National security strategy
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Foreword by the Prime Minister

When the Government took office almost two years ago, it was with a clear mandate to tackle Sweden’s internal and external security. When our freedom and openness are threatened by hostile powers – within and beyond our national borders – no task is more important.

In the foreseeable future, every Swedish Government will need to set the same priorities as we are doing now, because we are currently facing different times compared to when the previous national security strategy was presented in 2017. Not only in Sweden, but also in Europe and all over the world.

There are two obvious threats that affect our choices for Swedish security and freedom. The first is the war. The second is crime.

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Sweden and many other countries woke up to a new security reality. We are currently in the most serious security situation since the Second World War. The return of big power politics, as evidenced by a number of authoritarian states, is a threat to the world order that has created decades of peace and prosperity.

At the same time, organised crime that poses a systemic threat has emerged in the shadows. With every shooting and bombing, our open society risks becoming a little more closed. With every innocent bystander who falls victim to gang violence, everyone’s freedom is curtailed.

Lethal violence is an obvious threat to the physical safety and security of all people. But the threat is even greater than this. Parallel societies threaten our institutions and challenge our democracy. We have previously seen links between organised crime and violent extremism. We are now also seeing criminal gang members recruited by foreign state actors and used as proxies to commit acts of violence and other forms of activity that threaten security in Sweden and other countries in Europe.

This makes one thing explicitly clear: internal and external security are interlinked. In reality, not being able to address both means having no redress at all. Without a concerted response, Sweden will remain vulnerable. The Government has both the insight and the will to act. Our ambition is as clear as the mandate we were given: we will make Sweden freer and more secure, regardless of where the threats come from. This national security strategy is a contribution to these efforts. In practice, we are doing this in a number of different ways.
We are doing it by supporting Ukraine for as long as it takes. Because it is morally right, but also because the Ukrainian front constitutes the first line of defence of our freedom as well. What happens there will have consequences here for a long time to come.

We support Ukraine together with our allies, in both the EU and NATO. After more than 200 years of non-participation in military alliances, Sweden has been part of the Western defence community since 7 March 2024. This makes us more secure, while we are also strengthening the Western collective defence. As a member of NATO, Sweden has come home.

We are strengthening Sweden’s defence capability. For the past few years, what we are short on is time rather than resources. The modernisation of the total defence system is taking place unabated. A number of areas of society already have deep insight regarding the need to enhance resilience – insight that needs to be further spread and deepened. That is how we truly build preparedness.

We are implementing a paradigm shift of our efforts against organised crime. We are introducing tougher penalties, substantially increasing resources to the judicial system and giving law enforcement authorities more effective tools. At the same time, we are cracking down on the criminal economy and developing crime prevention efforts to break the trend of children and young people being recruited into criminal networks. Every month, it is becoming more difficult to be a criminal in Sweden.

And we are continuing to strengthen the Swedish economy and the competitiveness of Swedish businesses. This is the foundation of our prosperity and the investments that we now need to make.

When internal and external forces that wish Sweden harm mobilise, all good forces must do the same. And there are many of us who are both eager and determined in these efforts. The Government will do its part. Government agencies, regions and municipalities will do their part. And together with civil society, the business sector and each individual citizen, we will make Sweden freer and more secure.

Stockholm, July 2024
Ulf Kristersson, Prime Minister
Summary

At global level, authoritarian states are aggressively attempting to strengthen their influence and challenge and reshape the rules-based world order. This threatens our security and fundamental values. It also threatens our prosperity, which builds on Sweden's integration in a rules-based global market. Wars and regional conflicts around the world negatively impact Swedish security, including through their influence on trade and global flows.

In Sweden, the open society's institutions are under pressure from several directions, including from violent extremism, terrorism and organised crime. Widespread exclusion in parts of society aggravates these problems. Influence campaigns and disinformation via digital platforms undermine people's trust in government agencies and impact our security. These sources of separatism ultimately threaten interpersonal trust in our society, and they undermine community.

Climate change is already resulting in consequences for our national security. Higher temperatures, rising sea levels and more frequent and extreme weather are threatening settlements, infrastructure, the natural environment and people's lives and health. Conditions for production in green industries and other parts of the business sector will change if access to water is threatened. In the long term, climate change constitutes an existential threat to humanity.

Hostile actors – both state and non-state – are constantly attempting to exploit Swedish society's vulnerabilities in order to achieve their goals. These persistent actions, which undermine our democracy and essential services, can be summarised under the heading of 'hybrid threats'. They include, but are not limited to, cyber attacks, undue influence, economic pressure, sabotage attempts and unlawful intelligence gathering.

The threats to our security that come from abroad and those that come from within Sweden are currently so closely intertwined that the threats make up an inseparable whole. This is due to a number of factors, including the fact that Sweden is so highly internationalised. But it is also due to the fact that hostile actors have become increasingly good at exploiting Swedish society's vulnerabilities.

In the current security situation, the totality of threats facing Sweden is broad and serious. At the same time, Sweden is well-positioned to protect its national security in many respects. In recent years, this position has been tangibly strengthened. Our NATO membership, the modernisation of our total defence, the strengthening of our crisis management capacity and the extensive investments made to fight organised crime and strengthen the integrity of our essential institutions have been crucial to strengthening Sweden's national security.

Through the EU, we are part of a cooperative venture that has been considerably deepened in recent years, in a number of areas of great significance to our security. We have a well-functioning labour market and a strong, internationally competitive business sector that is deeply integrated with the rest of the world. Sweden is a leading nation in knowledge and research in a number of ways. As one of the world's most innovative countries, we have excellent conditions to harness technological development to promote our prosperity.

One of the factors that defines our time is rapid technological development. Our ability to contribute to and take advantage of it will be crucial, both for Swedish competitiveness and thus our prosperity, and for the development of our society. New technology also has major security policy consequences, which sets a series of new requirements for us, including with respect to protecting technical expertise. Excellent research and innovation is a prerequisite for ensuring our competitiveness. Rapid technological development also entails new requirements for analytical and decision-making capacity.
Based on our national security interests, the international situation and Sweden’s strength and assets, this strategy establishes that safeguarding Sweden’s national security is the Government’s most important task and top priority. Sweden must rapidly strengthen its capability to prevent and deal with the various threats and risks that are described in this strategy. This means that strengthening national security in the current situation must be given priority when balancing different public interests against one another. Building up the total defence, Sweden’s integration into NATO and the fight against organised crime that poses a systemic threat are of particular importance.

This strategy identifies three focus areas for the work on national security.

The first – A safe and secure Sweden – focuses on protection against external threats. This encompasses our foreign, security and defence policy, our integration into NATO and our actions as an Ally, defence of Ukraine, our role in the EU and efforts to uphold the rules-based world order.

The second area – A safe, open and cohesive Sweden – involves safeguarding openness, democracy and unity in Swedish society. This includes safeguarding human rights and freedoms; the rule of law and strengthening essential institutions; fighting violent extremism, terrorism and organised crime that poses a systemic threat; and countering parallel social structures, including through preventive measures.

The third area – A resilient and competitive Sweden – identifies measures to strengthen resilience in Swedish society, in the face of both constantly ongoing hybrid influence and extraordinary challenges that crises and wars entail. This area also includes measures to ensure and strengthen Swedish competitiveness and critical supply, which form the basis of our capability to safeguard our security, of rapid adaptation to changing conditions and of climate adaptation efforts.

The Government’s work on national security is guided – within the framework of applicable laws and other statutes – by the interests, principles, priorities and focus areas that are set out in this strategy. In doing so, the strategy lays a foundation for the more specific direction that the Government provides through established governance arrangements. These include government bills that concern matters such as the total defence, instructions, appropriation directions, government decisions and strategies for more specific areas.

The Government emphasises that national security is a matter that concerns everyone in our society. The Government’s goal is therefore for the strategy to also provide guidance on how government agencies, regions and municipalities – but also actors beyond the public sphere – can work to strengthen Sweden’s national security.

Implementation of this strategy will be reviewed on a regular basis. Efforts to safeguard and strengthen Sweden’s national security must be pursued over time. Therefore, the strategy is drafted with a time frame that extends to 2030. However, the international situation and developments in Sweden could necessitate reviewing and updating the strategy at an earlier date.
Central government’s most important task is to protect Sweden’s freedom, peace and security

No task is more important for central government than protecting Sweden’s freedom, peace and security. The ultimate responsibility for this task lies with the Riksdag and the Government. The Government’s overall view of this task is described in this national security strategy, which constitutes the framework for the Government’s work on national security.

In the strategy, the Government defines vital and strategic national security interests for its related efforts. Our vital interests are those that are worth the greatest sacrifices. We are prepared to allocate substantial resources to ensure our strategic interests.

The strategy then describes the global situation that forms the backdrop for the work on national security is based. Compared to 2017, when the previous national security strategy was adopted, the international situation has changed drastically – and worsened in most essential respects. The security situation in our neighbourhood and in Europe is the most precarious it has been since the Second World War. Russia is waging a brutal war of aggression against Ukraine and constitutes a serious threat to Sweden and its allies. The assessment of the Government is that the deteriorated security situation will persist in the foreseeable future, and there is a risk that it will further deteriorate.
Our national security interests

Sweden’s vital national security interests are to safeguard Sweden’s security, democratic form of governance, freedom, independence, sovereignty and freedom of action; to protect the lives and health of the population; to defend Sweden and its Allies against armed attacks and uphold its territorial integrity; to maintain critical supplies and the functioning of society; and to uphold its fundamental values such as democracy, the rule of law, and human rights and freedoms.

In its work on national security, the Government is also guided by strategic interests of a more limited scope, grouped here based on the strategy’s three focus areas:

Focus area 1
**A safe and secure Sweden**

- A rules-based world order based on international law and the UN Charter.
- Strengthened unity in the democratic world.
- Restored respect for the European security order.
- A politically and economically strong and well-functioning EU that acts in solidarity.
- A politically and militarily strong NATO, supported by a strong Swedish defence, with a strong transatlantic link.
- A secure and stable regional neighbourhood.

Focus area 2
**A safe, open and cohesive Sweden**

- Strong societal cohesiveness.
- A safe and secure society.
- Absence of crime that poses a systemic threat, terrorism and activities that threaten the constitutional order.
- Absence of corruption, infiltration and undue influence in public institutions.

Focus area 3
**A resilient and competitive Sweden**

- Countering climate change and adapting to its consequences.
- An open and rules-based international economic order.
- An economically secure and competitive Sweden.
- A resilient society.
In the current security situation, the totality of threats facing Sweden is broad and serious. At the same time, in protecting its national security, Sweden can draw upon significant strengths and assets. These have been tangibly reinforced in recent years, although they can never be taken for granted and our work to improve them must continue.

Overall, Swedish society’s resilience is strong. Sweden has a stable democratic political system and, as a country, we have shown that we can come together to take necessary measures when the situation demands it. Our society and its culture are characterised by high levels of interpersonal trust and strong social engagement. Civil society is vibrant. The individual willingness to defend Sweden and trust between societal actors are strong, as is the will to collaborate and cooperate.

Sweden is a rich country with stable public finances and low national debt. We also have effective public administration in which citizens have great confidence. The Swedish business sector is dynamic, innovative, diversified and very competitive from a global perspective. We have high labour force participation and constructive relations between social partners. Sweden is a prominent knowledge, research and innovation nation that is at the forefront in digital development.

Society is not currently adapted to the higher temperatures, more frequent and intense extreme weather events, and rising sea levels that are expected as a result of climate change, but Sweden is well-positioned to strengthen society’s robustness and adapt to the changing climate.

Swedish civil society is strong, and there is a high level of volunteer engagement among the population. Civil society plays an important role in Sweden’s collective total defence capability and helps build community and trust, which form the basis of individual willingness to defend the country.

Sweden is largely a safe and secure country, and trust in the judicial system is high. In recent years, however, we have seen increasing gang crime with shootings, bombings and organised crime that has become a systemic threat. A number of measures have been taken to counter these developments: the introduction of tougher penalties, new tools and more resources provided to both law enforcement authorities and crime prevention efforts. However, many years of work will be needed to rectify these problems that have been emerging for a long time.

For a number of years, we have been making substantial reinforcements to our total defence and crisis preparedness capabilities. Sweden’s security also benefits from its participation in many forms of international cooperation, and diplomatic means are an important instrument for the country’s security. Our EU and NATO memberships are most important of all. In recent years, EU cooperation has played an important role in managing the extensive crises that have affected the world and Europe. The COVID-19 pandemic, including joint procurement of vaccines, and the consequences of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine are prime examples of this. Sweden’s NATO membership thoroughly strengthens both Sweden’s and its neighbouring countries’ security.

Sweden also has strong bilateral ties characterised by a high level of trust with its closest neighbours, its allies and its closest partners. Sweden has a strong global standing, partly as a result of our long-standing and generous development assistance, strong commitment to multilateral institutions, innovation capacity, deep international cooperation on research and development, and extensive trade.

Swedish administration has also been reformed to be better positioned to respond to international developments, strengthen national security and meet the requirements that NATO membership entails. A National Security Council, a ministerial post for civil defence and a National Security Adviser position were established in 2022. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence have been reorganised. A higher regional level for civil defence and a new structure with preparedness sectors and emergency preparedness authorities, to act ahead of and during heightened alert, have also been introduced.
Our security situation

The assessment of the Government is that the current serious security situation will persist for the foreseeable future and that it risks further deteriorating. Russia poses the most serious threat to our national security in the period up to 2030. An armed attack against Sweden or its Allies cannot be ruled out. Nor can the use or threat of military measures against Sweden or its Allies.

Our democracy, the integrity of our public institutions and the cohesion of our society are also jeopardised by organised crime that poses a systemic threat, violent extremism, terrorism and anti-democratic values.

There are many complex threats and risks that can affect our modern society. Sweden is a highly internationalised country. Its business sector is deeply integrated into the world economy, and a significant part of Sweden’s population have their roots abroad. Combined with the fact that news spreads quickly via the internet and social media, this means that events outside Sweden and trends at global level affect us more than many other countries.

Reversely, the image of Sweden abroad is easily affected by events in Sweden, which can lead to consequences for Sweden’s security and Swedish interests abroad.

Internationalisation is one of the reasons why it is becoming increasingly difficult to make a meaningful distinction between external and internal threats. Links to the outside world and the vulnerabilities of an open Swedish society provide broad and extensive possibilities for states and other actors that want to influence Sweden. Influence often appears to be diffuse and may be difficult to attribute to a particular actor. Digital developments have also made it easier to work covertly. This is because digital platforms have become central for functions such as communications, payment services and essential services, and due to the emergence of anonymisation services, encryption and other new technologies.

It is impossible to predict all the threats and disturbances that can affect a modern society. Unforeseen events are inevitable, no matter how carefully analyses are made. Developments in recent years have also shown how difficult it can be to assess threats, how quickly they can change and how they can evolve faster than expected and in unexpected directions. It is therefore important to also have knowledge of and preparedness for threats that have previously been considered less likely.
Global developments are characterised by authoritarian states seeking to redefine international norms and undermine or reshape the rules-based world order, based on the UN Charter, to meet their goals and interests. In recent years, there has been a sharp decline in democracy, human rights and gender equality. From a security perspective, this is serious because democratic countries tend to live in peaceful coexistence and democracy is a prerequisite for human rights and the security of citizens. In addition, democracies tend to have higher growth and prosperity.

This democratic backsliding thus undermines support for the rules-based world order. This also affects Sweden, as its security is ultimately based on states respecting international law, including the rules of the UN Charter.

These developments also mean that the global security environment is increasingly characterised by the dynamic between China on the one hand and the United States and like-minded actors on the other. One consequence of this is that the security of our Euro-Atlantic region is becoming ever more closely linked with that of the Indo-Pacific regions.

Russia poses a serious threat to security throughout Europe. The security situation in Europe has been fundamentally reshaped as a result of the brutal war of aggression against Ukraine, which Russia is conducting with the direct or indirect support of Belarus, China, Iran and North Korea. The war is also significantly affecting global security, especially since a broad group of countries remain passive in the face of this obvious violation of the UN Charter. If Russia were to bring about a change of borders in Europe by military force, the security implications would also be serious in other parts of the world.

Sweden’s national security is significantly affected by events in Europe’s immediate neighbourhood, including in the Middle East and North Africa. This is partly because conflicts there can affect international security and bring about continued large flows of migrants to Europe, and partly because many people in Sweden have their roots in these regions. Instability in the Middle East and Africa can also affect Europe through crossborder crime, violent extremism and terrorism.

One of the factors defining our time is rapid technological development, especially in areas such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum technology and biotechnology. This drives economic development, but it also has increasingly tangible security policy implications. Many states increasingly see access to, and the ability to apply, emerging technologies as crucial to the balance of military and economic power. This has led to several measures by governments to take control of technology, innovation and supply chains.
Sweden has also taken steps to protect its strategic assets. At the same time, the fact that innovation power is increasingly becoming a security policy asset creates opportunities to strengthen Swedish influence, including in the field of defence equipment industry and defence technology. The global green transition brings new growth and cooperation opportunities, including between developed countries and global partner countries. For a country like Sweden, with highly internationalised business and higher education institutions, the increased control of technology, innovations and supply chains poses problems, as it risks limiting the possibilities for international cooperation on cutting-edge technology. Globally, this control risks increasingly instrumentalising natural resources for geopolitical purposes.

Technological development, coupled with the deteriorating global security situation, also contributes to the growing importance of space and infrastructure there. The risk of confrontation is increasing. Sweden is affected by this development because it has significant potential as a space nation, including through its satellite launch capability.

Digital development brings major benefits to society, but also increases existing threats and creates new ones. Although it is currently difficult to fully assess the consequences of the development of AI, it is clear that the technology has and will have increasing geopolitical importance and impact on national security and international cooperation. Social media and other internet platforms are being exploited to spread false rumours, disinformation, conspiracy theories and racist and antisemitic messages. These affect opinion formation, interpersonal trust, democratic discourse, community and, thus, national security. The risk of AI being used for such purposes is assessed to be particularly high, but it also has potential to respond to this use. With the help of digital technology, crime in Sweden can be led and organised outside Sweden’s borders, which further exacerbates the fight against it. Good international and bilateral cooperation is necessary. At the same time, technological development can also provide law enforcement with new opportunities to more effectively prevent and combat crime, such as through camera surveillance and the use of AI in various contexts.
Actor-driven threats

The external factor that has had the greatest impact on our security situation for more than a decade is Russia’s gradual development into a militarily armed, externally aggressive and internally repressive autocracy. Russia considers itself to be in permanent conflict with a Western world perceived to be led by the United States. The Russian regime does not hide its attempts to establish a new European security order based on spheres of interest instead of the right of each state to choose its own security policy path. It also seeks, systematically and forcibly, to expand its own power and influence, not only in neighbouring countries but throughout Europe. One instrument for achieving this is to create and exploit divisions both within and between countries in the EU and NATO. In other parts of the world too, Russia tries undermine the EU and the United States. Russia’s threats to use nuclear weapons are also a means used for this purpose.

Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine is the most serious expression of the Russian regime’s ambitions to date. It shows how far Russia’s leadership is prepared to go to achieve its goals and the level of risk it is prepared to take.

Although Russia has suffered heavy losses and the Russian economy is small compared to the combined economies of the EU and NATO, Russia’s military strength remains significant. Russia’s leadership is also redirecting its economy to support long-term aggression and prioritising military rearmament over other needs, while showing that it is prepared to use all available instruments to achieve its goals.

An armed attack by Russia on Sweden or one of our Allies is the pacing threat for the total defence that is now being built up within the framework of NATO’s collective defence.

China is the world’s second-largest economy and a key international actor. China’s totalitarian development, geopolitical ambitions and efforts to reshape the rules-based world order pose a threat to Sweden’s national security. China’s military rearmament and modernisation affect security in Asia and throughout the world. China’s modernisation and expansion of its nuclear capabilities, coupled with a lack of transparency or commitment to arms control and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons issues, can affect strategic stability and, in the long term, also have consequences for strategic deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic region. China’s deepening partnership with Russia and indirect support for Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine contribute to the serious security situation in Europe. China has been moving in an increasingly totalitarian direction. The central role of the party is emphasised and the repression of dissidents and certain ethnic groups, such as the Uighurs, has worsened.

China’s ambition to become a world leader in new technology and its use of cyber capabilities also have consequences for our security and competitiveness. Furthermore, China’s ‘military-civil fusion’ requires private Chinese companies to share their technology with the Chinese military. Chinese actors also conduct systematic intelligence activities and security-threatening activities against Sweden and Swedish interests.

The broad range of methods that mainly Russia but also China, Iran and other actors use to influence Sweden can be grouped together under the heading of ‘hybrid threats’. These actors strive to exploit all vulnerabilities in our society to achieve their political or other objectives. The threats are aimed at actors at all levels of the Swedish public sector, but also at civil society, the private sector and individuals. The methods include cyber attacks, undue influence, economic pressure, sabotage, impact on critical flows, migration as an instrument of pressure, unlawful intelligence activities and the execution of attacks and other acts of violence. Critical infrastructure has been a key target of Russia’s attacks in Ukraine. Through repeated attacks on, for example, energy-related infrastructure, Russia has put the Ukrainian energy system under extreme stress and subjected the civilian population to difficult living conditions.
Internet-connected systems in all sectors of society in Sweden are exposed to cyber threats, not just those that are directly relevant to national security. These threats come from foreign intelligence agencies, criminal groups and individuals. It is often difficult to definitively attribute cyber threats to a specific actor. This may be because a state uses groups that allegedly act independently to hide who the actual client is, or because a state shelters or accepts non-governmental groups that target Sweden with cyber threats.

The Swedish economy is also subjected to destabilising activities. These target both the private and public sectors and may include attacks on critical infrastructure, including the financial system. Our economic security is also threatened by attempts to use both legal and illegal methods to gain access to sensitive information, Swedish cutting-edge technology and knowledge, and control of essential public services and infrastructure such as transport and digital infrastructure. These attempts target Swedish companies as well as Swedish universities and innovation environments. Both businesses and critical infrastructure can also be acquired for the purpose of accessing information and knowledge or other economically important assets.

In addition, Sweden is vulnerable to unilateral dependencies in terms of supply of goods such as important components, pharmaceuticals and certain raw materials. Such dependencies can be exploited to exert economic pressure for political purposes. Disruptions in trade flows caused by conflicts in Europe or worldwide can also threaten our national security and the transition to a fossil-free society.

The threat of violent extremism and terrorism has become more complex and difficult to combat, partly because violent extremism environments are constantly changing, and digital platforms offer new opportunities to disseminate information and plan violent acts. These threats can be amplified by influence operations, including the spread of disinformation and conspiracy theories.

The insecurity caused by crime and society’s lack of capacity to deal with it, socio-economic vulnerability and exclusion undermine both community and the individual willingness to defend Sweden. Infiltration, corruption, threats and undue influence are growing and, in the long term, pose serious threats to the integrity of our public institutions, but also to the business community. The same applies to criminal networks’ attempts to establish parallel social structures and to challenge the State’s monopoly on power and violence in some parts of Sweden.

Substantial migration flows to Sweden over time, combined with an undemanding integration policy, have led to widespread exclusion in parts of society, with an increased risk of the emergence of parallel social structures and separatism. Inadequate checks on the identity of foreigners in Sweden and deficiencies in population registration, combined with a lack of ability to carry out the return of persons without legal right to stay in Sweden, have led to many people being outside the social safety net and without any contact with the public sector. Such a shadow society can, in itself, constitute a security threat.

Large migration flows also pose a risk, as people with antagonistic intentions can join large migration movements. Furthermore, the risk is that migrants are exploited as pawns to create instability (‘instrumentalisation’) and that they can be used as a means of pressure against Sweden.

If the growth of parallel social structures and separatism is not halted, this risks resulting in a part of Sweden’s population living in a context in which Swedish laws are not applied in practice and the values on which our society is based are not respected. This development thus poses a threat to the rule of law, trust in public institutions and, ultimately, democracy. Such a development is exploited by hostile state actors and other groups.
Sweden’s security is affected by a variety of threats and risks that do not originate from hostile actors. These can have far-reaching consequences for society and could, in the worst case, affect Sweden’s national security.

The most serious threat, especially in the longer term, is the existential threat to humanity posed by climate change. Climate change already has direct implications for our national security, such as extreme weather affecting food production, water supply and human health, including through the spread of infectious diseases. Critical infrastructure, other essential public services and production conditions for the business sector are also affected. If no adaptation of society to the changing climate is undertaken, the costs of loss and damage are expected to increase. Climate change will thus have consequences for our ability to deal with other types of threats to our national security.

Throughout the world, climate change deepens existing conflicts, partly because they affect access to resources such as fresh water, food and arable land. This leads to a higher risk of migration flows. At the same time, climate change is the clearest example of the need for global cooperation and commitment in order to respond to an emerging threat.

Sweden will most likely be affected by new epidemics and pandemics. On a global scale, increased urbanisation, population growth, the spread of chemicals, loss of ecosystems and climate change entail increased risks. New epidemics or pandemics can have even more serious and far-reaching consequences for human and animal health, and thus for the functioning of society, than the COVID-19 pandemic did. They can thus have a profound impact on society and major consequences for national security, which in turn can be exploited by hostile actors. International cooperation is a prerequisite for effectively managing major epidemics and pandemics.

Antimicrobial resistance is a significant and growing threat to human and animal health and our food production. Efforts to prevent resistance through the rational usage of antibiotics and good health care hygiene are pressing. Access to effective antibiotics is a prerequisite for running modern health care and saving lives. Residual and shortage situations are common because incentives for developing new antibiotics are insufficient and global production is concentrated to only a few sites.

Public health is of great importance for Sweden's resilience and thus ultimately for our national security. It is affected by factors such as access to food and drinking water, dietary habits and physical activity, the use of alcohol and tobacco and the presence of drugs in society. Experience from other countries shows a risk of opioids, in particular, becoming a threat to internal security and public health unless preventive measures are effective and inflow and drug trafficking are stopped.

The increasing digitalisation of society has meant that many essential public services are currently entirely or partly dependent on digital tools and systems. IT incidents that arise as a result of accidents, errors, lack of knowledge or system errors can therefore cause disruptions in the delivery of essential public services and thus also risk affecting Sweden’s national security. Swedish society is also becoming increasingly dependent on electricity. Disruptions can have extensive implications for large parts of society and risk affecting our national security.
Safeguarding Sweden’s national security is the Government’s single most important task. Sweden needs to urgently strengthen its capacity to prevent and respond to the various threats and risks described in this strategy. This means that the strengthening of national security should be accorded great importance when balancing and prioritising different societal interests. Of particular importance are building up the total defence, Sweden’s integration into NATO and the fight against organised crime that poses a systemic threat.

The work on national security is conducted in a manner consistent with the rule of law and democracy and fundamental rights and freedoms. Ultimately, it is about safeguarding a free and open society, tolerance and trust between citizens and public authorities. Against this background, the Government’s work is based on five guiding principles:

• **Urgency and pragmatism.** The security situation makes it urgent to increase capacity in many areas. It is therefore particularly important that the work is conducted without delay and with a pragmatic approach. If regulations and processes prevent this, they should be identified and made more effective as much as possible. New solutions, working methods and technology will be utilised to help improve efficiency.

• **Capacity to act and make decisions under uncertainty.** In many situations, especially during extraordinary events, indecision and lack of action can have far more serious consequences than taking measures that are less appropriate. When conditions make this necessary, an ability to take decisions even under conditions of great uncertainty and on the basis of inadequate information is required. Regulatory frameworks and working procedures should be designed to avoid a lack of clarity as regards the division of responsibilities. When instances of unclear division of responsibility are identified, they must immediately be reported so that necessary measures can be taken to resolve them.

• **Robustness and adaptability.** Although it is not possible to predict in detail which strains society will face, experience tells us that they will occur. This unpredictability calls for robustness and redundancy, but also for adaptability. Total defence preparations and crisis preparedness should be coordinated as closely as possible, and planning must be complemented with training and exercises.

• **Involvement of the whole of society.** Many risks and threats affect several sectors in society and span both geographical and operational boundaries. Therefore, the whole of Swedish society must be involved in cross-sectoral work on national security. Public sector actors should cooperate and collaborate with other relevant government agencies, regions and municipalities, and also with the business sector, the social partners, faith communities and wider civil society.

• **International cooperation.** Swedish security policy is based upon the idea that threats to our security need to be met, as far as possible, in cooperation with other countries and organisations. Cooperation within NATO and the EU is of particular importance in this respect. All actors with tasks related to national security should therefore, where appropriate, maintain close cooperation with relevant international partners.
The Government’s efforts to strengthen Sweden’s national security for the period until 2030 focus on three overarching areas.

The first area, a safe and secure Sweden, includes what has traditionally been considered external security.

The second area, a safe, open and cohesive Sweden, includes what is often grouped under the heading of internal security, but goes beyond this, also including long-term measures to strengthen the cohesion of Swedish society.

The third area, a resilient and competitive Sweden, includes measures to strengthen the resilience of society, including economic security and long-term measures to protect our prosperity, as it constitutes the material basis of national security.

Each section starts with a description of that area’s set of objectives. The aim is to provide a clearer understanding of each focus area’s objectives. The set of objectives for each strategic area is derived from our strategic security interests.
Area 1: A safe and secure Sweden

Objectives 2030

> The democratic world’s unity and global security policy footprint have been strengthened. Sweden has reinforced its relations with neighbouring countries, strategic allies and partners.

> NATO maintains an effective deterrence and defence through Sweden’s and other Allies’ efforts and is well prepared, within the framework of collective defence, to respond to an armed attack. Our total defence is strong, adequately sized and fully integrated into NATO.

> Sweden has a well-developed capacity to respond to hybrid threats from state actors threatening the country’s security and its economic or security policy interests, across the entire conflict spectrum.

> The EU is strong, and cooperation within the Union in the field of defence reinforces European defence capabilities and contributes to Europe’s security and resilience.

> Ukraine has received the support it needs to be able to achieve its objectives in the war of defence against Russia, for reconstruction, and for establishing the capacity to resist future attacks.

> Russia’s capability to carry out military aggression against Ukraine or other states has been reduced.

> The security threat from authoritarian states such as China, Russia and Iran is prioritised and managed in cooperation with democratic countries.
Sweden’s foreign and security policy is the first-line instrument to strengthen cooperation, prevent conflict and counter external antagonistic threats to Sweden’s security. Sweden will continue to build security together with others. The core of Sweden’s security policy is the solidarity-based alliance policy pursued as a member of the EU and NATO, organisations that occupy a special position among the international organisations of which Sweden is a member. The EU is Sweden’s most important foreign policy arena and NATO is Sweden’s most important defence policy arena. Swedish security policy requires active, broad and responsible international action, which includes strengthening democratic development globally, safeguarding the rule of law and promoting respect for human rights and freedoms. Membership of the UN remains central to safeguarding international law and addressing global issues such as climate change, humanitarian crises and widespread migration flows.

A strong total defence is a fundamental prerequisite to protect and uphold Sweden’s security. Furthermore, an effective security policy requires the coordination of a range of mechanisms, including diplomacy, strategic communications, development assistance, economic, legal and military instruments, as well as a resilient society. The ability to properly identify and analyse external threats is crucial for, ensuring that appropriate, well-balanced actions are taken. A good understanding of geopolitical developments, based on the work of diplomatic missions, defence intelligence agencies and security services, is of central importance. Equally important is our capacity to protect ourselves against foreign powers’ intelligence gathering and attempts to influence.

**Nato**

Sweden will be a loyal Ally

NATO is the ultimate guarantor for European and transatlantic security. Full integration into NATO — political, civil and military — is the single most important and urgent measure to strengthen Sweden’s security, and of great importance to our Allies. Membership increases predictability, strengthens deterrence against attacks against Sweden and our Allies, thus making our neighbourhood more secure.

As an Ally, Sweden is part of NATO’s collective defence. Sweden’s geographic location and ability to support other Allies is crucial to NATO’s ability to operate effectively in our region. Sweden shoulders this responsibility and fully embraces the opportunity to facilitate the collective defence not only of Sweden but also of our neighbours. Military defence will be adapted to the requirements attributed to Sweden as an Ally. The credibility of NATO’s deterrence is crucial to Sweden’s security. Sweden supports NATO’s strategic deterrence and will remain a strong voice for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation. The credibility of NATO’s deterrence and defence is based upon cohesion within the Alliance and the development and maintenance of strong military capabilities by Allies. Civil society’s resilience and ability to support military defence also requires ongoing efforts, both in Sweden and among Allies.

Sweden’s membership in a defence Alliance with binding mutual defence commitments constitutes a paradigm shift in Swedish security and defence policy, concerning all parts of the Swedish total defence. The NATO membership provides Sweden with an additional security policy platform. This makes us stronger as a country, providing new opportunities and tools for our security policy with regard to Russia, Ukraine, Asia and the Western Balkans, and for pursuing thematic issues such as terrorism, disinformation and the protection of critical infrastructure. The unity of NATO is the foundation of the Alliance’s strength. Sweden helps to safeguard it, including by working towards fair burden sharing and by living up to the common objectives agreed within NATO.
**The European Union**

Sweden will contribute to strengthening the EU

The EU is not only Sweden’s most important foreign policy arena, but also a values-based community and significant security policy actor in safeguarding peace and freedom on our continent. EU cooperation spans large parts of the economic and political spectrum in society. The legislation and joint measures decided within the EU are of great importance for Sweden’s security in a broad sense, for example in terms of cooperation against terrorism and organised crime, and in addressing health and climate threats. It is therefore a strategic Swedish interest to safeguard cooperation and solidarity within the EU. Sweden will, as far as possible, contribute to a strong and effective EU.

Swedish action in the EU is guided by the insight that Europe must take greater responsibility for its own security. A better equipped EU contributes to a stronger NATO. The EU’s role in security and defence needs to be strengthened in a way that favours the transatlantic link without compromising the competence of Member States. Defence industry and technology-related cooperation, which is also open to strategic partnerships, is important in this regard. The security situation and the experiences gained from Ukraine show that the EU’s common crisis management capabilities, resilience and preparedness need to be strengthened. As a member of both the EU and NATO, Sweden is well placed to promote coordination and deeper cooperation between the two organisations and with their respective Member States.

EU enlargement is an investment in peace, democracy, security, stability and prosperity. One of the EU’s most important tasks is therefore to complete the integration of Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, as well as the countries of the Western Balkans, into the Union, once these countries meet the requirements. Sweden, through strategic assistance to these countries, is a driving force for enlargement and also helps strengthen relations with the countries in the EU’s southern neighbourhood.

**Total defence**

Modernisation will be carried out swiftly and efficiently

Sweden is carrying out a comprehensive reinforcement of its total defence. Total defence consists of military operations (military defence) and civil operations (civil defence). In peacetime, total defence refers to the range of activities required to prepare Sweden for war. In the event of the highest state of alert being declared, total defence encompasses all public services that are to be maintained at such times. Thus, total defence is not a government agency or an individual organisation.

The modernisation of total defence is a complex task, involving major efforts by the whole of Swedish society, which necessitates trade-offs in relation to other societal interests. In view of the perilous global situation that has made this reinforcement necessary, activities of significance for total defence must be prioritised in such trade-offs.

Rearmament and the reinforcement of total defence capabilities must be characterised by a goal-oriented and effective approach on the part of all actors and at all levels. The Government has initiated a review of regulations that risk complicating or delaying the modernisation of the total defence. The review results may lead to new assignments to government agencies and amendments in the Government’s annual directives to the agencies.
Hybrid threats

Capability to respond to state actors' hybrid threats will be strengthened

Sweden and its allies are increasingly exposed to threats and attacks below the threshold of armed aggression from state actors. These attacks are conducted by both civilian and military means and through cyberattacks and disinformation; influence operations, disinformation, attempts to affect critical information flows and critical infrastructure; strategic investments; infiltration of, for example, higher education institutions, and theft of technology and innovation. Countering these threats requires capabilities that are partly outside the structure and mandate of total defence. Managing the threats requires improved situational awareness, together with command and control, and decision-making capacity. It also requires improved collaboration between different sectors and decision-making levels in society, between the public and private sector, and international cooperation. For the same reason, communication with groups in society that may be particularly vulnerable to, for example, disinformation campaigns should be characterised by an awareness of these threats. The Government intends to strengthen capability to identify, manage and address hybrid threats and attacks. Efforts to reduce vulnerabilities and strengthen resilience in society are an important part of this.

Ukraine

Sweden will contribute to the defence of Ukraine for as long as it takes

Together with the modernisation of our total defence, the most important measure for security in our neighbourhood is to ensure that Russia does not achieve its objectives in its war of aggression against Ukraine. Providing Ukraine with strong, coordinated and long-term support, which will also allow it to withstand future attacks, is also of great importance to Sweden's security. Support to Ukraine is therefore the Government’s top foreign policy priority. The bilateral agreement on security cooperation that Sweden has concluded with Ukraine is an expression of this. Sweden will continue to provide political, humanitarian, military and financial support to Ukraine, for as long as it takes. This will also apply should the donor group decrease, necessitating increased support from Sweden and other European donor countries. Sweden will continue to work to ensure that support to Ukraine is high on the EU and NATO agendas.

Provided that democratic countries continue giving Ukraine the support it needs, the fundamental balance of forces, both economic and military, are not in Russia’s favour in the longer term.

However, this would require urgent reinforcements of, among other things, defence production capability. The Government is working towards a well-developed collaboration between central government and the private sector in order to achieve this.

Russia

Sweden will counteract Russia’s aggression and power expansion

It is of great importance to Sweden's national security to counteract Russia’s influence, freedom of action and ability to target military and non-military threats against countries in the EU, NATO and Russia's neighbourhood. This requires Sweden, domestically and within the EU and NATO, to pursue a comprehensive, long-term and strategic policy to prevent Russia from expanding its power. Strong support to Ukraine is our best way to influence Russia's actions. EU sanctions against Russia and accountability for violations of international law committed during and through Russia’s aggression against Ukraine are other key components of this policy. The Government will continue to take measures to ensure compliance with sanctions and to make it more difficult to circumvent them, in order to hinder Russian arms production.
Key bilateral relations

Sweden will safeguard and develop its bilateral relations with key allies and partners.

Bilateral cooperation with the United States, the Nordic and Baltic countries, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Poland is of particular importance to Sweden’s security. The transatlantic link between Europe and the United States is crucial to Sweden’s security. NATO is the principal expression of this link, but it is also manifested in our close bilateral military cooperation and other long-standing close ties between the United States and Sweden.

Sweden prioritises strengthening its broad bilateral relationship with the United States and will help maintain and strengthen transatlantic ties. At the same time, Sweden’s security policy needs to take into account the shift in the focus of US security policy towards the threat from China and the fact that the United States’ willingness to contribute to Europe’s security could be affected by domestic political conditions. Within the EU and NATO, Sweden emphasises the importance of this transatlantic link and is working to ensure that these organisations also remain relevant to the United States.

Working to ensure a rules-based international order ultimately founded on the UN Charter and international law is a key component of Swedish foreign and security policy, and the top Swedish priority for efforts in the UN and other multilateral organisations.

The objective of Sweden’s development assistance is to create opportunities for better living conditions for people living in poverty and oppression. Development assistance is an integral part of the broader foreign policy and helps address global health threats, democratic backsliding and repression, armed conflicts, irregular migration and climate change. Global developments and security also affect Sweden. Thus, we can also help reduce direct and indirect threats to Sweden through strategic bilateral and multilateral development assistance.

Sweden’s security and prosperity are dependent on other countries’ interest in doing business and cooperating with Sweden. Sweden will strengthen its cooperation with countries that are particularly important to us in Asia and Oceania. This is essential, not least because Europe’s and Asia’s security have become increasingly interconnected. Cooperation of this kind helps reduce vulnerability in Swedish businesses’ value chains and strengthen Sweden’s long-term competitiveness. For similar reasons, it is important for Sweden to strengthen its cooperation with democratic states in Latin America.

Sweden needs to maintain a dialogue and trade with China as well as cooperation in areas where it is appropriate and compatible with our national security. In order to strengthen our economic security and resilience, we also need to reduce risks and vulnerable dependencies in relation to China. It is also important to enhance our knowledge of China. Sweden’s relations with China must be anchored in a European strategy with close transatlantic cooperation.
Area 2:
A safe, open and cohesive Sweden

Objectives 2030

> Sweden remains a cohesive, open and democratic society, characterised by respect for human rights and freedoms.

> There is strong mutual trust between the people and central government, regions and municipalities.

> The threat to the integrity of public institutions from organised crime, corruption, infiltration and undue influence is at a level that does not compromise the full functionality of our social structures.

> The terrorist threat has been reduced.

> Long-term preventive measures to ensure the cohesion of Swedish society are implemented in broad, cross-sectoral cooperation.
One of the foundations of Swedish society is the common respect for the core values enshrined in the Instrument of Government, which is part of the Swedish constitution. The trust between the people in our country, their trust in public institutions and the cohesion of society are based on this respect for the core values. It is thus a prerequisite for society’s resilience, against both external and internal threats.

The numerous and serious threats from different quarters that are directed against the cohesion of Swedish society require that strong continued measures are taken. The Government will take further initiatives to strengthen public institutions and the role of civil society in promoting democracy. However, achieving lasting results will require a broad commitment on the part of all societal actors: government agencies, regions, municipalities, the business sector, social partners, faith communities and wider civil society.

Sweden is, and will remain, a tolerant society. Movements that oppose our democracy and the values on which Swedish society is based also have the right, within the framework of the law, to exercise their freedom of expression to express their views. However, there is no reason why they should receive financial support and encouragement from the Swedish public sector.

Public institutions
The integrity of public institutions and trust in them will be ensured

A high level of trust in public institutions is a decisive factor for a sustainable democracy and a well-functioning society. This trust is dependent on the effective performance of institutions in their tasks and their ability to uphold their integrity and the rule of law. Public actors must therefore maintain adequate protection against infiltration and corruption, but also against actions such as cyber attacks. Cooperation between central government agencies, municipalities, regions and the business sector must be developed in this respect, while preserving the availability of critical data, functions and infrastructure.

Government agencies’ risk and vulnerability assessments form an important element of protecting institutions’ integrity. In addition to these assessments, employment controls should be given greater prominence and the exchange of information between government agencies should be improved.

The Government is taking steps to enable this.

Upholding a high level of trust in the electoral system is essential to our democracy. Sweden’s ability to ensure secure and accurate general elections, even in times of crisis, must be ensured.

Threats, violence and pressure against public officials and other figures in roles critical to democracy, such as journalists, constitute attacks on democratic society and must be treated as such.
Organised crime that poses a systemic threat

Organised crime that poses a systemic threat must be reduced and combatted.

Arbetet Efforts to reduce and combat organised crime that poses a systemic threat will be pursued with a resolve warranted by a threat to our vital national security interest. Law enforcement, crime prevention and the protection of public institutions will be strengthened, and more effective control functions will be introduced.

The ability to effectively reduce and combat organised crime that poses a systemic threat requires a greater common understanding of problems and better coordinated action by central government agencies, municipalities and regions. There is also a need for more cooperation between the public and private sector, social partners, civil society and international actors.

Having the possibility to share relevant information in a legally compliant and efficient manner is essential for the ability of government agencies, regions and municipalities to act effectively in collaboration. International collaboration in the law enforcement field is also crucial to enable effective action that can sustainably reduce organised crime.

Special priority will be given to measures aimed at fundamentally strengthening society’s resilience to organised crime that poses a systemic threat. This direction is set out in the Government’s national strategy against organised crime. Five key objectives guide these efforts: stop criminal careers, reduce access to firearms and explosives, destroy criminal finances, build resilience to unauthorised and undue influence, and secure reliable identities and an effective supply of data. These efforts include combatting work-related crime, which covers human trafficking, human exploitation, work environment offences and benefit offences. The introduction of a new government ID card with electronic identification will help strengthen Swedish ID administration and increase the possibilities to carry out checks and correct verification of identity data. This will prevent crime based on identity fraud.

Violent extremism and terrorism

Violent extremism and terrorism must be prevented and combatted.

Preventing and responding to threats of violent extremism and terrorism requires constant vigilance and intensive efforts. This work is carried out in Sweden and the EU, where terrorist acts have called for the activation of the solidarity clause in the Treaty of European Union. These efforts are also carried out in close cooperation with other foreign partners. Combatting terrorism is part of NATO’s collective defence linked to the main tasks of the Alliance.

The Government has set out a focus for these efforts in its strategy against violent extremism and terrorism. The strategy lists four areas of focus: preventing these phenomena, averting terrorist attacks and other ideologically motivated crimes, protecting people and functions in society and managing the situation during and after an attack. The full capacity of our society is needed for these efforts, and collaboration between authorities at all levels, civil society, faith communities and private sector actors is a prerequisite for success.
Parallel social structures
The emergence of parallel social structures will be counteracted

The Government will continue to take measures to counteract the emergence of parallel social structures in Sweden. Combatting organised crime and the criminal economy, and maintaining order in migration policy, are important elements of these efforts. However, further measures will also be taken to counter various forms of anti-democratic activities that jeopardise democracy and our open society. The control mechanisms for the payment of state grants to civil society will be strengthened. A ban on foreign funding of faith communities and other organisations in civil society linked to Islamism and extremism will be considered. It should not be possible for organisations that spread anti-democratic messages, such as antisemitism and other forms of racism or honour-based oppression, to receive support from public funds.

Preventive measures
Broad preventive measures will be taken to strengthen the cohesion of Swedish society

Measures will be taken in a wide range of areas to safeguard Sweden as a cohesive, open and democratic country in the long term.

The independence of the media sector and cultural life will be strengthened, and measures will be taken to protect cultural heritage and promote understanding of technological developments in the information landscape. Science and research must remain independent of political control. The continued promotion of respect for the equal value, equity and equality of all people is extremely important. Civil society organisations and faith communities play an important role in this. Effective and knowledge-based crime prevention is key for the sustainable reduction of organised crime that poses a systemic threat. Such crime prevention includes broad preventive measures and actions targeting risk groups and individuals who commit crimes. Health and medical care policy, social policy, education policy, integration and the work-first principle are important components of these efforts. Early intervention, strengthened parental responsibility and support for custodial parents are crucial in preventive work. The Government sets out more detailed direction on social crime prevention efforts in its strategy ‘Barriers to crime – a social prevention strategy against criminal networks and other crime’.

The entire education sector, from preschool to university, is of fundamental importance to enable children, young people and adults to unite and actively work for the democratic values that we uphold in Sweden. A well-functioning education sector is an important factor that provides the population with a high level of education and the ability to absorb information about Swedish society and assess what kind of information is false. A well-educated population creates powerful resistance to attempts to influence and disinformation, which also enhances democratic discourse.
Area 3:
A resilient and competitive Sweden

Objectives 2030

> Swedish society has resilience to all types of disruptions in society, in crisis and war.

> Effective management structures with clear mandates and developed cross-sectoral cooperation provide Sweden with sound capability to manage threats to its national security interests.

> Sweden can effectively provide and receive support to and from other EU and NATO members in order to manage disruptions in society and fulfil other tasks in civil defence.

> Collective situational awareness at national level allows for large-scale threats and risks to be identified and managed early and rapidly.

> Essential public services are adequately protected and robust.

> Through climate adaptation, Sweden is resilient to climate change.

> The Swedish economy and the Swedish business sector’s production capacity continue to deliver prosperity, and Sweden’s economic security is strong.

> The business sector, supported by high-quality compulsory and upper secondary school, higher education and research, continues to be dynamic, innovative and internationally competitive.
Societal resilience is a broad concept that involves preparations for the many types of disruptions that can affect a modern society. Resilience requires that society have the capability to withstand disruptions when they occur and then quickly recover. Resilience is important from both a domestic and an EU and NATO perspective. The more resilient individual member states are, the stronger the Alliance and the Union become. Increased civil defence capability greatly helps strengthen crisis preparedness and the Alliance’s collective deterrence.

According to NATO’s definition of civil preparedness, the critical functions that Allies have committed to being able to maintain are continuity of government, continuity of essential services to the population and civil support to military operations.

The population’s resilience to undue influence is an important component of a strong total defence.

Functioning health care is crucial in order to protect the lives and health of the population, support military defence capability to respond to an armed attack and maintain individual willingness to defend Sweden.

The basis of our national security is the Swedish economy, which is entirely dependent on financial stability, a functioning labour market, the business sector’s competitiveness, high-quality education and research, rules-based global trade and a well-functioning EU single market. Sweden is, and must continue to be, a prominent knowledge, research and innovation nation. Sweden should have effective labour immigration that contributes to the country’s competitiveness. The ability to recruit appropriate skills from other EU Member States, as well as third countries, strengthens Swedish companies and Sweden’s joint competitiveness. As one of the world’s most innovative countries, we are well-positioned to – through active research and innovation policy – harness the development of knowledge and technology in order to maintain and enhance our prosperity.

Government will take additional measures – partly to ensure leadership capability in the case of extraordinary events and partly to ensure that the entire Swedish administrative system is able to manage crises that affect multiple sectors of society or a large geographical area.

In order to strengthen operational leadership capability at war or at risk of war, as well as during peacetime crises, the Government has carried out a reform of the civil defence and crisis preparedness structure, including the introduction of 10 preparedness sectors with government agencies responsible for sectors. The Government intends to continue developing this system for it to be increasingly operationalised in crises, and to manage hybrid threats.

Effective command requires clarity on who has a mandate and obligation to act in the event of a crisis – something that evaluations of previous crises have identified as a problem. Rules, responsibilities and principles, such as the principle of responsibility (which states that the peacetime division of responsibilities among agencies remains unchanged under crisis or wartime conditions), should be designed to mitigate the risk of passivity. The Government has taken the initiative to review how this principle has functioned during crises.

Leadership capability

National leadership capability in crisis situations will be strengthened

The Government’s task is to assess and target various interests through strategic coordination of central government’s various capabilities. In the case of extraordinary events, this may require responsibilities and resources to be redistributed between government agencies, as was done in the management of the COVID-19 pandemic and other crises. The
Constitutional preparedness measures equivalent to those already existing for war and risk of war are needed in order to strengthen the ability to manage serious peacetime threats and crises. The Government is reviewing the possibilities to develop special regulations and mandates that can be activated in the event of serious peacetime crises.

Effective national leadership requires collective and cross-sectoral situational awareness. An overview of both how an extraordinary event affects the country and what capacity we have to manage its consequences is needed. Such an overview requires that all actors in the contingency structure report in accordance with the statutory reporting structures and status reports. Government agencies with a special responsibility to communicate and assess status reports should be able to submit information at an early stage in order to provide a necessary overview at national level. Joint situational awareness also requires information about serious disruptions to private operations that are significant to national security.

A cross-sectoral collective situational awareness that builds on status reports from various societal actors is also a prerequisite to enable Sweden to manage hybrid threats. Intelligence and security service capabilities are key. Close dialogue between various actors, a holistic approach to external and internal threats and a focus on translating intelligence into action are necessary. The Government has appointed an inquiry to submit proposals for how joint intelligence capability can be enhanced.

Possibilities to use new technology, such as AI, will be utilised to strengthen analysis and situational awareness. At the same time, the ability to address threats created by AI will be strengthened. In the digitalisation of public administration, there will be a continued focus on interoperability and information sharing.

**Essential public services**

Protection of essential public services will be strengthened

Essential public services maintain functions that are necessary for society’s basic needs, values and security. These may involve critical infrastructure for transport, communication and energy, or supply of goods and services such as medicines, food and water that are fundamental to the functioning of society. Our society’s resilience is dependent on the ability to also maintain these essentials under very difficult conditions. Actors that are responsible for any type of essential public service need to plan and then act.

Within the framework of strengthening civil defence, the Government is taking a number of measures that will also make essential public services more resilient to serious disruptions in peacetime. Within EU cooperation, there are also ongoing efforts to strengthen resilience in essential public services, including by setting cybersecurity requirements for providers of these services.

Major parts of the operations, resources and skills needed in order to maintain the functioning of society are outside the public sector. The Swedish public sector must therefore strengthen its cooperation with civil society and faith communities, the business sector and social partners on issues related to national security. This cooperation must be based on understanding and respect for the fact that public sector activities, the business sector and civil society have different driving forces, roles and responsibilities. The role of central government is to establish clear frameworks and objectives, and create incentives and long-term conditions for planning. The public sector sets clear security requirements for actors that carry out essential public services.
Climate adaptation is key to protecting people’s lives and property, infrastructure and economic interests. A transition to becoming fossil-free in Sweden and globally, including to reduce dependence on exports of fossil fuels, is in Sweden’s interest. Climate adaptation requires not only technical and physical measures in society, but also better knowledge of climate change and its effects, new ways of working and a clarification of the division of responsibilities and mandates in climate adaptation efforts. In its crisis preparedness efforts, the Government intends to establish a climate adaptation perspective and promote coordination and strengthening of climate adaptation and disaster risk reduction efforts, both domestically and internationally. In particular, these efforts will take into account needs related to ensuring critical supplies, such as maintaining Swedish food production, water supply and coordinated water management, as well as good community planning, effective communicable disease control, preparedness for extreme torrential rain, water shortages and droughts, and a robust infrastructure for energy supply, health care, telecommunications and transport. Outbreaks of contagious animal diseases that can affect access to food and our supply capability must be prevented. Pharmaceutical products, for both animals and people, must be available in sufficient quantities in order to cope with a sudden crisis. Sweden’s international climate policy will be developed.

**Ensuring critical supplies**
Supply of essential goods and services must be ensured

A prerequisite for Sweden’s resilience – in times of crisis, heightened alert and, ultimately, war – is that supply of essential goods and services can be maintained. Industrial policy is of fundamental importance for civil defence and to strengthen the robustness of key value chains, as well as to reduce unwanted risk exposure and undesirable strategic dependencies, particularly in relation to authoritarian states. The conditions to enable rapid reconfiguration of the supply structure for critical input goods will be strengthened. The sources of supply needs to encompass domestic production capacity, stockpiling, well-diversified imports that spread risk across countries and continents, and a deepened single market. These are efforts that the Government and government agencies carry out in Sweden and the EU, in close collaboration with relevant societal actors, and particularly the business community.

Secure access to critical raw materials and input goods is of crucial importance for the functioning of society. Having access to critical and strategic metals and minerals will be increasingly important to security. This means that Sweden’s assets of metals and minerals, and long-term increased access to sustainable forest biomass, are also important to its national security. It is important that permit processes are designed to allow effective use of these assets, with climate and the environment taken into account.

**Economic security**
Sweden’s economic security will be strengthened

The Swedish business sector, and thus our society’s functionality and prosperity, are dependent on access to global markets, and supply and value chains. The business sector has greatly benefited from increasing globalisation in recent decades. Sweden’s competitiveness and economic security are bolstered by the fact that people with in-demand skills can be recruited from other EU Member States, as well as third countries. Overall, this means that it is in Sweden’s strategic interest to limit the ongoing reversal of globalisation and protect free trade and Swedish businesses’ access to markets.
However, global developments in which financial resources are being used for political purposes, with states increasingly viewing technical know-how as a strategic asset, and where access to innovations, value chains and market access is being restricted, also require Sweden to take measures to safeguard its economic security. Without them, we cannot secure our future prosperity and create the resources required to develop our society and strengthen our national security.

We must safeguard our strategic assets in the form of a high-quality education system, free and excellent research, a strong and attractive innovation system, a diversified business sector and the ability to attract both strategic foreign direct investment and skilled labour within and outside the country. We must also make the necessary investments to maintain our own long-term competitiveness. This should be done in such a way that avoids negative effects on the multilateral regulatory framework, the EU single market and free movement.

Cooperation within the EU and NATO is key to enable us to strengthen our economic security. We also need to develop our bilateral cooperation with like-minded countries, including for the purpose of strengthening our understanding of how economic levers are used for security policy purposes and how this can be combated. A national strategic framework for economic security will be developed, and the dialogue between central government, the business sector and higher education institutions will be deepened. Increased awareness of intelligence-related threats and the risks of undesirable investments, acquisitions and unlawful technology transfers is an important instrument to strengthen economic security.

International research cooperation is crucial to enable excellent research and innovation to be conducted. However, openness and cooperation risk being unduly exploited by foreign powers and other actors. Research security must therefore be strengthened, including through increased knowledge and awareness of risks related to international cooperation. The ability to assess and manage these risks also needs to improve.

**Competitiveness**

Sweden’s competitiveness will be strengthened

The foundation of our future competitiveness is a school system that equips children and young people with necessary knowledge and abilities. Strong competitiveness requires high-quality education, training, research and innovation, particularly in cutting-edge technologies. Closer cooperation between the business sector and government agencies is needed to identify, develop and operationalise investments in technologies that are important to national security. The synergies between civil and defence-focused research and innovation systems will be harnessed.

Swedish actors’ leadership in strategically important technological fields, in which Sweden has strong assets, needs to be promoted. Funding of research and development forms the basis on which Sweden’s innovation capacity and competitiveness are created. In addition, the Government and its agencies, individually and jointly, need to have the ability to enable innovation and new technologies in the business sector and society by ensuring relevant regulatory frameworks and their application.

Central government’s promotion of the ecosystem for innovation strengthens Sweden’s economic security and helps enhance Sweden’s position as a partner on security policy. The Government will strive for strengthened transatlantic economic cooperation and research cooperation.

Competitiveness is also safeguarded through EU cooperation. Viable companies, a deepened single market, trade and innovation strengthen the EU’s resource base and thus its prospects of increased investments in security and geopolitical influence. Sweden is striving for strategic interests in the EU to be protected in a way that avoids negative effects on the single market.
This national security strategy sets out a direction for the Government’s work on issues that are of importance to Sweden’s national security. The strategy will be put into practice through concrete actions within the framework of the Government’s regular work, such as in proposals to the Riksdag, and through the issuing of directives to government agencies and other government decisions. More detailed instructions for the implementation of this national security strategy are also provided in the Government’s strategies for specific areas.

On behalf of the Government, the National Security Adviser is responsible for follow-up of the national security strategy. Continuous follow-up will take place in the National Security Council. The implementation of the strategy will also be reported on in special reports and followed up on a regular basis.