

The Study of Strategy

1. Unknown.

The Strategic Environment

1. Michael Howard, "The Use and Abuse of Military History," *Parameters* (March 1981) p.14.
2. Sir Julian S. Corbett, *Some Principles of Maritime Strategy* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988) pp. 8–9.
3. See Carl von Clausewitz, "War As An Instrument of Policy," *On War*, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) pp. 605–610.
4. Geoffrey Blainey, *The Causes of War* (New York: The Free Press, 1973) p.114.
5. *National Geographic* (September 1994) p. 32.
6. Based on the 1972, 1976, 1977, 1981, 1986, 1990, 1994, and 1996 versions of the *Statistical Abstract of the United States* distributed by the U.S. Bureau of the Census (Washington, D.C.).
7. For the best overall introduction to complexity theory, see M. Mitchell Waldrop, *Complexity: The Emerging Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992).

See also Alan Beyerchen, "Clausewitz, Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War," *International Security* (Winter 1992/1993) pp. 59–92.

8. Corbett, pp. 8–9.
9. John M. Collins, *Grand Strategy: Principles and Practices* (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1973) p. 167.
10. Ibid., p. 168.
11. Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975) p. 42.
12. Lawrence H. Keeley, *War Before Civilization*, "Table 6.1, Annual Warfare Death Rates" (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) p. 195.
13. *Compton's Interactive Encyclopedia*, version 2.01VW, "Africa" (1994).
14. Blainey, pp. 109–114.
15. George Liska, quoted in Michael Sheehan, *The Balance of Power: History and Theory* (London: Routledge, 1996) p. 2.
16. Clausewitz, pp. 566–573. Do not confuse this political idea with Clausewitz's closely related concept of the "culminating point

of the offensive” which is primarily an operational and logistical concept.

17. Clausewitz, p. 89.

18. See Edward J. Villacres and Christopher Bassford, “Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity,” *Parameters* (Autumn 1995) pp. 9–19.

Strategy: Ends and Means

1. President John F. Kennedy’s address at the U.S. Naval Academy Commencement, Annapolis, Maryland, June 7, 1961. Reprinted in Theodore C. Sorensen et al., *Let the Word Go Forth: The Speeches, Statements, and Writings of John F. Kennedy* (New York: Delacorte Press, 1988) p. 243.

2. **Military strategy:** “The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or the threat of force.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

3. **National strategy:** “The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

4. Col Dennis M. Drew and Dr. Donald M. Snow, *Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Process and Problems* (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Press, 1988) pp. 27–28.

5. Collins, p. 3.

6. Diplomatic, economic, military, and informational instruments make up the instruments of national power. Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, 24 Feb 1995. In earlier joint doctrine publications, *instruments of national power* were referred to as *elements of national power*, and the *informational instrument* was called the *psychological instrument*. The February 1995 edition of Joint Pub 0-2 updated this terminology.

7. In a true civil war, two sides are fighting for ultimate control of the same state or nation. The American Civil War was a war of secession; had it succeeded, there would have been two independent nations in place of the old United States. We call it a civil war because the secession failed and the Union remained intact.

8. Discussions in this publication of American Cold War strategies are strongly influenced by the analysis of John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982).

9. In classical military theory, the traditional term is *strategy of annihilation*. See Hans Delbrück, *History of the Art of War Within the Framework of Political History*, trans. Walter J. Renfro, Jr., especially vol. 4, chap. IV (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1985).

10. Strategy of erosion is known as strategy of attrition in classical military theory. The concepts are the same. We use the term erosion to avoid confusion with the tactical concept of attrition warfare. See Hans Delbrück, vol. 4, chap. IV.

Strategic Opposites

1. Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Col, USMC, Retired, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis, MD: United States Naval Institute, 1966) p. 311.

2. There is a long tradition of military theory involving asymmetrical strategies. It appears in Chinese military theory most prominently in Sun Tzu and in the works of Mao Zedong. A particularly clear discussion appears in Edward O'Dowd's and Arthur Waldron's, "Sun Tzu for Strategists," *Comparative Strategy*, vol.10 (1991) pp. 25–36. British military thinker B. H. Liddell Hart propounded asymmetry in his theory of the "indirect approach" most powerfully in his books, *The British Way in Warfare* (London: Faber & Faber, 1932), *The Ghost of Napoleon* (London: Faber & Faber, 1933), and *Strategy* (New York: Praeger, 1954). See also Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) especially the introduction written by Griffith.

3. John Foster Dulles, "The Evolution of Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* (Washington, D.C.: Department of State January 25, 1954).

The Making of Strategy

1. John Terraine, *A Time For Courage: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939–45* as quoted in Colin S. Gray, *War, Peace, and Victory: Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990) p. 8.
2. Used as a simple but effective model of the command and control process, the observation-orientation-decide-act (OODA) loop applies to any two-sided conflict. For a detailed description, see MCDP 6, *Command and Control* (October 1996) p. 63.
3. *Critical vulnerability* is a Marine Corps doctrinal concept that appeared first in FMFM 1, *Warfighting* (March 1989) pp. 35–36. The term *center of gravity* found its way into our strategic vocabulary via Clausewitz's *On War*. Clausewitz used the term frequently and in a variety of meanings. See Clausewitz, pp. 595–597. For a full discussion of *center of gravity* and *critical vulnerability*, see MCDP 1, *Warfighting* (June 1997) pp. 45–47.
4. R. Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, *The Encyclopedia of Military History From 3500 B.C. to the Present* (New York: Harper Collins, 1993) p. 952. See also: Shelby Foote, *Fort Sumter to Perryville* (New York: Random House, 1986) pp. 110–114.
5. **Strategic concept:** “The course of action accepted as the result of the estimate of the strategic situation. It is a statement of what is to be done in broad terms sufficiently flexible to permit its use in framing the military, diplomatic, economic, psychological and other measures which stem from it.” (Joint Pub 1-02)

6. James Turner Johnson, *Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War*, “A Moral and Historical Inquiry” (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981) pp. xxii–xxiii.

7. A. T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1942).

Conclusion

1. Sun Tzu, p. 63.
2. A. T. Mahan as quoted in Heinl, *Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations*, p. 311.
3. Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, before combined hearings of the Procurement and Research and Development Subcommittees of the House National Security Committee, March 29, 1997. This testimony can also be found in “Information Superiority,” *Marine Corps Gazette* (June 1997) pp. 59–60.