This document complements related discussion found in Joint Publication 3-26, 
FOREWORD

The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 are a stark example that some nations, organizations, groups, and individuals will implement extraordinary measures to further their cause and bring death and destruction to the United States. It is imperative that the Air Force prepare fully to detect, preempt, respond to, mitigate, and recover from the full spectrum of threats to the homeland, to include natural emergencies, nation-state aggression, terrorist attacks, and other man-made events.

Make no mistake about it: when the nation calls, the Air Force will respond – and we will respond quickly and effectively. We have much to contribute to the security of the homeland, regardless of the nature of the event. This includes the defense of the homeland through air and space operations, whether in air, space, or cyberspace.

While civilian sector and federal agencies possess substantial assets and capabilities to respond to these domestic emergencies, the Air Force, with its inherent speed and through its distinctive capabilities, stands ready to provide full-spectrum support to these civil agencies. The Air Force brings specialized assets to support the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation during the crisis portion of a terrorist event. We have capabilities that contribute to the Department of Homeland Security’s and their Federal Emergency Management Agency’s efforts at incident management, ranging from disaster relief to scenarios involving chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive devices.

This document describes how our Air Force organizes and employs air and space power in operations in the homeland. We have superb air and space warfare doctrine addressing air and space expeditionary forces and combat operations. Homeland operations doctrine complements those documents. It focuses on how we support civilian agencies through the appropriate combatant commander in a variety of operations, such as neutralizing terrorist threats, responding to natural disasters, and supporting the traditional mission of homeland defense. Concepts such as centralized control/decentralized execution and unity of effort are just as relevant in the civil support arena as they are in warfighting. The complexities of the interagency process, the nexus between law enforcement and national security, and other issues raised when we conduct operations in the homeland create seams that we must address. This document represents a significant first step to codify our best practices in conducting operations in the homeland.

T. MICHAEL MOSELEY
General, USAF
Chief of Staff
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INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

This Air Force Doctrine Document establishes guidance for organizing and employing air and space forces at the operational level in the conduct of military operations within the homeland. This includes the full spectrum of potential military operations, to include civil support prior to a terrorist incident, civil support to contend with the consequences of an event, and extraordinary homeland defense or civil support operations.

APPLICATION

This document applies to the Total Force: all Air Force military and civilian personnel, including regular, Air Force Reserve Command, and Air National Guard units and members.

The doctrine in this document is authoritative, but not directive. Therefore, commanders need to consider the contents of this Air Force Doctrine Document and the particular situation when accomplishing the Air Force’s missions. Airmen should read it, discuss it, and practice it.

SCOPE

Most Air Force assets (people, weapons, and support systems) may be employed in the conduct of operations within the homeland. This document discusses how we defend the homeland, support civil authorities, and prepare for domestic emergencies, as well as how the fundamentals of organization and employment of Air Force capabilities accomplish these responsibilities.
COMAFFOR / JFACC / CFACC
A note on terminology

One of the cornerstones of Air Force doctrine is that “the US Air Force prefers - and in fact, plans and trains - to employ through a commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) who is also dual-hatted as a joint force air and space component commander (JFACC).” (AFDD 1)

To simplify the use of nomenclature, Air Force doctrine documents will assume the COMAFFOR is dual-hatted as the JFACC unless specifically stated otherwise. The term “COMAFFOR” refers to the Air Force Service component commander while the term "JFACC" refers to the joint component-level operational commander.

While both joint and Air Force doctrine state that one individual will normally be dual-hatted as COMAFFOR and JFACC, the two responsibilities are different, and should be executed through different staffs.

Normally, the COMAFFOR function executes operational control/administrative control of assigned and attached Air Force forces through a Service A-staff while the JFACC function executes tactical control of joint air and space component forces through an air and space operations center (AOC).

When multinational operations are involved, the JFACC becomes a combined force air and space component commander (CFACC). Likewise, the air and space operations center, though commonly referred to as an AOC, in joint or combined operations is correctly known as a JAOC or CAOC.
FOUNDATIONAL DOCTRINE STATEMENTS

Foundational doctrine statements are the basic principles and beliefs upon which Air Force Doctrine Documents (AFDDs) are built. Other information in the AFDDs expands on or supports these statements.

- Homeland operations incorporate all applications of air and space power designed to detect, preempt, respond to, mitigate, and recover from the full spectrum of incidents and threats to the homeland, whether man-made or natural. (Page 1)

- The Air Force stands ready to provide air and space capabilities to the geographic combatant commander, whether in support of a civil agency or in defense of the homeland. (Page 6)

- The Air Force contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas, homeland defense, and support to civil authorities. (Page 9)

- Active duty Airmen are always under the command of military commanders up through the Secretary of Defense and the President. When Air Force capabilities are provided to civil authorities, the relationship is similar to the direct support role of one military force in support of another. (Page 10)

- The complexity and basic premise of the interagency process for homeland operations, as well as the potential for a surprise terrorist event on American soil, differentiate homeland operations from traditional Air Force missions overseas. (Page 13)

- An air and space expeditionary task force should be established and a commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) identified for conducting homeland operations with operational control of Air Force forces given to the COMAFFOR. (Page 15)

- In providing defense support for civil authorities, the Air Force supports federal, state, or local civil authorities in cases of natural or man-made domestic emergencies, civil disturbances, or authorized law enforcement activities. (Page 25)

- Once a joint task force is established, Air Force forces deployed to a crisis should be organized like any other Air Force task force, that is, as an air and space expeditionary task force, and the COMAFFOR should be given operational control of Air Force forces. (Page 31)
While September 11th was a call for the military to do more with regard to homeland defense, defending the United States, of course, has been the number one priority of the U.S. military since the founding of the republic. In fact, providing for the common defense was so basic an obligation of government that the founding fathers saw fit to place in that document, the Constitution, the very words, “providing for the common defense.”

—Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld
7 May 2002

Homeland Operations

Homeland operations incorporate all applications of air and space power designed to detect, preempt, respond to, mitigate, and recover from the full spectrum of incidents and threats to the homeland, whether man-made or natural. This includes homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, and emergency preparedness. This construct for homeland operations establishes the Air Force’s responsibilities in direct support of homeland security.

The Department of Defense (DOD) performs homeland defense, and contributes to emergency preparedness and defense support of civil authorities. The National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS) provides a federal framework for a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, as well as minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. The DOD, in its DOD Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, defines “homeland security” as “a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur.” For the Air Force, homeland operations are the means by which its support to homeland defense, defense support of civil authorities, and emergency preparedness is accomplished. Figure 1.1 shows the Air Force construct for homeland operations.

Homeland Security (HS)

Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur (from NSHS). HS includes domestic preparedness, critical infrastructure protection, and civil support in case of attacks on
Homeland Operations


Domestic relief operations  Support to law enforcement  Support to CBRNE incidents  Support to civil disturbances

civilians, continuity of government, continuity of operations, border and coastal defense, and national missile defense. By establishing its integrated response capability to support this effort, the Air Force is capable of responding to any sort of mission it is called upon to perform.

**Homeland Defense (HD)**

The DOD defines HD as the protection of US territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression, or other threats as directed by the President. United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) describes HD as the protection of US territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against military attacks emanating from outside the United States. In understanding the difference between HS and HD, it is important to understand that USNORTHCOM is a military organization whose operations within the United States are governed by law, including the Posse Comitatus Act, that prohibits use of the Army or Air Force for law enforcement purposes, except as authorized by Congress and the United States Constitution. Thus, USNORTHCOM’s missions are military homeland defense and civil support to lead federal agencies. Air Force HD missions include force protection actions, counterair, counterintelligence, air and space warning and control, counterterrorism, critical infrastructure protection, air and missile defense, information security operations, and network defense. In all of these missions, the DOD either acts as the designated lead federal agency, or with a high level of autonomy within the national security structure. For the Air Force, HD operations involve a significant counterair emphasis and could involve preemptive operations through conduct of global strike operations against threats to the US homeland or US forces and installations throughout the world. In addition, special operations forces
I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic.

—Excerpt from oath taken by all Airmen

Emergency Preparedness (EP)

The Air Force includes emergency preparedness (EP) within the homeland operations umbrella. *EP includes those planning activities undertaken to ensure DOD processes, procedures, and resources are in place to support the President and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) in a designated national security emergency.* This includes continuity of operations (COOP), continuity of government (COG) functions, and the performance of threat assessments.

Homeland operations routinely involve a unique collection of federal, state, and local agencies, which present a number of challenges. First, homeland operations are distinguished by reliance on coordination rather than control. Second, the multiplicity of agencies and wide variety of potential types of homeland operations make a common operational picture (COP) very difficult. An agency’s COP is often dependent upon the type of scenario in which it is involved and its functions, roles, and responsibilities in relation to the scenario (e.g., North American Aerospace Defense Command [NORAD] for air threats, the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA] for natural disasters). Third, the processes used by civil agencies are complex and the number of different agencies involved adds to the complexity. Fourth, different agencies have different rules of engagement. These items are addressed in the national incident management system (NIMS), developed by the Secretary of Homeland Security at the request of the President, that integrates effective practices in emergency preparedness and response into a comprehensive national framework for incident management.

The dynamic relationship between law enforcement and national security is illuminated by the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 (9/11). In the past, hijacked aircraft fell under the purview of either the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) or the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) because they were law enforcement concerns. On 9/11, a law enforcement concern rapidly became a national security issue when the aircraft were used as weapons. To counter the threat, the DOD quickly went from supporting civilian agencies to operating with a high degree of autonomy within the homeland under the direction of the President in his role as commander in chief. Computer attacks against critical DOD information systems are another example. Though computer hackers typically fall within the purview of civilian law enforcement, when
directed against critical DOD assets such attacks constitute a national security threat that involves both civilian and military agencies.

The enforcement of civilian laws by Air Force personnel highlights another challenge. With exceptions, the Posse Comitatus Act and other legal and policy documents prohibit the use of military forces in supporting law enforcement agencies by enforcing civil law within the United States, such as performing surveillance, searches, seizures, and arrests. However, National Guard forces operating in state status (i.e., state active duty or Title 32, U.S. Code [U.S.C.]) are not affected by the Posse Comitatus Act. Under the jurisdiction of the state governor, they can enforce laws within the civilian population.

Examples: Homeland Operations and Air Force Support

- **Domestic relief operations**
  - Forest fire, tornado, flood
  - Air Force Support: Airlift, medical, civil engineering, space support

- **Support to law enforcement**
  - Hijacked aircraft, CBRNE threats
  - Air Force Support: Combat air patrols, air refueling, reconnaissance, space assets, antiterrorism, civil support

- **Support to CBRNE incidents**
  - Recovery from CBRNE attack
  - Air Force Support: Airlift, reconnaissance, medical, civil engineering, space support

- **Support to civil disturbances**
  - Attempted invasion, large scale attack
  - Air Force operations: counterair, countersea, global strike, air refueling, reconnaissance, medical, civil engineering, space support

- **National special security event, presidential movement**
  - Air Force Support: combat air patrols, security forces, reconnaissance, medical, communications, air refueling, space support

DOD supports civil agencies

DOD is lead agency

**Fig 1.2 Homeland Operations and Air Force Support**

When the SecDef directs, the Air Force stands ready to defend the homeland. The Air Force makes available the full spectrum of air and space capabilities to meet
the threat or hazard. Our Service has a long history of contributing forces and resources in support of civil authorities. From disaster relief and counter-drug support to military support in response to terrorist activities, the Air Force continues to play a role in homeland operations.

**Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)**

*DSCA, often referred to as civil support, is DOD support provided during and in the aftermath of domestic emergencies—such as terrorist attacks or major disasters—and for designated law enforcement and other activities.* It includes military assistance for civil law enforcement operations in very limited circumstances. However, National Guard forces operating in state status (in state active duty and under Title 32, U.S.C.) can directly assist civil law enforcement operations. DSCA missions include, but are not limited to, supporting the Department of Justice (DOJ) in preventing or defeating terrorist attacks; response to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high yield explosive (CBRNE) incidents; response to natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, and fires; support to civilian law enforcement agencies, including counter-drug activities; and response to civil disturbances or insurrection. In all these missions, various federal, state, or local civilian agencies are primarily responsible for the management of the particular incident. For homeland operations, the Air Force’s involvement is supportive and dependent on a request to the DOD from the designated lead agency. Traditionally, DSCA operations were either considered crisis or consequence management. Crisis management activities were handled by the FBI and consequence management by FEMA. That distinction is now replaced with domestic incident management, a full-spectrum perspective that sees each event as a single incident requiring an integrated response.

Many of the same forces needed to support combat operations overseas and at home may be highly sought by the civil community when a crisis occurs. The SecDef, through his executive agent, determines the degree of DSCA that does not jeopardize the Air Force’s readiness. Current policy stipulates Air Force resources cannot be specifically allocated for the sole purpose of DSCA unless authorized by the SecDef, and are only made available when not required for other military operations (see DOD Directive [DODD] 3025.1, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*, for additional information).
Combat operations remain the highest priority for the Air Force; these operations take precedence over noncombat operations unless directed by higher authority. Figure 1.2 lists some of the types of operations Air Force forces could be involved in and the capabilities they can provide. Air Force organizations that provide support for domestic emergencies use the Air Force incident management system (IMS) structure to comply with Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, *Management of Domestic Incidents*. The IMS structure mirrors the national incident management system structure used by civil response agencies and outlined in the National Response Plan (NRP). For additional information, refer to Air Force Instruction (AFI) 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management Planning and Operations*.

**NATIONAL POLICY FOR HOMELAND SECURITY**

The Air Force stands ready to provide air and space capabilities to the geographic combatant commander (CCDR), whether in support of a civil agency or in defense of the homeland. The President provides national security policy in several documents, beginning with the *National Security Strategy* (NSS), and narrowing to a HS focus with the NSHS and HSPD 5. The NSS is very clear on the role of government: “Defending our Nation against its enemies is the first and fundamental commitment of the Federal Government.” In the fight against terrorism, potential Air Force operations include counterair missions; reconnaissance; global strike; and medical support, along with others.

At a broader level, HSPD-5 directed the establishment of the NRP. The NRP emphasizes a seamless, nationally integrated response, rather than fragmenting America’s response efforts. The NRP addresses the full range of domestic incidents. Ready to support this range, potential Air Force support includes medical personnel, civil engineers, and airlift capability.

The NRP is a dynamic document detailing how to integrate the incident response actions of federal, state, and local activities. HSPD-5 sets the guiding policy for domestic incident management and the NRP is the vehicle to unify this effort under the Secretary of Homeland Security. The NRP moves away from artificially dividing an event into crisis and consequence phases. Instead, the intent is to approach each event in a systematic and integrated manner, using the term domestic incident management.

*Dealing with the immediate consequences of a catastrophic event is a local responsibility. State or federal involvement is usually contingent on a request for support from the local authorities.* Terrorist events, however, such as 9/11 or those preceded by substantial threat warning, involve the overlapping authorities of local, state, and federal agencies. Each of these agencies has a role in intelligence collection, analysis, threat response, and consequence management. While every attempt is made to maintain local and state control of domestic incidents, attacks and disasters deemed of significance to national security may be managed under federal jurisdiction. This creates a potential seam, with local authorities in the lead for managing the
consequences of an event, while federal authorities lead the effort when national security is at stake. The numerous local, state, and federal agencies that may participate in homeland operations, each with its own differing chain of command, can complicate response efforts. The seams between agencies and the lack of a single command authority over the entire operation led to the NRP’s creation. It was designed to produce unity of effort for federal agencies, through the principal federal official (PFO), with the stated goal of approaching the operation in its entirety as management of a domestic incident. For more discussion of the NRP, see chapter 3.

**Air Force Support To The National Strategy For Homeland Security (NSHS)**

The NSHS is designed to mobilize and organize the nation to secure the United States homeland from terrorist attacks. Air Force operating concepts and procedures continue to be developed to support the national strategy. The strategic objectives of HS and how the Air Force supports them are to:

- **Prevent attack.** To prevent attacks against the United States, Air Force forces must deter, detect, predict, plan for, and preempt threats to the homeland. Air Force operations can prevent attack through early warning and military operations overseas, such as the global war on terrorism (GWOT).

- **Reduce vulnerability.** Air Force operations can reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorist attacks by “show of force” air patrols, air patrols over specific locations or resources, and through military support to law enforcement (MSLE) during special events such as the Olympics, the Super Bowl, and Presidential movements. In addition, joint planning and mutual training exercises with civil authorities well before an incident occurs also reduce America’s vulnerability and provide force protection for Air Force forces. The military places special emphasis on securing and safeguarding stockpiles of nuclear and chemical weapons and associated facilities, whether operationally deployed, in storage, in transit, or awaiting disposal.

- **Minimize damage and recover from attack.** Through DSCA, Air Force operations can respond promptly and decisively. Rapidly deployable medical capabilities and civil engineering expertise will be key contributors. The Air Force has the ability to provide logistics at all levels of operation, from bare base to main operating base support.

The NSHS provides a comprehensive framework for organizing the efforts of federal, state, local, and private organizations against a specific threat to national security—terrorism in the United States. In structuring its response to secure the homeland, the United States coordinates the resources of over 87,000 different local, state, and federal jurisdictions, focusing on six critical mission areas. The Air Force supports each area of the NSHS framework with its forces and capabilities:
 Intelligence and warning

- Potential Air Force support: air and space reconnaissance platforms; analysis expertise

Border and transportation security

- Potential Air Force support: Position, navigation, and timing support; reconnaissance

Domestic counterterrorism

- Potential Air Force support: Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), Civil Air Patrol (CAP)

Protecting critical infrastructure and key assets

- Potential Air Force support: Posted security forces, network defense, reconnaissance, airlift; counterspace, CAP

Defending against catastrophic terrorism

- Potential Air Force support: Civil engineering, reconnaissance, posting security forces, airlift; counterair; countersea; counterspace, CAP

Emergency preparedness and response

- Potential Air Force support: Emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLOs), emergency medical treatment capabilities, civil engineering, airlift, support to DOD continuity of operations (COOP) capability, continuity of government (COG) execution support

Principal Federal Official (PFO)

By presidential directive, the Secretary of Homeland Security is the PFO for domestic incident management. The Secretary of Homeland Security may appoint a subordinate to be his on-scene representative and that person will be considered the PFO for the particular incident. A key aspect of the federal response to a domestic incident is unity of effort to maximize the effectiveness of the forces of each federal agency.

When portions of the federal government are called on to support a homeland event, there will be a lead agency identified. For most homeland events, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is the lead agency at the federal level. For law enforcement-related events, the FBI is the lead agency at the federal level. DOD is the lead agency for HD. Historically, the lead agency has been referred to as the lead federal agent.
Air Force Support For The Homeland Security Mission Of The DOD

The highest priority of the United States military is the defense of the nation’s homeland against all enemies. The Air Force contributes to homeland security through its military missions overseas, HD, emergency preparedness, and support to civil authorities. The Air Force performs its missions to ensure air sovereignty, a nation’s inherent right to exercise absolute control and authority over the airspace above its territory, for the United States. Within the United States, the NSHS envisions circumstances under which the DOD and therefore the Air Force would be involved in improving security at home:

☀️ Air surveillance, air sovereignty alert, and direct air defense operations to defend United States citizens and territory. Although the events of 9/11 have created NORAD-directed steady state air defense operations, normally only extraordinary circumstances require such measures.

☀️ Quick response in support of civilian agencies by providing unique capabilities during an emergency such as an attack or natural disaster.

☀️ Participation in “limited scope” missions where other agencies have primary responsibility for security such as at national special security events (NSSE) like the Olympics.

☀️ Support to a joint task force (JTF) or federal coordinating officer (FCO) under DSCA as a designated base support installation. Support may include use of the installation infrastructure, aircraft, personnel, equipment, and ancillary resources.

It is the policy of the Department [of Defense] to protect personnel on military installations and DOD-owned or leased facilities from CBRNE attacks, to respond to these attacks with trained and equipped emergency responders, and to ensure installations are able to continue critical operations during an attack, and to resume essential operations after an attack.

—Deputy SecDef Paul Wolfowitz memo, Preparedness of US Military Installation and Facilities Worldwide Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Attack, 5 Sep 02

Air and space capabilities have been successfully applied in the homeland. Fighters have escorted suspicious aircraft, ensuring their safe landing. Air patrols patrolled high-threat and high-risk locations. Airlift moved civil agency personnel and cargo to the event scene. Specially configured mobility assets helped fight wild fires. Security Forces assisted in evacuation and cordon establishment after the bombing at the 1996 Olympics in Atlanta. The application of air and space power within the homeland has increased and the full spectrum of capabilities remains available.
Active duty Airmen are always under the command of military commanders up through the SecDef and the President. When Air Force capabilities are provided to civil authorities, the relationship is similar to the direct support role of one military force in support of another. Air Force commanders’ priorities should be consistent with DOD guidance in these areas. The same is true when Air National Guard forces are federalized under Title 10, United States Code (U.S.C.); if in Title 32, U.S.C., or state active duty status, they are under the command of the state’s Adjutant General, responsible to the state governor (for additional information, see Chapter 2).

DOD is the lead for HD missions and will be supported by other federal agencies for such missions. An agency other than DOD will be supported for civil support missions and DOD will play a role in providing that support, with the Air Force providing forces and resources from its capabilities. Figure 1.3 above describes this supported/supporting relationship between the DOD and non-DOD agencies. The key agency to which the DOD provides support is FEMA.

The DOD will conduct homeland operations when directed by the President or requested by civil agencies and approved by the SecDef. The wide ranging capabilities, superior state of readiness, and detailed planning and risk management skills of the Air Force mean it will be ready to support homeland operations, where the Air Force will make significant, positive impacts in those operations.
We’ve undertaken the most sweeping reorganization of the federal government since the beginning of the Cold War. The FBI has transformed itself into an agency dedicated primarily to the prevention of future terrorist attacks. The Department of Defense has established a new top-level command whose priority is to protect the American homeland. We established the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, to merge and analyze in a single place all vital intelligence on global terror. We created the Homeland Security Council within the White House…to help coordinate all homeland security activities across our government.

—President George W. Bush, Commander-In-Chief

All requests from civilian agencies for DOD assistance, except those provided under mutual aid agreements or in response to imminently serious conditions, flow through the Joint Director of Military Support (JDOMS). JDOMS is the clearinghouse for accepting interagency mission assignments. JDOMS routes their recommendation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and DOD Executive Secretary (ExecSec) for SecDef approval.

ORGANIZATIONS ESTABLISHED SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001

The Air Force established the Deputy for Homeland Operations (AF/A3S-H) and Air Forces, Northern, First Air Force (AFNORTH [1 AF]). Within the DOD, USNORTHCOM stood up as a geographic combatant command. The JDOMS was reorganized under the J-3 on the joint staff. In addition, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Homeland Defense was established. Weapons of mass destruction civil support teams were established, supported by the Air National Guard, for the states, territories, and District of Columbia.

Among non-DOD organizations, the DHS was established and a number of previously disparate organizations were moved under it. The Homeland Security Council, similar to the National Security Council, was also initiated. A number of terrorist focused, information fusion organizations were established, including the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which consists of DOD (Air Force support coming from AFOSI and Air Force intelligence), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), DHS, FBI, and representatives from other executive branch entities. The FBI further expanded their joint terrorism task forces at the national and local levels, which have a wide cross-section of experts, including AFOSI. Additional organizations supporting HS
include the Joint Staff Deputy Directorate of Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense (DDAT/HD), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Joint Intelligence Task Force for Counterterrorism (JITF-CT), the Joint Force Headquarters, National Capital Region (JFHQ-NCR), the Joint Task Force, Civil Support (JTF-CS), and state quick reaction teams (QRT).
CHAPTER TWO

FORCE PRESENTATION AND ORGANIZATION OF FORCES

On September 11th, our Air Force—our total force—was among the first to respond, launching interceptors and tankers from alert across the United States. Within hours we provided disaster assistance and began flying homeland defense missions that have continued around the clock since then—fighter, tanker, AWACS, and Air Control Squadrons all across America stood up overnight to prevent another airborne attack. Our Security Forces also responded magnificently when, for the first time ever, all our installations went to FPCON (Force Protection Condition) Charlie/Delta. We mobilized the ARC (air reserve components) in large numbers and they have met every challenge at home and abroad.

—General John Jumper, Chief of Staff, United States Air Force (CSAF), 2001-2005

The complexity and basic premise of the interagency process for homeland operations, as well as the potential for a surprise terrorist event on American soil, differentiate operations in the homeland from traditional Air Force missions overseas. These differences affect how we organize and present forces.

An air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) provides the means for the Air Force to support homeland operations most efficiently. This is the case when Air Force forces are required to perform operations in the homeland away from their home station or in a larger joint force operation. It is especially important for the command element to include the A-staff functions and an air and space operations center (AOC). By having a pre-identified or standing command element, key relationships can be established with interagency participants prior to an event. In addition, the staff can be educated and trained on the interagency processes, the NRP, and other areas that add to the complexity of homeland operations.

A standing command element and forces capable of response decrease response time. Terrorist attacks often come with minimal or no warning. This stands in opposition to the build-up phase typically available before initiation of traditional combat operations. As a result, homeland operations will often require immediate or near-immediate response. For example, while the alert fighters scrambled during the response to 9/11 were assigned to continental United States (CONUS) Region, NORAD, rather than an AETF, the fact they were on alert and tied to a 24/7 chain of
command allowed their response to be nearly instantaneous. In 2003, this rapid response was also demonstrated by First Air Force (1 AF), through their A-staff and standing AOC, as they prepared for potential support of Hurricane Odette recovery operations. Even though the hurricane did not have the impact predicted, Air Force forces were positioned to provide immediate support. This support became vital in 2005 during the operations surrounding the preparations for and aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Similarly, alert air forces assigned to the Alaskan NORAD Region are on 24/7 tasking from the Eleventh Air Force (11 AF) combined AOC-Alaska (CAOC-A) to protect critical oil resources and the national missile defense sites in the geographically remote Alaskan homeland. These 1 AF and 11 AF AOCs, along with the Pacific AOC, provide the operational command and control support for other homeland security missions.

FORCE PRESENTATION FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

In order to better enable the US military to conduct homeland security, President Bush and Congress established USNORTHCOM as a geographic combatant command. USNORTHCOM, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM), and the functional combatant commands conduct 24/7 military operations in the homeland under the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) execution order, Operation NOBLE EAGLE.

Figure 2.1. C2 Model: JTF with Service Components having OPCON of their forces.

When a domestic incident occurs and federal assistance is required, the Secretary of DHS will appoint a PFO as the on-scene coordinator. If DOD involvement is needed, the SecDef will direct the Commander, USNORTHCOM
(CDRUSNORTHCOM) or Commander, USPACOM (CDRUSPACOM), as appropriate, to appoint a single voice for the DOD in the form of a Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO). For very small DOD involvement, the DCO’s role may be to coordinate the efforts of the Service components to USNORTHCOM/USPACOM that provide direct support. If DOD involvement becomes extensive, then CDRUSNORTHCOM/CDRUSPACOM may establish a JTF or response task force (RTF) that would receive operational control (OPCON) of forces. In this case, the DCO becomes the JTF/RTF commander’s liaison to the federal agencies. The DCO assists the unity of effort to civil authorities by being DOD’s single face to the overall federal effort. Figure 2.1 above provides an example of command relationships for homeland operations.

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

An AETF should be established and a commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR) identified for conducting homeland operations with OPCON of Air Force forces given to the COMAFFOR. This should occur when Air Force forces are required to perform operations in the homeland away from their home station or in a larger joint force operation.

USNORTHCOM has many possible command and control options for use in homeland operations. For smaller events, forces may be placed under the OPCON of the DCO. As the response grows, task forces are used, as is the case with the standing joint task force for civil support. For large events, USNORTHCOM may rely on functional component commanders, as was done for Hurricane Katrina, where the 1 AF commander was designated the joint force air and space component commander (JFACC).

Typically in operations outside the United States, a JTF will organize with both Service and functional component commanders. The Air Force component commander is the COMAFFOR. Though the JTF commander selects the functional component commanders, it should be noted the Air Force plans and trains for the COMAFFOR to be dual-hatted as the JFACC. While CDRUSNORTHCOM has appointed functional component commanders for his area of responsibility (AOR), it is unlikely that subordinate JTF organizational structures will include functional component commanders. As a result, it is expected that air assets will be provided in direct support through the theater-wide JFACC to the subordinate JTF commander. Other Air Force forces presented to the JTF, though, will be presented through the COMAFFOR, who will be under the OPCON of the joint force commander (JFC). If a homeland defense operation takes place, it is anticipated that the combatant commander will be the JTF commander and, thus will use his/her standing, theater-wide JFACC. Similar organizational structures are anticipated within the USPACOM AOR, too. When appropriate, the COMAFFOR should appoint an air component coordination element (ACCE) to support the joint force operations. For further discussion on the COMAFFOR, JFACC, ACCE, and command relationships, see AFDD 2, Operations and Organization.
Geographic Combatant Commanders

Both USNORTHCOM and USPACOM are geographic combatant commanders with responsibilities for conducting homeland operations. USNORTHCOM’s AOR is the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, the Gulf of Mexico, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Bermuda, St. Pierre and Miquelon Islands, and waters out to 500 nautical miles (excluding Greenland). USPACOM’s AOR for homeland operations includes Hawaii and US territories and atolls. The AORs of both geographic combatant commanders extend 500 nautical miles from their respective land areas out into the surrounding waters.

USPACOM is unique in that the forces in Alaska are under the combatant command (COCOM) of CDRUSPACOM, but Alaska is in the USNORTHCOM AOR. To facilitate operations in Alaska, CDRUSNORTHCOM has established JTF-Alaska (JTF-AK), staffed by CDRUSPACOM’s Alaskan Command. 11 AF/CC, as JFACC, employs CAOC-A to support JTF-AK missions as well as Alaskan NORAD Region (ANR) missions. This arrangement allows for retention of unity of command and effort in presenting Air Force forces to CDRUSNORTHCOM. If additional forces are needed for a mission under USNORTHCOM control the SecDef may direct the attachment of forces from USPACOM or another combatant command.

Incidents occurring in the homeland within the USPACOM AOR are normally organized around the JTF construct with forces attached from USPACOM’s assigned forces. But, as in any other operation, if USPACOM does not have the resident capability required to handle the situation then SecDef can attach forces from any other combatant commander as necessary. USNORTHCOM has very few assigned forces, so SecDef will attach forces from another combatant command in most cases.

If a domestic incident occurs, CDRUSNORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM may establish a JTF to provide command and control for the DOD response force. In the NORTHCOM AOR, the air component to the JTF would normally be in the form of an AETF and 1 AF/CC, or his designee, would be the COMAFFOR. In some situations there may not be a need to attach Air Force forces to the JTF and 1 AF may assume a direct support role to the JTF. In the USPACOM AOR, the commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF/CC) designates the COMAFFOR. Command and control for Air Force forces within the USPACOM AOR will be executed through the PACAF Kenney Headquarters. In Alaska where NORTHCOM has responsibility for homeland security but forces are under the COCOM of CDRUSPACOM, PACAF/CC provides the commander, 11 AF, as the COMAFFOR supporting the USNORTHCOM JTF-Alaska.

The single-Service task force is also used in the USNORTHCOM AOR. There are instances where the military capability for an incident resides in a single Service and it makes sense to create a task force for only that one Service’s forces. As in all other task forces, the combatant commander charters it.
**Functional Combatant Commanders**

US Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) is a globally aligned functional combatant command with no assigned geographic AOR. In the area of HD, USSTRATCOM may expect to be the supported command for DOD space and information operations, especially computer network defense. USSTRATCOM is responsible for warning and, if necessary, assessing missile attack to the other combatant commanders. It is tasked as a supporting command to NORAD to provide missile warning and space surveillance in furtherance of NORAD’s mission of aerospace control of North America. In addition, USSTRATCOM would support USNORTHCOM and USPACOM in the event military operations are required to protect the homeland.

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) serves as the DOD single manager for transportation, providing common-user air, land, and sea transportation and terminal services to meet national security objectives. These security objectives can occur in the homeland and USTRANSCOM will normally be in a supporting role. Air Mobility Command (AMC) is the Air Force component of USTRANSCOM. As the single manager for air mobility, AMC’s mission is to provide airlift, air refueling, special air missions, and aeromedical evacuation for US forces. AMC also has the ability to support humanitarian, homeland defense, and other operations.

US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) serves as a supported or supporting commander for designated global strike operations and selected counterterrorism activities. The commander, USSOCOM serves as the supporting commander to USNORTHCOM and USPACOM within their respective AORs when requirements exceed conventional forces’ capabilities or special operations forces expertise is needed. When directed by the President or the SecDef, USSOCOM conducts special operations and provides special operations forces as required in support of civil authorities during DSCA operations, with Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) providing the Air Force personnel and materiel. USSOCOM may also provide liaison officers and other assistance to the supported combatant commanders.

**North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)**

NORAD has responsibility for providing air sovereignty, air warning, and air defense of the North American continent—specifically the CONUS, Alaska, Canada, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands. NORAD is a binational command, with two chains of command. One chain of command goes to the Canadian Prime Minister and the other to the President, but it does not go through the SecDef. Air Force air assets supporting NORAD fall under the OPCON of the NORAD commander in his role as commander, US Element NORAD, with OPCON delegated to the respective NORAD regional air defense commanders (i.e., Alaska and CONUS). Each region has a commander triple-hatted as JFACC, airspace control authority, and area air defense
commander for executing defensive counterair (DCA) missions. The commanders of Alaska NORAD Region and CONUS NORAD Region do not have OPCON over entire Air Force units; rather they have OPCON over specific personnel and assets directly supporting the DCA mission. NORAD air defense sectors execute tactical control of DCA assets as designated in the region air tasking order published by the 1 AF AOC and CAOC-A. USSTRATCOM supports NORAD by providing the necessary missile warning and space surveillance.

**Air Force Components**

The air component to USNORTHCOM is designated Air Forces Northern (First Air Force) (AFNORTH [1 AF]) and the commander is dual-hatted as the commander of 1 AF. The day-to-day air domain and civil support operations are conducted by AFNORTH (1 AF) from Tyndall Air Force Base, Florida. The AFNORTH (1 AF) standing “tailored” AOC is particularly suited for all homeland operations taking place within the USNORTHCOM AOR (except Alaska where the 11 AF CAOC-A supports the ANR and USNORTHCOM’s JTF-AK). The AFNORTH (1 AF) AOC is always manned, providing the fastest possible response. In addition, its personnel are trained and exercised in homeland operations, and are familiar with the complexities of the interagency process and the legal considerations applicable to operations in the homeland. The 18 AF tanker airlift control center (18 AF/TACC) provides the 1 AF AOC with the majority of its airlift and aerial refueling expertise through direct support of AFNORTH (1 AF)’s air mobility division (AMD).

When Air Force forces deploy or are employed in-place in support of USNORTHCOM inside the CONUS, Virgin Islands, or Puerto Rico, an Air Force single Service task force (SSTF) or the air component to a JTF is presented in the form of an AETF with administrative control (ADCON) back to 1 AF. The AETF forces will be OPCON to the SSTF commander or JTF/CC, who in turn reports to USNORTHCOM. If the AETF takes the form of an air expeditionary squadron (AES) or an air expeditionary detachment (AED), it will be attached to the AFNORTH (1 AF) standing headquarters. If the incident requires the establishment of an air expeditionary group or wing (AEG or AEW), they will also attach to the AFNORTH (1 AF) standing AETF headquarters, but two additional force presentation actions will occur if a JTF is formed. First, AFNORTH (1 AF) will deploy an air component coordination element (ACCE) to the JTF. At the same time, AFNORTH (1 AF) will establish an AEG or AEW. The AEW or AEG/CC will act as COMAFFOR for all Air Force forces supporting the JTF.

Normally USTRANSCOM airlift aircraft will operate in a supporting relationship with USNORTHCOM. USTRANSCOM does not normally transfer OPCON of strategic airlift aircraft and crews that are capable of continuing to perform airlift missions in support of other USTRANSCOM requirements. For additional information, see AFDD 2-6, Air Mobility Operations.

A standing COMAFFOR, AOC, and staff are essential for conducting homeland operations. The Air Force maximizes its contributions to homeland operations through
rapid response and force integration. With a standing COMAFFOR, AOC, and staff, the Air Force dramatically decreases the response time and has the opportunity to educate and train pre-identified personnel on the processes and participants associated with homeland operations before an event occurs.

**Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Agency (AFNSEP)**

The Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Agency is a field operating agency that organizes, trains, equips, and deploys emergency preparedness liaison officers (EPLO) to the site of a disaster as quickly as possible. *AFNSEP works directly with the COMAFFOR and JDAMS to coordinate the Air Force response in the initial stages of a homeland event.* AFNSEP visits all homeland Air Force bases annually to brief them on defense support of civil authorities.

The EPLO is a part of the defense coordination element located in the civil agency’s on-scene command post, acting as the Air Force’s representative to the defense coordinating officer. Traditionally, they are Air Force Reserve officers who deploy to assist in managing the consequences of an event. They have not historically been a part of the pre-incident, or crisis, phase of an event (e.g., a terrorist attack has not occurred, but intelligence indicates one is likely so a lead federal agent initiates actions). *To advise civil agencies on air and space capabilities in an effective and timely manner, Air Force EPLOs must deploy as soon as possible.* EPLOs are trained in emergency response and the coordination of follow-on Air Force assets in response to requests for Air Force support. They serve as the focal point within a joint field office for coordinating Air Force response to any incident. For incidents involving immediate response, a member of an Air Force installation emergency response element may be located in the civil agency’s on-scene command post until such time as the EPLO arrives.

**Air National Guard (ANG)**

Special considerations exist in determining command relationships when dealing with the ANG. *AFNORTH (1 AF)/CC and PACAF/CC (along with 11 AF/CC if designated as COMAFFOR) exercise OPCON of applicable ANG units and members when they are federalized and in Title 10, U.S.C., status for homeland operations.* ADCON for discipline, personnel support, and administration for these federalized units is retained by the ANG Readiness Center, or if full mobilization has occurred, is given to the gaining command. With approval of the governor of a state and the President of the United States, federalized ANG officers may command ANG personnel who are still in Title 32, U.S.C., status. When ANG personnel are involved in training for federal missions (Title 32 status), the commander of the providing command may exercise training and readiness oversight, but not command. Command remains with the state authorities. Guard members in Title 32 status are under the command authority of the adjutant general (TAG) of their state and therefore their governor. If Guard members operate in Title 32 status outside of their state but within the United States, command authority will remain with the TAG but be subject to any coordinating authority or state-
ANG assets can be classified into three categories within the law and, with the exception of one very limited situation under 32 U.S.C. §325 requiring approval of the President, can only be in one status at a time. The first is familiar: Title 10, where forces are under the authority of the President as commander in chief. The second category is “state active duty” for ANG forces under the authority of the state governor through the respective state’s adjutant general and funded by the state. The third category is Title 32 status. They are under the authority of the state governor for training purposes but funding is from the federal government. The ANG and Air Force have agreed that the joint definition of ‘coordinating authority’ allows the state governor to direct ANG forces to respond to the direction of a Title 10 commander. The forces are still under the command authority of the governor, but for unity of effort the Title 10 commander (i.e., active duty officer) can direct their actions.

—Information derived from Titles 10 and 32, U.S.C.

Air Force Auxiliary / Civil Air Patrol (AFAUX/CAP)

The AFAux/CAP is authorized, when directed by the Secretary of the Air Force, to fulfill any non-combat mission of the Air Force. When CAP operates in AFAux status, it is an Air Force federal military activity and as such is required to comply with the Posse Comitatus Act and intelligence oversight restrictions. AFAux/CAP forces are presented through the Air Education and Training Command commander to AFNORTH (1 AF) or PACAF in response to requests for DSCA, consequence management operations, and other federal operations.

AFAux/CAP assets, much like the ANG, can be classified into two categories within the law and can only be in one status at a time. The first category is Title 10, where these Air Force Auxiliary forces are deemed an instrumentality of the United States when carrying out a non-combat mission assigned by the Secretary of the Air Force. The second category is where these same individuals and equipment are acting in the CAP Corporate category under title 36 as a federally sanctioned non-profit corporation.

—Information derived from Titles 10 and 36, U.S.C.

The AFAux/CAP is located in every state as well as Puerto Rico and provides low-cost platforms using light aircraft. The platforms support sensors like the satellite digital imaging system (SDIS), which can transmit real-time high quality photos to the customer via the worldwide web, and a new sensor called ARCHER, an emerging hyperspectral imaging capability. These sensors can be used for non-combat missions...
such as search and rescue, critical infrastructure protection, low-level route survey or reconnaissance over high-value national infrastructure locations.

**Joint Task Force**

The JFC determines appropriate objectives and sets priorities for the entire joint force. In combat operations, the JFC normally exercises command authority through designated subordinate component commanders. All joint forces include Service component commanders (e.g., a COMAFFOR) and may, at the discretion of the JFC, also include functional component commanders (e.g., a JFACC). The JFC may execute operations either through the Service component commanders, the functional component commanders, or some combination thereof.

The standing JTF for civil support (JTF-CS) is normally not organized around Service components but rather by function. The result is a JFC supported by a series of functional task forces such as Task Force (TF) Transportation, TF Medical, TF Troops, and TF Aviation. In these cases, *Airmen should strive for unity of command through presentation of an appropriate AETF structure* (see fig 2.2).

![Diagram of Joint Task Force - Civil Support in USNORTHCOM](image)

**Figure 2.2. Notional organizational structure for Joint Task Force – Civil Support in USNORTHCOM**

In some DSCA operations, the JFC may elect to attach expeditionary combat support (ECS) forces to subordinate functional task force commanders (TFCs) with a specification of OPCON to the TFC. This organizational scheme is not the most operationally effective for unity of command or unity of effort under a single Airman. *Air Force best practice is that the JFC should allow the COMAFFOR to retain OPCON and TACON at his level.* The COMAFFOR then provides direct support to the various functional TFCs. Another option, though less optimal, is having the COMAFFOR retain OPCON while the functional TFCs receive TACON of Air Force forces.

Because the DOD could have a supporting role in any federal emergency, close cooperation between the JTF and other federal agencies is required through the supported combatant commander’s DCO. The DCO has a staff in the form of a defense coordinating element (DCE) that provides the interface to the federal response effort for
this coordination. The DCO and the DCE normally work for the JTF commander as part of the special staff.
CHAPTER THREE

HOMELAND DEFENSE AND DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Everyone knows that the Pentagon is not in the business of providing an armed force for [within] the United States, but when an event occurs we get the phone call and why do we get the phone call? Well, because the Department of Defense is considered the Department of Defense. They know that they’ve got troops. They’ve got people who respond. They’re organized and they can be of assistance.

—Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense

HOMELAND DEFENSE

While all combatant commanders have a role in HD, USNORTHCOM and USPACOM have a primary role in the direct defense of the homeland. What we have learned about combat throughout our history as a separate Service applies to combat operations in the homeland. This is well documented in current doctrine (see AFDD 2, Operations and Organization, and AFDD 2-1.1, Counterair Operations, for discussion of these capabilities). The defense of the homeland should primarily follow current warfighting doctrine.

One of our central air and space power tenets is centralized control, decentralized execution. This tenet remains relevant in homeland operations, but will very likely be stretched in the direction of “centralized execution” more so than in traditional combat operations. However, if execution is more centralized, the ability to engage fleeting targets decreases. One compensatory measure is to have well established and understood rules of engagement (ROE). To be effective, the ROE must be clearly understood and rapidly executable, with the shooter receiving approval in time to destroy the target. ROE should be defined when dealing with the full spectrum of response actions for homeland security.

NORAD and USNORTHCOM both have responsibilities within the same US air domain. NORAD is charged with air warning, air sovereignty, and air defense of the CONUS, Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, and Alaska, while USNORTHCOM has responsibility for all other air domain missions (other than those within USPACOM’s AOR) including responsibility for air domain missions in Mexico since NORAD’s charter
does not include Mexico. Additionally, USNORTHCOM is a geographic combatant command, with a chain of command through the SecDef to the President. NORAD is a binational command, with two chains of command. One chain of command goes to the Canadian Prime Minister and the other to the President, but it does not go through the SecDef. As a result, command and control relationships need to be emphasized to ensure people understand their chain of command, and from whom they take orders during certain events. For more information, see the discussion on command relationships for these organizations in Chapter 2.

The need for clarity in command relationships for HD is emphasized with the stand-up of the National Capitol Region command. Alaska also presents a need for command and control clarity, since Air Force forces in Alaska are under the combatant command of USPACOM, while the defense of Alaska is a USNORTHCOM responsibility. For Alaska, this clarity is provided through JTF-AK and CAOC-A. Lastly, while Hawaii, Guam, and other US territories and atolls are a part of the homeland, USPACOM is the geographic combatant command for those locations.

Airborne threat response will likely require more coordination when conducting combat missions in the homeland. This is partly driven by our country’s traditional treatment of hijacked aircraft and other terrorist threats as law enforcement concerns, rather than national security issues. Threat response procedures are well defined from the Cold War era, but the transition points should be clearly defined and aggressive coordination with civil authorities (e.g., DHS, FAA) is needed. This is relevant in the area of ballistic missile defense, as well.

In the targeting arena, additional coordination will also be necessary. While there are legal implications requiring thorough legal reviews before committing ISR assets, their employment need not be prohibited. A variety of organizations, such as the FBI, NCTC, Citizenship and Immigration Services Bureau of DHS, and state and local law enforcement can provide much of the needed data.

The Air Force can directly support the lead federal agency of the US Coast Guard for countersea operations. Air Force forces can be employed to support USNORTHCOM military operations for homeland defense by controlling use of the maritime environment along US coastal waters to prevent enemies from attacking civilian population centers, disrupting sea lines of communication, or committing terrorism on US sovereign soil. The Air Force performs comparable duties in the Pacific in support of USPACOM’s homeland defense missions. For further information on Air Force operations in the countersea role, see AFDD 2-1.4, Countersea Operations.
Lastly, added emphasis on the ROE can be anticipated. Senior decision makers continually balance the need for aggressive and effective combat operations with the need to minimize collateral damage and casualties. They most effectively accomplish this through applying risk management controls and processes. In the homeland, expect the balance to shift further towards protecting against collateral damage and casualties.

DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

Planning

Many of the capabilities inherent in air and space forces can also provide for rapid response to support civil authorities in cases of domestic emergencies and disasters. **In providing DSCA, the Air Force supports federal, state, or local civil authorities in cases of natural or man-made domestic emergencies, civil disturbances, or authorized law enforcement activities.** Acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and accidents involving hazardous materials stretch local and state emergency response resources to the limit, and sometimes beyond. For acts or threats of terrorism in the United States, the Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, is the lead agency. When disasters or accidents occur, local authorities lead the effort and request assistance from state (e.g., “non-federalized” National Guard) and/or federal agencies as needed. In both instances, regular and reserve military units, including Air Force civilian personnel, may be tasked to assist in response and recovery efforts. In all cases, the Air Force is prepared to support homeland operations through intelligence and information sharing.

Air and space operations centers (AOCs), in conjunction with the 18 AF/TACC, provide the full spectrum of planning for air and space operations in support of operations in the homeland. Specific regional AOCs provide support for homeland operations to CONUS NORAD Region and NORTHCOM for planning within the CONUS, Puerto Rico, and the US Virgin Islands; to ANR and JTF-Alaska for planning within Alaska; and to PACOM for planning within Hawaii, Guam and other US Pacific territories and atolls. The 18 AF/TACC supports homeland operations through effective application of air mobility capabilities to satisfy combatant commander requirements.

Regular and reserve installation commanders plan for situations that would require assigned units to assist local authorities. Installation commanders and planners should be aware of the various industries or other facilities in the surrounding communities. They should assess what potential hazard or threat these industries and facilities may pose to the installation. They should also determine what type of assistance each may require in the event of an emergency situation. The operational risk management process should be integral to any planning related to homeland operations. Installation commanders should be aware of critical dependencies on the surrounding community and work with involved agencies to ensure the installation is capable of continuing minimum essential functions in an emergency. **Coordinated**
planning between the installation and the community is critical to a successful emergency response and must take into account the need to preserve the installation’s ability to project and protect its forces when and where needed. What occurs in the community may affect the installation’s ability to perform its mission. In addition to providing support, Air Force installations should have plans and procedures in place for receiving aid and assistance from DOD or civil agencies when needed.

Memoranda of agreement or understanding (MOA/MOU) with the surrounding communities can clarify such issues as response procedures and capabilities, and reimbursement of costs. MOA and MOU provide a means to answer numerous questions before a disaster or accident occurs, and allow for planning as to how military units will respond and what the local authorities expect of them.

Key agencies for planning include local fire, medical, and police forces. During off-base emergency situations, the Air Force may be able to provide assistance fighting fires, treating the injured, evacuating buildings, and establishing cordons.

The National Response Plan (NRP) contains detailed guidance and considerations and should be the primary reference in developing MOA/MOU (an extended discussion of the NRP is located later in this chapter). Refer to the NRP and take the following into consideration, whether or not MOA/MOU are in place:

- **Installation commanders may provide immediate response to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage resulting from any civil emergency or attack.** Otherwise, SecDef approval is required prior to providing Air Force support. Commanders acting under immediate response authority must expeditiously notify the JDOMS through command channels.

- **Circumstances for requesting assistance:** Determine the circumstances under which mutual response will be requested and provided between the parties named in the memorandum. The circumstances will vary from installation to installation depending on available capabilities for both the off-base and on-base organizations, as well as what types of industries are located in the off-base communities. The most common example of requested assistance would be firefighting, explosive ordnance disposal, or hazardous materials units.

- **Procedures for requesting assistance (entry strategy):** There should be a written set of instructions that civil authorities must follow when requesting assistance. This will standardize request procedures and clarify requirements for both the military and civilian organizations involved.

- **Procedures for responding to and communicating with the lead command element (integration strategy):** Specific procedures should be provided for use by responding units when reporting to the scene of an emergency. Specify how the military organization will integrate with the civil authorities. A section within a MOA/MOU should also include frequencies for radios, radio procedures, equipment requirements, personnel requirements, force protection requirements, etc.
Procedure for cost accounting and potential reimbursement: A section within a MOA/MOU should contain instructions on how to track costs and request reimbursement. It applies to both the military and civilian agencies since most MOA/MOU are mutual response agreements.

Circumstances and procedures for withdrawing support (exit strategy): A MOA/MOU should specify such things as minimum notification time before assistance is withdrawn, maximum amount of time assistance can be provided, and procedures for transferring responsibilities to relieving units.

Procedures for scheduling and conducting training and exercises: Procedures for conducting joint exercises to familiarize all parties with the command structure and the scenarios in which assistance might be rendered should be incorporated into a MOA/MOU.

Installation coordination: A section in a MOA/MOU should describe efforts to bring all DOD installations clustered in one greater community together into an integrated, community-wide support plan (e.g., San Antonio, TX; Hampton Roads, VA; Washington, DC; etc.).

Most Air Force support to civil authorities will be in already familiar roles—conducting airlift of supplies to affected areas or providing medical or engineering assistance to people in need. Examples of Air Force capabilities that may be requested in a domestic disaster or emergency include (but are not limited to):

- **Air mobility.** AMC may provide airlift to support local, state, DOD, or other federal agencies (e.g., aeromedical evacuation).

- **Airbase opening and sustainment.** The Air Force provides AETF force modules to open an airbase, provide command and control, establish an airbase, generate the mission, and operate an airbase. These modules can be used to establish...
remote, abandoned, or inactive airfields with capabilities to accomplish an assigned mission; the capabilities can also be used to augment existing airfield facilities to handle the demands of a homeland security incident.

**Communications.** Deployable Air Force communications systems can provide worldwide, single-channel, secure voice and record communications, and secure on-site communications at or away from home stations.

**Reconnaissance.** The Air Force can provide reconnaissance capabilities, both analysis/assessment capabilities and assets (e.g., unmanned aerial vehicles; AFAux, space reconnaissance assets), to monitor designated locations and provide airborne surveillance. They could, for example, be used to monitor floodwaters, assess hurricane or tornado damage, or assist in tracking terrorist activities. Reconnaissance assets could also be used to collect airborne nuclear debris following a domestic nuclear event.

**Investigative support.** AFOSI can provide investigative expertise to support criminal investigations and counterintelligence services.

**Search and rescue.** Air Force assets can provide rapid response capability for search, transportation, insertion, and extraction functions in support of rescue activities or law enforcement.

**Civil engineering support.** Air Force civil engineer forces are capable of rapidly responding to worldwide contingency operations. Capabilities include operation and maintenance of facilities and infrastructure, aircraft rescue and facility fire suppression, construction management of emergency repair activities, monitoring and protecting resources subject to CBRNE events, and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). EOD provides assistance to federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies with EOD matters when determined to be in the interest of public safety. EOD supports specialized JTF operations and hazardous materials response for incidents involving explosives.

**Health Services.** Air Force Medical Service capabilities, while primarily designed to meet a wartime mission, are easily adaptable for civil disaster response. Small, incremental packages of tailored medical capability can be rapidly deployed to meet immediate and short-term civilian requirements.

The illustrative list above is intended to provide examples of the breadth of capabilities the Air Force can bring to its DSCA role. It, along with the potential DSCA missions listed in Figure 3.1, are not all-inclusive, but convey the large variety of responses to DSCA needs the Air Force can perform.

**Preparedness And Response**

Many events, from terrorist attacks to natural disasters, often occur with little or no warning. Terrorists attempt to hit quickly and decisively. A natural disaster, such as
a hurricane, can begin as an event believed to be controllable, but can rapidly spiral upward into one requiring greatly increased response needs. One of the best ways to mitigate against those realities is to lean forward within the existing legal and policy framework. There are a number of options available for the Air Force to be fully prepared.

Implementation of standing execution orders (EXORDs) provides for preparedness by the Air Force. For instance, to counter terrorism in the homeland after 9/11, there was developed a standing EXORD, the CJCS EXORD Operation NOBLE EAGLE. The EXORD can include prepare to deploy orders (PTDOs), and can establish direct liaison authorized (DIRLAUTH) relationships, command relationships, and other responsibilities, all before an event occurs. PTDOs can include force modules with unit type codes (UTCs) identified, sourced, and alerted to be ready for deployment within a certain notification window. DIRLAUTH allows subordinate echelons to establish relationships within the interagency community, cross-flow information, and refine plans and potential support requests. Similar to standing EXORDs, concepts of operations (CONOPS) help the air component prepare to act by documenting various processes, policies, and plans well before the event takes place. Headquarters, Air Combat Command (ACC) is the lead agent for the Air Force’s homeland security CONOPS. Lastly, a pre-identified, standing command element enables the air component to lean forward. Once identified, the COMAFFOR and staff can become experts on the plans and policies affecting operations in the homeland, ones that are substantially different than those impacting traditional operations. Additionally, a standing command element facilitates reduced response times.

In anticipation of being tasked during an actual emergency (under other than immediate response authority situations), commanders can recall personnel, run mobility lines, palletize equipment, and accomplish any other preparatory actions that will minimize the response timeline. Existing rules prohibit actual deployment of personnel until a formal request has been made, unless an immediate response resulting from a civil emergency or attack is required to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage.

Two-and-a-half years ago, our nation saw war and grief arrive on a quiet September morning. From that day to this, we have pursued a clear strategy: We are taking the offensive against the terrorists abroad.

—President George W. Bush
National Response Plan (NRP)

The NRP recognizes the dynamic nature of emergency situations and identifies the best way to integrate local, state, and federal actions. Many incidents begin as local events and the first responders are normally local medical, law enforcement, and firefighting personnel. If the situation overwhelms local capabilities, it escalates to the state government level. Depending on the nature of the event, DOD agencies may be receiving information on the evolving crisis; planning begins if a request for assistance (RFA) is expected. Also at this stage the federal government may send a response team to assist the state and local agencies with the crisis. *Because of legal considerations, federal assets are not normally used to help control the emergency until authorized by the President in the form of an emergency declaration.* Once the President authorizes employment of assets to respond, federal agencies have explicit permission to expend funds. For example, the DOD in partnership with the Department of Veterans Affairs, DHS, and the Department of Health and Human Services comprise the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). Upon activation of the NDMS, the DOD will provide available resources for patient movement and reception, and definitive medical care. The NDMS will be used for the purpose of saving lives and minimizing human suffering.

The NRP outlines how the federal government implements the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (usually referred to as the Stafford Act), as amended, to assist state, local, and tribal governments when a major disaster or emergency overwhelms their ability to respond effectively to save lives; protect public health, safety, and property; and restore their communities.

As a crisis unfolds it may become apparent that state and local civil capabilities will be exceeded and federal government involvement may be warranted. The PFO normally establishes a joint field office (JFO) to manage operations. From a military perspective, geographic combatant commanders continuously monitor their AORs and if they believe military forces may be needed they begin crisis action planning for response options. During the planning phase, the combatant commander may authorize military liaisons to deploy to the incident area. The combatant commander may also alert forces to prepare to deploy. The deployed liaisons advise the civil authorities on potential capabilities. Generally speaking, the intent of the Stafford Act is to restrict expenditure of federal funds until a declaration by the President and thus any costs incurred by DOD agencies prior to this declaration will not be reimbursed. The conduit for the PFO to do a formal RFA of DOD capabilities is the JDOMS who will staff the request through the DOD ExecSec for SecDef approval.

*The on-scene civil authorities in the JFO have available a single point of contact to the DOD, the DCO.* Historically, the DCO and staff (defense coordinating element which includes Service EPLOs) are embedded in the JFO, which contends with the consequences of an event. Led by the FBI, the joint operations center (JOC) is the focal point for all federal investigative law enforcement activities during a terrorist or potential terrorist incident or any other significant criminal incident. Currently the only
DOD representation at the JOC is in the consequence management cell. *Every effort should be made to get Air Force representation in the operations cell of the JOC.* If Air Force forces are likely to be needed, then an Air Force EPLO would be used. AFNSEP tracks the availability and expertise of the EPLOs and is the mechanism for activating and deploying them upon direction of the associated combatant command. For further information, see AFI 10-802, *Military Support to Civil Authorities*, and AFI 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management Planning and Operations*.

Once a JTF is established, Air Force forces deployed to the crisis should be organized like any other Air Force task force, that is, as an AETF, and the COMAFFOR should be given OPCON of Air Force forces.

**Immediate Response**

Imminently serious conditions resulting from any civil emergency or attack may require immediate action by military commanders or by responsible officials of other DOD agencies to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate great property damage. *When such conditions exist and time does not permit prior approval from higher headquarters, local military commanders and responsible officials of other DOD components are authorized to take necessary action to respond to requests of civil authorities, with follow-on reporting up the appropriate command chain as soon as practicable.*

There are steps that installation commanders can take to minimize the timeline for responding when requested. During planning, key installation personnel should become familiar with the layout of the communities that surround the installation, the hazards to Air Force personnel, and the type of support that may be required. All homeland installations should have some kind of MOA with the local community to address the possibility of an incident. Major accident response exercises can be tailored to include local DSCA. See AFI 10-2501 for full spectrum threat response off-base exercise and coordination requirements with local communities.

**Initial Response**

The formal request for assistance process takes time. From the moment the initial request is sent to the DOD until military forces are on scene, critical time elapses that may result in extensive human suffering and property damage. There are actions the component commanders can take in the interim. *The commanders of AFNORTH (1 AF) and PACAF are dual-hatted as component commanders and the Air Force regional planning agents for DSCA in their respective combatant commanders’ AORs.* The respective AFNORTH (1 AF) and PACAF staff expertise and designated operations centers play a central role in providing component-level initial support to civil authorities.

In general, to execute a component-level initial response effort, the regional planning agents should:
Quickly establish lines of communication to facilitate requests for assistance, as well as coordinate with the respective combatant commander and civil authorities.

Determine appropriate Air Force support and response capabilities.

Perform risk management evaluation categorizing hazards and assigning risk controls to the appropriate level of leadership.

Source Air Force assets.

Establish lines of command and control for Air Force forces.

Plan for the efficient hand-off to follow-on forces.

**Incident Management Actions**

When the SecDef approves use of military forces to aid in a domestic incident, the corresponding combatant command will establish a command structure to conduct the response, incorporating the appropriate Air Force response forces and capabilities. Air Force organizations use the IMS structure to organize response forces for compatibility and integration with domestic response organization incident management systems. As the operation progresses, military forces will get direction from civil authorities on how to respond; this will continue until the emergency subsides. Air Force forces should normally be used for what they are trained: civil engineering personnel can be used to help move rubble in a natural disaster, medical professionals can treat the sick and wounded, airlift forces can be used to transport humanitarian supplies, and other forces can provide support in their areas of expertise.

**Support To Civilian Law Enforcement**

The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) restricts direct military involvement for law enforcement purposes, except as authorized by Congress and the United States Constitution (see Appendix A), called military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA). *If Air Force forces are used in a law enforcement role they must be in compliance with public law.* Normally Air Force force protection forces, such as Security Forces and AFOSI, will be called on for their expertise and the tactical level employment of these forces should be in accordance with their training.
Oklahoma City Bombing

The bomb detonated outside the Alfred Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995, resulted in 167 dead, 467 injured, and 2 missing. No warning preceded the attack. The event highlighted the ability to provide technical support on extremely short notice in support of civil authorities. Fort Sill dispatched two medical evacuation helicopters and Tinker Air Force Base deployed a 66-person rescue squad. Under his immediate response authority, the Secretary of the Army directed the director of military support (DOMS, now joint director of military support) to stand up the 24-hour crisis action team one hour after the explosion and sent a liaison officer to FEMA headquarters. DOD ultimately provided technical support and equipment to many agencies including the FBI and FEMA.

DOMS received its first request for assistance three hours after the bombing, when FEMA requested transportation for an urban search and rescue team from Phoenix. An airborne C–141 from McChord Air Force Base was diverted to Luke Air Force Base to provide the airlift. After the presidential emergency declaration later in the day, DOMS staffed and issued an execute order tasking US Atlantic Command as the supported combatant commander. The DCO and the nucleus of the defense coordinating element were on scene eight hours after the blast and began coordinating all on-site requirements for support. Although the last formal request for support was received on April 29, DOD continued to assist in rescue and law enforcement efforts until the end of May. The peak strength reached 1,002 personnel and included a large amount of aviation and ground transport, specialized equipment with operators, and life support items. In addition to officially tasked military personnel, numerous volunteers of all professions and skills from Tinker, Altus, and Vance Air Force Bases also helped. In particular, firefighters, readiness troops, and readiness personnel helped organize support for search and recovery efforts.

—Various Sources
In addition, law enforcement agencies may frequently request a variety of reconnaissance capabilities. For instance, the DOD supported the FBI with reconnaissance assets during the Washington, DC, sniper shootings in 2002. Reconnaissance is an area in which the DOD has a tremendous capability edge over civilian agencies. While there are legal implications requiring thorough legal reviews before committing reconnaissance assets, their employment need not be prohibited. Figure 3.2 outlines potential command relationships for a single Service task force oriented around reconnaissance capabilities.

**National Special Security Events (NSSE)**

Terrorist attacks against highly visible, well-attended events can have a significant impact on our country because of the physical and psychological damage. When designated by the National Security Council, in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 62 (PDD 62), *Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Americans Overseas*, these events are called national special security events (NSSE). Examples include the State of the Union Address and national political party conventions. PDD 62 reaffirms the domestic lead agencies and their responsibilities. It outlines the roles and responsibilities of other federal agencies, including the Public Health Service, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Energy, the FBI, the US Secret Service, FEMA, and others. *Air Force forces can provide a wide range of support, such as assisting in command and control, air patrols, medical support, military working dogs, logistical support, and response if a*
crisis occurs. Many of the NSSE are vulnerable to air threats, so an air sovereignty mission is expected. NSSE are an example of where a JTF structure has proven successful within the NRP construct.

**Critical Infrastructure**

Certain infrastructure within the United States is critical to the defense and normal function of the nation. If this infrastructure were disrupted by a man-made or natural disaster, it could cause grave damage. Examples include national missile defense sites, the National Capital Region, and electrical generation plants. DOD can be called on to help protect such installations from attack and to respond if a disaster occurs. An analysis of the nation’s vulnerabilities in this area is extremely sensitive and highly classified. The Air Force must be prepared in case it is called on to detect, preempt, respond to, mitigate, and recover from any potential threat to the nation’s critical infrastructure.

**Military Assistance For Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)**

The Insurrection Act is an exception to the normal prohibition of military forces performing direct law enforcement duties in the civilian communities. Under certain conditions the President may invoke this act to send in DOD forces to help control a situation, referred to as MACDIS. If Air Force forces are sent in, they should normally be trained and equipped to handle civil disturbances and operate under very specific rules of engagement. Since National Guard forces in state status and under the control of a governor do not have the same restrictions (for Posse Comitatus Act purposes) as active duty forces, they could be the force of choice.
THE INTERAGENCY ENVIRONMENT

When a domestic incident occurs many federal, state, and local agencies will be involved, and Air Force forces must be aware of the different agencies to facilitate an effective and efficient mission. With the exception of HD missions, a civilian agency will be in charge of the incident and military assistance will be similar to a direct support role.

Federal Agencies

The primary agency involved in almost all domestic incidents is DHS and its Directorate of Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R). Within this directorate resides one of the most widely known relief organizations in the United States, the FEMA.

There are various plans and annexes that outline which agency is in charge of which event, and how the leadership transition from one agency to the other takes place. It is important to understand the policy guidance, particularly because so much of it is evolving rapidly. Air Force advocacy for EPLO representation during the pre-incident phase can overcome this and provide effective Air Force support in the interagency environment during crisis management.

State Agencies

A domestic incident routinely begins as a local level problem and elevates when it cannot be controlled. As such, the initial incident commander may be from the local law enforcement or fire department.
When the problem cannot be controlled at the local level, the state government will get involved with its resources. Each state has a comparable emergency management agency to FEMA to direct a response. Other agencies that could be involved range from state law enforcement to the state agency responsible for natural resources.

A key organization at the state level is the ANG in state, non-federalized Title 32 status. In these cases, the governor is in command of the ANG forces. This creates a seam between Air National Guard forces and active-duty Airmen. To resolve this seam, the governor can grant ‘coordinating authority’ to the active duty commander for unity of effort. Additionally, a state’s Adjutant General can be placed on active duty and simultaneously command active duty forces and their guard forces, if authorized by the President and the governor consents.

**Local Agencies**

At the local level, first responders will include fire, police, and medical personnel. They will initiate the incident command system in accordance with their local procedures. If the situation escalates and requires state or federal support on scene, the respective local, state, and federal chains of command remain separate. Local efforts remain under the control of their local leadership. State efforts are under the control of the governor and federal efforts ultimately fall under the control of the President but they will all work together within the unified management system creating a joint action plan as directed by the national incident management system (NIMS) and the NRP.

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We will eventually see a weapon of mass destruction used in a terrorist act...We had better start thinking about how we’re going to be prepared for that, because we’re woefully unprepared for that event. And that's inevitable, as this asymmetry continues.

—General Anthony C. Zinni, USMC, Ret. Commander in Chief, US Central Command 19 Oct 00, Senate Armed Services Committee, Testimony on USS Cole

**EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES**

The threat to the United States from state and non-state terrorist groups intending to use weapons of mass destruction is quite real, yet difficult to predict. One
of the best ways to prepare in the midst of the uncertainty is through education and training. The United States government is reorganizing federal agencies and departments to provide the most efficient command and control structure for response and mitigation to these events. Prior to the events of 9/11, defense support to civil authorities was predominantly focused and structured for response to natural disasters, such as forest fires, weather phenomena, and earthquakes. The federal, state, and local governments began preparing for large-scale response to weapons of mass destruction in the mid- to late-1990s while the DOD continued to focus on military operations outside the CONUS. Our nation is restructuring federal and military departments to rapidly respond to future attacks involving weapons of mass destruction.

Training Air Force Leaders And Responders

The restructuring of the federal government for response to terrorist events and defense support of civil authorities has generated doctrinal concerns on potential missions and distinctive capabilities the Air Force is best organized and equipped to provide. The unique Air Force capabilities best suited to assist civilian authorities must be provided and managed in a way that merges these assets seamlessly with the civilian command structure. To enhance this transition, Air Force leaders and responders need a firm understanding of the civilian command and control structure and capabilities of local, state, and federal emergency management organizations.

Local, state, and federal emergency management agencies have standard protocols and structures to merge assets and control the response effort. The Air Force uses a command and control system similar to the NIMS, albeit from a military perspective. Air Force responders must understand how to merge into the federal, state, and local organizational structure. Also, staff officers at unified commands, major commands (MAJCOMs), and numbered Air Forces (NAFs) should be knowledgeable about the primary agency and other agencies involved in the federal response effort. This understanding will enhance military planning, command and control, and training functions. Personnel designated to perform, or whose positions may require them to perform, ACCE duties should obtain training commensurate with those responsibilities.

One key to effective training is exercising as comprehensively as possible. It is especially critical that local Air Force installation personnel exercise with the local communities. By exercising at the local level, a better working relationship results and both sides are able to understand capabilities and limitations brought by each.

Who Should Train For Defense Support Of Civil Authorities

Installation first responders, command posts, dispatch centers, specialized teams, personnel assigned to disaster control groups, and installation leadership should receive training on when and how to respond, reporting requirements, and command and control relationships as they relate to the NRP and NIMS. Education and training should also be extended to the units representing those organizations likely to be tasked to support homeland operations.
MAJCOMs and NAFs are tasked with providing command and control assistance to a large Air Force response effort at the federal level. Staff officers performing the planning function, selecting units to deploy in support of AETF taskings, and advising senior commanders on response efforts must know the national response plans and taskings assigned. The Air Force’s EPLOs should be trained to facilitate recovering from a natural or man-made disaster. In addition, they should be familiar with all air and space capabilities relevant to homeland operations.

Headquarters Air Force personnel who formulate guidance and policy for defense support to civil authorities require a firm understanding of the federal strategy and those agencies tasked under federal plans. These staff officers are also responsible for educating the executive staff on appropriate actions and capabilities the Air Force can provide to the response effort.

**What Needs To Be Trained**

Installation disaster response force personnel and commanders should receive training on the national and military response structure. This training is provided by the Civil Engineer under the full spectrum threat response program. See AFI 10-2501 for training requirements. Disaster control group members must understand the role of the FCO, state coordinating officer, DCO, the incident command system, and public affairs considerations. Installation responders must understand the circumstances under which military units provide support to civil authorities, when support should be withdrawn, the reporting requirements to higher headquarters, and validation procedures for requests from FCOs and state officials. Training must be provided on how DSCA taskings will be processed through the regional planning agents, Air and Space Expeditionary Force (AEF) Center, and the Air Force command and control structure for responding units. Installation planners require training in the NRP, regional disaster assistance plans, and city and county emergency response plans in the vicinity of the installation.

MAJCOM and NAF staffs require training on the national homeland security structure, agencies at Headquarters Air Force responsible for developing Air Force homeland security policy, the federal response system to include roles of federal agencies and key participants, legal aspects of providing military support in civilian jurisdictions, AETF deployment structure for DSCA, and military capabilities most likely to be requested.

Members of the Air Force operations center and appropriate Headquarters Air Force personnel require education on the NRP; Air Force, USNORTHCOM, and USPACOM plans outlining response taskings; federal response structure to include command and control; interagency processes for decision making; federal agency taskings; role of the Department of Homeland Security; and how to evaluate requests based on legality, lethality, risk, cost, appropriateness, and readiness of forces to accomplish the mission.
Who Are The Trainers

City and state first responders and emergency managers receive training from a consortium of federal and state institutions (e.g., DOD, DOJ, DHS [FEMA], etc.) to prepare responders and decision-makers for dealing with the myriad of considerations involved in response to CBRNE events. These courses are also available to military personnel.

The Air Force education and training system is organized to provide training to five distinct groups: officer/enlisted accessions, developmental education, operational training (Air Force specialty training), special schools, and ancillary training to meet functional mission training. This Service education and training should take Air Force response capabilities for support of homeland operations into consideration when developing curricula.

At the very Heart of Warfare lies Doctrine...
**SUGGESTED READINGS**

**Air Force Doctrine Documents**
(Note: All Air Force doctrine documents are available on the Air Force Doctrine Center web page at [https://www.doctrine.af.mil](https://www.doctrine.af.mil))

AFDD 1, *Air Force Basic Doctrine*
AFDD 2, *Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power*
AFDD 2-1.1, *Counterair Operations*
AFDD 2-1.8, *Counter-Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Conventional Operations*
AFDD 2-9, *Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Operations*

**Air Force Publications**
AFPD 10-8, *Homeland Security*
AFPD 10-24, *Air Force Critical Infrastructure Program*
AFPD 10-25, *Full Spectrum Threat Response*
AFPD 10-27, *Civil Air Patrol*
AFPD 90-9, *Operational Risk Management*
AFI 10-208, *Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program*
AFI 10-245, *Air Force Antiterrorism Standards*
AFI 10-401, *Air Force Planning and Execution*
AFI 10-801, *Assistance to Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies*
AFI 10-802, *Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)*
AFI 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management Planning and Operations*
AFI 10-2701, *Organization and Function of the Civil Air Patrol*
AFI 90-901, *Operational Risk Management*
AFTTP(I) 3-2.34, *Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Risk Management*
CONOPS for Air Force Homeland Security ([available on the AF/XO website at](https://www.xo.hq.af.mil/xor/taskforce/hlsrefdocs.htm))
The Air Force General Counsel Guidance Document, Posse Comitatus
USAF Plan 55-2, DOD Civil Disturbance Plan (GARDEN PLOT)

**Joint Publications**
JP 3-01.1, Aerospace Defense of North America
JP 3-07.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism
JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations
JP 3-11, Joint Doctrine for Operations in Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Environments
JP 3-26, Joint Doctrine for Homeland Security
JP 3-61, Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs

**Department of Defense Publications**
DODD 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism Program
DODD 2000.16, DOD Antiterrorism Standards
DODD 2020.26, Defense Continuity Program (DCP)
DODD 3020, Defense Critical Infrastructure Program
DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities
DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances (MACDIS)
DODD 3025.13, Employment of DOD Resources in Support of the US Secret Service
DODD 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities
DODD 3150.5, DOD Response to Improvised Nuclear Device (IND) Incidents
DODD 3150.8, DOD Response to Radiological Accidents
DODD 4000.19, InterService, Interdepartmental, and Interagency Support
DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement
DODD 6010.22, National Disaster Medical System
DODI 2000.18, Department Of Defense Installation Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive Emergency Response Guidelines
DODR 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons
Other Publications

Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, 6 Feb 06
Department of Defense, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, Jun 05
Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz memorandum, Preparedness of US Military Installation and Facilities Worldwide Against Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Attack, 5 Sep 02
EO 12333, United States Intelligence Activities
EO 13354, National Counterterrorism Center
House of Representatives, A Failure of Initiative: The Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina
HSPD-5, Management of Domestic Incidents
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
National Response Plan
PDD-39, United States Policy on Counter-Terrorism
White House, Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned

Chief of Staff of the Air Force Reading List

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force Reading List is available for review at: http://www.af.mil/csareading/
Whenever and wherever DOD forces are employed they will comply with the laws of the nation; this takes on added significance for operations in the homeland. This appendix discusses two general points regarding homeland operations and the law. In addition, a brief description of pertinent laws and policies is also included.

First is the overall legal framework affecting the application of air and space power in the homeland. There are restrictions on using the military to collect intelligence in the homeland. As a general rule, DOD assets cannot be used to collect intelligence on US citizens. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 provides additional information. Exceptions to FISA are routed through the FBI to the FISA Court. In addition, there are restrictions on using the military for direct law enforcement duties in the civilian community, with exceptions. Some examples include the President’s ability to invoke the Insurrection Act if needed and legislation permitting some use of the military in direct law enforcement roles to counter the influx of illegal narcotics.

Second is the law and its impact on potential financial reimbursement to the DOD. When managing the consequences of an event, the states normally exercise primacy over domestic incidents and only when they ask for federal assistance, or in extraordinary circumstances does the federal government get involved. The request process is key for the military because a formal request by the state followed by Presidential approval is necessary for the military Services to get financially reimbursed. More information can be found in the Stafford Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 5121 et seq.).

Because of the legal and policy complexities, prompt and frequent consultations with military legal experts are among the most important considerations in planning for and employing military assets. The homeland legal environment is very complex and dynamic. Legal experts can help.

Legal Sources for Homeland Operations

**Anti-Deficiency Act (ADA), 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341-42, 1511-19:** The ADA generally prohibits the obligation or expenditure of appropriated funds in advance of, or in excess of, an appropriation by Congress.

**Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2367:** Requires DOD coordination with WMD response agencies. Authorizes DOD support to DOJ when the SecDef and Attorney General jointly determine that a WMD threat exists and civil authorities lack sufficient capabilities.

**Economy Act, 31 U.S.C. § 1535:** This act governs transfer of material between executive branch agencies within the federal government. The Economy Act does not
apply to the transfer of material to non-federal law enforcement agencies (LEAs). Reimbursement to the DOD from non-federal agencies is authorized under 10 U.S.C. § 377 to the extent such would be authorized under The Economy Act.

**Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities:** The national security emergency preparedness policy of the United States is to have sufficient capabilities at all levels of government to meet essential defense and civilian needs during any national security emergency. A national security emergency is any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, terrorist attack, technological emergency, or other emergency that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the national security of the United States.

**Executive Order 13228, Establishing the Office of Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council:** The Office of Homeland Security is headed by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. Its mission is to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks. The office coordinates the executive branch’s efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attack within the United States.

**Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978 and Amendments, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq.:** FISA establishes a legal framework for foreign intelligence surveillance separate from ordinary law enforcement surveillance. It is aimed at regulating the collection of foreign intelligence information in furtherance of US counterintelligence, while protecting the privacy interests of United States citizens. Under FISA, surveillance is generally permitted based on a finding of probable cause that the surveillance target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power; in these cases, specific procedural processes must be adhered to.

**Homeland Security Act (HSA) of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.:** HSA establishes the Department of Homeland Security by combining and consolidating previously existing agencies, such as the Coast Guard, Transportation Security Administration, Secret Service, Customs, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, under one department. The DHS mission is to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States; reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that occur within the United States. DHS also has responsibility for investigating and prosecuting terrorism.

**Insurrection Statutes, 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-334:** These statutes authorize the use of military forces, by presidential order in response to civil disturbances, including rebellion, insurgency, insurrection, or domestic violence such that the state authorities cannot or will not enforce state or federal law. The Insurrection Statutes permit the President to use federal forces in response to a request from a state or territory, to enforce federal authority, or to protect Constitutional rights. (See DODD 3025.12, Military Assistance with Civil Disturbances)
Military Cooperation With Civilian Law Enforcement Officials, 10 U.S.C. §§ 371-382: These sections authorize support to civilian LEA and deal with the use of military information, equipment, facilities, and personnel.

Military Information: Information collected during the normal course of military operations may be forwarded to federal, state, or local LEA if the information is relevant to a violation of criminal law. While the needs of the LEA may be considered when scheduling routine missions, missions may not be planned for the primary purpose of aiding LEA. (See DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials)

Intelligence: The USA Patriot Act removed some of the legal obstacles to the sharing of information between law enforcement and intelligence components. Intelligence is a specialized activity that is governed by multiple Congressional statutes, Executive Orders (EO), and DOD Directives. (See EO 12333, United States Intelligence Activities; DODD 5240.1, DOD Intelligence Activities; DOD 5440.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons; and AFI 14-104, Oversight of Intelligence Activities)

Military Equipment and Facilities: Military equipment and facilities may be made available to LEAs, subject to certain restrictions. (See DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials) Generally, military working dogs can be used to support civilian LEAs. (See AFI 31-202, Military Working Dog Program)

Military Personnel: Except when authorized by statute or the Constitution, direct participation by military personnel in the execution or enforcement of the law is prohibited. Prohibited activities include interdiction, searches and seizures, arrests, and surveillance activities. Generally, the Air Force will not provide advanced military training to civilian law enforcement agencies. Permissible training includes basic marksmanship, patrolling, mission planning, medical, and survival skills. (See DODD 5525.5, DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials)

National Defense Authorization Acts: Since 1991, Congress has annually renewed military support for counterdrug operations. Under this, the SecDef may authorize support to federal, state, local, or foreign LEAs if requested. Types of support include maintenance and repair of DOD equipment, transportation of personnel and supplies for the purpose of facilitating counterdrug activities, counterdrug training activities, aerial and ground reconnaissance, and provision of support for command and control networks. 10 U.S.C. § 124 makes the DOD the lead federal agency for the detection and monitoring of aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States. 32 U.S.C. § 112 authorizes certain federal funding for the state counterdrug activities of the National Guard.
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651: This act establishes a process for presidential declarations of emergencies. These declarations must be published in the Federal Register and Congress must review declarations every six months. Congress is also able to terminate these declarations. This act does not impact the President’s Constitutional authority.

Posse Comitatus Act (PCA), 18 U.S.C. § 1385: The PCA prohibits the use of the Army or the Air Force for law enforcement purposes, except as authorized by Congress and the United States Constitution. This prohibition applies to Navy and Marine Corps personnel as a matter of DOD policy. Prohibited direct support includes arrests, searches, and seizures as well as subjecting civilians to compulsory, prescriptive military service. The PCA does not apply to National Guard units in non-federal status.

Military Purpose: The PCA does not prohibit direct support to law enforcement agencies if the primary purpose is to further a military or foreign affairs function of the United States. Actions that serve a primarily military purpose include investigations taken pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) or other military administrative proceedings, and actions taken pursuant to a commander’s inherent authority to protect military personnel, property, or guests, or to maintain order on an installation.

Emergency Authority: The PCA does not prohibit direct support in emergency situations when the action is taken under the inherent right of the United States to preserve order and carry out government operations. During sudden or unexpected emergencies, responsible DOD officials or commanders may approve the use of military forces in a law enforcement capacity in order to prevent the loss of life or the wanton destruction of property, or to restore governmental functioning or order. This “immediate response” authority should be used with great caution and in extremely unusual situations.

Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121 et seq. [Stafford Act]: The statutory authority for federal disaster assistance. The Act provides procedures for declaring an emergency or major disaster, as well as the type and amount of federal assistance available. The Act authorizes the President to provide DOD assets for relief once a disaster is declared. After a presidential determination is made, DOD may use resources to “save lives, protect property,” and avert future threats (See DODD 3025.1, Military Support to Civilian Authorities).
APPENDIX B

NOTIONAL SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR DEFENSE SUPPORT OF CIVIL AUTHORITIES

- Ongoing emergency preparedness actions take place day-to-day (e.g., Air Force weather forces monitoring hurricane status)
- Emergency event occurs—may be natural or man-made.
- Local responders converge at disaster scene and take command of response.
- DHS and DOD (JDOMS) become aware of the event and begin planning in case called upon to respond; AFNORTH and PACAF (as applicable), the Air Force Operations Center, and AFNSEP also become aware of the emergency.
- If disaster is potentially man-made and a crime may have been committed, then DOJ may begin planning.
- Local responders recognize scope of event is beyond their capability and the state government becomes involved.
- DHS, DOD, and DOJ (if appropriate) may send liaison officers to the scene to advise the on-scene officers and prepare for federal response if needed.
- AFNSEP sources Air Force EPLOs.
- State authorities recognize scope of event is beyond their capability and request federal assistance through the President.
- A presidential declaration is made, specific involvement of federal agencies is approved.
- DHS designates a principal federal officer.
- DOD through JDOMS and, in turn, through USNORTHCOM/USPACOM designates a DCO.
- DOD forces identified to assist are approved through JDOMS.
- The AEF Center identifies Air Force forces.
- If Air Force forces are tasked to assist, every effort should be made to present these forces as an AETF through a COMAFFOR to the JTF commander. The COMAFFOR should be given OPCON of Air Force forces.
Upon declaration of completion of the civil support efforts by the JTF commander, DOD forces will redeploy to their home stations.
APPENDIX C

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

SEC. 202. Continuity of Government. The head of each federal department and agency shall ensure the continuity of essential functions in any national security emergency by providing for: succession to office and emergency delegation of authority in accordance with applicable law; safekeeping of essential resources, facilities, and records; and establishment of emergency operating capabilities.

—Executive Order 12656 Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities

The Air Force has a significant role in the process of preparing for national emergencies. One critical task is planning to assist in the continuity of government at the federal level. The Air Force currently has plans for continuity of operations, and the events of 9/11 demonstrated the necessity of those plans. The Air Force also has a significant input into the threat assessment process. The structure for this is illustrated in Figure C.1, from continuity of operations (COOP), to continuity of government (COG), supporting our enduring Constitutional government (ECG).

Figure C.1. Emergency Preparedness Structure

The SecDef Report to Congress cites several examples of emergency preparedness: “Examples of these emergency preparedness activities include: continuity of operations; continuity of government; conducting threat assessments; assisting federal, state, and local authorities in developing or enhancing their own strategic planning capabilities; and exporting the Department’s risk management approaches and methodologies to interested homeland security stakeholders. These activities also include, to the extent feasible and practicable, preparation for the provision of extraordinary civil support that may be required in the event of a devastating attack on the US. DOD is in support of a lead agency for all emergency preparedness activities other than those related to DOD continuity of operations.”
At the installation level, upgraded emergency preparedness planning and training is coupled with active force protection actions, including counterterrorism, antiterrorism, critical infrastructure protection, mission assurance, and information assurance, for Air Force infrastructure and personnel to both instill solid passive defense measures and allow a coordinated approach to installation and community protection. Combining these protection measures with the Air Force incident management system and continuity of operations planning will give local base offices the tools to maintain or seize the initiative after attack. For the longer term, networks of DOD installations will be integrated into the local community’s preparation and response scheme with rapid detection, response, and incident management capabilities.

Life Cycle of Incident Management

Understanding the elements of incident management helps the Air Force to better prepare for contingencies and plan for integrating its capabilities with civilian capabilities:

- **Awareness** is the continuous collection and analysis of intelligence, information, and knowledge.
- **Prevention** refers to actions to avoid an incident through sound application of risk management methodologies.
- **Preparedness** is a continuous process of improving performance.
- **Response** refers to the actions needed to address the immediate and short-term effects.
- **Recovery** refers to the actions needed to bring the community back to normal.

The Air Force full spectrum threat response program, outlined in AFI 10-2501, *Air Force Emergency Management Planning and Operations*, is the single integrated program used by the Air Force to address the full spectrum of physical risks, threats, mitigation strategies, crisis and consequence management activities, and passive defense activities and measures.

**CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS (COOP)**

DOD-level policies mandate COOP plans be developed and maintained to ensure essential functions continue unabated during national emergencies. These plans must integrate with, and are required to support, overarching and enduring constitutional government, continuity of the presidency, and continuity of government programs. Current guidelines require an “all hazards” approach to continuity planning covering any contingency, from natural or man-made disasters to a general nuclear war. COOP plans support COG and enduring Constitutional government programs.
Historical events indicate the disruption of Air Force operations is a distinct possibility. Survival of the Air Force is critical to the defense of the nation. As such it is crucial that each echelon of the Air Force understand its role in supporting Air Force mission essential functions. All Airmen should be prepared and know what actions to take when COOP is implemented.

AFI 10-208, *Continuity of Operations (COOP) Program*, provides guidance for developing programs to ensure continuity of essential operations of the Air Force during an impending or actual national emergency. Headquarters Air Force, major commands, direct reporting units, and field operating agencies must possess a comprehensive and effective COOP program. All Air Force organizations must develop plans to ensure continuity of its essential functions, including alert and notification of personnel, movement of key people, and operational capability. COOP planning is best maintained by developing an integrated plan and solution among all efforts that ensure continuity of missions. These include force protection, information assurance, counterterrorism, antiterrorism, mission assurance, critical infrastructure protection, and others.

**CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT**

Presidential Executive Order 12656, Section 202, *Continuity of Government*, states: “The head of each federal department and agency shall ensure the continuity of essential functions in any national security emergency by providing for: succession to office and emergency delegation of authority.” The DOD develops plans and policies to support the continuity of government functions. Various Air Force organizations may be called upon to support COG planning and execution initiatives. The Air Force provides airlift support to the President and other senior government officials to support COG. These plans are tiered to support the overarching program of ECG.
GLOSSARY

Abbreviations and Acronyms

ACC       Air Combat Command
ACCE      air component coordination element
ADA       Anti-Deficiency Act
ADCON     administrative control
AED       air expeditionary detachment
AEF       air and space expeditionary force
AEFC      Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center
AEG       air expeditionary group
AES       air expeditionary squadron
AEW       air expeditionary wing
AETF      air and space expeditionary task force
AFAUX     Air Force Auxiliary
AFI       Air Force instruction
AFNSEP    Air Force National Security Emergency Preparedness Agency
AFOSI     Air Force Office of Special Investigations
AFPD      Air Force policy directive
AFRC      Air Force Reserve Command
AFSOC     Air Force Special Operations Command
AMC       Air Mobility Command
AMD       air mobility division
ANG       Air National Guard
ANR       Alaska NORAD Region
AOC       air and space operations center
AOR       area of responsibility
CAOC-A    combined air and space operations center-Alaska
C2        command and control
CAP       Civil Air Patrol
CBRNE     chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high yield explosives
CCDR      combatant commander
CDRUSNORTHCOM commander, United States Northern Command
CDRUSPACOM commander, United States Pacific Command
CIA       Central Intelligence Agency
CJCS      Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI     Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CM        consequence management
COCOM     combatant command (command authority)
COG       continuity of government
COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces
CONOPS concept of operations
CONR continental United States NORAD region
CONUS continental United States
COOP continuity of operations
COP common operating picture
DCA defensive counterair
defense coordinating element
defense coordinating officer
DDAT/HD Joint Staff Deputy Directorate of Antiterrorism and Homeland Defense
DHHS Department of Health and Human Services
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DIA Defense Intelligence Agency
DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DOE Department of Energy
DOJ Department of Justice
DOMS Director of Military Support
DOT Department of Transportation
DSCA defense support of civil authorities
ECG enduring constitutional government
ECS expeditionary combat support
EO executive order
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EP emergency preparedness
EP&R emergency preparedness and response
EPA Environmental Protection Agency
EPLO emergency preparedness liaison officer
ExecSec Executive Secretary
EXORD execution order
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCO federal coordinating officer
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FISA Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
FP CON force protection condition
GWOT global war on terrorism
HD homeland defense
HQ headquarters
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HS</td>
<td>homeland security</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSA</td>
<td>Homeland Security Act</td>
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<td>HSPD</td>
<td>homeland security presidential directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMS</td>
<td>incident management system</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
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<tr>
<td>JDOMS</td>
<td>joint directorate of military support</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>joint force air component commander (JP 1-02), joint force air and space component commander (USAF)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFHQ-NCR</td>
<td>Joint Force Headquarters, National Capital Region</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFO</td>
<td>joint field office</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>joint information center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JITF-CT</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Task Force for Counterterrorism</td>
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<tr>
<td>JOC</td>
<td>joint operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-AK</td>
<td>Joint Task Force-Alaska</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF-CS</td>
<td>Joint Task Force-Civil Support</td>
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<tr>
<td>LE</td>
<td>law enforcement</td>
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<tr>
<td>LEA</td>
<td>law enforcement agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>LFA</td>
<td>lead federal agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>MACDIS</td>
<td>military assistance for civil disturbances</td>
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<td>MAJCOM</td>
<td>major command</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>memorandum of agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSCLEA</td>
<td>military support to civilian law enforcement agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSLE</td>
<td>military support to law enforcement</td>
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<td>NAF</td>
<td>numbered Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>NBC</td>
<td>nuclear, biological, chemical</td>
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<td>NCTC</td>
<td>National Counterterrorism Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>NDMS</td>
<td>National Disaster Medical System</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIMS</td>
<td>national incident management system</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORAD</td>
<td>North American Aerospace Defense Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NORTHAF</td>
<td>Northern Air Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>NRP</td>
<td>National Response Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>NSHS</td>
<td>National Strategy for Homeland Security</td>
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<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
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<td>NSSE</td>
<td>national special security event</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPR</td>
<td>office of primary responsibility</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORM</td>
<td>operational risk management</td>
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<tr>
<td>PACAF</td>
<td>Pacific Air Forces</td>
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<td>PCA</td>
<td>Posse Comitatus Act</td>
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<td>PDD</td>
<td>Presidential decision directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>PFA</td>
<td>primary federal agency</td>
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<td>PFO</td>
<td>principal federal official</td>
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<tr>
<td>PTDO</td>
<td>prepare to deploy order</td>
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<tr>
<td>QRT</td>
<td>quick reaction team</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFA</td>
<td>request for assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTF</td>
<td>response task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>state coordinating officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDIS</td>
<td>satellite digital imaging system</td>
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<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>SSTF</td>
<td>single Service task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACC</td>
<td>tanker airlift control center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAG</td>
<td>the adjutant general</td>
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<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>TFC</td>
<td>task force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTIC</td>
<td>Terrorist Threat Integration Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>UAV</td>
<td>unmanned aerial vehicle</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCMJ</td>
<td>Uniform Code of Military Justice</td>
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<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAFE</td>
<td>United States Air Forces in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNORTHCOM</td>
<td>United States Northern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States ship</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UTC</td>
<td>unit type code</td>
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WMD

weapons of mass destruction

Definitions

**Airman.** Any US Air Force member (officer or enlisted, active, reserve, or guard, along with Department of the Air Force civilians) who supports and defends the US Constitution and serves our country. Air Force Airmen are those people who formally belong to the US Air Force and employ or support some aspect of the US Air Force’s air and space power capabilities. The term Airman is often used in a very narrow sense to mean pilot. An Airman is any person who understands and appreciates the full range of air and space power capabilities and can employ or support some aspect of air and space power capabilities. (AFDD 1-1)

**air sovereignty.** A nation's inherent right to exercise absolute control and authority over the airspace above its territory. (JP 1-02)

**area of responsibility.** The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. (JP 1-02)

**combatant command (command authority).** Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. See also combatant commander; operational control; tactical control. (JP 1-02)

**combatant commander.** A commander of one of the unified or specified combatant commands established by the President. Also called CCDR. See also combatant command. (JP 1-02)

**consequence management.** Those measures taken to protect public health
and safety, restore essential government services, and provide emergency relief to governments, businesses, and individuals affected by the consequences of a chemical, biological, nuclear, and/or high-yield explosive situation. For domestic consequence management, the primary authority rests with the states to respond and the federal government to provide assistance as required. (JP 1-02)

**continuity of operations.** The degree or state of being continuous in the conduct of functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission in carrying out the national military strategy. It includes the functions and duties of the commander, as well as the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and others acting under the authority and direction of the commander. (JP 1-02)

**crisis management.** Measures to resolve a hostile situation and investigate and prepare a criminal case for prosecution under federal law. Crisis management will include a response to an incident involving a weapon of mass destruction, special improvised explosive device, or a hostage crisis that is beyond the capability of the lead federal agency. (JP 1-02)

**full spectrum threat response program.** The single, integrated Air Force program to address the full spectrum of physical risks, threats, mitigation strategies, and passive defense measures. The primary missions of the Air Force full spectrum threat response program are to 1) save lives, 2) minimize the loss or degradation of resources, and 3) continue, sustain, and restore combat and combat support operational capability in an “all hazards” physical threat environment at Air force installations worldwide. The ancillary missions of the full spectrum threat response program are to support Department of Defense homeland defense operations and to provide military support to civil and host nation authorities in accordance with Department of Defense directives and through the appropriate combatant command. The full spectrum threat response program is managed by the office of the Civil Engineer, HQ USAF/ILE. Also called FSTR. (AFI 10-2501)

**homeland defense.** The protection of U.S. territory, sovereignty, domestic population, and critical infrastructure against external threats and aggression. Also called HD. (Definition will be incorporated into JP 3-26 upon its approval)

**homeland security.** A concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within the United States, reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. Also called HS. (National Strategy for Homeland Security)

**operational control.** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between
combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will
eexercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be
specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to
perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving
organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating
objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the
mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of
military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned
to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the
commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised
through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional
component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to
organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in
operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does
not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of
administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called
OPCON. See also combatant command (command authority). (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains
another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that
helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects,
or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

weapons of mass destruction. Weapons that are capable of a high order of
destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers
of people. Weapons of mass destruction can be high explosives or nuclear,
biological, chemical, and radiological weapons, but exclude the means of
transporting or propelling the weapon where such means is a separable and
divisible part of the weapon. (JP 1-02)