Other Expeditionary Operations

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Other Expeditionary Operations

Introduction

Other Expeditionary Operations is the operational concept that is intended to assist in visualizing how the Marine Corps will conduct military operations other than war (MOOTW). It is one of three pillars under the Marine Corps capstone concept Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare. While the two other operational concepts, Operational Maneuver from the Sea and Sustained Operations Ashore, focus on operational maneuver and long-term combined arms combat operations above and on the ground, this concept describes the strategic environment in which Marine Air-Ground Task Forces will operate, the breadth and increasing complexity of the missions and tasks they will perform, and the capabilities they will require when performing military operations other than war.

The basic tenets of Maneuver Warfare, the Corps fundamental approach to warfighting, are as applicable to Other Expeditionary Operations as they are to the other operational concepts. The emphasis on speed and tempo, the importance of identifying and applying strength against enemy vulnerabilities, and the focus on supporting the commander’s intent and main effort in dynamic situations are valid across the range of military operations. So are the importance of dynamic decision-making under conditions of ambiguity and the need to create and exploit opportunity, no matter how fleeting.

Maneuver Warfare acknowledges that warfare is a protean activity, a fluid phenomenon that requires professional judgment and mental agility. Marines must be prepared to apply this basic philosophy across the range of military operations. The different circumstances that characterize MOOTW mandate the innovative application of combined arms with an ability to adapt and shift rapidly to changing events and conditions. In conventional warfare, we combine lethal fires and maneuver to achieve a temporal advantage vis-à-vis an adversary based on a geographical or physical location.
During MOOTW, although we retain the potential to employ lethal means, we immerse the force in the environment with the population and aggressively employ non-kinetic fires and shaping actions to achieve a psychological advantage with the local population based on persuasion. Under all circumstances, success in these operations will be predicated on boldness, initiative, imagination, and mission tactics that are inherent to *Maneuver Warfare*.

**Strategic Environment**

Throughout the last half of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, the U.S. national security strategy rested on deterrence in a bipolar world. However, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, a complex, unpredictable, and all too often violent world emerged. A new strategic environment replaced the one for which we had organized, trained, and equipped our forces.

Political differences fueled by ethnic animosities, that had remained under the surface during the Cold War era, exploded into atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The increased availability of automatic rifles, hand-guns, grenade launchers, and land-mines allowed untrained civilians, even children, to fight as soldiers and perpetuate violence, as in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to state and non-state actors, such as North Korea and Al Qaeda, increased the potential for catastrophic attacks on the United States.

terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania shocked the nation and abruptly ushered in a new strategic era. These events highlighted the extreme hatred that some harbor for the U.S. and emphasized how vulnerable our country and citizens are to terrorism.

This new era required a swift readjustment to our national security strategy, one that focused actively on many fronts at home and abroad, and orchestrated all of the elements of national power into a seamless effort. As a result, our nation crafted a new strategy, enacted legislation, and made organizational and procedural changes which focused less on the challenges it faced in the Cold War and more on the complex challenges it faces today and will face tomorrow, many of which fall within the scope of Other Expeditionary Operations. Altogether, these efforts have redefined the strategic focus for our nation as it enters this new environment; they also provide an impetus and foundation for this concept.

The future strategic environment will be characterized by increased uncertainty. This will require flexible, general purpose forces that can adapt rapidly to changing conditions and balance the use of lethal military power with a wide range of other capabilities. Overall, this reflects a change in the degree of emphasis, not in the kinds of missions performed. The monolithic threat of the Cold War required us to place a heavy emphasis on strategic deterrence, nuclear warfare, and conventional interstate warfighting capabilities. These are missions we must remain capable of conducting. However, given the instability of the world and the rapid diffusion of advanced technology, the national security interests of the U.S. require a greater emphasis on securing the homeland and conducting a wide range of missions and tasks grouped under the heading of military operations other than war.

The new strategic environment will demand well-coordinated, timely, and tailored responses integrated with many organizations and agencies. Oftentimes our responses will be combined in coalitions of the willing with the military forces of our allies and coalition partners, and will involve support from their governmental ministries.
It will require serious professional education and study, critical thinking, better and more realistic training, flexible organizations with the right numbers of personnel possessing the right skills and experiences, and the most effective equipment. It also will require a high state of readiness with forces available to respond on very short notice for long, out-of-cycle deployments, to perform a wide range of challenging, complex, and difficult missions.

**Description of Other Expeditionary Operations**

Other Expeditionary Operations encompasses the wide range of military operations the Marine Corps conducts between war and routine peacetime activities, which are commonly referred to as “military operations other than war.” Oftentimes these activities occur simultaneously, which compounds their complexity and extends their timeframe for resolution. The word “other” does not in any way imply that this concept or the activities which make up military operations other than war are of secondary or lesser importance than those performed during war. In fact, the distinction between them can be very unclear, as many of the activities considered to be military operations other than war also are performed during war and can be equally dangerous and difficult. Figure 1 below depicts the range of military operations from war through MOOTW, including homeland security and security cooperation activities.
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Range of Military Operations

The term military operations other than war is defined as:

Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war.\(^1\)

This definition captures two important aspects of such operations which apply to Other Expeditionary Operations: (1) the reality that military operations other than war are conducted during peace and war; and (2) the integration of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic elements of power.

Marines long have recognized the fluidity of modern warfare. It is well captured in the phrase “three block war,” where on one block Marines could be providing humanitarian assistance to local civilians and giving candy to children; on the next they

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\(^1\) Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 April 2001 as amended through 09 January 2003.
could be conducting security patrols, operating a checkpoint, and firing on a “technical vehicle” down the road; while on the third they could be in full combat operations. The Marine Corps legacy of Small Wars also provides a significant insight into how it views the challenges inherent in these types of operations, where diplomacy, information, military, and economic considerations all play key roles and allow for a broader spectrum of means than in conventional warfare to accomplish the overall objective.

Representative of the three block war, L to R: Marines from 26th MEU set up road block to check for weapons in Kosovo; Navy medical personnel provide medical aid in Djibouti; Marines from Charlie Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Marines battle to clear the main supply route in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

**Characteristics of Other Expeditionary Operations**

Because each situation is unique, there is no single solution that dictates how best to organize and conduct MOOTW. However, there is a set of common characteristics that describes the nature of Other Expeditionary Operations and may provide a basis for building the capabilities the Marine Corps will need to perform these types of operations in the future. These characteristics complement the MOOTW principles published in joint and Marine Corps doctrine.²

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**Dynamic Context and Mission Clarity.**

Military operations other than war often are undertaken in fluid or volatile situations. National and theater-level objectives will be defined, but will not be immutable given such a context. These types of environments will require that Marine Air-Ground Task Force commanders and their subordinates be prepared to constantly evaluate and match the dynamic context of the situation with the application of force. Missions will be varied, and all Marines, imbued with the initiative and creativity mandated by our *Maneuver Warfare* philosophy, must be able to adjust plans, organizations, and procedures to the environment and mission.

Security will be as important in these operations as in conventional warfare, but it will impose even greater responsibilities on the Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Security will involve more than traditional force protection. It will require the ability to create an environment in which the indigenous population’s socio-economic and governance needs can be met. In order to create such an atmosphere, commanders will need to immerse their forces in the environment with the population and provide a basic level of security and stability for the disparate civilian and non-governmental actors and functions.

Within this dynamic and broadened context of security, restraint will be the cornerstone for stability. Marines will need to demonstrate the judicious use of force during these operations due to the increased potential for an individual Marine’s actions at the tactical level to have magnifying political consequences at the operational and strategic levels.

During conventional conflicts, missions will tend to be much clearer and focused, while in military operations other than war they often will be uncertain and ambiguous. What the Small Wars Manual described in 1940 concerning mission clarity for small wars was accurate then and still applies today:
Small wars are conceived in uncertainty, are conducted with precarious responsibility and doubtful authority, under indeterminate orders lacking specific instructions.³

**Unity of Effort.** Marine Air-Ground Task Force commanders often will work under a complex command and control arrangement during military operations other than war that stresses *Unity of Effort* rather than *Unity of Command*. Highly flexible command and control arrangements and operating procedures will be the norm in such operations. Historically, American military organizations have used command and control processes that tend to be directive and very hierarchal during major combat operations. However, during MOOTW, *cooperation* and *coordination* with other militaries, civilian organizations, and local populations will be key to success. With its *Maneuver Warfare* philosophy, the Marine Corps encourages *mission-type orders* and *understanding of the commander’s intent* to facilitate dynamic decision-making and initiative at the lowest level possible in combat. *In military operations other than war, this style of decentralized command and control is even more necessary.* In all tasks, the goal will be to generate the greatest amount of synergy possible from joint, multinational, coalition, non-governmental, and indigenous assets. Especially during MOOTW, achieving overarching U.S. aims and the joint force commanders’ intent will be based heavily on coordination and cooperation.

**Close Contact.** Marines must cultivate the art of listening in the MOOTW environment. Operations will be influenced more by knowledge acquired from the continuous interaction with the local population, cultural intelligence, and human intelligence than from modern technologies. In order to maintain momentum and achieve decisive results during these types of operations, Marines will need to integrate that knowledge with tailored forces and the appropriate application of fires and maneuver. Many tactics, techniques, and procedures from classic offensive military operations will have direct application. Others will require selective adaptation and modified application.

Nevertheless, in almost all cases, commanders and Marines must ensure that close, continuous contact is maintained with the local population.

**Patience, Persistence, and Resolve.** Ours is an impatient culture which expects decisive results delivered in short order. Such impatience works against us during military operations other than war. Rather than decisive military operations employing overwhelming combat power, these operations mandate the patient pursuit of aim points and well-defined metrics that highlight progress. The measure of success will be progress towards such aim points rather than pre-identified withdrawal dates or rigid end-states. Finally, “*the days when Americans could win battles and then come home quickly for a parade are over,*” as our involvement in military operations other than war will extend U.S. presence in many places and over much longer, protracted periods of time.4

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**Other Expeditionary Operations Characteristics**

- **Dynamic Context and Mission Clarity**
  - Defined but not fixed policy objectives
  - Changing missions, flexible and agile plans and forces
  - Maintaining security and restraint
  - Uncertain and ambiguous missions

- **Unity of Effort**
  - Highly flexible command and control methods and organizational arrangements
  - Synergy with joint, multinational, private, and indigenous assets
  - Coordinated efforts of all military and non-military entities

- **Close Contact**
  - Stresses adaptive and discriminate forms of intelligence, fires, and maneuver to maintain momentum and achieve effects
  - Immersion in the environment with the local population
  - Listening, always listening

- **Patience, Persistence, and Resolve**
  - Patient pursuit of aim points vice rigid end-states
  - Transition plans vice exit strategies

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Capabilities Required in Other Expeditionary Operations

During military operations other than war, there tends to be a blurring of the lines concerning the military’s responsibilities in performing diplomatic, informational, economic, and humanitarian functions. First and foremost, the military is key to setting the conditions for a safe and secure environment that will allow other organizations to accomplish their often longer-term missions. While some of those organizations, particularly non-governmental organizations, already will be operating in a country when the military arrives, others will wait for the military to establish security before beginning their efforts. In any case, the Marine Corps frequently will become involved in a wide range of functions that are typical of military operations other than war, and for which it must be prepared. These activities may include: consultations with government officials and running town-hall meetings; providing law enforcement and security, often in conjunction with civilian police forces; training civilian police forces and militaries; resolving domestic disputes; repairing damaged utilities; operating local radio and television stations and publishing newspapers; and providing medical and dental care and veterinary support.

In addition to the basic capabilities it must possess to fight wars, the Marine Corps also will require certain capabilities to perform military operations other than war. When combined with warfighting capabilities, these provide a foundation for success in performing these operations in the future.

**Agility.**

In the strategic environment of the 21st century, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces will need to be able to discern quickly, almost intuitively, even the slightest changes to the situation, and then must be able to adapt and respond rapidly to various mission requirements. Capabilities such as human and cultural intelligence combined with UAVs and ground-based sensors, will help discern these changes.
During military operations other than war, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces will need to maximize their agility by rapidly tailoring their organizations to the situation and conducting distributed operations with the right mix of combat, support, and special operations forces (SOF). Whenever possible, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces will need to employ capabilities not only from within their own organic structure, but also from the other services, allies, coalition partners, and host nations. For example, an infantry battalion may need a military police company as one of its line companies, or it may need to operate with a local militia or army such as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. A Marine Air-Ground Task Force forming the nucleus of a joint task force may need psychological operations capabilities to provide information to the local population and civil affairs forces to coordinate humanitarian assistance and reconstruction efforts. In order to maximize interoperability and effectiveness, the Marine Corps may need to routinely exchange liaison officers and attach forces with myriad organizations.

During military operations other than war, the Marine Corps will need to be agile enough to smoothly and naturally shift its mindset, resources, styles of operating, and procedures to meet the requirements for each of the very different missions its forces will face. Leaders at all levels, but especially those in small units, will need to insure their people understand how they fit into the overall mission from the highest level. Individual Marines will need to be grounded not only in basic combat skills, but also in the art of balancing and tempering their actions consistent with the situation, mission, and commander’s intent.

**Use of Fires and Enablers.**

The Marine Air-Ground Task Force of the future will need the agility to adjust both organizationally and procedurally in order to apply the right capability at the right time and place. During combat, infantry, armor, and field artillery forces play primary roles, while other forces play important but supporting roles. But during military operations other than war, the situation somewhat reverses itself as the “main effort” shifts to support units and SOF. Forces such as engineers, military police, medical, and
civil affairs often play roles during MOOTW that are central to mission accomplishment, while infantry, armor, and field artillery forces play critical but supporting roles. For example, combat forces most likely will provide the overall security umbrella by their patrolling and control of an area, allowing other forces to perform their unique functions. When medical or civil affairs forces need to travel to an area in order to perform a mission, combat forces may be needed to escort and provide them with security. Commanders must anticipate these types of mission requirements and employ their assets accordingly.

Although the military may perform some functions that deal directly with the civilian population, ultimately organizations such as the United Nations Children’s Fund, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the World Food Program, and others will have the responsibility for performing nation building functions, many of which will continue long after the departure of the majority of U.S. forces.

During war, expeditionary fires can deliver the decisive blow to the enemy through coordinated aviation, naval surface, and ground-based means. However, during military operations other than war, fire support requirements can be vastly different from wartime. If they are employed, they probably will follow restrictive rules of engagement, placing a premium on non-lethal and precision fires that limit civilian casualties and damage to the local infrastructure.\(^5\) In order to maximize their efficiency and effectiveness in support of military operations other than war missions, existing tactics, techniques, and procedures may need to be modified and new ones developed.

Non-lethal weapons systems have the potential to play major roles during military operations other than war. Marine Air-Ground Task Forces may need the ability to incapacitate or immobilize individuals, disperse crowds, deny access to areas, and temporarily disrupt without destroying local electrical power and communications systems. New non-lethal technologies need to be lightweight and easily transportable onboard Marine Air-Ground Task Force shipping, and will need to be reasonably simple to employ, requiring only minimal training and maintenance. Policy decisions and legal approvals concerning guidelines and permission to use non-lethal systems will need to be clear and articulated as early as possible.

Information operations are another form of fires in military operations other than war. Marine Air-Ground Task Forces will need to effectively coordinate, deconflict, integrate, and synchronize capabilities such as electronic warfare, psychological operations, deception, computer network operations, public affairs, and civil affairs with other diplomatic, informational, military, and economic efforts that are woven together into the campaign plan. Information operations unique target audience analyses, preparation of the battlespace, battle damage assessment, and metrics for measuring the progress of information operations will need to be developed.

Throughout military operations other than war, psychological operations will play a primary role in communicating with local populations, insuring that the people hear and understand the U.S. and coalition message. However, the Marine Corps does not have any organic psychological operations forces as all such forces are assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command. To maximize this communications capability, especially at the tactical and operational levels, the Marine Corps may need to establish
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habitual training relationships and develop operating procedures with supporting psychological operations forces. It also may need to formalize agreements with U.S. Special Operations Command to assign full-time psychological operations staff planners and forces to various Marine headquarters and organizations.

Civil affairs forces will play a huge role in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and post-conflict reconstruction efforts, which often are the primary mission focus of military operations other than war. They may operate civil-military operations centers to facilitate coordination and cooperation with civilian organizations and may form joint civil-military operations task forces to orchestrate a wide range of efforts throughout their area of operations. These task forces would be tailored to include humanitarian relief generalists and specialists with technical skills in areas such as telecommunications, engineering, medicine, veterinary medicine, judiciary, and law enforcement. The vast majority of U.S. military civil affairs units are in the Army and Marine Corps Reserves, while there is one active duty civil affairs battalion in the Army. This total force approach has provided an efficient structure in the past, but must be optimized fully in the context of projected demands, especially today’s global war on terrorism.

Intelligence. During military operations other than war, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces will require extensive real-time information about the local environment from a wide variety of sources. Not only must they be able to collect the information they need, but they also must be able to analyze and process it into actionable intelligence, intelligence that is meaningful and useable, in a timely fashion, and pass it as quickly as possible up and down the entire chain of command. During these operations, much of that information and intelligence must be focused on the human dimension -- what the people

Marines from 4th Civil Affairs Group hand out food and medical aid to Iraqis during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
are thinking, what they believe, and what they are going to do -- and it must be optimized for operations involving civilians and in urban areas. Although reach-back can provide tremendous amounts of resources to facilitate this process, as can new technologies, the reality is that much of that intelligence can only be developed by personal, face-to-face contact with the local population.

**Human Intelligence.** One of the most critical forms of intelligence during military operations other than war, but difficult to obtain, is human intelligence. In addition to organic and other U.S., allied, and coalition intelligence assets, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces will need to identify and leverage reliable, local sources for human intelligence. They also must utilize the valuable information available to their own forces operating in an area. There are multiple venues through which to maintain contact with the population to gain information and intelligence: infantrymen operating checkpoints or conducting presence patrols, military police working with local civilian police forces, civil affairs specialists coordinating humanitarian relief efforts or working with local government officials, and medical personnel providing care to civilians. These sources could provide timely, situational awareness by adding bits and pieces of information that complete the larger puzzle and help predict actions of the other parties.

**Cultural Intelligence.** Marine Air-Ground Task Forces also will need extensive cultural intelligence during these operations, intelligence that focuses on the customs, culture, history, religion, art, and other human and social aspects of a society. Marine forces should participate in cultural intelligence seminars and similar events that provide them with timely and tailored training focused on cultural aspects of specific countries, regions, and issues. The Marine Corps Intelligence Activity routinely conducts these seminars for Marine Expeditionary Units; these seminars could be expanded to other organizations. Whenever possible, cultural intelligence training should be conducted prior to deployment, but also could be conducted while forces are aboard ships or at temporary staging bases en-route to a destination. In order to further enhance readiness and better prepare Marines for the cultural challenges they will face, culturally related issues also could be inserted into wargames and exercises. Individuals possessing an in-
depth understanding of culture, with different backgrounds and expertise, are available within various U.S. governmental departments and agencies, academic institutions, and civilian organizations, and could be available to help train and advise Marine organizations.

**Language Capabilities.** Marine forces at all levels, from Marine expeditionary force and division headquarters to brigades on down will need native-level speakers and translators who can read and write as well as listen and speak in the appropriate languages, using the correct accents. To minimize misunderstanding, it also will be important to use individuals from the same ethnic and cultural groups with whom the forces are dealing. Rarely will the Marine Corps and the other services have sufficient numbers of native-level linguists who speak the desired languages assigned within their organizations. Unfortunately, many times U.S. forces will not obtain linguists until after they arrive in a particular country and are able to hire local personnel; few if any of these linguists will have a U.S. government security clearance. In addition to language skills, these individuals will need to be trustworthy. The challenge will be to establish a mechanism to screen and hire people with the right capabilities, and then to check them to insure that they are translating correctly.

Other sources for linguist support will exist. If there is an American or coalition embassy in the country or region, it may be able to help obtain linguists. The Marine Corps also may be able to identify individuals with the right language capabilities who are from that country or region but are living in the U.S. or elsewhere; these individuals could be contracted early and linked with units prior to deployment. Finally, automation will offer various levels of linguistic and translation capabilities that should be explored and obtained when worthwhile.
Whenever possible during wargames and exercises, foreign language problems should be inserted into scenarios in order to familiarize Marines with the linguistic challenges they will face.

**Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.** One of the successes from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom was the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which provided real-time information concerning enemy locations. UAVs increased strike opportunities and enabled timely responses with SOF and conventional forces. They also created the impression in the minds of the Taliban, Al Qaeda, Iraqi military, and Iraqi militias that the U.S. was omnipresent and could find and target them swiftly. UAVs of the future will need to be able to exploit the environment of military operations other than war, which frequently will be in urban areas. Similarly, ground sensors that are small, easily emplaced and independently maneuverable, that can blend into the local terrain, will be needed as well. These systems could feed information directly to the lowest-level units that need them and could be responsive to their requirements. UAVs could be used in other roles as well, to deliver humanitarian daily rations to small, isolated groups of people or to drop leaflets and transistor radios at selected locations.

**Coordination and Cooperation.** Similar to conventional interstate warfare, military operations other than war will require a close relationship between and among the military and various governmental and civilian organizations involved in the operation. One major distinction between these types of operations and conventional war will be the emphasis on coordination and cooperation versus command and control.

**Forces from Other Nations.** Although U.S. military commanders will exercise command over their subordinate forces, most likely they will not have
command authority over military forces from other countries. When forces from different countries are involved in an operation, they will coordinate and cooperate closely, but will follow the guidelines and policies approved by their national chains of command. Even slight changes to missions may require national level approval, possibly delaying or prohibiting their participation in those missions.

**Other U.S. Governmental Departments and Agencies.** The U.S. ambassador or senior diplomat has responsibility for overseeing the efforts of personnel from all U.S. governmental departments and agencies operating in the country. During military operations other than war, this can be very complex. Several initiatives are being explored to help coordinate the activities of U.S. government departments and agencies involved in operations. One evolving concept is the joint interagency coordination group, which seeks to establish operational connections between civilian and military departments and agencies to improve their planning and coordination. Another initiative has been the creation of provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan with civil and military membership, including coalition forces, small Afghan National Army contingents, U.S. Special Forces, U.S. Agency for International Development and State Department officials, and others.⁶

**Civilian Organizations.** The key to operating with international organizations such as the United Nations, independent organizations, non-governmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations, will be to make every possible effort to reach out, to coordinate and cooperate, to share information, and to provide them with support when possible. These organizations may be international in scope and come from many different countries, including the country in which the military operation is taking place, as well as countries hostile to the U.S. They will have varied expertise, perspectives, agendas, time horizons, and cultures, all of which may be very different from our own.⁶ It will be very important for Marines to recognize that these organizations are performing important functions, and that although they may need support from the military, they may

keep their distance from the military because they must maintain independence and impartiality. Civil-military operations centers or similar organizations will be key to reaching out to these organizations and interfacing effectively with them. Figure 3 below depicts the makeup of a notional civil-military operations center.\(^7\)

**Special Operations Forces.** Special Operations Forces routinely perform a wide range of operations during MOOTW. These include such missions as foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, counterterrorism, counter proliferation, consequence management, humanitarian demining, counterdrug operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs. In addition to individual and collective skills, SOF possess

\(^{7}\) Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, 8 February 2001, p. IV-13
regional familiarization, cross-cultural understanding, and language skills. Subsequent to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the Marine Corps and U.S. Special Operations Command have explored ways to collaborate and work more closely together, to better complement each other’s forces and maximize the contributions each brings to the battlefield. Some traditional SOF missions will be performed by the Marine Corps to better enable SOF to fight the global war on terrorism. Although Marines are capable of performing many of these missions today, to be more versatile and effective in the future, the Marine Corps will need to modify its education and training programs, as well as its promotion and assignment policies.

**Reach-back.** The complexities of military operations other than war create a need for access to special knowledge sources. Modern technologies, particularly long-haul communications capabilities, facilitate the use of “reach-back” to communicate with forward deployed forces from the seabase and rear areas. In the future, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces should leverage reach-back to the maximum extent possible, where it makes sense. In many cases reach-back can reduce the number of forces required to be forward deployed, allowing them to perform their functions from the seabase or from rear, safe areas. It also can significantly increase the number and types of resources from other organizations available to support an operation.

**Sustaining the Force.**

Sustainment is the capability which gives forces the stamina, persistence, and capacity to endure in a mission for as long as it takes, to excel without running out of necessary items or losing focus, and ultimately to outlast and overcome all adversaries and obstacles.

In the future, U.S. forces may not have sufficient forward bases or overseas access necessary to conduct or support an operation. Consequently, Marine Air-Ground Task Forces deployed onboard amphibious ships will be needed increasingly to respond to the challenges posed by military operations other than war. Future maritime prepositioning
forces will combine the capacity and endurance of sealift with the speed of airlift to
deploy Marine Air-Ground Task Forces rapidly to objective areas with the capability for
indefinite sea-based sustainment.\(^8\) This robust sustainment capability will give Marine
Air-Ground Task Forces of the future increased agility to perform MOOTW. For
example, not only will they need to quickly replenish items such as food, fuel, and
ammunition, but they also will need to provide timely delivery of selected items and
personnel critical to the success of the “civilian” part of the mission. This may include
medicines to enable local hospitals to treat civilians, or equipment, parts, and technicians
to repair roadways, electrical power plants, water treatment facilities, and other utilities.

Seabasing will provide Marine Air-Ground Task Forces with several additional
capabilities. It will allow some forces to be based onboard ships while supporting
operations ashore. For example, delivery of relief supplies to needy people could be
launched from the seabase; UAVs could be launched from and
controlled by operators on board
ships; and intelligence fusion and
analysis could be conducted on
board ships. In some cases
seabasing could allow selected forces
to deploy ashore long enough to
perform their missions and then return to the seabase, while it could allow others to be
rotated and replaced with fresh forces as needed. During Operation Sea Angel in
Bangladesh, Marine forces sent working parties and helicopters ashore each day to
deliver medical care and relief supplies, but returned to their ships at night.

\(^8\) United States Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts for the 21st Century, Maritime Prepositioning Force
2010 and Beyond, 30 December 1997, pp. III-3 to III-4.
Conclusion

Other Expeditionary Operations envisions a world characterized by increased uncertainty and frequent demands for forces that will need to anticipate and adapt rapidly to constant change and selectively apply many different capabilities based on the mission and the situation. Overall, this will be an inherently joint and combined effort which will require integration of many diverse resources. The military force that is tasked to implement this concept and conduct military operations other than war must be able to deploy through forcible entry if needed. It must be able to guarantee free access for follow-on forces and protect civilian humanitarian relief organizations and the local population. This force also must be capable of quick response, possess operational and tactical mobility, be able to operate from the seabase, and be capable of applying the appropriate amount of force. These requirements point to the Marine Air-Ground Task Force -- forward-deployed and readily available as a highly relevant capability for our combatant commanders. This is both our heritage and our future.