

# Military Operations Other Than War



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Chief of Staff

## FOREWORD

The Armed Forces of the United States (US) face challenges more ambiguous and regionally focused than during the Cold War. These challenges can no longer be described as a single threat (the Soviet Union), but rather as multiple risks (one superpower, with friends and allies, reacting to regional events around the globe). Military operations other than war (MOOTW) are conducted to deter war, resolve conflict, promote peace, or support civil authorities. Therefore, the overall goal of MOOTW is to pursue US national policy initiatives and to counter potential threats to US national security interests. However, as the number and frequency of MOOTW increase, we need to ensure air and space forces are relevant, ready, and strong. This ensures our ability to win our nation's wars (the military's principal objective if deterrence fails) is not degraded. As the number and duration of MOOTW increase, commanders continually assess what effects these types of operations have on the Air Force's warfighting readiness and capability and inform senior leaders when these capabilities may be jeopardized.





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# INTRODUCTION

*We also have a long history of **military support for national goals short of [other than] war**, ranging from general military service to the nation (such as surveying railroads and waterways in the 19th century) to a wide range of actions abroad in support of foreign policy. In all military operations other than war, our purpose again is to promote the national security and protect our national interests.*

*Joint Pub 1, page I-1 [bold in original]*

## PURPOSE

Air Force assets (personnel and weapon systems) can be used across the range of military operations. This Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) explains one part of that range known as military operations other than war (MOOTW) and provides the Air Force perspective of MOOTW.

## APPLICATION

This AFDD applies to all active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and civilian Air Force personnel. The doctrine in this document is authoritative but not directive. Therefore, commanders need to consider not only the contents of this AFDD, but also the particular situation when accomplishing their MOOTW missions. This is particularly true since there is a misconception concerning war and MOOTW. The misconception is that war is violent and MOOTW is peaceful. However, violence occurs in many types of MOOTW and, as a consequence, casualties may be inflicted on any side. This is particularly true for MOOTW involving combat, although the possibility of violence must not be discounted during typical noncombat MOOTW.

## SCOPE

Although military operations other than war are normally conducted outside the US, two types can be conducted on US soil if they are consistent with US law. They are domestic support operations and the defensive portion of combatting terrorism.

## JOINT DOCTRINE

Detailed joint information on MOOTW can be found in Joint Publication (Pub) 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*; Joint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*; and the supporting joint tactics, techniques, and procedures publications.

The Air Force perspective of MOOTW is not identical to the way MOOTW is presented in joint pubs for two reasons. First, joint pubs are broad in nature to generically address all portions of the joint force; as such, joint pubs do not provide specific aerospace power guidance. AFDDs are written specifically for Air Force personnel and explain how air and space forces are used. Second, joint pubs list the various types of MOOTW alphabetically, so there is no framework to help the reader focus on this diverse topic. This AFDD provides that missing framework by grouping the various types of MOOTW according to typical combat, typical noncombat, and the overlap where a type of MOOTW may be either combat or noncombat. This framework allows the reader to focus on similar Air Force missions (e.g., strategic attack and air interdiction) or support functions (e.g., logistics) before reviewing another group.

# CHAPTER ONE

## OVERVIEW OF MOOTW

### MOOTW PRINCIPLES

#### Objective

A clearly defined and attainable objective, with a precise understanding of what constitutes success, is essential for any type of military operation. In addition to measures for success, commanders should understand what specific conditions lead to mission termination as well as those that could result in failure.

#### Unity of Effort

Unity of effort for MOOTW is both similar to, and distinct from, unity of command associated with military operations during war. The similarity is that all means are directed toward a common objective. The distinction is that unity of command deals solely with directing military forces, while unity of effort is broader because of the necessity to coordinate actions with several agencies and possibly with other governments or factions. Air Force commanders use unity of effort by ensuring liaison officers establish effective lines of communications with the host government, civilian organizations, and the news media.

#### Security

All Air Force personnel involved in MOOTW are responsible to some degree for this principle which may involve physical security and other protective measures to prevent virtually any person, element, or group from undermining or sabotaging the MOOTW objectives. Air Force commanders must take the necessary precautions to maintain this principle but must temper their actions with respect to the political, social, cultural, or religious norms of the area. For example, protection of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) by US military

forces may create the perception that an NGO or PVO is pro-US or vice versa. This may not be accurate, and may cause an NGO or PVO to decline US military protection in order to preserve its own neutrality.

## **Restraint**

As a MOOTW principle, restraint deals with rules of engagement as well as the restricted use of force. The latter refers to the judicious and prudent selection, deployment, and employment of forces most suitable to the operation. However, this concept does not preclude the possibility of applying overwhelming force, when appropriate, for self-defense or to display US resolve and commitment.

## **Perseverance**

This principle is especially important because a specific MOOTW may be protracted while another MOOTW may have changing conditions for successfully ending the operation. Therefore, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as long as necessary to achieve them, is paramount. It is also important to display patience when dealing with members of the local populace. This is particularly true if English is not a common language or when assisting with clean-up efforts after a disaster.

## **Legitimacy**

The MOOTW principle of legitimacy focuses on the perception a specific group (US or non-US) may have concerning the legal, moral, or religious rights of a set of actions. The perception of legitimacy is enhanced by observing internationally sanctioned standards and by ensuring that uses of authority are genuine, effective, and reasonable. During MOOTW, when a recognized government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid giving the perception of legitimizing them.

## TRANSITION

Commanders should anticipate that certain types of MOOTW may rapidly transition from typical noncombat to typical combat operations. As an example, an unopposed noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) may rapidly change to an opposed NEO. In addition, a transition can occur from MOOTW to war as well as from war to MOOTW. The transition to MOOTW after war can be difficult because of the significant change in the nature of the operation. To lessen the impact of this transition, it is important for commanders to plan for this transition at the very outset of hostilities. Transition activities may involve identifying the crucial skills needed until all redeployment actions are complete, the disposition of displaced civilians as well as enemy prisoners of war captured prior to the transition, and the return of friendly prisoners of war.

It is possible for two consecutive transitions to occur in the same area of responsibility, that is, from MOOTW to war and then back to MOOTW. A classic example of these transitions occurred in 1990-91. It began with a show of force (Operation DESERT SHIELD) to convince Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait or face severe consequences. This massive multinational show of force, coupled with economic and diplomatic activities, did not cause the aggressor to leave Kuwait. Therefore, the US Congress authorized the President to initiate Operation DESERT STORM (a war). When the military objectives delineated by the President were met, Operation DESERT STORM concluded and was followed by two distinct types of MOOTW. The first was humanitarian assistance to the Kurdish refugees (Operation PROVIDE COMFORT), for which there was virtually no time to prepare. The other was enforcement of an air exclusion zone (Operation SOUTHERN WATCH).



# CHAPTER TWO

## AIR AND SPACE FORCES IN MOOTW

### GENERAL

Air and space forces are essential to achieving success in virtually any type of military operation other than war (MOOTW). The reason involves the inherent attributes and capabilities of responsiveness, speed, range, flexibility, lethality, and precision. Air Force assets can deploy on extremely short notice to almost any location in the world within 24 hours to execute or support MOOTW. Air Force airlift, as well as air- and space-based weather data, communications, navigation, surveillance, and reconnaissance, are integral to almost every MOOTW. For example, Air Force Space Support Teams deploy to support regional planning staffs when requested. They provide space power expertise to assist in the planning and execution functions. In addition, basic capabilities and staff functions (such as command and control, intelligence, planning, and logistics) can be adapted to meet most MOOTW situations, including those involving a number of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs).


### MOOTW: OVERVIEW

There are 16 representative types of MOOTW as listed in Joint Publication (Pub) 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. Four typically involve combat, six do not, and six can overlap (they may be either combat or noncombat) depending on the particular situation. Because each type of MOOTW has its own unique characteristics, the appropriate response for one may not be appropriate for another.

Typical combat operations use or threaten to use force to deter war and help resolve conflict when a country or region is unstable. Because air and space forces train to meet demanding wartime requirements, basic mission training also qualifies these personnel to conduct MOOTW which may involve combat.

However, basic mission training does not necessarily qualify air and space forces to meet the very demanding requirements of typical noncombat operations which normally do not involve the use or threat of force. As such, typical noncombat operations try to keep day-to-day tensions below the threshold of armed conflict. They also promote peace, maintain US influence in foreign lands, and provide capabilities to help enforce policies benefiting US national interests. Personnel involved in typical noncombat MOOTW may need additional training in foreign language skills, cross-cultural communications, area orientation, security assistance law, and human rights considerations.

The following figure is adapted from Figure I-1 and its supporting text in Joint Pub 3-07. Figure 2.1 illustrates the 16 representative types of MOOTW from an Air Force perspective. The figure allows for operations to overlap, for the fluid transition from one operation to another as well as from noncombat to combat and vice versa, and for the possibility that more than one type of MOOTW may occur at any given time.



**Figure 2.1. Representative Examples of Military Operations Other Than War From an Air Force Perspective**

## MOOTW: TYPICAL COMBAT OPERATIONS

These operations involve the offensive use of airpower in the classic sense. Included here are enforcement of sanctions (quarantines), enforcing exclusion zones, protection of shipping, and strikes and raids. Typical airpower contributions include close air support, combat search and rescue, counterair, interdiction, and strategic attack. These contributions are supported and enhanced by air and space functions such as airlift; surveillance; reconnaissance; intelligence; logistics; command, control, communications, and computers (C<sup>4</sup>); weather; and counterspace.





## Enforcement of Sanctions

These operations (sometimes referred to as quarantines) stop the movement of designated *items* into or out of a nation or specific area. The objective is to establish a selective barrier, thus allowing only authorized goods to enter or exit. An air quarantine stops the flow of assets into or out of an area via air routes. However, an air quarantine is difficult to achieve because the enforcement is an “all or nothing” proposition. Unlike a ground quarantine where a vehicle’s tires can be shot and deflated, thus stopping the vehicle, the same action is clearly not possible with aircraft. Rules of engagement may allow shots to be fired across the nose of an aircraft, but this action may not be sufficient to convince the pilot to abort the mission. Consequently, shooting down an aircraft may be the only way to truly enforce an air quarantine, but that action may not be morally or politically acceptable for the situation. [NOTE: Joint Pub 3-07 refers to this type of MOOTW as Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations.]

## Enforcing Exclusion Zones

An exclusion zone is established to prohibit specified *activities* in a geographic area. Exclusion zones can be established in the air (no-fly zones), on land, or on the sea (maritime). The purpose may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior. Air and space assets support this type of MOOTW by providing surveillance and reconnaissance without regard to geographic barriers or borders. Thus, air and space assets monitor air, land, and maritime exclusion zones. Air assets also enforce exclusion zones by the threat or direct application of force. Operation SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq,

initiated in 1992, and Operation DENY FLIGHT in Bosnia, initiated in 1993, are two examples of counterair operations to enforce exclusion zones.

## **Protection of Shipping**

The Armed Forces of the United States can also be used to protect shipping. They provide, when necessary, protection for US flag vessels, US citizens (whether embarked on US or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence in and over international waters. These operations may extend to foreign flag vessels in international waters. Although the US Navy may be involved in the preponderance of this type of MOOTW, the Air Force also provides shipping protection. Air and space assets provide real-time imagery to support shipping operations. Interdiction and counterair capable aircraft protect convoys and keep shipping lanes free of potential adversaries. In addition, Air Force special operations forces routinely train with other Service counterparts to conduct antipiracy operations.

## **Strikes and Raids**

Strikes and raids are very similar; both achieve immediate results because they are based on a quick in-and-out operation, and both end with a planned withdrawal. A strike is basically an attack, while a raid is usually a small-scale operation to prevent a nation or group from launching its own offensive actions. Since the nature of the mission limits the time involved (quick in-and-out), airpower is ideally equipped to perform this type of MOOTW. Two inherent attributes of airpower (responsiveness and survivability) are key in this type of MOOTW. Operation EL DORADO CANYON (Libya, 1986) is an example of this type of MOOTW.

## **MOOTW: TYPICAL NONCOMBAT OPERATIONS**

The six types of MOOTW that typically do not involve combat are arms control support, domestic support operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, show of force, and support to insurgency. The last one is considered noncombat to the US Air Force (USAF) because we do not actively seek to engage in an

insurgency. Air Force contributions for these noncombat operations include airlift, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, search and rescue, aeromedical evacuation, education and training, and functions such as logistics, communications, medical aid, civil engineer projects, and security. Although these operations are planned as noncombat in intent, it does not mean the operations are conducted in a purely calm or peaceful environment. The situation could erupt into one requiring offensive use of airpower. Therefore, risks may be taken, casualties may occur, and the possibility an operation may transition to combat must be considered during both the planning and execution phases.



## **Arms Control Support**

The main purpose of arms control, a portion of counterproliferation, is to enhance our national security. Although arms control may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military also plays a vital role in this type of MOOTW. Arms control support is a type of military operation other than war in its own right, rather than a subordinate part of other operations. In addition, the use of the military in arms control is not new. Arms control involves any plan, arrangement, or process resting upon an explicit or implicit international agreement limiting weapon systems and armed forces. Aspects of weapon systems are the numbers, types, and performance characteristics (including command and control, logistics support arrangements, and any related intelligence-gathering mechanism). The characteristics of armed forces are the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the armed forces retained by the parties. Air and space assets are used to support both political and military objectives in this type of MOOTW. Both air and space assets are used to verify types, numbers, and locations of weapon systems affected by a treaty. Air assets may also be used to escort authorized deliveries of weapons or materiel. Arms control support may also involve preplanned overflight of national territories and airlift for affected parties to make treaty verification visits.

## **Domestic Support Operations**

The two broad categories of domestic support operations are military support to civil authorities and military support to civilian law enforcement agencies. National Guard forces, in State Status, are the principal providers of military assistance to State and local government agencies in civil emergencies. The US Air Force supports Federal, State, and local civil authorities when permitted by Federal law and statutes. This occurs only when the response or recovery requirements are beyond the capabilities of the civil authorities. Such support can be as diverse as saving lives and preventing human suffering, or fighting forest fires and mitigating great property damage in the aftermath of disasters. This temporary support may also be in the form of airlift of supplies, aeromedical evacuation, medical care, religious support, food, shelter, communications, and utilities. Examples include the Air Force response after Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki in 1992, as well as the U-2 missions flown from

Beale Air Force Base to obtain overhead photographs of the flood damage in northern California in 1995. Appropriate laws and directives are: The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Public Law [PL] 93-288, as amended); Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities; the Economy Act (Title 31, United States Code [USC], section 1535); Title 18, USC, section 1385 (*Posse Comitatus Act*); Title 10, USC, sections 331, 332, and 333; and DOD Directive 5525.5, *DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials*. Additional guidance is in Air Force Policy Directive 10-8, *Air Force Support to Civil Authorities*; Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-802, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*; and Joint Pub 3-07.7, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations*. [NOTE: Joint Pub 3-07 refers to this type of MOOTW as Military Support to Civil Authorities; however, this AFDD matches Joint Pub 3-07.7.]

## **Foreign Humanitarian Assistance**

These operations, conducted outside the United States, relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other conditions such as human suffering, disease, or hunger. Therefore, foreign humanitarian assistance operations use military assets to support what are usually nonmilitary objectives. Air Force units can respond rapidly to emergencies or disasters and provide various types of support to sustain operations. Air Force units have supported a number of foreign humanitarian assistance operations in the 1990s, such as Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, and Operation SUPPORT HOPE in Rwanda. Detailed guidance is available in Joint Pub 3-07.6, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations*. [NOTE: Joint Pub 3-07 refers to this type of MOOTW as Humanitarian Assistance; however, this AFDD matches Joint Pub 3-07.6.]

## **Nation Assistance**

Nation assistance is provided to another country based on agreements mutually concluded between that country and the United States. Three programs associated with nation assistance are humanitarian and civic assistance (HCA), security assistance, and foreign internal defense (FID). [NOTE: Joint Pub 3-07 refers to this

type of MOOTW as Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency. However, counterinsurgency is a portion of foreign internal defense which itself is a portion of nation assistance.]

- HCA programs (addressed in Title 10, USC, section 401) are distinct from humanitarian assistance (HA) operations. HCA are planned activities; HA is emergency relief. Humanitarian and civic assistance is limited in funding and types of allowable projects. Examples of HCA programs are medical, dental, and veterinary care; construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; as well as rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Therefore, USAF medical, logistics, and civil engineer personnel can be heavily involved in HCA programs.
- Security assistance is the selective use of cooperative programs with allied and friendly armed forces to furnish them with the means to defend themselves. One example of security assistance programs in which Air Force units participate is Direct Military Training. Another example is the transfer of defense articles through sale, grant, lease, or loan.
- Air Force units routinely conduct FID operations which support a host-nation's fight against lawlessness, subversion, or insurgency. US military involvement in FID focuses on counterinsurgency support to defeat an internal threat attempting to overthrow the established host government. The fundamental goal is to prevent insurgency. This is accomplished by defeating the threat insurgent organizations pose, and by correcting conditions that prompted the insurgency. Successful counterinsurgents realize that the true nature of the threat to the established government lies in the people's perception of their government's inability to solve problems. Counterinsurgency uses overt and covert methods in an integrated internal defense and development strategy. This strategy focuses on building viable political, economic, military, and social institutions that respond in a timely manner to the needs of society. At the direction of the National Command Authorities (NCA), the

US military can provide advice, logistics, and training but does not normally provide combat forces. Several Air Force units provided advisory support to the successful El Salvador counterinsurgency in the 1980s. The likelihood of a successful conclusion to an operation is increased by personnel who are trained and qualified in these operations. Such training includes language skills, cross-cultural communications, and area orientation. Although almost all Air Force units can support these operations, Air Force special operations units routinely train to conduct this mission. Air Force participation in FID operations is outlined in Joint Pub 3-07.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense*, as well as in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-7.1, *Foreign Internal Defense*.

## **Show of Force**

This type of MOOTW uses the physical presence of a credible force to either demonstrate US resolve or to increase visibility of deployed forces. Before tension escalates, a show of force can defuse a specific situation that may be detrimental to US interests or national objectives. These operations, usually involving routine overhead flights, demonstrate our capabilities and intent, and bolster the confidence of friends and allies. Although a show of force is clearly active in nature, it is not combat. Three inherent attributes of airpower (responsiveness, persistence, and flexibility) enable a commander to exert presence from the air. Training missions flown by long-range aircraft, such as the B-52 or B-1, are one way to demonstrate the responsiveness of airpower. Aircraft routinely flying overhead demonstrate persistence and provide presence. In addition to physical presence, air and space forces can also use Air Force information-based capabilities to achieve virtual presence as a means of globally projecting power in absolute minimum time. [NOTE: Joint Pub 3-07 refers to this type of MOOTW as Show of Force Operations, but the definition in the same pub is for “show of force.”]

## **Support to Insurgency**

An insurgency is an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict. The insurgent’s goal may be to seize

power or to establish an autonomous state within traditional ethnic or religious territorial bounds. Insurgency usually occurs when it is assumed that change within the existing system is not possible and therefore radical change in political control is necessary. Insurgency normally requires extensive use of covert methods. The insurgent leadership stresses and exploits issues which the key social groups support. At the same time, it neutralizes groups supporting the established government and seeks at least passive support from society at large. The US Government may support an insurgency against a regime threatening US interests. When this occurs, virtually any type of aerospace power (for example, airlift, reconnaissance, close air support, or strategic attack) may be used to support the insurgency. Because the Air Force does not normally seek to engage in an insurgency, advice, logistics assistance, and training may be provided to the insurgents when directed by the NCA.

## **MOOTW: OVERLAPPING OPERATIONS**

Depending on the particular situation, six types of MOOTW may be planned as either combat or noncombat. These operations are combatting terrorism, counterdrug operations, ensuring freedom of navigation, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, and recovery operations. Overlap occurs when the situation deteriorates into one requiring force. In this case, the operation transitions from a noncombat operation to a combat operation. For example, a peacekeeping operation (a portion of peace operations) is conducted to monitor a truce. If any of the belligerents fail to honor the terms of the truce, the noncombat peacekeeping operation may abruptly transition to a combat peace enforcement operation (also a portion of peace operations).



## Combatting Terrorism

Defensive measures known as antiterrorism and offensive measures known as counterterrorism combine to form combatting terrorism actions. Such actions oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Antiterrorism reduces vulnerability to terrorist acts; counterterrorism prevents, deters, and responds to acts of terrorism. Joint Pub 3-07.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism*, contains detailed guidance for the defensive portion of combatting terrorism.

- Although joint doctrine places combatting terrorism under MOOTW, Air Force personnel need to understand that combatting terrorism is not limited to nonwar operations. It is clearly force protection and applies across the range of military operations. All Air Force personnel need to actively protect themselves and their units from terrorism. This is particularly true for personnel in high-risk areas but should never be taken lightly anywhere. Air Force security police, Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), and special operations personnel assist local populations and staffs with antiterrorism measures and procedures. Air Force security police are the Air Force's primary protection force. Early threat assessment, planning, and coordination of the security force's needs are essential to provide an effective force protection capability. The AFOSI is responsible for providing guidance to counter the threat to Air Force interests posed by foreign intelligence services and terrorist groups. In addition, they can provide force protection during deployments. Joint Pub 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*, contains detailed guidance on the counterterrorism mission.
- All USAF organizations and individuals have an inherent capability to support some form of counterterrorist operations. Because one of the primary missions of special operations forces is the conduct of operations to prevent or resolve terrorist incidents abroad, these units routinely train for counterterrorist operations. However, with the growing threat of global terrorism, the United States is not immune to terrorist activities. Therefore, counterterrorism

operations are not only applicable for personnel stationed or deployed overseas, but also for those serving on US soil. In particular, personnel at command posts, missile sites, munitions storage areas, and flight lines must be constantly on guard against terrorists. Examples of possible terrorist acts against US personnel or military assets on US soil include using weapons of mass destruction as well as mail and vehicle bombs; sabotaging aircraft, missile launch facilities, and vehicles; and kidnapping. In the mid-1980s, numerous antimilitary groups unlawfully entered Air Force installations and damaged aircraft.

- Air and space forces are used to combat terrorism with surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence, airlift, combat search and rescue, close air support, interdiction, and strategic attack. Security police use military working dogs to aid in discovery of unauthorized individuals. In addition, explosive detector dogs are employed to assist in locating explosive devices.

## **Counterdrug Operations**

DOD enhances the ability of law enforcement agencies to counter the flow of illegal drugs into the US in accordance with Title 10, USC, section 124. However, Title 10, USC, section 375 and Title 18, USC, section 1385 (*Posse Comitatus Act*) preclude direct participation by active duty military personnel in law enforcement activities on US soil. Specific DOD responsibilities and guidance for conducting counterdrug operations at the source, in transit, and in the US are outlined in Joint Pub 3-07.4, *Joint Counterdrug Operations*. The Air Force uses surveillance and reconnaissance to identify, detect, and monitor illicit drug trafficking. Detection and monitoring of drug traffickers is a principal counterdrug role for ground-based and Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) radars. AWACS aircrews are assisted by air refuelers as well as by interceptors. The interceptors not only follow suspected drug traffickers, but also coordinate with the appropriate law enforcement agencies where they expect the drug traffickers to land. In addition to enhanced roles for the Air National Guard (in State Status), Air Force units have routinely supported counterdrug activities with C<sup>4</sup> systems, intelligence, logistics, and drug detector dogs on base and at air, land,

and sea points of entry. [NOTE: Joint Pub 3-07 refers to this type of MOOTW as DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations; however, this AFDD uses the title (less the word “Joint”) of the corresponding JTTP pub.]

## **Ensuring Freedom of Navigation**

US aircraft may operate, free of interference from any nation, in airspace over the high seas. A nation has complete and exclusive sovereignty over its national airspace, which includes the airspace over its territorial sea (as applicable). US aircraft, however, have the right to overfly international straits and archipelagic sea lanes, even if they are within a nation’s territorial sea, but the aircraft must pass over these waters expeditiously and must also refrain from any activities other than those incident to passage. DOD forces conduct freedom of navigation operations to demonstrate US or international rights to navigate air or sea routes. If US aircraft are threatened while over the high seas, or while overflying international straits or archipelagic sea lanes, appropriate actions may be taken to protect the aircraft, its crew, and passengers. However, ensuring freedom of navigation is not limited to international air or sea routes. Air- and space-based reconnaissance provide information concerning the location of hostile threats. Airpower deters or eliminates these threats to navigation routes with, for example, counterair operations. In addition, interdiction of sea- and land-based threats is another example of how airpower can support this type of MOOTW. [NOTE: Joint Pub 3-07 refers to this type of MOOTW as Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight, but the definition in the same pub only addresses ensuring freedom of navigation.]

## **Noncombatant Evacuation Operations**

A noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO) is typically conducted to relocate threatened noncombatants from locations in a foreign country. These operations generally involve US citizens, family members, and selected foreign nationals whose lives are in danger. As such, a NEO is conducted at the direction of the Department of State. Either the US Ambassador or the Chief of the Diplomatic Mission is responsible for preparing Emergency Action Plans to evacuate noncombatants. If evacuation by commercial

transportation is not possible, the US Ambassador will most probably request military assistance, usually in the form of airlift.

- The ideal situation is to conduct a NEO with little or no opposition. However, commanders should anticipate opposition and be prepared to use force. NEOs are similar to raids in that the operation involves a quick insertion, temporarily securing territory, and a planned withdrawal. Such NEOs differ from raids in that the force used is normally only sufficient to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. AFI 10-216, *Evacuating and Repatriating Air Force Family Members and Other US Noncombatants*, states that “Evacuation operations may also take place entirely within the continental United States (CONUS), especially for natural disasters.” It also indicates that for evacuation planning and processing, CONUS-based units should emphasize the need to be prepared to evacuate an area due to a natural disaster. Air Force personnel at safe havens need to be prepared to receive and repatriate evacuees.
- Air Force units have supported a number of NEOs by providing insertion of evacuation forces, airlift, combat search and rescue, aeromedical evacuation, air refueling, interdiction, counterair, close air support, intelligence, communications, and psychological operations. One example of psychological operations during NEOs is leaflets airdropped to announce evacuation locations, times, and procedures. Another example is the radio and television broadcasts from Air Force special operations C-130 aircraft. These broadcasts contain information similar to the leaflets. During opposed NEOs, low-flying aircraft are used for close air support as well as for psychological advantage (noise and shock value). Joint Pub 3-07.5, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*, and AFI 10-216 provide detailed NEO guidance.

## **Peace Operations**

This umbrella term encompasses two military activities (peace enforcement operations and traditional peacekeeping operations)

to support diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. The aim of these diplomatic efforts (such as negotiation, peace talks, and truce establishment) is to achieve a peaceful settlement among any number of belligerents involved in a conflict for virtually any reason. The military instrument of national power assists the diplomatic process of achieving a long-term peaceful settlement by establishing the environment for a truce or by keeping the negotiated truce. The former is referred to as peace enforcement and the latter is referred to as peacekeeping.

- Peace enforcement uses appropriate force, or the threat of it, to separate belligerents (with or without their consent). This may occur after a dispute has erupted and prior to a peaceful settlement. Air Force personnel should consider peace enforcement as an operation to restore order. This part of peace operations usually occurs after achieving international authorization to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to restore or maintain peace. Although ground activities are a very visible portion of peace enforcement, the Air Force supports the overall goal with air-to-ground operations such as close air support and interdiction. The Air Force can also provide other forms of aerospace power such as airlift, surveillance, reconnaissance, counterair, and space-based navigation.
- There are two requirements for peacekeeping: truce and consent. The former is secured through the diplomatic process. The latter means that all the major parties involved in a conflict mutually agree to have a neutral and impartial party observe the conditions of the truce while the diplomatic process continues to achieve a peaceful settlement. Peacekeeping implies that actions occur in a benign environment where peace prevails. However, in the real world of peacekeeping, there is no “peace,” and the environment can be tense. Therefore, there is actually no peace to keep; rather, a negotiated truce is maintained. US Air Force personnel should consider a peacekeeping operation as a truce-keeping mission; that is, a volatile situation with belligerents in a conflict who have agreed to the conditions of a truce—not peace. The challenge for peacekeepers is to deal with tension and violence without taking

sides. Traditionally, the USAF provides airlift for peacekeeping operations even when no US personnel are involved in the operation. Aerial reconnaissance missions provide a visible presence and assist ground activities such as patrolling and observing. Reconnaissance conducted with either air or space assets is a key factor in monitoring alleged violations of the truce. Other aspects of monitoring the truce in a peacekeeping operation include establishing road blocks and searching personnel. Air Force security police, because of their training and experience, are well-suited for this aspect of peacekeeping. In addition, personnel with expertise in intelligence or political-military affairs are also skilled in functions appropriate for peacekeeping observer roles. However, Air Force personnel, regardless of specialty, have served as observers in many peacekeeping operations. Detailed peacekeeping guidance can be found in Joint Pub 3-07.3, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*.

## **Recovery Operations**

The purpose of this type of operation is to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. Some recovery operations may require the unique capabilities of special operations forces. Other operations can be conducted by conventional Air Force units such as aeromedical evacuation or dedicated combat search and rescue units.

# CHAPTER THREE

## COMMAND AND CONTROL

### MOOTW COMMAND AUTHORITY

A detailed discussion on the provisions of joint command can be found in Joint Pub 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces*. Joint Pub 0-2 details the assignment and purposes of the different types of command authority, including combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, and coordinating authority. A joint force commander (JFC) assigns the appropriate level of authority over forces in accordance with the guidelines in Joint Pub 0-2.

### MOOTW COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

Command and control (C<sup>2</sup>) relationships should remain flexible because there is no single C<sup>2</sup> arrangement that works for all MOOTW situations. This is particularly true given that most military operations other than war are multinational in nature. Variables affecting the C<sup>2</sup> arrangement include the type of operation, specific mission objective(s), the existing host-nation C<sup>2</sup> infrastructure (if applicable), and the participation of multinational partners as well as regional alliance organizations.

### AIR FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER

To ensure centralized command and control of Air Force assets involved in a joint military operation other than war, an Air Force Component Commander (AFCC) should be designated. An air operations C<sup>2</sup> facility (such as an Air Operations Center [AOC]) will be established by the AFCC to coordinate Air Force activities. These activities could range from support to direct application of airpower. Examples of the former can include logistics, intelligence, communications, and weather. Examples of the latter can include counterair, interdiction, strategic attack, and close air support. The

structure and size of the air operations C<sup>2</sup> facility and its supporting staff are tailored to meet the scope and expected duration of the operation. Air Force major commands and field operating agencies provide support and liaison teams, such as the Air Force Space Support Teams and the Special Operations Liaison Element, to the AOC as requested by the AFCC.

## **JOINT FORCE AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER**

During joint operations, centralized control of theater air assets is the most effective way to employ airpower. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) is normally the component commander who has the preponderance of air assets and the capability to plan, task, and control joint air operations. The AFCC is usually designated as the JFACC. Thus, the AFCC is prepared to assume the JFACC's responsibilities, and uses the AOC to form the core of the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC). The JAOC operates as a fully integrated facility providing unity of effort for joint air operations. Like the AOC, the structure and size of the JAOC and its supporting staff are tailored to meet the scope and expected duration of the operation.

## **RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

Rules of engagement (ROE) for MOOTW reflect the principles of security and restraint, but may be more restrictive than ROE for military operations during war. However, ROE must never deny self-defense actions. Therefore, all personnel who conduct MOOTW must be trained and prepared to take appropriate self-defense measures. Commanders at all levels must take proactive steps to ensure their personnel know and understand the ROE and are quickly informed of changes. This can be achieved if the ROE are clear, simple, and concise; there can be no doubt as to what self-defense actions are authorized when needed. However, this may be difficult because of the number of nonmilitary organizations involved in virtually any type of MOOTW. Everyone needs to understand that personnel who take appropriate self-defense actions (those that are necessary, and in the right proportion) will not be prosecuted if they comply with the ROE. Commanders should ask their staff judge advocates to brief all personnel on the ROE as well

as the Law of Armed Conflict to ensure personnel are aware of this guidance. Failure to understand and comply with established ROE can result in fratricide, civilian casualties, mission failure, and national embarrassment.

## **Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE)**

The unclassified SROE approved by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff contain basic rules for national and unit self-defense. According to the SROE, national self-defense is "...the act of defending the United States, US forces, and in certain circumstances, US citizens and their property, US commercial assets, and other designated non-US forces, foreign nationals and their property, from a hostile act or hostile intent." National self-defense may be used, for example, in situations of international instability. Unit self-defense, according to the SROE, is "...the act of defending a particular unit of US forces, including elements or personnel thereof, and other US forces in the vicinity, against a hostile act or hostile intent." Unit self-defense may be used, for example, to thwart localized violence and terrorist acts. It may also be used during foreign humanitarian assistance as well as during peace enforcement operations.

## **Elements of Self-Defense**

The two elements of self-defense are necessity and proportionality. Necessity means that personnel must be in imminent danger before taking any forceful self-defense actions. Proportionality means that whatever force is used must be limited in intensity and duration to the force reasonably required to ensure safety. For example, warning shots (if authorized in the ROE) may be all that is needed to stop the hostile action.



# CHAPTER FOUR

## PLANNING AND SUPPORT CONSIDERATIONS

### GENERAL

There is a key difference between planning for MOOTW and planning for war. In MOOTW, the military contribution may be of a supporting nature because other US Government agencies or a host nation (or factions thereof) will usually have a preeminent role. In war, the military instrument of national power is the decisive element. As in war, commanders and their staffs involved in MOOTW need to continuously review the specific operations order. The reason is twofold: first, to ensure their actions are consistent with operational requirements, and second, to avoid “mission creep” (the evolution of unintended or nondirected missions).

### DEPLOYMENT CONSIDERATIONS

Although the possibility of combat may appear remote when units deploy to conduct some types of MOOTW, commanders should always plan to quickly transition to combat operations if necessary. The reason for the transition could be self-defense, escalation of hostilities, or a transition from MOOTW to war. Additionally, when conducting noncombat operations, commanders should consider how they would rapidly redeploy within the theater, or to another theater, to conduct combat operations. Although the decision on when and how much of a unit to deploy rests with senior leaders, units should not be tasked to deploy in a piecemeal fashion. By deploying as an entity, unit integrity is maintained and personnel continue to operate under the established procedures for which they train, adapting these to the mission and situation as required. Regardless of the type of MOOTW, the decision concerning what types of forces are needed should be made by the on-scene commander rather than personnel at other locations.

## **TOTAL FORCE**

The total force is comprised of active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and Air Force civilian personnel. Reserve and Guard forces may be available for tasking by the supported combatant commander. Therefore, it is important for commanders at all levels to identify as soon as possible the specific capabilities required to augment the active-duty force. When planning for selective callup, or use of volunteers instead of mobilization, planners need to consider issues such as availability, funding, man-day authority, and time required to bring these personnel on duty. These issues are important for three reasons. First, timely mobilization authorization must be obtained and any required training must be accomplished without delay. Second, the Reserve Component forces need to be identified in the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) to ensure the operation they will support is not delayed. As the active-duty force draws down, the involvement of Reserve Component personnel will probably increase. Third, there are numerous activities, such as airlift, which rely heavily on Reserve personnel. Air Force participation in most types of MOOTW can be accomplished using a combination of active duty and Reserve Component volunteers. The key to maximizing volunteerism among Reserve personnel is flexibility in tour lengths and rotation policies. Unless operational requirements dictate otherwise, tour lengths of 15 days will encourage volunteer participation and preclude the need for involuntary recall.

## **INTERFACE WITH OTHER SERVICES AND AGENCIES**

Military operations other than war are rarely conducted by a single Service or agency. Therefore, Air Force personnel should expect to work with personnel from other US Services, other agencies of the US Government, other nations' governments, and foreign military forces. Interagency operations is the preferred term when agencies other than DOD are involved. Two examples of other US Government agencies are the Department of State and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Many nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) participate in some types of MOOTW, particularly foreign

humanitarian assistance. Examples of NGOs and PVOs are the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and Doctors Without Borders.

The potential difficulties of working with other nations (language and customs, for example) can be diminished if each nation or local authority (as appropriate) provides a liaison official to work with the commander's staff. Unity of effort is critical during interagency operations and can best be achieved through consensus building. The task of consensus building is simplified when each organization's capabilities and limitations are understood by the others. However, it is also important to acknowledge any constraints which may preclude the use of a capability. Joint Publication (Pub) 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, as well as Joint Pub 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, address this topic in detail.

## **CIVIL ENGINEERING**

Civil engineer support may be called upon in any type of MOOTW, from a show of force to foreign humanitarian assistance operations to disaster response efforts in the United States. Civil engineers perform the broad functions of force beddown, base development, housing services, operation and maintenance, environmental quality, and emergency services. Some examples of emergency services are fire protection, disaster preparedness, and explosive ordnance disposal. Civil engineers must be ready to deploy to any location worldwide, must be able to perform effectively in high-threat environments, must be capable of providing support to austere or bare base operations, and must be able to adapt to rapidly changing situations. Air Force engineers support joint and multinational MOOTW by establishing base camps to beddown forces and to provide emergency services. Fundamental engineering principles apply during MOOTW just as they apply during war. Refer to Joint Pub 4-04, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support*, and Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-4.2, *Civil Engineer*, for specific guidance regarding civil engineer principles and concepts.

## **COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS, AND COMPUTER (C<sup>4</sup>) SYSTEMS**

The C<sup>4</sup> system(s) for MOOTW need(s) to be reliable, secure (when required), and redundant to be effective. Interoperability with a host-nation's C<sup>4</sup> system, if a host nation is involved, also adds to the effectiveness of that system and ensures effective use of scarce deployable resources. Regardless of what C<sup>4</sup> system is used, it is needed from the initial planning stages through redeployment. A broad range of options are available for using C<sup>4</sup> systems during MOOTW. These options may range from providing radio equipment to assisting a nation or friendly force with improving its field communications. In addition, these options may also include extensive C<sup>4</sup> upgrades for command posts, surveillance and warning sensors, as well as various communications and information collection and processing systems. Mobile and fixed-site equipment can be used. Airborne Warning and Control Systems (AWACS) aircraft, as well as airborne command posts, may be deployed to the area of operations to provide the overall control structure. Satellite communications resources may be used in areas where long-range communications are required.

## **FORCE PROTECTION**

Force protection during MOOTW can be a significant challenge, and advanced planning for force protection is essential. Security forces tasked with force protection focus primarily on defense of the air base against threats to sortie generation. However, they may also perform security escort duties for convoy operations, other related functions, and may provide protection from public unrest or terrorists. Procedures and actions required to maintain minimum standards of force protection during MOOTW must be clearly understood by all personnel and must also be enforced. Two critical elements of an effective force protection program are clear and simple rules of engagement (ROE) as well as a weapons and ammunition access policy. Regardless of the apparent threat, force protection must remain a high priority for all personnel. According to the USAF Counterproliferation Master Plan, our forces must be ready to conduct offensive and defensive military operations to

counter the employment and deployment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Therefore, commanders must ensure their personnel are properly protected in contaminated environments and can continue operations during and after a nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) attack. This supports the DOD counterproliferation policy objective of ensuring US forces are able to conduct operations when confronted with WMD and their associated delivery systems. Detailed NBC defense guidance is in Joint Pub 3-11, *Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense*. Other force protection measures include programs to preclude an adversary from observing friendly actions or exploiting friendly information.

## **INTELLIGENCE**

In addition to potential military threats, the focus of intelligence during MOOTW should also include a significant effort to understand the political, social, cultural, religious, and economic factors affecting the situation. Intelligence staffs work closely with national agencies to establish collection requirements and capabilities as early as possible. In MOOTW conducted outside the US, human intelligence (HUMINT) is an important source of information. If a HUMINT infrastructure is not in place when US forces arrive, it should be established as soon as possible. HUMINT supplements other sources with information not available through technical means. For example, the lack of easily detectable or visible targets could make imagery and signals intelligence collection less effective than desired. In addition, detecting, identifying, monitoring, characterizing, reporting, and targeting of WMD development programs are intelligence functions required by the USAF Counterproliferation Master Plan. To support this plan, intelligence personnel assess the WMD threat to our forces prior to and during deployment. Detailed intelligence guidance is in AFDD 2-5.4, *Intelligence*.

### **Counterintelligence**

Counterintelligence operations are as important during MOOTW as they are for war. Even though there may not be a well-defined threat, protection of the force requires that essential elements of friendly information be safeguarded. This is critical to countering

belligerent intelligence operations. Also, the adversary may collect information using members of the local populace who can gain access to US military facilities and personnel by providing local services such as laundry and cooking. However, other people in similar positions may provide valuable information for our forces. The Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI) is the primary agency for providing comprehensive counterintelligence support to commanders during MOOTW. This support could come from the AFOSI Investigative Operations Center (Bolling Air Force Base) or directly from the AFOSI Region Office serving the affected major command. Support may also come from the local AFOSI office within the area of operations. During joint operations, the unified command (or joint task force) director of intelligence is responsible for the intelligence fusion center. The Counterintelligence Support Officer provides the counterintelligence interface between the unified command (or joint task force) and the component commands as well as the Joint Staff.

## **Information Gathering**

Even though intelligence is actually gathered and analyzed, the term “intelligence” is not appropriate for every type of MOOTW, as explained in Joint Pubs 3-0 and 3-07. The generic term “information gathering” may be more appropriate because of the sensitivity of the type of support provided by, and associated with, intelligence. One example where it is particularly important to use the term “information gathering” is during the peacekeeping aspect of peace operations. By definition, peacekeepers are neutral and impartial, and must be perceived as such. Therefore, they must be information-conscious while gathering data concerning alleged violations of the negotiated truce. This is a particularly sensitive issue for the United Nations, which sponsors most peacekeeping operations. Another reason for peacekeepers to use the term “information gathering” is their safety. The belligerents may perceive intelligence as a hostile act, and this perception may destroy the trust belligerents have in the neutral and impartial peacekeeping force. Another example when the term information gathering is appropriate is when dealing with NGOs and PVOs. Because of what these organizations do, their personnel become very familiar with a local population’s culture and sensitivities, and may therefore be a

valuable source of information. Again, it's the perception that counts; representatives of these organizations may resent being considered a source of intelligence.

## **LEGAL**

Military operations other than war often involve gray areas of domestic and, perhaps, international law, thus presenting unique legal challenges. Some of these challenges include nonwar rules of engagement (ROE); local culture, customs, and government; international law and agreements (such as status-of-forces agreements); military and political liaison; claims; and contingency contracting. A thorough knowledge of governing regulations and other legal requirements applicable to military forces and other agencies involved in MOOTW is essential to promoting unity of effort and achieving success. Commanders should seek advice from the staff judge advocate concerning the legal implications of the specific MOOTW, especially when developing ROE. In addition, the staff judge advocate ensures the commander and staff understand what can and cannot legally be done in any given operation.

## **LOGISTICS**

Logistics support involves providing materiel and supplies primarily to US forces. It may also involve determining potential support capabilities and limitations; developing host-nation logistics systems, infrastructure, and procedures; status-of-forces agreements, terms of reference; and training host-nation logistics personnel. Logistics personnel who deploy in advance of other forces must be properly protected. Logistics systems supporting either US or multinational forces operate within the constraints of any existing status-of-forces agreements and the legal and political restraints governing US involvement. Extreme care should be taken to limit adverse effects on the host-nation economy by not exceeding its capability to absorb high-technology materiel or to accommodate the required logistics support. For these reasons, austerity is preferred to overdevelopment. Another aspect of logistics is the effort required to replenish supplies (including readiness spares packages, if they were used) and to repair equipment, as necessary, after redeploying to home station following any military operation other than war.

The objective is to ensure each unit is prepared to immediately respond to a war tasking. These actions to restore a unit's readiness apply not only to operations squadrons, but also to support squadrons as well. For example, the Air Force may provide a significant amount of support equipment, such as tactical communications and tents, for MOOTW. These items may need to be repaired or cleaned before they can be used again, or they may need to be replaced, to support another MOOTW or a war tasking. Fundamental Air Force logistics principles apply as equally for military operations other than war as they do for war. Refer to Joint Pub 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, and AFDD 2-4, *Logistics*, for specific guidance regarding logistics principles and concepts.

## **MEDICAL OPERATIONS**

The Air Force provides medical support during MOOTW for Air Force, joint, and multinational forces. When authorized, the Air Force can also provide medical support to the civilian populace as well as to migrants and refugees. Medical support may be in the form of air transportable hospitals, stand-alone air transportable hospitals, medical capabilities augmentation modules, and aeromedical evacuation. Medical support planners must consider the specific MOOTW, the location, the expected duration, all governing operational orders, legal authority, terms of reference, and applicable host-nation Ministries of Health approval (as appropriate). Detailed medical guidance can be found in Joint Pub 4-02, *Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations*; Joint Pub 4-02.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Health Service Logistics Support in Joint Operations*; and Joint Pub 4-02.2, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Patient Evacuation in Joint Operations*.

## **PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS**

Psychological operations (PSYOP) support the attainment of US national and military objectives through planned operations designed to project selected information. Its purpose is to influence the emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, or individuals. Psychological operations are systematically employed

to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to US objectives. While certain USAF units are assigned primary PSYOP responsibilities, almost all USAF units can use their inherent capabilities to support PSYOP. Visual information and Combat Camera resources can be used to support PSYOP. Additionally, these resources can also support the decision-making process, intelligence and information gathering, and the public affairs function. Additional PSYOP guidance is in Joint Pub 3-53, *Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations*, and AFDD 2-5.5, *Psychological Operations*.

## **PUBLIC AFFAIRS**

Military operations other than war are often conducted under the watchful eye of the news media; this is especially true in the initial phase of an operation. By using modern communications technology and satellites, media representatives deliver reports, with pictures, on a real-time basis. These reports may or may not be biased, but may provoke worldwide reaction by drawing attention to an operation. When information is withheld, journalists may resort to speculation. Their speculation may not be accurate but may be close enough to the truth to be accepted as such by large segments of the public as well as by governments. Therefore, it is important for commanders to have a good working relationship with the media, while also maintaining operations security. Public affairs personnel are responsible for developing and fostering a viable relationship with the media.

## **WEATHER OPERATIONS**

Air Force Weather (AFW) personnel participate as a key element of joint and multinational MOOTW in accordance with joint doctrine as well as joint tactics, techniques, and procedures for meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) operations. AFW personnel provide timely and accurate weather forecasts that enable commanders to direct forces at the right time and with the correct level of effort for each type of MOOTW. Virtually all forces that conduct or support MOOTW are influenced by the weather. Therefore, knowing how weather affects operations enhances the effectiveness of air and space forces engaged in MOOTW. Weather information must be considered in every facet of MOOTW planning,

deployment, employment, and redeployment. Commanders may seize a tactical advantage by effectively using information about poor weather conditions to screen and cover strikes and raids. Weather information provided by AFW personnel is critical to the safety of Air Force air and ground activities during natural disasters, when weather forecast and communications infrastructure may be crippled or nonexistent. Details on METOC operations can be found in Joint Pub 3-59, *Joint Doctrine for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support*; Joint Pub 3-59.1, *Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Meteorological and Oceanographic Support*; and AFDD 2-5.3, *Aerospace Weather Operations*.

# **CHAPTER FIVE**

## **EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXERCISES**

### **EDUCATION**

The first aspect of preparation is a robust military education system teaching all military and civilian personnel to conduct activities across the range of military operations. Formal military operations other than war (MOOTW) education begins during officer accession programs and at basic training, and culminates, as applicable, at the senior service school and the senior noncommissioned officer academy. The intent is to ensure Air Force personnel understand the principles, concepts, and characteristics of MOOTW. In addition, commanders should identify personnel who demonstrate foreign language ability and encourage them to develop and maintain their skills at a proficient level.

### **TRAINING AND EXERCISES**

The second aspect of preparation is training individuals, units, and staffs to ensure they are familiar with and have the necessary skills for MOOTW and to ensure that staffs can plan, control, and support such operations. Planners must create realistic and challenging field training exercises, modeling and simulations, joint simulations, seminars, and command post exercises allowing commanders, staffs, and units to participate in MOOTW. Exercises should emphasize not only employment operations, but deployment and redeployment phases, as well as the transitions to and from war. All exercises should also emphasize command, control, and communications; intelligence; appropriate laws; force protection; and the logistics coordination requirements necessary to successfully conduct MOOTW. For complete realism, space force participation must be included as appropriate. Commanders at all levels participate in exercises to familiarize themselves with the complexities

and details of MOOTW doctrine and operations. Realistic exercises (those with joint, interagency, nongovernmental organizations, private voluntary organizations, and media participation) are essential for determining possible shortfalls and corrective actions to achieve success in future operations. The Joint Readiness Training Center provides MOOTW training scenarios that mirror recent real-world events as well as potential future events. In addition, various US and non-US agencies, as well as foreign military services, actively participate in these training scenarios. Commanders will continually assess the effects MOOTW training and exercises have on their units' ability to conduct their wartime missions. Finally, after any military operation other than war, each commander must ensure all personnel receive the required refresher training needed to perform their wartime duties.

# GLOSSARY

## *Abbreviations and Acronyms*

AFCC	Air Force Component Commander
AFDD	Air Force Doctrine Document
AFI	Air Force Instruction
AFOSI	Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFW	Air Force Weather
AOC	Air Operations Center
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
C <sup>2</sup>	command and control
C <sup>4</sup>	command, control, communications, and computers
CJTF	commander, joint task force
CONUS	continental United States
DOD	Department of Defense
FID	foreign internal defense
HA	humanitarian assistance
HCA	humanitarian and civic assistance
HUMINT	human intelligence
JAOC	Joint Air Operations Center
JFACC	joint force air component commander
JFC	joint force commander
METOC	meteorological and oceanographic
MOOTW	military operations other than war
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NEO	noncombatant evacuation operations
NGO	nongovernmental organizations
PSYOP	psychological operations

Pub (or pub)	publication
PVO	private voluntary organizations
ROE	rules of engagement
SROE	standing rules of engagement
TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
US (or U.S.)	United States
USAF	United States Air Force
USC	United States Code
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

### ***Definitions***

***area of responsibility***—1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. [Definition pertains to naval use only and is therefore not included in this AFDD.] Also called **AOR**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

***arms control***—A concept that connotes: a. any plan, arrangement, or process, resting upon explicit or implicit international agreement, governing any aspect of the following: the numbers, types, and performance characteristics of weapon systems (including the command and control, logistics support arrangements, and any related intelligence-gathering mechanism); and the numerical strength, organization, equipment, deployment, or employment of the Armed Forces retained by the parties (it encompasses disarmament); and, b. on some occasions, those measures taken for the purpose of reducing instability in the military environment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

***combatant command (command authority)***—Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command

(command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called **COCOM**. See also **operational control; tactical control**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*combatting terrorism*—Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*command and control*—The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called **C<sup>2</sup>**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*command, control, communications, and computer systems*—Integrated systems of doctrine, procedures, organizational structures, personnel, equipment, facilities, and communications designed to support a commander's exercise of command and control across the range of military operations. Also called **C<sup>4</sup> systems**. See also **command and control**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*contingency*—An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military

operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response, and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. See also **contingency contracting**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**contingency contracting**—Contracting performed in support of a peacetime contingency in an overseas location pursuant to the policies and procedures of the Federal Acquisition Regulatory System. See also **contingency**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**counterdrug**—Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called **CD**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**counterdrug operations**—Civil or military actions taken to reduce or eliminate illicit drug trafficking. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**counterinsurgency**—Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**counterproliferation**—Counterproliferation refers to the activities of the Department of Defense across the full range of U.S. efforts to combat proliferation, including diplomacy, arms control, export controls, and intelligence collection and analyses, with particular responsibility for assuring that U.S. forces and interests can be protected should they confront an adversary armed with weapons of mass destruction or missiles. (United States Air Force Counterproliferation Master Plan)

**DOD support to counterdrug operations**—Support provided by the Department of Defense to law enforcement agencies to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**ensuring freedom of navigation**—Operations conducted to demonstrate United States or international rights to navigate air or sea routes. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**exclusion zone**—A zone established by a sanctioning body to prohibit specific activities in a specific geographic area. The purpose may be

to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior to meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions, or use or threat of force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*force protection*—Security program designed to protect soldiers, [all other military personnel,] civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combatting terrorism, physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs. (Joint Pub 1-02) [Words in brackets added for clarity and completeness.]

*foreign internal defense*—Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called **FID**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*humanitarian and civic assistance*—Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, Section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. See also **humanitarian assistance**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*humanitarian assistance*—Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host-nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*insurgency*—An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*joint force air component commander*—The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander's responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander's apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander's guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called **JFACC**. See also **joint force commander**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*joint force commander*—A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called **JFC**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*military operations other than war*—Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called **MOOTW**. (Joint Pub 1-02) [*An umbrella term encompassing a variety of military operations conducted by the Department of Defense that normally complement the other instruments of national power. These military operations are as diverse as providing support and assistance (when consistent with US law) in a nonthreatening environment, and conducting combat not associated with war. Also called MOOTW.*] {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is offered for clarity.}

*military support to civil authorities*—Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense to foster mutual assistance and support between the Department of Defense and any civil government agency in planning or preparedness [preparing] for, or in the application of resources for response to, the consequences of civil emergencies or attacks, including national security emergencies. Also called **MSCA**. (JP 1-02) {The word in brackets is applicable only to the Air Force and is offered for grammatical clarity in lieu of the word “preparedness.”}

*National Command Authorities*—The President and the Secretary of Defense or their duly deputized alternates or successors. Also called **NCA**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*nation assistance*—Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code Title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*noncombatant evacuation operations*—Operations conducted to relocate threatened noncombatants from locations in a foreign country. These operations normally involve United States citizens whose lives are in danger, and may also include selected foreign nationals. Also called **NEO**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*nongovernmental organizations*—Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called **NGO**. See also **private voluntary organizations**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*operational control*—Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called **OPCON**. See also **combatant command (command authority)**; **tactical control**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*peace enforcement*—Application of military force, or the threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. See also peacekeeping; peace operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*peacekeeping*—Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. See also **peace enforcement**; **peace operations**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*peace operations*—A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*[The umbrella term encompassing traditional peacekeeping (sometimes referred to as truce-keeping) and forceful military actions (peace enforcement), either of which may be used to support diplomatic efforts (peacemaking) to establish and maintain peace. The goal of peace operations is a long-term peaceful settlement.]* {Italicized definition in brackets applies only to the Air Force}

***private voluntary organizations***—Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United States-based. “Private voluntary organization” is often used synonymously with the term “nongovernmental organization.” Also called **PVO**. See also **nongovernmental organizations**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

***proliferation***—The spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical capabilities and the missiles to deliver them. (United States Air Force Counterproliferation Master Plan)

***protection of shipping***—The use of proportionate force by United States warships, military aircraft, and other forces, when necessary for the protection of United States flag vessels and aircraft, United States citizens (whether embarked in United States or foreign vessels), and their property against unlawful violence. This protection may be extended (consistent with international law) to foreign flag vessels, aircraft, and persons. (Joint Pub 1-02)

***raid***—An operation, usually small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or to destroy installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. (Joint Pub 1-02)

***recovery operations***—Operations conducted to search for, locate, identify, rescue, and return personnel, sensitive equipment, or items critical to national security. (Joint Pub 1-02)

***rules of engagement***—Directives issued by competent military authority which delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called **ROE**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*sanction enforcement/maritime intercept operations*—Operations which employ coercive measures to interdict the movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a nation or specified area. (Joint Pub 1-02) [Previously called **quarantines**.] {Sentence in brackets applies only to the Air Force and is added for clarity.}

*security assistance*—Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*show of force*—An operation, designed to demonstrate United States resolve, which involves increased visibility of United States deployed forces in an attempt to defuse a specific situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to United States interests or national objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*status-of-forces agreement*—An agreement which defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called **SOFA**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*strike*—An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*support to counterinsurgency*—Support provided to a government in the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions it undertakes to defeat insurgency. See also **support to insurgency**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*support to insurgency*—Support provided to an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. See also **support to counterinsurgency**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*tactical control*—Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called **TACON**. See also **combatant command (command authority)**; **operational control**. (Joint Pub 1-02)

*war*—A state of undeclared or declared armed hostile action characterized by the sustained use of armed force between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular and irregular forces in a series of connected military operations or campaigns to achieve vital national objectives. (AFSC Pub 1)

*weapons of mass destruction*—Weapons that cause indiscriminate, widespread destruction. Such weapons include nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in any form, and associated delivery systems. These three types of weapons are also referred to as NBC weapons. (United States Air Force Counterproliferation Master Plan)