The United States (US) employs a variety of political, economic, informational, and military instruments to help host governments free and protect their societies from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. The total US assistance effort is termed foreign internal defense (FID). FID includes Air Force operations as an integral part of the overall military assistance effort. Air Force FID operations support US political and strategic military objectives primarily by enhancing the air and space capabilities of countries where US interests are important enough to warrant assistance.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**INTRODUCTION** ................................................................. v  

**CHAPTER ONE — GENERAL** .............................................. 1  
  Operational Scope .............................................................. 1  
  FID Applications ................................................................. 2  
  FID Operations Objectives .................................................... 3  

**CHAPTER TWO — OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT** ....... 5  
  General ................................................................................. 5  
  Threat Forms .......................................................................... 5  
  Local Conditions ...................................................................... 6  
  Air and Space Power in Lesser-developed Nations ....................... 9  

**CHAPTER THREE — ROLE OF AIR AND SPACE POWER** ................................................................. 13  
  General .................................................................................. 13  
  Flexibility and Versatility ......................................................... 13  
  Priorities .................................................................................. 14  
  Missions .................................................................................. 16  
    Intelligence Collection ....................................................... 16  
    Airlift .................................................................................. 16  
    Close Air Support and Interdiction ....................................... 17  
  Psychological Operations (PSYOP) ......................................... 18  

**CHAPTER FOUR — CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS** ... 21  
  General .................................................................................. 21  
  Basic Concept .......................................................................... 21  
  Characteristics of US Air Force FID Activities ......................... 22  
  Capabilities ............................................................................. 23  
    Indirect Support ................................................................. 23  
    Direct Support (Not Involving Combat) .................................. 26  
  Combat Operations .................................................................. 30  
  Readiness Requirements ......................................................... 30
INTRODUCTION

In an increasingly unstable world, the value of SOF [special operations forces] in support of the peacetime regional plans of the geographic Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) and the US Ambassadors and their country teams has increased significantly. Geographic CINCs and US Ambassadors have implemented plans to assist many countries as they cope with the challenges of the new world environment. SOF are ideally suited to work closely with these nations as they address the challenges of internal defense and development.

General Wayne A. Downing

PURPOSE

Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-7.1 provides Air Force doctrine for foreign internal defense (FID) and supports basic air and space doctrine. It replaces AFDD 36.

APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force personnel involved in FID operations. This doctrine is authoritative but not directive; commanders are encouraged to exercise judgment in applying this doctrine to accomplish their missions.

SCOPE

This document articulates fundamental Air Force roles for FID and advises commanders how to employ and integrate Air Force resources to achieve FID objectives. It includes a discussion of the operational environment, command and control, planning considerations, and training.
JOINT DOCTRINE

This document is consistent with and complements Joint Publication (Pub) 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, and Joint Pub 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)*. It also supports FID principles in joint and multi-Service doctrine on military operations other than war (MOOTW).
CHAPTER ONE
GENERAL

OPERATIONAL SCOPE

US Air Force FID operations incorporate a broad range of air and space missions, resources, and capabilities. These operations rely on conventional as well as special operations forces to achieve FID objectives.

In most instances, US Air Force operations are conducted jointly with other US Service components and combined with the activities of foreign military forces in the host country.

With proper authorization, US Air Force operations may be conducted in support of FID activities of other US Government departments and agencies.

US Air Force FID operations are carried out through joint and multinational exercises and security assistance programs. As indicated in other parts of this document, there is a clear distinction between personnel performing mission activities under the command, control, and supervision of combatant commanders and performance under the laws, regulations, and funding applicable to a security assistance program.

Some FID operations, such as foreign training, may be conducted in the host country, in other friendly foreign countries, or in the United States.

Although some US Air Force elements may be organized and trained for FID operations in specific geographic areas, the overall US Air Force orientation in FID is global.
FID APPLICATIONS

US Air Force FID operations can be used to improve host air force contributions to peacetime stability and development, or they can be conducted during the incipient phase of an internal confrontation to help in preventing an outbreak of violence within the host nation. Also, US Air Force assistance can be used where an armed opponent internally threatens the host government.

US Air Force assistance primarily focuses on supporting foreign military forces in performing traditional air and space roles and missions. Also, US Air Force assistance may be used in developing or augmenting host air and space capabilities for internal development and resource mobilization.

Usually, the US Air Force provides assistance to the supported countries' air forces but may provide assistance to other host military services, depending on how air support responsibilities are assigned within the host country and on the types of air assets employed.
FID OPERATIONS OBJECTIVES

US Air Force FID operations are aimed primarily at developing and sustaining host airpower capabilities. Where host-country aviation units are inadequately sized or structured to make necessary and timely contributions to the defense effort, the US Air Force may be committed to more direct forms of support. Within the guidelines established in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, specific FID objectives are to:

- Train foreign military forces to employ and maintain air and space systems and support facilities.
- Advise foreign military forces and governmental agencies on the correct use of air and space power.
- Assist foreign military forces and government agencies on the actual use of air and space power.
- Assess foreign military aviation capabilities and provide direction towards improving their airpower employment methods.
- Aid in transferring of US defense articles and services under the Security Assistance Program to aviation units of eligible foreign governments engaged in internal defense and development (IDAD) operations.
- Provide direct support to host countries by furnishing (for example) humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), tactical intelligence, communications support, logistics, airlift, and combat firepower for tactical operations.
CHAPTER TWO

OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

GENERAL

This chapter addresses threats, local conditions, and host air and space capabilities frequently encountered during FID operations in lesser-developed nations. Commanders should, however, assess each situation on its own, taking into account the total operational environment.

THREAT FORMS

Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency manifest themselves, often in combination, in a variety of forms capable of seriously challenging the authority and survival of host governments. The following are examples of internal threats that are likely to require some form of host-military action and that may require US Air Force assistance.

Insurgency is a complex, protracted form of subversion employing psychological pressure, armed force, and terror to force or prevent social, economic, and political changes within the host nation. Economic and political issues are central to insurgency and/or counterinsurgency and generally take precedence over military force. The relationship of force to these central issues warrants special consideration in planning and executing military actions. Appendix A of this document discusses that relationship and provides a basis for countering the insurgents' organization and strategy.

Certain forms of civil disorder that are not necessarily associated with insurgency can produce widespread violence and social upheaval that may precipitate the host government’s collapse. Examples include anarchy arising from political and economic crises,
ethnic and religious confrontations, and armed disputes among rival political factions external to the government. Some of these situations may require military reinforcement of host civil law enforcement agencies.

Local dissident groups may use terrorist acts against citizens and property, which are symbols of government authority, to dramatize political causes or to extort concessions from host governments. Terrorism is often used as a tactical instrument in guerrilla warfare to demonstrate the inability of incumbent regimes to defend themselves and the population. State-sponsored or nonstate-sponsored terrorists may direct, control, and even conduct terrorist acts in the host nation.

Illicit drug production and narcoterrorism are also forms of lawlessness, and in some cases they function subversively. International drug cartels may employ terrorism to suppress government interference in drug production and trafficking operations. “Partnerships” involving exchanges of drugs, weapons, and money between insurgents and drug cartels may be used to support revolutionary movements. The insurgents’ infrastructure and the cartel can be one and the same. In such cases, revolutionary or separatist claims may be fraudulently used for the purpose of “justifying” the cartel’s existence.

LOCAL CONDITIONS

Major factors affecting FID planning and execution include physical and psychological pressure from hostile elements, social fragmentation, political instability, and economic impoverishment. Difficult terrain, physical isolation of population groups, and poorly developed infrastructures often impede military operations, but such obstacles also provide opportunities to use airpower in a variety of combat and noncombat roles.

Nations most susceptible to insurgency and other forms of subversion and lawlessness are characterized by social and political fragmentation and by a lack of national identity within population groups who resist or are denied integration into the national community.
• Identity problems and fragmentation often result from rigid class distinctions and from ethnic, linguistic, religious, and economic differences between ruling elites and much larger population segments. These differences, often exacerbated and sustained by geography, persist where nations have failed to break the isolation of outlying provinces and villages. Similar conditions of socio-political separation and disfranchisement exist in cities and provincial capitals where local governments and economies are unable to support or assimilate masses of landless rural people moving into the fringes of urban society.
• Severe alienation results when political and legal mechanisms are inadequate to protect the rights and privileges of citizens. Military as well as civilian law enforcement agencies are often viewed as symbols of repression.

Socio-political instability is closely tied to a variety of economic factors. Extreme, widespread poverty is often coupled with dramatic imbalances in the distribution of wealth and property. In some cases, industrial monopolies, marketing controls, restrictions on organized labor, and other forms of economic exploitation maintain the imbalance. Unstable monetary systems and the lack of public service programs often create negative social attitudes towards the government.

• Unfulfilled economic expectations sustained by widespread unemployment and chronic inflation add to deep-seated unrest. These factors, on their own, do not necessarily generate violence, but revolutionary groups and dissidents exploit them to shape popular attitudes against the government.
• The economies of developing nations typically rely on a narrow range of industry and farm production that hostile elements can easily cripple or halt. Financial insolvency is a critical factor limiting the ability of host governments to preempt or counter internal threats.

Subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency are global problems. Threat situations most likely to involve US Air Force FID activities, however, are prevalent in lesser-developed nations where public services, industrial infrastructures, and air support facilities are
relatively primitive by Western standards. Terrain varies widely but often includes heavily forested and mountainous areas. Typically, rugged terrain, adverse climate, and the scarcity of improved airfields affect not only the tempo, scale, and character of air operations but also the types of aircraft that can be employed.

- In some regions, seasonal weather patterns dictate the timing and form of military campaigning. Major offensives supported exclusively by ground logistics may be restricted to prolonged periods of dry weather. During extended periods of heavy rain and high water, air and space power offers significant advantages in rural administration, logistics, and tactical mobility.
- Surface transportation networks vary greatly. Hard-surface roads and rail lines may not extend into the interior. Ground lines of communication (LOC) are often subject to seasonal flooding as well as interdiction by hostile forces. In many cases, air transportation affords the only reliable form of physical contact with civil-military elements in rural areas.
- Television and radio broadcasting have dramatically improved host-government development and mobilization efforts in some lesser-developed nations. Most nations possess rudimentary telephone networks connecting major population centers though, in many cases, these networks do not extend into rural areas. Ground communications links are often targeted for interdiction.
- Most capital cities in the lesser-developed nations are served by airports capable of accepting medium to heavy multiengine jet aircraft. However, conducting military air operations from major civilian airports is often impractical, due to traffic congestion, space restrictions, and political sensitivity. Outside capital cities, civil and military aviation support facilities are relatively primitive. In many cases, military aviation units have access to only one or two main operating locations with hard-surface runways. Forward operating locations usually consist of short, unimproved airstrips with no approach or runway lighting and no overhead shelters or central electric power.
- Modern, ground-based navigational aids may be extremely limited. Nondirectional beacons are prevalent, though often unreliable. Except for those found at air installations occupied by US military forces, there are generally no terminal approach
aids outside international airports. As a consequence, military flying operations rely extensively on visual flight rules procedures.

AIR AND SPACE POWER IN LESSER-DEVELOPED NATIONS

By US Air Force standards, the scale of military aviation operations in lesser-developed nations may be relatively low in terms of force size, total sortie potential, resource consumption and availability, and overall support costs. The entire fixed wing tactical airlift capability of a lesser-developed nation, for instance, may consist of only four or five medium transports. The contributions of these aircraft, however, can be vital to the success of counterinsurgency or drug suppression operations. Because host governments possess so few aircraft, airframe availability, maintenance turnaround times, and sortie generation rates are critical. Grounding or combat loss of one or two aircraft can seriously impair or neutralize an air effort. Though inventories are small,
sustainment and supportability are difficult problems. Because of funding constraints and supply shortages in host countries, small logistics problems assume major proportions.

Host military aircraft best suited for IDAD operations (airlift, reconnaissance, surveillance, forward air control, and close air support) are typically well used, older generation aircraft acquired from the United States and other foreign sources. These aircraft are often nonstandard to US Air Force inventories and difficult to maintain because of dwindling sources of spare parts and supplies. Later generation platforms tend to be better suited for defensive counterair and interdiction. They are less useful in countering internal threats and are more expensive and difficult to maintain because of their technical sophistication.

Host nations threatened by insurgency and other forms of internal conflict usually require some form of outside financial or materiel assistance to acquire, operate, and maintain air and space forces. In some cases, their military aviation programs are entirely dependent upon foreign assistance for major weapon systems, air and space support equipment, aircraft spares, training, advice, technical services, survival equipment, specialized clothing, munitions, and even consumables.

- The complexity and cost of modern air and space systems magnify aircraft procurement and supportability problems.
- In many cases, aircraft support items and services are not available from local sources.

Insufficient technical skills, scarcity of tools and equipment, and lack of adequate plant facilities throughout the industrial support base limit aircraft and support systems maintenance capabilities. Additional limitations are inefficient personnel management practices and inadequate procedures for processing, storing, and shipping supply items.

- Most military aviation support facilities are able to conduct routine maintenance on piston-driven aircraft. A few have a limited capability for airframe overhaul and rebuild of nonpressurized
aircraft. Jet engine repair facilities are extremely limited. In most lesser-developed nations, there are no facilities for major overhaul and rebuild of jet and reciprocating aircraft engines.

- Where major aircraft repair facilities do exist, they are often located only in the civilian sector. Some local shop facilities have limited capabilities for test and calibration. Depot-level repair and overhaul facilities for air and space support items are not generally available.
- Routine flight-line servicing and maintenance often suffer because technical manuals are not published in the host language. Maintenance technicians may lack foreign language skills needed to receive technical instruction and advice from outside sources.

Generally, military aviation programs in lesser-developed nations rely on an extremely narrow base of experienced personnel to accomplish even routine operational tasks and support functions. Although basic flying skills are often highly developed, many individuals are insufficiently trained in joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP). The most serious training deficiencies are generally in aircraft and support systems maintenance.

- Most host aviation units lack technical proficiency and mid-level supervision in aircraft repair and support systems maintenance. Few of these units are able to develop a broad base of technical aviation support skills above the apprentice level. Typically, a large portion of the enlisted force, composed mostly of conscripts and short-term enlistees, do not receive technical air and space training during their period of service because they lack the required education (principally reading skills and mathematics), mechanical background, and service retention.
- Technical training for qualified students is severely limited because formal courses of instruction and on-the-job training programs have not been sufficiently developed. Internal instruction programs are difficult to establish due to insufficient numbers of qualified technicians both to instruct and maintain the assigned force. In most cases, outside training assistance is needed to generate host-nation training programs capable of operating on a self-sustaining basis.
Intelligence collection capabilities are characteristically unsophisticated and limited in scope. Human resources intelligence (HUMINT), often a valuable source of information, is limited by the lack of all-source analysis and fusion.

- Air reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft generally lack the means of collecting intelligence through thermal imaging, and most are incapable of exploiting the electromagnetic medium beyond a very limited capacity for communications intercept. Generally, collection is limited to visual and photographic means. Few air platforms are configured for photo reconnaissance.
- Typically, the lack of an intelligence corps, or career field, within the host air force limits collecting and analyzing intelligence. Even where intelligence programs have been developed, the lack of efficient procedures for timely dissemination of tactical intelligence degrades overall mission effectiveness.

To offset their lack of modern communications, lesser-developed nations should exercise considerable resourcefulness in designing command, control, and communications (C³) systems for military air operations. This resourcefulness, however, often entails the use of obsolete, low-performance radios that provide poor connectivity between air and surface elements. The makeshift nature of communications within the typical host-country equivalent of a Theater Air Control System (TACS) renders it extremely vulnerable to enemy intercept and jamming. Air request networks may not extend into remote areas of the interior. A general lack of communications security (COMSEC) training and procedures further degrade C³ effectiveness.
CHAPTER THREE

ROLE OF AIR AND SPACE POWER

GENERAL

This chapter provides general guidance on how to use air and space power properly in internal conflicts involving subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Although specific methods and applications may vary according to the nature and location of the conflict, air and space operations in this environment are founded on the basic tenets of air and space power. These tenets, coupled with certain principles governing air and space operations in internal conflict, apply equally to US and host-nation personnel. Accordingly, the following principles apply to the employment of air and space forces without regard to which country owns these forces.

FLEXIBILITY AND VERSATILITY

To achieve its strategic aims, a host government should establish and maintain effective administration and control on the ground, often in contested areas. At the same time, air and space power’s flexibility can help government forces achieve rapid concentration of effort from great distances and to overcome terrain features with increased margins of safety. This flexibility can be exploited with varying degrees of success, depending on the conflict environment, the types of air and space resources possessed, and the objectives to be achieved.

The host nation’s IDAD strategy provides a basis for determining appropriate air and space objectives. The IDAD strategy incorporates four basic functions to prevent or counter internal threats-developing social, economic, and political institutions in a balanced way; mobilizing manpower and materiel resources; securing the population and national resources; and neutralizing hostile elements.
Air and space operations are most successful when their resources and methods support the total range of IDAD functions. In this sense, versatility is central to the value of air and space power, and it should be aggressively exploited in countering subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

**PRIORITIES**

Air operations should be closely aligned with IDAD priorities. In counterinsurgency, for instance, the principal weight of air and space power should be applied where the government seeks critical points of leverage against the insurgent movement. Where IDAD actions are focused on socioeconomic development and mobilization, air and space resources should be employed “administratively” in nation-building and mobilization roles. These roles are principally logistics and communications efforts establishing government influence and control in contested areas of the country. Using air and space power in these roles enhances the host government’s ability to focus on political and economic solutions to the crisis. As the government brings all four IDAD functions into play, air resources should be used in support roles to create synergies among various defense and development initiatives. Where friendly lives and property are at risk from insurgent attack, for instance, air combat power functions as a component of coordinated joint security and neutralization actions aimed at creating a safe environment for developmental programs which, in turn, promote and sustain mobilization. Appendix A describes the

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**IDAD STRATEGY**

- Develop Social, Economic, and Political Institutions in a Balanced Way
- Mobilize Manpower and Materiel Resources
- Secure the Population and National Resources
- Neutralize Hostile Elements

*Figure 3.1. IDAD Strategy*
basic functions and objectives of IDAD strategy for counterinsurgency. Depending on the conflict situation, the four IDAD functions (balanced development, mobilization, security, and neutralization) are also employed in preventing or countering other forms of subversion and lawlessness.

The air and space role in development and mobilization focuses on administration and nation-building. Where ground LOC cannot be established and maintained because of terrain or enemy presence, aerial logistics and communication networks carrying information, supplies, and services to civilian elements establish a critical link between the government and the population. Such “direct contact” initiatives as government health care services and disease control measures demonstrate the regime’s willingness and ability to govern and, at the same time, provide access to important HUMINT.

Air and space power contributes most effectively to security and neutralization when it functions as an integrated, joint component of the overall internal defense effort. It is least effective when employed unilaterally as a substitute for ground maneuver or long-range artillery. In many instances, air support can be exploited to greatest advantage by emphasizing surveillance and logistics mobility over firepower. Insurgents generally possess no air capabilities of their own. They have no heartland, no fixed industrial facilities, and few interdictable LOC. At the guerrilla warfare level, their lack of extensive strength and weaponry is offset by tactical mobility, surprise, and deception. Their irregular forces are deployed in small units that find easy concealment in rural terrain and sometimes within civilian society itself. Where insurgents are unwilling to concentrate their forces, they usually present poor targets for air attack. In such cases, air support for security and neutralization should be used primarily to inform, deploy, sustain, and reinforce surface elements of the internal security force. The emphasis on surveillance and mobility also applies to military operations supporting counterdrug activities and to government actions suppressing terrorism and aggravated forms of civil disorder.
MISSIONS

Depending on the tactical situation and the objectives to be achieved, air and space assets can support IDAD through a variety of traditional air and space missions.

Intelligence Collection

Air and space platforms support various forms of intelligence collection for all aspects of security and neutralization. This support may be provided to civilian law enforcement agencies engaged in infrastructure penetration or to host-nation military and paramilitary units engaged in combating hostile forces. In some cases, platforms equipped with signals intelligence (SIGINT) or imagery intelligence (IMINT) capabilities may be used to identify and assess the infrastructures of insurgents, terrorists, and drug agents. Aerial reconnaissance and surveillance can be used to monitor the condition of isolated friendly enclaves, surface LOC, and civilian population groups or to collect intelligence on enemy strength, location, and movement in denied areas. Information on hostile activities is also accessible through HUMINT. Air and space assets expand and accelerate the HUMINT process by opening up collection sites not accessible by surface transportation and by speeding up collection, recovery, and distribution of time-sensitive data.

Airlift

Airlift increases the government’s capacity to administer and mobilize in outlying areas by physically extending the reach of public policy and information programs. Also, airlift provides a means of rapidly transporting security forces and supplies to forward areas of operation.

To promote balanced development and mobilization through nation-building, air transportation can be used to provide on site technical training and assistance in public services management, sanitation and hygiene, agronomy, agribusiness management and technology (marketing, supply, and distribution), veterinary medicine, ecology, environmental protection, and public schools
administration. Airlift can also support developmental initiatives by delivering construction equipment, supplies, and personnel for rural housing projects, power generation plants, hydroelectric facilities, bridge building, and other public works programs. In some instances, airlift can support political goals by extending the electoral process to rural groups.

To support security and neutralization, airlift can be used to deploy, sustain, and reinforce civil law enforcement agencies as well as military and paramilitary surface elements. Logistics functions are carried out through air landing, airdrop, and aerial extraction of equipment, supplies, and personnel. The airlift mission includes combat assault operations, medical evacuation, emergency extraction of military forces, noncombatant evacuation, troop movement, and resupply. Airlift is also used for infiltration and recovery of ground reconnaissance teams, surveillance personnel, and special intelligence resources.

Close Air Support and Interdiction

The most important applications of aerial firepower for security and neutralization are in instances when hostile elements openly commit their forces during assembly and attack against friendly positions or when their command and control (C2) centers and logistics elements are exposed and clearly identified.

Counterinsurgency operations may rely significantly on air-delivered munitions for close air support (CAS) in site defense, convoy escort, offensive tactical maneuvers, and other troops-in-contact situations. The purpose of CAS in such situations is to allow surface forces to accomplish their mission. Exceeding that purpose through excessive, indiscriminate applications of firepower can result in death and injury of innocent civilians and unwarranted property damage. In countering other forms of lawlessness (illicit drug production and civil disorders, for instance), surface operations are often aimed at controlling, arresting, and seizing, rather than inflicting casualties. CAS, if required, should be limited to protecting the surface force by using tactics and munitions designed for suppression, shock, and intimidation, rather than maximum lethality.
Interdiction relies heavily on accurate intelligence and is most effective when coordinated with ground-based search and verification. Interdicting “suspected enemy positions” can alienate friendly citizens and can quickly deplete the host air force’s munitions inventory. Commanders should always consider the political and psychological implications of using air combat power. Collateral damage involving loss of civilian life and property must be avoided wherever possible through careful target identification and planning, proper weapons selection, and accurate ordnance delivery. Short-term tactical objectives should be consistent with long-term strategic goals.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS (PSYOP)

PSYOP should be integrated into all aspects of development, mobilization, security, and neutralization to disrupt the unity and motivation of hostile forces and to politically isolate them from friendly civilian elements. PSYOP can be used to achieve the neutrality of hostile elements or to draw neutral elements into the mobilization process. As an adjunct to the overall PSYOP effort, public information programs are often required to counter insurgent disinformation and to ensure that friendly elements understand, accept, and support government policies and programs.

To support PSYOP initiatives, air and space resources can be used as information delivery platforms for radio and television broadcasting, loudspeakers, and printed literature. Using administrative airlift to establish the physical presence of government officials at isolated locations increases the effectiveness and reliability of information dissemination and collection efforts with the added benefit of building psychological support among target audiences.

In addition to technical means of information delivery, air and space forces possess inherent capabilities to produce psychological effects by demonstrating superior mobility, responsiveness, and firepower. The psychological impact of air activities on the behavior of target groups may be pursued as a principal goal to weaken enemy resistance and to capture public support, or it may be intentionally produced as a beneficial side
effect of such initiatives as humanitarian assistance, civic action, and nation-building. Whether intended or not, the inherent psychological effects of air and space power exert forceful and often dramatic influences on the attitudes of friendly as well as hostile elements. These effects should be anticipated in planning and executing all air and space activities.

The use of air and space resources in security and neutralization should be accompanied by public information programs to relieve anxiety and fear among friendly civilian elements regarding who is being targeted by government security forces. Development and mobilization programs involving military security forces should include informational initiatives clarifying and promoting government intentions. Air transportation of public information officials and the use of technical information delivery platforms provide a means of disseminating vital information when development and mobilization actions are undertaken in isolated areas.
CHAPTER FOUR

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

GENERAL

This chapter addresses the basic concept and general characteristics, capabilities, and requirements of US Air Force FID activities. Capabilities are divided into three major categories—indirect support, direct support not involving combat, and combat operations. Although various capabilities, programs, and activities within the categories may occur simultaneously, the categories themselves represent significantly different levels of US Air Force involvement. They also indicate the broad range of US Air Force FID options that can be exercised depending upon the level of US military commitment.

BASIC CONCEPT

Joint Publication 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF); Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War; and Joint Pub 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, contain the joint framework for FID. Within this framework, the principal thrust of US Air Force FID operations should be to encourage and support host-nation solutions to the problems of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, thus reducing the need for direct US intervention. Accordingly, US Air Force support is usually applied indirectly through security assistance training, advisory help, and logistics support. Additionally, the US Air Force can provide certain forms of direct support that do not commit US forces to combat. If all other options have been exhausted and the United States decides to intervene with force, the US Air Force has the capability to engage in combat to meet US and host-nation objectives. Such a possibility does not, however, establish as a matter of doctrine that US Air Force operations automatically transition from indirect to direct forms of assistance.
on the basis of any precondition or sequence of events. If direct support is required, the level and type of assistance should be appropriate to the conflict situation and should preserve or increase host-nation strength and responsibility for self-defense. Direct support should be withdrawn as soon as possible consistent with host-nation needs and capabilities.

CHARACTERISTICS OF US AIR FORCE FID ACTIVITIES

All forms of US Air Force support are considered as strategically defensive, though in some cases, they may be tactically offensive.

US Air Force FID operations support US response measures taken according to the principles of international and domestic law that affirm the inherent right of states to assist one another in maintaining internal order against insurgency and other forms of internal violence.

This is based upon the host government’s inherent right of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) charter and in customary international law in general. The UN
charter also recognizes, through the right of collective self-defense, that targets of aggression may request assistance, to include armed assistance, from other states. Such requests, under international law, should be evaluated according to the principles of necessity and proportionality.

Normally, the US Air Force will take part in FID when US National Command Authorities (NCA) honor a host-government request for military assistance.

CAPABILITIES

The US Air Force capabilities below will help commanders develop appropriate FID options to support US objectives and are specifically tailored to the air and space needs and capabilities of host nations. These capabilities fall under three main categories of FID tools: indirect support, direct support (not involving combat), and combat operations.

Indirect Support


• Security assistance, a principal military instrument for FID, involves the transfer of defense articles and services to friendly foreign governments through sale, grant, lease, or loan. The intent of this assistance is to help friends and allies acquire, maintain, and, if necessary, employ a self-defense capability. The principal objective of security assistance in FID is to establish secure environments in which foreign governments can pursue social, economic, and political initiatives to relieve tensions in their nations.

• The Department of State has the overall responsibility for military and economic security assistance. The Department of Defense (DOD) administers the military assistance portion, under the direction of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs. The US Air Force is responsible, as an implementing agency, for those security assistance programs assigned by the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA). These programs provide defense articles, services (including training), and construction to eligible foreign governments and international organizations on a grant, credit, or cash basis. Of the several security assistance programs involving the US Air Force, those of major significance in FID include international military education and training (IMET), foreign military sales (FMS), and foreign military financing program (FMFP).

- Security assistance organizations (SAO) are responsible for administering and managing overseas security assistance. The collective term SAO refers to those armed forces organizations permanently assigned to US diplomatic missions to carry out security assistance responsibilities. US Air Force elements assigned to SAOs administer and manage US Air Force programs and serve under the direction and supervision of the chief of the US diplomatic mission (usually the Ambassador), as provided by law. Primary tasks traditionally assigned to SAOs include monitoring the program; managing equipment, services, and training; evaluating and planning host-government capabilities and requirements; and providing administrative support and liaison functions exclusive of advisory and training assistance. Commanders should refer to Section 515 of the Foreign Assistance Act for additional details on SAO duties. (Codified in Title 22, U.S. Code, Section 2321i.)

- The transfer of all US defense articles and services must be accomplished under proper statutory authority. When authorized by statute, defense articles or services may at times be provided in accordance with bilateral agreements negotiated to cover a particular program. Negotiation of such assistance agreements is subject to specific requirements for delegation of authority and reporting and requires knowledge of international law, procurement law, and security assistance law.

- Although security assistance encompasses far more than FID, it plays a major FID role through logistics assistance, training, and advisory support. AFMAN 16-101, *International Affairs and Security Assistance Management*, contains general policy and procedures for security assistance articles and services under
the US Air Force management cognizance. Also, Appendix B discusses various types of security assistance teams that provide services overseas. Chapter seven discusses their employment in FID.

- Joint-multinational exercises are conducted to test and evaluate mutual capabilities of US and foreign coalition partners. These exercises, which are predominantly Service-funded, complement security assistance goals by testing and evaluating capabilities that security assistance recipients have expressed a desire to improve. Coincidental with testing and evaluating mutual capabilities, these exercises may include certain types of training and construction, as well as humanitarian and civic assistance projects, within the host country. Appendix C provides further guidance on exercise objectives, constraints, and funding.

- Exchange programs are a form of combined activity having potential FID applications. While some exchanges are authorized under security assistance (unit exchanges and professional military education exchanges), others are not. Individual
permanent change of station (PCS) and temporary duty (TDY) exchanges, which are separate from security assistance, are designated as DOD mission functions. These exchanges provide commanders a means to further FID objectives by fostering mutual understanding among combined forces and by familiarizing each force with the organization, administration, and operations of the other. Commanders run individual exchange programs in their areas of responsibility (AOR). Funding requirements and specific applications vary. Commanders seeking authorization for exchanges should consult applicable directives governing requests and coordination procedures.

- Mutual understanding between US Air Force FID personnel and host-nation forces can be pursued through orientation visits, conferences, and joint security consultations.

**Direct Support (Not Involving Combat)**

When it is impractical for the host air force to acquire self-sufficiency in time to counter the threat, the US Air Force may be tasked to provide direct support that does not commit US personnel to combat. Such support encompasses Service-funded activities that improve host air force effectiveness without duplicating or replacing security assistance efforts to create or maintain host-nation capabilities. US Air Force activities at this level normally focus on nation-building programs, civil-military operations, intelligence collection and analysis, logistics support, and other "stand-off" support functions. US Air Force activities should emphasize the host military’s combat role. When authorized and directed by the NCA, US Air Force commanders conduct or participate in the following direct support activities.

- US Air Force intelligence resources, with the country team and combatant commander’s intelligence assets, support host-nation IDAD planning through long-range strategic collection and analysis of potential conflict. At the tactical level, US Air Force technical search and verification capabilities complement and augment host-nation collection programs. Intelligence sharing involves providing intelligence products. It does not necessarily mean transferring collection methods, sources, or technology to the host nation.
• US Air Force ground and airborne communications resources can support host-nation security forces by providing critical command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) links and by encrypting information traffic. The US Air Force can also provide temporary navigation aids (inserted and operated by special tactics teams, for instance) where host resources are lacking. Such support may include host nation use of US communication assets, but it does not involve the transfer of communications systems or technology to the host nation. The US Air Force maintains control of systems employed in the direct support role and ensures protection of classified communications-computer technology.

• Civil-military operations (CMO) is a broad area embracing the relationship between military forces, civilian authorities, and the population and are employed to develop favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. The five major areas of CMO, each with important applications in FID, are civil affairs (CA), psychological operations, humanitarian assistance (HA), humanitarian and civic assistance, and military civic action (MCA). Joint Pubs 3-07 and 3-07.1 discuss these areas in greater detail.

• Although the US Air Force does not possess civil affairs units,
US Air Force resources can provide lateral support to joint US CA operations through airlift, communications backup, information broadcasting, legal support, and technical advice on air and space operations.

• The inherent psychological effects of air and space power can be employed to further FID objectives through shows of strength and overt demonstrations of support to friends and allies. Specific, stand-alone PSYOP capabilities can be used to support the dissemination of host-government information programs. Aerial platforms can dispense leaflets or conduct PSYOP broadcasting over standard radio, television, short wave, and military communications bands.

• With appropriate authorization and direction, the US Air Force can undertake humanitarian assistance independent of joint-multinational exercises or other military operations. US Air Force capabilities for HA include personnel evacuation, airlift, and medical support for disaster victims. Aerial platforms can also support relief activities by broadcasting evacuation instructions and other public information and by temporarily replacing or expanding coverage of existing ground transmitters.

• Whereas humanitarian assistance focuses on emergency transportation support and other support to alleviate urgent host-nation needs caused by natural disasters and catastrophes, HCA activities are planned in advance and carried out in conjunction with military operations and exercises. There are three distinct forms of HCA—Statutory HCA, De Minimus (or Minimal) HCA, and Stevens HCA. Appendix C contains a more detailed treatment of these forms.

• MCA can be undertaken along with security assistance training or as a combatant commander’s separate initiative. MCA is essentially a US military to host-nation military program involving projects undertaken by preponderantly indigenous forces. Examples of these projects include construction, health care, and agriculture. US Air Force support of MCA is generally limited to training and advisory assistance.

• Maps of lesser-developed nations often lack sufficient scale and definition for planning and executing exercises and tactical operations. US Air Force aerial photography and cartographic
services can provide detailed coverage of operating areas to tactical air components and surface maneuver elements participating in joint-multinational exercises. Such services can also be used for testing and evaluating mutual intelligence analysis techniques and procedures. A steady supply of photographs and maps for host-country personnel in quantities larger than that consumed in exercises usually requires security assistance funding.

- **US Air Force meteorological reporting, analysis, forecasting, and interpretation of forecast information can be employed as part of the direct support effort to enhance host-nation IDAD initiatives.** Interpretation of weather data for local effects (rainfall, flooding, wind, visibility, etc.) can be used in an MCA role or applied to host-military planning activities.

- **US Air Force strategic airlift can be used in the direct support role for delivery, recovery, and resupply of US defense articles and services, returning security assistance repair items to the United States, transporting host-nation personnel to out-of-country training locations, and providing aeromedical evacuation from main operating bases in the host nation.**

- **US Air Force resources may be used with counterdrug activities in countries receiving FID assistance.**

- **The DOD, with the US Air Force playing a substantive role, is designated lead government agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. Congressional interest in the earliest possible detection of illegal drugs requires certain activities be conducted outside the United States. Detection and monitoring is performed with Service funds, notwithstanding the possibility of incidental benefit to the host nation. Such activities may include nonconfrontational intercepts for communications purposes, gathering and processing tactical intelligence from a variety of sources (including fixed and mobile surveillance assets), and intelligence sharing.**

- **Subject to DOD policy and legislative guidance, the US Air Force may offer certain direct support to host-nation counterdrug personnel. US Air Force resources may also provide enhanced support to US civilian law enforcement agencies which may be operating in the region and to the State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. Such**
counterdrug support activities generally are conducted by unified combatant commanders within their geographic AOR.

- Counterdrug activities, subject to legislative constraints, may incorporate such US Air Force capabilities as intelligence sharing; meteorological services; aerial reconnaissance and mapping; airlift of personnel, supplies, and equipment; communications support; counterdrug training; upgrading and maintenance of equipment; and establishment and operation of operating bases or training sites that facilitate counterdrug activities.

- Unless directed by the NCA, US forces are prohibited from engaging in direct law enforcement activities. Thus, they may not directly participate in arrests, searches, seizures, or other similar activities. US forces do not engage in counterdrug field operations with host-nation forces unless competent authority specifically directs it.

**Combat Operations**

At higher levels of direct assistance, US Air Force resources are capable of supporting joint-multinational combat operations in the host country. US Air Force airlift can provide tactical mobility for both US and host-nation forces. Reconnaissance, attack, and forward air control (FAC) assets provide backup capabilities in support of US and host ground and naval forces. Also, US Air Force electronic combat assets can provide communications jamming in both standard and military frequency spectrums.

**READINESS REQUIREMENTS**

US Air Force readiness for FID includes the ability to function as a coherent whole with clearly defined relationships established between various forms of indirect and direct assistance. Additionally, the Air Force should function as part of a joint-interagency team with mutually supporting programs and objectives. Readiness also includes the ability to tailor assistance efforts to specific strategies at varying levels of US involvement.

US Air Force FID activities must be sensitive to host-nation needs and, at the same time, relate correctly to the plans and
operations of participating departments, executive agencies, and independent establishments of the US Government. Commanders should ensure that US Air Force security assistance and direct support operations function as integrated elements of the overall US FID effort.

Commanders should structure the FID effort to fit the precise requirements of the conflict at hand. At the same time, commanders may have to adjust assistance efforts to accommodate changing economic, political, and military priorities; rules of engagement; and operational imperatives brought about by shifting levels and modes of conflict. The ability to change tactics, techniques, procedures, equipment, and even doctrine is critical.

There is a clear distinction between security assistance and such Service-funded activities as intelligence sharing and joint-multinational exercises. Security assistance programs, which are aimed at equipping, training, and advising foreign forces, to make them independently capable of internal security, are strategic in nature. Service-funded activities, wherein US forces train and operate with foreign forces, are conducted primarily to benefit US personnel, though they may result in incidental benefit to the host nation. In most cases, however, the two forms of support are interdependent. For example, host air force capabilities acquired under security assistance should be tested, evaluated, and improved through joint-multinational exercises, but an exercise would be a wasted effort if the host force lacks the equipment and training it needs to qualify as a participant. Service-funded support complements security assistance and, in some cases (for example, intelligence sharing) allows the host nation to use its proven air and space capabilities to better effect. The two forms of support should, therefore, be closely coordinated to promote economy of effort, achieve a synergistic effect, and provide a properly balanced concentration of resources.

Air and space power functions as a force multiplier in countering subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency by increasing the survivability and effectiveness of internal security activities. As a force multiplier, it is most useful during the early stages of conflict when the host government’s chances of success are highest. US Air Force security assistance measures and most forms of direct
support not involving combat are, therefore, most effective when initiated early, preferably during the prehostilities phase. Early US Air Force initiatives to develop or improve host air and space capabilities also reduce the need for higher forms of direct support or intervention.

Air and space systems provided through security assistance should be specially suited to the needs and capabilities of recipient nations. US Air Force trainers and advisors should be skilled in the technical operation of these systems and should understand the correct use of air and space power in the operational environment. Commanders should strive for interoperability between US Air Force and host-nation C3I systems and between their respective logistics management functions for security assistance. In some instances, C3I and logistics interoperability may have to be established along lines more compatible with host-nation technical and financial resources than with standard US Air Force methods and procedures. Where possible, however, future upgrades, maintenance, and training should be considered as a means of achieving the desired level of interoperability.
CHAPTER FIVE
COMMAND AND CONTROL

GENERAL

This chapter provides general guidance on command and control (C²) for FID operations. Specific C² systems for direct and indirect support vary according to the conflict situation, host-nation requirements, US objectives, and the level of US involvement. C² systems for security assistance and most forms of direct support not involving combat contain civilian as well as military elements. US Air Force security assistance activities overseas are organized under a military command structure within SAOs, but civilian and military elements control and supervise these activities. Also, civilian and military elements control and supervise direct support activities, such as intelligence sharing and MCA, which are organized under a military command structure. Military authorities command, control, and supervise tactical operations in the field.

Security Assistance

The US Air Force conducts security assistance in accordance with the guidance contained in statutory authorities and executive orders, as well as directives, regulations, and manuals issued by the Department of State and the DOD.

• Overseas security assistance organizations respond through two command channels: one through the US diplomatic mission and the other through the unified combatant command. According to public law, executive direction, and DOD directives, all US Government personnel performing security assistance duties in a foreign country are under the policy direction and supervision of the Chief of Mission (i.e., the Ambassador).
• Temporarily assigned military personnel serve under the policy direction, coordination, and supervision of the Ambassador, unless deployed to perform duties directed by the combatant
Personnel temporarily deployed overseas to accomplish security assistance functions are normally assigned—for purposes of military command and supervision—to the combatant commander in whose AOR the operations are taking place. Where practical, temporarily deployed teams should be attached to an SAO for in-country administrative support (including umbrella coverage providing appropriate technical, legal, and administrative status in the host nation) and procedural guidance established by the combatant commander and the Chief of Mission.

- For more detailed guidance relevant to C² of temporarily deployed forces, commanders should refer to AFMAN 16-101.

**Direct Support**

Direct FID support not involving combat is authorized and directed on a case-by-case basis by the NCA and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Direct support of this nature is classified as a military mission with respect to C² responsibilities of the combatant commander in whose AOR the operation is conducted.

- Because these activities involve direct employment of air and space resources, military authorities should exercise military C².
Sustained operations should be conducted under the military control and supervision of a joint task force (JTF) belonging to the combatant commander. Where short-duration or one-time activities are involved and a JTF is not established, military control and supervisory responsibilities may be executed by other such designated agents of the combatant command as the air component commander.

- Personnel experienced in using the employed systems should direct and supervise the operation. Direct support of this nature, however, is often requested by the chief of the diplomatic mission and is generally subject to his or her approval. When directed by appropriate authorities, the US Air Force supports these requests.

- Coordination of mission requirements, operational constraints, and tasking should take place within the JTF or other designated agencies of the joint command. The Ambassador normally exercises in-country policy supervision and control of the activities.

**Combat Operations**

As a general rule, US Air Force FID forces employed in combat operations should be organized, commanded, and controlled on the basis of guidance established in joint and US Air Force doctrines. C^2 systems configured to meet the requirements of combatant commands and subordinate joint commands are established on the principle of centralized military control and decentralized execution. Joint Pub 0-2 contains general guidance on joint military operations and the performance of US Air Force activities at this level of involvement.

- Should it be necessary to expand FID assistance by introducing selected US combat forces, US Air Force tactical elements normally will be used as part of a JTF. The JTF commander exercises operational control of assigned tactical forces and executes area command responsibilities for US forces to ensure unity of effort.
COORDINATION

Because overseas military and civilian control elements’ supervisory authority may overlap (primarily below the level of combat operations), effective C² relies heavily on close coordination between participating agencies. Coordination is also vital where formal C² structures do not identify clear-cut channels of communication between the large number of programs, organizations, and individuals involved, particularly between military and civilian agencies. Where civilian and military responsibilities overlap, planning and execution of FID initiatives may require emphasis on close, continuous coordination rather than on “C²” as defined in military terms.

In many cases, the relationship between agencies is one of interdependence. Combatant commanders, for instance, have functions and responsibilities that go beyond security assistance. SAOs and country teams, with their knowledge of security assistance activities and other foreign aid efforts, serve the combatant commanders as important sources of information on host-nation IDAD planning and military preparedness. On the other hand, the combatant commanders have war plans and intelligence at their disposal that may be relevant to security assistance planning and crisis response. These commanders also have assigned forces, TDY personnel, strategic expertise, and materiel resources that can be brought to bear in host-nation relations, security assistance, joint-multinational exercises, and certain forms of direct support. Also, combatant commanders are in a position to promote interoperability and standardization for multinational operations involving US and host-nation forces.

Air Force elements assigned to combatant commands and SAOs (or other country team components) support joint-interagency coordination of air and space requirements and capabilities for security assistance planning, administration, logistics support, and direct support operations. To accomplish such coordination, US Air Force representatives should select and maintain appropriate channels of communication that may, in some instances, extend outside formal C² tasking. These channels can be
used to support a combatant commander’s efforts to help SAOs develop realistic air and space defense requirements in host countries. They can also be used to keep US diplomatic missions informed about air and space resources and capabilities available through the combatant commander for direct support and crisis response. Coordination arrangements tailored to specific locations and missions benefit not only US diplomatic mission objectives but also the combatant commander’s regional security assistance mission.

The US Air Force will coordinate such direct support activities as intelligence sharing, PSYOP, and HCA with the unified combatant commander, the US country team, and host-country programs with similar functions and objectives.

JOINT-INTERAGENCY OPERATIONS

FID operations are frequently joint. Additionally, US Air Force FID operations support other US organizations’ actions and requirements. Success of these operations depends on secure and nonsecure communications for tasking, coordinating, monitoring, and reporting among the various US civilian and military agencies. Command and control structures should be tailored to accommodate specific environments, missions, and force compositions and be adaptable to varying scenarios. These structures should connect in-country, joint-interagency elements and establish links between in-country elements, combatant commanders, and US command and supervisory elements.

Military C2 structures for US joint tactical operations function as part of the Global Command and Control System and are established in accordance with Joint Pub 0-2 guidance and implementing directives.

Simplicity in concept, organization, and structure adds to the efficiency of C2 systems and promotes sustained C2 effectiveness and survivability during the stress of combat. Simplicity also facilitates connectivity between US and host-nation C2 systems during joint-multinational operations.
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Multinational activity is inherent in all forms of military FID assistance, and all these forms require links between US and host-nation C^2 elements. Connectivity is essential, particularly when US and host-nation forces function in mutual support during combat operations.

Host air force C^2 structures should be adequate for internal needs and interoperable with US C^2 systems. Host C^2 systems should be capable of accepting and protecting US security information. To protect host-country operations and safeguard shared intelligence, US and allied C^2 systems require communications equipment, software, and accounting procedures for COMSEC. US Air Force elements play a key FID role by helping to develop and support multinational C^2 capabilities for air and space operations.

Significant C^2 interoperability problems typically involve incompatible equipment and standards, language barriers, differing C^2 procedures, lack of host-nation experience, and inadequate host-nation logistics infrastructures to maintain modern communications equipment. Equipment modernization and training provided under security assistance can alleviate some of these deficiencies. Due to limited security assistance funding and small defense budgets in host countries, however, full interoperability of equipment is difficult to achieve. Also, providing more sophisticated communications and cryptographic equipment is unlikely to produce solutions quickly or automatically. In many cases, the most efficient, cost-effective means of achieving near-term interoperability is US advisory assistance aimed at improving host C^2 doctrine, joint organizational structures, and procedural arrangements coupled with continuous training via joint-multinational exercises.

Command relationships and the apportionment of functions and responsibilities for multinational exercises and tactical operations are established in accordance with US and host-country agreements.
CHAPTER SIX

PLANNING

GENERAL

This chapter provides general guidance on US Air Force planning for both direct and indirect forms of foreign internal defense assistance. The combatant commander’s theater strategies and campaign plans should include, where appropriate, FID planning for both forms. A theater campaign plan for FID focuses on developing, deploying, employing, sustaining, and reconstituting military forces. Joint and multinational forces execute the plan that is unique to each theater of operations. The plan defines intermediate objectives to be accomplished in pursuit of national strategy and provides tactical commanders with general force employment guidance. The combatant commander bases this guidance on an assessment of employment opportunities and analysis of the relative strengths and weaknesses of friendly and hostile forces. The plan synchronizes joint operational elements through a concept of operations and establishes resource requirements, priorities, channels of communication, and basing modes. The plan thus provides commanders a means to influence and exploit tactical events to accomplish strategic objectives. Insofar as plans for direct and indirect assistance contribute to the attainment of strategic goals in the combatant commander’s AOR, they are extensions of theater strategy. Plans for direct and indirect support, however, vary in purpose and execution. The following considerations apply to this variance:

• Direct-assistance planning for FID primarily involves the mobility, provisioning, and employment of US forces. Air and space priorities and tasks established in the plan involve the allocation and apportionment of US Air Force aircraft, aircrews, and support resources. Also, US commanders may be required to execute combat portions of the plan. Direct support planning guides US military activities and at the same time complements and supports
host-nation IDAD programs. Where multinational operations are indicated, planning may include mobility and employment of foreign alliance forces. Direct support planning for FID does not normally include training, advising, and logistics support provided to the host nation.

- Where the US military operations’ principal function is to secure US and allied strategic interests through indirect FID assistance, planning is directed at logistics support, training, and advisory help to create and sustain the military capabilities of the host nation. Host-military commanders carry out force deployment, employment, and the orchestration of tactical events to accomplish intermediate and strategic objectives established in the host nation’s IDAD plan. The air combat forces subject to allocation and apportionment for fire and maneuver are those of the host nation. Accordingly, joint campaign plans for indirect FID assistance should primarily guide US military commanders and executive agents charged with security assistance and joint-multinational exercise responsibilities. Such plans serve US strategic interests by supporting host-nation IDAD programs where such assistance is politically feasible, strategically sound, and logistically supportable.

**PLANNING REQUIREMENTS**

As a general guide to method and procedure, air and space planning for FID should satisfy the following requirements:

- US Air Force FID planning requires a clear statement of basic air and space objectives in the host nation. Specifically, what major role (or roles) should air and space power play and what should that role accomplish in furthering the host nation’s strategy for IDAD? These objectives, derived from priorities contained in the IDAD plan, should function as the basis for planning various forms of air and space support to the host government. For details on priorities, see chapter three.
- Operational-level air and space planning for FID generally requires extensive cooperation and coordination among a variety of agencies within the joint-multinational-interagency arena. In most cases, combatant commanders function as focal points for coordinating indirect as well as direct forms of assistance.
• US Air Force planning for security assistance and all forms of
direct support short of combat operations should be conducted
jointly, or where appropriate, coordinated with joint US
military components and with US civilian agencies exercising
control and supervision of FID activities within the recipient
nation.
• US Air Force security assistance planning is inherently a
multinational activity involving US joint-interagency
components and appropriate elements of the supported
government and its military services.
• US Air Force planning for direct support short of combat
operations must be coordinated with the supported nation. In
many cases, the planning process requires the direct
participation of the supported government and its military
forces.
• US Air Force planning for joint-multinational exercises and
combat operations must be conducted in the joint-
multinational arena. Joint-multinational planning gives
participants a means to negotiate an agreement between
participants on mission objectives, force levels, composition
of forces, support arrangements, and rules of engagement. US
Air Force and host-nation forces should establish early in the
planning process command and control relationships,
functions, and responsibilities to guide commanders during
the execution phase.

• Plans establishing guidance and objectives for all types of direct
and indirect support should be compatible with host-government
IDAD initiatives.
• US Air Force FID planning should be flexible. Periodic revisions
may be necessary to accommodate alterations in host-nation
planning, unanticipated restrictions on US assistance, new
developments in air and space technology, and significant shifts
in conflict intensity and levels of US support.
• US Air Force FID activities are carried out in accordance with US
procurement and security assistance law, including statutes, case
law, Comptroller General opinions, and numerous DOD and US
Air Force regulations and directives. Also, US FID activities must
be conducted according to international law, including the law
of armed conflict, and applicable multilateral and bilateral agreements. The legislation governing this assistance is complex and subject to periodic revision. Security assistance funding levels, certain procedures, and allowable US military activities vary from country to country. To ensure compliance with legislative constraints and funding procedures, FID initiatives for both direct and indirect forms of support should be submitted for legal review prior to commencement and monitored for legal compliance during execution.

This doctrine and the principles of air and space power contained in AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*, furnish an initial point of departure for US Air Force FID planning. Other Service doctrines, multi-Service manuals, and joint publications containing foreign internal defense guidance strengthen the doctrinal foundations of US Air Force planning in the joint arena.

**STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE**

US Air Force planning for FID operations depends on strategic and tactical intelligence. Intelligence supports FID by providing early warning of insurgent conflict and by defining the precise nature of the conflict once it has started. Long-range strategic estimates provide the basis for US Air Force security assistance planning, US contingency planning, and intelligence support to host-nation IDAD planning. Tactical intelligence supports US direct support initiatives and, when appropriate, host-nation operational planning. The key to effective employment of US Air Force, DOD, and other US intelligence assets is the early development of essential elements of information (EEI) by combatant commanders, air component commanders, and intelligence analysts. These EEI must be effectively translated into collection requirements for both technical (SIGINT and IMINT) and HUMINT collection resources and methodologies. A major source to answer these EEI is the routine debriefing of US Air Force personnel supporting FID activities.

Because the internal dynamics of insurgency, counterinsurgency, and other forms of internal conflict vary with each situation, FID planning should begin with an analysis of the
total conflict environment. Planning should be based on all-source intelligence estimates of not only the enemy threat but also the host government’s ability to counter the threat. Intelligence requirements include risk assessment, analysis of friendly and enemy infrastructures, situation reporting, and targeting data.

Intelligence provides a foundation for determining appropriate air and space roles and for establishing correct priorities and relationships between military and nonmilitary options. In determining proper levels and types of US Air Force FID assistance, the most critical elements of information are often nonmilitary in nature, especially during the early phases of insurgency. Intelligence should analyze all factors in selecting or rejecting air and space options. These factors include public administration and public service requirements, social and political sensitivities to military operations, economic and political viability of the host nation, and psychological strengths of hostile and friendly elements.

Early assessments derived from basic and estimated intelligence increase the host government’s chances to counter the threat with the least amount of force. For example, if an insurgency progresses to the point where intelligence activities are reduced to crisis reporting, nonmilitary options are severely limited. At the crisis stage, the EEI focus primarily on military questions. How large is the enemy force and what are its capabilities? Where is it located and how can it be destroyed? In the early, incipient phase, the questions shift from what and where to who and why. Who are the insurgents? Who leads, informs, hides, and supplies their forces? And most importantly, why are they there? Critical EEI are built up from crisis background—from historical analysis and cultural factors; from social, economic, and political components of the conflict; and from the personalities and ambitions of the lead players. Early intelligence estimates provide a foundation for establishing proper correlations and priorities between military and nonmilitary air and space roles for both the host nation and US FID forces.
LOGISTICS

Logistics elements play a predominant role in security assistance, thus forming the backbone of indirect US Air Force FID assistance. US Air Force logistics elements also support US force deployment and specific joint-multinational operations in more direct forms of support.

Logistics planners should establish EEI on requirements for specific information about host-nation airfields, aviation support facilities, ports, energy sources, communications, and other in-country resources. These EEI should be incorporated into the combatant commander’s technical and HUMINT collection plans. Information developed by US Air Force logistics elements through site surveys, joint-multinational exercises, logistics studies, and other assessments supporting security assistance activities may contain significant information for planners. Accordingly, US Air Force intelligence elements should routinely debrief US Air Force logistics personnel who have deployed to foreign countries to satisfy EEI.

US Air Force logistics planning for security assistance incorporates intelligence estimates of air and space requirements and capabilities within the supported nation. Planning should balance these requirements against anticipated security assistance funds for initial investment expenses and should include realistic estimates of future funding for operations and maintenance costs.

• Logistics planning for significant force structure improvements should focus initially on what the host nation intends to do, or can do, for itself. Specifically, how does the host government intend to employ its national resources? What are the immediate and long-range priorities for IDAD? How does IDAD planning integrate all instruments of national power? How will military resources support social, economic, informational, and political initiatives? How can air and space operations support both military and nonmilitary objectives contained in the overall strategy? And finally, what is the host nation’s capacity to receive, store, operate, and maintain the air and space resources provided?
• After the host nation’s IDAD strategy is understood and its
aviation requirements and capabilities are defined, planning should proceed to the question of how (and to what extent) these requirements can (or should) be supported within existing US foreign policy objectives, legislative constraints, and security assistance funding levels. Specific levels and types of materiel support, including the provision or modification of major end items, flow from such considerations.

- Where restricted security assistance funding requires trade-off decisions between levels and types of air and space support, funding priorities should be aligned with strategic objectives identified in the IDAD plan.

Logistics planning for direct assistance should include all environmental factors influencing logistics requirements and the way a deployed force might be supported. Planning should take into account the limited logistics infrastructures prevalent in most lesser-developed nations and should allow for social, economic, and political factors that could enhance or impede US Air Force logistics operations.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE SURGE OPERATIONS

Foreign air forces receiving security assistance often possess the nucleus of a counterinsurgency or counterdrug capability but are not able to generate the air support required to meet national emergencies. In such emergencies, significant improvements can be achieved through security assistance surge operations involving new or increased support in equipment transfers, training, advice, and other forms of technical assistance. Where possible, this support should focus on low-cost options to upgrade existing host capabilities to perform required air and space roles and missions. Where the host nation faces imminent threat and US interests are at risk, the support may include more extensive efforts at increased levels of funding. Security assistance actions are conducted by the cognizant DOD component (not necessarily Service-to-Service). Planners coordinate their proposed actions with the Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force (International Affairs) (SAF/IA).

Surge requirements for air and space defense articles and services should be based on assessments and recommendations from
country team members (including SAO representatives), US Air Force survey teams, and combatant commanders. Because of the extraordinary logistics effort generally required during surges, planning conducted within the security assistance community should be closely coordinated with joint military and civilian defense agencies supporting the transportation and execution phases of the operation. In developing transportation schedules and modes of delivery, including US Air Force airlift, planners should consider such factors as the size of the logistics effort, overall budget constraints, the time limits imposed, and political restrictions on the presence of US military aircraft in the host country.

Surge requirements should be anticipated as early as possible. Some foreign air force organizations may have difficulty absorbing large, rapid infusions of additional security assistance. Surge activities involving additional aircraft, support items, and facilities should be geared to the availability of qualified aircrews and ground support specialists. For this reason, additional aircrew and ground training requirements are often a major planning factor in surge operations. A surge effort, therefore, begins by determining the near-term “build-up” potential of the host air force.

The long-term implications of major force structure increases in the host air force should be considered during surge planning activities. A near-term payoff in operational capability should be weighed against anticipated post-surge funding levels and long-term air and space requirements within the host nation.

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

There are two major aspects of PSYOP planning. Obviously, PSYOP planning should be accomplished for FID activities primarily initiated for psychological effect. Additionally, PSYOP planning should be included in all FID activities, even when those activities are not primarily designed for psychological effect. Operations and logistics planners at all levels of command should carefully consider the psychological implications of any US Air Force action involving direct or indirect support to a foreign government. Accordingly, PSYOP planning should be closely tied to all-source intelligence on
friendly and hostile elements. Requirements, objectives, and policy guidelines for US Air Force PSYOP activities are normally established within the joint-multinational-interagency arena. Planners should also anticipate enemy propaganda directed at US Air Force operations in the host nation. Operations likely to generate counterpropaganda requirements should be coordinated with appropriate US and host-country information agencies.

CIVIL AFFAIRS (CA)

In some circumstances, US Army or Marine Corps CA augmentation teams may be needed to support US Air Force elements deployed overseas on FID missions. Planners should identify requirements for CA support early in the planning process. CA teams can assist in preparing overseas bases and facilities by securing local acceptance and support of US Air Force operations. On-going CA tasks include such activities as coordinating US Air Force HCA and MCA projects and helping host-government authorities and military forces secure the cooperation and support of their own citizens. CA teams can also assist deployed US Air Force commanders and staffs by providing information on local civilian attitudes, culture, religions, ethics, infrastructures, and conflict dynamics in the area of operations.

SIMULATION AND GAMING

Simulation and gaming may be used to facilitate strategic and theater planning for FID. Success of air and space operations in FID often depends directly on the planner’s ability to assess a broad range of complex, mutually related problems involving human and technological factors. Simulation and gaming based on country-specific models are tools for identifying these factors and for developing and testing air and space roles and missions, security assistance initiatives, as well as direct support options.
CHAPTER SEVEN
EMPLOYMENT

GENERAL

While chapter three generally addresses air and space power’s role in dealing with subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency, this chapter specifically focuses on US Air Force FID activities supporting host-nation IDAD efforts. The basic principles of air and space power and the principles of war provide fundamental guidance for employing US Air Force FID forces. These principles apply equally to indirect and direct forms of assistance. US and supported allied commanders should practice unity of command, create economy of force, and accomplish maneuver to achieve desired objectives. As with their US counterparts, allied commanders should be able to employ air and space forces as mutually supporting, integrated systems capable of functioning synergistically with surface operations. Relative to the funding and/or policy limitations on FID assistance, force development programs for the recipient nation should provide host commanders the ability to tailor their own efforts to specific conflict situations, objectives, and priorities. Direct and indirect forms of support should be mutually supporting and synchronized with defense and development efforts on the ground.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE

Where possible, US Air Force security assistance efforts should focus on defense articles and services that minimize host-nation dependency on continuous in-country supervision and support by the United States. Recipient nations should, however, be trained to operate and maintain the systems provided. In some cases, they should be advised on how to employ these systems for specific operations. Systems training geared to introducing or upgrading air and space systems and support capabilities can often be accomplished outside the recipient nation. Where permitted,
however, some of the training and most of the advisory effort should be performed in-country, particularly during the early stages of US involvement. As host-nation proficiency in air and space operations increases, dependence on in-country US Air Force assistance can be reduced by developing internal training capabilities within host aviation units.

Resource mobilization plays a crucial role in combating insurgency and other forms of lawlessness and violence. Besides helping to provide US defense articles and services to the host nation, US Air Force logistics personnel should advise host-nation authorities on the use of airpower to establish and sustain IDAD programs through aerial lines of supply and personnel movement.

- Security assistance logistics operations should be sufficiently flexible to accommodate critical shifts in the tempo and scale of a conflict. Such shifts may require adjustment or realignment of delivery schedules and priorities among recipient nations, taking into account the difference between recipients not under immediate threat and those actually under siege by hostile forces. In some cases, accelerated delivery of programmed US defense articles and services may have to be provided to governments experiencing significant threats to national survival. Force activity

*Avionics maintenance advisory operations, Ecuador.*
designators (FAD), approved by the Joint Staff on a case-by-case basis, may have to be elevated to accelerate the flow of air and space weapons, spare parts, and supplies to critical areas of US interest.

- To overcome sustainability problems inherent in maintaining older generation aircraft and systems, US Air Force security assistance operations may also have to include administration and logistics support of nonstandard items. An example is the contractor-supported Nonstandard Item Parts and Repair Support system, a program for meeting supply, repair, and servicing needs of certain nonstandard items.

AFMAN 16-101 contains guidelines and specific policy for training conducted by US Air Force personnel under security assistance programs. With respect to FID, the following considerations also apply:

- Much of the training required by FID recipients centers on development of basic skills in flight operations, logistics, intelligence, communications, weather, and other support functions. Specialized training in such areas as counterinsurgency theory, military planning, air and space applications and employment should be used to provide foreign students a means of applying these basic skills to specific problems affecting internal security in their countries. Such training directly supports internal, host-nation solutions to the conflict, thus decreasing the likelihood of a larger US military role.

- Training for foreign personnel is provided in the United States or, in special cases, at overseas US military facilities. The most realistic setting for operational training and other types of instruction focusing on the use of applied skills, however, is the host nation itself. By conducting the training in-country, student capabilities are developed around actual conditions (weather, terrain, navigation aids, communications, and air base facilities) that will be encountered during future operations. Temporarily deployed personnel normally conduct in-country training. Where in-country instruction is prohibited or deemed impractical, training should be conducted at other overseas locations or in the continental United States (CONUS).

- Where practical, operational training should be conducted jointly.
Joint training offers major advantages in developing common understandings among host military services of requirements, capabilities, limitations, and procedures. Where facilities are available and training schedules permit, other significant advantages may be gained by combining foreign students with future SAO counterparts and other US FID personnel receiving specialized instruction. Combined student participation lays the groundwork for future contacts between US and host-country personnel by establishing mutual understanding of FID-IDAD requirements and objectives.

SECURITY ASSISTANCE TEAMS

US Air Force security assistance teams (Appendix B) supplement SAO capabilities by providing training, advice, and technical assistance to recipient nations. The teams, funded under security assistance, vary in size and composition. US Air Force personnel may deploy as a US Air Force team or function as the air component of a larger joint effort. A US Air Force team or air component may consist of one or more individuals selected from various US Air Force commands and headquarters elements to accomplish single or multiple tasks involving air and space operations and support. When the mission involves training or advisory efforts aimed at developing joint tactics, techniques, and procedures (JTTP), US Air Force teams should include members of the other US Services (as appropriate). Commanders should refer to AFMAN 16-101 for general guidelines and policy governing training team assistance. The following guidance has specific applications in FID.

Combatant commands may employ US Air Force security assistance teams for limited support on technical training in the operation and maintenance of specific air and space systems. In this case, the principal criteria for team selection are competence in the specialty requested, teaching skills, and language compatibility with host-nation recipients. When training and advisory assistance teams are required to provide guidance on planning, developing, and employing air and space power, teaching skills in one technical specialty are rarely sufficient. Trainers and advisors functioning in this capacity should also be able to recognize potential air and space
applications in a given internal conflict. They should understand the possibilities and means of integrating air and space operations into the host nation’s social, economic, psychological, political, and joint military initiatives and be capable of imparting this knowledge to foreign nationals.

• Relative to policy constraints on the number of temporarily deployed US military personnel allowed in-country, training and advisory teams should be sufficiently sized and structured to address all major deficiencies affecting the host air force’s ability to function coherently. Where possible, teams should be structured around a core element of mutually supporting air and space skills, and they should be specifically tailored to the host’s requirement. An integrated team approach is especially important if advisors are employed to assist operational efforts at remote forward locations.

• In-country support requirements, which country teams or combatant commanders normally initiate, should be based on recommendations derived from surveys and assessments. This approach anticipates the problem of a team deploying overseas to develop or improve operational capabilities of a particular weapon system only to learn that the system cannot be employed because the host air force lacks an adequate maintenance and supply system or because there is no air request net in the country.

Surveys on security assistance support of FID should include three basic tasks. The first task is to determine appropriate air and space roles and missions for the given conflict or pre-conflict situation. The team then conducts an assessment of the host nation’s ability to fulfill these roles with existing air and space resources. Finally, the team develops requirements and recommendations for improvements that can be carried out through host-nation initiatives or through additional US assistance. The team bases its recommendations for force improvements on a total assessment of existing functions, capabilities, and relationships of such basic air and space programs as operations, maintenance, supply, command and control, communications, and intelligence.

• Where IDAD planning for air and space operations is deficient or nonexistent, survey teams may recommend training or advisory assistance in the joint, integrated use of host air and
space resources to achieve the IDAD objectives established by the recipient nation.

- Before developing recommendations for additional US assistance, survey and assessment teams should determine host-nation capabilities to achieve required levels and types of operational capability through its own efforts. In some cases, significant, low-cost improvements can be realized by restructuring organizationally, realigning the mission, or retraining assigned forces to accomplish the required tasks. Other improvements are possible through equipment modifications using local resources.

- Air and space systems, organizations, techniques, and procedures recommended by the team should be suitable for the conflict situation and applicable to the needs and capabilities of the host government. Force structure increases, equipment modifications, and quality improvements in support areas should be supportable through security assistance and or host-nation funding, and they should be maintainable within the technological resources of the recipient nation. Adhering to this rule avoids unrealistic assessments or recommendations and minimizes the problem of creating expectations that cannot be fulfilled.

- Commanders should refer to DOD 5105.38-M, Security Assistance Management Manual, October 1988, with changes 1 through 7, for specific policies and procedures governing survey and assessment functions.

Air and space training and equipment provided to the host nation may not be sufficient to ensure the success of aviation programs in some conflict situations. Where permitted under current legislative guidance and when authorized and directed by appropriate authority, US Air Force advisory personnel may also be employed to advise host air force units on how to employ air support resources in a manner that serves the combined interests of the United States and the host nation.

- Advising differs from training mainly in its use of doctrine. Whereas training provides a doctrinal foundation for military operations, advising has its roots in doctrinal guidance but includes creative solutions adapted to actual situations in the host country. In this sense, advising is relatively unconstrained by
existing doctrine. This does not, however, lessen the need for consistency. US Air Force elements managing security assistance programs in a host nation should continuously monitor the advisory effort and, where appropriate, should help team members maintain continuity in tactics, techniques, goals, and procedures.

- Advice on air and space applications is often most effective when applied at top decision-making levels within the host government. Advice on strategic matters, operational-level planning, joint operations, and the integration of multiple governmental agencies is appropriately directed at higher levels of the military command structure. In addition, advisory efforts have a more lasting effect and carry considerably more weight when acted upon by senior members of the host military.

- Advisors should help host commanders apply an operational-level perspective to such issues as air base planning and construction, logistics, intelligence, command and control, communications, and training.

- Advisory assistance performed at the field level generally focuses on tactics and technical support functions, but much of the advice appropriate for command-level assistance applies here as well. Field advisors should help local subordinate commanders ensure that tactical air support planning follows joint operational-level guidance and that tactical operations are properly coordinated and synchronized with other joint-interagency activities.

- Besides providing technical assistance on operating and maintaining US defense articles, field advice should focus on such issues as air base security and operability, resource conservation, munitions safety, and ground-handling procedures.

- Advisors should help host air force commanders focus on the political and psychological implications of air combat operations. They should also provide assistance in devising methods of operation that reduce the risk of collateral damage to friendly military units and to civilian personnel and property.

- US Air Force advisory assistance can be employed, either as a directed mission or as an ancillary function of other advisory duties, to encourage and promote internal developmental programs and, where appropriate, human rights initiatives.

- Because of their close contact with in-country IDAD operations, US Air Force advisors are often in the best position to identify
requirements for additional security assistance efforts or more direct forms of support. When tasked by proper authorities, they should coordinate US direct support activities with host authorities at command and field levels and help analyze and interpret US-provided intelligence.

**DIRECT SUPPORT**

US Air Force direct support capabilities can be employed at varying levels of conflict intensity to enhance or supplement host aviation programs. These capabilities, though not intended as a substitute for security assistance, may be used concurrently with security assistance programs to prevent the transition to more destructive forms of conflict. At the same time, the direct support effort should not, through excessive momentum, cause that transition to occur or lead to self-generating requirements for increasingly higher levels of US military involvement. Also, direct support should not, through excessive application, undermine the host nation’s will or capacity to achieve an internal solution to the crisis. To preserve host self-sufficiency and legitimacy, the US Air Force should maintain a proper balance between direct and indirect forms of assistance.
Host air and space requirements may exceed the objectives and limitations of security assistance and joint-multinational exercises. At the same time, a US combat role may also be tactically inappropriate or politically infeasible as an FID instrument. To satisfy some of these requirements at acceptable levels of commitment and risk, US Air Force resources can be employed in a variety of direct support roles that bridge the gap between indirect assistance and combat operations. Specific capabilities include intelligence sharing, communications support, and other “stand-off” options listed in chapter four.

- As with any operation involving in-country employment of US personnel and resources, direct noncombat support does not eliminate all risks. It does, however, offer a means of providing specialized assistance to a host country without intentionally exposing US personnel to hostile fire.
- Direct US Air Force involvement in such activities as HCA and MCA obviously requires the physical presence of US Air Force personnel working in close contact with friendly elements. For such activities as intelligence collection and PSYOP, it may be possible to conduct launch and recovery operations from outside the recipient country when there are political or operational constraints on the presence of US Air Force assets on foreign installations.
- In accord with policies on using US forces within the host nation and/or the surrounding region, air and space operations should be carried out on the basis of established doctrine for US Air Force roles and missions. JTTP, however, should be tailored to suit specific objectives, political constraints, and environments.
- Commanders should be prepared to conduct air and space operations requiring clandestine, covert, or low-visibility techniques and procedures in politically sensitive or denied areas. These techniques and procedures may also be required for combat operations. In such instances, the use of US Air Force special operations forces should be considered.

If a conflict progresses to the point where host military capabilities are exceeded and US backup forces are committed, the US Air Force may be required to continue security assistance efforts and concurrently conduct or support joint-multinational combat
operations. Where feasible, US Air Force operations should focus on such support roles as logistics and intelligence, allowing host security forces to pursue offensive operations against hostile agents. If the conflict is an insurgency that reaches the conventional warfare stage, US Air Force elements may also be called upon to engage enemy main-force units when there are no other practical options. In this event, combat operations should be aimed at driving the insurgency back to a lower intensity phase to prevent a decisive, adverse outcome.

- A central objective of combat operations is to protect vital resources and to buy time for the host government to stabilize its social, economic, and political institutions. The US Air Force role here is supportive only. It is not designed to capture the strategic initiative or to transfer strategic responsibilities from the host government to the United States. To preserve its legitimacy and achieve a lasting, internal solution to the conflict, the host government must carry full responsibility for the strategic offensive.
- US Air Force combat operations should be carried out on the basis of established air and space doctrines and, where applicable, joint and/or multinational doctrines. Chapter three’s general guidance on the role of air and space power also applies to Air Force FID operations at the tactical level.
- During multinational operations, US Air Force commanders should anticipate differences in JTTP between US and host-nation forces and, where possible, attempt to resolve these differences. Commanders should employ JTTP appropriate to the tactical situation and, where necessary, provide adjustments to fit the strengths and weaknesses of allied forces.

FORCE PROTECTION

Force protection for FID applies to deployed operational units supporting host-nation IDAD programs. Force protection for air combat units and contingency support elements falls within the context of air base and site defense. Commanders must exercise force protection to ensure the defense and survival of personnel, facilities, C² structures, weapon systems, and logistics.
CHAPTER EIGHT
TRAINING

GENERAL

To accomplish its FID mission, the US Air Force employs a broad range of basic skills in air and space operations, maintenance, management, and administration. It also trains US Air Force and other DOD personnel for duties specifically related to the application of these skills in FID. The following guidance addresses FID training objectives and requirements, instructional methods, types of training, and training sources.

Individuals who command, plan, and administer FID operations should understand the operational environment and how deployed FID forces function under existing command and control relationships among combatant commanders and US diplomatic missions. Security assistance trainers and advisors should also understand the correct relationship of military force to other instruments of national power and be able to recognize proper uses of air and space power in various conflict environments. Courses of instruction should be tailored to fit user and operator requirements and should be administered to students before their assumption of FID duties. Where possible, training should be properly sequenced with general education and career development.

AFI 36-2201, Developing, Managing, and Conducting Training, provides the basis for planning and executing formal Air Force FID training programs. Instructional methods vary, however, according to course content and desired training objectives. Methods include classroom instruction, on-the-job training, joint-interagency seminars, exchange programs, consultation visits with foreign countries, distance education, and directed research. Joint-multinational exercises provide commanders opportunities to validate concepts and evaluate training effectiveness. Commanders should employ instructional simulation and gaming to assist in preparing Air Force personnel for FID operations.
TYPES OF TRAINING

The following discussion briefly describes major types, or levels, of training that should be employed to prepare US Air Force personnel for FID duties. Commanders preparing FID forces for overseas deployment should coordinate with supported agencies (combatant commanders, SAOs, etc.) to determine the types and depth of training required for specific activities and locations.

Familiarization training furnishes a general perspective on US Air Force and joint-interagency FID programs and capabilities. General familiarization in such areas as operational environments, uses of military force, and air and space roles and missions provides US Air Force personnel a broad conceptual framework for planning and executing FID operations. This training has extensive application for all FID participants and should be employed as the introduction to more specialized forms of instruction.

Air Force personnel deploying overseas for FID should receive specialized training [relative to the nature of their duties] in such areas as foreign languages, area orientation, foreign training techniques, cross-cultural communications, antiterrorism, counterdrug operations, and the principles of IDAD planning. This training is especially important for security assistance managers, trainers, and advisors. Deployed FID forces performing direct support activities may require additional training in such subjects as combat weapons and their employment, field craft, and psychological operations.

In selected cases, US Air Force personnel should receive technical training on specific FID assignments and responsibilities. Security assistance trainers or advisors, for instance, may require technical instruction on operating and maintaining nonstandard air and space weapon systems and support equipment. Supplemental instruction or cross-training in such areas as logistics, intelligence, communications, and civil-military operations can be used to increase the effectiveness and flexibility of deployed US Air Force elements, especially in situations demanding a minimum presence of US personnel.
A variety of FID-related instructional programs are available to US Air Force personnel. Commanders should refer to AFCAT 36-2223, USAF Formal Schools, for information on specific US Air Force courses. Additional FID training is available through other US Military Departments and civilian agencies via inter-Service or interagency support agreements.

Service academies and professional military education programs should be employed as sources of general education in FID matters. Civilian universities and colleges also have area studies and other instructional programs on the FID environment.

The joint special operations establishment provides both general education and specialized training in insurgency-counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and other subjects related to FID. US Air Force special operations forces should function as the principal source of specialized FID instruction on air and space matters for deployed Air Force security assistance teams and, where appropriate, direct support elements.

Various civilian departments, agencies, and independent establishments of the US Government are potential sources of specialized and technical instruction in such areas as intelligence, psychological operations, counterdrug, civil and military law enforcement, civic action, nation assistance, nation-building, country team operations, and public information programs.
APPENDIX A

INSURGENCY AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

GENERAL

This appendix provides US Air Force commanders, trainers, advisors, and other personnel involved in foreign internal defense (FID) a basic framework for understanding and evaluating the major components of insurgency and counterinsurgency. The discussion on counterinsurgency focuses on the major functions and objectives of a host nation’s IDAD strategy.

ANALYZING INSURGENCY

Because insurgencies vary greatly in form, scope, and intensity, it is impossible to construct a universal model for this type of conflict. There are, however, a variety of elements that can be analyzed to determine the composition and likely direction of an insurgent movement. Of principal interest to civilian and military FID planners is the way an insurgency is inspired, organized, and employed. Typically, insurgency incorporates an ideological content furnishing a revolutionary theory and cause; a revolutionary infrastructure providing leadership, organization, logistics, communications, and intelligence; and a militant arm to defend the revolutionary movement and enforce its political objectives. Understanding these elements allows defending elements to focus on the cause of the revolution and to direct their campaign against the infrastructure as well as the insurgent’s military forces. To devise appropriate countermeasures, including the use of air and space power, defense planners should also analyze the insurgent’s strategy—the goals and likely methods of attack.
Ideological Content

Poverty, class oppression, political disfranchisement, and ethnic strife often furnish the necessary conditions for revolution, but they are rarely sufficient to generate armed conflict. Given economic and political grievances, another condition must be met. A catalyst must be furnished to draw attention to these grievances and focus them on the failure of the state to act in the best interests of the people. The catalyst originates in the ideological content of the revolution (Marxism or religion for example). Together, the grievances and the ideological content function as necessary and sufficient conditions to set the revolution in motion. Party ideology is the mechanism for connecting the population with the central ideas and goals of the revolutionary movement. It defines the economic and political future of the revolutionary state and provides the inspirational basis for revolt. The ideological underpinnings of a revolution may extend beyond the legitimate needs and aspirations of the people. Insurgents bent on achieving power at any cost often view government reforms as a threat to their political ambitions.

Revolutionary Infrastructure

The revolutionary infrastructure furnishes the organizational devices to administer and control all social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives. Party leaders, located at the infrastructure’s center, formulate strategic plans, policies, and goals. They are the source of political-ideological order and discipline. Party leadership is represented by political cadres located throughout the organizational structure. Overall, the infrastructure functions as the heart of the parties’ command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) system.

The infrastructure is often organized into interconnected, clandestine cells responsible for recruitment, training, intelligence, deception, propaganda, and logistics. C3I lines extend to insurgent military elements and, where possible, to agents located in various segments of local and national government, host military organizations, and society at large. Insurgents may conduct political
actions and psychological operations through such legal front organizations as labor movements, organized student groups, and registered political parties.

The infrastructure is often a coalition of factions with differing grievances, ideological patterns, and political agendas. When faction leaders differ significantly over revolutionary ends, ways, or means, internal alliances are often dynamic and extremely fragile. The nature of these alliances—their dominant political direction and degree of cohesion—are important indicators of the nature of the revolution, its strategic goals, strengths, and weaknesses.

**Insurgent Strategy**

Usually insurgent strategy is carried out on multiple fronts (through social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives) to separate the government from the population and to neutralize the government’s self-defense mechanisms. The contest is for legitimacy and, where possible, political mobilization of the people. Mobilization furnishes the revolution with workers, fighters, money, weapons, and intelligence, while at the same time denying these assets to the government. By neutralizing the government’s authority through the use of propaganda and force, the insurgent creates opportunities to implant forms of political and economic control of the population. The strategy is ultimately aimed at “out administering” the host government. Although the insurgent does not necessarily require the active participation of the majority of the population, the insurgent secures neutrality or passive support.

**Military Operations**

The insurgent movement usually enters the armed conflict phase with a small guerrilla force that increases in strength as personnel and weapons become available. The insurgents fight as guerrillas because they lack the means to apply force quickly and decisively. The insurgents usually begin with little of the materiel and manpower resources available to the government. They avoid all-out confrontations with government forces, relying on accumulating smaller successes to achieve social, economic, psychological, and political objectives.
Guerrilla tactics extend the revolution with the means available, wearing down not only the host nation’s financial and materiel resources but also the political and moral resolve of foreign friends and allies supporting the counterinsurgency effort. By interdicting vital lines of communication, halting or slowing agricultural production, and inhibiting domestic and foreign trade, the insurgent reduces the government’s financial ability to resist. Successful interdiction of economic targets also undermines the legitimacy of the government by creating inflation, higher taxes, and critical shortages of consumer goods and services. Insurgents also may employ terrorism (assassination, kidnapping, extortion, and blackmail) as a tactical instrument to suppress or inhibit government actions. Selective attacks against industrial facilities, national transportation systems, government officials, and civil law enforcement agencies are often undertaken for their psychological effect, primarily to discredit the host government’s ability to manage and administer affairs of state.

Guerrilla tactics may also function as a crucial lead-in phase to conventional operations aimed at crushing or seizing the government’s main forces. In many instances, national security forces are driven into their most defensible positions during the protracted guerrilla phase. This withdrawal provides insurgents time and secures maneuvering space to consolidate their political and economic control in rural areas, establishes their legitimacy, and assembles a larger, more conventionally structured force capable of making a decisive, final assault on the government’s entrenched garrisons. With the defending forces isolated in static positions, the government’s chances of success at this point are poor.

**Phased Actions**

Insurgency is a progressive, evolutionary process marked by a series of phases corresponding to major transitions in the revolutionary movement.

Although a variety of models can be constructed, at least three such phases can be identified—an incipient phase, prehostilities phase, a guerrilla warfare phase, and conventional confrontation phase.
• Phase I corresponds to infrastructure development plus initial recruiting, organizing, training, and equipping of combat elements. During this phase, insurgents engage the government in open political confrontations, such as public demonstrations, labor strikes, and boycotts. Insurgents also establish secure base areas for military command elements and guerrilla operations. Political cadres focus on ideological indoctrination of civilians and armed revolutionaries.

• Phase II is the first level of armed violence. Irregular forces engage in sabotage, interdiction of communication and logistics links, assassination, and selective attacks against government security forces. Insurgents expand their secure base areas and, where possible, link them to form strategic enclaves of political autonomy.

• Phase III marks the transition from guerrilla actions to operations incorporating the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) of conventional fire and maneuver.

The reference to conflict phases is only a means of identifying critical shifts in the scope and intensity of insurgent activity. It does not signify a clean break between one kind of activity and another. For example, infrastructure development is a continuous process of expanding administration, command and control, training, and employing mobilized resources. Mobilization of insurgent combat forces must continuously expand to carry the insurgency from one phase to the next. Similarly, guerrilla operations may carry over into the conventional confrontation phase as a force multiplier. Also, an insurgency does not have to progress through all three phases to succeed. A critical combination of political, economic, psychological, and military pressures may be sufficient to precipitate the government’s collapse at any stage of the conflict.

The revolutionary movement is most vulnerable to government countermeasures during the initial build-up phase, before the insurgent develops military forces. Once the insurgency takes up armed combat, government countermeasures become far more complicated and difficult to apply. Insurgent warfare is, however, reversible. Reversibility can work to the advantage of either side in the conflict. If an insurgency fails militarily in one phase, it can revert to a lower phase, thus securing its survival while
generating or reinforcing combat capabilities. The government, on the other hand, may be able to capitalize on reduced levels of military activity to focus on solutions aimed at rooting out the infrastructure and eliminating economic and political grievances fueling the revolution.

COUNTERINSURGENCY

Countering a revolutionary strategy focused on political mobilization and protracted violence requires a wide range of social, economic, informational, political, and military initiatives. No single government initiative is sufficient, particularly when the insurgent is able to bind political-ideological goals with genuine grievances. The government’s initiatives should be taken simultaneously and should reinforce each other. These initiatives require all instruments of national power to be combined into a single, integrated IDAD program made of both military and civilian resources. The program itself is formalized through an IDAD strategy emphasizing unity of effort, maximum use of intelligence, minimum use of violence, and responsive government leadership and administration. Ideally, the IDAD strategy is used early enough to prevent an insurgency, but it can also be employed to counter an insurgency that has already started. The strategy incorporates four major functions—balanced development, mobilization, security, and neutralization.

Balanced Development

Balanced development attempts to create a social, economic, and political environment impervious to revolutionary attack. It does this through reforms aimed at removing or alleviating sources of legitimate grievance that can be exploited by revolutionary elements. Although the scope and detail of the reforms vary from country to country, their principal functions are to establish the defending regime’s legitimacy, capture the political initiative from the revolutionary movement, and mobilize public support of IDAD efforts. In some cases, balanced development may require major investments in the industrial and agricultural sectors. Economic development should, however, be balanced with equally important nation-building initiatives in such areas as human rights, legal process, public education, communications, health care,
transportation, utilities, water, and other public service programs. The host military often possesses unique capabilities in transportation, communications, and manpower that can be employed in nation-building programs.

**Mobilization**

The government mobilizes the population to participate in IDAD efforts. Mobilization maximizes manpower, materiel resources, political support, and intelligence available to the government while denying these resources to the insurgent. The net effect of mobilization is a social-political environment in which the government can “out administer” the leadership and control mechanisms of the revolutionary movement. Mobilization relies heavily on informational instruments to instill public confidence in the government and to reduce anxiety over military initiatives.

**Security**

Security includes all activities to protect the population, the government, and vital economic resources from insurgent violence. Security provides a safe environment for balanced development and denies the enemy access to popular support. The ability of internal security forces to maintain law and order is a key factor in demonstrating the government’s legitimacy. During the early stages of insurgency, civil law enforcement agencies should function as a major line of defense for internal security. Revolution’s major dynamic—political mobilization—occurs at the grass-roots level, and the government agency closest to that level is the local police. Police are generally the first to detect critical signs of unrest, particularly in rural areas, and they are often closest to important sources of human resources intelligence (HUMINT) on infrastructure organization and methods. They also provide a nucleus for establishing local auxiliaries and paramilitary forces. In some instances, civilian security forces are more acceptable to the local populace than the military. Military participation may begin with lateral support or augmentation of the police during low levels of violence and increase to a direct combat posture if the insurgency escalates.
Neutralization

Neutralization is physically and psychologically separating insurgents from the population. It includes all lawful activities to disrupt, disorganize, and defeat insurgent organizations. Neutralization thus enlarges the objectives of security to include eliminating sources of insurgent violence. Neutralization relies on civil law enforcement agencies as well as military forces to accomplish these objectives.

The principal targets of neutralization are the revolutionary infrastructure’s leadership and control elements. These elements are often deeply embedded in the civilian sector, operating clandestinely or under the protective cover of legitimate institutions. In most cases, penetrating and rooting out leadership and control elements can be done more effectively with legal, informational, and civil law enforcement and investigative instruments than with military forces.

Neutralization also requires internal defense forces that are organized, trained, and equipped for joint combat operations. Application of military force, however, is rarely decisive in determining long-term strategic outcomes. Defeating the insurgent militarily may drive the conflict to a lower phase of violence or drive it underground, but it does not eliminate the social, economic, and political tensions fueling the insurgency. Military force should be aimed at holding the conflict at the lowest possible level of violence while the government eliminates the infrastructure and engages in balanced development and reform. Force is not an end in itself. It is only an important means of buying time for the processes of reform and nation-building to take effect.

The reversible, multiphase nature of revolutionary conflict requires great flexibility in planning and executing military operations. TTP appropriate for conventional confrontations may be ineffective, even counterproductive, when executing military operations during counterguerrilla operations. Because of varying situations and force requirements, decision makers and planners require accurate, timely intelligence to facilitate the process of selecting proper options.
The social, psychological, and political implications of military actions, particularly those employing deadly force, should be clearly understood and correctly exploited by the defending government. Excessive or ineffective use of force erodes government legitimacy and promotes political mobilization in favor of the insurgent. Even when the government assumes special emergency powers through legislation or decree, security forces must provide for the safety of law-abiding citizens.
APPENDIX B

AIR FORCE SECURITY ASSISTANCE TEAMS

GENERAL

Commanders should refer to AFMAN 16-101 for guidelines and specific policy on assistance provided under the US Air Force Security Assistance Program. To assist commanders to identify and select appropriate options for foreign internal defense, this appendix furnishes a brief survey of teams which perform functions under security assistance. It also discusses functions, goals, and special constraints associated with US Air Force advisory support to host nations.

Basis of Requirement

Legislative guidance limits training and advising by permanently assigned security assistance organization (SAO) personnel. Also, SAOs are not, as a general rule, sufficiently sized or configured to advise and train or perform technical assistance duties that extend beyond primary (and essentially logistical) SAO functions. Outside assistance may be required in specific instances.

Types of Teams

Besides SAOs, several teams and organizations may perform limited security assistance functions for specified periods of time on a temporary duty (TDY) or permanent change of station (PCS) basis. These teams include technical assistance teams (TAT), technical assistance field teams (TAFT), mobile training teams (MTT), extended training service specialists (ETSS), quality assurance teams (QAT), language training detachments (LTD), and site survey teams (SST) and defense requirement survey teams. These teams, and
others assembled for specific purposes, can be employed by commanders for FID activities. In certain instances, temporarily deployed Air Force teams may be called on to advise foreign personnel on operational matters directly related to the use of host-nation resources in specific conflict situations.

NONTRAINING SUPPORT OF HOST-NATION FORCES

A variety of nontraining assistance functions can be accomplished under the security assistance program. The principal vehicles for nontraining support are TATs and TAFTs.

Technical Assistance Teams

In cases where the operational readiness of host aircraft and support equipment is seriously degraded because of battle damage, unexpected materiel failures, or long-term deficiencies in local maintenance and funding, a requirement for one-time repair and refurbishment may exist. Introducing new equipment provided under security assistance may also require specialized US Air Force assistance to place the systems in operation.

TATs and civilian engineering technical surveys (CETS) can be deployed TDY to provide these services. In some cases, US or foreign civilian contract personnel may be used. Such nontraining support may be conducted in the host country or, when prohibited or deemed impractical because of inadequate local facilities, conducted out-of-country.

TATs should not be used to provide technical training or instruction except for incidental over-the-shoulder technical assistance in conjunction with their primary duties.

Technical Assistance Field Teams

Where ongoing aviation support requirements cannot be met through the combined efforts of the host air force, the SAO, and temporarily deployed US Air Force teams, TAFTs can be assigned
PCS to the host nation, normally for one year or longer, from Department of Defense (DOD) resources. TAFTs help install, operate, maintain, and support foreign military sales (FMS), purchased weapons systems, and equipment. These functions can also be contractor supported through FMS.

**Specialized Nontraining Support**

Besides TATs and TAFTs, other forms of nontraining support allow commanders to tailor team capabilities to meet specialized field requirements.

US Air Force logistics assistance teams (funded through security assistance) can use periodic visits to offset host-nation materiel management deficiencies by performing inventories, refining procedures, clearing up back orders, and resolving accounting discrepancies.

The US Air Force can provide other specialized forms of nontraining support. An example is theater technical training of US service logisticians through the logistics team training (LTT) program. Small teams (10 to 15 individuals) train in such logistics skills as aircraft battle damage repair, corrosion control, materiel management, specialized maintenance, transportation operations, or other logistics support functions. Service operations and maintenance funds support the training of US personnel. Host-nation security assistance funds pay for repair parts and other expendables used by an LTT during training activities.

- The LTT concept is designed to ensure—and the service must certify—that deployments offer opportunities for critical training that would not occur, or would occur at significantly higher costs or reduced efficiency, in another, similar geographic area. The concept is based on the precept that certain US forces training is so critical and reasonably unavailable that incidental, spin-off services provided to a foreign country in exchange for the training opportunities are insignificant in the balance of benefits, thereby making the training in the best interests of the US Government.
- As with TATs, training or instruction of host personnel is limited to incidental, “over-the-shoulder” technical assistance.
TRAINING SUPPORT TO HOST-NATION FORCES

In many cases, incidental “over-the-shoulder” instruction occurring as a by-product of certain nontraining functions may not be sufficient to produce significant improvements in long-term self-sufficiency. Training teams, funded under security assistance, should be used where more extensive, formally structured courses of instruction are required. The teams can be deployed either TDY or PCS to reinforce SAO capabilities.

Mobile Training Teams

US Air Force mobile training teams deployed TDY from the continental United States (CONUS) or from overseas locations outside the recipient nation add to SAO capabilities by training host-nation personnel in the operation, maintenance, and employment of air and space weapon systems and support equipment. MTTs are authorized for specific in-country training requirements beyond the capability of SAOs, primarily to develop the recipient’s self-training capabilities in particular skills. MTTs may be funded from either FMS or international military education and training programs.

MTTs are also authorized to provide training associated with equipment transfers or to conduct surveys and assessments of training requirements. MTTs may be requested to carry out specific training tasks for limited periods of time.

MTTs will not be used to assemble, maintain, operate, or renovate a system.

Extended Training

Sustained US Air Force training capabilities are available through extended training service specialists assigned PCS and technically qualified to provide advice, instruction, and training in the engineering, installation, operation, and maintenance of weapons, equipment, and systems.
Special Operations Training

Although training of foreign nationals is normally furnished under security assistance, Comptroller General opinions allow US Special Operations Forces to perform this task under special circumstances as a service-funded activity when such training is directly related to their own training. US Air Force Special Operations Forces train host military personnel in specialized aviation skills supporting IDAD strategies to prevent or counter various forms of subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Training received by foreign nationals is incidental to the primary purpose of training US personnel. The incidental training is not security assistance.

ADVISORY SUPPORT TO HOST-NATION FORCES

When specifically authorized and directed, deployed US Air Force security assistance teams advise host military personnel on using air and space systems and related support capabilities. Advisory functions are subject to legislative restrictions and DOD directives on levels and types of assistance provided. Commanders and SAO personnel requesting this type of assistance must ensure that advisory activities fall within current policy guidelines and legal parameters.

Command Advisory Functions

US Air Force advisory assistance may be required to facilitate host air force support of IDAD objectives and to encourage a satisfactory correlation between US security assistance goals and the recipient’s use of security assistance assets. Advisory assistance teams accomplish these tasks by advising central command elements of the host military on the capabilities, limitations, and correct use of airpower in a given conflict. Command advisory functions focus on operational-level planning that bridges the gap between IDAD strategy and tactical employment.
Field Advisory Functions

US Air Force advisory assistance conducted at the field level (operational flying units, aviation support elements, and army maneuver units) focuses primarily on improving host military tactics, techniques, and procedures for air and space operations.

Air Force advisory functions include mission-related advice on intelligence collection and analysis, maintenance, logistics, communications, and administration as well as tactical operations. Field advisory support also has important applications in medical and military civic action programs, military construction, and psychological operations. Its principle objective is to provide guidance fostering self-sufficiency in the use of air and space resources for the conflict at hand, not to supplant host-nation capabilities.

Field advisory functions are not automatically linked to direct participation in host military operations. Advisory functions that expose US personnel to hostile fire represent a significant increase in US commitment with profound legal and political implications. Under current law, personnel performing defense services may not perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties related to training and advising, that may engage US personnel in combat activities outside the United States.
APPENDIX C

JOINT-MULTINATIONAL EXERCISES

GENERAL

This appendix establishes objectives and considerations that apply during joint-multinational exercises. Coincidental with testing and evaluating mutual capabilities, joint-multinational exercises may include certain types of training and construction, as well as humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA) projects, within the host country. Although the exercises may be conducted between US Air Force and the host air force units only, maximum utility is realized when they involve joint as well as multinational operations.

INTEROPERABILITY AND SAFETY TRAINING

Interoperability and safety training are significant aspects of joint-multinational exercises.

Safety Training

Safety training reduces the risks inherent in conducting military operations by two or more forces differing widely in language, culture, geographic origin, technology, and practical experience. Mutual safety is improved not only through training in the use of specific weapons but also through standardization of tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Interoperability Training

The purpose of interoperability training is to ensure that DOD and host-nation forces can function as mutually supporting entities during multinational combat operations. Training to achieve
interoperability should include doctrine, tactics, individual skills, weapons familiarization (particularly if US and host forces use different weapon systems), maintenance, and procedures for command, control, communications, and computers.

Interoperability training assumes that comparably proficient units are involved. The training experience allows US commanders to learn how other forces conduct IDAD operations and to develop the most compatible methodology, consistent with US FID policies and objectives, for operating together.

If the foreign force is not proficient enough to conduct multinational operations with US forces, FMS training provided under security assistance should be conducted to equalize the foreign force before multinational exercises are undertaken.

Joint-multinational exercises are not to be used to provide training to foreign military personnel if that training is normally provided under security assistance.

CONSTRUCTION

Construction related to multinational exercises is permitted under two sets of rules—one set for non-JCS exercises and another set for JCS exercises.

Non-JCS Exercises

During non-JCS exercises, operations and maintenance (O&M) funds may be used to construct or improve facilities under US control, if each construction project results in a complete, usable facility necessary for US units to take part in the multinational exercise. Strict project rules and precise funding limits are established for such construction.

JCS Exercises

Set-aside funds contained in the unspecified minor construction account of each US military service will pay for all
exercise-related construction during JCS exercises. Set-aside funds cover only material, supplies, nonmilitary labor costs, overhead (except planning and design costs), and DOD-funded costs applicable to operation and maintenance of equipment. O&M funds may not be used for construction related to JCS exercises.

HUMANITARIAN AND CIVIC ASSISTANCE

HCA projects that are conducted predominantly by US personnel may be performed in conjunction with exercises or military operations. HCA is rendered to the local populace. US governing authority prohibits HCA—directly or indirectly—to any military or paramilitary activity.

Authority

HCA is provided under separate authorities established in Comptroller General opinions and legislation that:

- Recognize DOD’s inherent ability to undertake HCA activities while fulfilling the training needs of the unit involved, which incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace.
- Permit authorized DOD personnel to conduct HCA activities that are unrelated to training requirements by using minimal expenditures of service funds in conjunction with JCS-directed or JCS-coordinated exercises overseas.
- Recognize DOD’s ability to carry out HCA on a reimbursable basis for another US Government agency with authority and appropriations to conduct such activities. This is referred to as an interagency transaction or economy act transaction. In an FID situation, such a transaction usually occurs when the United States Agency for International Development funds economic-assistance type activities under Part I, Developmental Assistance, of the Foreign Assistance Act.
- Provide authority to conduct certain types of HCA activities in conjunction with military operations (not necessarily exercises). This is a statutory authority referred to as either the CINC’s Cooperative Program or Title 10 Humanitarian Assistance and Other Assistance Authority.
Forms of HCA

There are three distinct forms of HCA with important applications in FID-related joint-multinational exercises—Statutory HCA, De Minimus (or Minimal) HCA, and Stevens HCA. Commanders contemplating the use of HCA should seek legal advice on the form of HCA most appropriate for the operation or exercise being conducted, especially with respect to rules governing HCA limitations and funding.

Statutory HCA. This is carried out in conjunction with authorized military operations, such as JCS-directed or coordinated exercises and single-service deployments for training, and is funded from specifically appropriated Program 10 (Host-Nation Support) O&M funds. The Secretary of State must provide prior approval for DOD to conduct this form of HCA, and the activities should be closely coordinated with State Department personnel in-country.

- The activities should complement, not duplicate, other assistance provided by the United States and enhance the security interests of both the United States and the host nation. The activities should also enhance the operational skills of US military personnel.
- Although the authority prohibits funding to construct airstrips, US Air Force airlift resources may be employed to support joint US HCA elements engaged in construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems, drilling wells and constructing basic sanitation facilities, and rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. The US Air Force may also provide or support medical, dental, and veterinary care in rural areas of a country.

De Minimus HCA. This is also carried out along with authorized military operations but consists of activities for which only minimal expenditures may be incurred. Such HCA is funded from Program 2 (General Purpose) O&M funds and is not subject to the requirements of Statutory HCA. An example of De Minimus HCA activities described by Congress includes a unit doctor’s examination of villagers for a few hours, with the administration of a few shots and the issuance of some medicine, but not the
deployment of a medical team for the purpose of providing mass inoculations to the local populace. Another example is the opening of an access road for several hundred yards but not the asphalting of any roadway.

**Stevens HCA.** This provides that Program 2 O&M funds may be used to pay costs incurred in providing HCA incidental to authorized military operations. Stevens HCA is limited to JCS-directed or coordinated exercises.

- Stevens HCA must complement, not duplicate, other assistance provided by the United States and enhance the security interests of both the United States and the host nation. It must enhance the operational skills of US military personnel and must be “incidental” in nature. Incidental HCA are those activities that are “minor” when viewed in the context of the overall exercise scenario in which they occur.
- Stevens HCA activities must be provided as an incidental benefit to a comprehensive training program. They cannot be designed as stand-alone civic action programs or as major exercise activities in their own right. Accordingly, commanders must determine what amount of incremental O&M cost associated with HCA would be reasonable in view of the overall amount of O&M funds to be expended in the JCS-directed or coordinated exercise.
## GLOSSARY

### Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFDD</td>
<td>Air Force Doctrine Document</td>
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<td>AFMAN</td>
<td>Air Force Manual</td>
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<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>C$^2$</td>
<td>command and control</td>
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<tr>
<td>C$^3$</td>
<td>command, control, and communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>C$^3$I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and intelligence</td>
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<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>close air support</td>
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<td>CETS</td>
<td>civilian engineering technical survey</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
<td>commander in chief</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
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<td>COMSEC</td>
<td>communications security</td>
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<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DSAA</td>
<td>Defense Security Assistance Agency</td>
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<td>EEI</td>
<td>essential elements of information</td>
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<td>ETSS</td>
<td>extended training service specialists</td>
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<td>FAC</td>
<td>forward air control</td>
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<td>FAD</td>
<td>force activity designator</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<td>FMFP</td>
<td>foreign military financing program</td>
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<td>FMS</td>
<td>foreign military sales</td>
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<td>HA</td>
<td>humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>HCA</td>
<td>humanitarian and civic assistance</td>
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<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human resources intelligence</td>
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<td>IDAD</td>
<td>internal defense and development</td>
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<td>IMET</td>
<td>international military education and training</td>
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<td>IMINT</td>
<td>imagery intelligence</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>JTTP</td>
<td>joint tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>lines of communications</td>
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<td>LTD</td>
<td>language training detachment (AFMAN 16-101)</td>
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<td>LTT</td>
<td>logistics team training</td>
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<td>MCA</td>
<td>military civic action</td>
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<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>military operations other than war</td>
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<td>MTT</td>
<td>mobile training team</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>operation and maintenance</td>
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<td>PCS</td>
<td>permanent change of station</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
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<td>pub</td>
<td>publication</td>
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<td>QAT</td>
<td>quality assurance team</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAF/IA</td>
<td>Deputy Undersecretary of the Air Force (International Affairs)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>security assistance organization</td>
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<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>signals intelligence</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>SST</td>
<td>site survey team (AFMAN 16-101)</td>
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<td>TACS</td>
<td>Theater Air Control System</td>
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<td>TAFT</td>
<td>technical assistance field team</td>
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<td>TAT</td>
<td>technical assistance team</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDY</td>
<td>temporary duty</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAAF</td>
<td>Unified Action Armed Forces</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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Definitions

**campaign plan**—A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**civil affairs**—The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Also called CA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**civil-military operations**—Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities and population, and which promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups. Also called CMO. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**counterinsurgency**—Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**essential elements of information**—The critical items of information regarding the enemy and the environment needed by the commander by a particular time to relate with other available information and intelligence in order to assist in reaching a logical decision. Also called EEI. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**force protection**—Security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism, physical security,
operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**foreign internal defense**—Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**foreign military sales**—That portion of United States security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. Also called FMS. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**guerrilla warfare**—Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular, predominantly indigenous forces. See also **unconventional warfare**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**host nation**—A nation which receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**humanitarian and civic assistance**—Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by Title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**indirect support**—For the purposes of this doctrine, term denotes security assistance and other efforts to develop and sustain host-
nation capabilities. It also establishes a distinction between security assistance and forms of support involving direct operational employment of US forces. Distinction supports guidance in National Security Strategy of the United States.

**insurgency**—An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**internal defense and development**—The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**international military education and training**—Formal or informal instruction provided to foreign military students, units, and forces on a nonreimbursable (grant) basis by offices or employees of the United States, contract technicians, and contractors. Instruction may include correspondence courses; technical, educational, or informational publications; and media of all kinds. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint**—Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**military civic action**—The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (US forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.) (Joint Pub 1-02)

**military operations other than war**—Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (Joint
An umbrella term encompassing a variety of military operations conducted by the Department of Defense that normally complement the other instruments of national power. These military operations are as diverse as providing support and assistance (when consistent with US law) in a nonthreatening environment, and conducting combat not associated with war. Also called MOOTW. {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

narcoterrorism—Terrorism conducted to further the aims of drug traffickers. It may include assassinations, extortion, hijackings, bombings and kidnapping directed against judges, prosecutors, elected officials, or law enforcement agents, and general disruption of a legitimate government to divert attention from drug operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

National Command Authorities—The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called NCA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

psychological operations—Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security assistance—Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

security assistance organization—All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and
groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. (Joint Pub 1-02)

_services_—As related to security assistance, includes any service, test, inspection, repair, training, publication, technical or other assistance, or defense information used for the purpose of furnishing nonmilitary assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA) of 1961, as amended, or for making military sales under the US Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended.

_special operations_—Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or psychological objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted during peacetime competition, conflict, and war, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, nonspecial operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called **SO**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

_strategic intelligence_—Intelligence that is required for the formation of strategy, policy, and military plans and operations at national and theater levels. (Joint Pub 1-02)

_subversion_—Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. (Joint Pub 1-02)

_tactical intelligence_—Intelligence that is required for planning and conducting tactical operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

_terrorism_—The calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (Joint Pub 1-02)
unconventional warfare—A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes guerrilla warfare and other direct offensive, low visibility, covert, or clandestine operations, as well as the indirect activities of subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and evasion and escape. Also called UW. (Joint Pub 1-02)

United States country team—The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, usually an ambassador, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)