IRREGULAR WARFARE

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This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-24, Counterinsurgency.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This Interim change to Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3 changes the cover to AFDD 3-24, *Irregular Warfare* to reflect revised AFI 10-1301, *Air Force Doctrine* (9 August 2010). AFDD numbering has changed to correspond with the joint doctrine publication numbering architecture. AFDD titles and content remain unchanged until updated in the next full revision. A margin bar indicates newly revised material.
FOREWORD

Our nation is at war. Warriors must plan and orchestrate irregular warfare as joint, multinational, and multi-agency campaigns, beginning with the first efforts of strategy development and concluding with the achievement of the desired endstate. As Airmen, we have a unique warfighting perspective shaped by a century-long quest to gain and maintain the high ground. We must be able to articulate Air Force capabilities and contributions to the irregular warfare fight, with its unique attributes and requirements. Employed properly, airpower (to include air, space, and cyberspace capabilities) produces asymmetric advantages that can be effectively leveraged by joint force commanders in virtually every aspect of irregular warfare. Irregular warfare is sufficiently different from traditional conflict to warrant a separate keystone doctrine document. While the fighting experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan should weigh heavily in the development of our doctrine, we intend this doctrine document to be broad, enduring, and forward-looking, rather than focusing on any particular operation, current or past.

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General, USAF
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INTRODUCTION

In this type of war you cannot – you must not – measure the effectiveness of the effort by the number of bridges destroyed, buildings damaged, vehicles burned, or any of the other standards that have been used for regular warfare. The task is to destroy the effectiveness of the insurgent’s efforts and his ability to use the population for his own ends.

—General Curtis E. Lemay

PURPOSE

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, establishes operational-level doctrinal guidance for irregular warfare (IW). IW is not a lesser-included form of traditional warfare. Rather, IW encompasses a spectrum of warfare where the nature and characteristics are significantly different from traditional war. IW presents unique challenges to military forces requiring innovative strategies for employing Air Force capabilities. Effectively combating and conducting IW is critical to protecting the US and its vital interests.

APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian personnel, including regular, Air Force Reserve, and Air National Guard units and members. Unless specifically stated otherwise, Air Force doctrine applies to the full range of operations.

The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, commanders need to consider the contents of this AFDD and the particular situation when accomplishing their missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it. Due to the political nature of IW, Airmen must be able to articulate Air Force capabilities to civilian leadership and decision makers.

SCOPE

This doctrine focuses on the operational and strategic aspects of IW and differences in the application of force from traditional warfare. Understanding the strategic context of IW is the first step in determining how best to employ forces. The document describes Air Force capabilities and operations required to effectively defend and counter adversaries. Effectively employing these capabilities relies on the development of coherent strategies and plans providing the appropriate force at the appropriate time. The complex nature of IW requires the combined capabilities of all military Services, government agencies, and partner nations. While this document focuses on Air Force doctrine, IW is inherently a joint and interagency fight.
One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is that “the Air Force prefers - and in fact, plans and trains - to employ through a commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and space component commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1)

To simplify the use of nomenclature, Air Force doctrine documents will assume the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFACC unless specifically stated otherwise. The term “COMAFFOR” refers to the Air Force Service component commander while the term ”JFACC” refers to the joint component-level operational commander.

While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are different, and should be executed through different staffs.

Normally, the COMAFFOR function executes operational control/administrative control of assigned and attached Air Force forces through a Service A-staff while the JFACC function executes tactical control of joint air and space component forces through an air and space operations center (AOC).

When multinational operations are involved, the JFACC becomes a combined force air and space component commander (CFACC). Likewise, the air and space operations center, though commonly referred to as an AOC, in joint or combined operations is correctly known as a JAOC or CAOC. Since nearly every operation the US conducts will involve international partners, this publication uses the terms CFACC and CAOC throughout to emphasize the doctrine’s applicability to multi-national operations.
FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS

Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which AFDDs are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports these statements.

- Irregular warfare (IW) is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities to seek asymmetric approaches in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. (Page 1)

- IW is not a lesser-included form of traditional warfare. Rather, IW encompasses a spectrum of warfare where the nature and characteristics are significantly different from traditional war. (Page 3)

- Traditional warfare and IW are not mutually exclusive; both forms of warfare may be present in a given conflict. (Page 3)

- Military power alone cannot bring decisive victory in COIN. (Page 4)

- The Air Force must be prepared to simultaneously conduct irregular and traditional warfare operations. (Page 8)

- Legitimacy and influence are the main objectives. (Page 10)

- The Air Force provides valuable and unique capabilities in IW. In many cases, these capabilities provide flexible and persistent options for dealing with IW challenges by providing a less intrusive force that can respond quickly and improve commanders’ overall situational awareness. (Page 14)

- In any phase of operation, the Air Force can be employed with varying degrees of intensity and visibility. (Page 19)

- The protracted approach that adversaries may use in IW requires a long-term strategy for victory. Winning a protracted war is all about winning the struggle of ideas, undermining the legitimacy of a competing ideology, addressing valid grievances, reducing an enemy’s influence, and depriving the enemy of the support of the people. (Page 48)

- In irregular operations, commanders should understand that the application of military force is in support of other instruments of national power, and that traditional joint force organizational relationships may not be as effective for irregular operational environments. (Page 58)

- Each IW contingency is different, and no single planning template can be applied to every operation. (Page 68)
CHAPTER ONE
UNDERSTANDING IRREGULAR WARFARE

The United States’ overwhelming dominance in recent conventional wars has made it highly unlikely that most adversaries will choose to fight the US in a traditional, conventional manner. Thus, for relatively weaker powers (including non-state entities) irregular warfare (IW) has become an attractive, if not more necessary, option. IW presents different challenges to our military and to the Air Force. This document highlights Air Force capabilities and outlines how they should be employed. It will also increase Airmen’s understanding of the different nature inherent in IW.

The Air Force’s ability to operate in the air, space, and cyberspace domains provides our fighting forces with a highly asymmetric advantage over IW adversaries. Command of the air prevents adversaries from conducting sustained operations in this domain while allowing US and coalition forces to exploit numerous advantages.

While our IW adversaries have their own asymmetric capabilities such as suicide bombers, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and the cover of civilian populations, they lack and cannot effectively offset unfettered access to the high ground that superiority in air, space, and cyberspace provides. Exploiting altitude, speed, and range, airborne platforms can create effects without the impediments to movement that terrain imposes on ground forces.

The unique perspective that Airmen bring to a conflict is as relevant in IW as in past traditional conflicts. Innovation and adaptation are hallmarks of airpower. Innovative, forward-thinking Airmen must continue to adapt tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment to counter a thinking, adaptive enemy.

US airpower in its myriad forms is capable of operating simultaneously in multiple theaters, producing invaluable combat and enabling effects across a wide spectrum of operations. When properly integrated, Air Force capabilities have been—and will continue to be—integral to the success of US military power.

IW DEFINED

The US has struggled to understand the threats posed by what has been referred to at various times as IW, low-intensity conflict, insurgency, small wars, and indirect aggression. For the purpose of this document, IW is defined as a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. IW favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Rather than seeking to impose societal change from the outside by a decisive
defeat of the population’s military and security forces, proponents of IW seek a change from within by delegitimizing the institutions and ideologies of the targeted state, and eventually winning the support of the population (or at least acquiescence) for their cause. However, because IW is a complex and nuanced type of warfare, it does not lend itself easily to a concise universal definition.

IW is not a new concept; organizations have clashed for political control for thousands of years. Today, changes in the international environment due to rapid global communications, near instantaneous 24-hour world news coverage, increasingly interdependent global commerce, and the proliferation of technologies and weapons of mass destruction/disruption make ensuring US security more of a challenge. Adversaries, unable to defeat the US in conventional warfare, continue to resort to and develop new IW capabilities and tactics. Air Force forces play an important role in IW, but just as with more traditional operations, their most effective employment requires careful study of the environment and appreciation for the unique characteristics of the conflict.

The following definitions highlight some key differences between IW and traditional warfare, and conventional and unconventional warfare. Understanding these differences allows Airmen to have a common frame of reference when discussing these types of warfare.

**Traditional warfare**—A confrontation between nation-states or coalitions/alliances of nation-states (Joint Publication [JP] 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States). This confrontation typically involves force-on-force military operations in which adversaries employ a variety of conventional military capabilities against each other in the air, land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. The objective may be to convince or coerce key military or political decision makers, defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies.

**Irregular warfare**—A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations.

**Conventional warfare**—A broad spectrum of military operations conducted against an adversary by traditional military or other government security forces that do not include chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) weapons.

**Unconventional warfare** (UW)—A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. (JP 1-02, Department of Defense [DOD] Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms)
IW is distinguished from traditional warfare primarily by the approach and strategy used to achieve the effects desired. Figure 1.1 contrasts traditional and irregular warfare. Traditional warfare seeks a change in the policies and practices, if not in the outright existence, of a government by coercing key government leaders or defeating them militarily. IW, conversely, seeks to undermine a group, government, or ideology by influencing the population, which is often the center of gravity. The focus of IW is not primarily on the military or destructive capability of an adversary (state or non-state).

The terms conventional and unconventional, on the other hand, refer to the weapons and forces conducting operations. Thus, IW may be conducted by conventional or unconventional forces or both depending on the circumstances and the operational environment.

IW is not a lesser-included form of traditional warfare. Rather, IW encompasses a spectrum of warfare where the nature and characteristics are significantly different from traditional war. It includes, but is not limited to, activities such as insurgency, counterinsurgency (COIN), terrorism, and counterterrorism.

Traditional warfare and IW are not mutually exclusive; both forms of warfare may be present in a given conflict. Airmen should understand that the nature of war will often change in the course of a conflict. This is especially true in IW where the conflict is often protracted. Traditional warfare can rapidly
evolve into an irregular war and vice versa, requiring the military force to adapt from one form to the other.

There are several ways of describing IW further, as shown in Figure 1.2. One description can be based solely on the actors or the methods used. In this description, non-state actors engaged in violent actions could be considered conducting an irregular war. The methods used can also describe a conflict as such. Ultimately, the conflict should first be described based on its strategic purpose and its effect on the relevant population. However, analysis of the actors and methods may also have a greater impact on the development of an overall strategy than in the past.

IW encompasses a multitude of activities covering a broad range, but at its core lies insurgency and COIN. An insurgency seeks to change or reduce the influence of the existing body that has political control, while COIN attempts to maintain the current system against an internal threat. The appropriate application of military power has been and will remain a central challenge for policymakers seeking to define an effective COIN strategy. Military power alone cannot bring decisive victory in COIN. However, history has demonstrated that the military instrument of power is vital in most counterinsurgency operations and should be used to buttress domestic security as well as political and informational programs. Therefore, police, civilian security, public information, and intelligence forces should be critical in a state’s use of persuasive instruments for conducting COIN.

**IW MODEL**

While the strategic context will be unique for any operation, the following construct, illustrated in Figure 1.3, provides a guide for how Airmen can view IW.

The Air Force provides critical capabilities to achieve effects in IW for the joint force commander (JFC) through the 17 Air Force functions. For more detailed information on the Air Force functions, see AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*. The key capabilities listed in Figure 1.3 will most likely be employed when the military is called upon to engage in the activities at the top of the diagram. While not listed, and often assumed, potential threats to air superiority
should be considered before employing airpower to conduct the activities listed in Figure 1.3.

**Figure 1.3. Irregular Warfare Model**

These activities include, but are not limited to: shaping and deterring, counterterrorism, COIN, support to COIN, and, where permissible under international law or United Nations (UN) mandate, support to insurgency. The majority of operations should focus their effect on the relevant population. The ultimate goal should be to enhance the legitimacy of the current government or marginalize the insurgents and terrorists when conducting COIN, support to COIN, or counterterrorist activities. When supporting an insurgency the goal is to marginalize the occupying power and enhance the legitimacy of the insurgents in the eyes of the population. This struggle for legitimacy requires Airmen to have a different mindset and exploit these capabilities in innovative ways. The battle of arms works in harmony but is surpassed in importance by the battle for influence.
Support to Insurgency as discussed in this document pertains to those operations against an “illegitimate” or occupying power (e.g., Vichy French in World War II) or the Taliban in Afghanistan). It is important to note that supporting an insurgent movement against a legitimate government is authorized when conducted for national defense (e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM [OEF] against the Taliban in Afghanistan) or when in accordance with a United Nations Security Council mandate.

Shaping and deterring operations, as well as counterterrorism, are continuous in nature and may occur independently or in conjunction with COIN, support to COIN, or support to insurgency operations. The diagram also highlights an important difference between COIN and support to COIN.

Support to COIN is defined as support provided to a government in the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic action it undertakes to defeat insurgency (JP 1-02). Implicit in this definition is a legitimate partner nation (PN) government in power with some capacity to direct and conduct COIN operations. This sets the foundation for building partnership capacity (BPC). Foreign internal defense (FID) activities in the form of assessing, advising, training, and assisting the PN’s combat support and combat activities is an important part of BPC. The role of the Air Force in BPC is to provide expertise and assistance that supports the overall IW strategy of the US government in assisting the PN address an insurgency. Ensuring PN military institutions can provide security for their citizens and government is a key priority in any BPC effort.

Support to COIN can include indirect support, direct support (not involving combat) and direct support (involving combat). Using this construct, the level of US involvement tends to increase as operations move from indirect to direct. BPC is the primary means for providing indirect support. BPC also plays a vital role as operations move to direct support. Direct support involves any or all of the following:

- US forces conducting operations by, through, and with the PN using the PN’s assets (these operations may or may not involve combat operations).
- US forces using US assets to support PN combat operations (does not involve combat operations and may include intelligence, mobility, and command and control [C2], and information operations [IO] capabilities to name a few).
- US forces using US assets to support PN combat operations (includes, but is not limited to, kinetic precision strikes, combat search and rescue [CSAR], and other capabilities which may employ lethal force).
It is important to note that transitioning between these different levels of operations require Presidential or Secretary of Defense (SecDef) approval. When these transitions are authorized, commanders need to be aware of the implications on C2 and force commitment. Regardless of the support provided, when conducting support to COIN the strategic initiative must rest with the PN. See AFDD 2-3.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*, for a detailed discussion on these operations.

In extreme cases, COIN operations may require all aspects of the counterinsurgency strategy and subsequent operations be planned and conducted by US and coalition forces and governments. COIN is defined as those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. This is largely the result of military intervention in failed states where either no viable government is in power or the existing government no longer has the capacity to govern or has been removed from power. Lack of governance or failing states often create an environment where terrorists and insurgents are able to establish sanctuaries in these ungoverned areas allowing recruitment and training to progress relatively unabated. An interagency approach using diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) means is essential to promote stability and security in these areas. These extreme cases require great patience and a high level of effort.

Large applications of US military force in COIN operations should be limited when possible and forces should perform such roles as restoring order or seizing the initiative. COIN operations present a difficult challenge in establishing a legitimate government instead of supporting or legitimizing an existing government. This subtle difference often has significant implications. In order to maintain the legitimacy of the new PN government, the primary responsibility for maintaining order must shift to the PN as rapidly as practical. This is particularly important as the long term presence of a large foreign force often exacerbates the situation by implying the PN government either remains incapable of this responsibility or is seen as an extension of the foreign force. The principal function of external forces will be to assist the PN by buying it time to develop autonomous ability to provide security and stability. Ultimately, the PN must defeat the insurgency by either attriting all the insurgents, gaining their support or acquiescence by reconciling the differences that spawned the insurgency, or discrediting the insurgent ideology by offering the population better alternatives.

As with the relationship between IW and traditional warfare, these activities are not mutually exclusive. US forces may find themselves conducting shaping and deterring, support to COIN, and COIN operations simultaneously. Airmen may also be engaged in operations supporting an insurgency in another area. Thus, the model not only depicts potential changes in the level of effort required, it also generalizes the operational environment forces are entering. In IW, it is typically most advantageous to shape and deter insurgencies and
terrorist groups before they mature to the point where they pose an increased threat or require the large introduction of US forces.

**IW “TRUTHS” FOR AIRMEN**

Across the range of IW scenarios there is a set of overarching concepts that provide the foundation for planning and employing Air Force capabilities. These “truths” do not apply to all conceivable situations; however, they do represent broad concepts that Airmen should consider. These overarching concepts either reflect a best practice in evolving IW concepts or base themselves on significant lessons learned from operations that failed to meet expectations.

- The Air Force must be prepared to simultaneously conduct irregular and traditional warfare operations. The nature of a single conflict can easily shift between types of warfare. Failure to understand or anticipate these shifts often leads to fighting the wrong type of war, or focusing on the wrong effects for a given conflict. IW and traditional warfare are not mutually exclusive and both are often present in the same conflict. Finding a critical balance in capabilities is essential to overall success in both conflicts.

- IW is a different form of warfare and not a lesser form of conflict within traditional warfare. The struggle for legitimacy and influence over a relevant population is the primary focus of operations, not the coercion of key political leaders or defeat of their military capability. In conducting operations, adversaries commonly use tactics to provide asymmetric advantages that erode the US population’s support for the conflict. These tactics often diminish the effectiveness of traditional military modes of attack. Therefore, while many IW tactical-level airpower applications may not be distinguishable from traditional operations, the desired effects at the operational and strategic levels may require a different mindset in order to better plan, understand, and coordinate Air Force capabilities.

- IW is intelligence-intensive. Providing actionable intelligence is challenging. The ability to hide among the population, the tactics employed, and the distributed nature of insurgent organizations make finding, identifying, and engaging targets difficult. Intelligence efforts may focus on non-traditional areas such as cultural, social, political, and economic issues rather than military capabilities and key leaders. Fusing information obtained from multiple sources, methods, and levels is required to provide timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence to all levels.

- Unity of effort across all instruments of power is essential to overall strategic success. Success in IW depends on a high degree of integration of the military with other elements of national power within a national security strategy. Organizationally, the instruments of national power—DIME—should operate in close cooperation among joint, interagency, intergovernmental,
In situations where IW operations are distributed among multiple distinct environments, a single, theater-level commander of Air Force forces/joint force air component commander (COMAFFOR/JFACC) commanding airpower may not always provide the adequate degree of situational awareness and flexibility in rapidly evolving operations. In some cases, the COMAFFOR/JFACC may delegate some aspects of planning and decision-making to subordinate Airmen positioned at lower levels within the theater air control system (TACS). Increasing the role and authority of subordinate Airmen may provide more innovative and effective uses of Air Force capabilities.

**Integrated C2 structures enable flexibility at all levels and are vital to successful counterinsurgency operations.** The complex operating environment of IW requires rapid, adaptive application of capabilities at the operational and tactical levels. Conducting multiple, separate operations against different IW adversaries in a single theater may require that the combatant commander (CCDR) establish multiple joint task forces (JTFs). It must be emphasized that key assets, especially intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), special operations forces (SOF), and all other low density/high demand (LD/HD) systems, are scarce resources and their use must be prioritized to those efforts that most directly affect the achievement of the CCDR’s or JFC’s strategic objectives. This prioritization decision is best accomplished through centralized control and decentralized execution.

In situations where IW operations are distributed among multiple distinct environments, a single, theater-level commander of Air Force forces/joint force air component commander (COMAFFOR/JFACC) commanding airpower may not always provide the adequate degree of situational awareness and flexibility in rapidly evolving operations. In some cases, the COMAFFOR/JFACC may delegate some aspects of planning and decision-making to subordinate Airmen positioned at lower levels within the theater air control system (TACS). Increasing the role and authority of subordinate Airmen may provide more innovative and effective uses of Air Force capabilities.

In other situations, the JFC may establish a subordinate JTF for a given operation involving the attachment of certain Air Force assets. Operational control (OPCON) of these forces should be delegated by the JTF commander to the attached COMAFFOR. While this C2 arrangement may enhance flexibility and responsiveness, the theater-level COMAFFOR should consider the theater-wide impact of attaching Air Force forces to a given JTF.

Ultimately, as the US military becomes involved in more IW operations, critical mission analysis should be used in order to determine the appropriate C2 arrangements to provide the most effective and efficient use of Air Force capabilities.

**Effective working relationships between people and organizations are key to success in IW.** Coordinated effort across the spectrum of operations is vital and success often hinges on effective interpersonal relationships. IW operations often use small teams of integrated airpower functional experts
working in concert with PN forces, as well as acting as liaisons to the PN, to integrate and bring together the full range of Air Force capabilities.

- **Operational effectiveness can be very difficult to measure; thus, feedback through a strong operations assessment and lessons learned process is essential to strategic success.** Complex localized conditions and issues require an adaptive strategy and assessment process. Measuring effectiveness of lethal and non-lethal operations is challenging. Determining which operations are effective and modifying those that are not are critical to adjusting strategy.

- **The adversary may be highly complex and adaptive.** The adversary often adopts a decentralized, broadly networked organization that operates semi-independently, taking advantage of local issues and conflicts that can be radically different in adjacent locales. Additionally, adversaries are adept at operating within the seams of military and political boundaries. To counter these tactics, military operations must be timely, precise, and coordinated. This often necessitates that military planning and intelligence processes be conducted and aggregated at a much lower level than in traditional warfare, but still requires operational level guidance from the JFC. Ultimately, the management of scarce resources to generate the most appropriate effects against a highly adaptive adversary remains critical to overall success.

**COIN “Truths” for Airmen**

- **Legitimacy and influence are the main objectives.** Whether conducting COIN, support for COIN, or shaping and deterring operations, the legitimacy of the PN government is critical. Legitimacy ultimately rests with influencing the perception of the relevant population and often is a function of the government’s ability to maintain security while addressing valid grievances of that population. In most conflicts, the center of gravity is the population and establishing or maintaining the legitimacy of their government is often the effect desired. While the government must maintain legitimacy, insurgents can diminish the popular support of the government by addressing the population’s grievances, real or perceived, or by eroding the government’s ability to maintain security. Recognition of tools at the insurgents’ disposal, like coercion and terrorism, is important due to their use as a way to erode popular support for the legitimate government.

- **The Air Force provides critical capabilities that enable joint force operations in COIN.** The COMAFFOR enables the JFC to achieve key objectives. Often, the effects desired in COIN will directly support ground operations (military and civilian) requiring proper integration and coordination. In other situations, Air Force capabilities may be used to achieve effects interdependently. Airmen should identify new and innovative ways to use those capabilities and advocate them to the JFC.
Military actions are a necessary part of any COIN strategy; military actions that affect the adversary’s will or capability must be integrated with the JFC’s objective to influence the populace. In order to achieve the JFC’s strategic and operational objectives, traditional approaches to warfare must often be reversed, first weighing the impact on the relevant population and then determining the impact of operations on an adversary’s will and capability. There may be times when a conscious decision not to respond to enemy provocation may be more effective toward achieving strategic goals. In COIN, strategic success is defined by successfully discrediting the hostile ideology rather than by achieving military tactical victories.

A key adversary strength is the ability to hide within the populace—countering many key advantages of traditional military power. Interpersonal relationships built through sustained interaction with the populace and partner operations with indigenous forces are critical to understanding the nature of the conflict and ultimate victory in the IW fight. Developing these relationships can effectively strip the insurgency of its most valuable asset—the support of the population. The inability to distinguish insurgents from the general population allows adversaries the freedom to organize and attack while creating a dilemma for counterinsurgency forces trying to identify insurgents. Cooperation of the general population provides valuable intelligence on the whereabouts of insurgents. This intelligence enables counterinsurgency forces to identify insurgents, making them easier to identify and target.

COIN is a protracted affair. While traditional war has tended to become shorter in duration due to technology and lethality, COIN has remained protracted in nature. Insurgencies can last for years, even decades. Insurgents and terrorists often use time as a primary weapon in order to develop capabilities and build popular support. Protracting the conflict gives insurgents greater latitude in determining where and when operations will take place. They also use time as a weapon to undermine support for a government (either the established government they are trying to overthrow or popular support for an intervening government). Every day an insurgent or terrorist organization exists threatens the stability of the status quo. Time is typically on the side of the insurgents because they can often achieve their goal simply by surviving and exhausting government efforts, resources, and national/coalition political will. Time is also required to establish and develop a PN’s capacity to conduct COIN.

INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM

The purpose of an insurgency is to overthrow and replace an established government or societal structure, or to compel a change in behavior or policy by the government or societal structure. Terrorism is a tactic which may be used to achieve an insurgency’s objectives.
An insurgency may extend beyond the borders of a single threatened state. Non-state actors such as transnational terrorist and criminal organizations often represent a security threat beyond areas they inhabit. Some pose a direct concern for the United States and its partners. Non-state actors often team with insurgents to profit from a conflict.

Insurgencies can expand to include local, regional, and global entities. This requires the US to employ forces not only to help defeat an insurgency in a single country, but also to defeat small extremist cells operating in other countries or ungoverned areas. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and the ability to affect international commerce give small, non-state organizations potentially disproportionate capabilities. As such, counterinsurgency strategies should be tailored to the threat and environment, precipitating a more direct and drastic approach. The way insurgencies are inspired, organized, and perpetuated should be of principal interest to Airmen. For more detailed information on insurgencies, see Appendix A.

COUNTERING INSURGENCY AND TERRORISM

Countering insurgencies is largely dependent on the capabilities of the PN government, its perceived legitimacy, indications of dissatisfaction or discontent in a portion of the population, and evidence of an active or forming insurgency or terrorist organization. While the maturity of an insurgency or terrorist organization is often difficult to ascertain in its early phases, other characteristics may indicate environments ripe for organizations to foster support.

Often, by the time a government becomes aware that a significant insurgency exists, insurgents hold the strategic initiative and generally are the first to conduct violent actions. Normally, as the government prepares to respond, the insurgency matures. If the government is incapable of responding or if involvement by essential coalition forces is delayed, the level of violence and disorder will tend to intensify. US forces supporting a PN's COIN operations will most likely have significant disadvantages. These include:

- Insurgents will likely have better knowledge of the physical, cultural, religious, and social environment, as well as the political landscape
- Non-indigenous forces often “stand out” and present lucrative targets
- Non-indigenous forces often do not understand the language and lack wide-area situational awareness in a high threat environment. Additionally, air forces may lack critical “ground truth” to find targets and avoid collateral damage or unintended consequences.
- Security concerns often force US and coalition forces to mass, preventing smaller, less intrusive exposure to the civilian population.
The level of violence and the state of a government’s infrastructure (political, economic, informational, and military) will determine the type of JIIM military force required. An effective counterinsurgency campaign will need to:

- Take the strategic initiative as soon as possible. An integrated campaign of information and action must be perceived as shaping and controlling the course of events toward achieving the campaign objectives.
- Provide security for the population.
- Address root causes of the insurgency and provide alternatives to valid grievances.
- Target or render ineffective insurgent leaders and active supporters.
- Gain a population’s support and consent to the government’s rule.
CHAPTER TWO

AIR FORCE APPLICATIONS IN IW

Downplayed, taken for granted, or simply ignored, air power is usually the last thing that most military professionals think of when the topic of counterinsurgency is raised.


The crosscutting characteristics of IW may shape how the Air Force should organize, train, and equip to provide ready and relevant forces to JFCs.

IW is about influencing the relevant population. Understanding the social dynamics that influence local politics, networks, and religious and cultural views is critical. Success depends on building relationships and partnerships, often at a local level. In most cases, military success against insurgents and terrorists sets the conditions for other aspects of the DIME to produce the desired strategic effects. For the insurgent or terrorist, military victory may often be irrelevant.

The Air Force provides valuable and unique capabilities in IW. In many cases, these capabilities provide flexible and persistent options for dealing with the IW challenges by providing a less intrusive force that can respond quickly and improve commanders’ overall situational awareness. In certain situations, Air Force capabilities provide non-lethal alternatives that produce desired effects versus lethal applications and their subsequent effects.

THE VALUE OF AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES IN IW

The speed, range, flexibility, versatility, and unique persistence of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities allow operations over vast denied areas and provide a critical portfolio of options for dealing with the challenges across the spectrum of IW. These tenets and characteristics require Airmen to possess a unique operational-level perspective when conducting operations.

The Air Force provides a wide range of effects from minimal, discrete, and precise effects to overwhelming power as required. Due to the dynamic nature of IW, any of these effects may be required at any time. The ability of the Air Force to quickly provide these effects allows JFCs to adapt to changes in the environment and respond appropriately. The Air Force provides a critical joint capability which offers an asymmetric advantage over our adversaries. Properly integrating all the functions of the Air Force enables flexibility in the development of strategy, operational plans, and employment.
Air Force capabilities can be employed to counter insurgencies and terrorists, as well as support insurgencies against occupying powers. Support to insurgencies will often involve extensive use of clandestine and covert instruments and methods, while the Air Force’s involvement in COIN may often be overt. The following ideas and concepts apply to all operations in IW.

**Minimal Intrusiveness**

Air Force capabilities can deliver a variety of effects from great distance without increasing force presence in a region or country. The ability to mobilize, deploy, employ, and redeploy US forces and capabilities allows airpower to deliver timely effects while minimizing our footprint and not highlighting US involvement when required. These effects can be lethal or non-lethal. In addition, these effects can be sustained for a long period with less risk to military forces.

Air Force forces often present a smaller military footprint when deployed and may reduce the total number of forces visible to local populations, thereby reducing potential resentment. This is especially true when Air Force forces are based outside the supported government’s borders or when employing small aviation detachments that provide the supported government valuable air, space, and cyber capabilities.

The introduction of a large foreign force may exacerbate the local situation while providing adversaries a new target set for attacks and propaganda. The minimal footprint of Air Force forces allows the application of military force with relatively little exposure to adversaries and populations. In some situations, the visible presence of coalition forces may bolster security and reassure the population, thus bolstering PN legitimacy; in other cases, such a visible presence may be detrimental. By providing an ability to collect information, move and sustain personnel, and simultaneously engage multiple targets, Air Force capabilities allow commanders the flexibility to shift forces quickly to better exploit fleeting opportunities.

**Rapid Response**

Air Force capabilities provide commanders an asymmetric advantage by providing desired effects over great distances. Control of air and space allows forces to reposition by air more quickly and at less risk than by ground transport. Airpower’s responsiveness can be used to transport ground forces, provide surveillance on emerging “hot spots,” and simultaneously provide precise firepower when required. This serves as an enormous force multiplier by moving either air assets or other forces to the areas of greatest need. This presents a constant, credible, and unpredictable threat of detection and response that can significantly complicate the enemy’s planning and execution. Air- and space-
borne sensors can be rapidly retasked to focus on emerging targets and key terrain. Cyberspace capabilities can often be employed in seconds.

**Rapid Mobility**

Because IW may not be limited by borders, the Air Force provides rapid mobility not only by airlifting forces in a timely manner to the immediate area of concentration, but also by resupplying those forces already in place. Air refueling extends the distance of long-range strike missions and allows the persistence for close air support and ISR.

Rapid repositioning of small teams through the air allows for a greater chance of tactical surprise across great distances and difficult terrain. Air mobility permits leaner ground-based operations, improving force protection during transport. Aeromedical evacuation allows for the rapid transport of injured personnel and civilians, not only shrinking the critical time between injury and focused medical care, but also reducing the footprint of medical facilities within the immediate area of operations (AO). Mobility decreases the insurgent’s inherent tactical and strategic initiative by allowing timely government response and multiplying the government’s reach for conducting security operations.

**Rapid Engagement**

In addition, speed and range reduce the find-fix-track-target-engage-assess (F2T2EA) “kill chain” when engaging time-sensitive and high-value targets. Applying lethal and non-lethal options at certain times may dramatically influence the outcome of operations on the ground.

The dynamic nature of IW requires an adaptable C2 structure to maintain situational awareness and initiative permitting timely action against adversary forces, especially emerging terrorist targets. Timely decisions and situational responsiveness are keys to compressing the “kill chain,” exploiting fleeting opportunities, and providing operational adjustments to negate adversary resourcefulness.

**Improved Strategic, Operational, and Tactical Situational Awareness**

The nature of IW presents significant challenges to Airmen as they seek to understand the operating environment. IW threats span the globe and require a patient and persistent approach in order to gather actionable intelligence. The
level of situational awareness needed to execute effective operations in IW often takes time to acquire. Emerging threats may appear in areas where the US has not invested significantly in either resources or cultural expertise. In order to increase overall situational awareness, information should be fused from multiple sources and disseminated to appropriate levels. Often local security forces and the affected population are the best source of information. The air and space operations center (AOC) often provides a robust capability that can link and disseminate this information.

The Air Force provides the ability to monitor, map, and survey large areas quickly and cover focused areas for long durations. By detecting and tracking adversary movement, Air Force capabilities (specifically ISR) can identify an adversary's safe havens, assembly points, and potential avenues of attack, as well as immediate threats to coalition forces. The balanced use of air, space, and cyber capabilities provides commanders with increased situational awareness at all levels.

Timely, accurate, and relevant intelligence should be gathered and analyzed at the lowest possible level and disseminated throughout the force. Because of the dispersed nature of COIN operations, counterinsurgents’ own actions are a key generator of intelligence. A cycle develops where operations produce intelligence that drives subsequent operations. Reporting by units, members of the country team, and associated civilian agencies often cues specialized intelligence assets. Fusing these inputs together often provides a more comprehensive operating picture. These factors, along with the need to generate a favorable tempo (rate of military operations) require the production and dissemination of intelligence at the lowest practical level.

Air Force surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities provide commanders additional situational awareness of events and the physical disposition of insurgent forces. Integration of human intelligence (HUMINT) (often derived from SOF and counterintelligence [CI] operations), and other forms of intelligence, through the all source fusion process, often provides a commander a more complete picture of the environment. See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion on Air Force intelligence capabilities.

Space capabilities add a unique dimension to the joint force's ability to posture quickly. Space capabilities enhance IW operations through satellite communication (SATCOM); surveillance and reconnaissance; accurate positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT); and blue force tracking (BFT). Surveillance and reconnaissance products may aid in mission planning, and on-orbit assets can provide predetermined effects in response to operational
Integrating Space-based Capabilities

The capabilities and effects we provide from and through space are an enormous advantage to our American and coalition forces. When you integrate space into our military operations on the ground, in the air or on the sea, you significantly increase combat effectiveness while decreasing the number of American and coalition troops you put in harm’s way. Thanks to space, our forces are able to move faster and fight smarter and more precisely.

—General Lance W. Lord, Commander, Air Force Space Command, 2002-2006

IW ACTIVITIES
Support to Insurgencies

Various US government organizations are postured to recruit, organize, train, and advise indigenous guerrilla or partisan forces. These operations usually consist of supplying equipment, training, and advisory assistance to non-state actors. They may also involve US direct-action operations supporting specific campaign goals.

The UW role includes such actions as insertion, extraction, and resupply of ground contact teams, direct-action forces, surface-force advisors/trainers, and guerrilla/partisan forces. Air Force capabilities may also be employed to support escape and evasion networks and intelligence networks; provide aerial delivery and resupply to US and indigenous/surrogate forces; carry out reconnaissance and surveillance; provide C2 platforms; and furnish aerial cover and fire support for specific contingencies. Information and influence operations may also be

priorities and events. In unique cases, offensive counterspace operations may deny the adversary access to communications and other space capabilities critical to their IO.

These capabilities enable highly accurate, adverse weather weapon system employment and rapid operational tempo information superiority. For example, the integration of space-based PNT capabilities with airborne platforms has expanded military precision-strike capabilities. Also, where communication lines cannot be laid, or when terrain and other line-of-sight radio frequency limitations hamper terrestrial-based communications, space communications keep forward and rear echelons in contact. In denied areas of the world, intelligence derived from space capabilities often fills critical gaps. The ability to pinpoint the location of friendly forces in an unpredictable environment is also of importance. BFT reduces friendly-fire incidents and coordination time, and provides rapid information critical in personal recovery missions. For additional information on space capabilities and considerations, see AFDD 2-2, Space Operations.
employed as force multipliers for military actions, or for tactical cover and deception activities.

UW falls mainly within the special operations area of expertise; the skills needed are very sophisticated and extensive. US Army Special Forces are the principal DOD resource for conducting UW when the mission requires interaction with friendly ground counterpart forces. While a variety of Air Force resources can be brought into play in UW, Air Force SOF offer capabilities and resources that are ideally suited or have distinct application in the UW realm.

SOF may conduct unconventional assisted recovery (UAR), a subset of non-conventional assisted recovery (NAR). UAR operations are conducted to seek out, contact, authenticate, and support military and other selected personnel as they move from an enemy-held, hostile, or sensitive area to areas under friendly control. Air Force elements working with foreign air forces are uniquely capable of supporting UAR plans and operations.

Given certain risk factors and political considerations, the Air Force may help non-US aviation assets conduct special air operations supporting indigenous/surrogate surface forces. In some UW operations, the use of US military aircraft may be inappropriate, tactically or politically. In those cases, training, advising, and assisting the aviation forces of insurgent groups, resistance organizations, or third-country nationals may be the only viable option.

**COIN and Support to COIN**

US national interests will likely be affected by destabilization in strategically important areas, especially those that affect trade routes, resources, and chokepoints. Additionally, those areas that may not be strategically important in terms of geography or resources can still directly affect national interests by providing sanctuary to radical organizations that oppose the US and its policies. The unique characteristics of the Air Force make its incorporation and integration into the CCDR’s or JFC’s plan essential.

Insurgencies typically require time and space to foment and to develop their support structure. While it is often difficult to determine the level to which an insurgency has matured, it is invariably beneficial to counter this threat as early as possible. **In any phase of operation, the Air Force can be employed with varying degrees of intensity and visibility.**

While the capabilities the Air Force brings to bear in any conflict will usually exceed the PN’s capability, Airmen should ensure their employment enhances the US’ and PN’s long-term strategy and, most importantly, that the PN does not become reliant on Air Force capabilities. Over-reliance on US capabilities can be detrimental to the legitimacy of the PN and might require the US to maintain a large or extended air presence. Therefore, BPC which increases the PN’s air force capability and reduces reliance on US capability is
the desired long-term strategy. BPC increases legitimacy, but is also a precautionary and preventative activity. Even a marginal PN airpower capability allows COIN forces to exploit its unique characteristics.

The maturity of an insurgency and the PN’s capabilities will significantly affect the level of effort required by US and coalition forces. The Air Force will be called upon to deliver multiple effects. These effects will generally affect the following areas of a PN’s counterinsurgency strategy.

**Provide Security**

Security provides the foundation for all subsequent counterinsurgency operations. Security allows non-military agencies to conduct operations to further gain support from the general population. Additionally, the local people’s willingness to risk their lives by helping the security forces may be contingent on the security forces’ ability to protect the people. Therefore, providing security allows the PN to address underlying grievances but also exploit valuable intelligence from the populace, moving them away from supporting the insurgency. Protracted COIN operations are hard to sustain. Maintaining security in an unstable environment is resource-intensive. In contrast, a small number of highly motivated insurgents with simple weapons, good operations security, and limited mobility can undermine security over a large area. Thus, successful COIN operations often require a large number of security forces in order to protect the population. The effort requires a firm political will and substantial patience by both US and PN governments.

Airpower can help alter this equation. A sizeable ground force engaged in protracted COIN operations can inflame the populace against the COIN forces and can wear down the political will of the US government and the local populace. Air Force capabilities bring many advantages, including an “economy of force” that enables the US to have a smaller ground force, which reduces the problems associated with a large “footprint” on the ground. These capabilities can help provide presence and security for critical areas, lines of communication, infrastructure, and borders.

Applied in the early stages of an insurgency, Air Force operations can help shape the situation on the ground. There may still be scenarios in which the general conditions on the ground have deteriorated to the point where an increased ground presence (foreign or indigenous) is required. During these situations, finding the right balance between directly supporting ground forces and employing Air Force capabilities in other operational areas may be critical to achieving the desired end state.

The Air Force’s unique characteristics allow US and PN forces to exploit key terrain and counter some of the adversary’s advantages. Control and exploitation of this key terrain allow friendly forces to see around obstacles, track
and maneuver over large distances more rapidly, and respond quickly with force when required. When partnered effectively with a ground force, airpower can negate many of the enemy’s advantages and reduce vulnerabilities to the joint force.

In a much broader context, the use of the full range of Air Force capabilities can significantly reduce the ability of our adversaries to overwhelm ground forces. Acting as a force multiplier, these capabilities allow a smaller force to have more firepower for protection, more maneuverability, and broader situational awareness. The use of airpower may also reduce the total number of forces deployed forward and enable forces to concentrate their military capability quickly with minimal risk. The combination of these two factors allows ground forces to focus their efforts where and when needed by relying on airpower to monitor areas where fewer ground forces are available.

**Combat Controller**

While on patrol providing security for a bridge opening ceremony, a small SOF team supporting a 20-man Afghan National Army force came under heavy and accurate fire. At this time, the joint terminal attack controller attached to the team quickly requested air assets to his position. Employing A-10, B-1B, U-2, and Predator aircraft, the team was able to move from contact. Additionally, the controller was able to request, coordinate and control the medical evacuation of two team members and an Afghan soldier wounded during the engagement. The precise and effective employment of air capabilities provided the smaller coalition force with the firepower advantage to successfully finish the patrol into previously denied areas. The Afghan National Army soldiers gained a tremendous amount of confidence and pride in the success of the mission. This patrol, as well as subsequent patrols, opened new villages up to communication and free commerce.

**Help Alleviate Root Causes**

Failure to address underlying grievances that are perceived as valid by the general population often leads to a strategic defeat for COIN forces. The PN government may be able, for a limited time, to provide the security necessary to limit insurgent operations; however, unless valid grievances are addressed, draconian rules (which typically amplify these grievances) will have to be enforced to maintain law and order in the long run. Insurgents often disrupt basic government services and subsequently use the situation to assist the local populace and thereby gain support. Only by addressing valid grievances can the government hope to sway the populace to support the government as it will be seen as legitimate and fair.
In addition to performing combat operations that directly counter insurgents and provide security, the Air Force can also conduct activities that enhance the legitimacy of the PN government. Transporting PN government officials with humanitarian supplies to outlying regions underscores the willingness of the PN government to provide essential services to the population. In doing so, Airmen should remember that it is generally better for the PN to lead such activities, with US forces playing a supporting role. This remains true as long as the PN is capable of performing the activity even if not as effectively as US forces.

Successfully using Information operations is largely contingent upon addressing valid grievances and may play a large role in helping the PN gain legitimacy. The Air Force enables psychological operations (PSYOP) and strategic communication (SC) through the dissemination of messages and leaflet drops allowing the PN to relay its message to the populace and insurgents. See Chapter 3 for a more detailed discussion on IO capabilities.

**Limit an Adversary’s Conventional Options and Flexibility**

Airpower constrains an adversary's conventional options at all levels of war. It can monitor large areas of open terrain, disrupt an adversary’s freedom of movement, and reduce his ability to mass forces for training or employment without detection. Historically, airpower has been most effective against targets in open terrain; however, current capabilities provide a wide array of options for achieving effects in urban and complex terrain. Therefore, airpower may prevent forces from massing and perhaps prevent the conflict spreading to conventional options. This capability allows friendly forces to operate in small units or be stationed in isolated areas without risk of being overwhelmed by a large insurgent force. In short, Air Force capabilities make it difficult for insurgents to shift to a conventional phase. The goal is to suppress the insurgents to a level that the supported PN's security forces can respond to. Once the insurgents have been reduced, PN forces should be visibly in the lead for all kinetic operations.

**Disrupt Enemy Movement**

Air Force capabilities can be leveraged to locate, fix, and target insurgents and terrorists. They can also help reduce the flow of personnel and material support to insurgents and terrorists from outside the affected state (e.g., help to police the borders, etc.). Leveraging their theater perspective, Airmen can monitor ground operations for emerging threats in one region, quickly bring firepower to bear in another, and provide surveillance of critical border areas in yet another.

These capabilities prevent the enemy from sustaining and operating in massed formations often requiring the enemy to disperse. However, as the
enemy disperses, interdiction of the limited supplies needed to sustain these small groups often becomes more difficult.

**Airpower in Vietnam**

The capability of airpower to deter the threat of conventional attack in IW was demonstrated by the example of American airpower in Vietnam. In the midst of “Vietnamization” in early 1972, indications of an imminent North Vietnamese conventional invasion of South Vietnam prompted a massive redeployment of US air assets under Operations COMMANDO FLASH and BULLET SHOT 1. In response to North Vietnamese conventional attack across the demilitarized zone on 29 March, B-52s attacked North Vietnamese base camps and troop concentrations and F-4s used laser-guided bombs to drop bridges in advance of the tanks, slowing the advance of the invasion. US airpower continued to forestall the conventional takeover of South Vietnam until May 1973.

The Air Force has unique capabilities to deliver non-kinetic effects against insurgent leaders and sanctuaries throughout the operating environment, even when ground forces are unavailable for integrated joint operations. These capabilities can be used to detect and monitor insurgent activity, deliver precise or wide area messaging, and conduct disruption or assurance operations through shows of presence and shows of force. Combining various elements of air and ground maneuver can keep the enemy leadership off balance and force insurgents to concentrate more on their own security than attacking the government or populace.

**Target Insurgent Leaders and Active Supporters**

Air Force capabilities also play an important role in targeting an insurgency’s leadership and active supporters. Despite addressing valid grievances that may reduce the insurgents’ popular support, the leadership and active participants may persist in their efforts. Additionally, the anonymity of these two groups may allow them to operate even without tacit support from the population, or even in the face of public opposition if their activities and identities are not detected. Since these groups often contain the most committed and potentially radical members, military

**Non-lethal Targeting**

Most are familiar with the role of airpower in kinetic strikes against insurgent leaders, as demonstrated by the takedown of Abu Musab al Zarqawi in Iraq. However, insurgent leaders can be targeted through non-kinetic means as well (e.g., PSYOP), and often with greater effectiveness when the leaders are captured, exploited for intelligence, or turned to support the government.
operations may have to focus directly on their capability. Air, space, and cyberspace capabilities, ranging from lethal to non-lethal, can target these groups directly and indirectly.

**Operation Enduring Freedom**

On 26 March 2006, an Air Force combat controller attached to a US Army Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha team in Afghanistan orchestrated one of numerous examples of a successful joint air-ground operation in support of the Afghan National Army. Shortly into their mission, the team made contact with a large enemy force—and rapidly assessed that they were surrounded on three sides by up to one hundred anti-coalition militants. While taking heavy and accurate enemy fire, the combat controller made radio contact with numerous aircraft and quickly talked them onto enemy positions and directed precise air strikes that enabled the team to break contact. Over the next six hours, the combat controller requested, integrated, and controlled A-10, B-52, Predator, AH-64, and CH-47 aircraft in support of the Afghan National Army and special operations mission. The professionalism and expertise of an embedded Airman and the precision and lethality of airpower, turned a potentially devastating blow to a maturing Afghan National Army unit into both a tactical and strategic success.

The Air Force’s ability to conduct time sensitive targeting (TST) provides a unique capability when targeting leadership and active participants. The ability of the AOC to gather, combine, and disseminate intelligence to operating forces in a timely manner provides the joint force with a quick-reaction capability critical in engaging leadership and active supporters.

**Air and Ground Coordination**

Working as a joint team, air and ground forces produce capabilities able to achieve effects far beyond their individual strengths. Often the most effective way to achieve the needed close coordination between air and ground forces is through trained battlefield Airmen embedded with tactical ground teams. This teaming requires a long-term commitment of all assets to establish the trust and understanding both inside the team and between the team and the local population. The situational awareness provided by long-term relationships with the indigenous populace takes away the ability of the enemy to blend into the population, enabling air forces to positively identify targets, and discriminate between suitable and unsuitable targets, a distinction often impossible from the air. The reach, speed, persistence, and lethality of airpower can then be employed for defensive and offensive actions, including the reach necessary to deny the adversary the ability to establish safe havens based on remote or
distant locations that are difficult to attack successfully with large groups of ground forces.

Air and ground coordination should start as early as possible in the joint planning process to ensure the operational requirements for Air Force capabilities can be balanced and prioritized across the theater. By being involved as early as possible, Air Force planners can deconflict other requirements in the theater, ensure the right mix and allocation of assets to provide the desired effects, optimize scheduling, and prepare collateral damage estimates for areas of preplanned or anticipated kinetic requirements in order to reduce the possibility of unintended harm to noncombatants or friendly forces. During execution, extensive use of joint fires observers (JFOs) can greatly extend the reach of joint terminal attack controllers (JTACs), especially in cases where ground units operate in large numbers of small-size teams. This requires pushing real-time information down to the JTAC. Improving the linkage of information between the air and ground force at the tactical level may result in more effective joint operations.

**Shaping and Deterring**

Shaping and deterring operations require an integrated effort across all instruments of power. The Air Force can anticipate being continuously engaged in these operations. Military operations may include BPC, humanitarian relief, IO, and ISR. These operations are critical in setting the stage for potential future operations and may prevent the emergence of an insurgent or terrorist group.

**Counterterrorism**

Transnational terrorists with radical ideologies and tactics present a significant threat to the US. These groups are adept at using IW to further their cause. Countering these groups that are very adaptive and loosely organized requires close cooperation with US partners and allies. Often these groups’ objectives are extreme, thus their willingness to compromise is minimal. Military forces should be proactive in targeting these groups. Air Force capabilities provide effects quickly across great distances critical to countering terrorist threats.

Terrorist organizations often find safe havens in states that either support their cause or are unable or unwilling to conduct operations against their
organizations. The threat of airpower can often be used to try and coerce the sponsor state using traditional means and methods. When coercion or deterrence fails, the airpower presents a significant capability to the JFC to use either for quick strikes or persistent operations. Air, space, and cyberspace capabilities can be used to monitor and gather information on otherwise inaccessible areas and often lead to actionable intelligence that can be used for future operations.

Countering terrorists in states where the PN is either unable or unwilling to target these groups also presents unique challenges. When the PN is incapable, US forces may be called upon to aid them in conducting operations. BPC and providing other critical capabilities are often necessary. The US must weigh the advantages of integrating operations with the PN, conducting them unilaterally, or supporting the PN’s efforts in countering the terrorists. The considerations involved are often similar to those when conducting support to COIN operations.

When PNs are unwilling to target these groups, understanding the reasons for their hesitancy may often reveal ways in which other means can be used to target these groups indirectly. Often PNs are reluctant to target such groups when there is a significant portion of the population that may be sympathetic to the insurgents’ cause. PN operations may alienate the population from the government and increase its vulnerability to potential adversaries. In such situations PN governments may need to address potential grievances with the population and undermine the legitimacy or ideology of the terrorist organization. Support from US forces may need to be covert in nature. IO, ISR, and other airpower capabilities may be employed without highlighting US involvement.
CHAPTER THREE

AIR FORCE CAPABILITIES IN IW

Maximum advantage should be taken of friendly air capabilities since insurgents generally lack this source of military power.

—Air Force Manual 1-1, 14 August 1964

The Air Force has significant air, space, and cyberspace capabilities that are well suited for IW situations. Many of these capabilities are already described in detail in AFDD 2-1, Air Warfare, and its sub-publications. The main focus of this document is to describe how the Air Force re-orient these capabilities from a focus on traditional warfare to how they may be employed during IW.

BUILDING PARTNERSHIP CAPACITY

Successful efforts to combat IW threats require international cooperation and commitment. BPC is the best strategy for achieving this. BPC is described as targeted efforts to improve the collective capabilities and performance of the DOD and its partners. BPC encompasses security assistance (SA), foreign military sales (FMS), and FID activities. In conducting BPC activities, the US works by, with, or through others: Enabling allied and PN capabilities, building their capacity, and developing collaborative mechanisms to share the decisions, risks, and responsibilities of today’s complex security challenges. The objective of BPC is to develop partners and improve collective capabilities and performance to prevent internal security risks from becoming transnational threats of US security interests.

Successful collaboration, requiring Airmen to have detailed knowledge of the local culture, society, language, and threat, may foster enduring relationships. If operations against a regional IW threat escalate, these relationships can provide considerable political weight for support ranging from overflight rights to basing. Overflight rights may allow the joint force more direct access to airspace that minimizes transit time, distance, and threat to assets. Basing rights may enable the joint force to base airpower assets closer to an IW threat than would otherwise be possible.

At the same time, the resources and tactical skills needed to locate, identify, and destroy irregular threats often do not exist or are limited in many developing countries. This is particularly true in the case of airpower. PN law and our own political, cultural, economic, and military considerations require that
PNs take a great deal of responsibility for their own security and function as viable partners.

Working within a PN’s internal defense and development (IDAD) plan, Air Force special and general purpose forces provide a wide range of capabilities that can be employed in indirect support, direct support not including combat, and combat operations. Often the distinction between these operations is not clear; however, transition between each of these requires Presidential- or SecDef-level approval. Successful PN airpower development is a complex undertaking that requires close integration with Department of State country teams and other elements and agencies of the US government. The inherent flexibility and versatility of Air Force capabilities provide unique capabilities that can be applied in unilateral, multilateral, and joint IW operations.

Stable, long-term efforts to effectively conduct BPC require judicious application of SA law and close integration of Air Force security cooperation strategy and the theater security cooperation plan (TSCP) across many US agencies. As a subset of BPC, FID involves complex operations, often operating over long periods of time, and requires extensive integrated planning among many agencies of the US and foreign governments. It also requires involvement and integration of both general purpose forces and SOF. For more detailed discussion on FID activities, the importance of well-integrated and synchronized IDAD planning, and other important information, see AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense.

Additionally, FMS programs support BPC and other activities that may contribute to IW efforts. The FMS program is the government-to-government method for selling US defense equipment, services, and training. Responsible arms sales further national security and foreign policy objectives by strengthening bilateral defense relations, supporting coalition building, and enhancing interoperability between US forces and militaries of friends and allies.

BPC should be a critical part of the US strategy to defeat transnational terrorist activities. Using an indirect approach to leverage partner nation capabilities may potentially reduce terrorist activity down to intra-national criminal levels. BPC enables the airpower to ensure partner nation airpower capabilities support this effort to eliminate transnational terrorism.

Assess, Train, Advise, and Assist

In terms of increasing the PN’s capability, FID functions to provide improved capability and increased capacity for PN air forces. The best way to
apply airpower in IW is often by, with, and through the PN’s air force, allowing other capabilities to be applied as required in support of PN operations. Direct application of US Air Force forces should be reserved for those instances where employment provides the only capability to produce the desired effects, for instance when PN efforts have been unsuccessful or lacking.

In conducting BPC activities, the Air Force and its coalition partners should first assess the capability of an affected PN in order to develop an all-encompassing strategy involving all the elements of indigenous power. Assistance ranges from strategic airpower assessments that address the overall capability of a nation to apply and sustain airpower through tactical–level instruction based on US tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Using this information to identify gaps in the PN’s capabilities, the Air Force can determine the scope and level of effort required to help the PN meet its security objectives.

Airpower can promote a wide range of lethal and nonlethal solutions that fit within the technical, financial, and professional capacity of a PN in ways that allow PN forces to ultimately assume responsibility for air operations. In those instances where a PN has an operational air force, the Air Force can provide the necessary technical and professional skills to enhance operational capacity and effectiveness. In situations where an indigenous air force does not exist or is in decay, the Air Force, through US government channels and subject to fiscal law restraints, can help the PN obtain the materiel and financial support it needs to build, equip, train, and sustain a viable airpower capability. The Air Force should maintain the ability not only to conduct IW operations, but to assist and train partners, enabling them to resolve internal challenges at all stages of development. The key to BPC is not finding high or low-tech answers, but the right mix of technology, training, and support that provides a PN with affordable, sustainable, and capable airpower.

BPC requires personnel with the relevant organizational, logistical, and warfighting skills who are specifically trained and prepared with cultural and language skills to assist PNs in building airpower capabilities where required.

**Combat Aviation Advisory Mission**

Combat aviation advisors assess, train, advise, and assist foreign units in airpower employment, sustainment, and force integration in three interrelated mission areas of FID, UW, and coalition support. Air Force combat aviation advisors operate as an integral part of foreign units. Aviation advisors influence planning, sometimes to a great degree at very senior levels, and execute mutually supportive operations with or without a significant US military presence. Fundamentally, combat aviation advisors focus on accomplishing tactical and operational level objectives to improve the combat capacity of PN forces.
BPC and Counterinsurgency

Airpower provides critical capabilities to a counterinsurgency which typically entails supporting civil law enforcement agencies, military surface forces, as well as government administrative mechanisms. The most commonly employed functions include air mobility, ISR, personnel recovery (PR), and C2. However, all airpower capabilities should be considered when developing strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. Developing these objectives requires Airmen to have an understanding of counterinsurgency doctrine and the local social, political, legal, and economic conditions the insurgency exploits.

It is important to understand the concepts of direct and indirect support within IW. Many of the stand-off nonlethal capabilities of the Air Force can be applied across the spectrum of IW. Through comprehensive planning, coordination, integration, and authorization, these capabilities can accomplish things typically considered direct application of conventional airpower, while supporting both direct and indirect support categories of FID.

Commanders should carefully weigh all available options and be aware that the strategic level of IW is often best supported by directly assisting the PN to conduct operations, even if their capabilities are less than those normally accepted by US risk assessment standards.

Direct assistance activities represent the essence of working with, by, and through PN forces to assist them in realizing their security objectives. Such activities, including those that involve hostile conditions, represent an indirect approach to applying US airpower capabilities in a direct assistance role. For example, it is often better for a PN to use 12 sorties to transport supplies and troops in their aircraft with our assistance than use Air Force assets to do the same mission in two sorties. In all cases, the strategic initiative must remain with the PN. Broad analysis of PN capacities and capabilities conducted on a regional basis that is integrated with detailed country analysis is essential in the development of clear plans to achieve BPC objectives.

INTELLIGENCE

While often an enabler of other operations, intelligence may constitute the primary function of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities in IW. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment, which builds understanding of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and informational (PMESII) systems, as well as the cultural factors in a conflict, enable friendly forces to target for specific effects within the operational environment. Intelligence products should provide the commander with the fullest possible understanding of all entities involved in the conflict. Near-real time ISR and precision location also help build commanders’ situational awareness even if they are not used directly in targeting.
Accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence is critical for setting the conditions for success. ISR provides situational awareness by fusing traditional and nontraditional sources of information. Of primary importance is cultural intelligence which may require innovative collection and analysis methods. Thus, operations are planned, executed, assessed, and adapted to influence or change relevant behaviors or reduce capabilities in order to achieve desired outcomes.

Analysis requires that data from all the intelligence disciplines be brought together to the right people on a timely basis. This has proven in the past to be a substantial challenge because of technical problems associated with sharing data and security requirements. This challenge needs to be overcome during IW given the likelihood of joint, coalition, or interagency organizational integration. All-source fusion helps overcome the inherent limitations of a single source to provide adequate information. However, IW environments may require more flexibility in the use of single-source intelligence given timeliness and inaccessibility.

**Analysis and Targeting**

In the IW realm, intelligence analysis often looks more at social structures such as tribal, religious, and personal relationships within populations than at traditional information on military systems such as orders of battle. Analysts are faced with a problem they have not usually dealt with in the past: providing “traditional” targeting information on small groups and individuals. In many situations, determining appropriate targeting parameters requires close integration with SOF, CI, and other HUMINT sources, as well as with multi-sensor fused collection from ISR assets. Air and space ISR assets can pinpoint information such as transmission sources and locations, and this has led to an ability to conduct remote strikes without relying on forward air controllers.

Intelligence provides commanders with increased situational awareness of the entire operational environment and information that can help them to determine the best courses of action (COAs) for defeating insurgents. For example, security might be obtained temporarily in a key area with precision lethal strikes, but might be secured long-term by providing social or economic programs. Such analysis requires thorough fusion of intelligence of all types from all possible sources, especially during the prelude to operations.

Intelligence personnel should think differently and be proactive in their collection, analysis, and planning by breaking from the traditional warfare mindset when engaged in IW. Intelligence personnel should provide decision makers with accurate, relevant, and timely intelligence pertaining to local civilian attitudes, culture, demographics, infrastructure, conflict dynamics, economics, religion, and social and political aspects of the operating environment. This intelligence helps US forces gain insight to the local populace, while helping identify enemy networks, their motivations, objectives, leadership, intentions, and locations.
Analytical efforts should not be locked into set processes, but should encourage creative thinking to develop competing hypotheses in regards to IW problems. External expertise and open source material (such as a PN’s “classical” and popular literature) may provide invaluable insights and should be understood. This improves intelligence efforts against foreign denial and deception techniques and improves understanding of the situation.

**All Source Intelligence**

Intelligence personnel must fuse, analyze, validate, and distribute timely, relevant, and accurate information (not just data) from all sources. All source intelligence includes the traditional intelligence disciplines of open-source intelligence (OSINT), signals intelligence (SIGINT), measurement and signal intelligence (MASINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), HUMINT, and CI. In addition, coordination with law enforcement, diplomatic, and medical agencies, along with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and other international organizations should be sought. The entire joint force should integrate this information through standardized reporting formats, common data links and databases, and improved capability to conduct data mining to improve integration. In IW, intelligence dissemination should be focused for the primary customers at the lowest level. Understandable and usable ISR products should be disseminated to these forces in a timely manner.

**Collection**

ISR operations can survey areas of interest with sufficient frequency to observe changes, deter enemy movement, validate HUMINT information, and enable other ground and maritime operations aimed at doing the same. ISR also has a high degree of flexibility and responsiveness to emerging IW requirements, to include intelligence collection, C2, indications and warning, and target acquisition. ISR provides specific advantages to theater commanders. The presence, real or perceived, of ISR over the adversary’s operational environment may have multiple influencing effects: Instilling fear, creating perception that he has no place to hide, or forcing him to use resources and time to improve his denial and deception techniques. This influencing effect may have a very significant impact on the outcome of IW operations and should be a major consideration in an effects-based approach to operations (EBAO).

Overhead ISR assets are typically in short supply and should be centrally controlled to ensure the most critical aspects of a JFC’s operational
needs are covered. The highly distributed nature of IW can exacerbate this problem, requiring a high degree of integration between all parts of the joint/coalition team in the planning process. In order to reduce the gap between demand and capacity, efficient use of assets and streamlined processes are required. In addition, using systems and products that are compatible and releasable to the supported PN government is essential. For more detailed information on the intelligence process see AFDD 2-9, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations*.

**Non-Traditional ISR (NTISR)**

NTISR assets (fighter and other aircraft equipped with sensors but whose primary function is not intelligence related) can be used when necessary to fill gaps in ISR coverage, but this use should be weighed against any negative impact on the primary mission. NTISR can increase effective ISR persistence and coverage in the operational environment by accessing denied areas and targets with focused surveillance. NTISR assets can fulfill intelligence requirements or provide real-time imaging. For example, battlefield Airmen now provide ground commanders beyond-line-of-sight awareness with a remote operations video enhanced receiver (ROVER), which links to aircraft targeting pods and unmanned aircraft systems. This allows NTISR assets and armed ISR platforms to directly communicate with ground forces in order to engage high-value targets based on this real-time intelligence. However, commanders should ensure NTISR-provided intelligence is fused with other analytical efforts in order to maintain the appropriate situational awareness.

**Human Intelligence**

Targets are often found, identified, fixed, and tracked by means other than technical sensor systems. The nature of IW—close contact with a populace that is often partially hostile in difficult terrain like urban settings—creates a high degree of dependence on HUMINT. HUMINT helps provide the pulse of the local populace and may even penetrate adversary networks. ISR collection and intelligence analysis leverages HUMINT to neutralize enemy forces’ effectiveness, while continually assessing their capabilities. These are critical considerations in any effort to develop an accurate assessment of the operational environment.

HUMINT also helps cross-cue technical ISR sensors to potential targets. Effectively integrated, HUMINT may become the lead cueing mechanism for air and space assets, which can bring more ISR capability to bear on a leadership target or isolate it for engagement. The integration of HUMINT with other ISR elements helps eliminate seams in IW operations and shortens the sensor to shooter “kill chain.”
Counterintelligence

CI is defined as the gathering of information or “activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments...foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities." (JP 1-02)

CI counters or neutralizes threats through HUMINT source operations, collections, counterintelligence investigations, operations, analysis and production, and technical service programs. During IW, the main Air Force CI capability resides in the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI). Commanders may also receive counterintelligence support from other Services or agencies, both US and coalition.

Air Force counter threat operations (CTO) are the AFOSI's capability to find, fix, track, and neutralize the enemy in order to create a sustained permissive environment for military forces, as well as provide a safe and secure operating environment. CTO are critical in detecting, assessing, denying, and responding to threats impacting Air Force operations. These operations facilitate the identification and neutralization of enemy and terrorist threats and are critical in providing force protection.

Distributed Operations

Distributed operations are those conducted by independent and interdependent nodes that operate as a team. Distributed operations allow for greater connectivity, not only between sensors and shooters, but also between those with execution authority and more senior decision-makers at all echelons up the chain of command. Additionally, distributed operations allow for a reduced forward footprint of personnel minimizing intrusiveness within the PN while providing a robust ISR capability. For further information on distributed operations, see AFDD 2-8, Command and Control.

The AOC integrates information from multiple sources and greatly improves management of ISR data collection. If certain sensors cannot communicate directly with one another, their product can be fused through information links in the AOC. The AOC is also tied into a robust global ISR architecture (e.g., the distributed common ground system [DCGS]) that includes ISR operators, multi-source sensor suites, fusion engines, detailed and up-to-date databases, beyond-line-of-sight data links, and analysts. This multiplicity of interlinked and mutually supporting systems enables a greatly increased refinement of ISR input in support of IW. Multiple sources of information can be merged and channeled to forces ready to act upon it. Many of the systems that provide intelligence data are not dedicated ISR resources or systems, requiring flexibility in integration. ISR-derived information can be used in a variety of ways to support situational awareness, intelligence preparation of the operational environment, target intelligence, and assessment.
In addition, the Air Force has integrated ISR with lethal precision attack capabilities to conduct dynamic targeting. The Air Force also has the capability to provide broad-area persistence by networking a variety of sensors, including SIGINT, MASINT, GEOINT, OSINT, and HUMINT. This network facilitates an understanding of the operational environment, the adversary, and other relevant populations and forces.

**Intelligence Collaboration**

Effective intelligence collaboration, collection, and analysis should:

- Maximize ISR data fusion.
- Establish and maintain shared situational awareness.
- Share collection priorities.
- Deconflict activities and operations.
- Collaborate on analysis and ISR concepts of operation.
- Develop targets.
- Share results of operations.
- Assess effectiveness.

**Foreign Disclosure**

Commanders and staffs should coordinate intelligence collection, and analysis with foreign militaries, foreign and US intelligence services, and other organizations. Every attempt should be made to sanitize information to the most releasable level possible to encourage the sharing of intelligence within a multinational environment. However, the sharing of US intelligence is a sensitive issue to be evaluated and approved by a foreign disclosure office based on the circumstances of each situation.

Sharing intelligence with PN security forces and government personnel is an important and effective means of supporting IW efforts. However, PN intelligence services may not be well developed. It is essential for Air Force intelligence personnel to evaluate PN intelligence capabilities, reliability, and offer training as required. When sharing intelligence with the PN, it is important to understand the likelihood of infiltration by insurgents or foreign intelligence services. US sources and methods must be protected. Refer to JP 2-0, *Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*, for further guidance on Intelligence.
INFORMATION OPERATIONS

IO are the integrated employment of the capabilities of influence operations, electronic warfare (EW) operations, and network warfare operations (NW Ops), in concert with specified integrated control enablers, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, destroy, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. While IO are conducted across the range of military operations (ROMO), they are particularly instrumental in IW. For more detailed information, see AFDD 2-5, *Information Operations*.

The military goal of IO is to shape the information environment, while simultaneously assuring worldwide freedom of operation in the air, space, and cyberspace domains. IO are used typically to support the commander’s decision-making and employment of force in traditional war; however, in IW, Air Force capabilities may be primarily used to support IO. IO are at the heart of IW and are crucial to shaping the relevant population’s attitudes and actions. IO may require higher prioritization of ISR, NTISR, and physical attack support than in traditional warfare.

Considerations for IW operations are inherently and distinctly different from traditional warfare. While a state may start a counterinsurgency with a large force advantage, insurgents usually start with a truly asymmetric information advantage over the state; they know where the state is while the state often doesn’t know where the insurgents are. This advantage leaves the insurgency with the ability to choose when and where it will fight. Additionally, non-state actors, insurgents, or terror groups are not hampered by political, legal, and moral restraints.

Due to IO’s potential impact on all other joint operations, coordination in the joint IO cell is vital. IO should be synchronized, integrated, and coordinated with other JIIM operations. In some situations, IO may lead other operations and be the first choice for commanders in confronting an emerging crisis.

**Network Warfare Operations**

NW Ops are composed of offensive, defensive, and supporting activities that achieve desired effects across the interconnected network portions of the operational environment. NW Ops are conducted in the cyberspace domain via the combination of hardware, software, data, and human interaction. The conduct of NW Ops will usually require an extensive interagency approach. Examples of networks include, but are not limited to, radio nets, satellite links, tactical digital information links, telemetry, digital track files, telecommunications, and wireless communications networks and systems.

Use of the internet and other electromagnetic means provides insurgents with a robust capability to recruit, train, and direct operations. US and coalition forces use cyberspace to not only enable their operations but also conduct direct
operations against adversaries. Degrading the adversary’s use of cyberspace can be detrimental to their operations. Network attack destroys, disrupts, corrupts, denies, delays, or degrades information that resides in telephone and data service networks. Attacking the networks will not only influence the adversary’s decision making, but can also affect the target audience of the networked information.

**Electronic Warfare**

EW comprises integrated planning, employment, and assessment of military capabilities to achieve effects across the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), which includes radio, visible, infrared, microwave, directed energy, and all other frequencies. Planners and operators are responsible for coordination and deconfliction of PN and coalition EW assets employed to control the adversary’s use of the EMS. EW can deny, disrupt, degrade, deceive, or destroy communication nodes of the adversary by using electromagnetic, directed energy, and high-powered microwave systems. For this reason, EW is an important coordination element, especially as current and future uses of the EMS multiply.

Control of the EMS can have a major impact on success across the full ROMO. EW assists air and space forces in gaining access to and operating without prohibitive interference from adversary systems. A joint EW coordination cell (EWCC) should be established to centralize EW planning and coordination efforts.

**Influence Operations**

Influence operations affect behaviors, protect operations, communicate commander’s intent, and project information to achieve desired effects. The military capabilities of influence operations are PSYOP, military deception (MILDEC), operations security (OPSEC), CI, counterpropaganda, and public affairs (PA). For more information on CI, see the intelligence section in this chapter.

**Psychological Operations**

PSYOP seeks to induce, influence, or reinforce the perceptions, attitudes, reasoning, and behavior of foreign leaders, groups, and organizations in a manner favorable to friendly national and military objectives.

Air Force PSYOP is an integral part of joint operations and is extensively coordinated throughout the joint and interagency force. PSYOP may be employed through a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF); therefore, the air component neither plans nor conducts independent PSYOP operations. PSYOP is designed to augment joint methods, practices, and objectives in the larger context of theater influence operations.
Malaya (1948 – 1960)

In the successful counterinsurgency in Malaya (1948-1960), airpower was the key enabler for a psychological campaign designed to convince the local people of the legitimacy and efficacy of the government. Leaflet drops were used extensively to deliver safe conduct passes, parody insurgent leaders, report insurgent setbacks, and even to offer pregnant female insurgents the use of government hospitals in order to have their babies in greater safety. Aerial loudspeaker operations were used to rapidly produce time sensitive messages and deliver them to specific audiences, targeting specific insurgents by name with messages designed to reduce their morale and hurt recruiting. Insurgent captives revealed in later interrogations that the loudspeaker aircraft were highly effective in influencing their decision to surrender.

PSYOP can be employed in IW to help counter terrorist threats, protect forces, dissuade or preempt hostile actors, and support counterpropaganda efforts.

Military Deception

MILDEC misleads or manages the perception of adversaries, causing them to act in accordance with friendly objectives. While MILDEC is conducted at all levels, commanders should coordinate deception efforts and actions to preclude “information fratricide” or inadvertent disclosure, compromise, or invalidation of other influence operation initiatives.

When formulating the deception concept, particular attention should be placed on defining how commanders would like the adversary to act, or not act, at critical points. The desired effect is to cause adversary action, not just shape his perceptions. Effective deception efforts require a thorough understanding of adversary cultural, political, and doctrinal perceptions and military decision-making processes.

Counterpropaganda

Counterpropaganda counters or redirects hostile foreign messages and themes. Counterpropaganda should be addressed by aggressive influence operation efforts in an offensive mindset rather than be reactionary to enemy efforts. Gaining and maintaining the information initiative in IW can be a powerful weapon to defeat propaganda. The actor who takes the initiative in disseminating information most likely will set the overall context and frame the public debate. These actions help to disarm adversary propaganda and eliminate the adversary’s ability to exploit tactical mistakes.
Strategic Communication

SC is a focused US government effort to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to the advancement of US government interests, policies, and objectives. SC integrates programs, plans, themes, messages, and products with the actions of all the elements of national power.

SC shapes perceptions at the global, regional, and national level, helping link government actions with message. SC is inherently linked to the IO capabilities of PA and defense support to public diplomacy. Air Force operations can, when appropriate, play a significant role in the larger US government effort to communicate policy and demonstrate US commitment. Effects created through IO employment should always be consistent with overall SC objectives.

Public Affairs

In addition to being the first line of defense against adversary propaganda and disinformation, PA operations are also comprised to analyze and help shape the international public information environment with proactive engagement. Public affairs, while a component of influence operations, is predicated on its ability to project truthful information to a variety of audiences

Integrating PA operations during the strategy development and planning phases of an operation enhances the chance of seizing and maintaining the information initiative for the duration of the campaign. This integration is especially crucial as phase transitions occur in the campaign. PA operations can define public perception and shape local reaction by clearly and properly articulating military objectives, helping provide context for the military operations. In the longer term, PA activities can help garner support for US efforts in nation building or other stability operations supporting US objectives in the country or region.

OPSEC

OPSEC should be employed to help counter any threat to operational information and to protect forces by not allowing the adversary to gain the information required to effective plan against deployed forces.
**AIR MOBILITY**

Air mobility is essential when conducting IW operations, supporting US ground forces, and enabling PN capabilities. Air mobility operations may increase the PN government’s capacity to govern and administer through presence and persistence in otherwise inaccessible regions of the country. They also physically extend the reach of public policy and information programs. Air mobility provides a means of rapidly transporting personnel and supplies to forward areas. Air mobility-focused Airmen, integrated with ground forces, often increases the effectiveness of air mobility and re-supply operations, as well as mitigating risk in those operations.

**Combat Deployment**

Through mobilization and national assistance, air transportation can be used to access remote regions and deliver resources and personnel to address a wide variety of problems and issues. For instance, air mobility can be used to rapidly deploy, sustain, and reinforce ground forces as part of security and neutralization operations. Air mobility has even been used successfully to support political goals by extending the electoral process to rural groups. Logistics tasks are enabled through air landing, airdrop, and aerial extraction of equipment, supplies, and personnel.

Only the USAF can bring to bear prompt, scalable delivery capabilities that can avoid insecure land routes and rapidly move people, equipment, and supplies into remote and dangerous areas at (relatively) low risk.


Fixed wing and vertical-lift airlift provide a crucial capability in IW. In the military realm, fixed-wing transports are best suited for carrying ground assault forces into forward staging areas for insertion. Vertical-lift platforms are ideal for carrying ground assault teams to remote sites unable to support fixed wing operations. In addition, casualty evacuation should be integral to any operation involving the employment of personnel in hostile-fire situations. Vertical-lift assets are best suited for this task because of their retrieval capability.
**Combat Sustainment**

Combat sustainment operations reinforce and resupply units engaged in many aspects of IW. Once delivered to the target area, an inserted force may be totally dependent upon airlift for sustainment, movement, withdrawal, redeployment, or aeromedical evacuation of casualties. Combat sustainment planning usually assumes that operational requirements and assessed threats allow little or no flexibility in the delivery times, locations, and load configurations. Combat requirements and cargo handling limitations at forward operating locations drive flight schedules and load plans. Combat sustainment employs both air landing and airdrop delivery methods.

**Integrating Mobility and Special Operations**

IW, unlike traditional warfare, usually requires a wider use of SOF. Specifically trained Air Force airlift forces provide unique air, land, and airdrop support to special operations. Since there are a limited number of airlift assets dedicated to this mission, the principle of economy of force is particularly important. When performing these missions, airlift crews normally act as integral members of a larger joint package. Because these missions routinely operate under austere conditions in hostile environments, extensive planning, coordination, and training are required to minimize risk. Airlift used in a special operations role provides commanders the capability to create specific effects, which may not be attainable through more traditional airlift practices. Commanders may also consider using indigenous aviation forces to support ground special operations forces in hostile or denied territory with air mobility and resupply, insertion and extraction, casualty evacuation, PR, ISR, and close air support (CAS). Indigenous capabilities should be adaptive, fluid, and responsive to asymmetric or irregular threats and circumstances. For additional information, see AFDD 2-6, *Air Mobility Operations*; AFDD 2-7, *Special Operations*; and AFDD 2-3.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*.

**AGILE COMBAT SUPPORT (ACS)**

ACS is the unique support capability of the Air Force to support operations. ACS produces the effects necessary to create, prepare, deploy, employ, sustain, protect, and redeploy Air Force and the PN’s similar capabilities when required by the JFC’s operational plan. These effects do not occur sequentially. Rather, they are continuous, iterative, and adaptable. Failure to incorporate ACS early in any operation may result in the inability to bring the desired effects to bear. Additionally, failure to incorporate ACS in planning for potential future operations may result in the inability to adequately support and sustain the necessary operations tempo due to an ill-prepared or ill-equipped
operating location. For more detailed information on ACS, see AFDD 2-4, *Combat Support.*

**ACS Operations in IW**

ACS operations in IW may be designed to support US-only or multinational operations, enable PN airpower capabilities against irregular threats, or a combination thereof. ACS may transition from an Air Force support role to the primary application of military force. The complexity and unpredictability of IW operations and activities present challenges to commanders, who should consider the different risks associated with employing ACS in IW:

- Operating in austere environments with limited infrastructure.
- Increased combat readiness for surviving and operating in increased threat environments to include CBRN environments.
- Increased security and force protection requirements.
- Extended logistical lines.
- Communications limitations.
- Multiple distributed operations.

ACS leadership may be required to assess a PN's ACS feasibility and capability as well as develop training and education plans to ensure full mission capability. ACS capabilities may set the conditions for achieving the JFC's objectives by supporting non-military instruments of power during IW operations. As such, ACS should be responsive and sufficient to sustain the operational requirements of IW. This includes the ability to rapidly develop and test new capabilities or modifications to assets to meet existing or future needs.

**Civil Engineering**

Air Force civil engineering forces provide design, construction, repair, and force protection of air and space power facilities, as well as protection of Air Force and PN personnel through explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), fire, and emergency management functions. Civil engineers also provide Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer (RED HORSE) teams capable of large airfield infrastructure and base public works efforts. These capabilities can be used in a secondary capacity to support the PN government through repairing or establishing utility infrastructure, roads, and facilities to support local communities such as schools, clinics, civic meeting centers, etc., as well as during natural and manmade disaster recovery operations.
In IW, commanders should generally give priority to projects most in need of a particular type of support, rather than what could be most efficient. For example, if the PN can accomplish the same work using labor vice heavy equipment, this might be preferable since it provides jobs and community involvement. Conversely, if a PN project is at a standstill waiting for a special capability (e.g., a crane), and one day’s RED HORSE activity will put dozens of people back to work, such a project would be a natural priority.

Civil engineering personnel bring technical, procedural, and organizational expertise that can be leveraged to advise PN engineering efforts. Traditional civil engineering craftsmen can provide advice and training for PN personnel on construction and engineering topics.

In addition, EOD, fire, and emergency management personnel may serve as advisors to support existing or emerging PN emergency service teams. For all specialties, a careful review of the PN request and the proposed level of assistance should be made to ensure security and safety regulations are not violated. Where a mature emergency response PN capability exists, the use of EOD, fire, and emergency management personnel to serve as liaisons can provide great benefits and improve safety by deconflicting efforts and ensuring safe areas of responsibility. However, the direct training of PN personnel can lead to numerous safety, security, and qualification issues which need to be addressed. In all efforts, EOD, fire, and emergency management personnel’s main focus will be on the protection of US and PN direct support personnel from EOD, fire, and CBRN hazards.

Medical Evacuation / Medical teams

Air Force medical teams are generally smaller than their counterparts in other Services, since the Air Force units they support are smaller. Medical evacuation of PN military or civilians can build good will among the population and create a positive message. Such messages should emphasize the US role as a friend and avoid emphasis on providing capabilities that the PN lacks.
Proper use of medical support and humanitarian relief can go a long way in achieving the overall goal of legitimacy in the eyes of the local populace, while failure to provide such support often opens the door to the adversary to enhance its position with local civilians.

**PRECISION ENGAGEMENT**

Precision engagement includes the full spectrum of capabilities that can be brought to bear to precisely achieve effects in support of the desired end state. Precision engagement in IW may be conducted by the same assets and functions used in more traditional operations. Since IW is a struggle for the population’s allegiance, the effect of any engagement operation on the population should be carefully considered. In determining the appropriate capability to achieve the desired effect, planners should look at effect, duration, and consequences to ensure the not only the direct but the longer term indirect effects that may result from use of a capability are anticipated.

Considering COIN in particular, a primary objective for the US and PN is to restore the rule of law. A second-order effect of executing strike operations is that they remind the population that this objective has not been achieved. There is potential for collateral damage from the smallest weapons, even those employed from the ground. If US forces conduct the strike, there may be the perception that the PN government is dependent for its survival on foreign forces. Combined, these may have the indirect effect of delegitimizing the PN government in the public’s perception. Nevertheless, strike operations have a place in COIN, since the ability to hold targets at risk throughout the AO helps the US and PN set the tempo of operations and seize the initiative from insurgent forces. The precision and lethality of airpower often provide the most discriminating application of firepower to COIN forces.

Precision engagement should be designed to employ PN airpower resources to the greatest extent possible. Properly trained and structured teams of Air Force experts, ranging from planning liaison to tactical operations personnel, offer potential for PN unilateral and US/PN combined actions against high-value targets. Use of these options serves to enhance the legitimacy of the PN government while achieving important US security objectives.

Just as in traditional warfare, attacks on key nodes usually reap greater benefits than attacks on dispersed individual targets. For this reason, effective strike operations are inextricably tied to the availability of persistent ISR and are the result of detailed target systems analysis that identifies and fully characterizes the targets of interest (networks, people, objects, entities). Persistence in IW is critical since it will never be known in advance when a key node will be identified or how long it will remain in place. In IW, planners may consider more use of airborne alert than they would during traditional operations.
The C2 relationships established for engagement operations should consider both the need for flexibility and the training level of forces to be employed. For precision engagement in IW, training and competency go beyond basic warfighting skills; Airmen should understand why they are accomplishing a task before they can choose how best to accomplish it. Commanders determining how to conduct precision strike should consider that a highly responsive C2 arrangement that potentially allows the employment of the wrong weapon at the wrong place or time may be worse for the overall effort than a more rigid structure that causes delays.

Air Force forces have historically provided capability to coalition ground forces with CAS only where a qualified terminal attack controller is available. In some circumstances, a ground-based controller embedded with PN forces may be required to determine the situation and ensure compliance with the rules of engagement.

Precision engagement should not include only physically lethal capabilities. The cyberspace domain may present numerous opportunities to directly target insurgents or to positively influence the population. Like air operations, cyber operations can strike directly at nodes of interest. For example, computer network attack may hinder or disrupt insurgent operations, or at least require them to expend resources defending their cyberspace assets.

Likewise, IO can access a connected population directly, without filters. For both attack and defense, a PN’s barrier to entry for some network warfare capabilities is relatively low. A PN may actually be able to employ certain capabilities more effectively than US forces, since they will not have the same language barriers and may operate under different legal restrictions. However, this does not alleviate US forces from following the law of armed conflict (LOAC) and the applicable rules of engagement (ROE). The PN may better understand culturally how to present a case and may have more credibility with the population. To benefit from this arrangement, campaign planners should ensure Airmen conducting lethal and non-lethal operations can quickly communicate their activities and results.

**COMMAND AND CONTROL**

Employing air, space, and cyberspace capabilities theater-wide in traditional warfare requires a robust C2 architecture. The COMAFFOR's theater air control system (TACS) provides such a capability. The speed in which the TACS is able to gather, analyze, and disseminate intelligence provides a critical
capability in IW. The ability to fuse multiple bits of information from multiple sources in a timely manner provides the commander options which may otherwise not have been presented. The ability to act on this information quickly is also critical due to the dynamic nature of IW. C2 is not only critical to Air Force operations but it is also critical for BPC. The ability of PNs to more effectively command and control operations both on the ground and in the air often leads to more effective operations.

When conducting BPC it is important to note that the PN will rarely, if ever, require the same scope and technological sophistication of C2 as the US. Some IW operations will not use the TACS for C2 and instead rely on PN capabilities. It is important to ensure the right level and scope of the C2 be developed based on the requirements of the PN.
Military leaders create strategy, campaigns, and plans using the entire spectrum of military capabilities. In IW, success requires a mindset that focuses on how these capabilities will positively influence the population to support the indigenous leadership. Airmen should understand the nature of IW by looking at the differences between IW and traditional warfare, as well as the operational environments. This understanding provides the foundation for the development and conduct of strategy and planning.

STRATEGY CONSIDERATIONS

Traditionally, strategy has been associated with the integration of the national and military objectives (ends); national policies and military concepts (ways); and national resources, military forces, and supplies (means) to accomplish given objectives in a defined campaign. However, this narrow view may mislead Airmen to believe that strategy begins and ends with the development and oversight of a campaign plan. Airmen should look beyond the achievement of milestones and military end state toward the ultimate political and cultural endstate, while understanding the implications of US action on potential future campaigns and operations.

Strategy development is iterative, relying on feedback to evolve and adapt to the dynamic environment in which it operates. Assessment becomes the critical ingredient that provides feedback for the development and modification of strategy. Understanding what actions have taken place and their subsequent effects allows strategists to evolve their strategy.
Strategy Differences in IW

Airmen need to understand the differences between IW and traditional warfare. Understanding the current operational environment not only requires analyzing the present strategic context, but also the effect of past operations. Campaign strategies involve more than just the use of armed forces. They must also take into account the economic, political, diplomatic, military, and informational instruments that might be used to promote a nation’s interest or secure a state from IW adversaries. The military portion of the theater strategy is only a part of the strategy, and should not be a sole course of action in itself, but rather should set the conditions for the other instruments of national power to operate. Within the context of IW, many campaigns and operations may not be led by the military. The effect of these strategies may not be readily apparent, requiring years and even decades before tangible results are evident.

Long View Versus the Quick Decisive Victory

The protracted approach that adversaries may use in IW requires a long-term strategy for victory. Winning a protracted war is all about winning the struggle of ideas, undermining the legitimacy of a competing ideology, addressing valid grievances, reducing an enemy’s influence, and depriving the enemy of the support of the people. IW requires patience and adaptation. The long view requires Airmen to consider personnel rotations, equipment wear and tear, and the impact on training and education early on in the operational design process.

Center of Gravity

Strategy development for IW requires a realization that an insurgency or terrorist organization exists and requires coordinated action by political and military leaders to determine the insurgency’s characteristics and centers of gravity (COGs). The COG for both the counterinsurgency and the insurgency is usually some segment of the relevant population. Effects on the population may be relatively less tangible, consisting of ideas and perceptions (such as the enemy’s influence or legitimacy).

While the COG remains largely unchanged, an insurgency’s vulnerabilities often shift as an insurgency develops. Early in its development, the leadership of any organization is critical. Leaders provide the strategic direction for the organization. Another key aspect lies with underlying grievances within the population. If the PN’s government fails to address “valid” grievances in a timely manner, the population will continue to be disaffected. If these grievances have some level of tacit support from the population, an insurgency may be able to develop more freely and aggressively expand. If not, the organization may remain largely covert in its development.
The ability to find, identify, and separate targeted individual leaders from non-targeted individuals will most likely be difficult. In addition, depending on the location of the target, the effects desired are often “soft” and may require non-lethal means. Lethal targeting opportunities, when they emerge, are fleeting, and collateral damage restrictions will be challenging.

Additionally, the characteristics of the population will not be homogenous in all areas of the PN. Cultural, geographical, religious, and economic differences within a state or region will often motivate the population differently. Thus, grievances in one area may be different than others, requiring different operations and effects to be achieved.

Focus on Stability

If a national government is weak, corrupt, incompetent, or if the governing authority is absent, a triggering shock can exacerbate an already difficult situation, producing widespread suffering, growing popular dissatisfaction, and civil unrest, all of which can be intensified by several interrelated factors. The absence of key government functions, competing ideology, widespread lawlessness, poor economic performance, pronounced economic disparities, and, in some cases, a serious external threat all influence the strategic context of any operation.

The primary focus of US military forces, civilian government agencies, multinational partners, and, in some cases, NGOs, will likely be helping severely stressed governments avoid failure or enabling the rebuilding of a new government after internal crisis or transfer of power. First and foremost, US forces should establish and maintain a safe, secure environment for the population and government.

The Air Force, through its functions and capabilities, provides the JFC key enablers to maintain a safe and secure environment. In providing security, the majority of military operations should focus on stability and deterrence. This requires early involvement in fragile states. The Air Force brings a flexible force for such operations. Rapid mobility, ISR capabilities, as well as the ability to deter external involvement through traditional deterrence of other state actors provides a more conducive environment for PN governments to develop and stabilize.

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

Proponents of irregular warfare realize that they cannot achieve their desired ideological or political objectives through conventional force and seek to achieve public support for their cause (or at minimum acquiescence to their presence) by creating problems and instability that can be blamed on the government. Disinformation and propaganda campaigns targeting the populace
are very effective means of achieving these goals, especially when tribal, ethnic, and religious affiliations can be leveraged or played against each other.

All operations should be integrated and synchronized to promote governmental legitimacy. As no single Service component has a monopoly on the information realm, a joint approach integrated with governmental and civilian efforts is absolutely essential. This ensures that the cumulative psychological effect of operations is working towards defeating the ideologies of a government’s potential opponents and not sending conflicting messages to the populace or fueling the insurgents’ disinformation and propaganda campaigns. Some IW operations are likely to be conducted in austere, remote regions that are under-governed or on the fringes of PN government control. The characteristic of remoteness affects the communications and logistics reachback capability of deployed friendly forces. It also affects force protection requirements including situational awareness enablers and self-defense measures. Small force size plus limited reachback capability may expose deployed forces to higher threat levels and increased risk. This is especially true of Air Force trainers and advisors embedded for extended periods of time at forward locations with PN forces.

Nations most susceptible to lawlessness, terrorism, and insurgency are characterized by various forms of social, economic, and political fragmentation and by a lack of a unifying national identity within population groups who resist or are denied integration into the national community. Some factors which contribute to this fragmentation include religion, political and ethnic alienation, separatism, lack of accessibility to government resources by certain groups, poor income distribution among social classes, poor economic opportunities, and disenfranchisement or lack of other political rights. Situations most likely to involve Air Force IW activities are prevalent in developing nations where public services, industrial infrastructures, and air support facilities are relatively primitive by Western standards. For additional information, see AFDD 2-3.1, Foreign Internal Defense.

IW will occur in many different operational environments. Adversaries are likely to operate in and from states that can be considered as failed, cooperative, or non-cooperative (see Figure 4.1). The environment influences the types of actions to be taken as well as the ability to conduct these actions. Adversaries are likely to operate within and from non-cooperative states that will limit or restrict joint force access. They will exploit state boundaries and other political, economic, and tribal seams in order to seek sanctuary from conventional military capabilities, complicating coalition planning. Operations in these environments will either support or target state and non-state actors. Once the general environment is determined, Airmen should understand the PMESII context in the area or state of interest to develop a more comprehensive picture of the strategic problem. Finally, operating environments are typically influenced by external states that may have an interest in the conflict.
Failed States

Executing IW against non-state adversaries operating within failed states is a challenge. Denied or non-governed areas may provide potential sanctuary for transnational terrorist networks and other non-state adversaries. These areas may be under the direct control of insurgents. In most cases, Air Force personnel will find themselves in austere locations in developing or underdeveloped countries. Furthermore, the locations from which they will work and live will not likely be able to provide adequate security, health standards, and C2 networks. Given these issues, Airmen may be responsible for their own security, communications, and well-being. There may be a degree of lawlessness and disorder. In such scenarios, the US may be the primary actor and be primarily responsible for both military and political actions. Thus, a large force may be necessary to bring security to such regions.

Cooperative Governments

Support to COIN operations occurs with PNs that either require or request US participation. This environment enables the US to employ many different forms of support including SA and FID. The level of US involvement will likely depend on the capabilities and level of threat to the PN government as well as US strategic goals. Operations in this environment may range from small unit
involvement to larger force requirements if a crisis deteriorates to the point that the PN cannot maintain security on its own. Careful consideration is required when the decision to move from support to COIN to COIN operations as this often not only changes the commitment required but also the perception of the people regarding the credibility and legitimacy of their government.

Non-Cooperative Governments

Executing IW against or within a non-cooperative state involves UW and other indirect approaches applied in conjunction with other diplomatic or economic actions such as blockades or sanctions. While UW has been a traditional core mission of SOF, executing UW as part of a larger IW effort may be more common in the future. UW has traditionally confined itself to operations against a single hostile state or occupying power. Many of the activities took place either within the hostile or occupied state or in the neighboring countries that either directly or tacitly supported efforts against the hostile state. This construct is changing as non-cooperative states have ever-increasing global linkages and interests. The increasingly global nature of IW may require joint forces to plan and execute IW against a non-cooperative state’s decisive points or vital interests that may reside outside the borders of the state itself. These interests may include offshore banking and financial assets, businesses, and other strategic resources, production operations, and facilities. Action against these interests provides the JFC with additional pressure points that can indirectly influence the hostile state adversary without entering the adversary’s sovereign territory. Some of these non-cooperative states may be supporters or sponsors of our non-state adversaries; others will be unwilling or unable to take effective action against non-state adversaries operating within their borders.

Operations in this environment normally require extensive coordination between SOF and those conventional Air Force forces that are assigned or attached to the geographic CCDR. This coordination can be expedited by the use of coordinating authority and direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) between SOF and conventional Air Force forces.

Air Force forces can also support operations against a non-cooperative state in a variety of manners. If the operation is covert in nature, a limited footprint or no footprint is often required. Use of ISR for intelligence and information in this context becomes increasingly important. If the IW campaign includes UW, there may be more Air Force involvement. Airlift will be instrumental in the insertion, extraction, and resupply of SOF and unconventional forces. Aeromedical evacuation and forward-based medical facilities provide critical support for UW operations. In the later stages of an insurgency a forward operating base may be needed or desired to support air operations; Air Force airbase opening capabilities may require augmentation (from joint or coalition partners) depending upon the threat and organic capability of the airbase. As the situation changes, the Air Force must be ready to deliver a variety of capabilities to support the effort and to lead some aspects of it.
THEATER SECURITY COOPERATION PLAN

The TSCP provides the direction and effort of US military forces for each geographic CCDR. This plan combines the effort of each of the individual Service component commanders and PN’s forces. US interests are best served when countries are internally secure, regions are stable, and other countries are willing and their military forces are able to contribute effective capabilities to regional, national, and international operations. Each COMAFFOR should ensure that his/her forces’ capabilities are considered and incorporated into the geographic CCDR’s TSCP. Properly developed and executed TSCPs can significantly shape the environment for future efforts against IW adversaries.

This will require day-to-day involvement with Department of State (DOS) country teams and other interagency organizations to help shape the TSCP. Regional specialists, operational planners, defense attaches, component numbered Air Forces, and CCDR staff elements should all engage in this process. The following information describes some of the ways in which the Air Force aids in the TSCP.

Security Assistance

SA is the provision of defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services in furtherance of national policies and objectives. SA is an important instrument of national security policy. Within the law and policy considerations, Air Force personnel can train and equip friendly foreign forces. DOD and other government agencies train foreign militaries and law enforcement personnel through several different programs, some funded by accounts within the Pentagon’s budget and others by DOS-administered foreign aid budget. SA fosters interoperability between United States forces and our allies.

SA is designed to help selected countries meet their internal defense needs and to promote sustainable development and growth of responsive institutions. The JFC must understand the distinction between personnel performing mission activities under the C2 of a combatant commander and personnel performing those activities under the laws, regulations, and funding applicable to Title 22, United States Code (U.S.C.), Foreign Relations and Intercourse.

Delivery of foreign military sales items can be performed in conjunction with combined operations and contingencies or with other training programs conducted by the geographic combatant commands. These operations may also be conducted by various departments and agencies of the US government.
Building Partner/Regional Capacity to Counter IW Threats

Insurgencies rely on IW to devalue US and other pro-democratic efforts. Building partnerships with allied and coalition forces comprises an important defense against adversaries using IW. Regional partnerships serve the strategic purpose of reducing instability, preventing terrorist attacks, and reducing the potential for expanded conflict. Forward planning in constructing partnerships enables US forces, when the need arises, to rely on these states’ indigenous forces.

In some instances, the best solution may be to work with strong allied partners to increase their capability and capacity to work with less capable PNs. This approach is especially important in regions where historical post-colonial relationships and regional balance-of-power influences provide strong allied partners who have greater access and influence than the US. This approach may also reduce the political stigma associated with US assistance efforts in some countries and regions. The US government may still need to make equipment and training available to the PN and its allies. Ultimately, BPC efforts should enable a PN to assume primary responsibility for deterring and preventing security challenges to itself and US national interests.

Persistent Presence

Persistence is key to effective operations in IW. The joint force needs a persistent regional presence to understand and affect the operational environment and our adversaries. Periodic short-duration deployments to at-risk states may be an inadequate operational approach because the short-term results of these deployments may be reversed quickly by adversary countermeasures and by the inertia common in failed and failing states. This continuity of effort may depend on the ability of joint force members to establish and maintain long-term interpersonal relationships with their counterparts in the relevant US missions and with foreign governments, traditional political authorities, and security forces.

STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

Because of the diversity of IW threats, goals, objectives, and constraints, strategy development should be region- and situation-dependent. This IW strategy development process should always, with the exception of UW, begin with the context and groundwork established by the TSCP. Strategies may require a more dynamic force allocation and presentation process to provide the flexibility and adaptability to counter numerous threats in multiple areas. To be effective, strategy should use an effects-based approach to operations that uses lethal and nonlethal capabilities. Within EBAO all military operations are designed to produce certain outcomes and to avoid effects that are undesirable.
Understanding the Environment and History of the Region

Understanding the environment and history of the region is a prerequisite to effective strategy development in any conflict. The environment, historical processes, and events that spawn insurgencies and counterinsurgencies shape the goals, objectives, and strategies of regional adversaries. This in turn will determine adversary capabilities, tactics, techniques, and procedures (e.g., terrorism, criminal activities, and propaganda). The environment and history also determine the capabilities and needs of the counterinsurgent or insurgent forces the US is supporting. Friendly forces should develop a combined strategy that exploits the respective strengths of the friendly forces and attacks the weaknesses of the adversaries.

Understanding the culture is indispensable to making effective decisions and avoiding costly mistakes. National and sub-national cultures may have different priorities of concerns or expectations of government. Without a thorough understanding of their culture, commanders may expect the population of the PN to hold the same values and expectations the US considers important. This “mirror-imaging” is often counterproductive and frequently leads to ineffective strategies that may have disastrous results.

While fundamental principles remain, the specifics of each situation are unique. It is unlikely that a universal template using previous IW experience will be appropriate for a new conflict.

Integration with Political and Other Interagency Organizations

Strategy development is affected by the organizational construct developed by the JFC or supported governmental organization. For example, Airmen may find themselves in support of a joint interagency task force (JIATF), JTF, military assistance group, or embassy team. Regardless of the organizational construct, political considerations remain central to any strategy. Airmen should be involved at every level to properly present Air Force capabilities and limitations, and integrate these into the overall strategy.

The JFC level normally integrates and deconflicts military IW strategy development with the plans and operations of interagency organizations, international organizations, and NGOs. The JFACC then develops the air component’s strategy to meet the JFC’s IW objectives. While still an emerging concept, many capabilities associated with network warfare and electronic warfare often have high level authorization requirements. Plans that include employing these capabilities should be coordinated early in the process. The Air Force has done a lot to facilitate the employment cyber capabilities, including resolution of legal issues, primarily Titles 10/50, U.S.C., distinctions. Constitutional protections are always preserved.
concept, cyberspace integration should not be overlooked.

**PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS**

Unity of effort during the strategy development and throughout the planning phases is instrumental to formulating a coherent achievable plan. The role of ongoing activities such as Air Force security cooperation, theater security cooperation, US aid to international development operations, and embassy team initiatives is applicable and all associated elements of national power should be integrated during the early stages of planning. Air planners should begin the planning process with a firm understanding of the strategic context and the mission of the JFC.

> The solution of this problem requires imagination, professional skill, and a fine sense of judgment by the commander of the counter-insurgency forces. He must protect the population and at the same time destroy insurgent elements within it. He must understand the population and the conditions which dictate the political operations of government. Tactical success may compromise strategic goals.

―General Curtis E. Lemay

**Commander’s Estimate**

Due to the vast differences between IW and traditional warfare as well as the spectrum of activities within IW, some unique considerations should be addressed. The complex nature of irregular threats presents a broad and extensive set of interconnected problems that typically extend beyond the political boundaries of a single state. To systematically account for and understand the problems associated with this type of warfare, the commander’s estimate should begin with the grand strategy and account for the multitude of different planning and participating organizations that hold a stake in the overall operation. In IW, the initial focus of the commander’s estimate is on understanding the environment and the problem it presents. It is often harder to define the problem than to solve it. Therefore, it is imperative for commanders to use all available resources (time and personnel permitting) to understand the strategic context of the current situation. Failure to comprehend the current situation may often lead to the implementation of a COA that was developed to solve “the wrong problem.” Once the crisis or problem is understood, commanders can determine the appropriate COA.

**Operational Art**

“Operational art represents the essential link between the overall strategy for the operation or campaign and the tactical details of its conduct. It encompasses the processes of planning, conducting, sustaining, assessing, and adapting operations and campaigns to meet strategic and operational objectives.
Operational art determines what will be accomplished in the battlespace; it is guided by the “why” from the strategic level and implemented by the “how” at the tactical level.” (AFDD 2, Operations and Organization)

Operational art requires an effects-based methodology that uses the full range of capabilities available and considers innovative ways to employ them. Operational art and design bridge the gap between the overall strategy and the executable plan. When feasible, plans should encourage and support PN solutions to their problems of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency to reduce the possibility of direct US military involvement. This requires an emphasis on efforts to develop and sustain self-sufficiency. The Air Force provides capability from building partnership capacity to direct combat operations.

As with strategy development, operational art and design are iterative. IW requires repeated assessments from different perspectives to see the various factors and relationships that affect operations. Assessment and learning enable incremental improvements to the plan.

To achieve operational effects, planners develop strategies responsive to the JFC’s objectives. Since the JFC provides guidance and direction during strategy development, it is essential that the air component be represented to articulate its capabilities in this phase of operational design. A large portion of the air component’s missions in IW combat operations is likely to provide capability to ground forces (e.g., airlift, ISR, and CAS) which require the development of integrating plans based on an understanding of the objectives, strategies, and constraints of the ground forces. In this case, strategy should be developed in close coordination with the ground commanders’ process to assure that the air component’s capabilities are effectively exploited and limitations are understood and minimized.

The air component may operate independently in other types of IW operations such as in air-related FID or shaping and deterrence operations. Additionally, the air component may be in the lead role for wide area surveillance and security, which may allow friendly ground forces to better concentrate their operations or operate in small dispersed elements. Monitoring significant border areas and other grey areas requires a close coordinated effort ensuring limited assets provide maximum effect. ISR and strategic attack are also critical in targeting high-value or time-sensitive targets such as terrorist leaders and WMDs. In these air-centric IW missions, overarching strategy development is conducted by the air component through the appropriate AOC and requires close coordination with other joint and government agencies.

Commanders should understand that the contributions of the Air Force in many IW situations are designed principally to apply indirect effects to influence relevant populations. While lethal operations and the application of traditional military force may be necessary, commanders should examine all air, space, and
cyberspace capabilities and select those most appropriate to achieve the effects required over what may be a protracted time period. **In irregular operations, commanders should understand that the application of military force is in support of other instruments of national power, and that traditional joint force organizational relationships may not be as effective for irregular operational environments.**

**Legal Considerations**

IW missions may be governed by unclear or emerging international law. As a matter of policy, US forces comply with the LOAC during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations. Since IW contingencies may develop very rapidly and in locations where US forces have not traditionally operated, arrangements that might otherwise be in place, such as a status-of-forces agreement, may not exist. The legal constraints on the use of US funds, equipment, and supplies to directly support non-US personnel may be complicated. Contingency contracting and the employment of local laborers may also present legal challenges. ROE for IW are often constrained and sensitive to the political and social conditions surrounding the operation.

If operations progress from BPC in a shaping and deterring activity to support to COIN operations, the commander should anticipate changing the ROE. Potentially employing forces in harm’s way, especially in situations where the US is conducting direct support (not involving combat), the ROE should be clearly understood by all operating forces. In addition, operations conducted in such close proximity to the civilian population also present LOAC and ROE challenges. Commanders should be aware of the potential of rapidly changing ROE and the need to inform subordinates as these changes occur. Ensuring Airmen understand the commander’s intent and ROE may often reduce the chance of a small tactical error resulting in a strategic setback.

**Operational Phases**

Campaign plans should typically outline the general phases of the operation. Phasing assists the JFC to organize operations by integrating subordinate operations and helps him/her visualize and think through the entire operation or campaign. There are generally five planning phases: deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority. Each phase represents a subdivision of the campaign’s intermediate objectives during which a large portion of the forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutual supporting activities. Phasing may not be as clear-cut in IW. The JFC may find himself entering an insurgency in something other than the shaping phase. The Air Force may find itself directly involved in phase II (seize the initiative) and phase III (dominate). JFCs should be aware that shaping operations may take place during all five phases and any actions taken to win phases II and III may significantly affect subsequent phases (positively or
negatively). Especially in COIN operations, JFCs may also find themselves in different phases, in different countries, with different campaigns at the same time.

Therefore, the operational environment and military involvement in COIN may not follow the traditional phasing model (Figure 4.2). Operations may solely concentrate on shaping and deterring aggression. Additionally, active participation in a PN’s COIN efforts may have different types of phases. Since COIN campaigns are not small versions of big wars, the classic six levels of phasing an operation may not be appropriate. Refer to the counterinsurgency phases discussion for the differences between the possible phases of a COIN compared to traditional operational phases.

**Figure 4.2. Phasing Model**
COUNTERINSURGENCY PHASES

First Phase (Defensive in nature) - Prepare and Consolidate

This initial phase consists of analysis and planning with the PN, preparation and deployment of the COIN forces along with the commensurate FID programs and IDAD resources to deter the insurgents. Initiatives by the PN’s government require all instruments of national power to be combined into a single, integrated IDAD program using both military and civilian resources. The IDAD strategy needs to be implemented early enough to prevent an insurgency but can also be employed to counter an insurgency that has already matured. The use of indigenous forces is fundamental to the success of this phase. This phase is typified by holding and consolidation activities in order to deter the insurgents and allow time for the COIN strategy to begin working.

Second Phase (Offensive in nature) - Seize the Initiative/Dominate the Battlespace

The Offensive phase includes the application of indirect military actions with the aim of defeating the enemy by destroying his will to fight and winning the “hearts and minds” of the populace. In this phase, the PN’s (not the US’) capability to secure and safeguard the populace is increased while other aspects of the COIN strategy resolve social and political grievances. The PN government must reoccupy contested areas in order to de-legitimize the insurgents and deny them the support of the populace or environment for their operations.

Third Phase – Transition, Conciliation, and Re-integration

This phase is typified by stabilizing the situation and enabling civil authorities of the PN government. The PN is no longer severely threatened, good government and rule of law exist; and social grievances are resolved. This phase is similar to normal stability operations.

Fourth and Final phase - Long-term Nation-building

―Operationalizing COIN,
Joseph D. Celeski,
JSOU Report 05-2, September 2005

Shaping and Deterring Operations

Shaping and deterring operations should normally be outlined in a TSCP. During shaping, US and interagency forces, in concert with the PN, conduct activities to dissuade or deter potential adversaries and ensure or solidify relationships with friends and allies. Shaping operations should be designed to positively affect the perceptions of the PN government and influence the behavior of both adversaries and allies.

Planning for these operations may be typified by small unit deployments to cooperative states. These forces will most likely work with and rely on the PN for
basic logistical support (billeting, basing, and food) and be supported by the COMAFFOR for those resources the PN cannot provide. Operations will tend to be long-term in duration requiring coordination for force rotations and sustainment.

Shaping and deterring operations may also include limited precision engagements. Air strikes on known training camps or sanctuaries in non-cooperative states may be conducted. These operations typically have well defined military targets and a short duration, and will most likely be planned and executed similar to traditional warfare. These operations often play a large role in countering terrorist organizations.

**Counterterrorism**

Counterterrorism operations should also be outlined in the TSCP. In most cases counterterrorism operations require the long-range employment of certain Air Force assets. Conducting operations against these loosely-networked organizations may require significant time for the level of intelligence capabilities to mature. BPC aids in this process.

As more actionable intelligence is gathered, US forces may be called upon to conduct indirect and direct operations. Air, space, and cyberspace capabilities provide a range of options for the JFC when deciding how and when to strike a potential terrorist target set. Plans beyond the steady-state operations are normally short in duration and may rely heavily on the Air Force’s lethal and non-lethal capabilities. The ability to generate operations quickly and deliver precise effects is critical as terrorist targets are often fleeting.

**Support to COIN**

Supporting PN’s COIN operations may present the greatest challenge for air planners. The maturity of the insurgency, the magnitude of operations conducted by the PN, PN capabilities, and US policy will significantly impact US involvement.

**Indirect Support**

Indirect support emphasizes Air Force efforts to develop and sustain host-nation self-sufficiency. Security assistance, appropriately supplemented by joint/multinational exercises and other joint initiatives, constitutes the primary Air Force contribution to indirect support FID operations.

**Direct Support Not Involving Combat**

When it is impractical for a PN air force to develop self-sufficiency in time to counter the threat, the Air Force may be tasked to provide direct support that does not commit US personnel to combat. Such support encompasses Service-
funded activities that improve PN Air Force effectiveness without duplicating or replacing SA efforts to create or maintain PN capabilities. Air Force activities should emphasize the PN’s combat role. These support activities may include:

- Command and control—create a tailored AOC that integrates PN capabilities and leadership.
- Communications—open channels to use Air Force communications assets.
- Positioning, navigation and timing aids—provide equipment and training.
- Intelligence collection and analysis—apply Air Force ISR to defeating irregular networks.
- Aerial photography and cartography—ensure National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) products are available to PN.
- Air mobility and logistics—provide training and fly in conjunction with PN forces.
- Logistics support—provide theater experts and reachback to US logistics pipeline.
- Civil-military operations assistance—civil affairs, IO personnel, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian and civic assistance, and military civic action.

**Direct Support Involving Combat**

On order, the Air Force may engage in combat operations to meet PN and US objectives. Planners should determine requirements based on the PN’s IDAD strategy. Supporting a PN’s COIN efforts will most likely present limitations and constraints not often found in traditional warfare. In addition, the need to maintain the PN’s legitimacy and their role in COIN may result in less efficient tactical employment of airpower, but should ultimately be more effective (e.g., flying more sorties using PN capability rather than one US sortie).

Support to COIN will most likely be a long-term commitment. Planning should determine a sustainable operations tempo as well as the appropriate force requirements. The long-term nature requires close coordination between the COMAFFOR’s AOC and A-staff. Plans need to consider the effect of sustained operations on assets and personnel. Force rotation plans should be coordinated and understood between both organizations. The level of effort may change as the conflict evolves requiring the ability to surge when and where required. Understanding that the nature of the conflict may change multiple times requires planners to continually rely on feedback and assessment in order to shape operations and modify existing plans.
COIN

COIN operations will most likely require the greatest commitment of assets and personnel. The US will most likely conduct COIN operations when the PN is incapable of conducting any substantial operations, the situation has deteriorated significantly (approaching a failed state environment), or when there is no effective government in power (failed state). When there is no legitimate government in power, coalition partners and the US will most likely be responsible for all aspects of the COIN strategy. Thus, some of the restrictions and limitations on employment that occurred while providing capabilities to a PN’s COIN effort may be reduced. However, creating a legitimate government will often be far more difficult in this situation. The Air Force will not only be called upon to conduct military operations but also execute missions for other agencies. Tremendous demands for Air Force capabilities may be placed on the air component.

Support to Insurgency

UW should not be seen as merely defensive in nature. It may also include offensive operations as well. UW operations can be used to exploit a hostile power’s political, military, economic, and psychological vulnerability by developing and sustaining resistance forces to accomplish US and coalition strategic objectives. UW is defined as a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces that are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. (JP 1-02)

While traditionally a SOF responsibility, UW is an operating arena of growing significance to Air Force general purpose forces. In a conflict environment characterized by rogue states, radical nationalism, terrorism, and asymmetric warfare, the ability to successfully apply air, space, and cyberspace in joint and combined UW operations is critical to US defense needs. The joint special operations air component commander, in particular, should be aware of current Air Force capabilities and employment methods to deal with threats that do not readily yield to other conventional solutions. UW operations are usually conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled, or politically sensitive territory across the operational continuum.

Support to insurgency is usually a long-term effort focused on achieving strategic aims directly, i.e., the insurgency or partisan resistance movement results in the fall of the incumbent government. While armed force may be employed, the focus of insurgency and support to insurgency should promote political mobilization and legitimacy.
Planning efforts for UW are normally conducted by SOF elements. UW may follow some of the insurgent strategies described in Appendix A. Air Force capabilities provide unconventional forces with significant capabilities for preparing the operational environment, supporting UW activities, and supporting massed forces during the latter stages of an insurgency. Since the line between lawful support for an insurgency and a “use of force” under the United Nations Charter can be thin, planners should carefully coordinate these activities that cause direct effects when integrated with indigenous forces.

**Preparation of the Operational Environment**

UW operations may be carried out by, with, and through indigenous and paramilitary forces to prepare a combat operating arena prior to the introduction of main battle forces. When UW operations support conventional operations, the focus may shift to primarily military objectives. Indigenous/surrogate forces delay and disrupt hostile military operations, neutralize key targets, destroy enemy lines of communication, disrupt/isolate enemy resources and C2 nets, develop intelligence collection sources and methods, and establish networks and contacts for unconventional assisted recovery operations. Integrating traditional Air Force capabilities provide significant advantages to these UW forces.

The Air Force provides critical ISR, IO, and mobility capabilities for UW forces. Low signature assets can provide timely intelligence on an adversary’s movements and forces as well as insert and extract critical liaison elements to provide IO support.

When UW operations are not in support of a larger traditional campaign, Air Force assets may have to play a more covert or clandestine role. Planning efforts and operations will tend to be on a much smaller scale than other IW operations. UW will most likely require long-term sustained support.

**Supporting UW Activities**

During the early stages of a UW campaign, using and incorporating Air Force architectures for gathering, analyzing and disseminating timely intelligence information can significantly contribute to UW operations. Providing UW support requires in-depth knowledge of the operational environment. It is unlikely that a single UW campaign will be the only ongoing operation in an area of responsibility (AOR). A small, dedicated planning staff may be needed to identify and integrate UW requirements with other air operations.

**Supporting Massed Forces**

As an insurgency matures to the point where direct confrontation with the adversary’s government begins, airpower plays a larger, more traditional role. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM provides one such example of the effect of
overwhelming support of unconventional forces. The incorporation of air, space, and cyberspace capabilities will follow more traditional planning and execution models. Using airpower with indigenous forces allows other US forces to concentrate, reducing the need for large force requirements.

Once US or coalition forces have removed the regime and the insurgency becomes the legitimate government, a transition from UW operations to stability operations may take place. The failure to identify and plan for this transition may have an adverse effect on US stabilization operations and the new PN’s IDAD strategy.

ASSESSMENT

The principal objective in IW operations must be to outthink, outperform, and adapt faster than the enemy locally, regionally, and globally in order to deny him the ability to set conditions favorable to his goals. Local commanders within the IW operational area should continually assess employment and support activities to determine the effects and implications of their actions while following the JFC’s overall intent. The ambiguities resident within IW require frequent adjustment of operational plans to ensure desired effects are achieved while avoiding specifically designated or unintended negative consequences.

Continuous operational assessment and adjustment are best achieved at the lowest appropriate operational level. Operations should be flexible and integrate both civil and military activities, to include the supported government and coalition partners. Significant C2 interoperability challenges in joint, interagency, and multinational operations typically involve incompatible equipment and standards, language barriers, differing C2 procedures, lack of PN experience, and inadequate PN logistics infrastructures to maintain modern communications equipment. Commanders should be fully cognizant of these limitations and structure processes for transmitting information and orders appropriately.

In most forms of IW, operational assessment (OA) will be more subjective than in traditional warfare. When there is not a large enemy fielded force and clear supporting infrastructure, there will be far fewer metrics available that can be easily quantified. Since a large part of the desired effects deal with feelings and perceptions among the local civilian populace, rather than with more conventional measures such as percentage reduction in combat power, OA personnel should train to deal with more intangible metrics. Likewise, commanders should be ready to make decisions based on inputs from their OA teams that may be subjective and incomplete.
CHAPTER FIVE
IW OPERATIONS

Irregular warfare demands continuous, flexible, integrated interagency and international planning and execution with the goal of preventing or, when necessary, responding to challenges within coherent global and regional strategies. The key to success in such a protracted conflict is the ability to adapt to meet the imperatives of the operational environment and develop JIIM capacity for IW and properly integrate and apply force capabilities at the right place and time. The imprecise nature of IW dictates that both force presentation and C2 relationships be tailored to the demands of the operational environment. See AFDD 2-8, Command and Control, for more detailed information.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Air Force forces deploy and employ under the command of a single Airman, the COMAFFOR. These forces, including personnel and equipment, are presented in the normal air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) structure. The AETF presents a scalable, tailorble organization with three elements: a single COMAFFOR, appropriate command and control mechanisms, and tailored and fully supported forces. The AETF presents the JFC with a task-organized, integrated package with the appropriate balance of capabilities, sustainment, control, and force protection. Regardless of the size, composition, or command structure established for conducting an IW campaign, commanders should still adhere to the tenet of centralized control and decentralized execution. However, while these principles are valid for all force employment, their application may be different in the operational environments of IW.

C2 Planning

The determination of the capabilities required and the establishment of C2 structures and command relationships of the forces that execute missions are of utmost importance in the planning process. Planners and leaders should understand that command structures for IW activities will most likely be different than our current military construct.

Air Force planners may have to adapt and develop creative C2 relationships to facilitate successful mission accomplishment and optimize the tenet of centralized control/decentralized execution. Due to the localized nature of most IW enemies and specifically insurgencies, decentralized execution is vital to the successful integration of airpower.

Most operations in IW will be multinational and interagency in nature. Variables affecting the C2 arrangement include the type of operation, type of
Air Operations in Malaya

The problem of reconciling decentralized control of ground operations with centralized control of air operations presented many difficulties. A number of experiments were tried out with the object of trying to decentralize a measure of control of air operations in parallel with the break-down of control of ground operations, but the fact that air effort is indivisible invariably undermined these arrangements in practice. Eventually, after a good deal of trial and error, a workable compromise was reached whereby the local State and District War executives were able to call upon the services of a mobile team of Air Staff Planners, established on the Air Headquarters, whilst control of air operations remained centralized under the Air Officer Commanding.

—Air Operations in Malaya, Group Captain K.R.C. Slater

forces, specific mission objectives, the existing PN C2 infrastructure, and the participation of multinational partners or intergovernmental organizations. At a minimum, C2 planning should ensure that Air Force planners are integrated into the appropriate level of planning for distributed operations and that Airmen command Air Force forces at all appropriate levels.

The TACS is a good example of an Air Force organization that can be adapted or modified by the commander to meet the challenges of IW. The current TACS organization is optimized for a theater-level traditional warfare with the AOC as the senior C2 element and focal point for all Air Force operations. During COIN operations, the preponderance of planning and integration of other Services occurs at lower distributed echelons. These distributed operations, which may not be mutually supporting at the tactical level, should be fully coordinated between commanders at the component level. Often the tactical or local situation drives the appropriate response and the situation in one area may be vastly different from numerous other areas. The level of success in one area may also progress at a different rate than another.

Certain operations require planning at the operational level while other operations may need to be developed at lower echelons. The air support operations center (ASOC) may aid in this effort. The ASOC provides the JFACC a vital link between air and ground operations. The ASOC will normally have more insight and situational awareness of ground operations conducted at the corps level and below. As operations become more dynamic, early air planning conducted at the corps level by Airmen may result in more timely, effective, and efficient uses of Air Force assets prior to ground forces submitting their requests. IW requires a planning structure that is equally focused at the local level and attuned to the dynamic environment. Airmen appropriately positioned at the lower levels with respective input and reachback to the AOC may allow more effective use of airpower at the tactical level freeing other assets to conduct other operational level operations.
Since Air Force capabilities can transition from one operational area to another, it is imperative that there is only one airspace control authority and one airspace control plan per joint force operation, and ideally only one per theater. There may be several locally executed IW engagements within a theater of operations requiring the coordination of all distributed planning activity and operations that may impact airspace control. By allowing some aspect of planning to occur at these lower levels and coordinating them at the operational level, the JFACC maintains the flexibility to better allocate his resources while still ensuring proper airspace control is applied.

**Each IW contingency is different, and no single planning template can be applied to every operation.** Commanders and planners should consider the objectives, duration, environment, and forces when developing plans determining their requirements. A key planning consideration is that IW enemies evolve over time; commanders and their staffs should recognize that an operation that begins with a particular characteristic may turn into something else with different political objectives, threats, and requirements. The ability to change and adapt in IW often requires intimate knowledge of the local conditions in which operations take place. Commanders should balance the ability to centrally plan at the operational level with the potential need to rapidly plan and execute at those lower echelons. “A reluctance to delegate decisions to subordinate commanders slows down C2 operations and takes away the subordinates’ initiative.” (AFDD 2-8)

IW requires protracted intelligence and operational preparation activities, BPC of state and non-state partners, and integration of interagency and multinational IW activities with US missions. Given that success in IW generally requires political initiatives, current JTF organizations reporting directly to the CCDR may not facilitate critical interagency and multinational coordination. The requirement for extensive coordination between these groups in IW may require the establishment of alternative command structures. While the CCDR will still provide prioritization and force allocation across broad AOR activities, the COMAFFOR may present Air Force forces to smaller joint task forces in a supporting role or as specifically attached AETFs. US military groups with expanded operational authorities within the traditional country team construct and operating under direct guidance of a chief of mission or other non-traditional C2 structure may be developed to meet specific circumstances. However, the theater level COMAFFOR, through a theater-level air control system, may still provide the best means for prioritization and provision of limited strategic assets in support of coordinated IW activities. These new structures necessitate development of appropriate planning, coordination, allocation, and deconfliction liaison elements.
**Emerging Concept**

IW will require the joint force to conduct protracted IPE and OPE [intelligence preparation and operational preparation of the environment] efforts, build the IW capability of state and non-state partners, and plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate interagency IW activities with US Missions around the world. The current use of Joint Task Forces reporting directly to Geographic Combatant Commanders does not facilitate any of these critical interagency and multinational IW activities. In the future, combatant commanders will have alternative C2 mechanisms for conducting and supporting IW when a JTF is not required to conduct large-scale combat operations. Some of the alternatives will require changes to current authorities.

—IW Joint Operating Concept

**Geographical Considerations**

Each IW operation is dynamic and unique. The location of operations, bases, and the general geography in the operational area may present the COMAFFOR with other C2 alternatives. The assets and capabilities inherent in the Air Force allow operations to originate from continental US (CONUS)-based and regional locations, or from in the operational area. IW operations may have assets originating from all three locations simultaneously. The diffuse nature of ongoing operations is particularly challenging as the COMAFFOR provides critical support to both air and ground forces throughout the theater. These capabilities should be flexible enough to achieve the desired effect that the IW mission warrants.

**CONUS Basing**

The ability to project influence across large distances is a great benefit in IW. The most important aspect of this is to get the right people, supplies, and needed reachback to the region where IW is being conducted. Intertheater airlift and aerial refueling enables the US to conduct IW operations across the globe. In some cases, cyberspace and space-based capabilities allow the US to conduct global operations without leaving their permanent base, while global strike operations may be generated from and return to CONUS bases.

These global capabilities are available simultaneously to multiple geographic CCDRs. As such, prioritizing these capabilities is increasingly important. In order to provide effective and timely support to the CDR, these capabilities are presented through the COMAFFOR. The high demand for these capabilities may dictate that a supporting/supported relationship be established. For more discussion on supporting relationships, see AFDD 2.
**Theater-based Forces**

Theater or regional basing allows the Air Force to provide greater capability and flexibility in IW. With regional basing, transit times for aircraft and unmanned aircraft (UA) are shortened, allowing longer on-station and loiter times. Airlift operations and aeromedical evacuation operations are also more responsive and timely. Theater basing allows commanders the flexibility to surge and divert forces in order to influence operations in multiple AOs.

However, the complexity of IW may make this wholesale interoperability of forces less effective. Due to the diffuse and local nature of IW, in-depth understanding of the tactical situation in each of these locations is essential. The situation, requirements, and effects required in one area may be drastically different from another. Thorough understanding of the operating environment requires time and experience.

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**Experience in one location cannot be assumed to apply to the environment of another. Over-emphasis on experience gained in a particular operation and environment can lead to inaccurate conclusions about the requirements and capabilities needed elsewhere, and could result in conceptual inflexibility in both hardware and general support.**

---Air Force Manual 2-5, 10 March 1967

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When the majority of forces available to the COMAFFOR are, in general, regionally based, C2 at the theater AOC may provide the most efficient C2 arrangement in order to achieve the JFC’s objectives. Centralized planning of LD/HD assets using a theater perspective is required to meet the competing demands from multiple operational areas. In this situation, it is imperative for the COMAFFOR to receive clear guidance as to the JFC’s prioritized effort. Understanding the JFC’s main effort will allow the COMAFFOR to make more informed decisions and shape operations accordingly. When supporting ground forces in different AOs, direct supporting relationships between specific units may enhance air forces’ situational awareness of the local conditions and effects required. Direct supporting relationships provide the COMAFFOR with the flexibility to shift focus and mass forces from one operational area to another while still allowing subordinate units to focus and enhance their knowledge on certain AOs.

**Basing Inside the Joint Operations Area (JOA)**

Basing Air Force assets within the JOA can provide unique advantages compared to CONUS or theater basing. Almost every aspect of airpower is more effective by being based closer to the JOA. Inside-the-JOA basing (near-basing) should increase Airmen’s understanding of the operating environment and
Forward Air Controllers (FACs) in Vietnam

FACs conducted visual reconnaissance in the same area every day. They became familiar with the terrain and regular activity in their sector and would notice if any big changes took place. Based with the Army units they supported, the forces in action below them were not strangers. FACs had a divided command structure. They lived with the Army, and their mission orders came through a different chain. The FACs' operational boss was an air liaison officer attached to an Army headquarters.

—Multiple sources

It is important to note that when supporting an insurgency, Air Force assets will most likely be unable to base within the JOA and may be required to base further away from the area of operations. This may result in additional ACS and operational considerations. Also, care should be given to ensuring operational security to avoid compromising mission success or involving third party nations.

Environment for Employment

In IW, small unit employment of forces from remote locations may become more prevalent. This is especially true when conducting early shaping and deterring operations through BPC. Operating in remote areas has numerous implications. It can increase requirements to live off the local economy and affect the types of communications equipment used by deployed IW forces when they are operating without benefit of large fixed-base communications structures.
Major environmental factors affecting planning and execution include physical and psychological pressures from hostile elements, social fragmentation, political instability, and economic impoverishment. Difficult terrain, physical isolation of population groups, and poorly developed infrastructures often will impede counterinsurgency and insurgency operations. Air Force capabilities are inherently flexible and can overcome many of these obstacles.

Given such environmental features as poor infrastructures, limited reach-back, and increased risk, it is essential that Air Force personnel functioning as small units (e.g., embedded trainers and advisors for either UW or FID) are specifically organized, trained, and equipped to operate and survive for extended periods of time independent of traditional C2 and support structures. Experience indicates that personal safety and performance are maximized when personnel are organized into teams with mutually supporting, interdependent skill sets. These teams should be capable of operating autonomously with maximum self sufficiency, which in turn supports reduced presence and logistics signature while deployed.

However, the potential for larger scale operations in IW is equally likely. Commanders still need to support and provide for Air Force forces operating from multiple areas at once. The requirements for support may be drastically different for each operating area. This will create increased demand for airlift throughout the theater. All of these factors emphasize the importance of clearly stated command relationships and chain of command.

**Force Presentation**

Although forces are presented through the AETF construct, they may be tailored differently from traditional warfare operations. Two considerations that should be taken into account when tailoring and sizing AETFs for IW are (1) the overall US strategic aim, and (2) the US' relationship with the PN country.

**Supporting the PN**

Air Force forces are tailored to provide capabilities for conducting activities in support of the PN government to bolster its legitimacy and influence over the relevant population. These activities include, but are not limited to, FID, counterterrorism (CT), military civic action (MCA), civil-military operations (CMO), and military support to PN COIN activities. Forces should be tailored to support the PN government’s IDAD plan by providing capabilities that can address deficiencies in PN security and governance. If the security situation in the PN is particularly dire and PN capabilities are lacking or inadequate, US forces may be required to assume the lead for COIN operations during certain times and in specific locations; this will most likely require a large AETF. AETFs should be properly sized, keeping in mind that a large US military presence in the PN creates a significant logistical, political, and cultural footprint. Basing forces in a
neighboring cooperative country may or may not be a viable option, depending on operational or political considerations.

Minimal PN support can be expected from a state where the government is unable to conduct its own operations. This will require AETFs to possess robust capabilities for self-sustainment, combat support, reachback, and force protection. In such cases operations from theater bases may be warranted. However, due to political sensitivity or operational considerations, IW activities may require that Air Force forces operate in a covert or clandestine manner that may impose strict limits on the overall size of the AETF.

Supporting Insurgencies

Air Force forces are also tailored to provide capabilities to insurgencies. This includes, but is not limited to, capabilities that provide support to indigenous resistance movements and other related UW activities. Due to political or operational considerations, UW typically requires that US forces operate with limited visibility.

For IW operations supporting insurgencies, AETFs should be based in a neighboring cooperative country in which the same considerations discussed above apply. Air Force elements conducting IW activities within the affected state itself (e.g., battlefield Airmen embedded with indigenous resistance forces) should be tailored so that they possess reachback capability for limited logistics support, intelligence, communications, and air mobility.

Force Protection in IW

Force protection requirements in IW are driven by the operational tasks that flow from the IW campaign plan, the US relationship with the affected country, and the operational environment. For IW campaigns in support of a cooperative state, Air Force forces will often be required to live and operate as embedded elements attached to PN forces. These forces may be tasked to conduct widely dispersed operations in very austere operating environments, far removed from secure main operating bases. Cooperating with PN forces for force protection can be valuable, given their local knowledge and the ability to interact with the indigenous population and move among them. However, commanders should continually assess the capabilities of PN security forces to determine if they can satisfy US force protection requirements. Force protection is a paramount responsibility for all Airmen and should not be viewed as a task falling solely to Air Force Security Forces, AFOSI, or PN forces. This may require that forces involved in IW receive additional combat training prior to deployment.

Force protection during IW can be a significant challenge, and advance planning for force protection is essential. Distributed operations with reduced
footprints may require Airmen to provide creative solutions to maintain adequate force protection. Small elements may be deployed to many locations requiring PN support. To the extent possible, commanders should consider using in-country and host nation resources. If additional resources are required, they should be assigned to centrally located positions to provide maximum benefit. However, larger force deployments may require larger support facilities and bases which present a more lucrative target for adversaries. Force protection assessments should include threats from CBRN weapons as well as from conventional means. See AFDD 2-4.1, Force Protection, for more detailed information.

EXECUTING OPERATIONS

The most critical part of developing the planning for and employment of Air Force forces is to correctly assess the environment. The analysis should focus on the relevant population as well as the enemy order of battle. The analysis should be a complete and comprehensive country PMESII study. The culmination of the analysis should provide the CCDR or JFC with multiple options to choose and select the correct military force structure. From those options, the Air Force component should be ready to apply personnel, assets, processes, and technology to provide an integrated capability to create the desired effects.

As with traditional warfare, each operational area is unique. Operational level Air Force component command directorates, action officers, and staff members should be completely versed in their AOR and understand air component requirements for US capability and potential PN capability. The operational components are the key entities that tie Air Force TSCPs, combatant command TSCPs, and BPC requirements together to build interoperable capability across the AOR. This requires a great degree of detailed knowledge of populations, their motivations, culture, and how they are influenced. This is a key difference between preparing for and executing traditional warfare and IW. A traditional approach to conflict concentrates more on affecting the enemy’s leadership and military capabilities while isolating the population. In IW, this approach should be reversed; operations should seek to influence the population first, then concentrate on isolating the enemy’s leadership and influence over the population.

Airspace Control

As with all conflict, airspace control in IW presents the JFACC numerous challenges in integrating military and civilian air operations. In traditional warfare military operations will often take priority or are conducted without the presence of civilian operations. In IW, especially when conducting BPC operations or providing support to COIN through indirect or direct operations (not involving combat), the JFACC should consider allowing airspace control over the operating area to be maintained by the PN air traffic control if it is capable of doing so. As the level of effort increases or if, upon direction, the joint force is tasked to
conduct combat operations, the JFACC should assume airspace control authority.

**Operation Cycles**

Within the context of a campaign plan or in conjunction with the combatant commander’s intent (when there is no military campaign), the goal of Air Force operations should be directed toward the stability and security of the PN.

Properly assessing the situation will lead to the sequencing of operations. Traditionally, sequencing implies linear time or event phasing. In IW, the enemy will use this predictive operational planning and execution paradigm against US forces by shifting their weight of effort in such a way as to disrupt operations. In the context of IW, sequencing can be based on time, events, relationships, intended consequences, or unintended consequences.

Employment of US forces and execution in IW generally follows a cycle of operations. This cycle includes:

- Assessing PN capabilities.
- Enabling PN (BPC).
- Conducting direct operations (may or may not involve combat).
- Reducing Air Force involvement in direct operations.
- Sustainment.

This process is iterative and US involvement may not necessarily evolve to direct operations. By definition, IW is non-linear in nature, so commanders may have to rethink operations. It may be more useful for commanders to think of IW in terms of cycles of operations instead of sequencing. Effective operational assessment and continual reassessment of the situation is critical to effective IW operations.

**Enabling PN Air Capabilities**

Part of the Air Force’s mission prior to an IW campaign or in an effort to avoid an IW campaign, should be to enable a PN’s airpower capability to include personnel training; building infrastructure for logistics, support, and sustainment; and platforms to conduct air operations. When conducting operations against a non-cooperative state, campaign planning should include a COA to leave airpower infrastructures intact as much a possible. Airmen should be an integral part of the reconstruction planning team.

When supporting cooperative states, executing even the most modest air force capabilities can provide significant contributions to IW in the form of
delivering humanitarian aid, transportation of political leaders, government presence, ISR capabilities, and border security.

In the absence of any PN air force capability, Air Force and SOF forces may be tasked with assisting in building this capability. A capable and competent air force is not built overnight. Some capability requires infrastructure which requires forethought, planning, and partnership with the PN. The Air Force is prepared to build this capability but early identification of requirements makes the realization of capability happen at a faster pace.

**Conducting Direct Operations**

Depending on the capability of the PN, direct operations may be conducted solely by US forces or in conjunction with PN forces. Direct operations will most likely be integrated with ground force operations. It is vital that US and PN air and ground forces be interoperable. US involvement in direct operations should be minimized. PN executing operations on their own behalf help provide legitimacy to the PN forces.

**Transitioning from Direct Operations**

Ideally, US forces should not become involved in direct combat operations, but should provide indirect support to PN in an IW conflict. Whether the US becomes involved directly or indirectly in IW, a properly conducted IW campaign may take years or even decades.

Realizing that IW is non-linear in nature, commanders should expect that a reduction in presence will be non-linear as well. Some aspects of airpower will mature more quickly than others and the Air Force will be able to divest itself sooner from some aspects of employment than others. As a rule of thumb, Airmen should be involved in direct operations as long as US ground forces are conducting direct operations. Even when US ground forces cease direct operations, it is likely that Airmen will remain in the PN to facilitate building and sustaining PN air forces, since building this capability can be a lengthy process.

**Sustaining the PN**

In providing a PN an air and space capability, it is important that Air Force leaders coordinate with all the partners in the interagency process. Understanding the capabilities that the PN can sustain is vital for long-term success.

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**AT THE VERY HEART OF WARFARE LIES DOCTRINE…**
SUGGESTED READINGS

**Air Force Publications**
(Note: All AFDDs are available at [https://www.doctrine.af.mil](https://www.doctrine.af.mil), and AFOTTPs at [https://505ccw.hurlburt.af.mil/505og/505os/afottplibrary.htm](https://505ccw.hurlburt.af.mil/505og/505os/afottplibrary.htm))

AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*
AFDD 2, *Operations and Organization*
AFDD 2-1, *Air Warfare*
AFDD 2-1.8, *Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Operations*
AFDD 2-2, *Space Operations*
AFDD 2-3.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*
AFDD 2-4, *Combat Support*
AFDD 2-4.1, *Force Protection*
AFDD 2-5, *Information Operations*
AFDD 2-6, *Air Mobility Operations*
AFDD 2-7, *Special Operations*
AFDD 2-8, *Command and Control*

AFOTTP 2-1.1, *Air and Space Strategy*

**Joint Publications**

JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*
JP 3-05.1, *Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations*
JP 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*
JP 3-09.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Close Air Support*
JP 3-10, *Joint Security Operations in Theater*
JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations*
JP 3-17, *Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations*
JP 3-18, *Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations*
JP 3-53, *Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations*

**Other DOD Publications**

US Army Field Manual 3-24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, *Counterinsurgency*

US Marine Corps. April 1987

Other Publications


APPENDIX

UNDERSTANDING INSURGENCIES

While not all insurgencies are the same, they share common characteristics. Understanding the motivation, organization, and support structure of an insurgency provides the insight needed to defeat it.

INSURGENT MOTIVATIONS

An insurgency is defined as an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02) Insurgencies tend to form in situations where the local population is suffering from relative deprivation of basic services, perceived grievances, or outright oppression. These conditions are often cultivated from political, cultural, or religious differences, and perpetuated by insurgents who deliberately orchestrate an IO campaign. Unable to make significant change in the system that has brought about these conditions, insurgents attempt to modify, replace, or separate from the government through violent means.

Additionally, there are movements that do not seek to change some aspect of the existing system, but seek to destroy it. Such extremists tend to be religiously motivated; others embrace a fanatical ideology that seeks to destroy the current system. To these groups destruction may be an end in itself or it may compel a revolutionary change worldwide.

The motivations discussed below describe the strategic direction and objectives that an insurgency is ultimately trying to achieve. From the government’s perspective, as the insurgents’ goals become more drastic or radical, the less likely minor concessions to underlying grievances will solve the crisis. In those cases where motivations support separation, overthrow, or destruction of the existing government, responses and counterinsurgent methods tend to intensify. Understanding insurgents’ motivations and objectives should aid commanders in determining a course of action.

Political

In general, insurgencies ultimately have political objectives. The source of political motivation results from perceived grievances with the government’s policies. Historically, politically based insurgencies tend to use latent, underlying social and economic grievances to incite the emotions of the population. They highlight the government’s inability or lack of desire to address or change these grievances. As an insurgency matures, the organization postures itself as the means to remedy these grievances. Ultimately, the insurgents offer alternatives to the populace usually in the form of either overthrowing the government or separating from it. Nationalist or separatist objectives normally draw upon other
motivational factors as well as cultural and religious differences. For some groups political and religious motivations are often the same.

**Cultural**

Insurgencies may spawn from cultural or ethnic differences between groups in a state. These types of insurgencies often form because of oppressive regimes that persecute a given group. Such insurgencies may take on nationalist overtones if the group seeks autonomy from the PN.

**Religious**

Insurgent groups often employ religion as a basis to portray their movement favorably and mobilize followers in pursuit of their political goals. For example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army frequently used Roman Catholic iconography in its publications and proclamations, although many of its members were not devout Catholics. In other cases, a religious ideology may be the source of an insurgent group’s political goals. This is the case in al Qaeda’s apparent quest to reestablish a worldwide Muslim Caliphate. For many Muslims, this invokes the golden age of Islamic civilization and helps mobilize support for al Qaeda among some of the most traditional Muslims while concealing the fact that al Qaeda’s leaders envision the “restored Caliphate” as a totalitarian state similar to the pre-2002 Taliban regime in Afghanistan.

—Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency

**Economic**

While insurgents can be motivated by economic grievances, this is usually done under the premise of countering political policies that have created the perceived grievance. Economic motivations discussed here result from power and money themselves. Criminal organizations may use IW in this regard to terrorize or influence a specific area in order to exploit it for their purpose. Not only do these profits support the insurgency, they may also be used to supplement and influence the local populace. The most obvious example is the international drug trade and associated money launderers. More importantly, other insurgencies and terrorist organizations, including radical extremists, may depend on the funds generated from these illegal activities.

Economic insurgencies or terrorist groups rarely seek to overthrow or promote change in the existing government. It is to their benefit if the government is incapable of supporting or governing the areas they wish to exploit. By providing basic services or through the use of brute terror, these organizations effectively control outlying areas, providing the freedom for them to
carry out illegal activities. Being economically motivated, such organizations will remain as long as there is a profit to be made.

**Radical Extremism**

Radical extremist insurgents frequently hold an all-encompassing worldview; they are ideologically rigid and uncompromising. Radical secular and Marxist movements have many characteristics similar to religious extremists. Belief in an extremist ideology fortifies the will of believers. Religious extremists think of themselves as “true believers” and brand those they consider to be “non-believers” as enemies. Some ideologies, such as those underlying the culture of martyrdom, maintain that dying for the cause will be rewarded.

Religious extremists may believe that pluralism and secular government are unacceptable and that the destruction of their ideological opponents is inevitable. Religion is absolute and violent extremists are often willing to use whatever means necessary, even violence against their own followers, to meet their political goals. Nevertheless, some are highly pragmatic and pursue more limited goals. They may form alliances of necessity in order to achieve their goals. Ultimately extremists see the need for revolutionary and not evolutionary change to the existing political system.

In this light, commanders should consider the presence of extremism in any insurgents’ ideology when evaluating possible friendly and enemy courses of action. While most insurgencies will often have extremist elements, they usually are held in check by the objectives of the organization. However, when extremism is the objective, insurgents resist changing their worldview; for religious extremists, religion is a very deeply held belief, and coexistence or compromise is often unacceptable. Dialog and negotiation may well prove unproductive and operations focused on establishing good will among such a populace are unlikely to be effective.

**ORGANIZATION**

During early stages of development and maturation, most insurgencies display some of the following organizational elements:

- **Leaders of the organization.** Typically, the leadership provides the strategic direction to break the ties between the people and the government and to establish credibility for their movement. Leaders may hold their positions based on their personality; power of ideas; promotion through the organization; or by religious, clan, or tribal authority. Though these leaders may not be visible, their existence and identities usually are known.

- **Active participants.** These are the executors of the organization’s strategy. They conduct attacks, train recruits, and mobilize support. While this group is not as identifiable, its operations may expose it to the government. This group
may be subdivided into “combatants” and “political cadre,” with the former involved in violent actions, and the latter in non-violent actions.

**Active supporters.** This group sympathizes with the insurgency cause and provides valuable support. This group is largely unknown to the government and difficult to identify. It performs such services as storing weapons and supplies, and providing information, funding, sanctuary, and other services.

**Mass Base.** The mass base consists of the followers of the insurgent movement—the supporting portion of the populace. These members may continue in their normal positions in society. While most do not provide specific services, their general support provides the resource base (financing and manpower) for recruiting future active supporters and participants. (FM 3-24)

**Population.** The final element in an insurgency is the population. How the general population views an insurgency and reacts to it can either impede or promote its development. When an organization’s goals are not popular with the majority of society, that organization will find it difficult to mature in highly populated areas. This limits operations and support. However, when the population is indifferent, this provides an advantage for the insurgents. Indifference allows more operations to take place among the general population, making identifying, tracking, and targeting active members and leaders more difficult. Thus, in an urban environment with an indifferent population, those forces conducting counterinsurgency operations will be highly vulnerable. This is why the relevant population is almost always considered the center of gravity in IW.

Unlike traditional state versus state conflicts, IW pits the government of political states that are hierarchically organized against organizations that tend to be networked and loosely structured. Due to the secretive nature of insurgencies, especially in the early stages of development, the leadership and active participants tend to adopt a flat, networked structure making the identification of leaders difficult. Flat structures result in a movement that rarely functions as a single entity. However, these organizations are capable of inflicting substantial casualties and damage. Loose networks usually have difficulty in forming a viable counter state and often have infighting as different “nodes” may hold slightly different views; they therefore have great difficulty seizing political power. However, flat, loose networks are very hard to destroy and can continue to create instability, even when degraded. It usually takes very little coordination to disrupt most states. The level of decentralization of responsibility and authority drives the insurgency’s structure and operational procedures.

**OPERATIONS**

The conflict in IW centers around two basic arenas: The first is the struggle for political legitimacy or influence and the second violent conflict. In this sense, insurgents have a dual advantage. Insurgents win when they prevail in
only one of these two struggles; the government, on the other hand, must win both struggles or they lose.

Insurgents conduct operations for generally two purposes: to influence the population that their cause is worthy and that they will win; and to affect the political will of the PN government and coalition support. If insurgents are successful in garnering support, the movement continues to mature, potentially becoming strong enough to reach its goals. Subsequently, by breaking the coalition’s will, the insurgents then only have to defeat the PN government that, because intervention of coalition forces was required, is probably incapable of dealing with the insurgent threat and will be forced to acquiesce unless its capability has been increased through FID and other programs.

The methods used by each group are largely political and can take any number of forms, including violent resistance, terrorism, guerrilla war, or revolutionary war. For both sides, the ultimate goal in IW is to produce a positive psychological effect on the affected population in order to obtain support and weaken support for the opposing group.

Leaders in an insurgency generally set the strategic goals for the organization and allow active participants the autonomy to conduct operations. Thus, tactical level operations may not readily support other tactical operations conducted in other areas, but all operations support the strategic goal. Insurgents use non-violent and violent means to accomplish these goals.

**Non-violent Operations**

Insurgents will exploit news media and the internet for communications, propaganda, funding, recruiting, and training. They function more like a tribal group, crime syndicate, or extended family than like a military or paramilitary organization. Using the internet, insurgents can now link virtually with allied groups throughout a state, a region, and even the entire world.

Insurgents will often use any underlying grievance that the population may have and use it to further fuel their cause. Thus, if there are widespread grievances, the organization in local areas carries out activities to satisfy them and attributes any solutions to the insurgency. As insurgencies mature, they tie all sorts of problems to larger issues requiring drastic measures. They must develop, build, and sustain an attractive message demonstrating moral superiority over the government and justification for their actions.

The proliferation of technology and information tools increases the amount of power available to insurgents and non-state actors. Individuals and organizations that were once contained in a particular region now have the ability to connect and recruit beyond state borders by collaborating and exchanging information virtually. Information age tools can magnify the desired effects of these groups and help propagate their message and cause.
Violent Operations

Violent operations are performed to seek psychological effects and are used to support IO. In most situations, an insurgency will not have developed to the point where it can counter a government’s capabilities. Early operations tend to focus on gaining the support of the populace, furthering support, gaining resources, and providing a base of operations from which to achieve their objectives.

Operations often use guerilla tactics, not necessarily to win but to avoid losing. Guerillas fight at the times and places of their choosing, attack small or isolated elements of the government, and then disperse in order to blend back into the population. Small units that operate in a dispersed fashion can avoid presenting targeting opportunities to a technologically superior foe. Guerilla tactics also involve operating close to civilians to offset surveillance and firepower advantages of a stronger adversary. These tactics help the insurgent organization discredit, embarrass, and frustrate the government, divert attention away from the larger effort to garner political support, and cause the government to divert resources to countering the attacks.

IW may also involve terrorist tactics. Terrorism and counterterrorism are activities conducted as part of IW and are frequently elements of insurgency and counterinsurgency. However, terrorism may also stand alone when its purpose is to coerce or intimidate governments or societies without overthrowing them. Insurgents often aim to deliberately create and exploit fear through violence or the threat of violence to obtain their political goals. Terrorist tactics can create powerful psychological effects among the target population.

Support

For either side, popular support is the source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. The support of the people ultimately determines which side prevails in IW. Thus, both attempt to convince the population that they should fight for their cause.

Insurgencies generally receive support from two critical sources: internal and external. Internal support is received from local active supporters and the mass base that either directly or indirectly supports insurgent goals and operations. Support is often linked to the perception of the organization’s legitimacy. The degree of acceptance from the mass base typically determines the level of support that can be garnered from them. Additionally, few insurgencies or terrorist campaigns succeed without some form of external support from another state or non-state actor.

Internal Support. Internal support provides an insurgency with medical assistance, supplies, intelligence updates, and training for new recruits. Traditional lines of communication and supply are not as apparent in IW. Instead of a flow of supplies from rear areas toward front lines, insurgent organizations obtain supplies from within the population. The lack of a distinctive logistics tail
along with the insurgent’s ability to get by with relatively few supplies when compared to a conventional force complicates traditional attempts to isolate insurgents.

The ability to gather and transmit accurate intelligence is a critical characteristic of a successful IW operation. Well-placed agents functioning within the local population bolster this intelligence network. As an organization expands and integrates with a local population, it increases opportunities to obtain more manpower and supplies critical for recruitment and further operations. As the insurgents gain more influence within the population their ideas can expand and penetrate every aspect of a society, making it very difficult to dismantle or isolate. Because insurgents are often embedded in an existing government, they have many opportunities to impede and discredit the conduct of that government. Finally, the existence of a shadow government can challenge the legitimacy of the established regime by its announced agenda and its persistence and control of certain areas. Such an organization can also serve as a conduit for sympathetic external support.

**External Support.** Access to external resources and sanctuaries influences the effectiveness of insurgencies. While support from neighboring states is often evident, such assistance is not limited to these countries. Countries from outside the region seeking political or economic influence can also support insurgencies. Insurgencies may turn to transnational criminal elements for funding or use the internet to create a support network among NGOs. Ethnic or religious communities in other states may also provide a form of external support and sanctuary, particularly for transnational insurgencies.

**STRATEGIES USED BY INSURGENTS**

> Historically, sanctuaries in neighboring countries have provided insurgents places to rebuild and reorganize without fear of counterinsurgent interference. Modern target acquisition and intelligence-gathering technology make insurgents in isolation, even in neighboring states, more vulnerable than those hidden among the population. Thus, contemporary insurgencies often develop in urban environments, leveraging formal and informal networks for action. Understanding these networks is vital to defeating such insurgencies.

> The meaning of the term sanctuary is evolving. Sanctuaries traditionally were physical safe havens, such as base areas, and this form of safe haven still exists. Today, insurgents can also draw on “virtual” sanctuaries in the internet, global financial systems, and the international media. These virtual sanctuaries can be used to make insurgent actions seem acceptable or laudable to internal and external audiences.

—FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency
Governments can be overthrown in a number of ways. Additionally, insurgents may seek first to remove or expel an occupying foreign force whether or not this foreign force is integral to the existing government’s capabilities or acts in lieu of such government. Understanding some of the more common strategic approaches to insurgency provides a framework for Airmen to aid in the development of an overall strategy to counter these movements. Insurgent strategies, or approaches, include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Coup d’etat.
- Military focused—(Foco) movement.
- People focused—protracted popular war.
- Urban focused.

**Coup d’etat**

Coup d’etat is characterized by the quick and violent overthrow of an existing government. This approach usually involves a few key leaders and military members in the existing government. These members make up the “vanguard” of the movement remaining highly secretive until the time is ripe for them to seize power. While this “vanguard” can often set the conditions for their operation, they often rely on other events to provide the catalyst for action. The results of a coup usually become apparent quickly. Either the coup is successful or the “vanguard” incorrectly assessed the situation and their level of support within the government, which quickly puts down the movement. Due to their secretive nature and small organization, coup members typically do not have time to rally support if the attempted coup is unsuccessful. Thus, once a coup begins, the results have largely been predetermined. Coups typically rely on the support of a large conventional force.

**Military Focused – (Foco) Movement**

Users of military focused approaches aim to create revolutionary possibilities or seize power primarily by applying military force. For example, the focoist approach, popularized by figures like Che Guevera, asserts that an insurrection itself can create the conditions needed to overthrow a government. A foco is a single armed cell, which emerges from hidden strongholds. In theory, this cell is the nucleus around which mass popular support rallies. While the Cuban revolution occurred in this manner, subsequent attempts patterned on it in Latin America and Africa have mostly failed. However, this approach has been used in combination with others and should not be discounted out of hand.

**Popular Protracted War**

The use of popular protracted war is well documented. The Chinese Communists used this approach to conquer China after World War II. The North
Vietnamese and Algerians adapted it to fit their respective situations. This type of insurgency usually progresses through an evolutionary process marked by a series of phases corresponding to major transitions in the revolutionary movement. Although insurgencies can take many forms, these phases are common to many. Mao Zedong’s theory of protracted war outlined a three-phased, politico-military approach including a pre-hostility or incipient phase, a guerrilla warfare phase, and a conventional confrontation phase.

- **Phase I–Strategic Defensive** corresponds to infrastructure development plus initial recruiting, organizing, training, and equipping of combat elements. During this phase, insurgents may engage the government in open political confrontations like public demonstrations, labor strikes, and boycotts. Insurgents often establish secure base areas for military command elements and guerrilla operations during this phase. Political-ideological cadres focus on indoctrination of civilians and armed revolutionaries.

- **Phase II–Guerilla Warfare** is the first level of armed violence. Irregular forces engage in sabotage, interdiction of communication and logistics links, assassination, and selective attacks against government forces. Insurgents expand their secure base areas and, where possible, link them to form strategic enclaves of political autonomy.

- **Phase III–Strategic Counteroffensive** marks the transition from guerrilla actions to operations incorporating the tactics, techniques, and procedures of conventional fire and maneuver.

The reference to conflict phases is only a means of identifying critical shifts in the scope and intensity of insurgent activity. Phases may not signify a clean break between one kind of activity and another, and may not apply in every conflict. For example, infrastructure development is a continuous process of expanding administration, command and control, training, and employing mobilized resources. Mobilization of insurgent combat forces must continuously expand to carry the insurgency from one phase to the next. Similarly, guerrilla operations in Phase II may carry over into the strategic counteroffensive phase as a force multiplier. Also, an insurgency does not have to progress through all three phases to succeed. A critical combination of political, economic, psychological, and military pressures may be sufficient to precipitate a government's collapse or persuade a government’s foreign backers to withdraw at any stage of a conflict. In Afghanistan's war against Soviet occupation, operations essentially started in Phase II and never progressed to Phase III before Soviet forces withdrew and the government they supported collapsed.

This type of insurgency is most vulnerable to government countermeasures during the initial build-up phase, before the insurgent develops military forces. Once the insurgency takes up armed combat, government countermeasures become far more complicated and difficult to apply. Insurgent
warfare is, however, reversible. Reversibility can work to the advantage of either side in the conflict. If an insurgency fails militarily in one phase, it can revert to a lower phase, thus securing its survival while generating or reinforcing combat capabilities. The government, on the other hand, may be able to capitalize on reduced levels of military activity to focus on solutions aimed at rooting out the infrastructure and eliminating economic and political grievances that may fuel the revolution. Therefore, the strategic environment may be defined by multiple operations, operating at different phases in different areas.

Urban Focused

Urban focused insurgencies may become more prevalent and effective as societies become more and more urbanized. This strategy uses terrorist tactics in urban areas to accomplish the organization’s goals requiring small cells with little to no popular support operating among the urban population. Historically, such activities have not generated much success without wider rural support, but they remain very difficult to counter. Urban strategies may typically provide excellent means of conducting tactical operations, but increasing public support is often difficult.
# Glossary

## Abbreviations and Acronyms

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACS</td>
<td>agile combat support</td>
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<td>AETF</td>
<td>air and space expeditionary task force</td>
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<td>AFDD</td>
<td>Air Force doctrine document</td>
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<td>AFOSI</td>
<td>Air Force Office of Special Investigations</td>
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<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
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<td>AOC</td>
<td>air and space operations center</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>ASOC</td>
<td>air support operations center</td>
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<td>BFT</td>
<td>blue force tracking</td>
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<td>BPC</td>
<td>building partnership capacity</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>close air support</td>
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<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
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<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>COG</td>
<td>center of gravity</td>
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<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency</td>
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<td>COMAFFOR</td>
<td>commander, Air Force forces</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>counterterrorism</td>
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<td>CTO</td>
<td>counter threat operations</td>
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<td>DCGS</td>
<td>Distributed Common Ground/Surface System</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIME</td>
<td>diplomatic, informational, military, and economic</td>
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<td>DIRLAUTH</td>
<td>direct liaison authorized</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>EBAO</td>
<td>effects-based approach to operations</td>
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<td>EMS</td>
<td>electromagnetic spectrum</td>
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<td>EOD</td>
<td>explosive ordnance disposal</td>
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<td>electronic warfare coordination cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>F2T2EA</td>
<td>find, fix, track, target, engage, assess</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>foreign military sales</td>
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<tr>
<td>Term</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>geospatial intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDAD</td>
<td>internal defense and development</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW</td>
<td>irregular warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>Joint force air and space component commander [USAF]</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFO</td>
<td>joint fires observer</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIATF</td>
<td>joint interagency task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIIM</td>
<td>joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JPOTF</td>
<td>joint psychological operations task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTAC</td>
<td>joint terminal attack controller</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>LD/HD</td>
<td>low density/high demand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOAC</td>
<td>law of armed conflict</td>
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<tr>
<td>MASINT</td>
<td>measurement and signature intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>MCA</td>
<td>military civic action</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILDEC</td>
<td>military deception</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAR</td>
<td>non-conventional assisted recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTISR</td>
<td>non-traditional intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NW Ops</td>
<td>network warfare operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>operational assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSINT</td>
<td>open-source intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMESII</td>
<td>political, military, economic, social, infrastructure and informational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PN</td>
<td>partner nation</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
PNT  positioning, navigation, and timing
PR  personnel recovery
PSYOP  psychological operations

RED HORSE  Rapid Engineer Deployable Heavy Operational Repair Squadron, Engineer
ROE  rules of engagement
ROMO  range of military operations
ROVER  remote operations video enhanced receiver

SA  security assistance
SC  strategic communication
SIGINT  signals intelligence
SOF  special operations forces

TACON  tactical control
TACS  theater air control system
TSCP  theater security cooperation plan
TST  time sensitive targeting
TTP  tactics, techniques, and procedures

UA  unmanned aircraft
UAR  unconventional assisted recovery
USSOCOM  United States Special Operations Command
UW  unconventional warfare

WMD  weapons of mass destruction

Definitions

administrative control.  Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)

air and space power.  The synergistic application of air, space, and information systems to project global strategic military power. (AFDD 1)

antiterrorism.  Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)
center of gravity. The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 1-02)

command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)

counter threat operations. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations’ capability to find, fix, track, and neutralize the enemy in order to create a sustained permissive environment for military forces, as well as provide a safe and secure operating environment. Also called CTO. (AFMD 39)

counterguerrilla warfare. Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies against guerrillas. (JP 1-02)

counterinsurgency. Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN. (JP 1-02)

counterterrorism. Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

cyberspace. A domain characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify and exchange data via networked information systems and associated physical infrastructures. (National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, 2006)

doctrine. Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application. (JP 1-02)

foreign internal defense. Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

guerrilla warfare. Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. Also called GW. See also unconventional warfare. (JP 1-02)

insurgency. An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (JP 1-02)
**insurgent.** Member of a political party who rebels against established leadership. (JP 1-02)

**intelligence preparation of the environment.** Tactical intelligence activities conducted to gain understanding of the physical, military, and civil characteristics of potential operational areas. Also called IPE. (IW Joint Operating Concept)

**irregular forces.** Armed individuals or groups who are not members of the regular armed forces, police, or other internal security forces. (JP 1-02)

**irregular warfare.** A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. (JP 1, page I-1; AFDD 2-3)

**joint force air component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

[The joint air and space component commander (JFACC) uses the joint air and space operations center to command and control the integrated air and space effort to meet the joint force commander’s objectives. This title emphasizes the Air Force position that air power and space power together create effects that cannot be achieved through air or space power alone.] [AFDD 2] {Words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}

**operational art.** The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 1-02)

**operational environment.** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02)

**strategy.** A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and/or multinational objectives. (JP 1-02)

**terrorism.** The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in
the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

**unconventional warfare.** A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called **UW.** (JP 1-02)

**weapons of mass destruction.** Weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapon. Also called **WMD.** (JP 1-02) [The Military Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (NMS-CWMD), 13 February 2006, deletes “high-yield explosives” from this definition and changes the language “transporting or propelling the weapon” to “delivery of weapons.”] {Words in brackets apply only to the Air Force and are offered for clarity.}