the selected COA. Rather, it is a summary that clearly communicates valuable guidance from the commander and is used as a valuable tool by the staff and subordinate commanders.

Who: The commander is responsible though the G/S-3 may prepare the document either by direction in consultation with the commander or in draft form for approval.

When: This is completed prior do the commander’s decision and forms the direction for the further planning.

How: The G-2 continues his work obtaining information and gathering intelligence. The G-4 develops the logistic estimate; the G-1, the personnel estimate; and special staff officers, their specific area estimates. On the other hand, the G-3 has prepared a detailed analysis of each course of action. He has worked closest with the commander; has a total unit employment analysis; and includes the commander’s personal input into his work. Each staff officer preparing an estimate must immediately notify the commander the Chief or G-3 of any "show stoppers" discovered. Note: Two "what if’s" or worst-case scenarios, when evaluating assumptions, may constitute a "show stopper."

Source: FMFM 3-1 para. 1402.b(8)

COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE

1. The commander considers the recommendations of his staff and makes his estimate of the situation (step 8). In his estimate, he analyzes and evaluates the proposed courses of action, selects the most favorable course of action, and announces it as his decision.

   a. The commander’s estimate of the situation is an orderly reasoning process by which a commander evaluates all factors affecting the situation, determines and analyzes feasible sequences of action, and reaches a decision on the course of action most favorable to the accomplishment of his mission. The commander may make his estimate based on written or oral estimates developed by the staff. It is
customary for staff officers to assist the commander by doing the following:

1. Assembling and interpreting information
2. Making necessary assumptions
3. Formulating possible courses of action
4. Analyzing and comparing the possible courses of action.

Although the commander’s estimate is one component of the sequence of command and staff action, it is a summation of all that has gone before and produces the commander’s decision which leads to all that follows. When the commander completes his estimate, he makes his decision and selects the course of action which will be followed. If the estimate is correctly written, the succeeding steps will only expand, develop, and implement this concept; the general framework within which these details are fitted will already have been developed.

b. The staff may write the commander’s estimate for the commander’s approval, or the commander may write it. In most cases, the G-3 does the actual work of preparing the commander’s estimate. The G-3 usually compiles the commander’s written estimate of a tactical situation, assembling and integrating the contributions of other staff sections. He may do it after consultation and direction, or may prepare it in draft form for approval. In either case, using a standard format is valuable to both the G-3 and the commander. A standard format facilitates the location of particular types of information, and helps to examine and evaluate the processes which were followed in analysis and comparison. Unless there is a sound reason to do otherwise, the best practice is to follow the prescribed commander’s estimate format.

Other general staff officers may perform a similar function for the commander with respect to other written estimates which deal with situations in their functional area. In every case, the commander reserves to himself the following tasks:

1. Selecting/modifying the course of action.
2. Formulating and announcing his decision.
3. Stating his concept of the operation.

c. Like many other problem solving techniques, the commander can think out the entire process involved in developing the commander’s estimate in a few moments. In a tactical situation, the commander’s thought process might follow this pattern:

1. What is my position?
(2) Where is the enemy?
(3) What are my alternative courses of action?
(4) Which is the best course of action?

2. Preparation of the Commander’s Estimate

The main paragraphs of the commander’s estimate are outlined and described below in detail. Figure 1 provides additional information found in the estimate and a sample format. Note that these five paragraph headings are almost a precise match for the basic problem-solving process.

a. **Paragraph 1--MISSION.** The mission and tasks which have been stated and analyzed earlier in concept development are repeated in paragraph 1, usually in the form in which they will appear in the operation plan or order. This will probably be the Restated Mission from step 2.

b. **Paragraph 2--SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION**

   (1) This paragraph is very important because it is the foundation upon which the commander builds his estimate. In many ways, paragraph 2 of the commander’s estimate is a summary of much of the information developed in the staff estimates. It must be emphasized, however, that it is not a repetition of the information. The drafter of the commander’s estimate must be selective in what he lists within paragraph 2; he lists those factors which will materially aid him in selecting a course of action; he analyzes each factor which will influence the choice of a course of action, as well as those which affect enemy capabilities; and, under each statement of fact, he includes a prediction of its probable influence on enemy or friendly actions. A well-constructed paragraph 2 is made up of sifted, consolidated, evaluated information which is pertinent to developing a sound operational decision. This point is discussed more fully in the discussion of the three main subdivisions of paragraph 2.

   (2) **Subparagraph 2a, Considerations Affecting the Possible Courses of Action.** This subparagraph is a summary of pertinent considerations in two broad categories.

   (a) **Characteristics of the Area of Operations.** The intelligence estimate provides the primary source of data on the area of operations. The drafter should consult with the G-2 on his subparagraph 2.a. and insure that the G-2 is aware of what is being selected for listing. The detailed items listed under characteristics of the area in figure 1 are not meant to be mandatory or exclusive, only suggestive of the sort of information that should be considered. Clearly, other factors could be included. The important point is that the drafter must attempt to identify those characteristics of the area of operations which will most affect his choice of a course of action.
(b) Relative Combat Power. Tabulating relative combat
craft power draws primarily on the staff estimates of the G-2, but is also
related to the G-1 and G-4 estimates where applicable. The drafter
considers all the factors listed in the format and any others which
appear pertinent to the particular operation at hand. Relative combat
craft power is more than a listing of numbers of troops, ships, aircraft,
missiles, and guns. It should reflect the competence and
characteristics of the involved forces, their disposition, and other
elements which will have a bearing on their ultimate effectiveness.

(3) Subparagraph 2b, Enemy Capabilities. Enemy capabilities
are defined by the DoD Dictionary as "Those courses of action of which
the enemy is physically capable, and which, if adopted, will affect
the accomplishment of our mission. The term "capabilities" includes
not only the general course of action open to the enemy such as
attack, defense, or withdrawal, but also all the particular courses of
action possible under each general course of action." It is customary
to refer to enemy capabilities and own courses of action.

(a) Enemy capabilities, are in one sense, the enemy’s
possible courses of action, but they must be stated differently.
Enemy capabilities are only broadly defined and avoid the specific
terms in which a course of action is couched. Enemy capabilities are
almost never stated as plans in which a sequence of events is
postulated while, on the other hand, a course of action most
frequently is. Enemy capabilities are considered realistic
capabilities. While pressure and counteraction may negate the
effectiveness of an enemy capability, his realistic capability should
be shown. (DO NOT CARRY THIS TO THE EXTREME.) In the analysis and
comparison paragraph, the relative success of your forces against an
enemy capability is evaluated.

(b) Paragraph 5 of the intelligence estimate provides a
summary of enemy capabilities with an estimate (if there is sufficient
information to justify one) of the order of probability of adoption.
This summary from the intelligence estimate may provide the drafter of
the commander’s estimate with all that he needs for subparagraph 2.b.
On the other hand, he may find it necessary to consult further with
the G-2 to compile an adequate listing. In any event, the list of
enemy capabilities will be further refined and evaluated at the
beginning of the paragraph 3 analysis. Paragraph 5 of the
intelligence estimate may also list some significant enemy
vulnerabilities. If this is the case or if the drafter of the
commander’s estimate knows of any significant vulnerabilities from any
appropriate source, they should also be listed in subparagraph 2.b.,
as they will prove useful in subsequent analysis.

(4) Subparagraph 2c, Own Course of Action. "Course of Action"
is defined by the DoD Dictionary as, "A possible plan open to an
individual or commander which would accomplish or is related to
accomplishment of his mission." The formulation of possible own
courses of action during the planning process is a creative task and
is different in nature from the rest of the planning sequence, which
deals mainly with collection, evaluation, and judgment. The commander or his G/S-3 must use both imagination and hard work in formulating these possible plans. Here is another point in the planning process at which the sequence cannot take place in easily identifiable steps. G/S-3 must begin to propose possible courses of action early in the planning process. Often this is most profitably accomplished in an oral briefing, after which the individual staff divisions can begin to check the feasibility of these preliminary proposals from their own points of view. By the time the actual drafting of paragraph 2 of the commander’s estimate has started, the other staff officers have a reasonably firm idea of his two or three most promising courses of action. Because of the length and complexity of the analysis and comparison conducted in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the commander’s estimate, it is not practical to carry more than three (or four at most) courses of action into these two phases of the estimate unless there is substantial automated data processing (ADP) available. The drafter of paragraph 2.c. Is faced with three basic tasks. These tasks include:

(a) Reducing his retained courses of action to a manageable number.

(b) Ensuring that those retained are the most promising courses of action of those that have been under consideration.

(c) Ensuring that those retained are actually, not just superficially, different from each other.

(5) Review. Let’s review what has been accomplished thus far in the commander’s estimate:

(a) The overall mission and subsidiary tasks have been stated in words that will be used in the operation plan or order.

(b) The significant characteristics of the area of operation have been listed and analyzed, and deductions relative to the probable influence of each factor on enemy capabilities and friendly actions have been highlighted.

(c) The relative combat power of the opposing forces has been set forth.

(d) A list of enemy capabilities, for further refining and evaluating, has been drawn up.

(e) A list of own courses of action, preferably three or less in number, has been made up and subjected to checks of variety, feasibility, acceptability, suitability, and completeness.

c. Paragraph 3--ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION

(1) The purpose of paragraph 3 is to check each proposed course of action listed in subparagraph 2c against each enemy
capability stated in subparagraph 2b to ensure that each confrontation that could occur is examined and evaluated and to bring to light those factors of the operation that are most significant in arriving at a final decision. Put another way, paragraph 3 is a series of elementary wargames in which the commander attempts to foresee the outcome of the tactical situation by ensuring that each course of action he is considering is measured against each enemy capability. The advantages of a Commander, Staff and MSC wargame are obvious.

(2) Analysis. The number of enemy capabilities that can be analyzed is subject to the same practical limitations as the commander’s own course of action. The planner needs to find the answer to the question--which enemy capabilities should be retained for analysis? Two methods are normally used to achieve this necessary reduction: grouping and selection.

(a) Grouping. Almost every joint military operation revolves around either the ground, the sea, or the air battle. In joint operations the respective forces operate in mutual support and for a common mission; nevertheless, there is normally one aspect of the operation which is pivotal. For example, an amphibious operation, although receiving vital support from sea and air forces, will ultimately succeed or fail depending upon whether the ground forces can attain and hold their physical objectives. In another joint operation, the fundamental objective might be to sever an enemy’s sea lines of communication. Although ground and air support may play highly important roles, the outcome of the sea battle will determine the ultimate success of the operation.

1 If a dominant factor can be identified in this manner, the enemy capabilities in that area should be the ones in which the most meaningful alternatives will occur. Returning to the example of a joint amphibious operation, the enemy’s sea and air capabilities might be grouped and considered as operating in support of each of the alternatives the enemy might choose in his ground battle. For example, assume that you are planning an amphibious operation across the beaches near a port which must be captured within a week of D-day. The enemy does not have sufficient forces to enable him to defend in both the beach area and the port. Here you might list enemy capabilities in terms of the ground battle:

- Defend in the port; delay on the beaches.
- Defend on the beaches; delay in port.
- Delay on the beaches and in the port.

In each enemy capability, we would state that the enemy would use his sea and air capabilities in a supporting role.

2 Although this sort of grouping is necessary in most joint operations to reduce enemy capabilities to manageable numbers,
care must be taken in using it. The following questions are particularly important:

- In choosing the pivotal segment of your operations, have you been objective? Have you chosen accurately, or have you chosen only that portion of the operation with which you are most familiar?

- Are you letting any highly significant enemy capabilities become submerged and ignored by your grouping technique?

(b) Selection. After grouping, more enemy capabilities remain for analysis than can be properly handled. In this event, you must further examine and evaluate your list. The arbitrary elimination of enemy capabilities is a historically hazardous practice for operational commanders. However, taking due precautions, you can ask some important questions.

1 Is there any enemy capability that has the same effect on all of your proposed courses of action? If so, a notation of this, along with a clear statement of what the effect is will eliminate the necessity to include it in the analysis part of paragraph 3 of the commander’s estimate. What is most likely Course of Action for him to pursue/what’s the most damaging to me?

2 If further reduction is required, the best procedure is to choose those three (four at the most) remaining enemy capabilities which appear to have the most bearing on your final decision. These are not necessarily, but will probably be, those retained enemy capabilities which appear most likely of adoption. (Paragraph 5 of the intelligence estimate may provide some insight into this problem.) Elimination of enemy capabilities from analysis must be avoided wherever possible.

(3) Method. The procedure in paragraph 3 analysis is a simple tactical play of each retained course of action against each retained enemy capability. There is no need to use a diagram or form; usually the most effective method is to state the opposing actions at the beginning of each separate confrontation; e.g., own course of action #1 vs. enemy capability #1. Under this heading, the drafter sets forth his mental picture of the way a battle would go in that particular confrontation (Wargaming). The value of the analysis depends upon the thoroughness with which it is completed and the ability of the drafter to develop imaginatively the interactions and results which might take place if that course of action was, in fact, opposed by that particular enemy capability. In subparagraph 3a., it is customary to set forth a brief explanation of the grouping and selection procedures necessary to reduce the enemy capabilities list to manageable numbers. If an enemy capability affects all courses of action the same way, the discussion of this effect should also be including subparagraph 3a. The succeeding subparagraphs are devoted to the tactical play of each enemy capability against each course of action.
(4) **Difficulty.** The paragraph 3 analysis of the commander’s estimate is traditionally the hardest part for officers new to this type of staff work to understand and use. One of the difficulties is getting started. Once this hurdle is crossed, the ideas will begin to flow. The following suggestions may help:

(a) Check the significant area factors listed in subparagraph 2a. Do any of them seem especially pertinent in this confrontation? How about the weather? Would low visibility on D-day really hurt you? Will poor exits from the landing beaches be of particular importance if the enemy chooses to defend at the beaches?

(b) Check the list of enemy vulnerabilities obtained from paragraph 5 of the intelligence estimate. List those that appear especially important in the confrontation. An example would be the effect of the enemy’s air vulnerability if the enemy elects to defend at the coastline.

(c) Check the tabulation of relative combat power included in subparagraph 2.a. of the commander’s estimate. One example of interest to the planner would be the projected rate of enemy force buildup if the enemy elects to defend or reinforce at the coastline.

(5) **Objective.** Some of the problems which accompany the paragraph 3 analysis may be eased by indicating what it is, and is not, intended to accomplish. This analysis of opposing courses of action is intended to do the following:

(a) Focus attention on each series of confrontations in turn, thus assuring that none are omitted.

(b) Stimulate thought about the operation so that you get ideas and insights that otherwise might not have occurred to you.

(c) Highlight those factors such as timing, simplicity, flexibility, weather on D-day, etc., which seem particularly important to this operation.

(d) Create a degree of familiarity with the tactical possibilities of the operation that would otherwise be difficult to achieve.

(6) **Governing Factors.** The final step in paragraph 3 is to tabulate in the last subparagraph those governing factors in the operation in light of which the final comparison among possible courses of action will be made. The governing factors and retain courses of action are the only tabulations carried forward from paragraph 3 to paragraph 4. The chief benefit of paragraph 3 is familiarity with and insight into the whole operation.

(7) **Modification and Testing.** In the process of completing the paragraph 3 analysis, modification to the list of retained courses of action may be required. For example, some may be discarded as
unsuitable, others combined into a single course of action, and entirely new ones may be introduced. When this is done, the new courses of action must be submitted to the same suitability, feasibility, acceptability, variety, and completeness checks with which the original courses of action were tested. In addition, they too must be run through a regular paragraph 3 analysis.

d. **Comparison of Own Courses of Action.** In this paragraph, the commander summarizes the advantages and disadvantages of each his own courses of action and compares and weighs the courses against each other. He selects that course of action which appears to offer the greatest prospect of success and states it as a conclusion. If several courses of action offer equal prospects of success, he chooses the one which favors future action. During this comparisons, certain favorable aspects of two or more courses of action may result in formulating a new or combination of courses of action which the commander may adopt and state in his decision. In some cases, it is possible to eliminate all but one of the commander’s own courses of action by means of deductions made in subparagraph 2a. In such cases, the comparison required by paragraph 4 is omitted.
COMMANDER’S ESTIMATE

Ref: (a) Maps:
   (b) ""

1. MISSION
   a. Basic Mission.
   b. Previous Decisions.
   c. Purpose of This Estimate.

2. SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION.
   a. Considerations Affecting Possible Courses of Action.
      (1) Characteristics of the Area of Operations.
         (a) Weather.
         (b) Terrain.
         (c) Hydrography.
         (d) Politics.
         (e) Economics.
         (f) Sociology.
         (g) Other Pertinent Factors.
      (2) Relative Combat Power.
         (a) Composition.
         (b) Strength and Combat Efficiency.
         (c) Disposition.
         (d) Arms and Armament.
         (e) Recent and Present Activities.
         (f) Time and Space.
         (g) Combat Service Support.
         (h) Personnel Situation.
         (i) Reinforcements.
         (j) Assistance from Neighboring Forces.
         (k) Peculiarities.
   b. Enemy Capabilities.
   c. Own Courses of Action.

3. ANALYSIS OF OPPOSING COURSES OF ACTION

4. COMPARISON OF OWN COURSES OF ACTION

5. DECISION

/S/

ANNEXES: (As appropriate)

Source: FMFM 3-1 Appendix A Form 12

F-58
SECTION 9: COMMANDER’S DECISION

Define: A concise statement of what the command as a whole will do to accomplish the mission.

What: The commander’s decision provides the basis for subsequent development of the operation plan or order. The commander must state his decision concisely and clearly.

Who: The responsibility for making this decision is solely the commander’s though it is prepared with his staff’s input and formally written by the G/S-3.

Where: The commander’s decision is found in paragraph 5 of the commander’s estimate.

When: This decision provides direction for the staff to complete their planning and the subordinate commanders in preparing their units. Adjacent commands may then develop their coordinating and supporting effort. It should be completed in a timely manner.

How: This is normally a written statement included in paragraph 5 of the commander’s estimate.

COMMANDER’S DECISION

1. The Commander’s Estimate, paragraph 5--Decision

   a. Regardless of whether the G/S-3 or the commander has written the commander’s estimate, at this point the decision is the commander’s. Each member of the staff prepares to answer any questions from the commander and develops appropriate briefing charts for this purpose. The G-3 does not brief his wargame of the courses of action but may use it to answer the questions or to expand on a particular critical event as needed.

   b. Decision. The commander reaches a decision based on his experience, his trust and confidence in his staff, and his estimate of the situation. The commander may agree with the staff recommendation or he may select another course of action. The commander’s selection of a course of action different from that recommended should not create much additional work since the requirements for each course of action should have been determined during wargaming.

2. The commander may direct the use of one of the courses of action with modification or one not previously considered. There is risk in doing this since the staff will not have analyzed the course of action to determine the advantages and disadvantages or the results. These
possibilities can be avoided if the G-3 has properly developed courses of action early in the estimate process. On receiving the decision briefing, the commander must—

a. Refine the course of action into a clear decision. The commander’s decision is a clear, concise statement of his intent, the general scheme of maneuver, and supporting fires for the operation. The commander should include in the decision statement the risk he is willing to accept to accomplish the mission. When fighting outnumbered, minimizing risk may ensure survival, but it may also preclude winning. The decision should be directed toward seizing the initiative rather than merely reacting to the enemy’s actions. The elements of WHAT, WHEN, WHERE, HOW, and WHY are present in all courses of action. These elements should be discussed in terms of the battlefield framework. If the WHO has not been identified previously, the commander will do so at this time.

b. Announce decision and concept of operation. When the commander reaches his decision, he must then expand the wording of the selected course of action into a statement of the concept of operation. The commander elaborates on this decision when he outlines his concept to the staff. The concept, as an amplification of the decision, should always include the intent of the commander. The concept should also include actions within the five elements of the battlefield framework and a clear designation of the main effort.

c. On receiving the commander’s decision, the G-3 prepare and issue another warning order to the command. This warning order outlines for the command what the next operation is, provides other information, such as the time for the orders briefing, and may include any special requirements for a particular unit.

d. A commander’s decision always indicates WHAT the command as a whole will do. It also indicates as much of; WHO, WHEN, WHERE, HOW, and WHY as may be appropriate and workable under the circumstances.

    WHAT is a statement of the course of action to be executed to accomplish the mission; i.e., "to land and secure," "to continue the march," "to attack," or "to defend."

    WHO usually refers to the command as a whole, but may refer to a designated subordinate command. If the former, the WHO may be omitted.

    WHEN is a statement of when the course of action is to be initiated; i.e., "on D-day at H-hour," or "without delay."

    WHERE is a statement of the position or area from which, to which, or over which the course of action is to be executed; i.e., "over Beaches RED and GREEN," or "from carriers and offshore bases." In the defense, it is a statement of the positions to be defended.

F-60
HOW is a statement of the scheme of maneuver or major tactical formation employed to execute the course of action; i.e., "with two divisions in the assault," or "with maximum range airstrikes and fighter sweeps." Details are usually reserved for the concept of operation.

WHY is a statement of the purpose of the operations; i.e., "to permit the establishment of air and naval bases in the area," or "to neutralize enemy air attacks." It is usually limited to information necessary to ensure intelligent compliance by subordinates. Additional details may be included in the concept of operation.
SECTION 10: COMMANDER’S CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Define: The concept of operations is an elaboration of the commander’s decision and explains his visualization of the major events which may occur during the operation. Here, he first states his intentions.

What: This evolves out of all previous work and study the commander and his staff have conducted in this process. After the commander announces his decision, he usually provides the staff with his concept of the operation.

Who: The commander is expected to exercise the authority granted him and take the responsibility for making the decision.

When: This should be completed early enough to allow the subordinate commanders the necessary time to prepare their units for the operation.

How: This is a written and included in the operation order. Initially, it may be briefed by the commander and his staff. There is no format for this document and it may include as much or as little detail as the commander chooses. As a general rule, major units and objectives will be specified in the concept of operations.

Source: FMFM 3-1 paragraph 1402.b(10)

Review your TPFDD or Force List. Make sure you did not overlook any units! The Naval Construction Force is often not tasked. Include the Sea Bees in your plan.

1. Commander’s Concept of Operations

   a. Definition. After announcing his decision, the commander usually provides the staff with his concept of the operation (step 10). In the estimate, the possible courses of action are compared and analyzed, and the commander decides which course of action to adopt for the operation. The commander’s concept is a by-product of his decision making process in the estimate, and many of its elements emerge during the estimate. The commander’s concept is an elaboration of his decision. It explains his visualization of the major events which may occur during the operation. It also outlines to the staff the commander’s intentions about the operation.

   b. Purpose. The concept, as written in paragraph 3 of the operation order, is a refinement of the overall concept announced by the commander at this point of the sequence. The commander’s concept serves three purposes. It facilitates detailed planning by the staff in the preparation of the operations orders; it ensures that these
orders are developed in accordance with his intentions and desires for the operation; and the decision statement and concept together provide the necessary elements for subparagraph 3 of the operation order. When refined in detailed planning, these elements become the formal concept of the operation which is issued to subordinate commanders as part of the operation order.

c. **Form.** No format is prescribed. However, logical arrangement of ideas minimizes misunderstanding and enhances clarity and effectiveness.

d. **Content**

   (1) Although the commander may say as much or as little as he desires, he must include certain essential information if his concept is to be useful to the staff. An oral concept differs from the written concept of operations found in paragraph 3 or the operations plan or order. The written concept in paragraph 3 is much more brief and does not include specific units. The amount of detail in the oral concept often depends on the commander’s confidence in the abilities of his staff officers and their need for information to begin the staff estimates. Obviously, the longer staff officers have been associated with a particular commander, the better they can anticipate his desires and the less detailed his concept will have to be.

   (2) As a general rule, major units and objectives must be specified in the concept of operation. In nuclear/biological/chemical (NBC) environment, nuclear/chemical employment and NBC defense must be discussed. Other important subjects include general scheme of maneuver, command and control, fire support, and alternate plans.

   (3) Many commanders maintain checklists to assist them in outlining concepts of operation. Suggested topics for an offensive action include:

   (a) Decision statement.

   (b) Objectives.

   (c) Scheme of maneuver (avenues of approach, main and supporting attacks).

   (d) Command and control.

   (e) NBC.

   (f) Air support.

   (g) Security (reconnaissance, rear area, communications security, etc.)

   (h) Fire support (targets, restrictions, priorities, preparation fires).
(i) Allocation of combat and combat support forces (armor, AAV, motor transport, engineers).

(j) Combat service support (resupply, medical, service support, and civil affairs).

(k) Alternate plan.

(l) Designation, location, and employment of the reserve.

(4) This list isn’t all inclusive or a minimum requirement. Its elements may be included if the commander desires. In any event, the commander does not normally discuss the technical aspects of these matters. For example, the allocation of combat support to the maneuver element may be described, but the commander does not prescribe a format task organization. This is accomplished during subsequent detailed planning.

(5) With respect to the fire support plan, the commander uses a similar approach. Fire support matters are discussed in general rather than technical terms. He not only provides the fire support planners with the information they need to guide their planning, but also informs the subordinate commanders of the concept of the availability and use of fire support. Thus, the commander should indicate WHAT fire support is desired and WHERE and WHEN. With this guidance, the technical details of HOW it will be provided can be prepared. This guidance should cover the following points as they apply to the situation:

(a) Fire support means available.

(b) General targets or areas which are of particular importance and against which particular supporting arms must be prepared to deliver fires.

(c) Maneuver elements to receive priority of support during a particular phase of the operation.

(d) Whether preparation fires are to be fires; if so, the approximate duration.

(e) The extent of planning required for employing NBC weapons to include effects desired and troop safety.

(f) General guidance on restricting the use of fire support.

(g) Exclusive or exceptional reliance upon a particular supporting arm or weapon during a particular maneuver phase or in accomplishing a particular task.
(6) The commander is not limited to tactical considerations in explaining the concept. He may also discuss logistical, personnel, and other matters about the operations.

2. Plans and Orders

   a. Basic guidelines. Military orders seek to communicate information that governs actions. All orders, whether oral or written, should be characterized by the following principles:

      - Clarity. The reader should not have to interpret words and phases.
      - Completeness. All required information and instructions must be included.
      - Brevity. Orders should avoid unnecessary details without sacrificing clarity and completeness.
      - Initiative. Orders should be mission type, telling what should be done, not how to do it, in order to foster initiative by subordinates.
      - Positive expression. Orders should avoid indecisive, vague, and ambiguous language; they should be positive.
      - Timeliness. A 70 percent solution on time is better than a 100 percent solution that arrives too late.

   In peacetime, during training exercises both in garrison and field locations, and especially in academic settings, operation plans (OPLAN’s) and operation orders (OPORD’s) tend to become lengthy, detailed, and redundant. Too much time and paper are wasted restating doctrinal guidance and addressing routine matters that are, or at least should be, contained in the unit field standing operating procedures (SOP’s). Planning staffs often generate thick annexes, which are directed primarily to only one staff section of the headquarters. Staffs consume large amounts of scarce planning time creating these OPLAN’s and OPORD’s, and commanders and their staffs require excessive time reading and digesting them. Much of this planning time will not exist after the outbreak of hostilities.

   Many operation orders actually used for significant operations were one to ten pages long. In some cases, operations were begun with nothing more than verbal orders, and brief written versions were prepared later.

      - All leaders (section leader and above) fully understand the doctrine commensurate to their respective level.
      - Good, functioning SOP’s critical for brief orders are developed and constantly exercised.
      - Each staff section remains in communication with its counterparts at echelons above, below, and when appropriate, adjacent. Staff sections must share pertinent information with other staff sections in their own headquarters.
When these conditions exist, the amount of information and data included in the OPLAN’s and OPORD’s and the amount of time needed to publish and understand them will be reduced.

WARNING ORDERS

1. **Purpose.** A warning order is a preliminary notice of an action or an order which will follow. It is issued when information is in sufficient detail to allow units to begin what preparation is possible. An early warning order allows units the opportunity to conduct reconnaissance, break camp, pre-load or pre-stage vehicles and ammunition, or gather in their staffs to begin their staff planning process. Care must be taken to ensure the frequency of issue or change do not result in confusion and needless movements or preparations by subordinates.

2. **Form.** A warning order normally takes the form of a brief oral or written message which spells out the information as available and instructions as required.

3. **Timing.** A warning order may be issued at any time during the planning process. Again, caution must be exercised to ensure confusion or misunderstanding is not generated by too many warning orders.
200K Call-Up, 9-5

Accompanying Supplies, 13-7, 13-8, 13-13, 13-59
ACE Medical Capability, 13-28
Adaptive planning, 3-3
adaptive planning guidance, 3-4
adaptive planning options, 3-4
advance force, 10-5
advanced base functional components, 4-8
aircraft maintenance and supply planning, 13-43
AMAL/ADAL, 13-30
Amphibious MEF(Fwd), 13-45
Amphibious Objective Area (AOA), 10-7
amphibious task force (ATF), 10-7
arrival database, 6-25
assault echelon (AE), 10-5
assault follow-on echelon (AFOE), 10-6
asset recording, 6-17
assignment and transfer of forces, 3-7
authority for ordering Reserves to training, 9-3
availability of retirees, 9-3
AVCAL, 13-31
aviation logistics, 13-37
aviation logistics ship (TAVB), 13-39
Aviation Logistics, Reserve, 13-39
aviation mobile facilities, 10-15

Base Force, 3-33
Base/Station Operations Support Group (BOSG/SOSG), 10-22

capabilities planning, 1-5
cargo documentation, 13-16
cargo increment numbers (CIN’S), 13-60
Casualty Estimation Model (CASEST), 14-4
Casualty receiving and treatment ships, 13-30
casualty reporting, 14-6
categories of planning, 1-4
Category I Retirees, 14-5
Category II Retirees, 14-6
Category III Retirees, 14-6
Chairman’s Program Assessment (CPA), 2-6
changes to operation plans, 7-20
chaplains, 9-13
CINC’S Preparedness Assessment Report (CSPAR), 2-6
Class V (W), 13-54
Class V(A), 13-58
Combat Replacement Companies (CRCs), 9-7, 14-3
Combat Replacement Factors (CARF’s), 13-57
Combat Service Support Area (CSSA), 10-14
Combatant Command (COCOM), 7-7
combatant commanders, 2-5
command and control of deployments, 10-17
command and staff action, 2-9
command relationships, 3-5, 4-6, 7-5
commandant’s planning guidance, 2-9
Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF), 10-8
Common Contingency Support Package (CCSP) Allowances, 13-41
common item support (CIS), 13-59
Common User Land Transportation (CULT), 6-22, 6-30
Component Commander Planning Activities, 7-10
Component Planning Activities, 7-14
Computer-Aided Embarkation Management System (CAEMS), 6-5, 6-9, 6-28
concepts for mobilization, 9-6
configuration for deployment, 10-12
consumer retail level supply support, 13-15
container internal stowage policies, 10-14
containerization, 10-13, 13-17
containerization planning, 10-13
Contingency Support Package (CSP), 13-9, 13-40
coordination of deployment, 10-3
COSAL, 13-38
counterattack, 3-6
Course of Action Development, 8-6
Course of Action Selection, 8-6
Crisis Action Centers (CAC), 8-5
Crisis Action Planning (CAP), 8-3
Crisis Action Procedures, 2-8
Crisis Action Teams (CAT), 8-5
Crisis Action/Time Sensitive planning, 8-3
Crisis Assessment, 8-5
Critical Items List (CIL), 2-6
CSS for aviation units, 13-45
CSSE Medical/Dental Capability, 13-28
--D--
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), 2-6, 2-8
Deliberate Planning Procedures, 2-7
deliberate planning process, 7-3, 7-8, 7-21
Deliberate Planning task assignment tables, 7-22
demobilization, 9-14
Dental Support, 13-29
deploy to fight, 3-4
deployment doctrine and policy, 10-5
deployment of an amphibious MAGTF, 10-6
deployment of nonunit related personnel and materiel, 10-22
deployment of Service component headquarters, 10-8
deployment phase, 6-4, 6-14
deployment phase, use of CAEMS, 6-18
deployment phase, use of CALM, 6-20
deployment phase, use of LFADS, 6-18
deployment phase, use of MAGTF II, 6-16
deployment phase, use of MDSS II, 6-18
deployment planning, 10-6
deployment responsibilities, 10-4
depot level maintenance, 13-17
determining aviation ordnance requirements, 13-59
development of force structure, 4-8
directing ship unloading, 10-7
DoD organization, 2-4
--E--
embarkation, 10-7
embarkation planning, 6-9, 6-11
employment phase, 6-4, 6-22
employment phase, use of CAEMS, 6-24
employment phase, use of CALM, 6-24
employment phase, use of LFADS, 6-23
employment phase, use of MAGTF II, 6-22
employment phase, use of TCAIMS, 6-24, 6-29
employment phase, using MDSS II, 6-23
gineering planning, 13-25
engineering support, 13-23
equipment allowance, 13-13
evacuation policy, 13-34
Execution, 3-7, 8-6
execution of a war withdrawal plan, 13-61
Execution Planning, 8-6
expansion of the Marine Corps’ operating forces, 9-11
external support for the MAGTF, 13-10
--F--
FDOs, 4-7
fleet hospitals, 13-32
Fleet surgical teams, 13-32
Flexible Deterrent Options (FDOs), 3-5, 4-7
Fly-in Support Package (FISP), 13-9, 13-40
Follow-on Support Package (FOSP) Allowances, 13-42
force activation, 9-3
force activation actions, 9-8
Force Combat Service Support Area (FCSSA), 10-14
Force Generation Tables, 14-5
force held assets, 13-51
Force Movement Control Center (FMCC), 10-21
force sizing tool, 3-3
forces available to augment/reinforce, 9-7
forward afloat forces, 10-11
forward deployment, 10-5
forward presence, 3-3
FTS, 5-4
Full Mobilization, 9-5
functional planning, 1-4
Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), 2-6

GCE Medical Capability, 13-27
geographic prepositioning, 10-11
Global Transportation Network (GTN), 6-22, 6-30
Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR), 9-3
Guidance for Sustainment Planning, 13-53
guidance on exercise of combatant command, 3-8
guidance on exercise of coordinating authority, 3-15
guidance on exercise of directive authority for logistic matters, 3-11
guidance on exercise of operational control, 3-12
guidance on exercise of support, 3-14
guidance on exercise of tactical control, 3-13

health services support, 13-27
hospital ships, 13-31
host nation support, 13-11

Identifying Unsourced Items, 13-55
IMA, 9-3
Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA), 9-4
Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), 14-5
individual replacementas, 9-12
Integrated Priority List (IPL), 2-6
intermediate maintenance, 13-17
intermediate retail level supply support, 13-15
intermediate staging bases (ISB), 10-11
interservice support agreement (ISSA), 13-11
intrafielectric transportation, 13-20
involuntary recall transportation, 9-4
IRR, 9-3

J-CAT User ID, 5-4
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2-4
Joint Military Blood Office (JMBO), 13-34
Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), 2-7
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), 2-5, 2-6, 2-7
Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS), 2-5

Landing Force Support Party (LFSP), 10-8
landing support operations, 13-20
legal authorities, 9-9
levels of maintenance, 13-17
levels of supply support, 13-15
LFADS transactions closed out, 6-26
LFADS/SASSY interface, 6-19
LMCC, 6-28, 6-22, 6-25, 6-30
Logistics Movement Control Center (LMCC), 10-21

G-3
logistics support for MAGTF’s, 13-39
LOGMARS/MDSS II/TC AIMS interface, 6-18, 6-23, 6-27

--M--

MGTF Commander Planning Activities, 7-14, 7-18, 7-19
MAGTF planners Military occupational specialty (MOS), 4-3
MAGTF/Division/Wing/FSSG Unit Movement Control Center (UMCC), 10-21
Mailgram Orders System, 14-4
Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs), 7-8, 7-18,
MALPS, 10-15
MALSP Task Organization, 13-37
manpower assignments, 14-3
Manpower Mobilization Assignment System (MMAS), 14-3
MRFOR Planning Activities, 7-17, 7-19
Marine Aviation Logistics Support Program (MALSP), 13-9, 13-37
Marine Corps Capabilities Plan, 2-9
Marine Corps Long Range Plan (MLRP), 2-9
Marine Corps Master Plan, 2-9
Marine Corps Mobilization Management Plan, 2-10
Marine Corps mobilization station (MCMS), 9-7
Marine Corps planning documents, 2-9
Marine Corps War Reserve Policy, 2-10
Marine Corps War Reserve Program, 13-13
Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward), 13-43
Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), 13-45
Marine Expeditionary Force Religious (MEFREL), 9-13

Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), 13-43
Marine Wing Support Squadron (MWSS), 13-19
Maritime Prepositioning, 10-6
Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF), 13-30
Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPSRON), 13-30
MARRESFOR Planning Activities, 7-18
marshalling, 10-5
MDSS II/LPADS interface, 6-18
medical battalion, 13-28
Medical Logistics, 13-29
medical material support, 13-27
Medical Personnel Unit Augmentation System (MPUAS), 13-29
Medical Planning Module, 13-33
Medical/Dental Personnel, 9-12
medical/dental support, 13-28
Medical/Dental Support Coordination, 13-28
MEF Commander Planning Activities, 7-14, 7-18, 7-19
MEF Planning Activities, 7-10
military blood program, 13-34
Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC), 10-7
mobil medical augmentation readiness team (MMART), 13-31
Mobile Combat Service Support Detachment (MCSSD), 10-14
mobilization, 9-3
mobilization authorities, 9-3
Mobilization Categories, 9-5
mobilization orders, 9-6
mobilization planning and execution responsibility, 9-8
Mobilization Procedures, 9-6
Mobilization Processing Center (MPC), 9-6
modes of transportation, 10-10
monitor status of movement, 6-18
motor transport support, 13-19
movement activity in support of the operation, 8-7
movement groups, 10-9
MPP MEF (FWD) ACE, 13-44
MSCs Planning Activities, 7-20
multiple tasked, 1-3

G-4
National Command Authority, 2-3
national defense strategy, 3-2
national emergency, 9-4
National Military Strategy (NMS), 3-3
National Security Council, 2-3
Naval Beach Group (NBG), 13-10
Naval Cargo Handling Force, 13-10
Naval Construction Force (NCF), 13-25
NAVCHAPGRU, 13-10
Navy Manpower Authorization, 9-13
Navy Support Element (NSE), 13-10
Navy War Reserve Materiel Programs, 13-13
Non-Medical Personnel for Mobilization/Continencies, 9-13
non-preassigned retirees, 9-4
Non-unit Related Personnel (NRP), 9-9
Norway Airlanded NEB, 13-30
Norway Airlanded NEB (NALMEB), 13-45
NRCHB, 13-10
numbers of containers by class of supply, 10-15

Officer Staffing Goal Model (OSGN) and Enlisted Assignment Model, 14-3
offload, 10-8
OPCON, 7-7
OPCON authority, 3-12
Operational Control (OPCON), 7-7
operational sponsors, 9-7
ordering Reserves to active duty work, 9-4
organic logistics capabilities, 13-3
organization for embarkation, 10-9
organization for landing, 10-8
organization for movement, 10-9
organizational level maintenance, 13-17
outload planning, 10-16

packaging, 13-15
Partial Mobilization, 9-4
Peculiar Contingency Support Package (PCSP) Allowances, 13-42
Personnel Increment Numbers (PINs), 9-12
phases of deliberate OPLAN development, 7-4
phases of Deliberate Planning, 7-20
Plan Development, 7-15
planning for mobilization, 9-5
planning phase, 6-5, 6-4
planning phase, use of CAEMS, 6-12
planning phase, use of CALM, 6-12
planning phase, use of LFADS II, 6-12
planning phase, use of MAGTF II, 6-6
planning phase, use of MDSS II, 6-8
planning phase, use of TCAIMS, 6-14, 6-20
planning responsibilities, 7-3
planning tasks, assignment of, 7-5
planning tasks, HQNC, 7-5
planning tasks, supporting establishment, 7-6
planning updates, 6-13
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), 2-5
Planning Roles and Missions, 4-5
policy governing deployment and employment of Marine forces, 4-7
port and landing support operations in theater, 10-20
Port of Embarkation (POE), 10-7
Pre-trained Individual Manpower (PIN), 14-5
preassigned retirees, 9-4
Presidential Selected Reserve Call-Up (PSRC), 9-4, 9-7, 9-11
primary planning authority, 7-7
principle planning agent, 1-4, 7-6, 7-20
prioritized loading, 10-7
Priority of Fill (POF) Table, 14-3
procedural phases, 6-3, 6-4
Program Decision Memorandum (PDN), 2-6

---N---
---O---
Program Objective Memorandum (POM), 2-6
Sourceing from DLA/Item Managers, 13-55
protection of classified material, 6-4
sources of aviation supply, 13-9
Provisional Support Battalions (PSBs), 4-7, 9-5
sources of logistics support, 13-7
--R--
sources of supply, 13-14
recommended publications, 2-10
sources of forces and materiel, 10-14
redeployment, 12-2
special area planning, 1-64
redeployment phase, 6-5, 6-25
Special Purpose Force (SPF), 13-43
redeployment phase, use of CAEMS, 6-28
Standby Reserve, 14-5
redeployment phase, use of CALM, 6-28
Station of Initial Assignment (SIA), 9-6
redeployment phase, use of LFADS, 6-27
Stop-loss actions, 9-9
redeployment phase, use of MAGTF II, 6-26
supply support concept, 13-14
redeployment phase, use of NDSS II, 6-26
supply systems, 13-14
redeployment phase, use of TCAINS, 6-29
supplying commands, 7-8
redeployment planning, 6-25
Supporting Establishment Master Plan, 2-10
redistribution of assets, 6-19
Supporting Establishment Planning Activities, 7-18, 7-19
regimental landing teams, 10-9
sustained baseline, 13-53
Regional Focus, 3-3
Sustainment for reserve forces, 13-58
regional planning, 1-5
sustainment requirement, 13-53
remain behind equipment, 13-16
Stop-loss actions, 9-9
request support, 6-21
Requirements, 4-9
requirement for support, 10-14
requirements planning, 1-3
requirements, developed within MAGTF II, 13-57
Regional Focus, 3-3
requisitions, 6-24, 6-28
Regional Focus, 3-3
resupply, 13-7, 13-8
regional planning, 1-5
Retired Component, 14-5
sustainment for reserve forces, 13-58
roles and authorities in war, 7-30
sustainment requirement, 13-53
--S--
SEALS, 13-10
Secretarial authority, 9-3
tactical motor transport, 13-19
Selective Mobilization, 9-5
tasking and responsibilities, 7-3
tactical motor transport, 13-19
tasking authority, 7-6
Service Headquarters Planning Activities, 7-9, 7-13,
taskings to assigned MAGTF’s, 7-6
7-18, 7-19
TELNET, 5-3
time sensitive planning, 8-3
Service planning’, 1-4
TACON authority, 3-13
total force concept, 9-3
Service-held stocks, 13-52
total force manpower assets, 14-4
Service-owned stocks, 13-52
Total Mobilization, 9-5
SHORCAL, 13-38
Total Obligational Authority (TOA), 2-6
Shore Party Group, 13-20
TPFDD LOI, 13-52
G-6
Training Exercise Support
Package (TESP), 13-35
Training Squadron Allowances
(TSA), 13-35
transport groups, 10-9
Troop List, 14-3
TUCHA, 4-9

--U--

UNAAF, 2-8
Unified Command Plan (UCP), 2-8
unit release, 9-14
Unit Replacements, 9-12
Unit Type Codes, 4-9
unsourced requirements, 13-54
update carrier schedules, 6-22
update lift requirements, 6-21,
6-30
update the deployment database,
8-7

--W--

W-Series T/Os, 9-9
War Reserve Withdrawal Plan,
13-56
Wartime Authorized Strength
Report (WASR), 14-3
Wartime Host-nation Support
(WHNS), 13-11
Wartime Series Table of
Organization (W-Series
T/Os), 14-4
Wartime Verification Extract
File (WVEF) Build
System, 14-4
Weapon System Planning Document,
13-10
wholesale level supply support,
13-15
WIN, 5-3
WIN policy, 5-4
WIN Terminal Area Security
Officer (WATASO), 5-4
Worldwide Military Command and
Control System
(WWNCCS), 2-7
WWMCCS as a Communications
Medium, 5-3
WWMCCS Intercomputer Network,
5-3, 14-7