This revised edition of Joint Publication 4-0, *Joint Logistics*, is the keystone document of the joint logistics series and provides the doctrinal framework which describes how logistics is delivered to support joint operations across the range of military operations. Joint logistics enables all joint operations and represents a significant portion of our total efforts and resources.

The overarching ideas and principles contained in this publication provide a common perspective from which to plan, execute and control joint logistics operations in cooperation with our multinational partners and other United States Government agencies.

Recent operations have placed unprecedented requirements on joint logisticians operating in the most difficult environments. While support to the joint force has been nothing short of exceptional, the future operating environment will likely present joint logisticians with an increasingly complex set of challenges. The United States will face diverse challenges in an operating environment that will be more complex, more interconnected, more dynamic, and likely more volatile than ever before. Historically, the United States has derived its military superiority from a remarkable ability to translate technological innovation, industrial capacity and a robust logistical architecture into effective battlefield advantages. Our support to the warfighter has been displayed on battlefields across the globe for decades, and has been studied by our friends and potential adversaries alike. This exceptional logistical capability represents a potent force multiplier for our Nation.

The current and future environments present tremendous challenges for the joint force logistician. We have made great progress in recent years, but we must continue to develop joint logistics doctrine to optimize joint military, interagency and multinational capabilities.

While the operating environment constantly changes, the outcome the joint force commander expects will not. The joint force commander expects joint logistics to give him *sustained logistic readiness* which will provide *freedom of action* to effectively execute operations in support of national objectives.

M. G. MULLEN
Admiral, U. S. Navy
1. Scope

This publication is the keystone document of the joint logistics series. As such, it provides overarching joint doctrine on logistic support to joint operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine for the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for the conduct of joint logistics. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes the doctrinal framework within which logistics can be optimized for operations, education, and training. This publication is intended to provide guidance to JFCs and staffs, their subordinate component commands, and combat support agencies for joint logistic operations including the incorporation of interagency and coalition elements. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, the Services, and combat support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and be consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.
SUMMARY OF CHANGES

- Introduces the joint logistics environment (JLE)
- Describes the characteristics of the joint logistician
- Introduces the joint logistics imperatives
- Introduces US Transportation Command as the Distribution Process Owner
- Introduces US Joint Forces Command as the Joint Deployment Process Owner
- Introduces the Department of Defense supply chain
- Discontinues the use of the functions of logistics, the elements of the logistics process, and critical logistic enablers
- Introduces the core logistic capabilities and the subordinate functional capabilities
- Discusses joint operation planning and introduces joint logistic planning considerations
- Discusses joint logistic execution and logistics execution organizations
- Discusses the logistic staff organization and control options
- Introduces multinational and interagency arrangements
- Deleted chapter on joint theater logistics
- Deleted chapter on conflicts in the theater
- Revised Authorities and Responsibilities
- Added Appendix on Joint Logistic Roles and Responsibilities
- Added Appendix on Supply Commodity Executive Agents
- Revised Appendix on Joint Logistic Boards, Offices, Centers, Cells and Groups
Summary of Changes

- Added Appendix on Department of Defense Logistic-related Executive Agents
- Deleted Appendix on Focused Logistics
- Deleted Appendix on Logistic Indicators and Checklist for OPLANs and CONPLANs
- Revised the definition of component
- Added the definition of the joint deployment and distribution enterprise (JDDE)
- Revised the definition of logistics
- Revised the definition of joint logistics
- Added the definition of global command and support system – joint (GCSS-J)
- Deleted the definition of global command and support system (GCSS)
- Added the definition of process owner
- Deleted the term level of supply
- Revised the definition of time-definite delivery
- Establishes definition for sustained logistic readiness
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</td>
<td>vii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER I</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOINT LOGISTIC OVERVIEW</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Introduction</td>
<td>I-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Logistics</td>
<td>I-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• The Joint Logistics Environment</td>
<td>I-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Logistics Imperatives</td>
<td>I-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Integrating Functions</td>
<td>I-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Core Logistic Capabilities</td>
<td>I-9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supply Chain Management</td>
<td>I-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER II</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORE LOGISTIC CAPABILITIES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Introduction</td>
<td>II-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Supply</td>
<td>II-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Maintenance Operations</td>
<td>II-4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deployment and Distribution</td>
<td>II-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Health Service Support</td>
<td>II-8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Engineering</td>
<td>II-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Logistic Services</td>
<td>II-14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Operational Contract Support</td>
<td>II-15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER III</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLANNING JOINT LOGISTICS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Introduction</td>
<td>III-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Operation Planning</td>
<td>III-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Planning Functions</td>
<td>III-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Logistic Planning Considerations</td>
<td>III-11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER IV</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EXECUTING JOINT LOGISTICS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Introduction</td>
<td>IV-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Joint Logistic Execution</td>
<td>IV-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Framework for Joint Logistics</td>
<td>IV-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Concluding Joint Logistic Operations</td>
<td>IV-6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## CHAPTER V
CONTROLLING JOINT LOGISTICS

- Introduction ....................................................................................................... V-1
- Authorities and Responsibilities ....................................................................... V-1
- Logistics Directorate, J-4 .............................................................................. V-4
- Logistics Execution Organizations ................................................................. V-6
- Logistic Control Options ............................................................................... V-11
- Technology ........................................................................................................ V-12
- Multinational and Interagency Arrangements .............................................. V-13
- Control of Joint Logistics .............................................................................. V-14

## APPENDIX

A Joint Logistic Roles and Responsibilities .................................................. A-1
B Supply Commodity Executive Agents ...................................................... B-1
C Joint Logistic Boards, Offices, Centers, Cells, and Groups ....................... C-1
D Department of Defense Logistics-Related Executive Agents ...................... D-1
E References ........................................................................................................ E-1
F Administrative Instructions .......................................................................... F-1

## GLOSSARY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Part</th>
<th>Abbreviations and Acronyms</th>
<th>GL-1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Part</td>
<td>Terms and Definitions</td>
<td>GL-5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## FIGURE

| I-1  | Joint Logistics Environment Operating Framework | I-4 |
| I-2  | Global Relationships                            | I-6 |
| I-3  | Core Logistic Capabilities                      | I-10|
| III-1| Joint Operation Planning Activities, Functions, and Products | III-2|
| III-2| Phasing Model                                    | III-6|
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Describes Joint Logistics as part of the Sustainment Joint Function
• Defines and Describes Joint Logistics and the Role of Joint Logisticians
• Discusses the Joint Logistics Environment within the Operational Environment and the Levels of War
• Lists the Joint Logistics Imperatives and Integrating Functions
• Describes the Core Logistic Capabilities
• Addresses Planning for Joint Logistics and its Integration within the Joint Operation Planning Process
• Describes Execution of Joint Logistics and the Organizational Framework for that Execution
• Describes the Control of Joint Logistics and the Required Authorities and Responsibilities

Joint Logistics Overview

Joint logistics is an essential component of joint operations because the Services, by themselves, seldom have sufficient capability to independently support the joint force.

The Nation’s ability to project and sustain military power depends on effective joint logistics. Joint logistics delivers sustained logistic readiness for the combatant commander (CCDR) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) through the integration of national, multinational, Service, and combat support agency (CSA) capabilities. The integration of these capabilities ensures forces are physically available and properly equipped, at the right place and time, to support the joint force.

The changing operational environment presents numerous, evolving challenges. This publication provides guidance for joint logistic operations, describes those core logistic capabilities that are essential to success, and offers a framework within which joint logistics can be planned, executed and controlled effectively.

Sustainment and Joint Logistics

Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission completion. Sustainment in joint operations provides the JFC flexibility, endurance, and the ability to extend operational reach. Effective sustainment
determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Sustainment is primarily the responsibility of the supported CCDR and subordinate Service component commanders in close cooperation with the Services, CSAs, and supporting commands.

**Joint Logisticians**

Joint logisticians are military officers, warrant officers, enlisted personnel, civilians, and contractors that specialize in providing joint logistics support that extends from the national industrial base to the end user. Joint logisticians are the planners, executors, and controllers of core joint logistic capabilities. They understand tactical, operational, and strategic operations and synchronize efforts to effectively meet joint force requirements.

**Joint Logistics Environment**

Political and military leaders conduct operations in a complex, interconnected, and increasingly global operational environment. This environment is characterized by uncertainty and surprise. Operations are also distributed and conducted rapidly and simultaneously across multiple joint operations areas (JOAs) within a single theater or across boundaries of more than one geographic combatant commander and can involve a large variety of military forces and multinational and other government organizations (OGAs). The joint logistics environment (JLE) exists within this operational environment and consists of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of logistic capabilities. It exists at the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war; and includes the full range of logistic capabilities, stakeholders and end-to-end processes.

**Levels of War**

Joint logistics spans the strategic, operational and tactical levels of war. It is, however, at the tactical level where the principal outcome – sustained logistic readiness – of joint logistics must be measured. At the strategic level, joint logistics is characterized by the vast capacity of the Nation’s industrial base, both government and commercial. At the operational level, joint logistics has its most significant impact. It is at the operational level that strategic and tactical capabilities, processes, and requirements intersect, and it is here where the essence of joint logistics resides. The tactical level represents that part of the operational environment where outcomes are realized. At the tactical level, logistic support is Service oriented and executed.
Key Global Providers

The key global providers in the JLE are the Services, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM). Global providers manage end-to-end processes that provide capabilities to the supported CCDR, and are challenged to link the CCDR requirements to the outcomes of those processes. Services lie in the heart of this collaborative network and their logistic organizations form the foundation of the JLE and are responsible to maintain systems life-cycle readiness. DLA and the Services share responsibilities as suppliers to the joint force since both “manage” supplies in support of readiness requirements. In this shared role, they support the components of the joint force with equipment and supplies needed for sustained logistic readiness. USJFCOM is the primary conventional force provider to CCDRs, which includes serving as the Department of Defense (DOD) Joint Deployment Process Owner (JDPO). USTRANSCOM is responsible for providing common-user and commercial air, land, and sea transportation, terminal management, and aerial refueling to support the global deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of US forces.

Joint Logistics Imperatives

The value of joint logistics can be determined by how well three imperatives are attained: **unity of effort**, **JLE-wide visibility**, and **rapid and precise response**. These imperatives define the desired attributes of a federation of systems, processes, and organizations that effectively adapt within a constantly changing environment to meet the emerging needs of the supported CCDR.

To achieve **unity of effort**, joint logisticians must develop a clear understanding of how joint and multinational logistic processes work; know the roles and responsibilities of the providers executing tasks in those processes; build agreement around common measures of performance (process outcomes); and ensure appropriate members of the JLE have visibility into the processes.

**JLE-wide visibility** is having assured access to logistic processes, resources and requirements in order to gain the knowledge necessary to make effective decisions. JLE-wide visibility provides the means to optimize logistic processes to maximize outcomes, increase readiness, and build confidence in joint logistics.
Rapid and precise response is the ability of the core logistics capability areas to meet the constantly changing needs of the joint force.

Integrating Functions

Sustained logistic readiness is driven by the effective and efficient delivery of joint logistics through coordinating and integrating Service, agency, and other capabilities to meet the supported commander’s requirements. To achieve this level of integration, commanders and their staffs, especially logisticians, must be able to: effectively and efficiently plan, execute, control, and assess joint logistic operations. Planning for joint logistic support links the mission, commander’s intent, and operational objectives to core logistic capabilities, procedures, and organizations. Joint logistic planning defines joint processes to establish an effective concept for logistic support. Executing joint logistics involves the employment of capabilities and resources to support joint and multinational operations. Effective control of joint logistic operations results from the exercise of authority and direction for the sustained logistic readiness of the joint force.

Supply Chain Management

The DOD supply chain is a global network that delivers materiel to the joint force. Its fundamental goal is to maximize force readiness while optimizing the allocation of resources. The logistic capabilities that contribute to the DOD supply chain includes fulfillment of commodity requisitions from supply, the distribution capabilities from deployment and distribution, and movement and retrograde of repairable items to support maintenance activities. Supply chain management synchronizes the processes, resources, and efforts of key global providers to meet CCDR requirements.

Core Logistic Capabilities

Core logistic capabilities provide a framework to facilitate integrated decision-making, enable effective synchronization and allocation of resources, and optimize joint logistic processes. The challenges associated with support cut across all core logistic capabilities – especially when multiple joint task forces or multinational partners are involved. The core logistic capabilities are supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, health service support (HSS), engineering, logistic services, and operational contract support.
The joint force commander (JFC) must plan for long-term internment operations. The JFC should ensure that all transfer or release operations are conducted in accordance with applicable law and policy.

The joint logistician effectively integrates three functional capabilities within the supply core logistic capability: managing supplies and equipment, managing inventory, and managing supplier networks. Specifically, supply demand planning involves the joint force operation planners, Service maintenance operations, and the distribution system to fully consider major components of the logistics pipeline beyond commodity stockpiles. Demand planning is accomplished in a collaborative environment to provide responsive supply operations. Another focus area critical to effective supply operations is the return and retrograde of equipment and supplies. Both demand planning and return and retrograde functions involve collaboration and execution by all three areas of the DOD supply chain.

Manage Supplies and Equipment. Attaining the JFC’s desired material readiness goals requires effective integration and management of supply operations. Integrated supply operations capitalize on supplier network performance capabilities and the integrated links with the supporting distribution and maintenance systems.

Inventory Management Operations. Managing inventory throughout the supply chain requires collaboration with supply and maintenance activities and distribution providers to enable the greatest effect at best value. Maintaining optimal stockage levels and accountability of materiel throughout the supply chain enables the joint logistician to manage the flow of materiel between strategic and tactical supply nodes to meet warfighter requirements.

Manage Supplier Networks. Supply operations extend to supplier selection and include management of DOD supplier networks. This role is performed by DLA and the Service materiel commands. As DOD’s supplier, DLA acquires needed materiel and supplies by purchasing, scheduling, shipping, receiving, and inspecting items. Additionally, the JFC exploits DLA and Service capabilities to source materiel within the theater via forward depots, forward repair activities, pre-positioned materiel, and contracting authorities.

Maintenance Operations

Maintenance operations deliver systems readiness for the JFC. The Services, as part of their Title 10, US Code (USC), responsibilities, execute maintenance as a core logistic capability. To execute this responsibility, Services employ a maintenance strategy that supports
Executive Summary

the JFC’s freedom of action through depot and field level maintenance to maintain the fleet readiness of units and capabilities. Maintenance is accomplished across DOD at two levels: depot level (sustainment) and field level (intermediate and organizational). These two levels are distinguished largely by their relative capabilities, flexibility, and capacity—they are not defined by the physical location at which a task is performed.

Depot Maintenance Operations. The purpose of depot maintenance is to repair, modify, rebuild and overhaul both entire systems and components and is directly linked to life cycle systems readiness.

Field Maintenance Operations. The purpose of field level maintenance is to rapidly return systems to users in a ready status. Field maintenance encompasses both intermediate and organizational levels and consists of shop maintenance supporting both the supply chain and weapon systems with component and end item repair.

Life Cycle Systems Readiness (LCSR). A LCSR capability enables the requirements, acquisition, and sustainment communities to provide systems with optimal availability and reliability to the joint warfighter at best value to the Services. Fleet management of our systems is critical and can only be enabled by a life cycle approach.

Deployment and Distribution

The deployment and distribution capability moves forces and logistic support globally and on time meeting the required delivery date and providing time definite delivery to meet the needs of the CCDR. Through sharing of critical information, it is possible to create unity of effort among diverse distribution organizations, and provide end-to-end support to satisfy deployment execution and sustainment operations. Visibility through the joint deployment and distribution enterprise (JDDE) provides the CCDR, in conjunction with the global providers, the capability to see and redirect strategic and operational commodity/force flow in support of current and projected priorities.

Move the Force. USJFCOM as the JDPO serves as the DOD focal point to improve the joint deployment process supporting joint and multinational operations, and interagency coordination. USJFCOM and other joint force providers are supported by USTRANSCOM during the planning and execution of the deployment and redeployment process.
Executive Summary

Sustain the Force. USTRANSCOM as the Distribution Process Owner (DPO) is responsible for coordination and overseeing the DOD distribution system to provide interoperability, synchronization, and alignment of DOD wide, end-to-end distribution.

Operate the JDDE. The JDDE is that complex of equipment, procedures, doctrine, leaders, technical connectivity, information, shared knowledge, organizations, facilities, training, and materiel necessary to conduct joint distribution operations. USTRANSCOM, as the DPO, will exercise control of the JDDE through coordination and synchronization with the other community of interest partners.

Health Service Support

The purpose of HSS is to maintain the individual and group health needed to accomplish a military mission. The CCDR requires medical capabilities that are scalable to the requirement, interoperable with other medical forces, and capable of rapid deployment into the JOA. The primary facilitators of HSS for the DOD are the Services, Service components, USTRANSCOM, DLA as the Class VIII executive agent (EA), and direct vendors. HSS is organized into five functional capabilities designed to deliver full HSS to the joint force.

Casualty management is the delivery of medical treatment from point of injury or illness, through patient movement, to definitive care.

Patient movement is the act or process of moving a sick, injured, wounded or other person to obtain medical and/or dental care or treatment. Functions include medical regulating, patient evacuation and en route medical care.

Medical logistics is the management of medical materiel blood products, medical maintenance, and optical fabrication.

Preventive medicine and health surveillance is the prevention of communicable disease and illness and protection of the force from exposure to health threats.

The theater medical information program is a tri-Service system that is designed to provide information to deployed medical forces to support all medical functional areas to include medical command and control.
Joint force engineers provide the optimum mix of Service engineer capabilities to maximize JFC freedom of action. The functions which define joint operational engineering help the joint force engineer integrate, synchronize and direct engineer operations. These functions include combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial engineering.

**Combat engineering** consists of those engineer capabilities and activities that support the maneuver of land combat forces and which require close support to those forces. Combat engineering enhances operational movement, maneuver, and force protection by facilitating mobility, countermobility, and survivability.

**General engineering** consists of those engineer capabilities and activities, other than combat engineering, that modify, maintain, or protect the physical environment. General engineering is a diverse functional area involving horizontal and vertical construction as well as numerous specialized capabilities, such as well drilling and tactical pipelines.

**Geospatial engineering** consists of those engineer capabilities and activities that contribute to a clear understanding of the physical environment by providing geospatial information and services to commanders and staffs. Geospatial engineering provides terrain visualization; operational and tactical terrain analysis; digitized terrain, standard and nonstandard map products, and imagery which may assist in setting environmental baselines for US occupied sites as well as identifying locations of natural, cultural and historical resources.

**Logistic Services**

Logistic services comprise the support capabilities that collectively enable the US to rapidly provide global sustainment for our military forces. Logistic services include many disparate activities that are highly scalable capabilities. Included in this area are food, water and ice, base camp, and hygiene services.

**Food services** includes planning, synchronizing and managing subsistence support to the joint force to include dining facility management, subsistence procurement and storage, food preparation, field feeding and nutrition awareness.
Water and ice operations produce, test, store, and distribute bulk water and packaged ice in an expeditionary environment.

Base camp services provide shelter, billeting, waste management and common user life support management in an expeditionary environment.

Hygiene services provide laundry, shower, textile and fabric repair.

Operational Contract Support

The Department of Defense increasingly relies on contractors to perform a multitude of functions and tasks. Factors that have led to this increased reliance include reductions in the size of military forces (especially in the combat support and combat service support areas), increases in operations tempo and missions undertaken by the military, increased complexity and sophistication of weapon systems, and a continued push to gain efficiencies and reduce costs through the outsourcing or privatizing of commercially adaptable functions.

The contract support integration functional capability can be utilized by the CCDR to ensure Service and component contract support augments organic military and government sources of support in an efficient and effective manner. This functional capability synchronizes the provision of contracted support through a process that optimizes JFC operational planning, requirements development, contract development, execution and closeout towards meeting the requirements of deployed forces within the operational area.

Contractor management provides the CCDR with the capability to orchestrate, functionally manage and maintain visibility over contractor personnel supporting the Joint Force in the designated operational area. While contractor management is related to contract support integration, contractor management largely concerns the activities of government and military activities charged with carrying out respective responsibilities for integrating contractor personnel into joint operations and in complying with terms and conditions in the contract, including requirements to provide government furnished support.

Planning Joint Logistics

The demands and complexities of global operations require that joint logistic planning be an integral part of all planning activities to deliver adaptive, integrated, and synchronized joint logistic support. Effective planning enables logisticians to anticipate requirements, and validate,
Executive Summary

Joint logistic planning be an integral part of all planning activities.

Synchronize and integrate them with available resources to minimize duplication of effort, resolve shortfalls, mitigate risk and ensure effective support of CCDR requirements.

Joint Operation Planning

Joint operation planning is the overarching process that guides CCDRs in developing plans for the employment of military power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) share the same basic approach and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and course of action development. The combination of JOPES and JOPP promotes coherent planning across all levels of war and command echelons, whether the requirement is for a limited, single-phase operation such as noncombatant evacuation or for a multiphase campaign involving major combat operations. Joint operation planning encompasses a number of elements, including four planning functions: Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development, and Plan Assessment.

The Principles of Logistics

The joint logistician can use the principles of logistics as a guide for analytical thinking when assessing combatant commander courses of action or plans. Responsiveness is providing the right support when it’s needed and where it’s needed. Responsiveness is characterized by the reliability of support and the speed of response to the CCDR needs. Simplicity is defined as a minimum of complexity in logistics operations. Simplicity fosters efficiency in planning and execution, and allows for more effective control over logistic operations. Flexibility is the ability to improvise and adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions and operational requirements. Flexibility is reflected in how well logistics responds in an environment of unpredictability. Economy is defined as the amount of resources required to deliver a specific outcome. Economy is achieved when support is provided using the fewest resources within acceptable levels of risk. Attainability is the assurance that the minimum essential supplies and services required to execute operations will be available. Attainability is the point at which the CCDR or JFC judges that sufficient supplies, support, distribution capabilities, and line of communication capacity exist to initiate operations at an acceptable level of risk. Sustainability is the ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a
Executive Summary

function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. **Survivability** is the capacity of an organization to prevail in the face of potential threats. Survivability is directly affected by dispersion, design of operational logistic processes and the allocation of forces to protect critical logistic infrastructure.

**The Planning Functions**

**Strategic Guidance**

During mission analysis joint logisticians must provide critical information to operations planners on the guidance contained in strategic logistical documents such as the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (Mobility and Logistic supplements) and related or supplemental publications.

**Concept Development**

Logistic planners coordinate and integrate planning efforts with operational planners so that sustainment requirements are an integral part of course of action development. The logistician identifies requirements and critical items and services needed and must be fully aware of force structure planning, time-phased force and deployment data development and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration requirements as they commence development of concepts of support (addressing supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, HSS, engineering, logistic services, and operational contract support) to meet sustainment requirements from theater entry and operations, to redeployment and reset. It is not uncommon for logistics and support operations to begin prior to or concurrent with planning. Thus logistic planners and their concepts of support need to remain flexible and sensitive to the ever evolving operational requirements and changing force structure/organization of the joint force.

**Plan Development**

A clear understanding of the concept of operations is essential to the joint logistician’s ability to meet joint force requirements. Because logistic support is provided through a variety of different organizations, joint logistic planning must provide the integration mechanism to unify all sources of support. The joint logistic concept of support specifies how capabilities will be delivered over time, it identifies who is responsible for delivering a capability, and it defines the critical logistical tasks necessary to achieve objectives during the phases of the operation.
The logistic concept of support coordinates the capabilities of joint, multinational, host nation, interagency, intergovernmental organization (IGO), nongovernmental organization (NGO), plus Active Component and Reserve Component forces.

**Assessment (Plan Refinement, Adaptation, Termination, or Execution)**

The supported commander extends and refines planning while supporting and subordinate commanders complete their plans. Branch plans and other options continue to be developed. The CCDR and staff continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would trigger plan refinement, adaptation, termination, or execution. **Preparation** includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement. The planning process now requires the CCDR to conduct **modeling and simulations** to test operational concepts as early as COA development to identify potential risks or impediments that could prevent mission success. The use of war games, simulations, or table exercises often enable joint logisticians to work directly with the operations planners as they seek to conduct assessments and identify risk. **Rehearsals** are used as another tool to assess the effectiveness of the concept of support, to familiarize supporting joint forces with the concept, and to provide all concerned with confidence in the selected concept. In order to **monitor** the progress or effectiveness of plans in execution, logisticians and various subject matter experts identify expected outcomes from the concept of support that will be used to assess logistics progress.

**Joint Logistic Planning Considerations**

The principal focus of joint logistic planning is at the operational level. The challenge for logisticians is to link strategic resources to tactical unit requirements. The objective of joint logistic planning is to fully integrate and coordinate support and operational execution to ensure sustained operational readiness of the joint force. After the execution of a joint operation, the CCDR’s planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping timeframes and organizational elements: **future plans, future operations, and current operations**. Operations and logistics are most effectively integrated as part of a collaborative planning process that includes subordinate component commands, supporting commands and global providers. Historically, **demand** for items increases faster than the supply system can provide, and special management actions might become necessary. To anticipate campaign priorities, planners must: provide instructions or guidance
for redistributing common-use assets from low to high-priority organizations within the command. Automatic (push) resupply works best for commodities and classes of materiel with constant usage rates (e.g., rations). **Requisitioning (pull)** is preferable for variable usage rate requirements (e.g., repair parts). Properly used and regulated, a combination of push and pull resupply will reduce unused or wasted space by adding predictability as well as combining compatible loads, thus resulting in a more effective as well as more efficient use of transportation assets and the logistic footprint in-theater.

**Joint Logistic Execution**

JFCs must be able to adapt to evolving mission requirements and operate effectively across a range of military operations. This range of military operations extends from shaping activities to major operations and campaigns. Joint logisticians must have a general understanding of the diversity, range, and scope of military operations and understand their role in each type of operation. Shaping activities include military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence. Developing mutually supportive relationships to enhance coordination between regional partners and CCDRs is an important enabler for joint logistic operations. **Crisis response and limited contingency operations** are usually single, small-scale, limited-duration operations. Many of these operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with OGA, IGO, and NGO elements. Logisticians must understand multinational and interagency logistical capabilities and coordinate mutual support, integrating them into the joint operation when appropriate. Many crisis response missions, such as foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, require time-sensitive sourcing of critical commodities and capabilities, and rapid delivery to the point of need. In these operations, joint logistics is most often the main effort. The primary challenges for logisticians during these types of operations are gaining visibility of the requirements, sensing competing priorities and adjusting continuously as the situation unfolds to ensure sustained readiness over time. **Major operations or campaigns** typically involve the deployment, sustainment, and retrograde of large combat forces. Joint logisticians develop support plans for the duration of the operation, as well as the return of equipment to the continental United States or other locations.

**Organizing for Execution**

The joint logistician must be aware of the characteristics and focus of operations and tailor logistics support appropriately. Peacetime shaping activities include military engagement, security cooperation, and
Executive Summary

deterrence. Developing mutually supportive relationships to enhance coordination between regional partners and combatant commanders is an important enabler for joint logistic operations. Crisis response and limited contingency operations are usually single, small scale, limited-duration operations. Joint logisticians must understand multinational and interagency logistical capabilities and appropriately integrate them into these types of operations. Many crisis response missions, such as foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, require time-sensitive sourcing of critical commodities and capabilities, and rapid delivery to the point of need. In these operations, joint logistics is most often the main effort. Civil support refers to Department of Defense support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies, and for designated law enforcement and other activities. To address the wide range of civil support requirements, joint logistic operations frequently involve supplying food and water, providing medical support, creating temporary shelter, contracting support capabilities, conducting distribution operations and assisting in the evacuation of the populace. Major operations or campaigns typically involve the deployment and sustainment of large combat forces. Joint logisticians develop support plans for the deployment and sustainment of those forces for the duration of the operation. The primary challenges for joint logisticians during these types of operations are gaining visibility of the requirements, sensing competing priorities, and adjusting continuously as the situation unfolds to ensure sustained readiness over time.

Joint Logistics Framework

The CCDR’s logistic staff must be able to rapidly and effectively transition from peacetime/planning activities to monitoring, assessing, planning, and directing logistic operations throughout the theater. As the operational tempo increases during a contingency or crisis, additional joint logisticians and selected subject matter experts (maintenance, ordnance, supply, etc.) can augment joint deployment and distribution operation centers and use established networks and command relationships instead of creating new staffs with inherent startup delays and inefficiencies.

Controlling Joint Logistics

Control is inherent in command; however, the joint logistician will rarely have unity of joint logistics command, and subsequently control of joint logistics is more challenging. Control of joint logistics involves organizing the joint staff and operational level logistic elements and their capabilities to assist in planning and executing joint logistic support
operations, integrating and synchronizing responsibilities, designating lead Service responsibilities and developing procedures to execute the CCDR’s directive authority for logistics (DAFL) when required. While logistics remains a Service responsibility, there are processes and tasks that must be considered when developing a concept of support in order to optimize joint logistic outcomes.

**Authorities and Responsibilities**

This authority includes all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics. Title 10, USC, and DOD Directive 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*, describe the statutory requirements for each Military Department to provide logistical support to assigned forces. **Combatant command** (command authority) over assigned forces is vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by Title 10, USC, and cannot be delegated or transferred. This authority over assigned forces includes DAFL, which gives the CCDR the authority to organize logistic resources within theater according to the operational needs. **Administrative control** is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support, to include the organization of Service forces and control of resources and equipment.

**Directive Authority for Logistics**

The exercise of DAFL by a CCDR includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures necessary to ensure the following: effective execution of approved operation plans; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands. In exercising DAFL, CCDRs have an inherent obligation to ensure accountability of resources. This obligation is an acknowledgement of the Military Departments Title 10, USC, responsibilities, and recognizes that the Military Departments do not resource their forces to support other DOD forces.

**Executive Agent**

The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or Deputy Secretary of Defense may designate a DOD EA and assign associated responsibilities, functions, and authorities within DOD. The head of a DOD component may be designated as a DOD EA. The nature and scope of the DOD EA responsibilities, functions, and authorities shall be prescribed at the
time of assignment and remain in effect until the SecDef or Deputy Secretary of Defense revokes or supersedes them.

Lead Service

The CCDR may choose to assign specific common user logistic functions, to include both planning and execution to a lead Service. These assignments can be for single or multiple common logistical functions, and may also be based on phases and/or locations within the area of responsibility. Geographic combatant commander lead Service assignments are normally aligned to Office of the Secretary of Defense-level EA designations, but this may not always be the case.

Logistics Directorate, J-4

The logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) is the CCDR’s principal staff organization responsible for integrating logistics planning and execution in support of joint operations. The J-4 staff executes its’ responsibilities by integrating, coordinating and synchronizing Service component logistic capabilities in support of joint force requirements. The J-4 is also responsible for advising the JFC of the logistic support that can be provided, and for optimizing available resources to provide the most effective joint outcomes by fusing information to facilitate integrated, quality decision-making. In addition, the J-4 must be able to integrate and effectively employ capabilities related to multinational support (acquisition cross-servicing agreement, security assistance, etc.), host nation support and interagency support.

The J-4 is responsible for ensuring adequate logistic expertise is an integral part of the planning process. The J-4 should establish a planning cell to fulfill this responsibility. The J-4 should establish a joint logistics operations center (JLOC) to monitor and control the execution of logistics in support of on-going operations. The JLOC is an integral part of the CCDR’s operations element and provides joint logistics expertise to the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) operations cell.

Synchronizing and integrating the many joint logistics functional capabilities, multinational and interagency capabilities and operational contract support may require the J-4 to establish a location or center where the requirements, resources, and processes can come together in a way that provides knowledge to effect quality decision-making. This fusion of information is essential to effective logistics support and critical to enabling the J-4 to “see the logistics battlefield” with clarity. This “fusion” element is comprised of functional experts representing...
the joint logistics functions, and provides functional assessments, analysis, and expertise to the planning and execution elements of the J-4. The CCDR may also establish boards, centers and offices to meet increased requirements and to coordinate logistic efforts.

The J-4’s size is tailored to meet its mission requirements. The core element is sized/tailored to perform its functions under “normal” day-to-day conditions and provides the continuity and theater expertise to transition to an increased operational tempo should a CCDR move into a contingency or crisis.

Logistics Execution Organizations

The fundamental role of joint logistics is to integrate and coordinate logistic capabilities from Service, agency and other providers of logistic support, and to facilitate execution of the Services’ Title 10, USC, responsibilities while supporting the ever-changing needs of the JFC. The Services’ operational-level logistic control structures form the basis for joint operations, thus it is important understand how each Service and US Special Operations Command conducts logistics at the operational level.

Logistic Control Options

The need for rapid and precise response under crisis action, wartime conditions, or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary in the conduct of joint operations, the CCDR’s logistic authority enables him to use all logistic capabilities of all forces assigned as necessary for the accomplishment of the mission. The President or SecDef may extend this authority to attached forces when transferring those forces for a specific mission and should specify this authority in the establishing directive or order.

The J-4 staff may be used to support a wide range of operations including campaigns; complex and/or long duration major operations; or complex operations involving multiagency, IGO, NGO and/or multinational forces, if properly augmented. When exercising this option the CCDR must specify the control authorities being bestowed on the J-4 and the control authorities this staff office will have when working with the components logistics elements. Taskings to Service component logistic elements in this case must come from formal tasking orders issued through the CCDR J-3.
As another alternative for controlling the major operations outlined above, the CCDR may elect to assign responsibility to establish a joint command for logistics to a subordinate Service component. The senior logistics headquarters of the designated Service component will normally serve as the basis for this command, an organization joint by mission (e.g., campaigns, major operations, humanitarian missions), but not by design. When exercising this option, the CCDR retains directive authority for logistics, and must specify the control and tasking authorities being bestowed upon the subordinate joint command for logistics, as well as the command relationships it will have with the Service components.

**Multinational Operations**

Integrating and synchronizing logistics in a multinational environment requires developing interoperable logistic concepts and doctrine, as well as clearly identifying and integrating the appropriate logistical processes, organizations, and command and control options. Multinational logistics is a challenge; however, leveraging multinational logistical capabilities increases the CCDR’s freedom of action. In today’s operational environment, logisticians will likely be working with multinational partners. While the United States maintains the capability to act unilaterally, it is likely that the requirement, and the desire, to operate with multinational partners will continue to increase.

**Other Agency and Organization Coordination**

Integration and coordination among military forces, OGAs, and NGOs and IGOs is different from the coordination requirements of a purely military operation. Their operating procedures will undoubtedly differ from one organization to another and with the DOD. Ultimately, some OGAs, NGOs and IGOs may even have policies not in consonance with those of DOD. As in multinational operations, the benefit of leveraging the unique skills and capabilities that NGOs and IGOs possess can serve as a force multiplier in providing the joint warfighter more robust logistics.
CHAPTER I
JOINT LOGISTIC OVERVIEW

“Logistics is the bridge between the economy of the Nation and the tactical operations of its combat forces. Obviously, then, the logistics system must be in harmony, both with the economic system of the Nation and with the tactical concepts and environment of the combat forces.”

--Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles, US Navy (1959)

1. Introduction

a. The Nation’s ability to project and sustain military power depends on effective joint logistics. Joint logistics delivers sustained logistic readiness for the combatant commander (CCDR) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) through the integration of national, multinational, Service, and combat support agency (CSA) capabilities. The integration of these capabilities ensures forces are physically available and properly equipped, at the right place and time, to support the joint force. Joint logisticians coordinate sustained logistic readiness through the integrating functions of planning, executing and controlling joint logistic operations.

b. A clear understanding of joint logistics- its description, personnel, core capabilities, functions, imperatives, and the operational environment will enable CCDRs and their staffs to meet global challenges across the range of military operations. These operations vary in size, purpose, and intensity extending from military engagement, security cooperation and deterrence through crisis response, and limited contingency operations, to major operations and campaigns if necessary. The changing operational environment presents numerous, evolving joint force challenges. This publication provides guidance for joint logistic operations, describes those core logistic capabilities that are essential to success, and offers a framework within which joint logistics can be planned, executed, and controlled effectively.

c. The six joint functions described in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, include Command and Control (C2), Intelligence, Fires, Movement and Maneuver, Protection, and Sustainment. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission completion. Sustainment in joint operations provides the JFC flexibility, endurance and the ability to extend operational reach. Effective sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Sustainment is primarily the responsibility of the supported CCDR and subordinate Service component commanders in close cooperation with the Services, CSAs, and supporting commands. Key considerations include employment of logistic forces, facilities, environmental considerations, health service support (HSS), host-nation support (HNS), contracting, disposal operations, legal support, religious support, and financial management. This publication will concentrate on the logistic function of sustainment; the personnel services function can be found in the JP 1-0 series.
2. Joint Logistics

a. **Joint logistics is the coordinated use, synchronization, and sharing of two or more Military Departments’ logistic resources to support the joint force.** From a national perspective, it can be thought of as the ability to project and sustain a logistically ready joint force through the sharing of Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, and industrial resources. In today’s operating environment this will include coordination and sharing of resources from multinational partners, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). This provides the JFC the freedom of action necessary to meet mission objectives. It is an essential component of joint operations because the Services, by themselves, seldom have sufficient capability to independently support a joint force. By purposefully combining capabilities, the commander can optimize the allocation of limited resources to provide maximum flexibility to the joint force. It is this kind of interdependence, focused on common outcomes, that delivers sustained logistic readiness.

b. **Personnel.** Joint logisticians are military officers, warrant officers, enlisted personnel, civilians, and contractors that specialize in providing joint logistics support that extends from the national industrial base to the end user. Joint logisticians are the planners, executors, and controllers of core joint logistic capabilities. They understand tactical, operational, and strategic operations and synchronize efforts to effectively meet joint force requirements. Joint logisticians reach a level of proficiency through a combination of training, education, and operational experience created by Service, joint, and multinational duty assignments.

(1) Key attributes of a logistician include:

(a) An ability to effectively apply joint logistic policy, doctrine, rules, tools, and processes to enhance the readiness of the joint force.

(b) An ability to translate commander’s intent, mission, and operational objectives into the required logistic-related tasks.

(c) An ability to understand the operational situation in order to analyze available information to determine if joint logistic processes are established and working.

(d) An ability to plan and execute logistics in an ever changing operational environment that includes significant ambiguity and uncertainty.

(e) An ability to forecast logistic requirements, shortfalls and solutions, and to clearly articulate the logistic feasibility of an operation plan (OPLAN).

(f) An ability to integrate Service, host nation (HN), and multinational logistic capabilities in support of a joint force.
(g) An ability to assist JFCs as they exercise authority and provide direction for the common support of forces.

(h) An ability to integrate and exploit commercial sector logistic practices and processes.

Joint Logisticians Education and Development

One of the most critical considerations for the development, enhancement and control of joint logistics is the process that trains, educates and develops joint and Service logisticians, including military, civilians and contractors. Supporting joint logistic human capital development extends across a broad range of areas from acquisition and industrial processes to logistical support operations. Effective joint logistic management in an ever-changing environment requires a global, systematic and long-term approach to make the most beneficial decisions in support of the joint force and to ensure sustained logistic readiness for the joint force commander (JFC). In addition to developing a Service centric core expertise, logisticians must learn how to think about the complex and dynamic challenges they will face- developing a mature global perspective for prioritization of effort and being comfortable with making decisions in an uncertain operational environment. There is also an experiential component to developing joint logistic skills; some things can only be learned through performance of tasks. Joint logisticians are not expected to possess all the in-depth knowledge necessary to fully support the joint force. However, each is expected to be an expert in their Service or agency’s logistic profession, enabling the JFC to integrate diverse logistical support capabilities for the joint force.

(2) Joint logisticians are exposed to logistic operations in a complex, diverse, globally distributed and interdependent joint, interagency, and multinational environment. When logisticians return to their Services from joint assignments, they have a broader knowledge of logistic capabilities from the strategic to the tactical level.

c. The Operational Environment. The operational environment will continue to change and increase in complexity. Therefore, core logistic capabilities must continue to evolve to meet the demands of this dynamic environment. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, describes the operational environment as the composite of conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment.
3. The Joint Logistics Environment

a. **Complexity.** Political and military leaders conduct operations in a complex, interconnected, and increasingly global operational environment. This environment is characterized by uncertainty and surprise. Operations are also distributed and conducted rapidly and simultaneously across multiple joint operations areas (JOAs) within a single theater or across boundaries of more than one geographic combatant commander (GCC) and can involve a large variety of military forces and multinational and other government organizations. The joint logistics environment (JLE) exists within this operational environment and consists of the conditions, circumstances and influences that affect the employment of logistic capabilities. It exists at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war; and includes the full range of logistic capabilities, stakeholders, and end-to-end processes (See figure I-1). Understanding this environment and its characteristics is essential to planning, executing, and controlling logistic operations.

![Figure I-1. Joint Logistics Environment Operating Framework](image)

b. **Physical Domains.** Joint logistics takes place within the physical domains of air, land, maritime, and space. Service components provide the expertise within these domains and the JFC and staff focus on leveraging and integrating those capabilities.
Chapter V, “Controlling Joint Logistics,” provides additional detail on Service logistic control elements and guidance on how these capabilities might be used to leverage the control of joint logistic operations.

c. **Information Environment.** The global dispersion of the joint force and the rapidity with which threats arise have made real-time or near real-time information critical to support military operations. Joint logistic planning, execution, and control depend on continuous access to make effective decisions. Protected access to networks is imperative to sustain joint force readiness and allow rapid and precise response to meet JFC requirements.

d. **Levels of War.** Joint logistics spans all levels of war. It is, however, at the tactical level where the principal outcome - sustained logistic readiness - of joint logistics must be measured.

   (1) **Strategic.** At the strategic level, joint logistics is characterized by the vast capacity of the Nation’s industrial base, both government and commercial. The Nation’s ability to project and sustain military power comes from the strategic level; it enables sustained military operations over time and represents one of our Nation’s greatest strengths. At this level, modern, clearly defined, well-understood and outcome-focused processes should drive effectiveness across joint, Service, agency, and commercial organizations. These global processes combined with agile force positioning are fundamental to optimizing joint logistics and critical to the Nation’s ability to maintain flexibility in the face of constantly changing threats.

   (2) **Operational.** At the operational level, joint logistics has its most significant impact. It is at the operational level that strategic and tactical capabilities, processes, and requirements intersect, and it is here where the essence of joint logistics resides. Joint logisticians at this level must integrate or coordinate national, DOD, combatant command, Service and functional components, multinational, interagency and other partner capabilities, and HNS, with the JFC’s tactical requirements. Joint and Service logistics fuse at the operational level. Logisticians face their greatest challenge at the operational level because of the difficulty of coordinating and integrating capabilities from many providers to sustain logistically ready forces for the JFC.

   (3) **Tactical.** The tactical level represents that part of the operational environment where outcomes are realized. At the tactical level, logistic support is Service-oriented and executed. Organizations operating at the tactical level are focused on planning and executing those operations, engagements, and activities to achieve assigned military objectives. Tactical units require sustained logistic readiness to meet assigned objectives. Sustained logistic readiness results from the cumulative efforts of Service, agency, and other providers across the entire JLE.

e. **Global Relationships.** The JLE is bound together by a web of relationships among global logistic providers, supporting and supported organizations and units, and other entities. The key global providers in the JLE are the Services, the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA), United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) and United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) (see Figure I-2). Effective joint logistics depends on clear roles, responsibilities, and relationships between the global providers. Global providers manage end-to-end processes that provide capabilities to the supported CCDR, and are challenged to link the CCDR requirements to the outcomes of those processes.

See Appendix A, “Joint Logistic Roles and Responsibilities,” for a listing of logistic-related roles and responsibilities of the Services, CSAs, and commands.

(1) Services. In accordance with Title 10, United States Code (USC), the Services are responsible to prepare for such employment (of Service forces), and for such recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including those aspects of research and development assigned), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining ready forces. Services lie in the heart of this collaborative network and their
logistic organizations form the foundation of the JLE and are responsible to maintain systems’ life-cycle readiness.

(2) Defense Logistics Agency/Services. DLA and the Services share responsibilities as suppliers to the joint force since both “manage” supplies in support of readiness requirements. In this shared role, they support the components of the joint force with equipment and supplies needed for sustained logistic readiness. As suppliers, they are responsible to deliver the right forces and materiel, at the right place and time, to give the components of the joint force exactly what they require, when they need it.

(3) United States Joint Forces Command. USJFCOM is the primary conventional force provider to CCDRs, which includes serving as the DOD Joint Deployment Process Owner (JDPO). As the JDPO, USJFCOM is responsible for maintaining the global capability for rapid and decisive military force power projection. As the JDPO, USJFCOM is responsible for leading the collaborative efforts of the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) to improve the joint deployment and redeployment processes, while maintaining the overall effectiveness of deployment and redeployment processes so that all supported joint force commanders and supporting DOD components can execute military force power projection more effectively and efficiently.

(4) United States Transportation Command. USTRANSCOM is responsible for providing common-user and commercial air, land, and sea transportation, terminal management, and aerial refueling to support the global deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of US forces. It serves as DOD’s Distribution Process Owner (DPO) and is also responsible for coordinating and overseeing the DOD distribution system to provide interoperability, synchronization, and alignment of DOD-wide end-to-end distribution. It develops and implements distribution process improvements that enhance defense logistics. This support is delivered by a distribution process optimized to support CCDR requirements, and delivers required sustainment and deployment support at the time and destination specified by the joint force.

4. Joint Logistics Imperatives

a. The value of joint logistics can be determined by how well three imperatives are attained: unity of effort, JLE-wide visibility, and rapid and precise response. These imperatives define the desired attributes of a federation of systems, processes, and organizations that effectively adapt within a constantly changing environment to meet the emerging needs of the supported CCDR.

(1) Unity of Effort. In accordance with JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, unity of effort is the coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action. For joint logisticians this is the synchronization and integration of logistic capabilities focused on the commander’s intent and is the most critical of all joint logistic outcomes. To achieve unity of effort,
joint logisticians must develop a clear understanding of how joint and multinational logistic processes work; know the roles and responsibilities of the providers executing tasks in those processes; build agreement around common measures of performance (MOPs) (process outcomes); and ensure appropriate members of the JLE have visibility into the processes.

(2) **JLE-Wide Visibility.** JLE-wide visibility is having assured access to logistic processes, resources, and requirements to gain the knowledge necessary to make effective decisions. JLE-wide visibility provides the means to optimize logistic capabilities to maximize outcomes, increase readiness, and build confidence in joint logistics. It provides access to authoritative information and enables the user to respond quickly to the CCDR’s changing needs. Visibility fundamentally answers the CCDR’s questions, “Where is it?” “How will it get there?” and “When will it get there?”

(3) **Rapid and Precise Response.** Rapid and precise response is the ability of the core logistic capabilities, military and commercial, to meet the constantly changing needs of the joint force. The effectiveness of joint logistics can be measured by assessing the following attributes, or key performance indicators:

(a) Speed is at the core of responsiveness. Speed does not mean everything moves at the same rate or fastest rate, but everything moves according to priority at the rate that produces the most effective support to the joint force.

(b) Reliability is reflected in the dependability of the global providers to deliver required support when promised. Reliability is characterized by a high degree of predictability, or time-definite delivery of support. Time-definite delivery is the consistent delivery of requested logistic support at a time and destination specified by the requiring activity.

(c) Efficiency is directly related to the amount of resources required to deliver a specific outcome. In the tactical and operational environments, inefficiency increases the logistic footprint and increases force protection requirements and risk. At the strategic level, inefficiency increases the cost for a unit of process outcome.

b. The joint logistics imperatives enable the measurement of our ability to provide sustained logistic readiness. The essence of these imperatives guide joint logisticians in the performance of the three integrating functions needed for successful joint logistic operations.

5. **Integrating Functions**

Sustained logistic readiness is driven by the effective and efficient delivery of joint logistics through coordinating and integrating Service, agency, and other capabilities to meet the supported commander’s requirements. To achieve this level of integration, commanders and their staffs, especially logisticians, must be able to: effectively and efficiently plan, execute, control, and assess joint logistic operations.
a. **Planning.** Planning joint logistic support links the mission, commander’s intent, and operational objectives to core logistic capabilities, procedures and organizations. Joint logistic planning defines joint processes to establish an effective concept for logistic support. Effective planning among the combatant commands, Services, CSAs, and other government and nongovernment agencies is essential to enable integration and visibility across the operational environment. Obtaining and understanding joint requirements for supplies and services is vital to supporting the deployment, employment, and redeployment of forces and equipment. Chapter III, “Planning Joint Logistics,” provides additional details and considerations for planning logistic support concepts.

b. **Executing.** Executing joint logistics involves the employment of capabilities and resources to support joint and multinational operations. The joint logistician must be able to assess and respond to requirements by monitoring dynamic situations and providing accurate feedback to subordinates and decision makers. The joint logistician must determine the proper balance of efficiency and effectiveness in processes being executed, and remain flexible to employ new methods as the environment changes. Chapter IV, “Executing Joint Logistics,” provides additional details and considerations for executing joint logistic operations.

c. **Controlling.** Effective control of joint logistic operations results from the exercise of authority and direction for the sustained logistic readiness of the joint force. This integrating function includes choosing organizational options to best execute effective joint logistic operations. Chapter V, “Controlling Joint Logistics,” provides additional details on joint logistic control options.

### 6. Core Logistic Capabilities

Core logistic capabilities provide a framework to facilitate integrated decision-making, enable effective synchronization and allocation of resources, and optimize joint logistic processes. The challenges associated with support cut across all core logistic capabilities – especially when multiple joint task forces (JTFs) or multinational partners are involved. The core logistic capabilities are supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, HSS, engineering, logistic services, and operational contract support (see Figure I-3). The core logistic capabilities must be integrated within a complex operational environment, bridging the strategic sustaining base of the Nation to the tactical environment where outcomes are measured. There are significant challenges integrating Service and agency programs and systems not designed to holistically support joint operations. However, achieving this integration is essential to providing the most effective support to the JFC. An important objective for logisticians at the operational level is to set the conditions for tactical level logisticians to achieve success.

*Chapter II, Core Logistic Capabilities, provides additional detail on the joint logistic core and functional capabilities.*
a. **Supply.** Operations that include identifying requirements, selecting supply sources, scheduling deliveries, receiving, verifying and transferring product, inspection and acceptance, and authorizing supplier payments. It includes the following functions: management of supply operations, inventory management and the management of DOD’s supplier networks.

b. **Maintenance Operations.** Operations that encompass key functions executed by the Services to deliver systems readiness and enable the JFC’s freedom of action. Field maintenance operations are focused on rapidly returning systems to the user. Depot
maintenance operations are focused on rebuilding/repairing systems and components to sustain long-term life cycle readiness. Total life cycle systems management is focused on the readiness and the integrated control of systems’ long-term health by maximizing availability and reliability of systems at best value to the Military Departments.

c. **Deployment and Distribution.** Deployment and Distributions operations include planning, coordinating, synchronizing, moving forces, and sustainment, and operating the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise (JDDE) in support of military operations. Distribution capabilities are a part of joint logistics, while the full range of deployment activities are a series of operational events enabled by logistics. The portion of deployment that falls within the logistics capabilities is the movement of forces and materiel.

d. **Health Service Support.** Services that promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and medical intelligence services.

e. **Engineering.** Operations that assure mobility, provide the infrastructure necessary to position, project, protect and sustain the joint force, and enhance visualization of the operational area across the full range of military operations. Operational engineering is the integration of combat, general, and geospatial engineering to meet national and CCDR requirements.

f. **Logistic Services.** Operations that are essential to the technical management and support of the joint force. Logistics Services includes food, water and ice, base camp, and hygiene services in an expeditionary environment.

g. **Operational Contract Support.** Operations that provide the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing that support to the joint force in a designated operational area. As indicated, the major functional capabilities are support integration and contractor (personnel) management. Contract support integration gives the CCDR the ability to synchronize and integrate contract support in support of mission requirements. Contractor management provides the CCDR with the ability to manage and maintain visibility of the associated contractor personnel in the designated operational area.

h. Integration of the core logistics capabilities is critical to effectively sustaining the joint force. The complexity of this integration requires continuous collaboration between key stakeholders to maximize effectiveness and economy of resources. One of
the most important collaborations takes place between the supply, maintenance, and deployment and distribution communities in the DOD supply chain.

7. Supply Chain Management

a. The DOD supply chain is a global network that delivers materiel to the joint force. Its fundamental goal is to maximize force readiness while optimizing the allocation of resources. The logistic capabilities that contribute to the DOD supply chain includes fulfillment of commodity requisitions from supply, the distribution capabilities from deployment and distribution, and movement and retrograde of repairable items to support maintenance activities. Additionally, multinational partners, interagency, HN, NGOs, and other organizations may be segments within, or the end users of, the supply chain. Supply chain responsiveness and reliability are critical to the overall success of joint operations.

b. The supply chain provides materiel and equipment as requirements are defined or identified and communicated throughout the supply chain’s activities. The supply chain satisfies requirements through appropriate sourcing, maintenance, and/or distribution of materiel and equipment to the requirements generators.

c. Supply chain management synchronizes the processes, resources, and efforts of key global providers to meet CCDR requirements. Several critical elements of supply chain management include: communicating with the JFC to attain visibility of forces as they maneuver, to identify critical weapon systems and equipment, and to prioritize tasks by operating area and intensity. The successful sharing of information on these elements is key to forecasting days of supply required and the distribution capacity required. Combatant command planners are key to optimizing supply chain operations and must strive to rapidly identify and communicate CCDR requirements to providers. It is important for these planners to establish mission priorities, assess the risk to and plan for the protection of the supply chain in theater, and collaborate with global providers to establish JLE-wide visibility of materiel requirements, distribution operations, resource availability/shortfalls, and shared processes.
1. Introduction

The previous chapter provided a framework for joint logistics by describing joint logistics, its environment, and the key global relationships that give it strength. In this chapter, joint logistics is further described in terms of the capabilities it delivers. These capabilities enable achievement of objectives (ends) through combinations of functions (ways) executed by the people and processes (means) within a broad range of conditions and to a specified set of standards. Joint logistics, in the larger sense, can best be understood as a joint capability area. The ways of joint logistics are its core logistic capabilities: supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, HSS, engineering, logistic services, and operational contract support. Each of these capabilities includes the people, processes, and resources required to conduct joint logistics. See the Joint Electronic Library (JEL), http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jplogisticsseriespubs.htm, and the Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic Information System (JDEIS), https://jdeis.js.mil, for current list of joint logistic publications. The core logistic capabilities and the subordinate functional capabilities, when viewed in total and combined with joint personnel service support, provide the ability to globally project and sustain the joint force. Understanding these capabilities will enable the JFC and his subordinate commanders to obtain effective logistic support. The joint logistician must be able to integrate and make effective use of Service, agency, commercial, interagency, and multinational logistics assets.

2. Supply

a. The 2005 Base Realignment and Close decisions transitioned several supply functions previously performed by the Services to DLA. The supply functions transferred include: 1. Commodity Management Privatization (Privatization of the management of tires, packaged petroleum, and compressed gases), 2. Depot Level Repairable Procurement management consolidation (Consumable Item Management Transfer and transfer of the procurement management and related support functions for depot level repairable), and 3. Supply, Storage, and Distribution Management Reconfiguration.

b. It is important for the joint logistician to understand the complexities of supply operations; the functions and processes that define it, the many players responsible for executing tasks, and the roles and relationships between those players. The joint logistician effectively integrates three functional capabilities within the supply core logistic capability: managing supplies and equipment, managing inventory, and managing supplier networks. Visibility of requirements/demands is critical for supplies and it requires communication and integration with other areas affecting the DOD supply chain, maintenance, and distribution. Specifically, supply demand planning involves the joint...
force operation planners, Service maintenance operations, and the distribution system to fully consider major components of the logistics pipeline beyond commodity stockpiles. Demand planning is accomplished in a collaborative environment to provide responsive supply operations. Another focus area critical to effective supply operations is the return and retrograde of equipment and supplies. Both demand planning and return and retrograde functions involve collaboration and execution by all three areas of the DOD supply chain.

(1) Manage Supplies and Equipment. Attaining the JFC’s desired material readiness goals requires effective integration and management of supply operations. Integrated supply operations capitalize on supplier network performance capabilities and the integrated links with the supporting distribution and maintenance systems. The attainment of performance objectives shared by the customers and suppliers requires seamless interfaces between supply operations from acquisition to delivery of the requested item to the end user. With inputs from the customers and logisticians within the distribution and maintenance systems, DLA, as the predominant supplier, matches the infrastructure capabilities of supply, storage, and distribution points against anticipated customer requirements and commercial production capacities to determine inventory requirements. This collaborative body of logisticians affects supply system performance that can be assessed using shared authoritative data and performance metrics to ensure effective supply support to the JFC. The joint logistician working within a responsive network will collaborate, conduct performance reviews, and when required, coordinate adjustments to increase performance.

(2) Inventory Management Operations. Managing DOD’s materiel inventory is the key capability in determining where materiel both exists and should exist. Although materiel is typically in motion within the supply chain, logisticians determine the optimal amount of materiel supporting operational requirements shipped from supply sources and processed and positioned at enroute supply nodes, to meet the issue and reclamation requirements of the end user. Managing inventory throughout the supply chain requires collaboration with supply and maintenance activities and distribution providers to enable the greatest effect at best value. When maintainers at all levels receive and rebuild materiel to serviceable condition for return to inventory, they effectively are suppliers and therefore influence the positioning of materiel within the supply chain. Similarly, the effectiveness of the distribution system and its capacity to move materiel influences the inventory levels at supply nodes. Inventory management capitalizes on authoritative information (accurate, real-time, and widely visible) and performance trends to inform decisions about attributes of the materiel inventory throughout the supply chain. Maintaining optimal stockage levels and accountability of materiel throughout the supply chain enables the joint logistician to manage the flow of materiel between strategic and tactical supply nodes to meet warfighter requirements.

(3) Manage Supplier Networks. Supply operations extend to supplier selection and include management of DOD supplier networks. This role is performed by DLA and the Service materiel commands. As DOD’s supplier, DLA acquires needed materiel and supplies by purchasing, scheduling, shipping, receiving, and inspecting items.
Additionally, the JFC exploits DLA and Service capabilities to source materiel within the theater via forward depots, forward repair activities, pre-positioned materiel, and contracting authorities. The mix of suppliers supporting a JFC during operations is not static. The method by which DLA sources materiel will likely change as an operation develops. Sourcing may rely more on strategic and operational sources (e.g., basic loads and pre-positioned materiel) at the onset of an operation. Sourcing may favor increased use of contracting and rebuild services as an operation stabilizes and the JFC gains logistics capabilities in theater. As joint forces draw down, supply sourcing may depend on increased strategic sourcing, retrograded excess, and contracting.

c. Supply Executive Agents. A DOD executive agent (EA) is the head of a DOD component to whom the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) or the Deputy Secretary of Defense has assigned specific responsibilities, functions, and authorities to provide defined levels of support for operational/administrative or mission designated activities that involve two or more of the DOD components. See Appendix B, “Supply Commodity Executive Agents,” for a listing of commodity-oriented (Class I - Class IX) EAs; Chapter V, “Controlling Joint Logistics,” for additional discussion on EAs; and Appendix D, “Department of Defense Logistic Related Executive Agents.” See also JP 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine for additional specific information.

d. War Reserve Materiel. War reserve materiel includes the mission essential secondary and principal end items and munitions required to attain operational objectives in the scenarios authorized for planning in the SecDef planning guidance. Pre-positioning can increase war reserve materiel effectiveness by enabling a CCDR to rapidly field capabilities until follow-on capabilities are available via strategic lift. Logisticians influence the positioning of war reserves throughout the supply chain by determining the optimal balance between rapid employment, flexible response to multiple
requirements, and synchronization with supply chain components to effectively deliver the intended capabilities. See DOD Directive (DODD) 3110.6, *War Reserve Materiel Policy* for additional information.

e. Supply Chain Relationships. Supply operations provide the supply chain the capability to identify and select suppliers of materiel and receive that materiel commensurate with quantitative and qualitative conditions. It enables precise distribution and transfer of materiel to the end user by optimizing the links between supply nodes and maintenance and distribution providers. Supply operations further provide managed materiel inventories that are determined through deliberate collaboration with maintenance and distribution providers in order to optimize the end effect of the supply chain to the warfighter. To this end, suppliers are responsible for delivering perfect order fulfillment – providing the right items in the right condition when and where the customer requests it.

3. **Maintenance Operations**

   a. Maintenance operations deliver systems readiness for the JFC. The Services, as part of their Title 10, USC, responsibilities, execute maintenance as a core logistic capability. To execute this responsibility, Services employ a maintenance strategy that supports the JFC’s freedom of action through depot and field level maintenance to maintain the fleet readiness of units and capabilities. These levels of maintenance utilize various functional capabilities to achieve their goal. Sustainment planning provides ready, reliable systems at best value and is achievable through life cycle systems readiness (LCSR). LCSR in support of the joint force begins when a weapon system is being acquired and continues until the system is disposed of.

   b. Maintenance is accomplished across DOD at two levels: depot level (sustainment) and field level (intermediate and organizational). These two levels are distinguished largely by their relative capabilities, flexibility, and capacity- they are not defined by the physical location at which a task is preformed.

   (1) Depot Maintenance Operations. The purpose of depot maintenance is to repair, modify, rebuild, and overhaul both entire systems and components and is directly linked to LCSR. Depot maintenance is the most complex and extensive level of maintenance work and links the Nation’s economic base (people, resources, and industry) to its military operations.

   (2) Field Maintenance Operations. The purpose of field level maintenance is to rapidly return systems to users in a ready status. Field maintenance encompasses both intermediate and organizational levels and consists of shop maintenance supporting both the supply chain and weapon systems with component and end item repair. It also consists of on-equipment maintenance tasks necessary for day-to-day operations. It is less complex than depot maintenance, and serves as the link between strategic capabilities and tactical requirements.
(3) Life Cycle Systems Readiness. A LCSR capability enables the requirements, acquisition, and sustainment communities to provide systems with optimal availability and reliability to the joint warfighter at best value to the Services. Services and acquisition program managers must ensure that an effective life cycle systems approach is used for all newly developed and fielded systems. Essential tools for development are the sustainment key performance parameters (KPPs) of materiel availability, and key system attributes for materiel reliability and total ownership costs. The value of the sustainment KPP is derived from the operational requirements of the system, assumptions for its operational use, and the planned logistic support to sustain it. Fleet management of our systems is critical and can only be enabled by a life cycle approach.

c. Maintenance activities must possess the technical skills, tools, equipment, facilities, and quality assurance to maintain equipment readiness. The functions below describe the tasks necessary to provide effective maintenance support to the joint force.

(1) Inspect. The inspection of equipment determines faults and verifies repairs or determines the condition of an item by comparing its physical, mechanical, or electrical characteristics based on established equipment and serviceability standards.

(2) Test. Testing evaluates the operational condition of an end item, or subsystem thereof, against an established standard or performance parameter.

(3) Service. Servicing equipment includes preventive maintenance checks and services, monitoring equipment health and condition, predictive maintenance to sense/anticipate failure, and diagnosing equipment faults.

(4) Repair. Repair restores items to serviceable condition including the actions taken to overhaul, modify, or restore systems and system components to a like new or mission capable condition. Repair actions take place at the depot or field levels of maintenance. Once repaired, equipment is returned back to the user for employment or to the supplier for future distribution.

(5) Rebuild. Rebuild recapitalizes an item to a standard as nearly as possible to its original condition in appearance, performance, and life expectancy to include technology upgrades and capability improvements. Rebuild is the highest degree of materiel maintenance applied to equipment.

(6) Calibrate. To check, adjust, or standardize adjustments on instruments or test measurement and diagnostic equipment to bring them to a predefined standard.

d. Reset. Reset is a critically important activity to restore a unit to a desired level of combat capability commensurate with its future mission. Reset encompasses maintenance and supply actions that restore and enhance combat capability for both unit and repositioned equipment that has been destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn out due to operations and training. These maintenance and supply actions involve depot and field
level work, and since the focus is future mission requirements it can include: enhancing existing equipment through the insertion of new technologies, restoring selected equipment to near zero-miles/zero-hours condition, and/or procuring replacement systems. The procurement of replacement systems, while not maintenance operations work, is directly related to LCSR.

US Air Force sergeant performs scheduled maintenance on a F-15C Eagle aircraft; Soldiers perform maintenance on a vehicle at a patrol base in Iraq; US Navy technicians perform maintenance checks aboard USS BOXER.

e. CCDRs are responsible for the coordination of Service maintenance operations within their areas of responsibility (AORs). It is important that CCDR requirements are clearly understood and that Service maintenance capabilities are synchronized and when practical, integrated, thus providing the most effective and efficient materiel availability to the joint force. Where practical, maintenance facilities for joint or cross-service maintenance should be established and inter-service use of capabilities should be emphasized.

f. Supply Chain Relationships. The supply chain process becomes more responsive when activities provide visibility of materiel condition and repair requirements to the supply and distribution providers. Within this process, the Services play a key role in optimizing the maintenance function. Visibility enables the most effective delivery of parts to satisfy maintenance requirements. Once repaired, equipment is returned to service for the warfighter, or placed in the supply chain for future distribution.

4. Deployment and Distribution

The global dispersion of the threats we face, coupled with the necessity to rapidly deploy, execute, and sustain operations worldwide makes the deployment and distribution capability the cornerstone of joint logistics. These operational factors are causing what has historically been a supply-based support concept to shift to a distribution-based system of support. This global distribution-based system requires the end-to-end synchronization of all elements of distribution. The deployment and distribution capability supports the movement of forces and unit equipment during the movement phase of the deployment and redeployment processes, and supports materiel movement during the logistical sustainment of operations. The deployment and distribution capability moves forces and logistic support globally and on time meeting the required
delivery date and providing time definite delivery to meet the needs of the CCDR. Through sharing of critical information, it is possible to create unity of effort among diverse distribution organizations, and provide end-to-end support to satisfy deployment execution and sustainment operations. Visibility through the JDDE provides the CCDR, in conjunction with the global providers, the capability to see and redirect strategic and operational commodity/force flow in support of current and projected priorities.

See Chapter V, Movement, in JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations and JP 4-09, Global Distribution, for additional information.

Sailors attach supplies to a MH-60S Seahawk helicopter during replenishment between the USS EISENHOWER and USNS ARCTIC.

a. Move the Force. USJFCOM as the JDPO serves as the DOD focal point to improve the joint deployment process supporting joint and multinational operations, and interagency coordination. USJFCOM and other joint force providers are supported by USTRANSCOM during the planning and execution of the deployment and redeployment process. USTRANSCOM, as the DPO, supports the deployment process by providing the strategic distribution capability to move forces and materiel in support of JFC operational requirements and to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to home and/or demobilization stations.

b. Sustain the Force. USTRANSCOM as the DPO is responsible for coordinating and overseeing the DOD distribution system to provide interoperability, synchronization, and alignment of DOD wide, end-to-end distribution. It collaborates with other logistics agencies and commands (i.e., DLA and Service materiel commands) to provide optimal processes for movement of materiel through the distribution pipeline, from sourcing through issuance to end user. Additionally, it supports the retrograde process to move materiel from the operational area back to the supply process for refurbishment,
restocking, or disposal, as appropriate. It also develops and implements distribution process improvements that enhance the Defense Logistics and Global Supply Chain Management System.

c. Operate the JDDE. The JDDE is that complex of equipment, procedures, doctrine, leaders, technical connectivity, information, shared knowledge, organizations, facilities, training, and materiel necessary to conduct joint distribution operations. USTRANSCOM, as the DPO, will exercise control of the JDDE through coordination and synchronization with the other community of interest partners. The JDDE is a subset of the JLE and its governance is the primary responsibility of the DPO in coordination with JDPO and other members of the JDDE community of interest.

d. Supply Chain Relationships. A supply chain is an engineered flow (processes) of information, physical distribution, and funding to deliver products to the end customers. The deployment and distribution capabilities are the lynchpin in the physical distribution piece of end-to-end supply chain management. The operation of the JDDE provides visibility of information (status), facilities, and processes within the supply chain.


5. Health Service Support

a. Purpose. The purpose of HSS is to maintain the individual and group health needed to accomplish a military mission. The CCDR requires medical capabilities that are scalable to the requirement, interoperable with other medical forces, and capable of rapid deployment into the JOA. In accomplishing this, HSS capabilities are employed across the range of military operations and include the ability to organize, train, and equip
prior to deployment, and enabling the employment of physically fit personnel. HSS employs a mix of Service capabilities in order to keep the force healthy and available, maximizing the commander’s freedom of action. The primary facilitators of HSS for the DOD are the Services, Service components, USTRANSCOM, DLA as the Class VIII EA, and direct vendors.

b. Functions. HSS offers distinctive and overlapping care capabilities that enhance performance in a military force in accordance with JP 4-02, Health Service Support. HSS is organized into five functional capabilities designed to deliver full HSS to the joint force. The resulting capabilities describe the “what needs to be done” under the respective functional areas.

(1) Casualty Management. Casualty management is the delivery of medical treatment from point of injury or illness, through patient movement to definitive care. Casualty management is conducted along a continuum of care that includes: first responder, forward resuscitative care, theater hospitalization, definitive care, and en route care.

(2) Patient Movement. Patient movement (PM) is the act or process of moving a sick, injured, wounded or other person to obtain medical and/or dental care or treatment. Functions include medical regulating, patient evacuation, and en route medical care. PM is conducted using a variety of movement mechanisms including ground, air, and sea.

(3) Medical Logistics. Medical logistics is the management of medical materiel blood products, medical maintenance, and optical fabrication. Medical logisticians ensure health care providers have the necessary products and services available to provide medical care. Medical logisticians work at all points in the supply chain, at the strategic level interfacing with manufacturers, at the operational level integrating medical logistics to ensure adequate materiel and equipment are available for deployment and sustainment, and at the tactical level distributing materiel to the health care providers.

(4) Preventive Medicine and Health Surveillance. Preventive medicine and health surveillance is the prevention of communicable disease and illness and protection of the force from exposure to health threats. Prevention includes the use of vaccines and pharmaceuticals prior to exposure. Protection is the identification of health threats, protective measures and, once exposure occurs, associated treatment programs. Another important aspect of preventive medicine is medical intelligence preparation of the operational environment. Most prevention activities are planned and executed prior to deployment by the Service components, while protection activities generally occur during deployment, employment, and redeployment. Preventive medicine includes environmental, occupational, and disease threat considerations in military operations.

(5) Theater Medical Information. The theater medical information program (TMIP) is a tri-Service system that is designed to provide information to deployed medical forces to support all medical functional areas to include medical C2. TMIP integrates medical systems at the theater level to support deployed forces, and to enhance
the Services’ capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information.

c. Joint Force Surgeon. The joint force surgeon normally reports to the JFC as a member of the personal staff and serves as principal advisor to the JFC for HSS and force health protection. Joint force surgeons serve as the focal point for joint medical support and are responsible for providing recommendations to the JFC on the effective employment of all HSS capabilities. Joint force surgeons analyze JFC intent, identify HSS requirements, and integrate Service and DLA medical capabilities. Early involvement of HSS personnel in developing operation and campaign plans can ensure that HSS resources are optimized in support of US and multinational forces. HSS planning supports maneuver forces by ensuring treatment and evacuation assets are available. Additionally, HSS planning enables the JFC to make best use of deployed resources as well as capitalize on existing infrastructure such as HN hospitals, medical resources, and warehousing facilities.

d. Health Service Operations. Health service operations also play a significant role in foreign humanitarian assistance, civil support, and disaster relief. During foreign humanitarian assistance operations, HSS personnel may be required to provide medical care, medical screenings, and evaluation of HN facilities for availability and adequacy. During noncombatant evacuation operations, joint HSS personnel may be required to provide medical care to the evacuees. In support of theater security cooperation plans, HSS can help the JFC build international relationships. HSS provides a wide range of capabilities in support of the National Response Framework, such as facility assessments, medical personnel and materiel augmentation, deployment of medical resources, and assistance in the restoration of critical health services (safe food and water, medical care, and medical infrastructure).

(1) When appropriate, the joint force surgeon coordinates medical resources of multinational forces, interagency, HN, and NGOs and IGOs into the HSS plan to support the joint operation.

For details on working with nonmilitary agencies, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II and Chapter IV Health Service Support Operational Considerations as detailed in JP 4-02, Health Service Support, for additional information.

(2) Integration of medical resources is important not only to support the joint force, but also in caring for dislocated civilians and detainees and any scenario where a chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) mass casualty event may occur. By integrating all available resources, the joint force surgeon is better positioned to meet any medical requirements that the situation may demand.

e. Service Capabilities. Each Service has organic HSS units with capabilities that are tailored for their traditional roles and missions; however, these units are normally
capable of meeting other Services’ requirements. The Army, Navy and Air Force have the collective capability to perform all types of HSS missions, from tactical level support to rehabilitative care.

(1) The Army also has robust medical logistic assets capable of providing long term sustainment support to include medical materiel storage, optical fabrication, blood operations and medical maintenance. In addition, Army medical logistics provide Class VIII forward distribution for the JTF.

(2) The Navy is the only Service that has the capacity to provide afloat operational hospitalization of casualties.

(3) The Air Force is the only Service that has the aircraft and medical personnel specifically trained to provide fixed-wing patient movement of casualties transitioning between treatment locations.

f. Executive Agencies. The US Army is the EA for rotary-wing medical evacuation as well as medical research and development; and the US Air Force is the EA for fixed-wing aeromedical evacuation. DLA is the EA for medical materiel.

For additional information and detail on HSS, refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support, which provides doctrine for the planning and execution of HSS throughout the range of military operations.

6. Engineering

In early April 2004, convoys came under complex attacks aimed at cutting lines of communications, isolating the forces fighting in the central portion of the country (including Baghdad) and focusing on the commercial convoys in an effort to interdict the flow of sustainment. On the morning of April 9, we woke up to the realization that the main supply routes between Kuwait and Baghdad were “raining bridges.” We experienced a period of about five days when our surface distribution system for all commodities ground to a halt. Through close coordination with Engineers to rebuild or repair the bridges and the application of heavy force protection for convoys, we were able to get the routes reopened.

Supporting Victory in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
BG Scott A. West, Quartermaster General (2004)

a. Engineer operations are a significant force multiplier for the JFC. Joint force engineers provide the optimum mix of Service engineer capabilities to maximize the JFC’s freedom of action. The functions which define joint engineering help the joint force engineer integrate, synchronize, and direct engineer operations. These functions include combat engineering, general engineering, and geospatial engineering.
(1) Combat Engineering. Combat engineering consists of those engineer capabilities and activities that support the maneuver of land combat forces. Combat engineering enhances operational movement, maneuver, and force protection by facilitating mobility, countermobility, and survivability. Mobility overcomes physical obstacles to US and allied forces; countermobility restricts an adversary’s ability to maneuver and sustain his forces; and survivability protects critical assets and organizations. Most combat engineering activities are planned through the Service or functional components and executed by the joint force at the tactical level. For more information on combat engineering, refer to JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations; and JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

(2) General Engineering. General engineering consists of those engineer capabilities and activities, other than combat engineering, that modify, maintain, or protect the physical environment. General engineering is a diverse functional area involving horizontal and vertical construction as well as numerous specialized capabilities, such as well drilling and tactical pipelines. During military operations, general engineering tasks typically include construction and repair of strategic and operational lines of communications (LOCs), airfields, seaports, base camps, and logistic facilities supporting joint and, when required, interagency coordination and multinational operations. Without these facilities, the flow of logistics to warfighting units would be greatly impaired. General engineering also includes environmental considerations in military operations. See JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, Annex D, “Environmental Considerations,” for detailed information. The joint force engineer employs a combination of military engineers, civilian contractors, and multinational and host nation capabilities to meet JFC operational requirements. For more information on general engineering support, refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

(3) Geospatial Engineering. Geospatial engineering consists of those engineer capabilities and activities that contribute to a clear understanding of the physical environment by providing geospatial information and services to commanders and staffs. Geospatial engineering provides terrain visualization; operational and tactical terrain analysis; digitized terrain; standard and nonstandard map products; and imagery which may assist in setting environmental baselines for US occupied sites as well as identifying locations of natural, cultural and historical resources. Geospatial engineers assist in predictive analysis of the impact that terrain and weather has on operations, to include communication and intelligence systems. In addition, the analysis of environmental intelligence is critical during the planning phase of any military operation to ensure force protection, environmental protection, and assistance in complying with US and international laws, policies, directives and treaties. Since much of geospatial data is stored on intelligence systems, geospatial engineers are often located within the intelligence directorate of the joint force. For more information on geospatial engineering, refer to JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, and JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

b. Joint force engineers are responsible for providing comprehensive recommendations to the JFC on the effective employment of all engineer capabilities in
support of joint operations. The joint force engineer analyzes the JFC’s intent and integrates Service capabilities. Engineer planning supports the development of the JOA for maneuver, enhances strategic and operational movement, and provides infrastructure for force projection and sustainment. Early involvement of engineers in developing OPLANs and targeting plans can minimize the amount of reconstruction required by US and allied forces. This enables the JFC to capitalize on existing infrastructure such as roads, bridges, airfields, and other essential facilities and structures for operational uses and can accelerate the return of infrastructure to a desired condition upon cessation of hostilities. Infrastructure reconnaissance supports the commander’s understanding of the status of infrastructure through assessments and surveys. For more information on infrastructure reconnaissance see JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations.*

An Army multi-role bridge company pushes a newly assembled assault float bridge section upstream outside Camp Taji, Iraq; airmen work on the roof of a tactical operations center in order to run wires which will provide electrical service in the building; an airman using a global positioning system collects survey data while deployed to Iraq.

c. Engineers assist in preparing the theater for the full range of military operations by providing intelligence support, facilities and infrastructure, and improved theater access. During crisis response and limited contingency operations, engineers play a significant role. For example, during noncombatant evacuation and foreign humanitarian assistance operations, engineers may be required to provide infrastructure improvements to airfields and seaports, repair or create basic essential services structures or facilities, clear helicopter landing zones, and construct base camps. In combating terrorism, engineers reduce the vulnerability of personnel, critical infrastructure, and other important assets. Finally, engineers provide a wide range of capabilities in support of the National Response Framework, such as damage assessments and technical assistance, rubble and debris removal, and the restoration of essential services to mitigate damage and relieve human suffering.

d. When appropriate, the joint force engineer considers the engineer capabilities of multinational forces, interagency NGOs, and IGOs to develop valid courses of action (COAs), improve coordination, or properly integrate them into the joint operation. For details on working with nonmilitary agencies, refer to JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II.* When engineering support requirements exceed available military engineering capabilities or capacity, the JFC may turn to external support and/or theater support contracts. Theater support contractors assist deployed engineer forces under prearranged contracts through host nation and regional
businesses and vendors. These contracts provide goods, services, and minor construction. External theater contracts, such as the civil augmentation program (CAP), are with US or third party businesses and vendors. These types of contracts usually provide road and airfield construction, heavy equipment and transportation services, and base camp services. The CAP contracts, such as the Army’s Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, the Navy’s Global Contingency Construction Contract and Global Contingency Service Contract, and the Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, can play a significant role in mission accomplishment by providing the JFC and joint force engineer with additional options and flexibility in general engineering and logistic support.

e. Each Service has core engineering units and capabilities that stem from their traditional roles and functions to meet specific operational requirements and can support other Services during joint operations and training.

For more detail on Service engineering capabilities, see JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

f. SecDef designated the US Army Corps of Engineers and the Naval Facilities Engineering Command as construction agents for design and construction of US military facilities worldwide. The US Air Force is the designated DOD construction agent for military construction in the British Isles (see DODD 4270.5, Military Construction). Engineers are involved in development of military construction projects supporting the global repositioning of US forces and assist in developing business rules and standards for operating joint bases. DLA is the DOD EA for Construction and Barrier Materiel.

7. Logistic Services

a. Logistic services comprise the support capabilities that collectively enable the US to rapidly provide global sustainment for our military forces. Logistic services include many disparate activities that are highly scalable capabilities. Included in this area are food, water and ice, base camp, and hygiene services.

(1) Food Service. Food service includes planning, synchronizing and managing subsistence support to the joint force to include dining facility management, subsistence procurement and storage, food preparation, field feeding, and nutrition awareness.

(2) Water and Ice Service. Water and ice operations produce, test, store and distribute bulk water and packaged ice in an expeditionary environment.

(3) Base Camp Services. Base camp services provide shelter, billeting, waste management, and common user life support management in an expeditionary environment.

(4) Hygiene Services. Hygiene services provide laundry, shower, textile and fabric repair.
b. Mortuary affairs (MA) oversight and responsibility currently resides within the Joint Staff Logistics Directorate. MA delivers care for deceased personnel beginning with the point of incident and ending at final disposition.

For a more complete discussion of joint MA operations, see JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations, and DODD 1300.22, Mortuary Affairs Policy.

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8. Operational Contract Support

DOD increasingly relies on contractors to perform a multitude of functions and tasks. Factors that have led to this increased reliance include reductions in the size of military forces (especially in the combat support and combat service support areas), increases in operations tempo and missions undertaken by the military, increased complexity and sophistication of weapon systems, and a continued push to gain efficiencies and reduce costs through the outsourcing or privatizing of commercially adaptable functions. Operational contract support is the core logistic capability that gives the CCDR the ability to synchronize and integrate both the delivery of Service, agency, and other government organization contract support and the contractor personnel providing support to the joint force in a designated operational area. Operational contract support consists of the functional capabilities of contract support integration and contractor (personnel) management. The logistics directorate of a joint staff (J-4) at the combatant command level is typically responsible for overseeing operational contract support that is provided to the joint force in a designated operational area.

a. Contract Support Integration. This functional capability synchronizes the provision of contracted support through a process that optimizes JFC operational planning, requirements development, contract development, execution, and closeout towards meeting the requirements of deployed forces within the operational area. The
Contracting officers and program managers meet with contractors in Iraq.

Contract support integration functional capability can be utilized by the CCDR to ensure Service and component contract support augments organic military and government sources of support in an efficient and effective manner. Subject to certain constraints placed on the functions that contractors may perform in battlefield environments, generally speaking, contract support may be used to provide capabilities that do not exist in the joint force or do not exist to the depth and breadth required; contract support also may be employed when there are no acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs), inadequate HNS agreements, or when there are diplomatic constraints on the use of military personnel. Contract support is executed by contracting officers warranted under authorities granted to the Services and other components under Title 10, USC, and in accordance with rules established in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement, and Service FAR supplements. Contract support integration in a large contingency is a complex undertaking for numerous reasons, including separate Service and component contracting authorities, hundreds of contracting activities originating contracts, combatant commands possessing command authority but not contracting authority, contracts originating and largely executed outside the operational area that are activated for performance in the operating area, separate Service funding sources and Service priorities for support of their own forces. Effective contract support integration allows the CCDR to both maintain visibility of contracted capabilities and synchronize execution of contract support in the designated operational area. Moreover, it provides the ability to constantly assess and manage the risks associated with contract support. Proper planning, coordination and execution of contract support integration is key to optimizing both the effectiveness of contract support to the joint force and the efficiency of requiring activities and contracting activities supporting joint force needs. Thus, operational contract support is a tool for combatant command use in order to evaluate risk and apply contract support in mitigation against identified shortfall of capabilities required to complete the missions.
b. Contractor Management. Contractor management provides the CCDR with the capability to orchestrate, functionally manage, and maintain visibility over contractor personnel supporting the joint force in the designated operational area. The CCDR can easily maintain visibility over contractor personnel working under Service contracts let by contracting officers in the designated operational area. However, his ability to maintain visibility over contractor personnel working under contracts originating outside the designated operational area is more challenging. While contractor management is related to contract support integration, contractor management largely concerns the activities of government and military activities charged with carrying out respective responsibilities for integrating contractor personnel into joint operations and in complying with terms and conditions in the contract, including meeting requirements to provide government furnished support. Contractor management in a large contingency is a complex undertaking that requires close coordination between three elements/entities. These elements are: the CCDR staff involved in planning for the support and setting theater entrance and theater management rules, the Service components that will be involved in providing such support and the contracting officers who will be responsible for ensuring that the contracts properly reflect the respective support relationship between the contractor and the government. Proper planning, coordination, and execution is crucial to maintaining a good military-contractor relationship, maximizing effectiveness, and minimizing costs both the contractor and the government resulting from unplanned support issues.

For further guidance on contracting and contractor management, refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.
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CHAPTER III
PLANNING JOINT LOGISTICS

“As we select our forces and plan our operations...we must understand how logistics can impact on our concepts of operation...Commanders must base all their concepts of operations on what they know they can do logistically.”

-- General Alfred M. Gray, Jr.
29th Commandant of the Marine Corps (July 1987- June 1991)

1. Introduction

a. US military forces face a challenging security environment where it has become increasingly difficult to predict with any certainty which nations, combinations of nations, or non-state actors may threaten US interests. To mitigate this risk, CCDRs must develop plans that can generate multiple military capabilities across the range of military operations in order to dissuade, deter, or defeat any adversary. Well coordinated plans help mitigate risk and increase CCDR freedom of action.

b. The demands and complexities of global operations require that joint logistic planning be an integral part of all planning activities to deliver adaptive, integrated, and synchronized joint logistic support. Effective planning enables logisticians to anticipate requirements, and validate, synchronize and integrate them with available resources to minimize duplication of effort, resolve shortfalls, mitigate risk and ensure effective support of CCDR requirements. Joint logistic planning includes the identification of roles, responsibilities, key tasks and resources, along with the sequencing of logistical capabilities to meet the commander’s intent. Effective joint logistics planning identifies future requirements and proposes solutions; it requires joint logisticians to clearly understand the commander’s intent and concept of operations (CONOPS). The objective of joint logistic planning is to fully integrate support planning and operations. The more integrated the logistics plan is with the operational concept, the more effective the overall operation will be.

2. Joint Operation Planning

a. Joint operation planning is the overarching process that guides CCDRs in developing plans for the employment of military power within the context of national strategic objectives and national military strategy to shape events, meet contingencies, and respond to unforeseen crises.

b. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) share the same basic approach and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and course of action development. The combination of JOPES and JOPP promotes coherent planning across all levels of war and command echelons, whether the requirement is for a limited, single-phase operation such as noncombatant evacuation or for a multiphase campaign involving major combat operations. JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting CCDRs and to joint
force component commands when components participate in planning. JOPP helps commanders and their staffs organize planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders.

Refer to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, (Planning Policies and Procedures); CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II, (Planning Formats); and CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution), for details on JOPES. Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, for details on JOPP.

c. Joint operation planning encompasses a number of elements, including four planning functions: Strategic Guidance, Concept Development, Plan Development, and Plan Assessment (See Figure III-1). These functions can be done either sequentially or concurrently depending upon the type of planning and time available. Joint operation planning features detailed planning guidance and frequent dialogue between senior leaders and commanders to promote a common understanding of planning assumptions, considerations, risks, COAs, implementing actions, and other key factors. Plans may be rapidly modified throughout their development and execution. This process involves expeditious plan reviews and feedback, which can occur at any time, from SecDef and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The intent is to give SecDef and the CCDR a mechanism for adapting plans rapidly as the situation dictates.
d. CJCSTM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I, Planning Policies and Procedures, provides for orderly and coordinated problem solving and decision making in two related but distinct categories—contingency planning and crisis action planning. These categories differ primarily in level of uncertainty, amount of available planning time, and products. First, the process is highly structured to support iterative, concurrent, and parallel contingency planning throughout the planning community to produce thorough and fully coordinated OPLANs when time permits. Second, the process is shortened in crisis action planning, as necessary, to support the dynamic requirements of changing events. During actual military operations, the process adapts to accommodate greater decentralization of joint operation planning activities. Contingency and crisis action planning share common planning activities and are interrelated.

3. Planning Functions

Planning translates strategic guidance and direction into executable OPLANs and operation orders (OPORDs) for contingency or crisis action response. Planning is initiated from a continuous awareness of global events, recognition of the need for a prepared military response to support the National Security Strategy, and follows a collaborative, iterative planning process. From a logistician’s perspective it is important for the operations planners to understand the capabilities and limitations of their apportioned core logistic capabilities. The joint logistician is deeply involved in each of the planning functions and can use the principles of logistics to assist in preparing the logistic plan to support the CCDR’s mission.

a. Principles of Logistics. Logisticians use the principles of logistics as a guide for analytical thinking when assessing COAs or plans/orders. These principles are not a set of rigid rules, nor do they apply in every situation. They should be applied with creativity, insight and boldness. These principles should guide joint logisticians during all of the planning steps. The joint logistic principles are:

(1) Responsiveness. Responsiveness is providing the right support when it is needed and where it is needed. Responsiveness is characterized by the reliability of support and the speed of response to needs of the joint force. Responsiveness is enhanced by visibility commanders need to see where their support is and when it will arrive. Clearly understood processes and well-developed decision support tools are key elements enabling responsiveness to emerging requirements. By establishing and monitoring/controlling battle rhythm to look at logistic operations, the joint logistician can see and predict logistic issues and make adjustments to support operational needs.

(2) Simplicity. Simplicity is defined as a minimum of complexity in logistic operations. Complexity introduces confusion into an already chaotic environment. Simplicity fosters efficiency in planning and execution, and allows for more effective control over logistic operations. Clarity of tasks, standardized and interoperable procedures, and clearly defined command relationships contribute to simplicity. Simplicity is a way to reduce the “fog of war” or the friction caused by combat. Having
clearly understood objectives, plus clear logistic processes and procedures, assists unity of effort.

(3) Flexibility. Flexibility is the ability to improvise and adapt logistic structures and procedures to changing situations, missions, and operational requirements. Flexibility is reflected in how well logistics responds in an environment of unpredictability. Where responsiveness is a commander’s view of logistic support, flexibility is a logistician’s view of being responsive. The logistician’s ability to see and predict requirements in an ever changing environment allows for the development of viable options in supporting operational needs.

(4) Economy. Economy is defined as the minimum amount of resources required to deliver a specific outcome. Economy is achieved when support is provided using the fewest resources within acceptable levels of risk. At the tactical and operational levels, economy is reflected in the number of personnel, units and equipment required to deliver support. Among the key elements of the logistic principle of economy is the identification and elimination of unnecessary duplication and redundancy.

(5) Attainability. Attainability is the assurance that the minimum essential supplies and services required to execute operations will be available. Attainability is the point at which the CCDR or subordinate JFC judges that sufficient supplies, support, distribution capabilities, and LOC capacity exist to initiate operations at an acceptable level of risk. It is also that point at which logistic capabilities exist at a level that will allow the transition of operations between phases. Some examples of minimal requirements are inventory on hand (days of supply), critical support and Service capabilities, theater distribution assets (surge capability), combat service support sufficiency, and force reception throughput capabilities.

(6) Sustainability. Sustainability is the ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. Sustainability is focused on the long-term objectives and requirements of the supported forces. Sustainability provides the JFC with the means to enable freedom of action and extend operational reach. Effective sustainment influences the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations allowing the CCDR to seize, retain and exploit the initiative.

(7) Survivability. Survivability is the capacity of an organization to prevail in the face of potential threats. To ensure continuity of support critical logistic infrastructure must be identified and plans developed for its protection. Survivability is directly affected by dispersion, design of operational logistic processes and the allocation of forces to protect critical logistic infrastructure. Examples of critical logistic infrastructure include industrial centers, airfields, seaports, railheads, supply points, depots, LOCs, bridges, intersections, logistic centers, and installations.
b. **Strategic Guidance.** At the CCDR level, planning begins with the receipt of strategic guidance or a planning directive and continues as the CCDR develops a mission statement. This JOPES planning function relates to the first two JOPP steps (Initiation and Mission Analysis). The staff’s planning activities initially focus on mission analysis, which develops information to help the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders understand the situation and mission. Planning activities include identifying assumptions, planning forces, mission and desired end state. Logisticians identify critical logistical assumptions. During mission analysis joint logisticians must provide critical information to operations planners on the guidance contained in strategic logistical documents such as the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) (Mobility and Logistic supplements) and related or supplemental publications. Additionally, detailed information on airfields, seaports, road, rail, and bridging capabilities and other critical infrastructure.

c. **Concept Development**

(1) This JOPES planning function relates to the following JOPP steps: COA Development, COA Analysis and Wargaming, COA Comparison, and COA Approval. The staff develops, analyzes, and compares valid COAs and develops staff estimates that are coordinated with the CSAs, and JPEC when applicable. The output is an approved COA along with common understanding of the enemy situation, interagency coordination requirements, multinational involvement (if applicable), and capability requirements. Logistic planners coordinate and integrate planning efforts with operational planners so that sustainment requirements are an integral part of COA development. The logistician identifies requirements and critical items and services needed and must be fully aware of force structure planning, time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) development and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI) requirements as they commence development of concepts of support (addressing supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, HSS, engineering, logistic services, and operational contract support) to meet sustainment requirements from theater entry and operations, to redeployment and reset. It is not uncommon for logistics and support operations to begin prior to or concurrent with planning. Thus logistic planners and their concepts of support need to remain flexible and sensitive to the ever evolving operational requirements and changing force structure/organization of the joint force.

(2) During COA refinement, phasing of joint operations is done to ensure joint capabilities are available in the proper sequence to meet the operational requirements. Phasing helps the CCDR and his staff visualize and think through the entire operation and define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. The planning process routinely uses a standard phasing construct (six phases numbered from 0 to V – see figure III-2). The actual phases used will vary (compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) with the joint campaign or operation and be determined by the JFC. Phases are designed and protracted sequentially, but some activities from a phase may continue into subsequent phases or actually begin during a previous phase. Transitions between phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, and may be accompanied by changes in command relationships. Phase transitions will normally require changing priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the design of the operational
area, creating new support challenges. Using operational phases as the common denominator provides an effective method to ensure the support capabilities are provided when and where needed during the course of an operation. For example, during phases I and II (Deter and Seize Initiative), the focus may be on the rapid expansion of theater presence through the opening of intermediate staging bases, forward operating stations, and main operating bases required to sustain military operations. In these phases, a joint expeditionary capability to rapidly establish and initially operate a port of debarkation and support expanding distribution may be required to support the CCDR’s operational requirements. A critical element of initial entry is collecting accurate port and airfield infrastructure information along with an understanding of projected throughput and expansion requirements. An example of logistics planning for an operational task would be planning for joint and multinational force JRSOI. During phase III (Dominate), a key task is sustaining combat operations. It is essential to leverage visibility during rapid and dispersed combat operations to see changing requirements as the situation develops. Phase IV (Stabilize) may include providing basic subsistence to the civil population and equipping of local security forces. During this phase, the logistician must plan to ensure that logistical support expands to meet stabilization requirements often including critical infrastructure repair, temporary base camp or forward operating base enhancement, and improved theater distribution capabilities. Improved theater distribution capabilities include: maturation of materiel retrograde system supporting item repair, redistribution of materiel, and eventual retrograde and reset of materiel and forces. Successful Phase IV logistic planning requires coordination with multinational, HN, interagency, IGO, NGO, or other agencies. Phase V (Enable Civil Authority) may require planning for simultaneously supporting redeployment, force regeneration, relief operations, community assistance, and logistic support to civil authority.

![Figure III-2. Phasing Model](image-url)

**Figure III-2. Phasing Model**

d. **Plan Development.** During the plan development function, the CCDR’s staff will create a detailed OPLAN, OPORD, or operation plan in concept format (CONPLAN), with required annexes. The supported CCDR, staff and subordinate
commanders, and supporting commanders conduct a number of different planning activities to include:  force planning, support planning, nuclear strike, deployment planning, shortfall identification, feasibility analysis, refinement, documentation, plan review and approval, and supporting plan development.  A clear understanding of the CONOPS is essential to the joint logistician’s ability to meet joint force requirements. Because logistic support is provided through a variety of different organizations, joint logistic planning must provide the integration mechanism to unify all sources of support. The joint logistic concept of support specifies how capabilities will be delivered over time, it identifies who is responsible for delivering a capability, and it defines the critical logistical tasks necessary to achieve objectives during the phases of the operation. The logistic concept of support coordinates the capabilities of joint, multinational, host nation, interagency, IGO, NGO, plus Active Component and Reserve Component forces. Two planning activities logisticians are most involved in are:

   (1) Support Plan Development.  The purpose of support planning is to determine the sequence of the personnel, logistics, and other support required to provide supply, maintenance operations, deployment and distribution, HSS, engineering, logistic services and operational contract support in accordance with the CONOPS. Support planning is conducted in parallel with other planning, and encompasses such essential factors as EA identification; assignment of responsibility for base operating support; airfield operations; HSS; aeromedical evacuation; personnel services; handling of prisoners of war and detainees; theater general engineering policy; logistic-related environmental considerations; support of noncombatant evacuation operations and other retrograde operations; disposal; and nation assistance. Support planning is primarily the responsibility of the Service component commanders and begins during CONOPS development. Service component commanders identify and update support requirements in coordination with the Services, USJFCOM, DLA, and USTRANSCOM. They initiate the procurement of critical and low-density inventory items; determine HNS availability; develop plans for asset visibility; and establish phased delivery plans for sustainment in line with the phases and priorities of the CONOPS. They develop plans for battle damage repair; retrograde of reparables; container management; force and LOC protection; and transportation and support that are aligned with the CONOPS. Service component commanders continue to refine their sustainment and transportation requirements as the force providers identify and source force requirements. During distribution planning, the supported CCDR and USTRANSCOM resolve gross distribution feasibility questions impacting intertheater and intratheater movement and sustainment delivery. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers identify air, land, and sea transportation resources to support the approved CONOPS. These resources may include apportioned intertheater transportation, GCC-controlled theater transportation, and transportation organic to the subordinate commands. USTRANSCOM and other transportation providers develop transportation schedules for movement requirements identified by the supported commander. A transportation schedule does not necessarily mean that the supported commander’s CONOPS is transportation feasible; rather, the schedules provide the most effective and realistic use of available transportation resources in relation to the phased CONOPS. Mobilization planning includes two processes: the military mobilization process by which the Nation’s Armed Forces are
brought to an increased state of readiness, and the national mobilization process of mobilizing the national economy to meet non-defense needs as well as sustaining the Armed Forces across the range of military operations.

(a) Transportation Feasibility. Transportation refinement simulates the planned movement of resources that require lift support to ensure that the plan is transportation feasible. The supported commander evaluates and adjusts the CONOPS to achieve end-to-end transportation feasibility if possible, or requests additional resources if the level of risk is unacceptable. Transportation feasibility determination will require concurrent analysis and assessment of available strategic and theater lift assets, transportation infrastructure, and competing demands and restrictions.

1. USTRANSCOM supports GCCs with coordinated transportation planning expertise required during the contingency planning process. This includes reviewing the JSCP tasking, analyzing supported CCDR requirements registered in the JOPES for transportation feasibility, and advising the CCDR of changes required to produce a sustainable force deployment concept.

2. The CCDR conducts movement planning to ensure the time-phasing arrival of forces supports the employment plan. The time-phased sequencing of forces supports JOPES, and once prepared for use is called the TPFDD, which is the basis for transportation feasibility assessments. Retrograde and the movement of detainees, courier missions, initial contingency sustainment, and others as designated should be assessed to predict impact upon strategic transportation and overall transportation feasibility.

(b) Logistics Supportability Analysis (LSA). The LSA, as outlined in CJCS Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.03C, Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), provides a broad assessment of core logistic capabilities required to execute the CCDR plans. The LSA is a critical plan assessment tool that seeks to define the total unconstrained logistical requirement for execution of a CONOPS. The LSA findings should highlight deficiencies and their associated risk to supporting theater operations. The LSA assesses each core logistic capability, and is usually accomplished as part of plan development and updated during plan assessment.

1. Critical Items. Critical supplies and materiel must be identified early in the planning process. Critical items are supplies vital to the support of operations that are in short supply or are expected to be in short supply. Critical items may also be selected mission-essential items that are available but require intense management to ensure rapid resupply for mission success. Special handling, transportation and storage of requisitions or requests for transportation of critical items may be required.

2. Limitations. Logistic planners must understand the limiting factors affecting deployment, sustainment, and redeployment degrading the ability to support a campaign or OPLAN. Identifying limitations en route to or within the theater is the first step in coordinating activities to avoid overloading LOCs. Traditionally, limited
Planning Joint Logistics

unloading capacities at ports and airfields, lack of asset visibility, and limited inland
transportation have constrained the operational reach of combat forces. Logistic planners
must anticipate congestion and seek solutions to limitations. Finally, if multinational
operations are planned, the impact of multinational land, naval, and air forces competing
for real estate, ship berthing and unloading facilities, transportation, labor, and
construction materials on US force deployment and employment plans must be assessed.
Planners must evaluate the impact of using seaports of debarkation (SPODs), aerial ports
of debarkation (APODs), and/or joint logistics over the shore when preparing for
operations.

3. Logistic Outsourcing. Planning for the use of contracted capabilities
is a complex undertaking. It must address both contracting capability and the
management of contractor personnel. Planning for contract support is complicated by the
fact that support flows from inside and outside the theater. Detailed planning should be done for both contracting support (contracting support plan)
and contractor (personnel) integration (either integrated into appropriate functional areas
of the plan or in a separate contractor integration plan annex). Such plans need to be at a
level of detail appropriate to ensure contract support is fully integrated and on par with
forces planning (e.g., in TPFD). Planning should identify sources of supplies and
services from civilian sources and integrate them with operational requirements. The
Services have existing contracts whose capabilities include planning for worldwide and
country-specific logistics support and execution of logistic support plans during
contingencies. Contract support in a JOA is provided by theater support, external support
(e.g., Navy fleet husbanding support and Defense Energy Support Center [DESC] fuels
contracts), and systems support contracts.

Refer to JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support, for additional information.

4. Threat. Logistic units and installations are also high-value assets
that must be safeguarded by both active and passive measures. Active measures must
include a defense plan for logistics with provisions for reinforcement and fire support.
Passive measures include dispersion, physical protection of personnel and equipment,
deception, and limiting the size of an installation to what is essential for the mission.
Although the physical environment will most often only degrade logistic capabilities
rather than destroy them, it must be considered when planning. Logistic operations are
particularly vulnerable to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that deny, temporarily
hamper, or restrict the use of critical infrastructure (e.g., aerial ports and seaports of
embarkation, APODs/SPODs) and prepositioned assets. Survivability in a CBRN
environment presents additional challenges and will dictate planning for dispersion and
the allocation of protective forces at critical nodes of the logistic infrastructure –
particularly within the theater. Decentralization and redundancy are critical to the safety
of the logistic system supporting the CCDR. Planners must also consider alternate
APODs and SPODs in the event that WMD use denies access to the primary sites or
trans-load operations that enable continued use in a contaminated primary site.
Additionally, WMD use on ports may affect the ability and willingness of civilian
flagged carriers, (Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement and civil reserve air fleet) to
use these ports. The allocation of reserves, development of alternatives, and phasing of logistic support contribute to survivability. All force protection initiatives for traditional and irregular threats must emphasize security of logistic support.

*For further information on logistic planning considerations in CBRN environments, see JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments. For additional information on planning development refer to JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. For specific information on deployment planning refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.*

(c) Logistics Synchronization Matrix. One product of detailed planning is a synchronization matrix, which allows the CCDR and his staff to display many of the known activities of the operation by phases, functional areas and operating systems. It also allows the CCDR to assign responsibility for task accomplishment and identify metrics for future execution monitoring. The joint logistic concept of support is synchronized with the OPLAN. Particular attention is given to linking critical joint logistical tasks and responsibilities to key operational objectives and vice versa. The joint logistician develops his own logistic synchronization matrix (or decision support tool) as part of joint logistic detailed planning, which can assist in identifying logistical requirements matched to force deployment and sustainment actions, operational phasing, scheme of maneuver, and the generation of logistic theater capabilities.

(2) The deliverable product at the conclusion of plan development is a completed joint logistic concept of support which resides in the base plan and logistic annex to an OPLAN/OPORD. CCDRs follow the guidelines for contingency planning in Enclosure CJCSM 3122.03C, *JOPES, Volume II, Planning Formats.*

e. **Assessment (Plan Refinement, Adaptation, Termination, or Execution).** The supported commander extends and refines planning while supporting and subordinate commanders complete their plans. Branch plans and other options continue to be developed. The CCDR and staff continue to evaluate the situation for any changes that would trigger plan refinement, adaptation, termination, or execution.

(1) Preparation for execution. This consists of activities performed by joint forces to improve the ability to execute an operation. Preparation includes, but is not limited to, plan refinement; rehearsals; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; coordination; inspections; and movement. Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ opportunities for success. It facilitates and sustains transitions, including those to branches and sequels.

(a) Modeling, Simulations, and Exercises. The planning process now requires the CCDR to conduct modeling and simulations to test operational concepts as early as COA development to identify potential risks or impediments that could prevent mission success. The use of war games, simulations, or table exercises often enable joint logisticians to work directly with the operations planners as they seek to conduct assessments and identify risk. During these events, the joint logisticians must be able to
portray how well the logistic concept of support integrates and nests with the CONOPS. In addition, the joint logistician must be able to refine the logistic concept of support dynamically if a wargame, simulation, or exercise demonstrates a need for a change.

(b) Rehearsals. Rehearsals are used as another tool to assess the effectiveness of the concept of support, to familiarize supporting joint forces with the concept, and to provide all concerned with confidence in the selected concept. Rehearsals help to clarify roles and responsibilities, and are essential to effectively prepare for execution of an operation. There are many forms of rehearsals which have historically improved operational execution and these include: review of concept drills, exercises and table tops. Rehearsals are usually part of Step 4 of JOPP activities.

(2) In order to monitor the progress or effectiveness of plans in execution, logisticians and various subject matter experts identify expected outcomes from the concept of support that will be used to assess logistics progress. Identifying shared measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and MOPs at key nodes aids this comparison, but the ultimate MOE is the delivery of expected combat power at the time and location the CCDR requires. Coordination with Service logistic components and supporting commands will help ensure correct MOEs and MOPs are identified, understood, and valid.

4. Joint Logistic Planning Considerations

Military operations require specific logistical support starting at the strategic level in the national industrial base and ending at the tactical level where required sustainment
is delivered on time, at the right place, in the right quantity. The principal focus of joint logistic planning is at the operational level. The challenge for logisticians is to link strategic resources to tactical unit requirements. Joint logistic planning is the accurate identification of future requirements and the development of a scheme or method of meeting those requirements through the synchronization of logistic capabilities and resources in time and space. The objective of joint logistic planning is to fully integrate and coordinate support and operational execution to ensure sustained operational readiness of the joint force.

a. Organizing for Joint Logistic Planning. Operations and logistics are inseparable. After the execution of a joint operation, the CCDR’s planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping timeframes and organizational elements: future plans, future operations, and current operations. Logisticians may not be on any planning cell on a full time basis, however, a coordinated staff battle rhythm, information technology, and staff management may facilitate support to the numerous planning or coordination cells. Operations and logistics are most effectively integrated as part of a collaborative planning process that includes subordinate component commands, supporting commands and global providers. Collaborative, inclusive planning helps prevent unnecessary duplication or overlap of logistical functions among the Service component commands, and ensures early identification of risks associated with shortfalls in support capabilities.

(1) Future Plans. Future planning usually occurs in a joint planning group or in the plans directorate of a joint staff (J-5). In order to develop possible concepts of support and identify sustainment risks early in the planning process logisticians should be members of the future plans cells providing subject matter expertise as necessary. The time horizon for future plans varies according to the level of command, type of operation, commander’s desires, and other factors. Typically, the emphasis of future plans is on planning the next phase of operations or sequels to the current.

(2) Future Operations. Future operations’ planning usually occurs in the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3) or in the joint operations center. A future operations planning team normally works on branch plans, revising planning assumptions, and other assigned tasks. Joint logistic expertise is required in this planning function as well. The current conditions, the readiness of the logistical resources and capacity available to the supported commander become critical elements of information in developing branches and sequels to an existing plan. The timeframe for future operations planning varies but the period typically is more near-term and focused on the current operation or a soon-to-be executed plan.

(3) Current Operations. Current operations’ planning is normally conducted in the joint operations center, and addresses the immediate or very near-term planning issues associated with ongoing operations. This type of planning has a very short time horizon, and results in fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) directing rapid action by the joint force. Normally, the joint logistics input to this type of planning is provided from the
logisticians in the operations center, with reach back to the joint logistics fusion or sustainment centers.

![Marines discuss plans for handling wildfire evacuees at the Regimental Information Facility on Camp San Mateo, Camp Pendleton, CA.](image)

b. **Demands of an Expanding Force.** Execution of an OPORD or campaign plan or response to a crisis may be accompanied by general expansion of the Armed Forces of the United States. Historically, demand for items increases faster than the supply system can provide, and special management actions might become necessary. To anticipate campaign priorities, planners must: provide instructions or guidance for redistributing common-use assets from low to high-priority organizations within the command; obtain assets from external sources with lower priority needs; control the allocation of new assets in short supply; and provide efficient means to retrograde, repair, and then reissue critical items.

c. **Balancing Push and Pull Resupply.** Automatic (push) resupply works best for commodities and classes of materiel with constant usage rates (e.g., rations). It is particularly useful for establishing and maintaining the stocks of common-user items, which may then be distributed within the theater. Requisitioning (pull) is preferable for variable usage rate requirements (e.g., repair parts). Properly used and regulated, a combination of push and pull resupply will reduce unused or wasted space by adding predictability as well as combining compatible loads, thus resulting in a more effective as well as more efficient use of transportation assets and the logistic footprint in-theater. Current logistic initiatives are designed to further reduce the logistic footprint, increase the velocity and visibility of resupply, and emphasize pull resupply for maximum efficiency. In this regard, planners must realize that for certain commodities such as repair parts and major end-items, the Services have oriented their logistic system to a pull system, heavily reliant on information systems and a rapid, time-definite distribution system. Whether a push or pull system is employed, planners must determine planning
factors based on the mission and environment and maintain the flexibility to adjust planning factors and resupply methods as circumstances dictate.
CHAPTER IV
EXECUTING JOINT LOGISTICS

“It's through information technology that we will have the visibility of the processes that we will further validate. And it's time to do the same thing with the supply chain—start to finish, factory to foxhole.”

--General John W. Handy, US Air Force Commander, USTRANSCOM (October 2001- September 2005)

1. Introduction

   a. The term “executing joint logistics” in this publication is used to describe actions and operations conducted by joint logistic forces in support of the JFC mission. Force reception, theater distribution, and MA are examples of joint logistic operations. Since joint logistic operations span the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, the transition from planning to execution is critical.

   b. In today’s ever-changing operating environment, planning and executing operations often occur simultaneously. Even though these two functions may be running concurrently, it is critical that planning outputs serve as inputs to the execution function. Planning fidelity must translate into executable actions for those forces assigned to the JFC to accomplish the stated mission. An up to date logistic concept of support is the critical planning output that serves as the “expectation” against which the logistician measures execution. The logistician should be able to monitor, assess, and direct (when required) logistical operations in order to assure that the concept of support is being effectively executed.

2. Joint Logistic Execution

   JFCs must be able to adapt to evolving mission requirements and operate effectively across a range of military operations. These operations differ in complexity and duration. The joint logistician must be aware of the characteristics and focus of these operations and tailor logistical support appropriately. This range of military operations extends from shaping activities to major operations and campaigns. Joint logisticians must have a general understanding of the diversity, range, and scope of military operations and understand their role in each type of operation.

   a. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence. Shaping activities include military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence. Developing mutually supportive relationships to enhance coordination between regional partners and CCDRs is an important enabler for joint logistic operations. The US and multinational partners collaborate in order to expand mutual support and leverage each others' capabilities to quickly respond to future contingencies. Effective joint logistic operations in peacetime provide the foundation for an expanded role in later crisis and provide additional warfighting flexibility. Specific issues that can be addressed in peacetime include:
(1) Securing interagency approvals and permissions, normally through the country team, to execute events and establish the supporting infrastructure for DOD activities.

(2) Address partner nation (PN) and regional sensitivities, changing politics, and overall stability. These issues play heavily on where and when DOD can secure permissions for events and support. Successful execution of bilateral events, for example, does not guarantee continued access in the near-term. PNs often need extended timelines before they are prepared to permit additional bilateral or multilateral events. Additionally, positive US relations and successful bilateral engagement in one nation can impact US interests in other regional locations.

(3) Determining optimal presence and posture: Persistent DOD presence in other nations is generally less supported by both country teams and partner nation governments. Maintaining a low visibility signature to US DOD presence and activities is often the only way we can secure requisite interagency and PN permissions. In some instances, interagency and/or PN desires/mandates not only limit/restrict US military presence, but also apply to US civilian contractors. In these instances, logistic support (or construction) must be executed through local nationals or third-country nationals.

(4) Developing formal agreements/permissions between the US and many developing nations (e.g., status-of-forces agreements, ACSAs): US law and military regulations often involve long approval processes and restrictions on the types of funding authorized.

b. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations. Crisis response and limited contingency operations are usually single, small-scale, limited-duration operations. Many of these operations involve a combination of military forces and capabilities in close cooperation with other government agencies, IGO and NGO elements. Logisticians must understand multinational and interagency logistical capabilities and coordinate mutual support, integrating them into the joint operation when appropriate. Efforts during peacetime shaping operations to develop partner capacities can pay dividends in these types of operations. Many crisis response missions, such as foreign humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, require time-sensitive sourcing of critical commodities and capabilities, and rapid delivery to the point of need. In these operations, joint logistics is most often the main effort. Civil support refers to the unique DOD ability to provide support to civil authorities. DOD responds to requests for support under the National Response Framework to civilian authorities. Upon approval by SecDef, or at the direction of the President, DOD resources may be used to support federal, state, local, and tribal authorities. These operations frequently involve supplying food and water, providing medical support, aeromedical evacuation, creating temporary shelter, providing contracting support, conducting distribution operations and assisting in the evacuation of the populace. In the event of an incident involving CBRN or high-yield explosives, joint logistics operations may also involve providing specific consequence management support, such as emergency clearance of debris and restoration of essential public services. For other capabilities, such as MA, state and local medical
examiners or coroners normally maintain jurisdiction. When this is the case, DOD should be prepared to support as needed.

*For additional information see JP 3-28, Civil Support.*

image of a rough terrain forklift to offload humanitarian relief supplies from a Navy landing craft on the beach in Biloxi, Mississippi during Hurricane Katrina relief operations.

c. **Major Operations or Campaigns.** Major operations or campaigns typically involve the deployment, sustainment, and retrograde of large combat forces. Joint logisticians develop support plans for the duration of the operation, as well as the return of equipment to continental United States (CONUS) or other locations. These plans often leverage contractor support to alleviate logistical capability shortfalls. The primary challenges for logisticians during these types of operations are gaining visibility of the requirements, sensing competing priorities and adjusting continuously as the situation unfolds to ensure sustained readiness over time. A critical planning requirement during major operations is to plan for the transition to phase IV (Stability), and phase V (Enable Civil Authority), where logisticians will have competing requirements to include supporting stability operations, providing basic services and humanitarian relief, and assisting reconstruction efforts, while redeploying a large number of forces and equipment. The retrograde of contaminated materiel will require special handling to control contamination and protect the force and mission resources from CBRN hazards.

3. **Framework for Joint Logistics**

a. **Organizing for Execution.** The CCDR’s logistic staff must be able to rapidly and effectively transition from peacetime/planning activities to monitoring, assessing, planning, and directing logistic operations throughout the theater. This transition may occur through the directed expansion of the joint logistics operations center (JLOC) and/or the CCDR’s joint deployment and distribution operations center (JDDOC). The CCDR’s or JFC’s staff is augmented (either physically or virtually) with representatives
from Service components, USTRANSCOM and other supporting CCDRs, CSAs, and other national partners or agencies outside the command’s staff. For example, each GCC has established a JDDOC to synchronize and optimize the flow of arriving forces and materiel between the intertheater and intratheater transportation. As the operational tempo increases during a contingency or crisis, additional joint logisticians and selected subject matter experts (maintenance, ordnance, supply, etc.) can augment JDDOCs and use established networks and command relationships instead of creating new staffs with inherent startup delays and inefficiencies. This expanded organization must be organized and situated to ensure increased coordination and synchronization of requirements in the deployment and distribution process. This organization must have clear roles and responsibilities between the various elements and clearly understood relationships between the logistical elements and the combatant command staff.

b. **Technology.** Logisticians use a variety of automated tools to assist in planning and execution.

*See Chapter V, “Controlling Joint Logistics,” for more information on technology.*

c. **Achieving Situational Awareness.** A role of the joint logistician is to support the CCDR in achieving situational awareness in order to make decisions, and disseminate and execute directives. Maintaining situational awareness requires maintaining visibility over the status and location of resources, over the current and future requirements of the force, and over the joint and component processes that deliver support to the joint force. This kind of visibility is the key to continuously monitoring progress and is enabled by operational inputs which serve to inform joint logisticians about the current situation. Service reports, operational summaries, and logistical situation reports all serve to expand the joint logistician’s awareness of the JOA. Awareness is enhanced through automated systems and reports such as the Defense Readiness Reporting System, munitions report,
or bulk petroleum contingency report. Collectively this information enables joint logisticians to assess planned versus actual consumption in order to detect possible shortfalls, predict requirements and develop possible solutions to issues. This data should be used to predict requirements and capabilities near-term (10 days or less), mid-term (about 30 days), or long-term (next operational phase).

d. **Battle Rhythm.** The combatant commander will establish a battle rhythm for the operation along with mechanisms for establishing and maintaining visibility for all functional areas, to include logistics. The joint logistician must develop a supporting battle rhythm for the sustainment staff that builds off the JFC battle rhythm. Synchronizing logistic reporting with operational updates, ensuring that the operational planning cycle is part of the logistical battle rhythm, and minimizing shift changes at critical points in the battle rhythm will enable more effective execution. Additionally, tying the battle rhythm to the component logistical elements will provide more accurate situational awareness and promote better integrated support to the joint force.

e. **Joint Logistic Boards, Offices, Centers, Cells, and Groups.** The joint logistician will often use boards, centers, or other organizations to assist the J-4 staff in executing joint logistic operations, by prioritizing and/or allocating resources, controlling functions or prioritizing requirements. More information about these organizations can be found in Appendix C, “Joint Logistic Boards, Offices, Centers, Cells, and Groups.”

f. **Synchronization Matrix.** A synchronization matrix or decision support tool/template serves to establish common reference points to help assess the progress of an operation. Joint logisticians may use a matrix to assess expected progress against actual execution and recommend adjustments as needed. A logistic synchronization matrix is built around the concept of the operation, and normally contains the phasing of the operation over time along the horizontal axis. The vertical axis normally contains the functions that the joint logistician is responsible to integrate as part of a concept of support. The body of the matrix contains the critical tasks, arrayed in time and linked to responsible elements for execution. It is this sort of decision support tool that enables the logistician to “see” into the future, “assess” against the current situation, and develop options for effective support that respond to a changing operational environment.

g. **Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs).** CCIRs are key data that the CCDR has identified as being critical to his decision making and mission success. Joint logisticians must ensure that CCIRs are a part of every operational update, and must ensure that functions, resources or processes directly linked to CCIRs are given highest priority. Operational adjustments or branch plans may be necessary if CCIRs cannot be collected to ensure mission success. Joint logisticians will most often use friendly forces information requirements to guide decision making, those requirements are often a direct reflection of resources (force availability, unit readiness, or materiel availability).
4. Concluding Joint Logistic Operations

Joint logistic operations are always ongoing, but it is possible that some logistic operations could be complete before the operation has been completed. For example, force reception operations could be complete when forces have moved to the tactical assembly area, have been placed under the control of the commander for integration and employment, and no other forces are flowing into the JOA. It is important for joint logisticians to monitor these transitional activities and ensure logistical resources used for the completed actions are either given new tasks, or the resources are redeployed back to home station. When operations are complete, joint logisticians should participate in the lessons learned process to review processes, roles, authorities, and the execution of the operation.
1. Introduction

This chapter describes the authorities, organizations, and control mechanisms that enable the synchronization of logistics in support of the CCDR. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, identifies C2 as a joint function. Command includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and the art of motivating and directing people and organizations to accomplish missions. Control is inherent in command; however, the joint logistician will rarely have unity of joint logistics command, and subsequently control of joint logistics is more challenging. Control of joint logistics involves organizing the joint staff and operational level logistic elements and their capabilities to assist in planning and executing joint logistic support operations, integrating and synchronizing responsibilities, designating lead Service responsibilities and developing procedures to execute the CCDR’s directive authority for logistics (DAFL) when required. While logistics remains a Service responsibility, there are processes and tasks that must be considered when developing a concept of support in order to optimize joint logistic outcomes.

2. Authorities and Responsibilities

The purpose of this section is to further describe authorities and responsibilities for logistics and underscore their importance in implementing joint logistics. These authorities are necessary to effectively control joint logistics and are not intended to supersede the responsibility of the Services to provide support to their own forces.

a. Title 10, USC, and DODD 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components, describe the statutory requirements for each Military Department to provide logistical support to assigned forces. Title 10, USC, also describes the basic authority to perform the functions of command that include organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and “giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.” This authority includes all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics. Services are responsible to prepare for such employment (of Service forces), and for such recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping (including those aspects of research and development assigned), training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining ready forces.

b. Combatant command (command authority) (COCOM) over assigned forces is vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by Title 10, USC, and cannot be
delegated or transferred. This authority over assigned forces includes DAFL, which gives the CCDR the authority to organize logistic resources within theater according to the operational needs.

c. **Directive Authority for Logistics.** Commanders of combatant commands exercise authoritative direction over logistics, commonly referred to as DAFL, in accordance with Title 10, USC, Section 164. The CCDR may delegate directive authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as required to accomplish the assigned mission. For some commodities or support services common to two or more Services, one provider may be given DOD EA responsibility by SecDef or the Deputy Secretary of Defense. However, the CCDR must formally delineate this delegated authority by function and scope to the subordinate JFC or Service component commander. The exercise of DAFL by a CCDR includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures necessary to ensure the following: effective execution of approved OPLANs; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.

(1) The President or SecDef may extend this authority to attached forces when transferring forces for a specific mission, and should specify this authority in the establishing directive or order.

(2) A CCDR’s directive authority does not: discontinue service responsibility for logistic support; discourage coordination by consultation and agreement; or disrupt effective procedures or efficient use of facilities or organizations. Unless otherwise directed by SecDef, the Military Departments and Services continue to have responsibility for the logistic support of their forces assigned or attached to joint commands, subject to the following guidance.

(a) Under peacetime conditions, the scope of the logistic authority exercised by the CCDR will be consistent with the peacetime limitations imposed by legislation, DOD policy or regulations, budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific conditions prescribed by SecDef or CJCS.

(b) Under crisis action, wartime conditions, or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic authority of CCDRs enables them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions. The President or SecDef may extend this authority to attached forces when transferring those forces for a specific mission and should specify this authority in the establishing directive or order.

d. **Administrative Control.** Administrative control (ADCON) is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations with respect to administration and support, to include the organization of Service forces and control of resources and equipment. ADCON is synonymous with the administration and support responsibilities identified in Title 10, USC, as previously mentioned.
e. **DAFL Execution.** In exercising DAFL, CCDRs have an inherent obligation to ensure accountability of resources. This obligation is an acknowledgement of the Military Departments Title 10, USC, responsibilities and recognizes that the Military Departments do not resource their forces to support other DOD forces. In that regard, CCDRs will coordinate with appropriate Service components before exercising DAFL or delegating authority for subordinate commanders to exercise common support capabilities to one of their components. In keeping with the Title 10, USC roles of the Military Departments, CCDRs should maintain an accounting of resources taken from one Service component and provided to another. This accounting can be used to reimburse the losing Service component in kind over time within the AOR when possible, or can be used to pass back a requirement to DOD for resource actions to rebalance Military Department resource accounts.

*For more information on DAFL, refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.*

f. **Executive Agent.** SecDef or the Deputy Secretary of Defense may designate a DOD EA and assign associated responsibilities, functions, and authorities within DOD. The head of a DOD component may be designated as a DOD EA. The DOD EA may delegate to a subordinate designee within that official’s component the authority to act on that official’s behalf for any or all of those DOD EA responsibilities, functions, and authorities assigned by SecDef or the Deputy Secretary of Defense. The nature and scope of the DOD EA responsibilities, functions, and authorities shall be prescribed at the time of assignment and remain in effect until SecDef or the Deputy Secretary of Defense revokes or supersedes them. EA designations are related to, but not the same as, CCDR lead Service designations discussed below.

*For additional information on EA, refer to JP1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, for supply commodity related EAs, refer to Appendix B, “Supply Commodity Executive Agents,” and for logistic-related EAs, refer to Appendix D, “Department of Defense Logistics-Related Executive Agents.”*

g. **Lead Service.** The CCDR may choose to assign specific common user logistic functions, to include both planning and execution to a lead Service. These assignments can be for single or multiple common logistical functions, and may also be based on phases and/or locations within the AOR. GCC lead Service assignments are normally aligned to Office of the Secretary of Defense-level EA designations, but this may not always be the case. For example, in circumstances where one Service is the predominant provider of forces and/or the owner of the preponderance of logistic capability, it may be prudent to designate that Service as the joint logistic lead. It would be rare for one Service logistic organization to have all the capabilities required to support an operation, so the CCDR may augment the lead Service logistic organization with capabilities from another component’s logistic organizations as appropriate.
3. Logistics Directorate, J-4

a. The CCDR must have the right resources to plan, execute, and control logistics within the joint operational area. The J-4 is the CCDR’s principal staff organization responsible for integrating logistics planning and execution in support of joint operations. The J-4 staff executes its’ responsibilities by integrating, coordinating, and synchronizing Service component logistic capabilities in support of joint force requirements. The J-4 is also responsible for advising the JFC of the logistic support that can be provided, and for optimizing available resources to provide the most effective joint outcomes by fusing information to facilitate integrated, quality decision-making. Although the organizational considerations outlined below could apply to a CCDR’s J-4 staff, they will most frequently be applied to subordinate joint force J-4 organizations. In addition, the J-4 and other logisticians support the J-3 lead in the planning and executing of requirements for the JRSOI process and base support installations planning and sustainment.

b. Structure. In order to effectively conduct its responsibilities, the J-4 is organized around the integrating functions of planning, execution, and control, and is responsible for integrating the joint logistic functional capabilities across these integrating functions. In addition, the J-4 must be able to integrate and effectively employ capabilities related to multinational support (ACSA, security assistance, etc.), HN support, and interagency support.

   (1) Planning. The J-4 is responsible for ensuring adequate logistic expertise is an integral part of the planning process. The J-4 should establish a planning cell to fulfill this responsibility.

      (a) Within the strategic planning framework, this function is normally executed as part of the J-5 planning process. J-4 representation in the J-5 planning process is critical to ensure early integration of logistics in OPLANs. The number of personnel from the J-4 needed in the J-5 planning process is dependent on the nature and maturity of the plan itself. For example, more resources may be needed to provide supportability analysis after a COA decision than during initial mission analysis.

      (b) Within the operational planning framework, the J-4 executes its responsibility as part of its operations center task. Normally an assistant battle captain is assigned primary responsibility to work with the operational planning cell of the J-3 to develop FRAGOs and other execution orders to control on-going operations. This joint logistic operational planning capability is key to ensuring that on-going operations can be effectively sustained as operational conditions change.

   (2) Execution (Operations). The J-4 is responsible for executing and controlling joint logistics, and should organize to respond to anticipated or on-going operations.

      (a) The J-4 should establish a JLOC to monitor and control the execution of logistics in support of on-going operations. The JLOC is an integral part of the CCDR’s
operations element and provides joint logistics expertise to the J-3 operations cell. The JLOC is tailored to the operation and staffed primarily by the J-4 staff.

See Appendix C, “Joint Logistic Boards, Offices, Centers, Cells, and Groups,” for additional information on the JLOC.

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**During the first months of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, battlefield distribution was a challenge in the southern part of the Iraqi Theater of Operations. As a result, the 377th Theater Support Commander’s Director of Support Operations and the Coalition Forces Land Component Command’s Chief of Sustainment integrated logistics functions with the goal of providing a rapid and timely flow of forces, material and sustainment while simultaneously reducing the logistics footprint. Their initiative to integrate logistics support efforts created a single Theater Support Command Center (TSCC) to better manage and coordinate Army and Marine Corps logistics.**

The TSCC achieved big dividends by pulling together functions traditionally performed by individual Services, within Service stovepipes. Integrating logistics functions, especially Class III (fuel) and Class V (ammunition), reduced traditional coordination measures, as information from activity cells fed directly to the functional fusion area. Integrating the functional areas reduced the time required to gather and fuse information, and therefore provided greater situational awareness, faster, to the command center.

The TSCC synchronized, prioritized, directed, integrated and coordinated the common-user and cross-Service logistics functions necessary to accomplish the joint theater mission.

--Iraq, March 2003 to May 2003: Joint Combined Combat Operations

(b) Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center. USTRANSCOM, as the DPO, through its Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC), collaborates with JDDOCs to link strategic deployment and distribution processes to operational and tactical functions in support of the warfighter. The geographic CCDRs are responsible for implementing their JDDOC core structure. The JDDOC is an integral organization of the GCC’s staff, normally under the direction of the J-4 and collocated with the JLOC during operations. However, the GCC can place the JDDOC at any location required or under the operational control of other command or staff organizations. The JDDOC can reach back to the national partners to address and solve deployment and distribution issues for the CCDR and can have the capability to develop deployment and distribution plans, integrate multinational and/or interagency deployment and distribution, and coordinate and synchronize the movement of sustainment in support of the CCDR’s priorities. The JDDOC structure is built around a core structure, but is flexible and is tailored by the CCDR after considering the operational mission, the
operational environment (i.e., US only, allied and/or coalition participation, force posture) and the maturity of the theater of operations.

(c) Fusion Cell. Synchronizing and integrating the many joint logistics functional capabilities, multinational and interagency capabilities and operational contract support may require the J-4 to establish a location or center where the requirements, resources, and processes can come together in a way that provides knowledge to effect quality decision-making. This fusion of information is essential to effective logistics support and critical to enabling the J-4 to “see the logistics battlefield” with clarity. This “fusion” element is comprised of functional experts representing the joint logistics functions, and provides functional assessments, analysis, and expertise to the planning and execution elements of the J-4.

(d) Joint Logistics Boards, Centers and Offices. The CCDR may also establish boards, centers and offices to meet increased requirements and to coordinate logistic efforts (e.g., subarea petroleum office, joint facilities utilization board, joint mortuary affairs office).

See Appendix C, “Joint Logistic Boards, Offices, Centers, Cells and Groups,” for additional information.

(e) Size. The J-4’s size is tailored to meet its’ mission requirements. It is built around a core set of responsibilities described above in order to plan and execute logistic operations for the CCDR on a daily basis at the existing operational tempo. The core element is sized/tailored to perform its functions under “normal” day-to-day conditions and provides the continuity and theater expertise to transition to an increased operational tempo should a CCDR move into a contingency or crisis.

1. To meet increased requirements generated by planned operations or crisis situations, the core J-4 staff is first augmented by in-theater assets using personnel from the CCDR’s resources. Additional resources can be requested from national assets using either a request for forces or joint manning document process.

2. The size and composition of the augmentation will vary depending upon mission requirements, to include the scope of the scenario and the maturity of the theater. For example, deployment operations may require significant JDDOC augmentation from USTRANSCOM to synchronize intertheater and intratheater movements. Additional augmentation could also be required from DLA due to the criticality and volume of supply support required. Other augmentation could include operational contract support, enhanced munitions support, or other specialized support.

4. Logistics Execution Organizations

The fundamental role of joint logistics is to integrate and coordinate logistic capabilities from Service, agency and other providers of logistic support, and to facilitate
execution of the Services’ Title 10, USC responsibilities while supporting the ever-changing needs of the JFC.

a. **Service Logistics Control Structures.** The Services’ operational-level logistic control structures form the basis for joint operations, thus it is important understand how each Service and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) conducts logistics at the operational level. The following paragraphs briefly describe those logistic C2 capabilities and are fundamental to understanding Service and special operations forces (SOF) logistics capabilities.

1. **Army.** The overarching theater-level headquarters is the Army Service component command (ASCC). The ASCC is responsible for providing support to Army forces and common-user logistics to other Services as directed by the CCDR and other authoritative instructions. The theater sustainment command (TSC) is the logistic C2 element assigned to the ASCC and is the single Army logistic headquarters within a theater of operations. The TSC is responsible for executing port opening, theater opening, theater surface distribution and sustainment functions in support of Army forces, and provides lead Service and EA support for designated common user logistics to other government agencies, multinational forces, and NGOs as directed. Additionally the TSC, working with the JFC’s J-4, or as designated or directed, is responsible for establishing and synchronizing the intratheater segment of the surface distribution system in coordination with the JDDOC with the strategic-to-theater segment of the global distribution network. The TSC rapidly establishes C2 of operational level logistics in a specified area of operations/JOA by employing one or more expeditionary sustainment commands (ESCs). The ESC provides a rapidly deployable, regionally focused, forward-based C2 capability that mirrors the organizational structure and functionality of the TSC.

2. **Marine Corps.** The Marine expeditionary force (MEF) is the largest force the Marine Corps employs at the operational level. The logistics combat element (LCE) that supports the MEF is the Marine logistics group (MLG). The MLG is the principal and largest Marine logistics element. The MLG is organized to provide multifunctional direct support and functional general support to logistic units and combat arms and tactical units. A standing and experienced command and control capability, as well as an operations and planning capability, are organic to the MLG. It can rapidly and seamlessly task organize, and deploy to meet MEF mission requirements. While the Marine Corps does not possess an organic capability to execute operational-level logistics, the Marine component commander may be augmented and/or may task elements of an LCE to perform limited operational-level functions. Integration with strategic level logistical support is coordinated through the operational-level Marine component commander.

3. **Navy.** Numbered fleet commanders (e.g., Fifth Fleet, Sixth Fleet, and Seventh Fleet) have operational logistics responsibilities within a CCDR’s geographic boundaries. Fleet operational forces are normally organized into task forces under the command of a task force commander. The commander, logistics forces, executes tactical logistics based on numbered fleet policy, guidance and direction. The logistics task force
commander normally exercises operational control (OPCON) of assigned combat logistics forces and is responsible for coordinating the replenishment of forces at sea.

(4) Air Force. The air and space expeditionary task force (AETF) is the organizational structure for deployed US Air Force forces. The AETF presents a scalable, tailorable organization with three elements: a single commander, embodied in the commander, Air Force forces (COMAFFOR); appropriate C2 mechanisms; and tailored and fully supported forces. The Air Force air and space operations center provides operational-level C2 of Air Force forces and is the focal point for planning, executing, and assessing air and space operations. Although the Air Force provides the core manpower capability for the Air Force air and space operations center, other Service component commands contributing air and space forces, as well as any multinational partners, may provide personnel in accordance with the magnitude of their force contribution. The Air Force air and space operations center can perform a wide range of functions that can be tailored and scaled to a specific or changing mission and to the associated task force the COMAFFOR presents to the JFC. The Air Force forces staff is the vehicle through which the COMAFFOR fulfills operational and administrative responsibilities for assigned and attached forces, and is responsible for long-range planning that occurs outside the air tasking cycle. The director of logistics (A-4) is the principal staff assistant to the COMAFFOR for JOA-wide implementation of combat support capabilities and processes, to include the coordination and supervision of force beddown, transportation, supply, maintenance, logistic plans and programs, and related combat support activities. In general, the A-4 formulates and implements policies and guidance to ensure effective support to all Air Force forces.

(5) Coast Guard (USCG). USCG deployable units are capable of providing combat and combat support forces and as such, must be able to react rapidly to worldwide contingencies. In order to accomplish the many missions, deployable units and assets consist of high endurance cutters, patrol boats, buoy tenders, aircraft, port security units, maritime safety and security teams, maritime security response teams, tactical law enforcement teams, and the National Strike Force. Logistical support is provided through the USCG maintenance and logistic commands and their subordinate elements. When USCG units operate as part of a JTF, Coast Guard units may draw upon the logistic support infrastructure established by/for the JTF. These general support functions normally include but are not limited to the following: berthing, subsistence, ammunition, fuel, and accessibility to the naval supply systems. The Navy logistic task force commander is responsible for coordinating the replenishment, intratheater organic airlift, towing, and salvage, ship maintenance, and material control, as well as commodity management for the task force group.

(6) Special Operations Forces. SOF in the US are normally under the COCOM of Commander, US Special Operations Command (CDRUSSOCOM). When directed, CDRUSSOCOM provides US based SOF to a GCC. The GCC normally exercises COCOM of assigned and OPCON of attached SOF through the commander of a theater special operations command (TSOC), a subunified command. When a GCC establishes
and employs multiple JTFs and independent task forces, the commander, TSOC (CDRTSOC) may establish and employ multiple joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTF/task force special operations (SO) requirements. Accordingly, the GCC, as the common superior, normally will establish supporting or tactical control command relationships between JSOTF commanders and JTF/task force commanders. When directed, CDRUSSOCOM can establish and employ a JSOTF as a supported commander. The CDRTSOC and JSOTF J-4s are the primary logistic control authorities for SOF. Responsibilities include oversight of the core logistic capabilities. The JSOTF J-4 must ensure that SOF forces are supported by the Services, which is required by Title 10, USC. The JSOTF J-4 is dependent on Service and joint logistic support as the primary means of support. The JSOTF J-4 may have to recommend and/or set priorities of support for common items and consolidated functions. Limited resources available to the JSOTF elements may require the J-4 to provide prioritization information to the JTF J-4 and/or the appropriate lead Service logistic organization. In addition to the core logistic capabilities, SO-peculiar support must be considered. This support includes equipment, materials, supplies, and services required for SO missions for which there is no Service-common requirement. These are limited to items and services initially designed for, or used by, SOF until adopted for Service-common use by one or more Military Service; modifications approved by CDRUSSOCOM for application to standard items and services used by the Military Services; and items and services approved by the CDRUSSOCOM as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a SO mission. This support will be provided via USSOCOM Service component logistic infrastructures and in coordination with theater Service components. Logistical support to SOF units is the responsibility of each Service’s logistic command and control structure and this responsibility exists regardless of whether the SOF unit requiring support is assigned to the Service component, the TSOC, JSOTF, joint psychological operations task force, or a joint civil-military operations task force. For rapid response operations, USSOCOM component commands will maintain the capability to support SOF elements for an initial period of 15 days. Services and/or executive agents should be prepared to support special operations as soon as possible but not later than 15 days after SOF are employed.

For additional guidance on SOF logistic operations, refer to JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and JP 3-05.1, Joint Special Operations Task Force Operations.

b. USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM serves as the single coordination and synchronization element on behalf of and in coordination with the JDDE community of interest to establish processes to plan, apportion, allocate, route, schedule, validate priorities, track movements, and redirect forces and supplies per the supported commander’s intent. This coordination and synchronization does not usurp the supported CCDR’s Title 10, USC, responsibilities but drives unity of effort throughout the JDDE to support CCDRs. The supported CCDR is responsible to plan, identify requirements, set priorities, and redirect forces and sustainment as needed to support operations within the respective AOR. USTRANSCOM exercises responsibility for planning, resourcing, and operating a worldwide defense transportation system in support of distribution operations, to include reviewing taskings and analyzing supported CCDR’s requirements.
for transportation feasibility, and advising on changes required to produce a sustainable force deployment. During the deployment, sustainment, and redeployment phases of a joint operation, CCDRs coordinate their movement requirements and required delivery dates with USTRANSCOM, and supported CCDRs are responsible for deployment and distribution operations executed with assigned/attached force in their respective AORs. USTRANSCOM may also sponsor or provide other distribution process enablers, to include the JDDOC, DDOC-Forward, and joint task force-port opening (JTF-PO). Although all Services have the organic capability to execute theater opening functions, among other logistics tasks such as port opening and distribution, the JTF-PO provides a joint expeditionary capability to rapidly establish and initially operate an aerial port of debarkation (POD) and conduct cargo handling and port clearance/movement control to a forward distribution node, facilitating port throughput in support of combatant commander executed contingencies. JTF-PO also supports USTRANSCOM’s mission of providing end-to-end synchronized cargo and passenger movement and common-user terminal management. JTF-PO is designed to be in place in advance of a deployment of forces, sustainment, or humanitarian/relief supplies in order to facilitate joint reception, staging, onward movement, integration and theater distribution. This is accomplished by providing an effective interface between the theater JDDOC, associated POD, and other organizations. In cases when a JTF-PO is utilized, Commander USTRANSCOM (CDRUSTRANSCOM) will retain OPCON of forces in most cases while in theater. However, some instances may call for forces to be transferred to the CCDR, and these cases will be decided by SecDef with input from CDRUSTRANSCOM and the supported CCDR.

c. **USJFCOM.** USJFCOM is DOD’s primary joint force provider and is involved in deployment operations under its charter to provide trained and ready joint force assets to geographic CCDRs as they require them. USJFCOM fulfills this responsibility by performing four distinct functions: joint force trainer, integrator, primary joint force provider, and joint deployment process owner.

d. **DLA.** DLA manages, integrates and synchronizes suppliers and supply chains to meet the requirements of the Armed Forces of the US, military allies and coalition partners. When directed, DLA also supports interagency and non-DOD organizations by providing humanitarian and natural disaster relief. DLA provides the equipment, supplies and services needed for sustained logistic readiness, and supports major aviation, ground and maritime systems by providing tailored logistic support, by optimizing investment strategies and by capitalizing on commercial business practices. In addition, DLA has EA responsibilities for subsistence, bulk fuel, construction and barrier materiel, and medical materiel. DLA provides a continuous forward presence through its regional commands in the Pacific, Europe, and Southeast Asia, and has liaison officers attached to every combatant command staff to assist with planning, exercises and current operations. DLA’s contingency support teams are also deployed to enhance theater distribution to meet the warfighter’s needs.

e. **Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA).** DCMA is the combat support agency responsible for ensuring major DOD acquisition programs (systems,
supplies, and services) are delivered on time, within projected cost or price, and meet performance requirements. DCMA is a combat support agency whose major role and responsibility in contingency operations is to provide contingency contract administration services for external and theater support contracts and for selected weapons system support contracts with place of performance in the operational area and theater support contracts when contract administration services is delegated by the procuring contracting officers.

f. Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA). DSCA serves as the DOD focal point and clearinghouse for the development and implementation of security assistance plans and programs. DSCA manages major weapon sales and technology transfer issues, budgetary and financial arrangements, legislative initiatives and activities, and policy and other security assistance matters. DSCA has oversight responsibilities for DOD elements in foreign countries responsible for managing security assistance programs, and oversees the DOD Humanitarian Assistance Program that provides nonlethal property to authorized recipients. DSCA arranges DOD funded and space available transportation for nongovernmental organizations for delivery of humanitarian goods to countries in need; coordinates foreign disaster relief missions; and, in concert with DLA, procures, manages, and arranges for delivery of humanitarian daily rations and other humanitarian materiel in support of US policy objectives.

5. Logistic Control Options

The need for rapid and precise response under crisis action, wartime conditions, or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary in the conduct of joint operations, the CCDR’s logistic authority enables him to use all logistic capabilities of all forces assigned as necessary for the accomplishment of the mission. The President or SecDef may extend this authority to attached forces when transferring those forces for a specific mission and should specify this authority in the establishing directive or order. The CCDR may elect to control logistics through his J-4 staff tailored and augmented as discussed in paragraph 3 (Logistics Directorate, J-4). The CCDR may also decide to control joint logistics through a subordinate logistics organization. In these instances, the CCDR will delineate the authorities and command relationships that will be used by the subordinate commander to control logistics. In both cases, the CCDR expects effective control of joint force logistics by fusing procedures and processes to provide visibility and control over the logistic environment, and integrating joint logistic planning with operations planning. Control of joint logistics is enhanced by how effectively the logistician combines the capabilities of the global providers and the Service’s logistic elements with the JFC’s requirements in a way that achieves unity of effort.

a. Staff Control. The J-4 staff may be used to support a wide range of operations including campaigns; complex and/or long duration major operations; or complex operations involving multiagency, IGO, NGO and/or multinational forces, if properly augmented. For example, the staff may be expanded and scoped to provide increased movement control or material management capabilities; it could be augmented with a
robust operational contracting capability; the J-4 could receive augmented capability to coordinate multinational support operations, or expanded to execute JOA-wide infrastructure rebuilding missions. When exercising this option the CCDR must specify the control authorities being bestowed on the J-4 and the control authorities this staff office will have when working with the components logistics elements. Taskings to Service component logistic elements in this case must come from formal tasking orders issued through the CCDR J-3. The “logistics task order”, which could come in the form of a FRAGO, formalizes the authorities given the J-4 by the JFC, and enables the rapid response to operational logistic requirements.

b. **Organizational Control.** As another alternative for controlling the major operations outlined above, the CCDR may elect to assign responsibility to establish a joint command for logistics to a subordinate Service component. The senior logistics headquarters of the designated Service component will normally serve as the basis for this command, an organization joint by mission (e.g., campaigns, major operations, humanitarian missions), but not by design. When exercising this option, the CCDR retains directive authority for logistics, and must specify the control and tasking authorities being bestowed upon the subordinate joint command for logistics, as well as the command relationships it will have with the Service components. This command would control logistic taskings as directed by the CCDR and must not infringe on the authorities and responsibilities as specified in paragraph 2 (Authorities and Responsibilities). The CCDR would augment this joint command as required with joint, agency and other Service capabilities to effectively integrate and control logistic requirements, processes and systems, and with forces made available.

6. **Technology**

a. The rapid advance of technology, if leveraged effectively, can enable the CCDR to effectively control logistics within the operational area. Technology, in the form of information systems, decision support tools and evolving communications capabilities can improve visibility of Logistic processes, resources and requirements and provide the information necessary to make effective decisions. These technologies can also contribute to a shared awareness that enables the CCDR to focus capabilities against the joint warfighter’s most important requirements, and can be used to more effectively capture source data, make data more accessible within the public domain, and integrate data into tools or applications that enable effective decision-making. Logistics operations rely on a variety of Service and agency information systems to gather the data necessary for planning, decision-making, and assessment.

b. The **Global Combat Support System – Joint (GCSS-J)** is the primary information technology application used to provide automation support to the joint logistician. In order to deliver visibility over resources, requirements and capabilities, GCSS-J uses a services-oriented architecture to link the joint logistician to component, Service, multinational, and other agencies allowing all concerned to use shared data to plan for, execute and control joint logistic operations.
See JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, Appendix A, Enabler Tools, for more information on deployment and redeployment enabler technologies.

7. Multinational and Interagency Arrangements

Multinational and interagency operational arrangements regarding joint logistics are bound together by a web of relationships among global providers. These relationships are critical to joint logistics success because logistical capabilities, resources, and processes are vested in a myriad of organizations which interact across multiple physical domains and the information environment, and span the range of military operations.

a. Multinational Operations. In today’s operational environment, logisticians will likely be working with multinational partners. While the United States maintains the capability to act unilaterally, it is likely that the requirement, and the desire, to operate with multinational partners will continue to increase. Multinational logistics is a challenge; however, leveraging multinational logistical capabilities increases the CCDR’s freedom of action. Additionally, many multinational challenges can be resolved or mitigated by having a thorough understanding of the capabilities and procedures of our multinational partners before operations begin. Integrating and synchronizing logistics in a multinational environment requires developing interoperable logistic concepts and doctrine, as well as clearly identifying and integrating the appropriate logistical processes, organizations, and command and control options. Careful consideration should be given to the broad range of multinational logistic support structures.

For further guidance on multinational logistics, refer to JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

US and coalition forces unload a Turkish International Security Assistance Force helicopter from an aircraft at Kabul International Airport in Kabul, Afghanistan.
b. **Other Government Agencies (OGAs), IGO, and NGO Coordination.** Integration and coordination among military forces, OGAs, and NGOs and IGOs is different from the coordination requirements of a purely military operation. These differences present significant challenges to coordination. First, the OGA/NGO/IGO culture is different from that of the military. Their operating procedures will undoubtedly differ from one organization to another and with the Department of Defense. Ultimately, some OGAs, NGOs and IGOs may even have policies not in consonance with those of DOD. In the absence of a formal command structure, the joint logistician will need to collaborate and elicit cooperation to accomplish the mission. As in multinational operations, the benefit of leveraging the unique skills and capabilities that NGOs and IGOs possess can serve as a force multiplier in providing the joint warfighter more robust logistics.

*For additional guidance on interagency, intergovernmental organization, and nongovernmental organization coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II. For additional guidance on civil-military operations, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.*

“*The current logistics apparatus was suited ideally to the battlefields of the Cold War, with more clearly defined front lines...It is not enough to ship supplies just to the nearest seaport or airfield. Nor can we solely depend on just-in-time concepts for fast-moving tactical forces. The current scenarios require a logistics infrastructure that can deliver supplies to the last tactical mile...*”


8. **Control of Joint Logistics**

Control of joint logistics is reflected by how effectively the logistician combines the capabilities of the global providers and the requirements of the CCDR in a way that achieves unity of effort. Integrating those capabilities is the essence of controlling joint logistics, and joint logisticians must integrate Service, multinational, agency, and other organizational capabilities and resources to plan, execute and control logistics in support of the CCDRs’ CONOPS.
1. General

Basic roles and responsibilities of the Services, CSAs, and commands involved with joint logistic support are outlined in JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*. Specific responsibilities for the joint logistical functions are articulated in applicable JPs and can be found on the JDEIS web portal at https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/ or the JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/. Clearly articulating responsibilities is the first step in fully synchronized and coordinated logistic support during joint operations.

2. Office of the Secretary of Defense.

SecDef is responsible for developing national security emergency operational procedures and assigning forces to the combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands. Those SecDef offices most concerned with logistic matters are:

a. **Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P])**. The USD(P) is the principal staff assistant and advisor to SecDef and the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DOD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. For more information on the USD(P), see DODD 5111.1, *Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P])*.

b. **Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L])**. The USD(AT&L) sets policy for acquisition through DODDs of the 5000 series. The USD(AT&L) directs and controls the DLA, through the deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness). For more information on the USD(AT&L), see DODD 5134.01, *Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L])*.

c. **Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness (DUSD[L&MR])**. The DUSD(L&MR) serves as the principal staff assistant and advisor to the USD(AT&L), the Deputy Secretary of Defense and SecDef on logistics and materiel readiness in the DOD and is the principal logistics official within senior management. For more information on the DUSD (L&MR), see DODD 5134.12, *Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness (DUSD [L&MR])*.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

CJCS is the principal military adviser to the President and SecDef. As such, CJCS is assigned specific supervisory and joint operation planning responsibilities in the area of strategic direction, strategic planning, and joint operation planning. With respect to logistics, CJCS’s responsibilities include preparing joint logistic and mobility plans to support strategic plans; advising SecDef on critical deficiencies and strengths in force logistic capabilities and assessing the effect of such deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives and policy and on strategic plans; reviewing logistic plans...
and programs to determine their adequacy and feasibility for the performance of assigned missions; preparing and submitting general strategic guidance for the development of industrial and manpower mobilization programs; and preparing and submitting military guidance for use in the development of logistic-related military aid programs and other actions relating to foreign military forces. For more information on the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*.

4. **Military Departments**

The Military Departments exercise authority to conduct all affairs of their departments. These authorities include recruiting, organizing, supplying, equipping, training, servicing, mobilizing, demobilizing, administering, and maintaining forces; constructing, outfitting, and repairing military equipment; constructing, maintaining, and repairing buildings, structures, and utilities; and acquiring, managing, and disposing of real property or natural resources. For more information on the Military Departments, see DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*.

5. **Military Services**

The Army, Marine Corps, Navy, and Air Force (under their departmental Secretaries) as well as the Coast Guard (under the Department of Homeland Security in peacetime and the Department of the Navy in wartime) are responsible for the functions enumerated in DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*. The components provide logistic support for Service forces, including procurement, distribution, supply, equipment, and maintenance, unless otherwise directed by SecDef.

6. **Combatant Commands**

CCDRs are responsible for the development and production of joint OPLANs and CONPLANs. During peacetime, they act to deter war and prepare for war by planning for the transition throughout the range of military operations. During war, CCDRs plan and conduct campaigns and military operations to accomplish assigned missions. The joint operation planning responsibilities of CCDRs are further described in the Unified Command Plan, JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, and JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

a. **Supported Combatant Commanders.** CCDRs are responsible for the development and production of joint plans and orders in response to mission taskings. They exercise directive authority for logistics (DAFL) over assigned forces within their area of responsibility (AOR). Refer to Chapter V, “Controlling joint Logistics,” for more detail on DAFL.

b. **Supporting Combatant Commanders.** Certain situations may require that one CCDR support another CCDR. Support is a command relationship obligating the
supporting organization to aid, protect, complement, or sustain the supported organization. Supporting CCDRs and their subordinates ensure that their actions are consistent with the supported commander’s strategy. The primary task for supporting combatant commands is to ensure that the supported CCDR tasked to achieve national objectives receives the timely and complete support needed to accomplish the mission.

c. **Functional combatant commands** participate in joint operation planning typically as a supporting command to a supported geographic combatant command.

7. **Combat Support Agencies**

CSAs are DOD agencies designated in law or by the SecDef. They are supporting agencies in the same manner as supporting combatant commands. Supported commanders may assign missions and tasks to them consistent with their assigned functions in OPLANs and OPORDs. CSAs that provide some type of worldwide logistic support for the missions of the Military Departments and the combatant commands across the range of military operations, as well as to other DOD components, Federal agencies, foreign governments, or international organizations as assigned. The logistic – related CSAs are DLA, DCMA, and DSCA. For more information on CSAs, see DODD 3000.06, *Combat Support Agencies*. 
## APPENDIX B
### SUPPLY COMMODITY EXECUTIVE AGENTS

| CL I Subsistence | **EA** - Plan for, procure, manage, ensure quality, and maintain war reserve stocks to support Service and combatant command requirements for types, quantities, and delivery.  
**Services** - Provide forecasts and coordinate mission transfers.  
**Combatant Commands** - Coordinate support for military operations. |
| Executive Agent (EA) – DLA  
DODD 5101.10 |
| CL II Clothing / Textiles / Individual Equipment / Tools | **DLA** - Plan for, procure, and manage requirements and distribution of materiel.  
**Services** - Determine requirements and provide supporting distribution structure at retail level.  
**Combatant Commands** - Coordinate support for military operations. |
| **Title 10, USC Responsibility – Services** |
| CL III Bulk Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Subclass: Bulk Petroleum  
EA – DLA / Defense Energy Support Center  
DODD 5101.8 | **EA** - Acquire, store, and distribute bulk petroleum from source of supply to acceptance by customer. Establish equipment standards and interoperability requirements. Establish customer relationships with defense agencies and friendly forces where US is designated fuels role support nation.  
**Services** - Provide force structure to operate tactical storage and distribution systems.  
**Army** - Manage overland petroleum support.  
**Air Force** - Provide distribution of bulk petroleum products by air.  
**Navy** - Provide seaward and over-the-shore bulk petroleum products.  
**Marine Corps** - Maintain capability to provide bulk petroleum to USMC.  
**Combatant Commands** - Integrate EA supply chain recommendations. |
| CL IV Construction / Barrier Materiel  
EA – DLA  
DODD 5101.12 | **EA** - Plan for, procure, manage, and supply materiel required by DOD components.  
**Services** - Provide requirements and maintain war reserve stocks.  
**Combatant Commands** - Provide requirements and determine points of physical and accountability transfer of materiel. |
| CL V Ammunition Subclass: Conventional Ammunition  
Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA) – Army  
DODD 5160.65 | **SMCA** - Integrate wholesale conventional ammunition (specified items) logistics functions of Services to achieve efficiency and effectiveness. Coordinate transition of logistic support functions with Services.  
**Services** - Retain acquisition and logistics responsibilities not delegated to SMCA. Provide contingency requirements and receipt, storage, and issue requirements to SMCA.  
**Combatant Commands** - Coordinate support for military operations. |
| CL VI Personal Demand Items  
Title 10, USC Responsibility - Services | **Services** - Plan for, procure, and manage requirements and distribution of materiel. Provide supporting force structure.  
**Combatant Commands** - Coordinate support for military operations. |
| CL VII Major End Items  
Title 10, USC Responsibility - Services | **Services** - Plan for, procure, and manage requirements and distribution of materiel. Provide supporting force structure.  
**Combatant Commands** - Coordinate support for military operations. |
| CL VIII Medical Materiel  
EA – DLA  
DODD 5101.9 | **EA** - Develop and implement acquisition and distribution strategies to support the medical materiel requirements identified by DOD components and CCDRs worldwide for peacetime, wartime, homeland defense and other contingencies.  
**Services** - Provide requirements and supporting force structure.  
**Combatant Commands** - Coordinate requirements and integrate EA supply chain recommendations. |
| CL IX Repair Parts  
Title 10, USC Responsibility - Services | **Services** - Plan for, procure, and manage requirements and distribution of materiel. Provide supporting force structure.  
**Combatant Commands** - Coordinate support for military operations. |
1. General

There are a number of logistic boards, offices, centers, cells, and groups that reside at the strategic and operational levels that can be used to resolve joint logistic issues during operations. These enduring or temporary organizations may be staffed on a permanent, full-time basis, such as the JLOC at the Joint Staff J-4, or on a temporary basis such as a subarea petroleum office (SAPO) at a JTF to resolve specific strategic and operational gaps, shortfalls, or the impact of competition with another supported commander’s concurrent operations. These organizations have specified responsibilities and relationships identified in DOD or CJCS instructions, manuals and memoranda or combatant command planning documents.

2. Strategic-level Boards, Offices, and Centers

Strategic-level joint logistic boards, offices, and centers provide advice or allocation recommendations to the CJCS concerning prioritizations, allocations, policy modifications or procedural changes.

a. Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board (JMPAB). The JMPAB is the sole agency charged with performing duties for the CJCS, in matters that establish materiel priorities or allocate resources. The CJCS, through the JMPAB, establishes, modifies, or recommends policies for allocating scarce materiel assets in the DOD system when competing requirements among DOD components cannot be resolved by the DOD components. The board when convened is chaired by the Joint Staff J-4 and comprised of the following; J-3, J-5, J-6, J-8, Service logisticians, DLA, USSOCOM (when required), and Defense Security Cooperation Agency (for issues concerning use of a force activity designator, project code, or force module subsystem).

b. Joint Transportation Board (JTB). The JTB may be convened by the CJCS during wartime or contingencies for ensuring President and SecDef requirements for all common-user transportation resources assigned or available to DOD are apportioned and scheduled to optimize accomplishment of DOD objectives. When convened the CJCS JTB: adjudicates competing lift requirements; when required, evaluates COAs being proposed or taken by the Commander, US Transportation Command (CDRUS TRANSCOM) to resolve conflicting transportation requirements and makes appropriate recommendations to the CJCS; transmits CJCS guidance to the CDRUS TRANSCOM and supported CDRDs; understands the projected operational activities of the CDRDs and the strategic direction issued by the President and SecDef to anticipate developing problems or future resource requirements; when needed, provides an interface among supported and supporting CDRDs, the CDRUS TRANSCOM, the Chiefs of the Services, other CSAs, and the CJCS on matters concerning transportation.

For additional information on the JTB refer to JP 4-01, Defense Transportation System.
c. **Joint Logistics Operations Center.** The Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC) is a current operations directorate within the Joint Staff J-4. The JLOC receives reports from supporting commands, Service components, and external sources, distills information for decision/briefings, and responds to questions. The JLOC coordinates and synchronizes the planning and execution of ongoing combatant command operations, interagency support requirements, and assigns priority movement for selected senior officials.

d. **Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC).** The DDOC located at USTRANSCOM directs the global air, land, and sea transportation capabilities of the Defense Transportation System to meet national security objectives provided by DOD. The DDOC fuses capabilities of multimodal deployment and distribution operations, intelligence, force protection, capacity acquisition, resource management and other staff functions to collaboratively provide distribution options to the warfighter. C2 of the majority of intertheater lift forces and logistic infrastructure is accomplished through the DDOC, which tracks the movement requirement from lift allocation and initial execution through closure at final destination.

For additional information concerning the DDOC refer to JP 3-35, *Deployment and Redeployment Operations*.

e. **Defense Health Board (DHB).** The DHB provides independent advice and recommendations on matters pertaining to operational programs, policy development, and research programs and requirements for the treatment and prevention of disease and injury, the promotion of health and the delivery of efficient, effective, and high quality health care services to Department of Defense beneficiaries.

f. **Defense Medical Standardization Board (DMSB).** The DMSB provides the joint voice of clinical experts on matters of expeditionary medicine. The DMSB serves as an executive-level body responsible for enhancing Service medical department cooperation, interoperability, and operational flexibility, while promoting efficient HSS. The DMSB is the focal point for medical standardization within DOD.

g. **Global Patient Movement Requirements Center (GPMRC).** The GPMRC is a joint activity that reports directly to the CDRUSTRANSCOM, the DOD single manager for the strategic and CONUS regulation and movement of uniformed Services and other authorized patients. GPMRC authorizes transfers to medical treatment facilities of the Military Departments or the Department of Veterans Affairs and coordinates intertheater and inside CONUS patient movement requirements with the appropriate transportation component commands of USTRANSCOM.

h. **Armed Services Blood Program (ASBP).** The ASBP consists of approximately 81 blood banks and blood donor centers worldwide, including 22 Food and Drug Administration licensed blood donor centers. The ASBP plays a key role in providing quality blood products for Service members and their families in both peace and war. As a joint operation among the military Services (Army, Navy, and Air Force), the ASBP
Joint Logistic Boards, Offices, Centers, Cells, and Groups

has many components working together to collect, process, store, distribute, and transfuse the blood worldwide. The ASBP coordinates with the supported CCDR and USTRANSCOM to ensure blood products distribution meets operational needs. *For additional information concerning the DHB, DMSB, GPMRC, and ASBP refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support.*

## 3. Operational Joint Logistic Boards, Centers, Cells, and Others

Operational level joint logisticians must provide advice and recommendations to the supported CCDR concerning prioritizations, allocations, or procedural changes based upon the constantly changing operational environment. These boards, centers, cells, and other organizations are defined in terms of roles, responsibilities, locations, and relationships in planning or execution documents.

a. **Joint Logistics Operations Center.** The JLOC may be established at the combatant command or joint subordinate commands at the discretion of the JFC and operated by the JFC’s logistic staff. At the combatant command or subordinate level the JLOC is tailored to the mission or operation. It coordinates and synchronizes the planning and the logistic operations for such functions as engineering, contracting, materiel readiness, mortuary affairs, HNS, and other services; and must coordinate closely with the combatant command JDDOC concerning transportation and distribution of supplies.

b. **Joint Deployment and Distribution Operations Center.** A JDDOC is a joint capability solution designed to synchronize and optimize intertheater and theater deployment, distribution, and sustainment operations within a GCC’s AOR. The JDDOC is an integrated operations and fusion center (movement control organization), acting in consonance with the GCC’s overall requirements and priorities, and on behalf of the GCC, may direct common user and intratheater distribution operations. The JDDOC is a standing operations center, normally under the direction of the CCDR’s J-4, but may be placed under other command or staff organizations. It may move to a forward-deployed location, or be collocated with a subordinate logistic command, unit, or task force. However, regardless of location, the JDDOC retains its direct organizational relationship to the combatant command. It does not become a subordinate activity of the host organization to which it may be attached. The JDDOC relies on liaison and collaboration to achieve reachback to access national support capabilities.

*For additional information concerning a JDDOC refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.*

c. **Combatant Commander Logistic Procurement Support Board (CLPSB).** A GCC may establish a CLPSB to ensure that contracting and other related logistic efforts are properly coordinated across the entire AOR. This board is normally chaired by a GCC J-4 representative and includes representatives from each Service component command, DOD CSAs as well as OGAs or organizations concerned with contracting matters. The primary purpose of a CLPSB is to establish AOR-wide contracting and
Appendix C

ccontractor management policies and procedures; determine the theater support contracting organizational structure; coordinate with other IGOs, NGOs, and HNs on contracting support issues and actions; and coordinate with DOD and Military Departments on potential loss of contract support and risk management.

d. **Joint Acquisition Requirements Board (JARB)**. A JARB approves and prioritizes JFC designated, joint logistic related, high value and or high-visibility requirements and determine the proper source of support for those requirements. It is normally chaired by the subordinate JFC (either subunified command or JTF-level) deputy commander or J-4, the JARB is utilized to coordinate and control the requirements generation and prioritization of joint logistic supplies and services that are needed in support of the operational mission. The JARB is normally made up of representatives of the Service component logistic staffs, SOF component staff, DLA, Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), joint staff engineer, communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6), joint staff comptroller, staff judge advocate (SJA), and other JFC staff members as directed. It also should include representatives from designated theater support and external support contracting organizations. The theater support and external support contracting members’ main role in the JARB process is to inform the other JARB members which contracting mechanisms are readily available for their particular acquisition to include limits of the local vendor base for each type of support.

e. **Joint Civil-Military Engineering Board (JCMEB)**. The CCDR or subordinate JFC may establish a JCMEB to assist in managing civil-military construction and engineer projects and resources. The JCMEB is a temporary board, chaired by the CCDR or his designated representative such as the combatant command J-4, combatant command engineer, subordinate joint force engineer, or civil affairs (CA) officer. The joint force engineer will provide the secretariat and manage the administrative details of the board. Key members on the board include the J-3 future plans officer, J-4, engineer, CA officer, SJA, and comptroller. Other personnel from the staff, components, DOD agencies or activities in support of the combatant command may also participate.

f. **Joint Environmental Management Board (JEMB)**. The CCDR or subordinate JFC may establish a JEMB to assist in managing environmental requirements. The JEMB is a temporary board, chaired by the CCDR or subordinate joint force engineer, with members from the joint force staff, components, and any other required special activities (e.g., legal, medical, and CA). The board establishes policies, procedures, priorities, and the overall direction for environmental management requirements in a JOA. The JEMB will coordinate its activities with the combatant command or subordinate joint force engineering staff.

g. **Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB)**. A JFUB is a joint board that evaluates and reconciles component requests for real estate, use of existing facilities, inter-Service support, and construction to ensure compliance with JCMEB priorities. The JFC may establish a JFUB to assist in managing Service component use of real estate and existing facilities. The JFUB is a temporary board chaired by the combatant command or
subordinate joint force engineer, with members from the joint force staff, components, and any other required special activities (e.g., legal, force protection, comptroller, contracting, and CA). If the JFC decides that all engineer-related decisions will be made at the JCMEB, then the JFUB functions as a working group to forward recommendations for decision to the JCMEB. It serves as the primary coordination body within the JTF for approving construction projects within the wire to support troop beddown and mission requirements.

For additional information concerning a JCMEB, JEMB, and JUFB refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

h. Logistics Coordination Board. A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad logistics oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating logistic information, providing logistic guidance, reviewing logistic policies, and priorities. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units.

i. Theater - Joint Transportation Board (T-JTB). The T-JTB may be established by a GCC to interface with the CJCS JTB and at the theater operational level in order to rapidly change transportation resource allocation to adjust to changing circumstances or immediately react to emergency or unanticipated situations. Procedures for establishing the T-JTB are developed during peacetime to facilitate rapid stand-up and execution under emergency or wartime conditions. The T-JTB’s role is to resolve contentious transportation issues within the command, at the operational level.

For additional information concerning the T-JTB and joint movement center (JMC) please refer to JP 4-01, Defense Transportation System.

j. Joint Movement Center (JMC). The JMC may be established at a subordinate unified or JTF level to coordinate the employment of all means of transportation (including that provided by allies or HNs) to support the concept of operations. This coordination is accomplished through established theater and JTF transportation policies within the assigned operational area, consistent with relative urgency of need, port and terminal capabilities, transportation asset availability, and priorities set by a JFC. The JTF JMC will work closely with the JDDOC.

k. Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center (TPMRC). The TPMRC manages the validation and regulation of intratheater patient movement within their respective theaters. The TPMRC is responsible for theater-wide patient movement (e.g., medical regulating and aeromedical evacuation scheduling) and coordinates with theater medical treatment facilities to allocate the proper treatment assets required to support its role. The TPMRC communicates this transport to bed plan to the theater Service transportation component or other agencies responsible for executing the mission. The TPMRC coordinates with the GPMRC for intertheater patient movement.
1. Joint Patient Movement Requirements Center (JPMRC).  JPMRC is normally under the operational control of the commander, JTF (CJTF). The JPMRC maintains coordinating relationships and is normally collocated with the JTF JMC and communicates movement requirements to the transportation component responsible for executing the mission. The JPMRC coordinates closely with the TPMRC and GPMRC for movement into theater controlled beds outside the JOA.

m. Joint Blood Program Office (JBPO). The JBPO is under the staff supervision of the combatant command surgeon. This office is responsible for the joint blood program management in the theater of operations. The JBPO advises the combatant command surgeon on all matters pertaining to theater blood management activities; and evaluates the JBPO, blood product depots, blood transshipment centers, and blood supply units to ensure that personnel, equipment, and resource requirements are addressed in the GCC’s OPLANs.

For additional information concerning a TPMRC, JPMRC, and JBPO refer to JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

n. Joint Petroleum Office (JPO). The JPO, established by the GCC, works in conjunction with its Service components, SAPOs, and the Defense Energy Support Center (DESC) to plan, coordinate, and oversee all phases of bulk petroleum support for US forces employed or planned for possible employment in the AOR. JPOs typically have a mix of Service representatives.

o. Subarea Petroleum Office. When tactical operations warrant extensive management of wholesale bulk petroleum in a JOA, the GCC’s JPO may establish a SAPO. Staff augmentation may be provided by Service components. The primary function of the SAPO is to discharge the staff petroleum logistic responsibilities of the JTF. Through the SAPO, the CJTF establishes policies, procedures, priorities, and oversight to optimize critical petroleum, oils, lubricants (POL) support for the JTF. The SAPO is responsible for POL planning and execution within the JOA. This level of planning focuses on support for each Service component. Its products are the inland petroleum distribution plan and base support plans. The SAPO conforms to the administrative and technical procedures established by the GCC and DESC.

For additional information concerning a JPO or SAPO refer to JP 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine.

p. Joint Mortuary Affairs Office (JMAO). The GCC will normally establish and operate a JMAO that has responsibility for maintaining data on burial and recovery status of all dead and missing. The joint MA officer coordinates programs for search, recovery, identification, burial, or concurrent return of human remains and supervises the establishment and maintenance of temporary cemeteries and serves as the clearing point for graves registration information. At the discretion of the GCC, the CJTF may direct a JMAO be established in the JOA. The JTF JMAO is formed and organized to plan and
execute all MA programs. The JTF J-4 has staff supervision responsibility for the JMAO.

For additional information concerning a JMAO refer to JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

q. Explosive Hazards Coordination Cell (EHCC). The JFC may establish an EHCC to predict, track, distribute information on, and mitigate explosive hazards within the theater that affect force application, focused logistics, protection, and awareness of the operational environment. The EHCC should establish and maintain an explosive hazard database, conduct pattern analysis, investigate mine and improvised explosive device strikes, and track unexploded ordnance hazard areas. The cell provides technical advice on the mitigation of explosive hazards, including the development of tactics, techniques, and procedures, and provides training updates to field units.

For additional information concerning an EHCC refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.
# APPENDIX D

## DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LOGISTICS-RELATED EXECUTIVE AGENTS

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<td>DOD Logistics Use of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) Standards</td>
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https://dod-executiveagent.whs.mil/index.cfm

**LEGEND:**
- ASBP Armed Services Blood Program
- CDRUSJFCOM Commander, United States Joint Forces Command
- CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, United States Transportation Command
- Dir DLA Director, Defense Logistics Agency
- DOD Department of Defense
- DODD Department of Defense Directive
- EDI Electronic Data Interchange
- SECAF Secretary of the Air Force
- SECARMY Secretary of the Army

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### Table D-1 Department of Defense Logistics-Related Executive Agents
APPENDIX E
REFERENCES

The development of JP 4-0 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Federal Law

   Title 10, USC.

2. Strategic Guidance and Policy

   e. Unified Command Plan.
   f. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.
   g. National Response Framework.

3. DOD Publications

   a. DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.
   b. DODD 2310.01E, The Department of Defense Detainee Program.
   c. DODD 3000.06, Combat Support Agencies.
   d. DODD 3110.6, War Reserve Materiel Policy.
   e. DODD 3216.1, Use of Laboratory Animals in DOD Programs.
   f. DODD 4140.1, Supply Chain Materiel Management Policy.
   g. DODD 4151.18, Maintenance of Military Materiel.
   h. DODD 4270.5, Military Construction.
   i. DODD 4500.09E, Transportation and Traffic Management.
   j. DODD 4705.1, Management of Land-Based Water Resources in Support of Contingency Operations.
k. DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components.*

l. DODD 5101.8, *DOD Executive Agent (DOD EA) for Bulk Petroleum.*

m. DODD 5101.9, *DOD Executive Agent for Medical Materiel.*

n. DODD 5101.10, *DOD Executive Agent for Subsistence.*

o. DODD 5101.11, *DOD Executive Agent for the Military Postal Service (MPS).*

p. DODD 5101.12, *DOD Executive Agent for Construction/Barrier Materiel.*

q. DODD 5111.1, *Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P]).*

r. DODD 5134.01, *Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD[AT&L]).*

s. DODD 5134.12, *Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness (DUSD[L&MR]).*

t. DODD 5154.24, *Armed Force Institute of Pathology.*

u. DODD 5154.25, *DOD Medical Examination Review Board.*

v. DODD 5158.04, *United States Transportation Command.*

w. DODD 5158.5, *Joint Deployment Process Owner.*

x. DODD 6000.12, *Health Services Operations and Readiness.*

y. DODD 6055.9E, *Explosives Safety Management and the DOD Explosives Safety Board.*

z. DODD 6205.3, *DOD Immunization Program for Biological Warfare Defense.*

aa. DODD 6400.4, *DOD Veterinary Services Program.*

bb. DOD 6490.2, *Comprehensive Health Surveillance.*

c. DODD 8190.1, *DOD Logistics Use of Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) Standards.*

d. DOD Instruction (DODI) 1300.22, *Mortuary Affairs Policy.*
ee. DODI 3020.37, Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crises.

ff. DODI 5158.06, Distribution Process Owner.

gg. DODI 6200.2, Application of Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Rules to Department of Defense Force Health Protection Programs.


ii. DOD 4500.54G, Foreign Clearance Guide.

4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3170.01, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.

b. CJCSI 5120.02A, Joint Doctrine Development System.

c. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I Planning and Procedures.

d. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II Planning Formats.

e. CJCSM 3150.14B, Joint Reporting Structure – Logistics.

f. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

g. JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations.

h. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.

i. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.

j. JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

k. JP 3-05, Doctrine for Special Operations.

l. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volume I, Volume II.

m. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

n. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments.
Appendix E


q. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations.*


s. JP 3-41, *Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives Consequence Management.*


w. JP 4-02, *Health Service Support.*

x. JP 4-03, *Joint Bulk Petroleum and Water Doctrine.*

y. JP 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning.*


bb. JP 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.*

cc. JP 4-09, *Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution.*


ee. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning.*

ff. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System.*
APPENDIX F
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center ATTN: Joint Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The Director of Logistics (J-4) is the lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 4-0, 6 April 2000, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO:       JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4//
   INFO:     JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//
               CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10//

   Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

<table>
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F-1
5. Distribution of Printed Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications


b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications.
GLOSSARY
PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

A-4  Air Force logistics directorate
ACSA  acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
ADCON  administrative control
AETF  air and space expeditionary task force
AOR  area of responsibility
APOD  aerial port of debarkation
ASBP  Armed Services Blood Program
ASCC  Army Service component command

C2  command and control
CA  civil affairs
CAP  civil augmentation program
CBRN  chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR  combatant commander
CCIR  commander’s critical information requirement
CDRTSOC  commander, theater special operations command
CDRUSSOCOM  Commander, US Special Operations Command
CDRUSTRANSCOM  Commander, US Transportation Command
CJCS  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM  Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJTF  commander, joint task force
CLPSB  commander’s logistics procurement support board
COA  course of action
COCOM  combatant command (command authority)
COMAFFOR  commander Air Force forces
CONOPS  concept of operations
CONPLAN  operation plan in concept format
CONUS  continental United States
CSA  combat support agency

DAFL  directive authority for logistics
DCMA  Defense Contract Management Agency
DDOC  Deployment and Distribution Operations Center
DESC  Defense Energy Support Center
DHB  Defense Health Board
DLA  Defense Logistics Agency
DMSB  Defense Medical Standardization Board
DOD  Department of Defense
DODD  Department of Defense directive
DODI  Department of Defense instruction
DPO  distribution process owner
DSCA  Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DUSD(L&MR)  Deputy Under Secretary for Defense (Logistics and Materiel Readiness)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<td>USD(AT&amp;L)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics</td>
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<td>USD(P)</td>
<td>Under Secretary of Defense for Policy</td>
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<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for these terms and definitions.

**acquisition and cross-servicing agreement.** Agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis with US allies or coalition partners that allow US forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. Authority to negotiate these agreements is usually delegated to the combatant commander by the Secretary of Defense. Authority to execute these agreements lies with the Secretary of Defense, and may or may not be delegated. Governed by legal guidelines, these agreements are used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies, or exercises to correct logistic deficiencies that cannot be adequately corrected by national means. The support received or given is reimbursed under the conditions of the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Also called ACSA. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-08)

**base.** 1. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. 2. An area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support. 3. Home airfield or home carrier. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)


**combatant command (command authority).** Nontransferable command authority established by Title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, Section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)

**combat service support.** The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war.
Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. Also called CSS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

**combat support.** Fire support and operational assistance provided to combat elements. Also called CS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

**component.** 1. One of the subordinate organizations that constitute a joint force. Normally a joint force is organized with a combination of Service and functional components. (JP 1) 2. In logistics, a part or combination of parts having a specific function, which can be installed or replaced only as an entity. (JP 4-0) Also called COMP. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**concept of logistic support.** A verbal or graphic statement, in a broad outline, of how a commander intends to support and integrate with a concept of operations in an operation or campaign. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

**critical supplies and materiel.** Those supplies vital to the support of operations, which owing to various causes, are in short supply or are expected to be in short supply. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

**deployment.** 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within operational areas. 3. The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4. The relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

**depot.** 1. supply - An activity for the receipt, classification, storage, accounting, issue, maintenance, procurement, manufacture, assembly, research, salvage, or disposal of material. 2. personnel - An activity for the reception, processing, training, assignment, and forwarding of personnel replacements. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

**directive authority for logistics.** Combatant commander authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands. Also called DAFL. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)
distribution. 1. The arrangement of troops for any purpose, such as a battle, march, or maneuver. 2. A planned pattern of projectiles about a point. 3. A planned spread of fire to cover a desired frontage or depth. 4. An official delivery of anything, such as orders or supplies. 5. The operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistic system to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” to support the geographic combatant commander. 6. The process of assigning military personnel to activities, units, or billets. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

equipment. In logistics, all nonexpendable items needed to outfit or equip an individual or organization. See also component; supplies. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

Global Combat Support System. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Global Combat Support System-Joint. The primary information technology application used to provide automation support to the joint logistician. Also called GCSS-J. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

global distribution. The process that synchronizes and integrates fulfillment of joint force requirements with employment of the joint force. It provides national resources (personnel and materiel) to support execution of joint operations. The ultimate objective of this process is the effective and efficient accomplishment of the joint force mission. See also distribution. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-09)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

inter-Service support. Action by one Military Service or element thereof to provide logistic and/or administrative support to another Military Service or element thereof. Such action can be recurring or nonrecurring in character on an installation, area, or worldwide basis. (JP 1-2. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

joint decision support tools. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise. The complex of equipment, procedures, doctrine, leaders, technical connectivity, information, shared knowledge, organizations, facilities, training, and materiel necessary to conduct joint distribution operations. Also called JDDE. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02 and sourced to DODI 5851.06.)

joint logistics. The coordinated use, synchronization, and sharing of two or more Military Departments’ logistic resources to support the joint force. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
level of supply. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

line of communications. A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

logistics. Planning and executing the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

logistic support. Support that encompasses the logistic services, materiel, and transportation required to support the continental United States-based and worldwide deployed forces. (Upon approval of this revision, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

materiel. All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

multinational logistics. Any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition, including those conducted under United Nations mandate. Multinational logistics includes activities involving both logistic units provided by participating nations designated for use by the multinational force commander as well as a variety of multinational logistic support arrangements that may be developed and used by participating forces. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-08)

port of debarkation. The geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. This may be a seaport or aerial port of debarkation; for unit requirements; it may or may not coincide with the destination. Also called POD. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

pre-position. To place military units, equipment, or supplies at or near the point of planned use or at a designated location to reduce reaction time, and to ensure timely support of a specific force during initial phases of an operation. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

process owner. The head of a Department of Defense component assigned a responsibility by the Secretary of Defense when process improvement involves more
than one Military Service or Department of Defense component. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**rapid and precise response.** Rapid and precise response is the ability of the defense supply chain to meet the constantly changing needs of the joint force. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**shared data environment.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**supplies.** In logistics, all materiel and items used in the equipment, support, and maintenance of military forces. See also component; equipment. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

**supply.** The procurement, distribution, maintenance while in storage, and salvage of supplies, including the determination of kind and quantity of supplies. a. **producer phase** — That phase of military supply that extends from determination of procurement schedules to acceptance of finished supplies by the Military Services. b. **consumer phase** — That phase of military supply which extends from receipt of finished supplies by the Military Services through issue for use or consumption. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-0)

**supply chain.** The linked activities associated with providing materiel from a raw materiel stage to an end user as a finished product. See also supply. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-09)

**time-definite delivery.** The consistent delivery of requested logistic support at a time and destination specified by the receiving activity. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**unity of effort.** Coordination and cooperation toward common objectives, even if the participants are not necessarily part of the same command or organization - the product of successful unified action. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 1)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 4-0 is the Logistics keystone publication. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program Directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft; staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC Joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

**ENHANCED JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY**

**Joint Doctrine Publication**