Joint Publication 4-08

Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations

25 September 2002
1. Scope

This publication describes the unique logistical aspects associated with multinational operations, including planning, coordination, execution, command and control, and deconfliction of logistic requirements. It provides guidance and principles for the Armed Forces of the United States in conducting logistic activities when operating as part of a multinational force. It describes the nature of logistic support elements such as supply systems, movement control, maintenance, engineering, contracting, logistic information systems, host-nation support, real estate management, security, and health support during the appropriate phases of multinational operations. It outlines the organization, structure, methodology, coordinating responsibilities, and processes; establishes priorities; and institutionalizes the logistic planning function for multinational operations, ranging from major theater war to military operations other than war. It describes the responsibilities, authorities, and organizational structures that may be established to coordinate logistic support during multinational operations. It addresses the logistic support areas that commanders and their staffs should consider during the planning and execution of logistic support activities during multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands. These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational
doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

JOHN P. ABIZAID
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Describes the Fundamentals of Logistics for Multinational Operations
- Discusses Command and Control of Logistics for Multinational Operations
- Describes Use of Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements
- Provides Considerations for Multinational Logistic Planning and Execution
- Reviews Application of Relevant US Legal Authorities and Funding/Reimbursement Arrangements

Fundamentals of Logistics for Multinational Operations

*Multinational logistics is a general term used to describe any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more countries or organizations in support of a multinational force.*

In the future, the United States will most likely be engaged in multinational military operations conducted with allies or coalition partners as part of an alliance or coalition. These multinational operations may also be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations (UN). In order to ensure that multinational operations are supported effectively and efficiently, participating nations need to coordinate their logistic activities and rationalize use of logistic resources through mutual support arrangements. Because the participants in multinational operations are sovereign states with their own military establishments, equipment, doctrine, procedures, national cultures, and military capabilities, the logistic support for these operations presents difficult challenges to US geographic combatant commanders, subordinate joint force commanders, the Services, and Defense Agencies. Nevertheless, multinational logistics is critical in many situations for smooth synchronized force deployment, efficient use of host nation and theater contractor resources, and timely distribution/allocation of logistic support with reduced logistic footprints. Each type of multinational operation and organizational structure — whether alliance, US-led, non-US-led, or UN-commanded — has distinctive features especially regarding command and control (C2), funding, degree of doctrinal standardization, force interoperability, and logistics preplanning. These variable features place a premium on developing flexible multinational logistic support concepts that can be tailored to effectively respond to a broad range of contingencies.
Multinational logistic operations are governed by unique principles. Successful multinational logistic operations are governed by several unique principles. First, multinational logistic operations are a collective responsibility of participating nations and the multinational force commander (MNFC), although nations are inherently responsible for supporting their forces. Nations are highly reluctant to give MNFCs directive authority for logistics. Nevertheless, a second principle is that MNFCs should be given sufficient authority over logistic resources to ensure that the force is supported in the most efficient and effective manner. Third, cooperation and coordination are necessary among participating nations and forces, which should make use of multinational logistic support arrangements in order to reduce the logistic footprint in the operational area. Finally, synergy results from the use of multinational integrated logistic support; to ensure this, the MNFC must have visibility of the logistic activity during the operation.

Obtaining early commitment of allied logistic resources is difficult, yet critical to tailoring logistic support of an operation. Multinational operations are highly political. Generally, nations are reluctant to commit forces early. In some coalitions, formal advance planning (deliberate or contingency) is considered too sensitive for sharing. Thus, US logistic planners must work closely with alliance and potential coalition partners to the extent possible in coordinating national plans to support political decisions. Obtaining early knowledge of the organic logistic support capabilities of forces provided by participating nations and identifying the means to support their needs will be critical to effectively supporting the total force.

Command and Control of Logistics for Multinational Operations

Command relationships and organizations that promote mutual and efficient logistic support are key to success. Unity of command and unity of effort may be more difficult for multinational operations, but realizing these principles will be facilitated through the establishment of a multinational logistic C2 organization that carefully balances the authorities and responsibilities of the MNFC and participating nations. Normally, the MNFC should have the authority and responsibility to coordinate and manage a wide range of logistic activities, including movement control, civil engineering, host-nation support, theater contracting, and health service support. To assist the MNFC in executing logistic responsibilities, a variety of C2 and management organizations may be established, such as a multinational joint logistics center and functional coordination bodies comprised of participating nations’ representatives, to
facilitate multinational logistic operations. Linking the multinational logistic organization with national support elements, host nations, and nongovernmental organizations is essential. The appropriate C2 relationships and mechanisms must be clearly defined and established during operation plan development. **Determining the appropriate C2 of multinational logistic operations is the most important step in planning the support of multinational operations.**

**Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements**

Although nations are ultimately responsible for providing the logistic support of their forces, the capability of participating nations to support forces provided to the MNFC may vary widely in multinational operations. All nations, including the United States, will likely need some nonorganic support. The need for such nonorganic support — which may be provided by contractors, host nations, or other participating nations — must be identified during the planning phase and arranged for prior to participation in the operation. MNFCs must be aware of both the logistic needs and potential contributions of allies during an operation. **The diverse force mix of a multinational operation complicates the logistic support concept.** However, benefits will accrue to participants through the use of various multinational logistic support arrangements, such as the pooling of resources, to provide multinational integrated logistic support and the use of logistics units placed under MNFC operational control (OPCON) to support the entire multinational force (MNF). The use of pre-negotiated agreements will facilitate logistic support. Nations may establish **bilateral and multilateral support arrangements** to more efficiently provide logistic support, thereby contributing to the operation but at a level consistent with national capabilities. Mutual support concepts, such as **Role Specialist Nation** for specific classes of logistic support and the use of **Lead Nations** to provide logistic support within a geographic area, will play an important role in the logistic support concept of a multinational operation. **Nations’ forces need not rely solely on national “stovepipe” logistics in order to participate in such operations.** The fact that participating nations’ forces are likely to have a wide variety of equipment does not minimize the importance of working to achieve **standardization and interoperability** among potential partners.
Executive Summary

Multinational Logistic Planning

There are four critical tasks associated with planning the logistic support for a multinational operation: (1) identifying the logistic support required to accomplish the mission and support the MNF; (2) identifying opportunities for US and other participants’ logistic support contributions; (3) obtaining US and other nations’ commitments; and (4) identifying the robustness of the organic logistic support capabilities of forces provided by participating nations. It is imperative that logistic support and operation planning occur simultaneously. Obtaining effective logistic support in a multinational operation will pose particular challenges for the MNFC and will require detailed planning and flexible execution, taking into account the logistical capabilities, demands, and limitations of each national contingent. **US combatant commanders and their staffs should work with potential coalition partners, to the extent possible, in coordinating logistic support plans.** Each phase of a multinational operation has distinctive logistic requirements that must be addressed during the planning phase. Also important are the logistic factors to consider when transitioning from either a joint US-only operation to a multinational operation or vice versa. The logistic support burdens and opportunities to use multinational logistics to ease those burdens vary in these changing situations.

Relevant US Legal Authorities and Funding and Reimbursement Arrangements

There are several legal authorities that affect the way in which logistic support may be exchanged between the United States, its allies, and potential multinational partners. **US commanders and their staffs must be familiar with both these legal authorities and annual Department of Defense authorization/appropriation legislation to ensure that US participation in multinational logistic operations is conducted in accordance with these authorities.** US participants must understand the funding and reimbursement requirements of different multinational logistic support arrangements before committing the United States to such arrangements.
Executive Summary

CONCLUSION
Several major considerations affect US logistics participation in multinational operations. First, US forces and logistic resources may be placed under the OPCON of a foreign MNFC, who should have sufficient authority for logistics to effectively and efficiently support the force. Second, US laws affect the exchange of logistic support between US forces and those of other nations as well as with host nations; US commanders must be aware of these legal considerations. Third, consultation, cooperation, and coordination between US commanders and other nations, multinational headquarters, and forces is essential to achieve unity of effort in providing logistic support. The use of centralized coordination centers in such areas as movement control, contracting, civil engineering, customs and border clearance, and medical support can assist US commanders in effectively supporting US forces. Finally, use of multinational logistic support arrangements, coupled with modern technology and concepts, is important for synchronized deployment and timely sustainment of a multinational force with a reduced logistic footprint in the operational area. Advances in such areas as information technology, joint deployment, and theater distribution systems can benefit both the planning and execution of multinational logistics activities and enhance US and allied military capability.
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CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF LOGISTICS FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

“The man who goes alone can start today; but he who travels with another must wait till that other is ready.”

Henry David Thoreau, American writer (1817-1862)

1. General

a. The purpose of this publication is to expand upon the general logistic guidance contained in Joint Publication (JP) 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, and to provide more detailed guidance to US commanders and logisticians involved with providing or receiving logistic support during multinational operations. (Throughout this publication, the term “multinational” encompasses operations that also may be referred to as “allied,” “alliance,” “bilateral,” “combined,” “multilateral,” or “coalition.”)

b. The overall doctrine for supporting US joint operations has been established in JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations. Logistic support for multinational operations, however, differs fundamentally from single nation joint operations in that the participating forces represent different sovereign nations with different cultures and approaches to logistic support. This has profound implications for how the United States should organize, prepare, and execute the logistic support of Armed Forces of the United States and presents unique challenges for geographic combatant commanders, subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs), Services, and Defense Agencies. Although many of the principles of logistics for joint and multinational operations are the same, multinational logistics (MNL) involves distinctive command and control (C2) concepts and principles.

c. The United States is a member of various alliances and multinational forums — such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) Armies Program — that have developed logistic doctrine and procedures for supporting multinational operations. When participating in NATO or other multinational operations, US forces will conform to previously approved international agreements.

d. The United States, however, is a global power and geographic US combatant commanders face unique MNL challenges arising from regionally specific coalition structures, capabilities, and operational requirements. Although many NATO MNL principles and concepts apply to any alliance/coalition operation, US doctrine must be applicable to all operational situations. This publication uses established US joint logistic doctrine and terminology as the basis for US MNL doctrine. Where applicable, NATO and other approved doctrine and terminology is incorporated in order to ensure maximum interoperability with allies and potential coalition partners.
2. The Basis for Multinational Logistics

a. Definition. MNL is any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations supporting a multinational force (MNF) conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition, including those conducted under a United Nations (UN) mandate. MNL includes activities involving both logistic units provided by participating nations designated for use by the multinational force commander (MNFC) as well as a variety of MNL support arrangements that may be developed and used by participating forces.

b. Requirement for MNL. Throughout its history the United States has often acted militarily through alliances or coalitions. Figure I-1 lists selected multinational operations since 1991 in which the United States has participated either as the lead nation or as a significant force contributor. In these operations, US forces have often received and/or provided logistic support from/to allies and coalition partners. The requirement for MNL, however, has increased in the new strategic environment as a result of several factors:

• Increasing deployments to distant, logistically austere operational areas to counter a larger array of national security threats;

• More diverse multinational composition of alliance and coalition operations;

• High operational tempo and the requirement for multiple simultaneous, overlapping, and/or closely sequential operations that place a heavy burden on logistic force structure;

• Requirements for rapid force deployment with reduced logistic footprints in the operational area;

• Reduction of the size of armed forces.

c. Benefits of MNL. Use of MNL, in the form of centralized coordination, management of common-user logistic (CUL) activities, and multinational support arrangements, can significantly enhance the ability of the United States and its multinational partners to effectively and efficiently deploy and sustain forces in multinational operations.

• MNL can speed force deployment, increase operational flexibility, and enhance logistic sustainment of the force.

• MNL enables more effective and efficient use of in-theater resources through host-nation support (HNS) and theater support contracting. It can especially minimize undesirable competition for contracted support in austere regions where the local economy and infrastructure have been degraded. Such competition can stress local populations and cause price escalation, reduced availability and quality of local goods/services, and maldistribution of resources available to a MNF.
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<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>COMMAND</th>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>DESERT STORM</td>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td>Major Theater War</td>
<td>UN-sanctioned, US-led coalition</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>PROVIDE COMFORT</td>
<td>Southern Turkey</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>UN-sanctioned, US-led coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991-1996</td>
<td>PROVIDE COMFORT II</td>
<td>Southern Turkey</td>
<td>Enforce no-fly zone</td>
<td>UN-sanctioned, US-led coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>SEA ANGEL</td>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>Multinational, US Joint Task Force (JTF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ongoing</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>US/Latin America</td>
<td>Counterdrug</td>
<td>US-led bi/multilateral operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-present</td>
<td>SOUTHERN WATCH</td>
<td>Southern Iraq</td>
<td>Enforce no-fly zone</td>
<td>UN-sanctioned, US-led coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>PROVIDE RELIEF/RESTORE HOPE</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>UN-led, US JTF</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992-1996</td>
<td>SHARP GUARD</td>
<td>Adriatic</td>
<td>Maritime enforcement of economic sanctions/arms embargo</td>
<td>UN-sanctioned, NATO-led</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1995</td>
<td>DENY FLIGHT</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Enforce no-fly zone, protect UN forces</td>
<td>UN-sanctioned, NATO-led</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993-1999</td>
<td>ABLE SENTRY</td>
<td>Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>UN-led</td>
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<td>1994</td>
<td>SUPPORT HOPE</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>US JTF in support of UN operation</td>
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<td>1995-1997</td>
<td>JOINT ENDEAVOR (IFOR)</td>
<td>Bosnia-Balkans</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>UN-sanctioned/NATO-led</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>UNITED SHIELD</td>
<td>Somalia</td>
<td>Security for UN force withdrawal</td>
<td>US</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>DELIBERATE FORCE</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Limited air campaign</td>
<td>NATO-led</td>
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<td>1995</td>
<td>QUICK LIFT</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>US airlift/sealift of UN forces</td>
<td>US</td>
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<td>1995-present</td>
<td>SAFE BORDER</td>
<td>Peru-Ecuador</td>
<td>Monitor border settlement</td>
<td>US-led</td>
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Figure I-1. Selected Multinational Operations: 1991-2002
### SELECTED MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS: 1991-2002 (cont’d)

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<th>OPERATION</th>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>TYPE</th>
<th>COMMAND</th>
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<tr>
<td>1996-present</td>
<td>NORTHERN WATCH</td>
<td>Southern Turkey</td>
<td>Enforce no-fly zone</td>
<td>UN-sanctioned, US-led coalition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-present</td>
<td>JOINT GUARD/</td>
<td>Bosnia</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>UN-sanctioned, NATO-led</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997-ongoing</td>
<td>JOINT FORGE (SFOR)</td>
<td>Central America</td>
<td>Humanitarian/civil-action</td>
<td>US-bilateral</td>
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<td>1998</td>
<td>DESERT THUNDER</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Force presence</td>
<td>US-led coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>DESERT FOX</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Cruise missile strikes</td>
<td>US-led coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998-99</td>
<td>EAGLE EYE</td>
<td>Kosovo/Serbia</td>
<td>Air surveillance</td>
<td>NATO-led</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>ALLIED HARBOUR/SHINING HOPE</td>
<td>Albania/FYROM</td>
<td>Humanitarian Relief</td>
<td>NATO-led</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>ALLIED FORCE/NOBLE ANVIL</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Enforce peace and security</td>
<td>UN-sanctioned, NATO-led</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999-present</td>
<td>JOINT GUARDIAN (KFOR)</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>UN-sanctioned, NATO-led</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>STABILISE (INTERFET)</td>
<td>East Timor</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>UN operation/Australia-led</td>
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<td>2000-present</td>
<td>MONUC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
<td>Cease-fire monitoring/peacekeeping</td>
<td>UN-commanded (US providing financial assistance and training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-present</td>
<td>ENDURING FREEDOM</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Global war on terror</td>
<td>US-led coalition</td>
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**Figure I-1. Selected Multinational Operations: 1991-2002 (cont’d)**

- MNL provides opportunities for nations without sufficient logistic resources to participate in the operation.

- It provides the opportunity for nations to participate in an operation by providing logistic support instead of combat forces, when the former contribution better assists national policies.

- It lessens demands on the United States to provide full support of forces from organic resources. Use of bilateral or multilateral support arrangements, pooling of resources, HNS, and theater support contracting enhances US “logistics depth” and can lead to significant cost savings and reduced logistic force structure in the operational area.

- A national “go-it-alone” approach to logistics in a multinational operation where a participating nation — on its own and independent of all other participants — would deploy its own forces, arrange
support from foreign nations, and compete for theater commercial resources to sustain its national contingents, could lead to logistic chaos and a logistically unbalanced support structure.

e. The extent to which MNL is required and can be effectively used depends on many factors, including the mission, the size of the force, the extent of multinational diversity, the relative size of national force contributions, the degree of standardization and interoperability within the force, use of a common language and doctrine, availability of HNS and theater commercial resources, the logistic capabilities of participating nations, and national legal restrictions on exchanging mutual support.

f. Multinational operations of even modest complexity require some centralized coordination of logistic operations and the use of some mutual support arrangements to facilitate smooth, timely, responsive, and effective deployment and force sustainment. At a minimum, multinational operations require
centralized coordination of deployment and allocation of scarce HNS and theater support contracting resources. More complex operations, such as a major theater war (MTW) or those involving a wide range of participating nations, could require more extensive centralized coordination of critical logistic functions, including negotiation of HNS and agreements relating to border crossings, customs, and duty fees, medical support, civil engineering, contracting, movement control, and provision of CUL supplies, such as bulk petroleum.

Doctrine for CUL has been established in JP 4-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations.

3. Principles of Multinational Logistics

   a. The principles of logistics for US joint operations, described in JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, also apply to the logistics of multinational operations. However, because participating forces represent sovereign nations, there are several unique principles for MNL operations. Figure I-2 lists the principles of MNL as contained in NATO’s capstone logistic publication MC 319/1, NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics, and expanded upon in Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine. Although first formulated in NATO documents, these principles are adaptable to all multinational operations.

   • Primacy of Operations. Logistic support must be focused on accomplishing the mission, as defined by the MNFC and participating nations. Nations should provide sufficient logistic assets to support the MNFC’s operational objectives.
Responsibility. Logistic support of multinational operations is both a collective and individual national responsibility of participating nations and the MNFC. The precise balance of responsibilities varies from operation to operation. In all operations, national force commanders and the MNFC must work together to ensure that the operation is effectively and efficiently supported. Although nations are ultimately responsible for the support of their forces, logistic support in multinational military operations is not solely a national responsibility.

Authority. In multinational operations, the MNFC must be given sufficient authority over logistic resources to ensure that operational priorities can be effectively supported. Sovereign nations are reluctant to give MNFCs directive authority for logistics. However, the MNFC should have the authority to redistribute logistic assets as a temporary expedient to meet unanticipated or emergency situations. In addition, the MNFC may have operational control (OPCON) of logistic units provided by nations to support the overall operation. (See Chapter II, “Command Relationships and Organization for Multinational Logistic Operations,” for more details regarding MNFC authorities.)

Cooperation. Because multinational operations are primarily conducted by consensus of the participants, nations must cooperate with each other and with the MNFC to achieve unity of effort and ensure that their forces and the overall operation are adequately supported. The basis for this cooperation begins in peacetime with the establishment of bilateral/multilateral contacts and agreements.
• **Coordination.** Given the absence of traditional logistic C2 authorities, nations must closely coordinate their logistic actions with the MNFC throughout both the planning and execution phases of the operation. This coordination must exist between all levels of the operational and logistical command structure. Coordination is especially important in the areas of movement control, contracting, medical support, customs and border clearance, negotiation and allocation of HNS, provision of fuel supply, and negotiation of bilateral and multilateral agreements.

• **Provision and Sufficiency.** Logistic support of a MNF must be sufficient to achieve designated levels of readiness, sustainability, and mobility to meet operational requirements. The provisioning of support to participating forces and the overall operation may be accomplished individually or by cooperative arrangements among the participants.

• **Flexibility.** The logistic support concept for multinational operations must be flexible enough to accommodate the needs, legal restrictions, and capabilities of diverse forces. Since the scope, mission, and composition of multinational operations differ, logistic support must be tailored to meet operational requirements unique to each operation. Moreover, changes in operational conditions and relationships among multinational participants during an operation require a high degree of flexibility in planning and executing logistic support.

• **Simplicity.** Logistic support for multinational operations is complex. To be effective, therefore, the logistic support concept and its implementation must be easily understood. Standardized procedures, mission-type orders, and a clearly defined logistic support structure with precisely defined missions, roles, and responsibilities must be developed and established. Simplified reporting requirements and formats should be employed. Peacetime efforts to achieve interoperability among potential multinational partners must be pursued to simplify operations.

• **Timeliness.** Developing and establishing an effective logistic framework requires more time in multinational operations than for single-nation operations because of the involvement of multiple nations in the planning process. Logistic planners and operators should allow extra time for proper coordination with nations during the planning and execution of logistic activities in a multinational operation.

• **Economy.** Given the limits on logistic resources and the benefits of reducing logistic footprints in the operational area, nations should work together to achieve the most economic use of logistic resources through multinational coordination and mutual support arrangements.

• **Visibility.** To effectively coordinate and manage support of the MNF, the MNFC must have up-to-date information concerning the status of logistic assets and capabilities of
participating units. As a means of gaining such visibility, the MNFC must be authorized to require logistic status reports. Common reporting formats must be provided to participants and interoperable information technologies employed for rapidly passing and processing logistic information.

- **Synergy.** MNL can be an effective force multiplier enabling the United States and other participating nations to support operations more effectively with fewer overall logistic resources.

b. In addition to the MNL principles listed above, several other “principles of logistics,” identified in JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, and not unique to multinational operations, are also applicable.

- **Responsiveness.** The logistic support of a MNF must be responsive to rapidly changing operational circumstances. MNL arrangements, therefore, must facilitate rapid exchange of common support items among the forces. This requires planning and standardization far in advance of the operation.

- **Survivability.** MNF and their logistic support capabilities must be survivable, especially in today’s world of diverse threats. Antiterrorism/force protection (AT/FP) measures must be considered when establishing MNL arrangements to ensure uninterrupted support of the MNF.

- **Sustainability.** Long-term support can be enhanced through use of MNL, either individually or by the kinds of cooperative arrangements discussed in Chapter III, “Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements.”

- **Attainability.** MNL can be used to achieve minimum essential levels of support quickly since it relies on more sources of support than just national resources.

4. **Special Considerations in Organizing and Conducting Multinational Logistic Operations**

a. **The Impact of National Sovereignty.** The planning and conduct of logistics in operations involving multiple sovereign nations characteristically differs from that in single-nation operations.

- MNFCs typically do not have the same degree of directive authority over MNF logistics as commanders of national operations. Nations give MNFCs only as much authority over their national logistic resources as they are willing to concede to achieve national objectives in the operation. As described in Chapter II, “Command Relationships and Organization for Multinational Logistic Operations,” these authorities are generally quite limited, and often involve only coordinating authority. As a result, effective logistic operations in a multinational operation depend on good personal relationships between multinational and
national force commanders. MNFCs and the logistic staff must use persuasion and diplomacy to ensure that national contingents support operational priorities. In order to ensure better understanding between commanders, liaison officers should be dispatched to all relevant organizations throughout the multinational C2 structure.

- US and other forces participating in multinational operations must operate under limitations imposed by applicable international agreements, including status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs), national laws, and regulations. The US has negotiated a number of bilateral SOFAs that govern US forces operating within another nation’s territory. SOFAs may also be multilateral, however, and where feasible, should be negotiated to apply to all participants in the MNF. Detailed SOFA provisions are usually contained in supporting technical arrangements (TAs). Many of the areas addressed in the TAs relate directly to logistic issues: medical support, environmental obligations, customs and duties, movement control, landing rights and/or port utilization fees, and rights and protection of MNF contractors. Accordingly, the MNFC’s logistic and legal staffs may become closely involved with negotiation, implementation, and application of the SOFA and TAs to ensure that such documents facilitate rather than hinder logistic support of the operation.

- Differences in national rules of engagement and force protection (FP) requirements constitute potential areas of friction in a multinational operation and could affect the security of rear area installations and logistic assets upon which US and other MNFs may rely.

- National laws guide the exchange of logistic support among nations. There are a number of legal provisions that stipulate the manner in which US forces can exchange logistic support with other force contingents and/or participate in MNL arrangements. (See Appendix C, “Relevant US Legal Authorities Affecting Logistic Support in Multinational Operations,” for a more complete discussion of this subject.)

b. The United States as Provider and Recipient of Logistic Support. US national security strategy envisions that the United States may provide logistic support as part of its national contribution to a multinational operation, as it did in operations RESTORE HOPE (Somalia), UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti), and STABILIZE (East Timor). However, given its global security interests, the United States has concerns about over-commitment of logistic resources to regional multinational operations. To ensure proper support of its forces, the United States in turn could require extensive foreign logistic assistance (as in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM, ongoing Balkan peacekeeping operations, and ENDURING FREEDOM). The US, therefore, is likely to be both a consumer and provider of CUL in multinational operations. US commanders and logistic planners should view MNL as a means to effectively and efficiently support US forces.
c. Differences in Multinational Logistics Based on Organizational Structure. JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations, lists two basic types of multinational operations — alliance and coalition — and describes the general command structures associated with each. Each type of operation has distinctive characteristics that affect the logistic C2 relationships, funding and reimbursement mechanisms for MNL support, and the scope of MNL arrangements.

- **Alliance Operations.** Alliance operations are conducted within the political context of a formal agreement between two or more nations that are united by treaty in the promotion and defense of common security interests.

  - Figure I-3 summarizes logistics-relevant characteristics of alliance and other multinational operations. Although these characteristics may apply generally to regional alliances and may serve to facilitate logistic support planning and execution, their specific application in actual operations may not be clearly established, as was discovered during the early stages of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996. (At the beginning of this operation some participating nations maintained that NATO’s collective logistic doctrine did not apply to non-Article 5 operations — that is, those operations not involving the defense of NATO territory. This issue was resolved in an update of MC 319/1, NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics, which specifically now applies to all NATO operations, including those involving Partnership-for-Peace countries and the European Union.)
## LOGISTICS-RELATED CHARACTERISTICS OF TYPES OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Logistic Command and</strong></td>
<td>Established organization and relationships. Tailored for specific operations.</td>
<td>Established templates. Ad hoc Field Mission Headquarters (HQ) established for each operation.</td>
<td>US structure provides framework for operation.</td>
<td>Lead nation provides structure in consultation with other participants.</td>
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<td><strong>Control Structure/</strong></td>
<td>Frequently exercised.</td>
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<td><strong>Organization</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Logistic Doctrine and</strong></td>
<td>NATO: Well developed. Highly detailed. Commonly agreed.</td>
<td>Developed but unfamiliar to many participating countries.</td>
<td>US uses national doctrine. Familiar to some participants and shares many features with established alliance doctrine.</td>
<td>Varies, depending on lead nation and participating nations. (American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Standardization Program nations have agreed logistic guidelines.)</td>
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<td><strong>Procedures</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Division of Logistic</strong></td>
<td>Nations and NATO have collective responsibility for logistic support.</td>
<td>United Nations (UN) is responsible for planning and coordinating logistic support of UN-commanded operations.</td>
<td>US coordinates logistic support. Participating nations are responsible for own logistic support unless otherwise negotiated.</td>
<td>Lead nation coordinates logistic support. Participating nations responsible for own logistic support unless otherwise negotiated.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Responsibilities</strong></td>
<td>Member nations are ultimately responsible for deploying and supporting their own forces, but encouraged to use multinational logistics arrangements.</td>
<td>Troop contributing nations are encouraged to provide units with organic unit level logistics capability. Nations must confirm authorized contingent structure and logistic support in a Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) memorandum of understanding (MOU). UN sometimes requests US and other nations to provide logistic support for UN contingents. UN responsible for base camp infrastructure in mission area.</td>
<td>Participating nations are responsible for own logistic support unless otherwise negotiated. Level of logistic integration is operation-specific.</td>
<td>Level of logistic integration is operation-specific.</td>
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*Figure I-3. Logistics-Related Characteristics of Types of Multinational Operations*
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<tr>
<td><strong>Commander's Logistic Authorities</strong></td>
<td>NATO: Generally agreed-upon authorities and responsibilities for managing and coordinating deployment and sustainment functions.</td>
<td>UN Force Commander has no logistic authority over troop contributors' logistic resources.</td>
<td>As arranged among participating nations.</td>
<td>As arranged among participating nations.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Logistic Planning</strong></td>
<td>Structured planning process. Established multinational planning staffs. Highly integrated.</td>
<td>Structured planning process with some pre-planning. However, limited UN HQ planning capability. Small permanent staff. Relies on augmented military staff provided by member states.</td>
<td>US planning process and staff with augmentation and input from selected participants.</td>
<td>Lead nation planning process and staff. Major US contribution.</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Logistic Requirements Determination</strong></td>
<td>Detailed requirements determination process in support of force structure and operational planning.</td>
<td>Some operation-specific requirements planning. No peacetime force structure planning.</td>
<td>Detailed operational requirements planning for national forces. Ad hoc integration for coalition requirements. Some coordinated force planning with selected nations.</td>
<td>Depends on lead nation. US typically coordinates closely with lead nation and selected participants.</td>
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<td><strong>Standardization Interoperability</strong></td>
<td>High level for logistic doctrine and procedures. Low-medium level for logistics supplies and equipment. Formal, developed standardization agreements in a broad range of logistic functions.</td>
<td>Low level for logistic doctrine and procedures, logistic supplies and equipment. No formal standardization agreements.</td>
<td>Varies depending on participants. Medium-high level in some areas with close allies.</td>
<td>Varies depending on participants.</td>
</tr>
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*Figure I-3. Logistics-Related Characteristics of Types of Multinational Operations (cont’d)*
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Knowledge of participant logistic capabilities/ Experience in operating with participants</th>
<th>Alliance Operations</th>
<th>UN Operations</th>
<th>US-Led Coalitions</th>
<th>Non-US-Led Coalitions</th>
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<tr>
<td>High. Lesser experience with non-Alliance countries participating in Alliance operations.</td>
<td>Low-medium depending on participants.</td>
<td>Low-high depending on participants. Usually some close allies involved.</td>
<td>Low-high depending on participants.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Extensive Alliance-funded structure.</td>
<td>UN-owned logistic base and some major equipment items.</td>
<td>Nationally owned.</td>
<td>Nationally owned.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO: Established agreements with Alliance members. NATO commander coordinates and negotiates, on behalf of nations.</td>
<td>UN Force Commander negotiates with host nation.</td>
<td>Varies depending on operation. Bilateral process or nations may give multinational force commander (MNFC) authority to negotiate.</td>
<td>Varies depending on operation. Bilateral process or nations may give MNFC authority to negotiate.</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO: Common funding for HQ and approved projects that benefit the alliance or the operation as a whole. Otherwise, nations responsible for all operational costs.</td>
<td>Troop contributing nations partially reimbursed for national troops, equipment, and logistic sustainment. Nations providing logistic support to other participants through Letters of Assistance (LOA) may be reimbursed for expenses.</td>
<td>Participating nations normally pay own costs. Terms of multinational support determined by nations. Nations may financially assist less-capable participants.</td>
<td>Participating nations normally pay own costs. Terms of multinational support determined by nations. Nations may financially assist less-capable participants.</td>
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Figure I-3. Logistics-Related Characteristics of Types of Multinational Operations (cont’d)
In addition, in today’s strategic environment — which encourages broad multilateral participation — alliance operations often may include nonalliance members, as is the case in NATO peacekeeping operations in the Balkans. Within NATO operations, forces of nonalliance nations must be certified as logistically supportable in order to ensure that such contingents possess adequate logistics capabilities prior to being incorporated into the operation. Support arrangements need not be strictly national. Non-NATO nations can make arrangements with NATO and other nations for the provision of selected CUL support, as Russia has done with the United States in Kosovo. However, whatever the source, the logistic support of nonalliance members needs to be integrated into the alliance’s overall logistic support concept for the operation.

**Coalition.** A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalitions can form within the framework of a formal international organization (such as the UN) or through one of the nations in the coalition (possibly building off peacetime coalition structures, such as the ABCA forum). Figure I-3 summarizes logistics-related characteristics of various types of coalition operation.

**UN Operations.** These operations are conducted under the authority of a UN Security Council Resolution and under the leadership of a UN military force commander who may report to a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. US participation in UN operations in Somalia, Haiti, and East Timor are examples of this model. UN operations are characterized by the following: (1) They are conducted in accordance with UN policies, regulations, and procedures, which may not be familiar to US or other commanders. (2) Standardization and/or interoperability among troop contingents may be low due to the diverse mix of participating nations and lack of pre-operational multinational training. (3) UN operations are more likely to be ad hoc than operations conducted by regional alliances. (4) Participants and their logistic capabilities can vary widely, although some nations are specializing in UN operations and have substantial experience operating with each other. (5) UN headquarters (HQ) is responsible for establishing a UN field logistic system to support the UN force during all phases of the operation. Nations are encouraged, however, to provide forces that are logistically self-sufficient, and must confirm logistic arrangements with the UN.

THE IMPORTANCE OF MULTILATERAL LOGISTICS IN POWER PROJECTION OPERATIONS

“We must take a powerful armament with us from home to a distant land . . . Here a friendly country is always near, and you can easily obtain supplies. There you will be dependent on a country which is entirely strange to you . . . ”

Nicias of Athens (discussing the planned expedition to Syracuse, Sicily in 415 BC)
• **US-Led Coalition Operations.** Examples of US-led coalition operations include Operations DESERT STORM, SOUTHERN and NORTHERN WATCH, PROVIDE COMFORT, and ENDURING FREEDOM. Such operations may be authorized by the United Nations, but the logistic C2 relationships, doctrine, and procedures are generally based upon US doctrine. The overall C2 structure may be one of the types discussed in JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*. US-led coalition operations are characterized by the following: 

1. The organizational structure for coordinating and managing MNL activities is an extension of the US logistic organization. Consequently, the core MNFC HQ logistic staff consists primarily of Americans, although it is augmented by coalition members. 
2. The degree of standardization and/or interoperability among coalition members depends upon the coalition partners involved in the specific operation. US-led coalitions, however, will typically include a few close allies that frequently operate with US forces and thus are familiar with US logistic doctrine and procedures. Other coalition partners may have little or no experience operating with US forces. 
3. Because of its logistic strengths, the United States may be requested to provide a range of common logistic support to some or all participating nations. 
4. Depending on the kind of operation, operational planning will be shaped primarily by US objectives and approaches. However, to ensure effective support of the operation, the US MNFC must work with participating nations to identify logistic support requirements and ensure that they are included in appropriate logistic plans.

• **Non-US-Led Coalition Operations.** The United States may participate in coalition operations led by another nation. Such operations have many of the same general characteristics as US-led operations, except US forces are in a subordinate role. In such operations, the lead nation establishes the parameters for logistic participation. The US JFC (or separate Service component commanders if there is no joint force command) is guided by applicable US laws, regulations, and established agreements concerning the provision or exchange of logistic support among participants. The US JFC must clearly understand the expectations of the MNFC regarding US contributions to the overall logistic support concept. To the extent permitted by US laws and approved by the appropriate command authority, US logistic activities should be integrated into the overall operation seamlessly and with the transparency expected of participants.

• Whatever the structure of the coalition, the nation or international organization that has the lead in organizing the coalition is **challenged to rationalize and harmonize the logistic support of the disparate participating countries.** The MNFC may direct the use and application of logistic policies and procedures of the sponsoring nation or agency. Considerable ingenuity is required to ensure that such policies and procedures are clearly understood and integrated.

• The variable conditions under which US forces may operate in either an alliance or coalition multinational structure place a premium on developing **flexible logistic support concepts** that can be **tailored to effectively respond to a broad range of contingencies in any situation.** Regardless of the method of employment, **US forces participating in multinational operations must adhere to US laws** as well as to appropriate international security agreements, such as the UN or NATO charters.
d. Impact on MNL by Type of Operation. JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, lists the variety of multinational operations in which Armed Forces of the United States may be involved, ranging from the extremes of MTW to the vast variety of military operations other than war (MOOTW). The nature of the military mission dictates both the extent and type of MNL support required.

- **Logistic Support in War.** Logistically, intensive combat operations result in increased demands upon in-theater medical capabilities and medical evacuations; all classes of supply, especially fuel and ammunition; battle damage repair capabilities; replacement of major end items/principal items of equipment; spare parts; and transportation. Intense combat operations involving a MNF reinforce the requirement for centralized coordination and mutual support arrangements to achieve operationally efficient support. Reimbursement is less of an issue; redistribution and reallocation may be more easily authorized.

- **Logistic Support in MOOTW.** JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, and JP 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*, describe the nature of MOOTW and the extent to which US military forces may be involved. Noncombat MOOTW, such as peacekeeping and humanitarian operations, offer numerous opportunities for MNL. In such operations, nations are likely to be interested in controlling costs. Often, broad multilateral participation is solicited. There is a need for close coordination with international organizations (IOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local civilian agencies operating within the same areas. The MNFC is likely to be responsible for coordinating operations of the MNF with these organizations and for coordinating selected logistic activities of the force, e.g., contracting, movement control, and engineering. Combat MOOTW tend to involve smaller-size units and to be of short duration. US commanders may be reluctant to devote the resources to establish MNL arrangements for such operations. Nevertheless, to the extent that such operations involve allies and other nations, MNL can still be useful in providing effective support (e.g., aircraft and ship refueling services), especially if such support takes advantage of standing pre-negotiated logistic agreements.

e. Complex Interagency/International Operations. Multinational operations may sometimes have a nonmilitary dimension (e.g., humanitarian relief). Even when the MNF itself does not have such missions, there may be humanitarian/disaster relief and/or various “nation building” activities occurring simultaneously in the operational area.

- Humanitarian relief operations will typically be conducted by NGOs. IOs, such as the UN and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, may be involved in coordinating these and other nonmilitary activities. It is also possible that antiterrorism and other combat operations could occur simultaneously with peacekeeping and humanitarian support operations, with distinct MNFs operating within separate command chains, as in ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan.
The activities of NGOs and IOs in the operational area can both complicate and assist logistic support of an MNF. NGOs are often very familiar with the logistics-related conditions in the operational area — including local sources of supply — and have established contacts with host nations (HNs) and regional contractors. MNF logisticians can take advantage of NGO information and relationships to arrange HNS and theater support contracting and plan logistic operations. On the other hand, NGO activities create additional competing demands for local infrastructure and support resources. Although NGOs can reduce the need for military logistic capabilities (for humanitarian operations), they also could require military logistic support in an emergency.

It is essential that the activities and capabilities of NGOs and IOs be factored into MNL planning and that MNF logisticians maintain close coordination with all such groups throughout all phases of a multinational operation, beginning with early planning. MNFCs will need to establish appropriate organizations for coordination with such groups, and liaison contacts with nations conducting their own civil-military activities independently of the MNF.

The use of Department of Defense (DOD) resources in a manner that may directly or indirectly assist or otherwise benefit NGOs and IOs is subject to strict legal requirements. For example, DOD has limited authority and funding to provide for the transportation of humanitarian relief. Certain authorities, however, such as the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Act, 10 United States Code (USC) 401, require the promotion of operational readiness skills of the US military participants and high-level approval. Other authorities, such as Overseas, Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Assistance, 10 USC 2551, do not contain such requirements, but could raise other legal issues depending upon the facts of the individual case. In order to ensure the specific use of DOD resources is authorized and intended to be properly implemented under the correct legal authority, the MNFC should consult with his or her legal staff officer on legal authorities relating to the specific use of DOD resources. Misunderstandings concerning the source and limits of legal authority and the execution of activities may complicate mission execution and could lead to violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act, resulting in reprimands or other sanctions.

See JP 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, for further details.

f. Antiterrorism/Force Protection. FP against terrorism and other threats is as important in multinational operations as in US-only operations but presents special challenges.

Coalition partners do not necessarily share US views on standards of FP.

The risk of fratricide is greater in multinational operations.

Because of the salient operational/political role of the United States in a coalition, US forces may be singled out as special targets in a multinational operation.

• Logistic operations in rear areas are especially vulnerable to terrorist and adversary attack. The self-defense capabilities of logistic units are typically limited. Forces are dispersed and not in combat mode during deployment/redeployment. Requirements may exist to provide FP for nonmilitary agencies and contractors.

• Within US-led coalitions, the US MNFC should develop and coordinate FP guidelines and a Security Plan for the MNF as a whole. FP, however, is ultimately a national responsibility and within national units, national commanders will conduct FP in accordance with both their own national policy and coalition guidelines.

• The MNFC-developed and coordinated AT/FP Security Plan should include assignment of sufficient FP resources to permit continued logistic operations in support of combat and other mission forces.

• Depending on the complexity of the operation, there may be special requirements for commanders of national support elements (NSEs) to coordinate FP with other partner NSEs and with the MNFC.

• Depending on the threat, the United States may decide to rely on HN or MNFs for some FP of rear logistic units. Conversely, the United States may be requested to provide FP to coalition forces transiting or located in the US operational area.

• FP of rear area logistic activities in multinational operations therefore requires close liaison and coordination with the MNFC and other coalition participants, including the HN.

g. **Limits to Using Multinational Logistics.** Although the use of MNL has substantial benefits, there are limits as to how extensively it can be used.

• Most nations lack the deployable logistic assets to support both their own forces and to provide additional logistic units for general support of the MNF.

• **Nations may be reluctant to commit logistic forces to support the overall operation early during the force generation process.** This reluctance can complicate timely establishment of MNL arrangements that are crucial for streamlining support and leveraging logistic assets of allies and coalition partners.

• **Lack of established MNL planning organizations, especially in coalitions, leads to ad hoc logistic organization development,** which in turn adversely impacts the effectiveness and efficiency of logistic support, especially during initial stages of operations.
• Some functional areas (e.g., blood supply and some equipment maintenance) are not conducive to multinational arrangements because of national sensitivities or material incompatibilities.

• It is difficult to achieve multinational consensus during the planning phase regarding common funding for financing/reimbursement arrangements, yet up-front common funding can significantly reduce critical support costs.

• There are many gaps in standardization of procedures, supplies and equipment, especially among US and non-NATO military forces, that impede MNL. Alternative procedures implemented by participating nations are often required to lessen the adverse impact of this lack of standardization.

• In order to minimize differences between US and allied logistics doctrine, joint doctrine provides the US position for developing multinational doctrine with NATO allies and selected coalition partners. This publication, where appropriate, incorporates key MNL doctrine concepts and terminology that is already agreed by the US and allies/coalition partners and that provide a model for emergent situations where no agreed multinational doctrine exists. Differences will remain, however, that could cause confusion and impede MNL operations. Some of the US definitions for the terms listed in the Glossary, for example, differ from the corresponding NATO definitions. For non-US-led multinational operations, US commanders and staff need to review key coalition/alliance terminology before operational planning to ensure common understanding with multinational partners.

• Planning and arranging MNL C2 structures and mutual support arrangements and executing MNL operations requires substantial staff time and effort. However, familiarity with MNL concepts and procedures gained through education, training and operational experience can substantially reduce the administrative burden of MNL and maximize its benefits.
CHAPTER II
COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND ORGANIZATION FOR MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC OPERATIONS

“We should expect to participate in a broad range of deterrent, conflict prevention, and peacetime activities. Further, our history, strategy, and recent experience suggest that we will usually work in concert with our friends and allies in almost all operations.”

Harry S. Truman (1884-1972)

1. General

The C2 structure for managing logistics during a multinational operation includes the authorities and responsibilities exercised by the MNFC and nations and the C2 organization through which the MNFC and nations exercise their assigned authorities and responsibilities. The logistic C2 structure established for a multinational operation must complement and be integral to the operation’s overall C2 structure. There is no single logistic C2 arrangement that best fits the needs of all multinational operations. Although the specific structure will vary from operation to operation, any MNL C2 structure will typically reflect the considerations highlighted in this chapter. The MNL C2 structure, therefore, must be tailored to each particular operation and will be based on several factors:

a. Type of operation (e.g., MOOTW or MTW)
b. Size of operational area
c. Number of participating nations
d. Political interests and culture of the participating nations
e. Number of components involved
f. Extent of HNS and theater contractor support available
g. Complexity of the operation.

2. Multinational Logistic Operations: Authorities and Responsibilities

JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*, describes the four levels of command authority available to US commanders: combatant command (command authority) (COCOM), OPCON, tactical control (TACON), and support. Other authorities outside the command relations include administrative control, coordinating authority, and direct liaison authorized. JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, describes the general use of these authorities in multinational operations. See the Glossary, Part II, for descriptions of each. Each of these levels of authority — except COCOM — may apply to US logistic forces assigned to a multinational operation.
a. **Multinational Force Commander**

- In multinational operations, the United States and other participating nations continue to exercise command over their forces throughout the operation. Generally, however, nations give the MNFC OPCON over their assigned forces (with qualifications discussed in JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*, for placing US forces under OPCON of UN commanders). JP 3-16 states that the “MNFC must be aware that many different interpretations of OPCON and TACON exist among alliance and coalition partners and must ensure complete understanding of the terms early in the planning of the operation. The fundamental elements of US command apply when US forces are placed under the OPCON of a foreign commander.”

- One of these elements of OPCON, which is also shared by the NATO definition of the term, is that OPCON of itself does not include authority over administrative and logistic functions. Thus, in granting OPCON of US forces to the MNFC, the degree of MNFC coordination and tasking over administrative and logistic functions must be specified.

- Typically, the United States and other nations will grant the MNFC coordinating authority over common logistic matters during a multinational operation. Under coordinating authority, the MNFC can require consultation between forces but does not have the authority to compel agreement. Coordinating authority recognizes the consultation relationship necessary for forces of sovereign nations to reach consensus during multinational operations to achieve the objective. In cases where the MNFC is a “dual-hatted” US commander who also exercises command over US forces in the MNF, the US MNFC may be delegated directive authority for common support capabilities for US forces. Other nations participating in the MNF, however, may only grant the US MNFC coordinating authority over national logistic activities in the operational area.

- In addition to granting the MNFC coordinating authority, the United States and other participating nations may place logistic units under the OPCON of the MNFC for tasking in support of the MNF.

- The United States may also grant the MNFC the authority to redistribute logistic resources to meet exigent requirements during an operation. For example, MC 319/1, *NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics*, gives NATO commanders the authority to “direct the redistribution of national logistic resources to overcome unanticipated deficiencies.” There are strict restrictions, however, on what assets can be redistributed and under what circumstances, and nations have the right to withhold specific logistic resources from redistribution.

- The United States and other participating nations may grant MNFCs directive authority for common support capabilities in other areas consistent with the OPCON of assigned and attached combat forces. Such authority, however, may only be granted to the MNFC through prearranged agreements.
• In addition, the MNFC may be given authority to exercise TACON of ground units transiting through the area normally designated as the communication zone (COMMZ) or rear area. This consideration may apply regardless of whether the operational area resembles the traditional linear or nonlinear operational area. The authority and responsibility for TACON of units in the COMMZ or other designated rear area is normally subordinated to the commander assigned responsibility for these areas.

For details regarding C2 in the rear area, see JP 3-10, Joint Doctrine for Rear Area Operations.

• Normally, tanker airlift control elements and aircrews under the COCOM of the Commander, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) either transiting or based in the operational area are excluded from MNFC exercise of TACON.

• Because C2 relationships within a multinational operation differ significantly from single nation operations, and nations may understand key terms differently, it is important that participating nations clearly understand the extent of the MNFC’s logistic authorities and responsibilities — and their limitations — during each operation.

• The main logistic tasks of the MNFC are: to develop the overall logistic concept for the operation, including concepts for specific logistic functions, and to manage common logistic support of the MNF within the scope of authorities granted by nations. The extent to which the responsibilities listed below may apply to any given situation is based upon the specific requirements of a particular operation. Critical for any operation is close and continuous coordination with participating sovereign nations. In order to ensure that the operation is properly supported, the MNFC should have the authority and responsibility to:

  • Specify the required level of logistic support for the operation.

  • Work with nations to ensure that their contingents possess the requisite logistic capabilities. Support can be provided through organic resources and/or arrangements made with other sources.

  • Identify requirements for CUL support of the MNF, including port reception and cargo handling capabilities, theater-level transportation, engineering, medical support, ground and air medevac, bulk fuel, rations and water, and other logistic commodities and services.

  • Determine the potential use of MNL arrangements, such as lead nation (LN), role specialist nation (RSN), or pooling arrangements, to provide common logistic support, and work with nations in establishing such arrangements.

  • Develop, with participating nations, the detailed Logistics Annex to the operation plan (OPLAN), to include plans for transitioning through subsequent operational phases.

  • Ensure that logistic planning is fully integrated and simultaneous with operational planning.
• Provide logistic guidance to subordinate logistic organizations in accordance with the mission and as directed by higher authority.

• Assist, as requested by nations, in developing bilateral and multilateral agreements for mutual exchange of logistic support.

• Prioritize common HNS requirements and, if requested by nations, negotiate HNS agreements. Coordinate HNS allocation during execution.

• Provide advice to nations and higher authorities in negotiating TAs with HNs regarding border crossings, duties and customs fees, etc. Nations may give the MNFC the authority to negotiate TAs on behalf of the MNF.

• Coordinate theater support contracting, procurement, and real estate/infrastructure activities of participating nations to reduce competition for theater contractor resources and ensure their efficient allocation. If requested, negotiate contracts for selected CUL support and manage contract execution.

• Identify common funding requirements and obtain necessary funding to satisfy early logistic requirements for the MNF.

• Provide input to nations and higher authorities regarding necessary agreements for the transit of MNF formations through/over nations outside the operational area.

• When appropriate, arrange common support for MNFs from nations outside the operational area, e.g., bunkering for vessels, refueling services for aircraft, staging areas for land forces, and recreational areas for the force.

• Establish the MNF C2 and CUL management organization. Work with participating nations to ensure proper staffing and provision of necessary equipment, especially communications, vehicles, and computer support.

• Establish and publish logistic reporting requirements and work with nations in collecting necessary logistic information and establishing communications links to support MNFC logistic planning and management.

• Coordinate and task logistic units placed under MNFC OPCON by nations, including common-user intra-theater transportation.

• Validate, prioritize, and synchronize MNF strategic movements into and out of the operational area as well as operational movements within the operational area.

• Coordinate reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) operations in the operational area.
• Coordinate, with nations and supporting commands, the use of intertheater airlift, aerial refueling, aeromedical evacuation (AE), and commercial air transportation to support the movement of personnel, equipment, and supplies into, within, and out of the operational area.

• Determine common infrastructure requirements for the MNF and, if improvements are needed, work with participating and host nations to obtain engineering capabilities to make improvements.

• Establish close contact with NGOs and IOs operating in the operational area, coordinate with these organizations regarding activities that have an impact on MNF logistics, and take advantage of their contacts and information in planning MNF support.

• Coordinate with NSEs, as necessary, especially regarding real estate management and use of lines of communications (LOCs).

• Regarding logistic matters, interface, as necessary, with the in-theater national commander of each national force participating in the MNF.

• In consultation with staff judge advocate or legal counsel, identify applicable host nation or other applicable environmental guidelines and restrictions, and coordinate actions of the MNF to ensure such actions are consistent with those guidelines and restrictions.
b. **Secretary of Defense**

- In concert with the Secretary of State, develop US policies for negotiating and executing possible bilateral and/or multilateral support agreements with the MNFC and/or with potential partner nations.

- Based on MNFC plans, determine the requirements for additional HNS agreements, en route and over-flight rights, as well as modifications to existing SOFAs, and oversee negotiation of necessary agreements.

- Authorize US acceptance of RSN and LN responsibilities for designated functions.

- Authorize acceptance of foreign-provided articles and services.

- Review the foreign military sales (FMS) system as a source of support for allies and identify opportunities to streamline the approval process for sales.

c. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff**

- Provide advice and recommendations to the President and Secretary of Defense regarding forces — including logistic forces — to assign to a multinational operation.

- Formulate policies for training joint forces for multinational operations.

- In coordination with the geographic combatant commanders, Services, and Defense Agencies, identify functions for which the United States can be a RSN/LN or otherwise contribute common-user logistic support. Examples include strategic lift, deployment planning and management, procurement and distribution of fuel, and medical support.

- Upon approval to provide an RSN function or other common-user support, recommend a DOD activity/command to provide the specific functional support to the MNFC.

d. **Geographic Combatant Commanders**

- Retain COCOM over all US forces designated to participate in a multinational operation within the area of responsibility (AOR). COCOM may not be delegated, although it may be exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. Should a geographic combatant commander establish a joint task force (JTF), its commander will usually be delegated OPCON authority. Such authority will specifically identify the extent to which administrative and logistic functions are included.

- Ensure that combatant command components clearly understand the policies and procedures associated with logistic support provided to and received from allies and coalition partners during multinational operations.
• Become familiar with the unique logistic support procedures and arrangements of UN operations and regional alliance organizations.

• Participate in MNL exercises and become familiar with the logistic support concepts, policies, and procedures of potential multinational partners.

• Educate potential multinational partners on US logistic doctrine, policies, procedures, and processes and existing Service-level standardization agreements to facilitate their participation.

• Develop and maintain a logistic information database for each nation within the region. The database should include information on HNS capabilities, including available theater support contractors and their capabilities, as well as military logistic capabilities of potential multinational partners.

• Develop programs that enhance two-way interoperability between US and MNL information systems within the combatant commander AOR.

• Work with the nations participating in a multinational operation to develop a combined multinational time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL).

• Ensure all command echelons support and interface with the deployment information system to be used by the MNFC.

• Initiate action to develop and/or complete acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs), FMS letters of offer and acceptance (LOAs), HNS agreements, and other logistic support agreements with allies/coalition partners in the region.

• Be prepared to deploy, as required, logistic planning cell(s) with appropriate logistic planners and functional area experts to participate in MNL planning activities.

• Identify the need for, obtain proper authority, and expedite negotiation and conclusion of bilateral and multilateral logistic support agreements.

• Develop, document, and build a relationship with prospective participating IOs and NGOs.

• Consistent with current DOD policy on AT/FP, establish AT/FP policies and programs and ensure adequate FP is provided to all US forces and contractors transiting or operating in the geographic combatant commander’s AOR. Protection for defense contractors should be addressed in applicable OPLANs and contingency plans. Where feasible, it should also be addressed in SOFAs and TAs.

For details see Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 2000.12, DOD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program.
• Serve as the DOD point of contact for the entire MNF with host nation officials on matters involving AT/FP policies and measures.

e. **Commander, US Transportation Command**

• Provide strategic airlift and sealift capabilities to multinational partners, as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

• Provide intratheater airlift capabilities to the supported JFC or the MNFC as directed by the Secretary of Defense.

• Provide assistance to the geographic combatant commanders for the responsive and timely closure and sustainment of US forces participating in multinational operations.

• Support and interface with existing deployment information systems to be used by the MNF.

• If tasked, provide strategic deployment planning and management support to individual allies/coalition nations or (through the MNFC) to the entire MNF.

f. **Military Departments/Services/Defense Agencies**

• Execute Title 10, USC responsibilities to organize, train, equip, and sustain forces provided for multinational operations. Such forces should be prepared to operate effectively with allies and coalition partners and to conduct MNL operations.

• Engage allies and potential coalition partners in MNL training opportunities.

• Develop and implement approved international standardization agreements.

• Review US/Service capabilities that can be provided to satisfy possible RSN, LN, or other requests for MNL support.

• Provide RSN/LN support to the MNFC when authorized by the Secretary of Defense.

• Ensure that JTF components clearly understand the policies and procedures associated with logistic support provided to and received from participants during multinational operations.

• Review support procedures under FMS and those provided under wartime transfer terms.

• Issue instructions to US contracting officers concerning use of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and ACSAs. Identify FAR provisions that may be waived, including those waived under an ACSA, during contingency operations. If a FAR provision conflicts with contracting rules established by the MNFC, the FAR has precedence.
• Ensure that contracting officers conform to MNFC contracting policies and processes, especially restricted items lists promulgated by the MNFC to the extent allowed by US law.

g. **Subordinate Joint Force Commander**

• Is normally given OPCON over assigned or attached forces. Authoritative direction for a common support activity or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training must be specifically delegated by the geographic combatant commander.

• When “double-hatted” as the MNFC, assume all logistic responsibilities and authorities granted by participating nations to the MNFC.

• In non-US led multinational operations, ensure proper coordination and cooperation of US forces with relevant MNF commands to ensure that the MNFC’s priorities are properly supported. Assign appropriate liaison personnel to achieve smooth coordination with the MNFC and participating multinational contingents.

• Assume all other responsibilities described in this chapter for ensuring integrated logistic support of US forces within a multinational operation.

3. **Logistic Organizations in Multinational Operations**

   a. **Logistic C2 Organizations**

   • The logistic C2 organization of a multinational operation encompasses both the internal logistic staff elements of the MNFC HQ and the overall logistic organization, as integrated into the total MNF C2 structure.

   • If the operation is relatively small or involves only a few multinational partners, the MNFC may rely on the Combined-Joint Logistics Officer (CJ-4) and staff, augmented (if necessary) with functional experts, to plan and coordinate MNF logistic activities.

   • In the case of larger, more complex operations requiring more coordination and common support, the MNFC may establish a separate organization to assist the CJ-4 in developing and executing the operation’s logistic support plan. NATO designates such an organization for coordinating and managing MNF logistics a **Multinational Joint Logistics Center (MJLC)**.

   • For a US-led multinational operation, the JFC may establish an organization functionally-similar to the MJLC that is tailored in size and specific functions to the particular operation. This organization may be designated **Combined/Joint Logistics Center, Multinational Logistics Coordination Center**, or the like. Since the United States has endorsed NATO logistic doctrine and its concept of the MJLC, the term “MJLC” will be used throughout this publication to refer generically to any organization (established by any US command, alliance, or coalition) that performs the same or similar functions.
The MJLC (or its equivalent), if established, may be established as:

- An augmentation to the CJ-4’s staff, especially during initial planning or for smaller operations of limited duration.
- A separate staff section within the CJ-4 organization.
- A separate organization integrated in or collocated with the MNFC HQ or other supporting HQ.
- A module placed within a component command.

As shown in Figure II-1, the MJLC may consist of various functional coordination centers (or other equivalent bodies) that provide centralized coordination of common support services, such as engineering, movement control, medical activities, contracting, HNS, and the provision of common supplies, such as bulk fuel and rations. The terminology used to designate such organizations and their specific functions varies depending on the command organization for the operation (e.g., NATO, US-led coalition, ABCA coalition, etc.).

In a US-led coalition operation, for example, the MJLC could comprise a number of joint logistic centers, offices, and boards that would be expanded to include coordination of MNL matters. These bodies could include combined versions of: joint logistics readiness center or joint logistics operation center (JLOC), joint movement center (JMC), Joint Petroleum Office, joint civil-military engineering board (JCMEB), Joint Facilities Utilization Board (JFUB), Combatant Commander Logistics Procurement Support Board, theater patient movement requirements center, Joint Blood Program Office, Joint Medical Surveillance Team, Joint Materiel Priorities and Allocation Board, and Joint Transportation Board.

See JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, Appendix B, for details on the functions of these centers, offices, and boards.

NATO has developed detailed doctrine regarding the structure of an MJLC, including the functions and staffing of various coordinating centers. The specific names and functions of these centers are described in AJP 4.6, Multinational Joint Logistic Center Doctrine.

Depending on the command structure of the operation, some functions, such as movement control, civil engineering, and medical support, may not fall under the staff cognizance of the CJ-4. The MNFC may determine that these functions will be organized under other staff sections, such as the Combined-Joint Operations Officer, staff engineer, or staff medical officer. Nonetheless, the CJ-4/MJLC will be involved in coordinating various aspects of these functions — for example, contracting for local supplies and services in support of engineer and health support activities.
Figure II-1. Illustrative Multinational Joint Logistic Center Structure
Another important functional task of the CJ-4/MJLC will be to maintain close coordination on logistic matters with NGOs and IOs through the MNFC’s civil-military coordination center or civil-military operations center (CMOC), if established. The United States and other nations participating in a MNF may establish separate national CMOCs to best supervise national civil-military activities. Nations need to closely coordinate their activities with the MNFC.

In addition to functional coordination tasks, the MJLC may be assigned the responsibility for coordinating the efforts of logistic units provided by nations to serve at the theater/operational-level for support of the entire MNF. NATO doctrine considers that there may also be a need to establish tailored component-level subordinate multinational logistic centers (MNLCs) to conduct component-level coordination.

Regardless of the specific logistic C2 and/or management structure developed for a multinational operation, execution of the MNFC’s logistic responsibilities should be clearly delineated between the CJ-4 and the MJLC or equivalent.

The CJ-4 is responsible for developing the initial logistic guidance, planning for the logistic support of the operation, and promulgating logistic policies on behalf of the MNFC. The MJLC (or equivalent) is primarily concerned with implementing the guidance, policies, and plans developed by the CJ-4 and approved by the MNFC. Essentially, the MJLC performs the execution role for the CJ-4, serving as an extension of the CJ-4 staff.

Regarding the overall logistic C2 organization, several options exist consistent with the various multinational C2 structures described in JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations. Figures II-2 through II-4 depict three possible logistic C2 organizational structures modeled after a NATO operation, US-led coalition operation, and UN-commanded operation. The C2 organization for a non-US-led coalition operation may either resemble the basic overall structure of a US-led-coalition operation or alliance operation, or may differ.

The structure represented in Figure II-2 can apply across the spectrum of multinational operations, from MOOTWs through MTWs, but is most applicable to larger multinational operations with many participants. The key logistic organizational elements of this model are an MJLC, an MNLC for the maritime component, and NSEs supporting respective national contingents. (Depending on the size and complexity of MNF air and land forces, MNLCs may also be established for the Air and Land Component Commands.)

In the operation represented, US contingents assigned to the MNF operate under OPCON of the relevant component commander, as has occurred in NATO Balkan operations. Alternatively, US forces could participate in the operation as a JTF and be supported through a combination of Service-specific logistic organizations and a joint logistic organization responsible for providing CUL to US JTF units.
Figure II-2. Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization: Alliance-Led Multinational Operation
• In the structure depicted in Figure II-3 for a US-led multinational operation, the relevant lead service for CUL support of US forces also provides such support to coalition partners. A combined/joint logistic operations center, directed by the MNFC’s CJ-4, coordinates selected logistic activities (e.g., fuel supply and distribution and medical support) with coalition partners through various cells and boards. A combined/joint movement center is also established. This structure is suited to operations where only a few allies or coalition partners contribute to a predominate-US MNF. The logistic structure for the operation consists of US staff elements that are augmented with multinational personnel to form an integrated combined structure.

• The logistics C2 structure for a non-US-led coalition operation may diverge from the US or alliance models in various aspects. To the extent possible, US logistic planners should seek to influence the multinational logistics structure of a non-US-led coalition to be consistent with approved US joint doctrine. However, US commanders and logistic staff should be prepared to operate within C2 organizations that differ from those discussed within this publication.

• Figure II-4 represents a key feature of UN operations: responsibility for logistic support may be shared between a force commander and a chief administrative officer (CAO). This dual structure was developed to manage peace support operations involving relatively few military forces (e.g., small peacekeeping contingents and observer teams) that could be most efficiently supported through a single logistic organization. In several larger more recent operations, participating nations have been encouraged to provide their own logistic support for their national contingents. (This support can be provided organically or through bilateral/multilateral arrangements with other participating nations.) Figure II-4 represents such an operation in which the United States provides bilateral support to the forces of several other participating nations. Another option is that the United States may be requested to serve as LN for the provision of selected logistic support to the entire MNF, as the US did in UNOSOM II. In this case, the CAO would exercise overall logistic coordination for the entire UN mission — including the provision of support for other UN activities (such as election monitoring and military observers) — but the US logistic group would operate under the control of the force commander.

• Other logistic C2 structures are possible. The key is that in multinational operations there will almost always be a requirement for some centralized coordination or management of common logistic support for the MNF. US commands and Military Services (and their staffs) must be prepared to support US forces in a variety of alliance and coalition organizational structures and, in the case of US-led operations, to establish logistic organizations for coordinating logistic support for the entire MNF.

b. Incorporation of US Theater Management Logistic Considerations in Multinational Operations.

• In alliance operations, US forces are guided by previously agreed processes and procedures. For coalition operations, standardization agreements may also have been previously concluded that determine the organization arrangements for an operation. For example, within the ABCA Standardization Program, the participants have agreed to an army component logistic organization structure for coalition operations that comprise two or more ABCA nations.
ILLUSTRATIVE LOGISTIC COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION:
US-Led Multinational Operation

Figure II-3. Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization: US-Led Multinational Operation
ILLUSTRATIVE LOGISTIC COMMAND AND CONTROL ORGANIZATION:
UN-Commanded Multinational Operation

CAO  Chief Administrative Officer
CISS  Chief Integrated Support Services
COE  Contingent Owned Equipment
COS  chief of staff
DCOS  deputy chief of staff
NSE  national support elements
SRSG  Special Representative of the Secretary General

SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARY GENERAL

SRSR

FORCE COMMANDER

COMBATANT COMMAND

PRESIDENT/
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

KIVPOL  ELECT  MILITARY OBSERVERS  COA

CISS  DCOS LOG

COS

PERSONNEL

LOGISTIC OPERATIONS

TRANSPORT

SUPPLY

COMMUNICATIONS

ENGINEERING

CONTRACTOR COE

NATIONAL CONTINGENT

NSE

Bilateral Support

US CONTINGENT

Figure II-4. Illustrative Logistic Command and Control Organization: United Nations-Commanded Multinational Operation
In the case of US-led coalitions, the US JFC is expected to expand upon the tools available for managing joint logistic operations and adapt them to the multinational environment. Current US doctrine for the logistic support of joint operations identifies the need to “capitalize on the assets and capabilities available in theater to facilitate support to the warfighter.” Joint theater logistics management (JTLM) is “one way to help achieve a unified focus within the theater by integrating information, product delivery, flexible response, and effective C2. JTLM ensures that the right product is delivered to the right place at the right time.”

See JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, Appendix B.

Options for expanding JTLM organizational structures to manage MNL include: using a predominant Service organization as the nucleus operational logistic activity to manage common requirements; expanding the logistic readiness center, and using the lead Service, as directed by the combatant commander, to provide CUL support (e.g., fresh water) to multinational partners.

Regardless of the approach, US staff conducting JTLM functions will need to be augmented by personnel from participating nations to give the JTLM organization the capability to manage MNL activities. The nucleus for the organization may be available through US personnel currently staffing logistic readiness centers and/or from other logistic commands not anticipated to participate in the operation as a unit. Geographic combatant commanders can facilitate establishment of multinational JTLM organizations by conducting logistic staff augmentation planning exercises with prospective regional allies.

The challenge for JTLM organizations in multinational operations is to gain visibility of the logistic requirements and status of the total MNF. To the extent feasible, JTLM organizations should strive to use improved communications and modern technology to integrate the logistic reporting and information systems of participating nations. Enhanced logistic connectivity may be difficult to achieve, however, because of the differences in technological sophistication among participants and national requirements for information security.

LESSONS LEARNED FROM OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Lessons are bountiful from the first North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) out-of-sector experience. The magnitude of the challenge — from organizing a headquarters vision, to designing a theater deployment, sustainment, and initial redeployment package, to the execution of the plan — is mind boggling. There were no similar NATO operations for comparison. The staff of the NATO Commander for Support (C-SPT) in JOINT ENDEAVOR had to learn through trial and error, but being able to address mistakes without outside interference was a rare opportunity. C-SPT was initially successful primarily because of good men and women who had spent the better part of a year together coming to grips with multinational logistics. NATO would not go out-
of-sector for the first time and fail on their watch; teamwork and personal pride were in-grained.

Multinational logistics, NATO, and C-SPT dodged the proverbial bullet in JOINT ENDEAVOR. Few understood the C-SPT role or how to measure its performance. The only line between success and failure early on was the thin facade of the unknown, behind which we labored diligently to solve issues never before confronted by NATO.

A concern for future NATO operations is that success breeds higher expectations for next time. Unfortunately, without a standing logistics headquarters, a benign theater, and a dedication to institutionalizing the logistic lessons learned from JOINT ENDEAVOR, replicating C-SPT’s success is questionable. Logistics is a national responsibility. Nevertheless, national logistics have shortcomings in joint, combined, multinational, and alliance environments, especially when service and commodity contracts, ports, and facilities are managed and controlled by a theater logistics command. Theater logistic synergies appear to be optimized by centralized instead of national control of certain funds, services, contracts, and assets. In a multinational logistic operation, such a command can return huge dividends — to the advantage of participants.

Much remains to be accomplished in the diverse and misunderstood world of multinational logistics. Any military scenario that is not dedicated to optimization and mutual synergy — that is, derived from proven or potential multinational logistic practices such as collective bargaining for outsourcing and contracting, common funding, centralized support services, and reduced manpower requirements — squanders precious resources. A NATO commitment to move away from ad hoc planning and operations would be a major step toward optimizing logistic support. Depending on piecemeal logistics is like relying on a bank account with no balance. No commitment can be made from the account without first making a deposit. Someone once said that good logistics alone cannot win a war but that bad logistics can lose one. US and NATO policies suggest a heavy future reliance on multinational logistics. A concerted effort must be made now to get it right.

SOURCE: MG William N. Farmen, USA (Ret.), NATO logistics commander during Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, published in Joint Forces Quarterly
c. **Operational Logistic Support Organizations**

- **General.** In addition to MNL coordination centers at the MNFC HQ level, nations participating in a multinational operation may determine the need for operational-level support organizations to provide common support for the MNF. Such organizations include advanced logistic support sites (ALSSs) and forward logistic sites (FLSs) for supporting multinational maritime forces, and intermediate staging bases (ISBs) for supporting ground and air units.

- **Function.** MNL support elements serve as critical transshipment nodes, supply storage and distribution points, refueling stations, staging bases for onward movement into tactical operational zones, medical support centers, and providers of other common-user logistic support.

- **Command Relationships.** MNL sites may be organized as elements within the coalition/alliance C2 structure under the command of the MNFC. Within a NATO maritime operation, for example, ALSSs and FLSs are elements of the multinational maritime force shore support organization and may report either to a MNL maritime command or directly to a maritime element embedded in the MJLC. In such an organizational structure, ALSSs and FLSs are multinational organizations with NATO commanders and integrated multinational staff. Multinational support organizations, however, could also be lead nation-operated organizations that provide support to multinational partners, as requested. For example, the United States could establish a national ISB outside the tactical operational area that is used both for staging and supporting US forces and providing logistic services to other nations. In this case, the logistic site providing MNL support is under command of the operating nation (the United States), and the site commander coordinates with the MNFC.

d. **National Support Element**

- **General.** An NSE is any national organization or activity that supports national forces that are part of a MNF. NSEs serve as the intermediary between the strategic level of logistic support from nations to their forces at the tactical level. They also coordinate and consolidate CUL functions. Routinely, the US Service component of a joint force which has the preponderance of the lead Service CUL responsibilities would be designated the US NSE responsible to provide CUL support to US forces in a multinational operation. If the US force is geographically dispersed, separate component NSEs might be required. NSEs include nationally commanded ALSSs, FLSs, ISBs, or other organizations, in the operational area, that support national forces assigned to the MNF.

- **Functions.** An NSE provides multifunctional logistic support, including supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, customs and border clearance, engineering, environmental, and contracting and may provide a hedge against enemy interdiction of support capabilities/assets. As noted above, an NSE may provide CUL support to multinational forces as well as national
forces. It is also possible that in some operations, selected CUL would be arranged by the MJLC (or equivalent), thereby reducing the role of the NSE in providing such logistics.

- **Location.** In today’s nonlinear battle space, NSEs are located geographically to best support the force and sited to take advantage of air, rail, and/or sea LOCs. In cases where the MJLC (or equivalent) has real estate management responsibility, especially in the COMMZ, nations desiring to locate NSEs in the MNFC’s operational area must coordinate with both the MJLC and the host nation for final site approval. This is critical in those areas with limited air and sea ports of debarkation in which several nations may be competing for limited available space or facilities. NSEs from several nations may be collocated to achieve economies and efficiencies. Some nations may find it especially advantageous to form a combined NSE.

- **Command Relationships.** NSEs are national activities that remain under control of national authorities — not the MNFC. There are two basic options for US command relationship of NSEs.

  - US NSEs will normally be under direct command of their respective Service component commander.
  
  - In exceptional cases, the US NSE may be a logistically-focused JTF under OPCON to the senior JTF commander.
  
  - Both options are consistent with the practice of most nations, participating in a multinational operation, to designate a national commander in-theater to which the NSE normally reports. In such cases, the national commander retains national control over all national units and other elements not transferred under OPCON of the MNFC.

- **Multinational Coordination.** Regardless of the national command relationship that may exist, US NSEs are expected to coordinate and cooperate fully with both the appropriate MNF logistic C2 organization and the host nation. **It is incumbent upon the NSEs to provide liaison personnel to such logistic C2 organizations as the MJLC in order to establish and maintain the appropriate relationships.**

4. **Functional Area Coordination**

   a. **General**

   - Experience from a wide range of multinational operations shows that **centralized coordination** of selected logistic functions by an MJLC (or equivalent organization) is critical for effective and efficient deployment and sustainment of a multinational operation. These critical functions include: movement control, civil engineering, health service support, arranging HNS, and contracting.
Functional coordination centers should be staffed with qualified representatives from as many participating nations as possible. In US-led multinational operations, it is important for MNF cohesion and solidarity that non-US logistic personnel be fully represented in all MNL organizations, including functional coordination centers, and be viewed as full members of the staff. As discussed in Chapter I, “Fundamentals of Logistics for Multinational Operations,” however, establishing such integrated staffs can be challenging because of language differences and internal US security requirements.

b. Movement Control. A variety of organizations may be established to manage, control, and coordinate strategic and operational movement for multinational operations.

In US-led coalition operations, the MNFC’s movement control concept is usually an extension of US joint doctrine, as discussed in JP 3-35, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and JP 4-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Movement Control.

Normally in such operations, all air movements into, within, and out of the operational area will be coordinated through the joint force air component commander (JFACC). The JFACC will usually establish a director of mobility forces (DIRMOBFOR) to coordinate and integrate inter- and intratheater air mobility operations through the air mobility division within the joint/combined air operations center (CAOC). Organizations such as a regional air movement coordination center (RAMCC), under the DIRMOBFOR, may be established to provide “slot times” for all aircraft — including multinational, IO, and NGO aircraft — operating in the operational area airspace. The RAMCC will usually be collocated with the CAOC, if established.

To provide overall coordination of all movements in the operational area, the US JFC may also establish a JMC. Depending on the composition of the MNF, the JMC may also function as a multinational movement center, and may be so-designated, with full staff participation from multinational partners.

Other management tasks of the JMC may include:

- Coordinate MNF ship movements into and out of the operational area.
- Coordinate MNF RSOI activities, in conjunction with contracting, HNS, and logistic operations centers. Prior to deployment, the JFC will coordinate with deploying and host nations in assigning LN and RSN responsibilities for the operation of ports of debarkation (PODs). Since US forces may be deploying through PODs operated by other nations, and vice versa, it is essential that all participating nations closely coordinate their reception of forces at PODs with the JMC.
- Prioritize and coordinate surface intratheater movements.
• Cooperate with medical staff organizations to arrange and coordinate AE flights. (A separate AE coordination center may be established to facilitate such activities.)

• Coordinate allocation of common-user transportation resources. While each nation is ultimately responsible for deployment and sustainment of national forces, nations may make transportation resources available to assist participating nations in moving their forces and supplies. Transportation resources may also be available from regional contractors or the host nation. The JMC may be tasked to coordinate with other coordination centers in arranging and allocating the use of these resources.

• Coordinate MNF movements with the HN’s national movement coordination center, if established.

• MNF deployment will normally be executed more smoothly through use of a single integrated multinational TPFDL. In US-led coalition operations, the supported US combatant commander is responsible for developing the TPFDL and incorporating forces of deploying multinational partners into the force flow.

• The organization and planning tools for synchronizing and coordinating movement control in other kinds of multinational operations are similar, and will usually include:
  
  • A planning center (at the strategic or geographic command level) to construct a detailed multinational deployment plan.
  
  • A joint movement coordination center at the MNFC HQ level.
  
  • An air component center for controlling air movements.
  
  • Organizational elements for managing/协调ing RSOI activities and allocating any common-user transportation resources.

• In a NATO operation, for example, strategic movement is managed by the allied movement coordination center (AMCC), which combines and de-conflicts separate national detailed deployment plans (DDPs) into a single multinational deployment plan to ensure smooth flow of forces in accordance with the MNFC’s deployment priorities. The AMCC, in cooperation with NATO’s civil transportation planning boards and committees, also assist nations in resolving strategic lift shortfalls through arrangements with other allied nations and/or commercial transportation firms.

• At the operational level, a joint theater movement staff (JTMS) develops movement and transportation directives and plans, and prioritizes theater movement requirements. A joint transportation coordination center (JTCC) may also be established. The JTCC focuses primarily on managing intratheater movements and tasking any transportation assets provided by nations for support of the entire MNF.
• NATO’s JTMS and JTCC perform similar functions to a US JMC. If the US establishes a separate national JMC for managing movement of US forces in a multinational operation, the JMC must coordinate closely with the multinational movement control centers to ensure synchronized deployment and in-theater movement.

• In non-US led coalitions, the US may be requested to function as lead nation for deployment planning and movement control because of its expertise in these areas.

• **Staffing.** Multinational movement coordination organizations require a diversity of skilled personnel with expertise in all modes of transportation, including both military and commercial transportation and associated infrastructure. Also required are experts in AE to coordinate such activities with the medical staff organization. In non-US led operations, US JFCs should have staff representation in or close liaison with all MNF movement control centers. US MNFCs should work with nations to ensure that they also are represented in similar organizations in US-led operations. MNF liaison with host nation movement control centers, if established, is crucial in all multinational operations.

• **Information Requirements.** In order to effectively synchronize and manage multinational movements, the JMC (or equivalent) requires detailed, timely information on individual nation’s deployment plans. If possible, information should also be in the format and categories for inclusion in a multinational time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) or DDP to support deployment planning and courses of action (COAs) analysis. For non-US led operations, US strategic movement planners must have the capability to integrate US deployment data into a non-US deployment planning system, for example, NATO’s Allied Deployment and Movement System (ADAMS). **Information reporting requirements must be carefully developed and the communications and automated management systems must be readily available to support the JMC (or equivalent).** Given the important role of this center, attention must be given to ensuring the quality and timeliness of the data flow. The information flow includes not only requirements and capabilities but also visibility of movement status. In-transit visibility is essential for tracking the identity, status, and location of assets, from origin to destination, across the range of multinational operations and is critical to managing those assets and delivering them to the required points of application.

c. **Civil Engineering**

• Civil engineering lends itself to multinational coordination and management arrangements. In multinational operations, the force engineer is responsible for coordinating all civil engineering operations that affect the entire MNF. The organization and mechanisms used for coordination and management depend on the focus of infrastructure activities and the C2 structure of the multinational operation.
Civil engineering operations are conducted either as a main force mission (e.g., in humanitarian operations) or in support of MNF deployment and sustainment operations. In either case, a special engineer task force, under MNFC control, may be established to conduct the operations. Nations participating in a multinational operation may place assigned engineer units under the OPCON of the engineer task force commander. As alternatives, engineer units may receive tasking from the MJLC or equivalent organization, or nations may simply coordinate engineer activities with the MNFC and the force engineer.

To assist the force engineer, an engineer coordination element may be established. In a US-led multinational operation, this coordination element will normally comprise a staff element within the joint force joint staff, Director for Logistics (J-4) and will usually involve a number of functionally specific joint engineer boards — for example, JFUB, JCMEB, and Joint Environmental Management Board. These joint boards would be expanded with personnel from coalition partners to form combined organizational elements with multinational engineer coordination functions. In NATO doctrine, the central coordinating organization for civil engineering is called an engineer coordination cell (ECC) and may directly support the force engineer, who is a special staff officer under the MNFC. If joint engineer boards have been established in support of US forces in a NATO operation, they should coordinate closely with the ECC. The theater engineer may also establish regional/component subordinate offices to assist the ECC in coordinating multinational engineering activities.

For details on US engineering doctrine, see JP 3-34, Engineer Doctrine for Joint Operations. For NATO doctrine, see AJP-4, Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine.

Whatever the specific coordinating organization, it is the responsibility of the force engineer (and staff) to effect centralized direction and decentralized execution of the civil engineering effort and to ensure a unified and efficient use of engineering resources for common support of MNF operations. More specifically, it is the responsibility of the force engineer (assisted by the ECC or equivalent) to:

• Identify and prioritize requirements for civil engineer projects that support MNF operations.

• Work with participating nations to obtain engineer capabilities to execute common engineer projects.

• Coordinate with other staff elements or coordination cells (e.g., financial, contracting, and movements control cells) for procurement of engineer materials for both common and national specific engineer projects. Because of the scarcity of engineer materials in some operational areas, it will be necessary to prioritize and centrally coordinate the procurement by nations of engineer material for national and common infrastructure projects.

• Coordinate with contracting staff in arranging local engineer capabilities, if available.
• Task units provided by nations for common infrastructure projects.

• Employ liaison detachments with key participating nations and at critical geographic locations in the operational area to ensure most efficient use of engineer resources.

• Common funding may be used to fund common infrastructure projects, as it was in NATO peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. The ECC should work with MJLC budget and finance staff in allocating funds for these projects in a timely manner.

• **Staffing.** Personnel assigned to multinational engineer coordinating centers should possess appropriate engineering skills and expertise. To the extent possible, appropriate engineer resource specialists should represent each nation involved in the operation and be able to commit their nation’s financial resources, monitor the funding process and oversee execution processes when needed. US contributions to the ECC (or equivalent) may include civilian specialists from Service engineer centers, such as the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency. These specialists are most familiar with specialized construction, demolition and other engineering specifications and procedures. The United States and other participating nations in multinational operations must coordinate with the MNFC in ensuring that these engineer contractor personnel are appropriately covered in all MNF SOFAs and TAs.

• **Information Requirements.** The ECC requires a standardized project management software that includes the ability to estimate engineer project requirements and costs, monitor project status, and incorporate contractor capabilities to support operational requirements. There is also a need for a reliable communications link with all potential customers to make available clear requirements definitions and funding information.

d. **Health Service Support.** Nations are ultimately responsible for providing health service support (HSS) for their forces. Because of national sensitivities, the United States strives to rely on national resources for providing HSS to its forces to the maximum extent. Opportunities nevertheless exist to rationalize HSS within a multinational operation. For example, HSS Levels III-IV (See Figure II-5) could be provided by a LN or RSN. However, differences in medical standards, customs, and training, require careful consideration in planning multinational medical support. The exchange of blood and blood products between nations is an especially sensitive issue.

*More detailed guidance on HSS in multinational operations, can be found in JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Services Support, Appendix D “Multinational Operations.”*

• As the MNFC’s chief medical officer (CMO), the force surgeon is responsible for overall planning and coordination of medical support for the MNF. Specific responsibilities include:

  • Develop overall MNF policy for medical support and promulgate to force participants.

  • Advise nations in estimating medical risk and associated casualties.

  • Conduct medical assessment of the area.
• Develop the operation’s overall medical architecture, to include determination of the number, size, capabilities, location, and source of Level III-IV medical facilities.

• Review national medical support plans, and integrate into the overall operation HSS plan.

• Identify potential use of multinational HSS arrangements (e.g., LN Level III-IV hospitals) and work with nations to develop such arrangements.

• Determine the ability of prospective participants to provide medical capabilities for the operation, and assist nations, if requested, in obtaining medical support through multinational assistance.

• Establish medical evacuation policy and support concept, and work with nations in rationalizing medical evacuation capabilities through use of LN, RSN, and other multinational arrangements.

• Coordinate in ensuring adequate blood supply for national contingents, using LN providers, if necessary.

• Because of its robust, high quality medical capabilities, the United States may be able to provide HSS support to multinational partners, including: Class VIII medical supplies; veterinary services; medical laboratory services; optical fabrication; medical equipment and repairs; preventive medicine; and casualty evacuation (ground and/or air).

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**LEVELS OF HEALTH SERVICE SUPPORT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL I</td>
<td>Self-aid, buddy aid, and combat lifesaver skills</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL II</td>
<td>Resuscitation, stabilization, and application of emergency procedures to prolong life</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL III</td>
<td>Care requiring clinical capabilities (surgery)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL IV</td>
<td>Not only surgical capability, as in Level II, but also further therapy during the recovery and rehabilitative phase</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEVEL V</td>
<td>Definitive, convalescent, restorative, and rehabilitative care normally provided by the military, Department of Veterans Affairs, Continental United States civilian hospitals, or combatant commander-approved safe havens</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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*Figure II-5. Levels of Health Service Support*
• US laws and policies, however, place restrictions on the provision of HSS to other nations and the use of foreign HSS by US forces. US commanders must be aware of such restrictions and in non-US led multinational operations inform the MNFC of these.

• A medical coordination cell (MEDCC), in NATO parlance, may be established to work under the technical direction of the force surgeon. The MEDCC (or equivalent) is designed to:

  • Coordinate multinational, joint, and multifunctional medical issues, including AE. Coordination of the medical evacuation of casualties from the theater is the most important routine operation of the MEDCC during an operation. The MEDCC coordinates with national elements, the medical facility from which the evacuation will occur, the evacuation providers, and the multinational movement control organization that will coordinate the actual movement of the casualties. Close coordination with appropriate national liaison personnel is extremely critical during this entire process.

  • Determine the medical “robustness” of prospective participating nations and work with nations to ensure adequate medical support.

  • Ensure that medical care and facilities are available to assist in the event emergencies exceed an individual nation’s capabilities in the operational area.

  • Determine opportunities to employ LN, RSN, and other multinational arrangements to achieve more efficient and effective use of HSS capabilities within the MNF.

  • Certify the adequacy of local civil medical/dental resources to meet MNF standards.

  • Establish veterinary procedures to ensure quality food storage, distribution, and preparation.

  • Plan and execute a preventive medicine program to reduce or eliminate nonbattle casualties.

• **Staffing.** Apart from the administrative and clerical personnel needed to support cell activities, each person should be a skilled health services practitioner. Personnel with expertise in AE should also be included to work with movement control centers in planning AE flights. Ideally, each nation participating in the operation should provide representatives to the MEDCC.

• **Information Requirements.** The MEDCC depends on critical and timely information regarding, for example, emergency medical requirements and the location of need. A clear picture of the HSS capabilities of participating nations must be developed, shortfalls identified (prior to force deployment), and the need determined for Level III-IV medical facilities to supplement national or other in-theater Levels I-III medical capabilities. The MEDCC
depends on situation reports provided by all elements of the MNF in order to ensure that adequate medical/dental capability is available where and when needed, particularly in the case of crises or when national capabilities are inadequate to meet requirements. These reports may be supplemented by MEDCC staff visits. Of critical importance is the need for an accurate patient tracking system. Medical information connectivity must exist between the MEDCC, national elements, and all members of the medical technical chain. To ensure effective HSS during multinational operations, US geographic combatant commanders should encourage and, where appropriate, assist multinational partners to develop such a capability, and work together to ensure necessary interoperability.

- **Coordinating Activities.** The MEDCC coordinates closely with the MNF’s movement control center for transportation assistance; with the contracting office, for contractor support; with the engineering coordination cell, for facility construction; and with the JLOC for needed logistic support. The MEDCC must coordinate closely with the host-nation support coordination center (HNSCC) and CMOC regarding the availability of local civil medical resources to supplement military HSS capabilities.

e. **Host-Nation Support**

- **HNS will often be critical to the success of a multinational operation.** Centralized coordination of HNS planning and execution will be important to ensure that limited HNS resources are allocated most effectively to support the MNFC’s priorities. The more limited HNS resources are in the operational area, the greater the requirement for centralized management.

- NATO doctrine recognizes the importance of centralized HNS coordination and gives NATO commanders the authority to:
  - Prioritize HNS requirements.
  - Negotiate HNS agreements, on behalf of nations, with host nations.
  - Coordinate HNS allocation with “sending” and host nations.

- In US-led multinational operations, nations typically negotiate their own HNS agreements. Participating nations nevertheless should coordinate their HNS arrangements with the MNFC, who in turn should coordinate HNS allocation with the HN.

- To assist the MNFC in HNS coordination activities, a HNSCC may be established. One of the most important functions of the HNSCC is to assist the MNFC and legal counsel in developing TAs that involve logistic matters such as: infrastructure, finance, purchasing and contracting, engineering, environment, hazardous material storage, landing and port fees, medical, border customs, tariffs, and real estate. In US-led multinational operations, the MNFC needs to involve participating nations in the negotiation of either commonly worded separate bilateral TAs or a single set of agreements applicable to the entire MNF.
Staffing. The HNSCC should be staffed with specialists familiar with developing and executing HNS agreements. In addition, consideration should be given to including representatives of the HN within the HNSCC to

- facilitate coordination and identification of resources for potential use by the MNF and
- provide interpretation and translation services to the HNSCC staff.

Information Requirements. In order to effectively plan and coordinate HNS allocation, the HNSCC needs up-to-date information on HNS logistic capabilities and on-going HNS allocation to MNF contingents throughout the operation. To ensure that it receives such information, the HNSCC must maintain close contact with the HN and with MNF contingents. In order to facilitate HNS planning and operational coordination, US geographic combatant commanders and alliance organizations should develop an HNS catalogue or database of potential HNS capabilities in advance of operations.

Coordinating Activities. In conducting its operations, the HNSCC coordinates closely with appropriate CMOC organizations, the legal, financial, and contracting staff of the MJLC, and the host nation’s representatives.

Contracting

Contracting is an essential element of logistic support, especially in multinational operations. Both theater support contracting and CUL-related external theater support contracting make use of regionally available supplies, services, and construction capability in immediate support of deployed units, at staging locations, interim support bases, or forward operating locations. (See Chapter III, “Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements,” and Appendix D, “US Contracting Considerations for Multinational Operations,” for a fuller description of contracting activities.) The use of local contractor services can also play a very important role in the economic health within the countries where the operation is being conducted.

Centralized coordination of contracting efforts is essential to provide the necessary management of limited resources to ensure that the MNFC’s operational priorities are effectively and efficiently supported. Through centralized coordination of contracting efforts, maximum benefits are derived from volume procurements, competition is optimized, price escalation is avoided, and the opportunities for local black market operations are minimized. The need to coordinate contracting activities is especially important during MOOTW when locally available supplies and resources may be very limited and the disjointed unilateral competition for such resources could result in bidding up the cost of those services.

To most effectively coordinate contracting activities of MNF participants, the MNFC may establish a centralized contracting coordination cell. In NATO doctrine, this
organizational element is known as the theater allied contracting office (TACO). The contracting coordination office and its regional/component subordinate offices, if established, must develop and maintain close contact with potential contractors, operational customers, other coordination centers (especially the HNSCC), and staff elements such as the command legal counsel and the budget and finance offices.

- **The establishment of a centralized contracting center is not intended to usurp the contracting prerogatives of any nation.** In multinational operations, US commanders are responsible for contracting operations to support US forces, and contracting officers are guided by US laws and the FAR in obtaining contractor services. The contracting coordination center prioritizes and coordinates national contracting of goods and services that are in limited supply within the operational area or are commonly needed by the entire force (or by more than one component). These commonly needed goods and services may include food, fuel, lodging, labor, construction materials, facilities, and transportation. To effectively coordinate MNF contracting activities, the MNFC may publish a **restricted items list** that identifies critical, limited supplies and services within the operational area, the procurement of which must be coordinated with the contracting coordination center.

- In a NATO operation, the TACO may also negotiate basic ordering agreements (BOAs) for use by all participating nations, assist nations in negotiating contracts, and negotiate contracts for common-funded MNF activities. In US-led operations, the contracting coordination center, which is an extension of the JTF contracting office, may be requested to assist nations in similar ways but is likely to focus on coordinating national contracting efforts.

- **Staffing.** Personnel assigned to this center should be skilled in procurement functions. To the extent possible, the personnel should represent each nation involved in the operation and be warranted to commit their nation’s financial resources, when needed.

- **Information Requirements.** A database of goods and services available in the operational area, as well as contractors’ capability to support operational requirements, must be developed. There is also a need for a reliable communications link with all potential customers through which a clear definition of requirements and funding information may be made available.

**g. Other Logistic Operations**

- In addition to the functions discussed above, there are other logistics activities that could benefit from multinational coordination at the theater-level. These activities include:
  - Petroleum, oils, and lubricants supply and distribution
  - Real estate and environmental management, and
  - Procurement of fresh rations, water, and ice.
• Even services that are normally provided nationally (for example, mortuary affairs) may be amenable to multinational support in some situations. (US doctrine states that in appropriate circumstances, the United States may provide mortuary services to allies, coalition partners, or to the local populace in humanitarian operations. See JP 4-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.)

• In US-led multinational operations, multinational coordination of these services may be effected through various functional joint boards, cells, and offices, which are expanded to include multinational staff, or through a JLOC, or joint logistics coordination center (JLCC) in NATO doctrine. In addition to coordinating specific logistic functions, the JLOC/JLCC provides general oversight of the MNF logistic posture, coordinates all support functions of RSNs and LNs, and exercises tasking authority for assigned operation level logistic units.

• **Staffing.** This JLOC/JLCC should be staffed with experienced logisticians from participating nations with functional expertise, particularly in supply and maintenance operations, fuels and fuel management, and ration management. The US force commander should consider including representatives from the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA).

• **Information Requirements.** The JLOC/JLCC is the proponent for logistic information gathering for the MNFC, who must have visibility of the MNF overall logistic situation. Reporting requirements must focus on the critical information required at respective command levels and be included in the logistic support plan. Adequate and timely reporting of information is critical, and US and other national commanders must cooperate in providing such information to the MNFC.

h. **Supply, Maintenance, and Repair.** Because of the diversity among national forces the opportunities to integrate supply, maintenance, and repair activities on a multinational level are limited. There may be occasions, however, when nations participating in an operation are using equipment procured from another participating nation. **Logistic planners should identify equipment similarities among participating nations during the planning or force generation process.** In these situations, operation planners should be apprised of such considerations in assigning forces to specific commands or areas. **Logistic planners should also identify areas where international agreements would facilitate supply and maintenance support of multinational operations.** Upon identifying a need, the MNFC should seek a determination of the feasibility of such agreements and, where applicable, pursue their development in coordination with the appropriate higher command level. In the case of US equipment, ACSAs and FMS can assist. It is possible that the logistic footprint of participating nations may be reduced by such initiatives.

5. **Considerations for Facilitating Logistic Command and Control**

Regardless of the specific structure established to coordinate and manage MNL activities, the following considerations will facilitate MNL C2.

a. The MNFC’s authority for logistic matters must be **clearly defined in the OPLAN** and supporting plans.
Participation of forces from many nations can severely complicate coordination of logistic support.

b. A flexible MNL C2 structure must be established early in the planning cycle to coordinate national and MNL operations and support the MNFC’s concept of operations.

c. MNL C2 activities must be organized on the basis of the operational mission and coordinated with nations to obtain support and manning for the structure. **In alliances, the MNL C2 structure should be established in peacetime** in order to improve contingency planning, participate in exercises, establish manning requirements for actual operations, and serve as an integral component of the operational planning process. **For coalition operations, the MNL C2 structure may not be established in advance.**

d. In anticipation of participating in coalition operations, US geographic combatant commanders should establish the capability to coordinate future MNL operations within existing US JTF planning structures/HQ to facilitate expansion during coalition operations. Effort must be made to minimize the potentially adverse impact of last minute, ad hoc MNL support arrangements.

e. Effective MNF support requires that the MNFC develop a spirit of cooperation, coordination, and communication with and among participating nations.

f. The MNL C2 structure must include coordinating mechanisms and procedures to facilitate linkages with the appropriate operational HQ, senior coordinating agencies/HQ, component commands, and other national HQ, as appropriate.
g. MNL C2 operations require the use of an effective liaison system, consisting of technically skilled logistic representatives.

h. In order to gain full benefits from MNL arrangements, US commanders must be familiar with the logistic procedures of the MNF, whether NATO, UN, or those of the LN.
(The joint force of 2020 must be prepared to “win” across the full range of military operations in any part of the world, to operate with multinational forces, and to coordinate military operations, as necessary, with government agencies and international organizations. . . . Mutual support relationships and collaborative planning will enable optimum cooperation with multinational and interagency partners.”

Joint Vision 2020

1. General

   a. Normally, MNFs are supported through a combination of national and multinational sources. To ease individual national burdens and achieve operational efficiencies, nations may supplement purely national support by participating in one or more of the multinational logistic support arrangements listed in Figure III-1.

   b. Some logistics functions are more conducive than others to provision through such arrangements. Figure III-2 lists supplies and services that may be provided using one or more multinational support arrangements. Even though some services are normally provided nationally, there are situations when the United States will either provide or accept such services to/from other nations. Moreover, almost all logistic supplies and services could be provided on a bilateral basis to another nation’s units. Such bilateral support sometimes occurs in UN and NATO operations when a nation logistically “sponsors” another nation to facilitate its participation in an operation.

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**Figure III-1. Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements**

- Lead Nation
- Role Specialist Nation
- National Logistics Units for Multinational Support (Including MILUs*)
- Host-Nation Support
- Contractor Support
- Bilateral and/or Multilateral Arrangements

*Multinational Integrated Logistic Units
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Support</th>
<th>National</th>
<th>Bi-/ Multilateral (Note 1)</th>
<th>External Theater Support Contracting</th>
<th>HNS/ Theater Support Contracting</th>
<th>National Units for MNL Support</th>
<th>RSN</th>
<th>Lead Nation</th>
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<td>Materials Handling Equipment (Note 3)</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port Operations</td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>x</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure III-2. Supply and Services Suited for Multinational Provision*
As illustrated in Figure III-3, the United States and its allies and coalition partners have extensive experience with multinational logistic support arrangements. The United States has both provided and received logistic support through such arrangements.

d. Multinational logistic support arrangements can be implemented at various levels of command and to various degrees for any type of operation, from the entire range of MOOTW through MTW. The MNFC may play a key role in developing and implementing these arrangements and should be closely involved in providing policy guidance and integrating such support arrangements into the operation’s overall logistic concept. For the United States, as with other nations, participation in multinational support arrangements remains a national decision that must be undertaken in accordance with applicable legal authorities. US legal and procedural requirements for MNL operations are discussed in paragraph 4 below and in Appendix C, “Relevant Legal Authorities for US Logistic Support in Multinational Operations.”
2. Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements

a. Lead Nation Logistic Support. Under the LN concept, one nation agrees to assume responsibility for coordinating and/or providing a range of logistic support services to either all or part of a MNF. Such services may include transportation, medical support, medical evacuation, rear area security, POD operations, engineering, and movement control. The United States provided selected LN logistic support to UN contingents in Somalia and Haiti, and NATO allies have provided LN support in NATO peacekeeping operations.

- Often, LN assignments are based upon geographic considerations. For example, a COMMZ or operational area may be divided into sectors with LN responsibilities assigned to the major force in that area. Thus, more than one LN may service an operation based upon the division of geographic areas.

### EXAMPLES OF MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC SUPPORT ARRANGEMENTS IN SELECTED OPERATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Multinational Logistics Arrangement</th>
<th>Providing Country</th>
<th>Logistic Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Desert Shield/ Storm</td>
<td>Host-Nation Support (HNS)/Theater Support Contracting</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Airbases, ports of debarkation (PODs), port operations, fuel, water and fresh rations, surface transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bilateral Support</td>
<td>Multiple</td>
<td>US contracted sealift from various countries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Rail for VII Corps deployment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Comfort (Turkey)</td>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Airfields</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Fuel -- Vehicle and Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theater Support Contracting</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Trucking (commercial contracts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore Hope (Somalia)</td>
<td>Lead Nation</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Port operations, medical support, water purification, fuel, and rations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Multilateral</td>
<td>UK and France</td>
<td>Level III medical facilities outside operational area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support Hope (Rwanda)</td>
<td>Theater Support Contracting</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>Fuel, accommodations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP) support to nongovernmental organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uphold Democracy (Haiti)</td>
<td>Lead Nation</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Base camp construction (LOGCAP) for UN, engineering, port improvements and operations, medical support, water purification, fuel</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure III-3. Examples of Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements in Selected Operations
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Multinational Logistics Arrangement</th>
<th>Providing Country</th>
<th>Logistic Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IFOR/SFOR</td>
<td>Role Specialist Nation</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Bulk fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lead Nation</td>
<td></td>
<td>UK, France, US</td>
<td>POD operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational integrated logistic center (MILU)</td>
<td>Providing Country</td>
<td>Logistic Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILU</td>
<td>Greece, Bulgaria, Austria</td>
<td>Truck unit (HELBA)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILU</td>
<td>Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Poland</td>
<td>Nordic Support Group (Nordic-Polish Brigade)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILU</td>
<td>Netherlands, Belgium, UK</td>
<td>Multinational Integrated Medical Unit (MIMU)/ MND(SW)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Composite theater-level logistics unit</td>
<td>Providing Country</td>
<td>Logistic Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater level support</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Role-3 hospital, engineer, and transportation units (GECONFOR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater level support</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Role-3 hospital (SFOR)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled multinational logistics unit</td>
<td>Providing Country</td>
<td>Logistic Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pooled multinational logistics unit</td>
<td>Providing Country</td>
<td>Logistic Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>PODs Accommodations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutritional Contracting</td>
<td>NATO negotiated</td>
<td>Fresh rations, fuel</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mutual Support Arrangement</td>
<td>Providing Country</td>
<td>Logistic Support</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure III-3. Examples of Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements in Selected Operations (cont’d)**
### Examples of Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements in Selected Operations (cont’d)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation</th>
<th>Multinational Logistics Arrangement</th>
<th>Providing Country</th>
<th>Logistic Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Role Specialist Nation</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>Bulk fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lead Nation</td>
<td>UK, France</td>
<td>Port operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Port operations, transportation, movement control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theater level support</td>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>Support Brigade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theater level support</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>Transportation Company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Theater level support</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Railway Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>External Theater Support Contracting</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Contractor provides logistic support to KFOR contingents on case-by-case basis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stabilize (East Timor)</td>
<td>LN/Bilateral</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Air transportation, force protection, rations, fuel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bilateral</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Logistics planning, contracted heavy lift helos, helo-pads and base camps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enduring Freedom</td>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>Uzbekistan</td>
<td>P O D, airfields</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure III-3. Examples of Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements in Selected Operations (cont’d)**

- Commanders designated by their nations to assume LN responsibilities must coordinate logistic support for forces within their geographically assigned limits. National contingents receiving LN support must maintain appropriate liaison with the LN. If the United States assumes LN responsibilities, the appropriate US commander within the geographic responsibility of the MNFC must coordinate activity with the MJLC (or equivalent) and its functional coordination cells.

b. **Role Specialist Nation Logistic Support.** Under RSN arrangements, one nation assumes responsibility for providing a particular class of supply or service for all or part of a MNF, usually at a determined rate of reimbursement. Provision of bulk fuel in Bosnia and Kosovo by the United States and France, respectively, are examples of RSN support.

- This option should be strongly considered when a participating nation possesses unique logistic strengths. The major difference between RSN and LN is that the RSN arrangements usually are single-item/single-service oriented, while the LNs are concerned with providing or coordinating multiple services within designated geographic regions.
Possible items or services for RSN support include strategic lift, movement planning, contracting services, fuel management and provisioning, real estate management, hazardous waste disposal, and AE. **Prospective RSNs should be approached early in operational planning** since considerable time may be required to obtain national approval for such designation.

Because of its robust logistic capabilities, the United States may often be asked to accept RSN responsibilities for particular services. **If so requested, geographic combatant commanders should formally coordinate the request through the Joint Staff for action and decision by appropriate US authorities.** Because of the impact this decision may have on the logistic posture of an operation, such a request should be expeditiously transmitted and acted upon. Acceptance of RSN responsibilities may be crucial for the initial stages of an operation. There should be operational, financial, management, or force structure benefits accruing from using an RSN arrangement. For example, serving as an RSN for one logistic function may be used as a basis for obtaining support from other nations in another functional area, thus reducing the amount of US logistic forces to be provided within the operational area.

c. **National Logistic Units for Multinational Support.** One of the more effective ways for nations to optimize use of logistic capabilities in a multinational operation is by placing national logistic units under OPCON of the MNFC for tasking in support of the entire MNF. For many multinational operations, there is an especially urgent requirement for theater-operational level medical, engineering, and transportation capabilities.
There are three ways nations can contribute these and other logistic capabilities in support of the MNF:

- individual nations can provide a particular logistic unit, for example, an engineer battalion, to the MNFC for tasking (as Romania did for NATO’s Stabilization Force [SFOR]);

- a country may contribute a composite logistics unit performing several logistic functions, such as the German Contingent in IFOR, which comprised medical, transportation, and engineer units; or

- two or more nations may pool or combine capabilities into a single unit providing logistic services. The combined unit may be either loosely organized (such as NATO’s channel flight service in the Balkans), or nations may decide to participate in a more tightly integrated unit. In the latter case, nations may divide responsibilities — with one nation providing a HQ (for example) while other nations provide functional logistic support units (as with the Nordic Support Group in support of the Nordic-Polish Brigade in Bosnia).

NATO designates any composite logistic unit comprised of assets from two or more nations a “multinational integrated logistic unit” (MILU). MILUs offer the opportunity for smaller nations, which may lack fully capable logistic units, to contribute meaningfully to the operation-level support of a multinational operation.
• All three kinds of national contributions to MNF support may be made at any level of organization and command. If supporting a particular component, their missions may be directed by a component MNLC, or they may report directly to the component commander. If used as a theater-level asset, such units may receive taskings through the MJLC (or equivalent).

• Because of national reluctance to rely on MNL, MNFCs must ensure that multinational CUL units are truly beneficial compared to national support options. MNFCs also need to ensure that such units, if needed, are given proper support and FP.

• Through the use of MILUs and other national logistic contributions, however, US commanders of MNFs may be able to expand participation in US-led multinational operations and to enhance logistic support of the MNF with fewer demands on US logistic capabilities. US MNFCs, therefore, should review possibilities for MILU formation and national logistic contributions to theater-operational support during the initial operational planning phase.

d. Host-Nation Support

• JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines HNS as “civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations.” HNS can be viewed as a special case of LN support, in which the LN is a host or transited nation. HNS can be an important, and in some cases essential, source of support for a MNF. JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, identifies some areas in which HNS may be provided. These include transportation, civilian labor, services, rear area protection, petroleum, telecommunications, supplies, health services, facilities and real estate, and contracting. This support is not limited to an operational area but may extend to nations through or over which US forces need to traverse en route to a specific operational area.

• HNS is generally furnished in accordance with an agreement negotiated prior to the start of an operation. HNS agreements are normally established in diplomatic channels between a nation or a MNF and a receiving nation. These are normally umbrella-type agreements that are augmented by TAs detailing the specific support to be provided and the type/amount of reimbursement. In some cases, reimbursement may not be required because the providing nation recognizes the importance of coalition/alliance forces deployed on its territory and/or considers HNS to be its contribution to the security arrangement. As part of the HNS agreement process, an assessment must be conducted of the host nation’s ability to satisfy MNF support requirements. Responsibility for funding possible improvements to host-nation facilities by either the MNF or a nation must be clearly identified in the HNS agreement.

• During crises, it may be necessary for the US geographic combatant commander to request authority to negotiate bilateral HNS agreements for the purpose of providing logistic assistance to other nations. Such negotiation must be conducted expeditiously in coordination with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
(OSD), and the State Department, in compliance with applicable DODDs. Alternatively, the MNFC may be authorized to negotiate HNS agreements on behalf of the nations contributing forces to the MNF, with their prior concurrence. This approach, which NATO doctrine endorses, simplifies and streamlines the process and reduces the amount of time required to put such agreements into place.

e. **Contractor Support.** US joint doctrine recognizes three kinds of contractor support — systems support, theater contractor support, and external theater support. (See JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, Chapter V.) Systems support contractors support specific weapon systems of deployed forces. In cases where a nation operates foreign-acquired equipment, some or all of the support for such equipment may be provided by foreign contractors and hence could be “multinational.”

- Theater support contracting (or contracting of “in-country resources” in NATO doctrine) encompasses support obtained through contingency or pre-arranged contracts with regional or local businesses and vendors. An important difference for logistics planners between theater contractor support and HNS is that there is no guarantee of service with the former arrangement whereas the HN is responsible for the provision of HNS and has strong incentives to ensure its provision.

- External theater contracted support is provided through contracts awarded under the command and procurement authority of supporting HQ outside the theater. The contracts are usually prearranged but may be awarded or modified during the mission based on the commanders’ needs. Examples include the Army logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP), the Air Force contract augmentation program (AFCAP), and the Navy construction capabilities contract program (CONCAP).

- The US Army initially designed LOGCAP as an alternative to using Service personnel for providing logistic support to deployed forces. Support offered under LOGCAP can span the spectrum of logistic support, including base camp construction, maintenance, transportation, and the entire range of base operations. Because of its success, both the US Air Force and US Navy have established similar programs.

- Under the provisions of all three programs, a contractor is selected and paid a retainer, which allows it to preplan and perform selected administrative and logistic support functions — during peace, crises, or war — using its capability as a substitute for military support forces. When activated, this program is intended to provide a rapid, in-theater logistic support capability.

- In multinational operations, the United States can use external theater contracting in two ways to enhance logistic support of the MNF and its own forces. In the first case, the US may use its national capabilities to provide logistic support to other nations as part of its RSN, LN, or other multinational responsibilities. For example, the United States used LOGCAP services to provide selected support to UN contingents in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti.
Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements

- The United States and its allies/coalition partners may also collectively arrange external theater contractor support for common logistic supplies and services — such as fresh rations, fuel, and accommodations — using a multinational contracting arrangement with one or several national or multinational contracting firms. In this kind of multinational logistics civil augmentation program, the United States would participate in a multinational contract with private construction or logistic firms that would provide selected logistic support to the entire MNF, including US forces.

- During planning for multinational operations, US MNFCs should consider the use of US and multinational external theater support contracting as sources of MNF support and coordinate with participating nations for their employment. In alliance or non-US led operations, the US JFC should similarly consider how US external theater support contracting could be used to support not only US forces but other contingents in the MNF.

- In peacetime, US geographic combatant commanders should assess the availability of external theater support contracting alternatives within their AOR for possible use during multinational operations. Where possible, and in concert with the Department of State, geographic combatant commanders should negotiate standby support agreements in peacetime to avoid negotiating such agreements during a crisis. Commanders should continually assess the risks associated with the nonavailability of external theater contractor support and develop plans to cope with situations in which such support may not be available.

- Contracting is an increasingly useful means of obtaining logistic support in multinational operations, especially given the development of Service logistics civil augmentation programs, and the expanded use of contingency contracting procedures.

- All contracting activity in support of multinational operations must conform to applicable laws as well as policies established by the MNFC. In establishing policy, the MNFC must weigh nonmilitary as well as military considerations. Nonmilitary considerations include the potential need to enhance the economic situation within the host region, the avoidance and/or elimination of black market activities, and development/improvement of the in-theater infrastructure. To maintain multinational cohesion and support the political aims of the operation, participating nations must conform to the contracting policies established by the MNFC. US law, however, always controls in the event of inconsistencies between US law and MNFC policy.

- The following additional considerations apply to both external theater and theater support contracting in multinational operations.

  - It is critical that policies and procedures governing the actions of contractors in the operational area, including their activities in transit nations, be clearly established by the MNFC, in close consultation and coordination with staff legal counsel, and reflected in the appropriate
OPLAN. Of particular concern are policies concerning environmental protection; customs, duties, and taxes; FP; contractor liability; and the protections to be afforded contractor personnel. Provisions for using LOGCAP, AFCAP, and CONCAP should address contractor access to ports, airfields, and other distribution system linkages, prioritization for use of these facilities, responsibility for aircraft and ship unloading, air base clearance, identification of contractor personnel and security clearance where necessary, in-theater protection to be afforded the contractor, and purchasing of items on the restricted items list. These issues should be clearly addressed in appropriate OPLANs, CONPLANs, and respective logistic support plans, as well as the need for contractor management personnel to cooperate and coordinate with the appropriate MNFC staffs and/or MJLC/MNLC coordination centers.

Theater support contracting in multinational operations is not meant to replace HNS arrangements or the existing supply systems, but should be used to augment those procedures, especially when HNS arrangements are not in place or it is more economic or effective to use local purchases vice the supply system. If substantial contracting activity is envisaged, it is imperative that a contracting capability be available as part of the enabling element of a deploying MNF. The US force commander should deploy with such a capability even if the MNFC does not have such a capability. Additional guidelines for developing and executing US contracts in support of multinational operations are contained in Appendix D, “US Contracting Considerations in Multinational Operations.”


f. **Bilateral/Multilateral Arrangements.** Multinational logistic arrangements encompass arrangements made between/among two or more nations for the routine and/or emergency support of designated logistic supplies and services. The arrangements may establish conditions for mutual support between/among nations or the provision of support by one nation to another nation or nations. In such arrangements, the terms and conditions of support are solely the responsibility of the participating nations. The MNFC, however, should be apprised of any such arrangement that affects the logistic capability of forces under multinational command. Examples of bilateral/multilateral logistic arrangements are shown in Figure III-4. Of particular note are situations when the United States functions as the “framework” nation for a multinational unit (brigade, division, maritime task force, or air wing) provides selected support (e.g., medical services) to forces of other nations in the unit on a bilateral (usually reimbursable) basis. In a “framework” unit, a specified nation provides the command HQ—suitably augmented with personnel from other contributing nations—for a multinational unit. It also may provide selected communications links with higher HQ and other combat support and logistic capabilities, as required and agreed upon.

3. **Implementing Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements**

Implementation of multinational logistic support arrangements may involve a range of legal, administrative, or financial mechanisms. These implementing mechanisms include mutual support
agreements, memoranda of agreement, (MOAs), standardization agreements, and common funding. Once the support arrangements have been agreed upon, the MNFC’s logistic staff must coordinate expeditiously with participating nations and the commanding alliance or IO, if applicable, to identify and develop the required implementing mechanisms.

a. **Mutual Support Agreements.** Mutual support agreements are a broad class of agreements developed by an MNFC or an IO and agreed upon by nations. These mutual support agreements may serve as the implementing vehicle for a broad range of multilateral support arrangements. They can either be general in application or tailored to a specific class of support or operation. An example is the NATO-brokered Theater Mutual Support Agreement for the Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia. It provided that the forces of any signatory nation could receive logistic support from any other signatory nation for unforeseen requirements in return for prompt repayment in cash or kind. Development of this NATO-brokered agreement eliminated the need for individual bilateral agreements among all the nations involved. The mutual support agreement concept has been accepted as an element of NATO logistic doctrine, but the concept may be employed in any multinational operation. **US commanders and logisticians should be aware, however, that an alliance or coalition-negotiated mutual support agreement alone generally does not provide sufficient legal authority for exchanging support with multinational partners.** Specific and additional agreements between the US and coalition partners (e.g., ACSA or FMS agreements) may be required to fully implement alliance or coalition-negotiated mutual support agreements that allow US forces to provide logistic support to other nations.
b. **Memoranda of Agreement.** In instances where nations agree to combine national logistic assets or units to form MILUs, they may do so under the terms of an MOA. **The legal status, form, and content of an MOA are generally determined by the nations involved.** MOAs usually address issues such as internal C2, scope of national contribution, division of MILU-level responsibilities, cost sharing, liability, and administration. The requirement for an MOA, like its contents, is a national decision.

c. **Standardization Agreements.** Several types of standardization agreements have been developed by alliances, IOs, and nations to enhance operational compatibility, especially for logistics. NATO has developed formal standardization agreements (STANAGs) to document agreed-upon doctrinal, procedural, or materiel standards, and the ABCA forum has developed similar quadripartite standardization agreements. Although complete standardization of supplies, equipment, and materiel is difficult to attain, STANAGs can facilitate and simplify the implementation of many support arrangements among participating nations. For example, the forms and procedures for exchanging logistic support within NATO have been documented in a single STANAG that has also been made available to NATO’s Partnership for Peace nations. **US commanders and their staffs should be aware, however, that standardization agreements do not provide legal authority to provide or receive logistic support; they merely document agreed upon standards for items, services, or procedures to be used in multinational logistic support arrangements.**

4. **US Legal Authorities**

a. US participation in multinational logistic support arrangements must be undertaken in accordance with US legal authorities. **US combatant commanders may not enter into multinational logistic support arrangements without specific legal authority.** Several legal authorities are available to US commanders, but they differ significantly in terms of required conditions, type of permitted support, and implementation procedures. **Most of these authorities also require advance negotiation of some type of nation-to-nation agreement,** generally at the DOD or geographic combatant command level. In many cases, US combatant commanders and their staffs must tailor their plans to participate in MNL support arrangements to reflect the requirements of preexisting legal authorities and their implementing agreements.
b. This section describes the applicability of selected US legal authorities to different multinational logistic support arrangements. Appendix C, “Relevant Legal Authorities for US Logistic Support in Multinational Operations,” contains a more detailed description of the general provisions, financial requirements, limitations, and required implementing agreements for these authorities.

- **Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement Authority**

  - The ACSA authority provides authority for US forces to acquire or transfer logistic support from foreign sources and/or multinational partners. As described in Appendix C, “Relevant Legal Authorities for US Logistic Support in Multinational Operations,” there are restrictions in the types of defense articles and services that can be provided to or purchased from other nations through ACSAs. Nevertheless, ACSAs constitute an operationally flexible authority for exchanging logistic support between US and multinational forces, particularly in emergencies and unforeseen circumstances.

  - **US participation in MNL arrangements.** In an operational setting, US and multinational commanders have the flexibility to structure ACSA exchanges of logistic support in accordance with local requirements and conditions. For example, operational commanders may determine the timing, location, and reimbursement terms for ACSA exchanges.

  - ACSAs can also be used for preplanned logistic support arrangements, such as in fulfilling RSN or LN responsibilities. However, because the nomination/negotiation process to conclude a new ACSA requires coordination with the Department of State and notification of Congress (for ACSA agreements with non-NATO nations or organizations) operational commanders must identify the need for and request the negotiation of any required cross-servicing agreements as far in advance of the start of an operation as possible.

  - Another consideration is that the ACSA legislation explicitly prohibits the DOD from increasing US inventories in anticipation of meeting foreign logistic requirements. For this reason, US commanders who consider using the ACSA authority to meet routine logistic requirements of foreign nations partners must ensure that in doing so they do not place the operational readiness of US forces at risk. Since ACSA transactions will involve items or supplies purchased with appropriated US funds, its use may be subject to additional restrictions contained in DOD authorization or appropriation legislation.

- **Cooperative Military Airlift Agreement Authority (CMAA).** The CMAA authority provides authority for US forces to acquire or exchange airlift support from foreign sources and/or multinational partners in combined exercises, training, deployments, operations, other cooperative efforts, and unforeseen circumstances or emergencies. While not as flexible as the ACSA authority, some foreign nations have expressed a preference for CMAA arrangements. The Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have delegated
authority to the Commander, USTRANSCOM to negotiate and conclude CMAA arrangements with foreign military authorities; USTRANSCOM has delegated authority to Air Mobility Command (AMC) only to negotiate CMAA arrangements. Due to the length of time necessary to negotiate a CMAA, commanders should identify and request the negotiation of any required CMAA as far in advance of the start of an operation as possible.

**Arms Export Control Act (AECA)**

- The AECA of 1976 provides DOD the authority to sell defense articles or services from existing DOD stocks or new procurement or DOD design or construction services to friendly foreign nations or IOs. Collectively, these government-to-government sales of defense articles or services are known as FMS. The **AECA can be used for providing logistic supplies (such as food or bulk fuel) that US and multinational forces can use in common and for which demand is relatively predictable.** As such, the AECA can serve as the authority for US participation in preplanned support arrangements (such as RSN or LN) involving basic logistic commodities. When planning US support authorized under the AECA, geographic combatant commanders and their logistic staffs need to allow sufficient time for the negotiation of the required FMS agreements. **Regular and early coordination with and approval from security assistance elements and the implementing materiel/logistic commands is essential.** Although FMS cases (contracts) can be negotiated and concluded in advance, routinely, an operation will begin before the required FMS agreements are in place. In this situation, US commanders should inform multinational partners in advance that the expected US support cannot be provided immediately. MNF partners have to develop or rely on interim support arrangements, such as ACSAs, while awaiting the negotiation and activation of the necessary FMS agreements.

- US commanders must also recognize that some participants, for a variety of reasons, may decline to purchase US logistic support through the FMS channel. Though this may introduce inefficiencies in the operation, nations have a sovereign right to determine their preferred means of support. Although AECA requirements can sometimes complicate and/or delay the planning and delivery of multinational logistic support, **this law constitutes the most frequently used US legal authority for the provision of routine US logistic support to multinational partners.**

**Foreign Assistance Act (FAA)**

- The FAA of 1961 contains a broad range of authorities to provide military goods or services to foreign countries or IOs for multinational operations, the two most important of which are Section 506, which provides authority for DOD drawdowns, upon Presidential determination, to friendly foreign nations for unforeseen emergencies, and Section 607, which allows DOD (and other government departments) to provide commodities and services to friendly foreign countries or IOs on an advance of funds or reimbursable basis.

- Within DOD, the Section 506 drawdown process is generally managed by the responsible Military Department materiel commands using security assistance personnel and information.
Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements

systems. The geographic combatant command role is usually limited to alerting the President and Secretary of Defense that a military emergency exists and coordinating the delivery of support with the foreign recipient and responsible DOD materiel commands. The drawdown may be provided from the operational stocks of a Service component of the respective geographic combatant command.

- **Section 607** may be used to provide routine logistic support under an LN or RSN arrangement, but is generally used only in those situations in which other support authorities, such as FMS agreements, cannot be used. In the past, the DOD has provided significant logistic support under section 607 to the UN. Support has been provided both by Service components operating with the UN and continental United States-based materiel commands and defense agencies. Because foreign requests for support usually require coordination with the Department of State, as well as approval by OSD, this authority is not well suited for unforeseen or emergency situations. Also, because DOD regulations require the DOD component or agency providing support to separately account for and bill for such support, Service component commanders must be prepared to commit dedicated resources to manage these transfers. Geographic component commanders and their logistic and financial staffs should coordinate with OSD, the Joint Staff, and potential recipients to define responsibilities and procedures for approving, implementing, and tracking requests for logistic support under Section 607. It is also critical to coordinate with the Military Departments and other DOD agencies providing section 607 support from outside the operational area.

- **The Federal Property and Administrative Service Act.** The Federal Property and Administrative Service Act provides authority for any US Government agency, including DOD, to transfer foreign excess personal property (FEPP) to foreign countries for foreign currency, substantial benefits, or the discharge of claims. The narrow definition of FEPP and the procedural requirements for transfers under this law limit its operational utility. The Federal Property and Administrative Service Act is not well suited for emergency transfers. **It is best used for planned transfers of overseas property for which the DOD requirement is limited and which the host foreign country is willing to accept. In operational terms, it is most applicable in the termination or redeployment phases of a multinational operation.** Although DOD regulations assign the Military Departments and DLA the responsibility for screening and negotiating the transfer of FEPP, Service components of the geographic combatant commands are well placed to identify potential FEPP and foreign recipients, particularly in an operational context. Geographic combatant or component commanders who wish to initiate FEPP transfers should coordinate with the appropriate Military Department logistic staff and/or with local DLA representatives.

- **Fly America Act and the Cargo Preference Act.** The Fly America Act and the Cargo Preference Act are two authorities that apply to all US Government-funded transportation operations. For the most part neither of these authorities imposes significant operational constraints on US commanders. There are exceptions, however, that are discussed in Appendix C, “Relevant Legal Authorities for US Logistic Support in Multinational Operations.”
• **Annual DOD Authorization and Appropriation Acts.** The authorities above provide a broad legal framework for US participation in a broad range of multinational logistic operations. In addition, the standing legal authorities may be supplemented and, in some cases, overridden, by provisions contained in annual DOD authorization or appropriations acts. Such provisions may, for example, prohibit or restrict exchanges of logistic support that involve the expenditure of US appropriated funds, such as those authorized under the ACSA or Section 607 of the FAA. **US combatant commanders must ensure that subordinate forces are informed of such legislative restrictions and provide appropriate guidance for adhering to them.** At the same time, commanders should consider alternative support mechanisms for MNL, such as FMS, that may not be affected by legislative constraints on the expenditure of US funds.

5. **Funding and Reimbursement**

   a. **US Requirements.** In general, nations are expected to fund their participation in multinational logistic support arrangements and reimburse providers for any support received from other nations. Funding and reimbursement requirements for US participation in these arrangements are generally a function of the applicable US legal authority. For example, US support provided under an LN/RSN or emergency support arrangement is generally implemented under the AECA or ACSA authority, respectively. In these cases, funding and reimbursement are managed in accordance with the funding procedures for these authorities. However, some multinational support arrangements, such as provision of national logistic assets to a MNL organization or participation in a MILU, may involve deferral or waiver of reimbursement. **US combatant commanders who envision participating in support arrangements for which reimbursement is to be waived must receive approval from higher HQ.** **A decision to waive or defer reimbursement for support provided to other nations is ultimately a political decision and is transmitted from the President and Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the commander.**

   Detailed policies and procedures for funding and reimbursement in multinational logistic operations are described in JP 1-06, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Financial Management During Joint Operations.

   b. **Financial Reporting.** US participation in multinational logistic operations requires regular financial reporting. The content and source of these reports vary with the controlling legal authority. In general, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS), in coordination with the security assistance offices of the responsible Military Department, prepares and distributes financial and other reports on support provided under the AECA and Section 506 of the FAA. Geographic combatant commanders should ensure that they receive copies of these reports. The responsible geographic combatant command Service component prepares reports on support provided under an ACSA and forwards them to the geographic combatant commander and Military Department as input for an annual report to Congress. Service component commanders are also responsible for ensuring that their allocated ceiling on the value of ACSA acquisition and exchanges is not exceeded. The geographic combatant commander is responsible for allocating to each Service component its share of the statutory ceiling on ACSA activity. The responsible Service component commander prepares reports on support provided under Section 607 of the FAA and forwards them to DFAS. Failure to complete these reports will result in failure to recoup the costs of providing the support.
Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements

c. **Common Funding.** Common funding — national funds paid into a common account managed by an alliance organization (e.g., NATO) or an IO (e.g., the UN) — *can be an invaluable means of funding common logistic requirements essential to the start of an operation.* Common funding can also reduce the necessity for the United States to unilaterally fund those requirements. Examples of common-funded items include international HQ operating expenses, common communication systems, and improvements to theater supply routes and airfields. **US commanders assigned as MNFCs need to identify potential requirements, sources, and procedures for obtaining common funding as early as possible.** In situations where pre-established common funds are not available or do not cover all relevant areas, other funding arrangements must be developed ad hoc. The methodology for sharing common costs must also be determined in cases where two or more nations form MILUs, integrated operational units, or support groups (e.g., multinational NSEs). Contributions to a common fund must be based on a mutually agreed-upon formula as well as the basis for allocating operational costs.
CHAPTER IV
MULTINATIONAL LOGISTIC PLANNING

“The stroke of genius that turns the fate of a battle? I don’t believe in it . . . You think out every possible development and [when] one of these developments occurs, you put your plan in operation, and everyone says, ‘What genius . . . ’ whereas the credit is really due to the labor of preparation.”

Marshal Ferdinand Foch, Commander of Allied Forces in Europe during World War I, interview April, 1919

1. General

This chapter provides guidance to US MNFCs and their staffs in the development of MNL support plans. This guidance is intended to complement doctrine and procedures developed by alliances and IOs that have been ratified by the United States, and to serve as the basis for planning logistic support in operations where such guidance does not apply. This chapter also provides guidance for developing logistic support plans for US forces participating in multinational operations and for selected transition operations involving US and multinational forces. Logistic planning of multinational operations poses considerable challenges. Realistically, only a few nations can logistically support themselves in every operational phase: deployment; sustainment; and redeployment/termination. Planning multinational support arrangements to ease national logistic burdens and to make logistic support more operationally effective and efficient is a key planning objective. Centralized, coordinated planning is also required to ensure smooth MNF deployment and efficient allocation of HNS and theater contractor resources, as well as to reduce logistic footprints in the operational area.

a. MNL planning, however, is complicated by several factors:

• Deliberate advance planning for multinational operations is usually confined only to close allies that are highly likely to join with the United States in the planned operation. Many potential coalition partners are politically hesitant to be seen as involved with the United States in advance planning. Most planning for multinational operations, therefore, tends to be ad hoc.

• Nations are generally reluctant in the early planning process to commit forces to the MNF. This is especially true regarding logistic contributions to MNF support. Logistic planning for multinational operations, therefore, can be a lengthy iterative process during which nations come to agreement on the logistic C2 organization and support arrangements only after extensive deliberation.

• Given these factors, planning for multinational operations usually commences only after the crisis has developed. Since logistics often is a limiting factor in operations, logistic planning needs to be initiated as soon as possible and occur concurrently with operational planning.
Within a multinational operation it is imperative that participating nations have confidence in the way partners are supporting their forces. Nations are often reluctant to, and sometimes prohibited from, sharing national OPLANs with potential partners because of the highly sensitive nature of such planning. Nonetheless, efforts should be made to share operation and logistic support plans during the plan development stage. While details may not be shared, general logistic support concepts, possible force/resource contributions, logistic support requirements, capabilities, and possible support arrangements should be discussed.

The requirement for an information database regarding the logistic capabilities of potential coalition partners is crucial for effective MNL planning. During peacetime, US and coalition planners may be able to use such information to identify — in advance — possible MNL contributions to an operation and to implement programs, including coalition exercises and planning seminars, to enhance interoperability. United States Pacific Command’s Multinational Planning Augmentation Team program and the Coalition Theater Logistics - Advanced Concept Technology Development project are examples of such efforts to enhance coalition logistic planning and to provide planners requisite planning tools. The challenge in creating coalition logistics databases and planning tools is to develop mechanisms that allow selective sharing of nationally sensitive information.

b. To more effectively integrate partners in contingency logistics planning, the MNFC should consider the following measures:

- Seek early assignment of logistic planners from participating nations to the MNFC logistic planning staff.
- Produce coalition logistic planning templates using US/lead nation data and planning factors. Templates would be filled out by participating nation logistic planners.
- Arrange temporary assignment of US/lead nation logistic liaison officers to the national HQs of participating nations.
- Provide access to US/lead nation logistic information management systems or arrange electronic interface between compatible national systems where feasible.
- Seek early briefings on participating nation logistic capabilities and shortfalls and obtain commitments to cooperative logistic arrangements.
- Seek early staffing for MJLC (or equivalent) functional coordination bodies.

c. National operational preferences influence the degree to which nations are willing to rely on MNL during the early phase(s) of an operation. Nevertheless, early MNL planning increases the options available to national commanders for employing MNL for mutual benefit during the critical first stages of an operation.
2. Multinational Logistic Planning Issues

   a. Perspective of US MNFC. When functioning as the MNFC, US commanders have the responsibility to develop a concept of operations and initial support concept, in coordination with participating nations. Upon approval of participating nations, US and other multinational logistic planners then iteratively develop the support plan during a series of planning conferences, as time allows. US MNFCs must address the following critical logistic issues in planning for multinational operations.

   - Logistic C2 relationships and organizational structure. Given differences in national terminology, it is essential that participating nations operate with the same understanding of C2 relationships.

   - Structure, staffing, and equipment of MNL organizations. Personnel from participating nations need to be integrated into MNF logistic HQ organizations to make them truly multinational.

   - Logistic authorities and responsibilities of the MNFC and participating nations.

   - Logistic reporting requirements and reporting capabilities of participating nations.

   - Interoperability of logistic command, control, communications, and information systems within the force. Achieving interoperable logistic command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) is difficult, even with long-time allies. To facilitate C3I interoperability, the United States may need to provide requisite systems to coalition partners.

   - Logistic requirements for national contingents (e.g., level of medical support, amount of supplies to be maintained in the operational area).

   - Logistic capabilities of participating national contingents. The MNFC needs to know to what extent national contingents may require support from non-organic resources in order to develop a logistic plan for the operation. NATO doctrine currently requires certification of the logistic capabilities of non-NATO contingents before they participate in non-Article 5 Alliance operations. Similar “certifications” may not be relevant or required for US-led coalitions and, in any case, may be beyond the resources of the US MNFC and staff to conduct. However, even in the case of less formal logistic assessments, US MNFCs should be aware that such assessments of coalition partner capabilities may be politically sensitive and require multinational cooperation.

   - Requirements for force-wide mutual support arrangements and implementing mechanisms.

   - Requirements for multinational support, including requirements for theater/operational-level logistic forces.
As in all aspects of multilateral military operations, logistic planning and execution often requires extensive coordination.

- Concepts for logistic functions and use of MNL support arrangements, such as RSN and LN, to implement such concepts.

- Prioritized requirements for HNS and theater support contracting resources.

- Authorities and responsibilities of the MNFC and nations in arranging support from host and transited nations. Centralized coordination of in-theater resource allocation is essential for operationally efficient support of multinational operations.

- Differences between US and allied/coalition logistic doctrine. As illustrated in Figure IV-1, for example, US logistic doctrine recognizes ten classes of supply vice five for NATO. US doctrine also differs somewhat with NATO doctrine in the number and scope of logistic functions and in the definitions of several MNL-related terms. The US MNFC should assist all nations participating in a multinational operation in understanding unique aspects of US and allied/coalition logistic doctrine that could impact MNL activities in the operation.

- Availability of logistic planning tools, including logistic intelligence databases in the operational area, and responsibilities for developing and maintaining such databases.

- Mechanisms to protect logistic technical databases and logistic information systems from information operations.
### US AND NATO CLASSES OF SUPPLY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class of Supply</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Subsistence--ration and gratuitious issue of health, morale, and welfare items.</td>
<td>Personal consumption items.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Clothing, individual equipment, tentage, tool sets, and administrative and housekeeping supplies and equipment.</td>
<td>Items established by tables of organization and equipment (TOE) -- e.g., clothing, weapons, tools, spare parts, vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Petroleum, oils, and lubricants.</td>
<td>Fuel and lubricants, except aircraft and weapons fuel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIa</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aviation fuel and lubricants.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Construction materials.</td>
<td>Non-TOE items, such as fortification and construction materials and additional vehicles.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>Ammunition.</td>
<td>Ammunition, explosives and chemical agents of all types.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>Personal demand items.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>Major end items--includes tanks, helicopters, and radios.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII</td>
<td>Medical.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX</td>
<td>Repair parts and components for equipment maintenance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Nonstandard items to support nonmilitary programs such as agriculture and economic development.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure IV-1. US and NATO Classes of Supply**

- Relationships with and support to IOs, NGOs, and other nonmilitary organizations.
- Coordination with US non-DOD departments and agencies on logistic matters affecting the mission/operation.
- Applicability of existing NATO or ABCA standardization agreements to serve as a basis for quick development of standardized coalition logistic procedures.
- Requirements for infrastructure improvements within the operational area and funding arrangements for such improvements.
- Logistic-related items, such as landing rights, customs, taxes, and environmental issues, to be addressed in SOFAs and supporting TAs.
- Environmental considerations and hazardous material/waste treatment and removal.
• Up-front common funding authority and availability of funds.

• AT/FP measures for logistic sites and activities.

• In addressing these issues, US MNFCs must keep in mind cultural and religious aspects of multinational partners that could affect the operation (e.g., dietary preferences, physical characteristics, and religious taboos).

Appendix A provides a “Commander’s Checklist for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.”

b. US Commander’s Perspective. The US commander must be an early and active participant in the planning process, anticipate support requests, identify US support requirements, and be prepared to respond appropriately. Close and continuous coordination with the Joint Staff may also be necessary, especially when Secretary of Defense approval is required for US participation in a specific MNL support arrangement — for example, acceptance of RSN or LN responsibility. In cases where the US force commander is not “dual-hatted” as the MNFC, the following critical planning tasks should be addressed:

• Incorporate MNFC logistic guidance into US support plans.

• Coordinate US logistic planning with MNFC logistic planning and maintain continuous liaison.

• Determine sources of support from the host nation and theater support contractors and consult with other participating nations and the MNFC in identifying potential multinational support arrangements. (The United States must clearly identify the extent to which it can participate in multinational support arrangements.)

• Notify the MNFC as to the logistic supplies and services that the United States will make available to support other participants in the MNF and what limits there are on such support. (US logistic contributions to the MNF are approved by the Secretary of Defense and communicated to MNFC planning staffs.)

• If additional ACSA agreements are required, coordinate with designated negotiating authorities (generally the cognizant geographic combatant commander) and ensure that Service components identify points of contact and implementation procedures for this authority.

• Notify the MNFC regarding what logistic assets are available for possible redistribution.

• Notify the MNFC of relevant aspects of the US support plan in order to assist the MNFC in harmonizing support for the entire MNF.
Multinational Logistic Planning

- Coordinate closely with nations contributing forces to US “framework” units (divisions, brigades, air wings, maritime task forces) regarding support available from the framework unit and on what terms.

- Promulgate MNFC logistics policy, plans, and procedures to participating US units.

- Assemble databases from all available sources on logistic capabilities of non-US units operating within US framework units and with nations, including host nations, located in the operational area.

- Determine AT/FP requirements for US logistic forces, coordinate measures with the MNFC and host nations, and obtain clear specification of responsibilities of US forces, host nations, and other coalition participants.

- Review US legal authorities and notify the MNFC regarding any legal constraints that might have an impact on US participation in MNL activities.

Appendix A, “Commander’s Checklist for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations” and Appendix B, “Draft Multinational Logistics Annex to OPLAN” are provided to assist US commanders and logistic staffs prepare to participate in multinational operations.

3. Multinational Logistic Planning by Operational Phase

In every multinational operation, the MNFC needs to develop logistic plans for all phases of the campaign or major operation to address significant activities such as deployment, sustainment, and redeployment/termination. The text below provides notional examples of potential activities to be accomplished during a campaign or major operation.

For details on phasing in multinational operations, see JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.

a. Phase I: Deployment includes strategic movement from ports of embarkation (POEs) to PODs in the operational area and RSOI.

- Figure IV-2 lists key MNFC activities that should be addressed during the deployment planning phase. In the case of a US-led multinational operation, the MNFC must work with nations in developing DDPs in formats that can be incorporated into a single TPFDL. MNFC organizations involved in synchronizing the flow of forces must be kept up-to-date on conditions in the operational area that could disrupt force deployment. The MNFC must be kept informed on any changes in national deployment plans. To the extent that such changes impact on the MNFC’s concept of operations, alternative COAs must be developed for the commander’s approval. The resultant changes must be immediately communicated to all deploying forces.
KEY MULTINATIONAL FORCE COMMANDER TASKS DURING DEPLOYMENT PLANNING

- Assign Final Destination, Required Delivery Dates, Ports of Debarkation (PODs), and Deployment Routes to Deploying Formations, Based on the Commander’s Operational Plan.

- Provide Guidance to Participating Nations Regarding Modes of Transportation and Transportation Assets.


- Define the Command and Control Organization to Manage, Coordinate, and Control Force Deployment.

- Identify the Number and Type of Logisticians (Especially Contracting and Budget/Finance Personnel) to be Included as Part of the Enabling Force.

- Arrange Host-Nation Support (HNS) for Port Reception of Deploying Forces or Arrange for Lead Nation/Role Specialist Nation Operation of PODs.

- Arrange for Use of Host-Nation Transportation Infrastructure.

- Arrange HNS for Onward Movement or Arrange Contributions from Troop-Sending Nations of Transportation/Cargo Handling Assets to Support Onward Movement.


- Arrange for Such Support from the Host Nation or Theater Support Contractors

Figure IV-2. Key Multinational Force Commander Tasks During Deployment Planning
The US commander must perform the following in planning deployment of US forces in a multinational operation.

• Develop a DDP for US forces and coordinate with the MNFC in harmonizing the plan with other national deployment plans.

• Establish connectivity between US and MNFC deployment planning systems, e.g., the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and ADAMS.

• Identify requirements for reception and onward movement and coordinate with the MNFC and participating nations in planning multinational arrangements for the most operationally efficient provision of such support.

• Identify US logistic capabilities that are available to support deploying forces, if requested.

• Ensure FP of deploying US forces, including civilian contractor personnel accompanying the force.

b. **Phase II: Sustainment Operations.** In planning for sustainment, both US and other MNFCs and national commanders face a common challenge — how to be responsive in providing logistic support to mission forces while minimizing the logistic footprint in the operational area. Both the MNFC and US force commanders should plan for maximum feasible use of multinational arrangements to achieve both objectives.

The key tasks to be accomplished by US and other MNFCs during planning for this phase are shown in Figure IV-3. Planning by the MNFC for the sustainment phase requires a thorough understanding of the logistic support requirements and capabilities of participating nations. As part of this process, a methodology should be adopted for determining the ability of each nation to support its forces (whether through organic resources or other means). The MNFC (US or other nationality) needs to build trust and confidence with coalition MNF so that they will cooperate in this effort.

In planning for sustainment of US forces during a multinational operation, US commanders should do the following:

• Cooperate with the MNFC and other participating nations to take full advantage of opportunities for MNL in sustaining US forces.

• Coordinate with the MNFC in harmonizing US sustainment planning with multinational planning.

• Develop concepts for providing support to non-US elements assigned to US framework units and ensure available resources for multinational support.
c. Phase III: Redeployment/Termination

- **Redeployment.** In many respects, redeployment of forces from a multinational operation is the reverse of the deployment process, and therefore in planning redeployment, the MNFC and nations must address many of the same issues as in deployment. Redeployment, however, may pose additional planning problems that the MNFC and nations need to collectively address. Figure IV-4 lists key MNFC activities that should be addressed during the redeployment/termination planning phase.

- The MNF (personnel, equipment, and supplies) may have increased during the operation and there may be a requirement for rapid exit (e.g., to deploy to another crisis area) so that the JMC (or equivalent multinational movement coordination organization) needs to manage a more complex activity.
There could be a requirement to improve ports for redeployment but common funding may be reduced or depleted.

National forces may need to prepare vehicles and equipment to meet agricultural standards for return to their home base. Nations establish such standards, but the MNFC can assist nations in coordinating multinational support for the provision of such services from LNs or local contractors.

As nations redeploy, care needs to be given to protecting the environment. In close consultation with staff judge advocate or legal counsel, the MNFC issues policy and guidance on environmental protection. Nations must be prepared to continue extended operations simultaneously with partial redeployment. This is especially true with low density, high demand force capabilities.

**Termination.** The MNFC and nations collectively plan logistic activities relating to operation termination. A time-phased termination plan should be developed that addresses the following issues:

- Property accounting. For the multinational HQ, property must be accounted for and decisions made as to the disposition of excess property.

- Borrowed equipment and real estate/facilities must be returned to the host/owning nation.
• Environmental Matters. The MNFC implements guidance to conduct redeployment operations consistent with applicable laws, regulations, and agreements relating to environmental remediation. Under US law, regulation, and policy, the use of appropriated funds for such remediation is prohibited unless specifically authorized. Absent existing authority, it may be necessary for a US MNFC to obtain authority to negotiate and conclude an appropriate agreement.

• Equipment disposal. Participating countries may decide to dispose of property and equipment in the operational area. The MNFC issues guidance on the disposal of common-funded equipment. In addition, the MNFC issues guidance on property disposal activities by participating nations.

4. Transition Operations

Three kinds of transition operations involve special logistic planning issues for US commanders, whether as the US JFC or as the MNFC.

a. Transitioning from a US Joint Operation to a Multinational Operation. It is conceivable that the United States may find it necessary to initiate military action before an international consensus develops (such as Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia). Following the development of international support, a multinational operation, conducted by an alliance or a coalition, possibly under UN management, may be authorized.

• The main question for US logistic planners in such transitions is what role the United States will play in the logistic structure supporting the MNF. Since the United States may have an extensive logistic structure (including HNS agreements and contracts with local suppliers) already in place in the operational area, it may be asked to assume the lead role in the MNL organization — at least for a transition period. The senior US logistic commander may become the MNL director; US contracts and HNS agreements may become the vehicles for multinational agreements; and the United States may be asked to assume LN and RSN roles, perhaps using LOGCAP, AFCAP, and CONCAP contractors, for supporting the MNF.

• The extent to which the United States accepts logistic responsibilities for the MNF is decided by the Secretary of Defense. However, two conditions are critical for a smooth transition to multinational support:

  • The United States must have the proper legal arrangements (e.g., ACSAs) in place to provide logistic support to members of the deploying MNF.

  • Deploying forces must be prepared to reimburse the United States for logistic services rendered, unless other arrangements have been made.
b. **Transitioning from a UN Operation to Another Multinational Operation**

- In transitioning from a UN operation to another multinational operation, as in the transition from the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to NATO’s IFOR in Bosnia, the UN may remain the lead agency for humanitarian assistance within the operational area. In this case, the MNFC should be prepared, within capabilities, to consider requests for assistance from IOs and NGOs in accomplishing their humanitarian mission. A UN representative HQ organization should remain in the area and serve as the coordinating point of contact for possible assistance requests.

- The incoming MNFC should use the in-theater UN infrastructure/organizations to facilitate early development and establishment of the new MNF.

- Essential to the successful transition is the development of a cooperative environment between UN and the new MNF. If a UN military force/HQ is withdrawing from the operational area, the new MNF should negotiate the transfer of materiel and infrastructure/facilities with the UN commander as appropriate. This procedure would apply in reverse should a UN force relieve another MNF. In addition, agreements between the UN and the MNF are necessary to **coordinate the shared use of specified resources**. Claims relating to incidents occurring prior to the MNF assuming command of operations are the responsibility of the UN.
WHEN THERE IS NO TIME FOR DELIBERATE PLANNING:
OPERATION SEA ANGEL

Bangladesh has traditionally been one of nature’s favorite targets. Cyclone Marian struck this delta on the southeast coast during the evening of 29 April 1991 with winds in excess of 235 km/hr and tidal surges between 15 and 20 feet. Well over 100,000 people died and millions were left homeless. For the government of Bangladesh (GOB), the cyclone could not have come at a worse time. The young, inexperienced government faced serious problems. The combination of a poorly developed infrastructure and the havoc wreaked by the cyclone effectively cut off Chittagong for several days. Further, once relief supplies were brought to Chittagong, the GOB virtually had no means to distribute them to isolated islands off the coast where needs were most acute.

On 10 May 1991, the President directed the US military to provide humanitarian assistance. A Contingency Joint Task Force was immediately formed under the command of Lieutenant General Henry C. Stackpole. A US Navy Amphibious Task Force returning from the Persian Gulf war was redirected to Bangladesh.

The relief effort truly was an international operation. Besides the indigenous GOB forces and the international and local nongovernmental organization (NGO), several countries joined the United States in participating. The United Kingdom sent a supply ship with four helicopters. The Japanese government sent two helicopters. India, Pakistan, and China also provided assistance. Immediately upon his arrival in the capitol city of Dhaka, LtGen. Stackpole began an assessment of the situation.

LtGen. Stackpole proceeded to develop a Campaign Plan consisting of three phases. After initial survey, liaison, and reconnaissance, Phase I (one week) entailed initial stabilization of the situation (delivery of food, water, and medicine to reduce loss of life). Phase II (two weeks) entailed restoring the situation to the point where the Bangladesh government could take control of relief efforts. Phase III (two weeks) was the consolidation phase in which the Task Force would depart and the Bangladesh government would take complete control of all relief efforts.

In the final analysis, Operation SEA ANGEL proved to be unique in several respects. It was almost entirely sea-based, with no more than
To effect a smooth transition, working groups should be established at the appropriate levels to coordinate administrative, financial, and logistic matters.

A critical component of the transition is the reorganization, certification, and reflagging of possible UN units, including logistic forces, to the MNFC.

In the past, the United States, as a member of an alliance or coalition, has been called upon to plan for extracting UN peacekeeping forces from threatening situations, as was the case with UNPROFOR in the Balkans. In this kind of operation, normal logistic support for threatened UN forces would likely be disrupted and the United States might be required to support UN contingents during extraction operations.

c. Reduction of US Force Commitment in a Multinational Operation.

In supporting US National Security Strategy, US commands/Services may need to withdraw some or all of their forces from a multinational operation in order to execute other missions. US forces participating in a multinational operation must maintain sufficient flexibility in MNL arrangements, to the extent warranted by Secretary of Defense risk assessments, to be able to logistically disengage from the operation and to support redeployment to another operational area. MNFCs may also need to adapt their logistic plans to accommodate possible changes in US force contributions.

On the other hand, the US requirement for MNL arrangements may increase as the size of the US force contribution in an operation decreases. The same principle applies to the entire MNF, especially in peacekeeping operations, as the operation progresses and the size of the total force is reduced.

SOURCE: Paul A. McCarthy, Operation Sea Angel, a Case Study, RAND, 1994
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APPENDIX A
COMMANDER’S CHECKLIST FOR LOGISTIC SUPPORT OF
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. General

Logistic operations as described in this publication cover a wide spectrum of subjects. The checklist provided below offers the MNFC, the US JFC, and logisticians participating in multinational operations a tool for use in planning logistic support.

2. Planning

   a. Overall Mission-Force Organization-C2

   ____ What is the nature of the operation — its specific mission, the size of the force, national composition, and expected duration?

   ____ Under what authority is the operation being conducted? UN? NATO? National governments only?

   ____ Will a combined joint task force (CJTF) be formed? What assigned forces will be under OPCON of the CJTF commander or MNFC? How is “OPCON” understood by participating nations?

   ____ What is the overall C2 structure of the force?

   ____ Will the forces be organized along component or national lines?

   ____ Does the OPLAN provide a summary of the requirements, taskings, and concept of coalition operations that logistic planning must support?

   b. Overall Logistics Planning

   ____ Is the planning for the multinational operation underway concurrently by operation and logistic planners?

   ____ Has a JFC been designated to provide US input and interface with the multinational planning element, especially for logistics?

   ____ Will the US planning element represent both the operation and logistic communities?

   ____ Has the force logistical concept and requirements been determined and concisely stated?

   ____ Have logisticians assessed the feasibility and/or supportability and risks of the mission?
Appendix A

____ Have logistic policies, processes, and reporting procedures been established and promulgated throughout the force?

____ Is a listing available of national doctrinal, policy, and procedural publications appropriate to the level at which the plan is prepared? Are allied/coalition and joint service references included where applicable?

____ Have logistics-related assumptions been stated and are they realistic?

____ Has the MNFC identified financial responsibilities of all of the participants and developed reimbursement procedures for CUL support?

c. Logistic C2 Relationships and Organization

____ What is the logistic C2 organization for the operation? Will an MJLC or equivalent organization be established, or will the CJ-4 (and staff) manage and coordinate MNF logistics? If established, where will the MJLC be located in the C2 structure?

____ Has the multinational command structure been designed to eliminate unnecessary duplication of logistic functions?

____ Has the US structure been similarly aligned?

____ Are the responsibilities for support clearly stated for the following? Are they aligned with the correct authority?

• Supporting Command(s)

• Supported Command(s)

• HNS

• Other Services

• Coalition Partners

• NSE

____ What directive authority, if any, will the MNFC have over logistic support for the MNF? Will the MNFC have OPCON over any logistic units or resources?

____ Will the MNFC have “redistribution” authority over national logistic assets, and to what extent has the United States accepted such authority? What limits has the United States imposed on MNFC redistribution of US logistic assets?
Have coordinating centers been established for movement control, medical support, contracting, civil engineering, and logistic operations?

- Where will they be assigned?
- What authority will such centers have?

For non-US-led operations, what (if any) US logistic elements will be attached to multinational HQ?

For US-led operations, what plans exist for incorporating coalition partner staff into US logistic C2 and operational organizations? What arrangements have been made to facilitate integrating coalition personnel into US logistic organizations — e.g., introduction to US systems and procedures?

Have logistic supported and supporting command relationships been established or referred to higher HQ for resolution?

Will the US establish a NSE?

Will the mission of the US NSE be to support all US components or will there be separate NSEs for each US component of the MNF?

Will US NSE(s) have any responsibilities for providing support to non-US contingents?

Where will NSE(s) be located?

What US liaison elements are needed?

Does the US have a process to ensure that US liaison elements on multinational command staffs possess requisite authorities and have a full understanding of both US and multinational objectives?

What multinational liaison elements are needed, who will provide them, what qualifications should they have, and where will they go?

d. Logistic Communications and Information Systems

Has the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence system been established to rapidly disseminate to all participants, time sensitive logistic related information?

What automated logistic information planning tools are available to support COAs analysis and to assist the MNFC logistic staff in ensuring that operational priorities are
fully supported? Is a coalition logistic database available to support logistic planning? Are participating nations being encouraged to “populate” the database with up-to-date information that is usable by coalition logistic planners?

Are national logistic information systems interoperable, and workarounds or contingency measures being implemented to facilitate exchange of critical logistic information?

What mechanisms are in place to protect logistic information databases and communications systems to ensure continuous logistic support in case of cyber attack?

Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?

e. MNL Support Arrangements

What is the concept for using RSN, LN, and MILU arrangements for providing CUL support to the MNF? Have requirements for such arrangements been identified and particular nations, with the requisite capabilities, assigned the relevant responsibilities?

Has the US offered to assume RSN, LN, or MILU responsibilities? For what specific logistic functions and geographic area?

To what extent can the United States use external theater support contracting to provide logistic support to MNF contingents? What arrangements (legal and otherwise) need to be implemented to allow for such use of US external support contracting capabilities?

If multinational external theater support contracting programs have been previously established, can such capabilities be used to provide CUL in the planned operation?

Are the logistic capabilities of all participating nations — large and small — being fully leveraged through use of MNL arrangements to ensure the most operationally effective and efficient support of the MNF with the smallest logistics footprint?

Are smaller participating nations who have compatible equipment encouraged to link together to enhance mutual support?

What are the implications of planned MNL arrangements for the size and structure of US logistic forces assigned to the operation and the time-phased deployment of specific units?

Is there a requirement for a MNF-wide mutual support agreement to facilitate mutual support among all participating nations? Is the US able to participate in such an agreement?

What action is being taken to obtain waivers to US legal authorities to engage in mutual logistic support with other nations?
Commander’s Checklist for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations

____ What US element is charged to assure that the necessary ACSAs and related implementing agreements are in place with participants?

____ Does the US have an ACSA with each participating nation? If not, what will be the legal mechanism for exchanging logistic support?

____ What is the opportunity for the US to develop or use existing bilateral and multilateral agreements with allies involved in the operation?

____ To what extent do participating nations have open FMS cases with the United States to facilitate participating in US logistic support?

____ Is the MNFC aware of existing agreements among participating nations in the form of bilateral or multilateral arrangements, funding, and training?

f. Logistic Capabilities/Certification

____ What level of sustainment stocks is mandated by the MNFC to maintain in the operational area? What level should US forces maintain?

____ Are forces — MNF and US — sufficiently robust “logistically” to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?

____ Have standards regarding logistic capabilities been established and what organization will inspect and ascertain compliance with logistic-related standards prior to deployment?

____ Does the MNFC logistic staff possess the requisite information regarding participant logistic capabilities in order to properly coordinate MNF logistics? Are there measures the MNFC staff can take to assist nations in ameliorating any logistic deficiencies?

____ Is there a requirement for a formal logistic certification process and, if so, how can it be conducted with maximum cooperation and understanding among participating nations?

g. Managing Allocation of HNS

____ What are the MNF requirements for logistic support provided from sources in the operational area?

____ What infrastructure and other host nation logistic resources are available in the operational area to meet MNF requirements?

____ What defense articles and services is the host nation willing to provide and under what reimbursement conditions, and what resources must be procured through contracts with local providers?
Appendix A

___ How is HNS provision and allocation to be managed and coordinated? Is the MNFC authorized by nations to negotiate HNS agreements on behalf of nations and to prioritize allocation?

___ Have the appropriate coordination channels been established with the host nation to ensure timely provision of HNS where it is most needed? Have the US and other MNF nations established liaison teams in the MNFC HQ and at key HNS locations to coordinate the provision of HNS to national contingents?

___ What HNS agreements do the United States and other MNF nations already have in place with host nations? How are pre-existing bilateral HNS arrangements to be integrated into a total MNF HNS structure?

___ Have MNF nations agreed on a policy for reconciling conflicts in HNS allocation among nations?

h. Contracting

___ Is the MNFC authorized to coordinate contracting in the operational area in order to ensure that priorities are efficiently supported?

___ What organization within the MNFC HQ will manage this process?

___ What are the MNF contracting policies and process?

___ Is a “restricted items list” required to manage contracting for scarce resources in the operational area?

___ Will the MJLC or equivalent organization be required to negotiate contracts for the entire MNF? If so, have participating nations assigned requisite personnel to the MNF contracting center?

___ To what extent does the US plan to use external theater contracting during the operation?

___ Who will manage this process?

___ Will there be a single MNF manager for external theater support contracting to include HNS, LOGCAP, AFCAP, and other contractor support?

___ Who will be the US manager to interface into this process?

___ Has the US identified the main point of contact of contractor personnel, including both theater and external theater support contractors?
i. Common Funding

____ Will common funding be available to support multinational common costs and expenditures?

____ Has it been determined if or to what extent operational-related expenses will be reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by the participating nations?

____ Has the United States identified funding to support operations and/or to provide reimbursement of expenditures from existing budgets?

j. SOFAs/TAs

____ Who is responsible for negotiating a SOFA with the host nation(s), including transited nations? What is the status of SOFA negotiations?

____ Who is responsible for negotiating the TAs to supplement the SOFA?

____ What logistics-related issues/items need to be addressed in the SOFA and TA(s)? For example, are US and other national contractors properly included as part of the MNF for purposes of SOFA rights and obligations?

____ What US elements are participating in these negotiations?

____ Has the appropriate authority been delegated to the MNFC to negotiate and conclude with multinational partners agreements deemed necessary to conduct the planned operation?

k. Relations with NGOs, IOs, and Local Populations

____ How will MNF logistic HQ coordinate with NGOs and IOs? Will a CMOC be established for this purpose?

____ What MNF logistic organizational element is authorized as the main point of contact with IOs and NGOs?

____ What efforts have been made to obtain logistics-related information from IOs and NGOs operating in the area and to take advantage of their knowledge and contacts in the operational area?

____ What efforts have been made to coordinate activities with such organizations to reduce competition for local resources, enhance operational efficiency, and eliminate redundancy in operations?
Appendix A

____ What is the MNF concept for providing logistic support for the restoration of local government and other civil-military activities? What are the MNF and US logistic requirements to support local populations?

____ What is the MNF concept for assisting local governments and populations through acquisition of local goods and services?

1. Engineering

____ What is the MNF concept for civil engineering? How will MNF engineering activities be coordinated? Through what organization?

____ Have required projects been identified that benefit the entire MNF (e.g., bridge and main supply route construction)?

____ What resources will be used to execute these projects? Who will provide the resources?

____ To what extent are HNS and theater contracting resources available for such projects?

m. Demining

____ What is MNF demining plan?

____ What are the logistic support requirements for that plan?

n. Health Services Support

____ What is the MNF concept for medical support? What level of capability are nations required to provide their forces in the operational area? What medical policy and guidance has been issued to participating nations?

____ What organizational element will coordinate health services support for the MNF during the operation? Have nations identified skilled personnel to staff the multinational medical coordination center?

____ Are there any existing HSS agreements among participating nations or with host nations? What opportunities exist for multinational arrangements to consolidate and rationalize medical support in the operational area? Have LN and RSN health service responsibilities been assigned to nations? Is there role for multinational integrated medical units?

____ What medical supplies and services can the United States offer to provide MNF contingents? Has the US JFC notified the MNF CMO of all US legal restrictions that pertain to providing medical support to other nations’ personnel and the terms and conditions of such support?
Commander’s Checklist for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations

- What restrictions apply to US acceptance of medical support from other countries?
- What is the quality of the health service capability in the operational area?
- To what extent does US intend to contribute to and use a MNF Blood Bank?
- Is there any plan for the US forces to develop an Initial Preplanned Supply Support package?
- What are the approved commercial sources of medical products?
- Are medical facilities identified to support the operation? What is the status of evacuation plans, both intra- and intertheater?
- To what extent will US strategic medical evacuation capabilities be required to support the MNF?
- What is the MNF and US theater medical evacuation policy?
- What is the process of reimbursement between US and multinational partners regarding the provision and receipt of medical assistance, including medical evacuation?
- Have necessary provisions been made to allow rendering of such health support to foreign forces?

  o. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Threats
- Are chemical weapon threats known and are US and MNF medical facilities prepared to cope with their possible use?
- What plans does the US and the MNF have to decontaminate personnel and materiel?
- To what extent will the MNF and the US need to provide such support to local civilian population?

  p. Graves Registration
- Are graves registration and mortuary procedures in place to service multinational casualties to include recognition of culture differences in dealing with casualties?

  q. Prisoner of War (POW) Management
- What is the MNF plan to handle and care for POW’s? US plan and role?
- What will be POW turn-over procedures and to what nation?
Appendix A

r. AT/FP

____ What guidance has the MNFC issued regarding FP?

____ What arrangements have been made with host nations and coalition members for FP, especially in rear areas?

____ What FP, if any, will be provided by HN and/or coalition partners to US forces, and what FP will the US be required to provide other national contingents of the MNF?

____ Will there be a lead rear area security coordinator? What are the responsibilities of logistic units to provide local security and to coordinate with the lead rear area security organization?

____ What element is responsible for FP planning?

____ What element will be responsible to identify FP threats?

____ Has munitions site planning been conducted?

____ Have munitions control/security procedures been established?

s. Environmental Hazardous Waste

____ Has the staff legal office been consulted regarding applicable host nation and other environmental law?

____ What is the higher authority guidance regarding environmental law and policy issues?

____ What legal restrictions apply, if any, including the restrictions on the use of appropriated funds or the requirement to notify the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, OSD, or Congress?

____ What, if any, MNFC guidance should be promulgated?

____ Has an environmental checklist been prepared for use by contingents in assuming responsibility for in-theater facilities?

____ What are the applicable host nation and other laws and policies relative to the handling, movement, storage, and disposal of hazardous material?

3. Deployment

____ What automated system will be used to establish and execute the TPFDL?
Commander’s Checklist for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations

____ What will be the US contribution to strategic lift of forces other than US?

____ Has the deployment plan deconflicted NGO/IO and contractor transportation requirements in order to avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure?

____ What LOCs are to be established?

____ What will be the responsibilities assigned relative the LOCs from reception to in-theater destinations?

____ What en route support will national elements require?

____ What role will the multinational HQ play vis-a-vis the sending nations with regard to external en route support?

____ What is the MNF requirements determination process for flowing the MNF forces into the theater?

____ Has a MNF TPFDD/TPFDL been established? What is the method of insertion of forces into the theater?

____ Is there a need for a logistics over-the-shore operation? If so is that identified in a separate plan?

____ What is the MNF plan to manage the flow of force into the operational area for the MNFC?

____ What will be the US management and operational responsibilities to support deployment?

____ What is the MNF plan to use US strategic lift capability to support deployment?

____ What will be the reception ports of entry (to include border crossing points) into the operational area?

____ What are MNF security arrangements for the POEs/PODs?

____ What LOCs will be used?

____ What is the plan to manage use of the LOCs?

____ What LOC will the US use?

____ What will be the US responsibilities for that LOC?
What is MNF reception, staging and onward movement plan to include en route support for US forces?

Has the MNFC selected and allocated staging areas and tactical unit assembly areas?

What staging areas and tactical assembly areas have been allocated by the MNFC for US use?

What MNF agreements have been made for en route support of deploying forces to include the US?

Is the MNFC obtaining clearances for MNF elements transiting en route nations?

What is the MNF security plan for reception points in objective area?

What is the MNF plan for coordinating IO and NGO movement into the operational area?

What is the process to manage road and rail movement into and out of the theater?

Who has that management responsibility?

Who will be the US manager of that flow?

What are the reception requirements for the force moving by these modes?

Who has highway regulation and control responsibility?

Have custom and border clearances been planned for? Obtained? By whom?

What HNS will be available, if any, to support US forces deploying into the operational area?

What MNFC and US logistic capabilities need to be deployed very early?

What initial assets has the MNFC identified as requiring visibility during deployment?

Does the US agree to provide such visibility to MNFC? To what extent will this information be shared with other MNF participants?

What is the mechanism and frequency of reporting such information?

Is there an FP plan covering force deployment?
4. Termination/Redeployment

The checklist for deployment also applies in large measure to the redeployment process. The following represent some additional issues associated with termination and redeployment.

____ Has the end state, exit strategy and redeployment plan been developed by the MNFC?

____ What is the status of the US redeployment plan?

____ Has the redeployment TPFDD and TPFDL been developed and validated?

____ What are the host nation and US customs/agriculture requirements?

____ Have the US Customs and Border Clearance agencies, particularly the US Department of Agriculture, been contracted to determine requirements for returning cargo and passengers?

____ If articles are left in theater, what are the procedures for transferring or disposing of those articles?

____ What US forces, equipment and materiel will remain in theater?

____ What are the support requirements for this force?

____ What MNF forces and materiel will remain in place?

____ What is the MNF plan to dispose of excess or unusable or equipment where transportation costs exceed new purchase costs?

____ What is the MNF plan for disposal of hazardous items?

____ What is the MNF FP plan for withdrawing forces?

____ What logistic support will be required for withdrawal?

____ What is the MNF close-out plan for facilities? Does it include a checklist for environmental issues?

____ What will be the role of LOGCAP, AFCAP, and CONCAP during US withdrawal?

____ What is the estimated cost for facility restoration?

____ Who will pay for the restoration? US or common-funding?

____ What is the plan to dispose of equipment procured through MNF resources?
Appendix A

5. Transition Considerations

____ What is the destination for US equipment?

____ What are the equipment readiness standards to be met before being redeployed?

____ Where will withdrawing equipment be brought to standards? Are facilities adequate for the task?

____ Have standards been established for equipment being relocated?

____ Are there applicable accounting procedures for reporting financial expenditures and have reimbursement procedures been initiated?

____ Is a transitional plan available to facilitate deployment and operational assumption of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency or alliance?

____ Will the United States be asked to provide additional logistic resource or units to support the operation?

____ To what extent can other participating nations provide logistic resources that will reduce the US logistic contribution to the operation?

____ To what extent have the additional logistic requirements of the operation been rationalized given the increased scope of the operation?

____ To what extent has the logistic structure been identified to meet logistic requirements above the maneuver unit level, e.g., corps or theater-level logistic units.

____ How will the US JTF C2 structure be affected? Will the US assume command of the operation?

____ If the US is to lead the operation, to what extent will its C2 organization be augmented by personnel from other participating nations?

____ Will a MNFC be established to coordinate logistic support for the operation?

____ What degree of authority for logistics will be given for the operation?

____ How will costs of the operation be apportioned amongst participating members?

____ To what degree will up-front common funding be made available and for what uses?
Is there a need to develop MOAs to formalize relations among the participating nations? Is there authority to negotiate and conclude such agreements? Have appropriate MOAs been developed?

What modifications are necessary to existing SOFAs and TAs to accommodate forces from the additional countries? Is there authority to negotiate and conclude such agreements?

What agreements are necessary to permit the redistribution of logistic resources during emergency conditions? Is there authority to negotiate and conclude such agreements? Have all participating nations agreed to those provisions?

To what extent will US logistic policies and procedures be changed to satisfy either UN or regional alliance policies and procedures?

Have logistic policies, procedures, processes, and reporting requirements been identified and promulgated?

Has the ability of transferred units to support themselves and/or logistic deficiencies been identified?

If a NATO operation, to what extent and in what areas will NATO STANAGS be used?

Will the participating nations provide logistically robust units that are self-sufficient?

To what extent can existing contracts supporting US forces be amended to support the additional forces?
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This appendix comprises two examples of formats for the Logistics Annex to a multinational OPLAN. The first example represents the format specified in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3122.03A, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume 1, Planning Policies Procedures*, which would apply to a US-led multinational operation. The second example represents a notional format for a Logistics Annex for a NATO or other non-US led multinational operation. The notional multinational format is provided to acquaint US logistic planners with an alternate format that they may encounter while planning to participate in possible non-US-led multinational operations. Logistics planning information applicable only to US forces participating in a multinational operation would be contained in the Logistics Annex to a separate US-only OPLAN.

Example (1): LOGISTICS ANNEX (Annex D) TO OPLAN FOR US-LED MULTINATIONAL OPERATION

REFERENCES

1. SITUATION

   a. Enemy. See separate Intelligence OPLAN annex (Annex B).

   b. Friendly. Lists allies/coalition partners and the specific tasks assigned to each, as well as NGOs not subordinate to the operation’s command.

   c. Assumptions. Statement of valid and necessary assumptions.

   d. Resource Availability. Identification of significant competing demands for logistic resources at the strategic and operational level where expected requirements may exceed resources. Describes recommended solutions within resources available for planning, including use of reasonably-assured HNS.

   e. Planning Factors. Statement of approved multinational planning factors.

2. MISSION. Statement of the “essential” tasks to be accomplished as it relates to the overall MNF mission.

3. EXECUTION

   a. Concept of Logistic Support. Statement of the overall concept of logistic support, limited to overarching logistics guidance and intent. This can include delineation of logistics C2, to include use of centralized coordination/management activities and establishment/coordination with NSEs; MNFC’s general logistic authorities, including use of coordinating and redistribution
authority; delineation of national and multinational support; guidance on logistic forces in the operational area; reliance on HNS and theater/external theater contracting support; delineation and focus of effort by phase, etc.

b. Tasks

(1) Statement of logistic support responsibilities of the MNFC and participating nations and support required from other US/national/multinational commands.

(2) Assigned support responsibilities of joint/combined centers, offices, and boards, such as those for transportation and procurement of CUL supplies, and others providing services to the MNF (reference JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations).

c. Force Protection. Statement of MNF FP policy and responsibilities regarding logistic activities in the operational area. Refer to overall operation policy and guidance in separate OPLAN annex.

4. ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT

a. Logistics. Includes discussion of specific support concepts for various classes of supply and services that delineates policy, requirements, tasks, and responsibilities of nations and the MNF by phase of operation and use of MNL support arrangements, such as RSN, LN, and MILUs.

(1) Supply and Distribution. Includes summary discussion of supply and distribution policies and arrangements, including relevant multinational considerations (e.g., use of MNL arrangements and any conditions relevant to the provision of CUL). Detailed discussion and lists of supply depots, terminals and LOCs are included in appendixes or tabs.

   (a) Distribution and Allocation.

   1. Main and alternate supply depots or points and supporting terminals to be used or considered.

   2. Pre-positioned logistic resource allocation.

   3. Existing terminals and LOCs, and the known or estimated throughput capability. Indicate the time-phased expansion necessary to support the plan.

   (b) Level of Supply.

   1. Time-phased operating stockage objectives and safety levels required to support the plan.
2. Pre-positioned war reserve materiel requirements to support the time-phased deployments pending resupply.

3. Significant special arrangements, including multinational mutual support arrangements, required for materiel support beyond normal supply procedures.

4. Shortfalls/overages resulting from comparison of requirements and assets estimated to be available (from logistic reports submitted by participating nations).

5. Specify when resupply for materiel support is scheduled to begin and describe MNFC guidance/procedures for establishing resupply.

(c) Salvage. Instructions for, and logistic impact of, the collection, classification, and disposition of salvage. Identifies possible use of RSN/LN arrangements for salvage operations.

(d) Captured Enemy Materiel. Instructions for the collection, classification, and disposition of enemy materiel.

(e) Local Acquisition of Supplies and Services. (US activities are governed by Federal Acquisition Regulations, JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, and DOD Instruction 3020.37, Continuation of Essential DOD Contractor Services During Crisis.)

1. Identify acquisition of goods and services in the following categories:

   a. The general categories of materiel and services that are available and contemplated as a supplement to regular sources.

   b. Those that may be used as emergency acquisition.

2. Assessment of the dependability of the local acquisition or labor source in each of the above categories and the joint/combined element that will obtain or manage the resources.

3. Contracted CUL services (existing or new) that are required to support plan execution and identify the existence of contingency plans to ensure the continuation of these services.

4. “Restricted” supplies and services, if any, whose contracted acquisition by participating units must be coordinated with the MNFC HQ.
5. Multinational agreements or contracting vehicles (e.g., MNFC negotiated BOAs) as well as relevant national authorities (e.g., ACSAs) that provide for the acquisition and transfer of logistic support, supplies, and services, between the MNF and governments of eligible countries.

(f) Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants (POL). Specify any multinational arrangements (e.g., use of RSN arrangements) for provision of CUL POL. Refer to JP 4-03, Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine, and more specific discussion in separate appendix.

(g) Inter-Service Logistic Support. (In a combined/multinational OPLAN this paragraph will be limited to discussion of any multinational inter-Service support arrangements, e.g., offshore provision of bulk POL by multinational naval forces to army forces.)

(h) Mortuary Affairs. Although mortuary affairs are usually a national responsibility, the US may undertake such responsibilities for other countries. Refer to separate appendix on Mortuary Affairs, or, if not used, indicate the mortuary affairs activities applicable to the plan and policy for providing these affairs. Address cultural issues applicable to the composition of the MNF.

(i) Nonnuclear Ammunition. Discuss any pertinent points, including multinational arrangements, and refer to separate appendix, if necessary.

(2) Maintenance and Modification. Discuss any pertinent points, including any MNFC guidance and possible use of multinational arrangements.

(3) Medical Services. Reference JP 4-02, Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations, series and separate OPLAN annex (Annex Q). Includes statement of plan for collection and medical treatment of sick, injured or wounded personnel, prisoners of war, and civilians. Discusses support requirements for combat health support logistics to include blood management, combat stress control, preventive medicine, dental services, and veterinary service.

(a) Evacuation. Describes inter- and intratheater evacuation policy and procedures for obtaining both from theater assets. Identifies fixed evacuation sites on service support matrix and overlay.

(b) Hospitalization. Defines levels (1 thru 5) of health service support available in the theater and procedures for casualty admittance to hospitals. Give respective levels of multinational medical care available in theater.

(4) Mobility and Transportation. See the JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, series.

(a) General. Provides general planning guidance to nations participating in the MNF to assist in their planning functions.
(b) **Mobility Support Force and Transportation Feasibility Analysis.** Provides an estimate of the multinational mobility support and transportation feasibility of the plan (based on nationally developed deployment plans). Discusses items of significance discerned during the feasibility analysis that affect mobility and transportation tasks. Considers the availability of adequate lift resources, airfield reception capabilities, seaport and aerial port terminal capabilities, port throughput capabilities and other requirements for joint and combined RSOI. Also, assesses any features that will adversely affect movement operations, such as the effect of deployment or employment of forces and materiel on airfield ramp space (to include possible HNS).

(5) **Civil Engineering Support Plan.** Indicates the civil engineering support activities applicable to the plans and the policies for providing these services, including reliance on multinational support arrangements (such as use of engineering MILUs) and use of common funding, if applicable, for acquisition of Class IV materiel.

(6) **Sustainability Assessment.** Refer to separate appendix that provides guidance on preparing a MNL sustainability assessment for the OPLAN. Completion of such an assessment depends on the willingness of participating nations to provide relevant information on their support requirements and available logistic support capabilities.

(7) **Security Assistance.** (This paragraph may be omitted from a multinational OPLAN because security assistance is usually a bilateral matter and beyond the MNFC’s purview.)

(8) **Logistics Automation for Deployment, Force Tracking, and Sustainment General Guidance.** States policy and guidance and delineates the conceptual approach for MNL automation support for the MNF. Discusses facilities, networks, and frequency management policies. More detailed discussion may be included in a separate appendix.

(9) **Operations Security (OPSEC) Planning Guidance for Logistics.** Provides comprehensive guidance for ensuring OPSEC of logistic activities. May indicate restrictions on use of US-only information systems or facilities.

b. **Administration.** Includes general administrative guidance to support MNF logistic operations (under the MNFC’s purview) for the Basic Plan. Specify requirements for logistic reports, including time, methods and classification of submission. May require a separate appendix describing detailed report formats.

### 5. COMMAND AND CONTROL

a. **Command Relationships.** Refer to separate OPLAN annex (Annex J) for command relationships external to logistic units. Describes C2 relationships relating to MNF logistic organizations, including the MJLC and national logistic units placed under OPCON of the MNFC; location and use of logistic liaison officers; and coordination with NSEs. Designates the component that is responsible for C2 of ports and terminals. C2 of the RSOI mission for specific LOCs must also be delineated.
b. **Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems.** Refer to separate OPLAN annex (Annex K) for detailed command, control, communications, and computers requirements. Provides a general statement of the scope and type of communications required.

Typical Appendixes to Logistics Annex D will include:
1 — Petroleum, Oils, and Lubricants Supply
2 — Water Supply
3 — Mortuary Affairs
4 — Sustainability Analysis
5 — Mobility and Transportation
6 — Civil Engineering Support Plan
7 — Nonnuclear Ammunition
8 — Logistics Automation
9 — Logistics Reports
Example (2): NOTIONAL LOGISTICS ANNEX TO OPLAN FOR NON-US-LED MULTINATIONAL OPERATION

REFERENCES

1. GENERAL

2. SITUATION

   a. Friendly Supporting Activities.
   
   b. Resource Availability.

3. ASSUMPTIONS

4. MISSION (or LOGISTIC OBJECTIVES)

5. CONCEPT OF LOGISTIC OPERATIONS. (General Description)

   a. General Support Concept.
   
   b. Logistic Command and Control.
   
   c. Logistic Responsibilities of MNFC and Contributing Nations.
   
   d. Lines of Communications.
   
   e. HNS Support Concept.
   
   f. NGO Participation and Coordination.
   
   g. General Concept for Other Key Logistic Functions.
   
   h. Key Logistic Tasks by Phase of Operation.

6. TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES. (Detailed Description)

   a. Logistic Responsibilities of MNFC and Subordinate Organizational Elements.
   
   b. Logistic Responsibilities of lead nations and role specialist nations.
   
   c. Logistic Responsibilities of Contributing Nations and other Troop Commanders.
7. MATERIEL AND SERVICES. (Detailed description of specific support concepts for various classes of supply and services that delineate policy, requirements, tasks and responsibilities of nations and MNFC by phase of operation, and MNL support arrangements. Those functions that require significant MNFC coordination — e.g., movement control, medical support, civil engineering, and contracting — are discussed in separate sections or appendices.)

a. GENERAL CONCEPT AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) Role of NSEs, Coordination Between NSEs and MNF Organizations.

(2) Supplies and Services Provided Multinationally.

(3) Role of Contracting.

(4) Days of Supply, National Stockage Objectives, Storage and Transshipment.

b. SUPPLY. (Specific concepts for each class of supply, emphasizing the MNL support aspects, where applicable. List may reflect US 10-class system, NATO’s 5-class system, or some other. Types of items included in each category should be clearly indicated.)

(1) Class I: Rations, Water, Ice

(2) Class II: General Supplies

(3) Class III: Fuel and Lubricants

(4) Class IV: Construction Materials

(5) Class V: Ammunition

(6) Class VI: Personal Demand Items

(7) Class VII: Major End Items

(8) Class VIII: Medical

   (a) Class VIII-b, Blood and blood products

(9) Class IX: Spare Parts

(10) Class X: Nonstandard items to support nonmilitary programs

c. SERVICES
(1) Maintenance

(2) Laundry and Bath

(3) Refuse Collection and Disposal

(4) Toxic Waste Disposal

(5) Mortuary Affairs

(6) Facilities

(7) Moral, Welfare, Recreation

(Functions that require significant MNFC coordination are described in the following notional separate sections.)

8. TRANSPORTATION AND MOVEMENT CONTROL

9. MEDICAL SUPPORT AND EVACUATION

10. CIVIL ENGINEERING

11. CONTRACTING. (Including Restricted Items List considerations.)

12. FUNDING SUPPORT. (Especially emphasizing the availability, use, and accountability of common funding.)

13. HOST-NATION SUPPORT

14. ENVIRONMENT. (Including provisions for the handling and transport of hazardous material and waste.)

15. ADMINISTRATION AND PERSONNEL

16. LOGISTIC REPORTING

17. LOGISTIC COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIPS

18. FORCE PROTECTION

19. CONTINGENCY PLANS
Appendix B

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APPENDIX C
RELEVANT LEGAL AUTHORITIES FOR US LOGISTIC SUPPORT IN
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. General

This appendix describes the general features associated with implementing agreements and financial requirements of the key legal authorities for MNL operations. As noted in Chapter III, “Multinational Logistic Support Arrangements,” US combatant commanders may not enter into MNL support arrangements without specific legal authority and prior negotiation of appropriate agreements. These legal authorities differ significantly in terms of required conditions, type of permitted support, and implementation procedures. A complete description of the relevant statutes and associated DOD implementation procedures may be found in the applicable DOD directives cited in Appendix E, “References.”

2. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement Authority

a. General Description. The ACSA authority, 10 USC 2341-2350, originally enacted as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Mutual Support Act (NMSA) of 1979 (Pub.L.No. 96-323), was developed to facilitate reciprocal logistic support. The ACSA legislation provides authority for US forces to perform the following two legally distinct, although not entirely separate, functions:

- Acquire logistic support from foreign sources.
- Exchange logistic support with multinational partners through cross-servicing agreements.

Among other things, the ACSA authority waives selected provisions of US contracting law and prescribes ordering and reimbursement procedures that are more flexible than those permitted under other authorities, such as the Arms Export Control Act. The type of logistic support that may be acquired or transferred under the ACSA is broadly defined; it includes food, billeting, transportation (including airlift), POL, clothing, medical and communications services, ammunition, base operations support (and construction incident to base operations support), storage services, use of facilities, training services, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance services, and air and sea port services.

Items that may not be acquired or transferred under ACSA authority include weapon systems (except for temporary use of general purpose vehicles and other items of military equipment not designated as significant military equipment on the United States Munitions List promulgated pursuant to 22 USC 2778 (a)(1)), guided missiles, naval mines and torpedoes, nuclear ammunition, cartridge and aircrew escape propulsion system components, chaff and chaff dispensers, guidance kits for bombs and other ammunition, and chemical ammunition (other than riot control agents).
Appendix C

b. **Implementation.** Acquisition-only authority does not require the existence of a cross-
servicing agreement or an implementing arrangement (IA), but should only be used when no
applicable ACSA exists. US MNFCs or other elements of Armed Forces of the United States
supporting the US MNFC must obtain approval from the appropriate combatant command.
Acquisition-only transactions document the terms and condition of the specific acquisition
transaction. Exchanges of logistic support (which include both acquisition and provision of
support) require the prior negotiation of a bilateral ACSA and IA in the form of an ACSA
between the DOD and the foreign nation’s armed forces. The IA will contain specific procedures
for the execution of transfers under the ACSA, especially Service-specific or geographic-specific
procedures. In consultation with the Secretary of State, DOD has the authority to negotiate
ACSA. For approved countries and organizations, this negotiating authority has been delegated
to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who has further delegated it to geographic combatant
commanders, who may redelegate the authority to Service component commanders. Countries
or international organizations that are not pre-approved as ACSA-eligible require consultation
with the Secretary of State and advance congressional notification prior to negotiation of an
ACSA. Further, prior to concluding an agreement that has been negotiated, further consultation
with the State Department is necessary. Parties eligible to conclude ACSAs with the United
States include the governments of NATO countries, NATO subsidiary organizations, the United
Nations organization or any regional organization of which the US is a member, and other
nations designated by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Secretary of State.

c. **Financial Requirements.** A key ACSA provision is the range of reimbursement options
permitted for logistic exchanges: payment in cash, replacement in kind, or replacement by supplies
or services of equal value. Furthermore, the terms of reimbursement may be negotiated by the
US and foreign parties on a transaction-by-transaction basis. That is, the providing party (which
determines the form of reimbursement) may require cash reimbursement in one exchange
transaction but accept replacement in kind or replacement of equal value in another.

3. **Cooperative Military Airlift Agreements**

a. **General Requirements.** CMAA, 10 USC section 2350c, provides authority for US
forces to acquire or exchange airlift support from foreign sources and/or coalition partners in
combined exercises, training, deployments, operations, other cooperative efforts, and unforeseen
circumstances or emergencies. The Secretary of Defense has delegated to the Commander,
USTRANSCOM the authority to negotiate and conclude CMAAs; the Commander,
USTRANSCOM has delegated to AMC the authority to negotiate such agreements, retaining
the authority to conclude CMAAs.

b. **Implementation.** The CMAA itself normally sets forth the terms, conditions, and
procedures to be followed by the United States and the allied country involved. Operational,
financial, and other detailed procedures may be included in a technical annex or appendix to the
CMAA. No additional agreements are required.

c. **Financial Requirements.** Section 2350c states that the rate of reimbursement for
transportation shall be the same for each party and not less than the rate charged to military
forces of the United States. Credits and liabilities may be liquidated as agreed upon between the parties, either by in-kind transportation services or by direct payment. The liquidation must occur on a regular basis, but not less often than once every 12 months. CMAAs may not be used by allied countries to transport defense articles purchased under the AECA at less than the full rate of reimbursement that is equal to the cost of transportation (see paragraph 4 below).

4. Arms Export Control Act

a. General Description

- The AECA of 1976, 22 USC 2751-2796, was developed primarily to manage and regulate the sales of major weapons systems and associated support and training to foreign countries or IOs, but it can and has been used as the authority for transfers of logistic support. Among other things, the AECA provides authority for the following:

  - Sales of defense articles or services from existing DOD stocks.
  - Sales of defense articles or services from new procurement managed by DOD.
  - Sale of DOD design or construction services.

- Collectively, these government-to-government sales of defense articles or services are known as FMS. The AECA imposes restrictions on the type of articles and services that can be transferred, and contains specific provisions regarding purchaser eligibility, third country retransfers, congressional notification/certification, and reporting. However, most of these restrictions apply to sales of high cost, high technology weapons systems; few apply to FMS made in support of US MNL obligations.

b. Implementation. All sales under the AECA must be documented in formal government-to-government agreements, known as LOAs. LOAs are generally initiated, negotiated, and implemented by the materiel and logistic commands of the Military Departments and reviewed and approved by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency; the geographic combatant commands (and their components) have little formal role in these processes. The negotiation of LOAs required to fulfill US MNL responsibilities can be time-consuming, particularly when many nations expect to receive support through FMS at the same time. In some cases this process may take 60 to 90 days.

c. Financial Requirements. The AECA requires advance payment in US dollars for all FMS transactions. For US and multinational commanders, this requirement means that US logistic support authorized in an FMS case cannot be provided until the recipient makes the agreed-on deposit in the United States. The advance payment requirement means that no appropriated US funds are involved in the transfer of support under the AECA. Thus, such transfers would not be affected by any DOD authorization or appropriation act provisions regulating logistic transfers involving the use of appropriated funds, such as those under the ACSA.
5. Foreign Assistance Act

    a. General Description. The FAA of 1961, 22 USC 2151-2349aa-9, contains a broad range of authorities to provide financial aid or sell/transfer free of charge military goods or services to foreign countries or IOs. Although less important for MNL operations than the ACSA and AECA, two provisions of the FAA are important: Section 506 (22 USC 2318) drawdowns and Section 607 (22 USC 2357) reimbursable sales.

    Section 506(a)(1) provides authority to the President, on determining that an unforeseen emergency requiring immediate military aid to a country or IO exists, to direct the drawdown of existing DOD articles and services for transfer to a foreign country or IO. The value of DOD articles and services provided under this authority will be limited in the drawdown determination, and the drawdown equipment or supplies must come from existing stocks; no new procurement is authorized. Additionally, Section 506 authorizes drawdowns from DOD inventory or resources specifically for support of counterdrug, disaster relief, and migrant and refugee assistance. The second authority, Section 607 of the FAA, allows any US Government department (including DOD) to provide commodities and services to friendly foreign nations or IOs on an advance-of-funds or reimbursable basis. The agency providing support under Section 607 may also contract with nongovernmental personnel to assist in providing that support.

    b. Implementation. Section 506 drawdowns will be issued by a Presidential Determination. However, support under Section 607 is usually provided under an agreement (known as a Section 607 agreement) negotiated between the intended foreign recipient of logistic support and the US State Department. The agreement defines the general terms and conditions for any US Government support for an individual country or specific UN mission. A signed 607 agreement expresses the State Department’s policy approval for providing US support to a country or UN mission but does not commit the DOD to honor every UN support request. It does, however, eliminate the requirement for State Department review of individual support requests. Within the DOD, any Section 607 support that is to be managed through security assistance channels (generally equipment leases and repair parts provided by Military Department materiel commands) will be implemented through an LOA.

    c. Financial Requirements. Section 506 does not require reimbursement for the provided equipment, supplies, or services, but it does require the DOD to closely monitor the value of stocks and training drawdown to ensure that the annual cap is not exceeded. The act authorizes supplemental appropriations to reimburse the providing DOD component for drawdowns but such appropriations require separate congressional action. By contrast, Section 607 requires the foreign country or IO to pay for US support, but imposes no specific deadline for reimbursement. If reimbursement will not be completed within one hundred and eighty days after the close of the fiscal year in which such services and commodities are delivered, then payment of interest is required at the current rate established pursuant to section 635(b)(1)(B) of Title 12, USC. Repayment of such principal and interest must not exceed a period of three years from the date of signing of the agreement to provide the service: That funds available for this paragraph in any fiscal year shall not exceed $1,000,000 of the total funds authorized for use in such fiscal year.
and shall be available only to the extent provided in Appropriation Acts. Interest shall accrue as of the date of disbursement to the agency or organization providing such services.

6. Federal Property and Administrative Service Act

   a. **General Description.** The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, 40 USC 511-514, permits any US Government agency, including DOD, to transfer FEPP to foreign countries for foreign currency, substantial benefits, or the discharge of claims. Within DOD, pursuant to 32 C.F.R. 736.1, FEPP is defined as any DOD property, excluding major naval vessels and records of the DOD, not required for discharge of DOD responsibilities that is located outside the United States and designated island territories (Puerto Rico, American Samoa, Guam, the Trust territories of the Pacific Islands, and the US Virgin Islands). Property that may be transferred under this authority includes such logistic items as accommodations, construction materiel, food, and medical equipment that are both excess to DOD requirements and/or costly to remove from a foreign country.

   b. **Implementation.** Transfers of logistic items under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act are implemented by a MOU developed by the cognizant Military Department and coordinated with the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Among other things, the MOU identifies the items to be transferred, the fair market value of the items, and the tangible non-monetary benefits to be received by the US Government in exchange for the FEPP. The geographic combatant commanders have little formal role in this process.

   c. **Financial Requirements.** The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act and the implementing DOD regulations allow the Military Departments and the DLA a broad degree of latitude in determining the financial terms of the transfer. DOD requires that transfers of FEPP for “substantial benefits” must be in the overall interests of the United States and be tangible and appreciable in relation to the value of property being transferred.

7. Fly America Act

The Fly America Act, 49 USC App. 1517, prohibits the expenditure of US funds for air transportation aboard a foreign air carrier if a US air carrier is available to provide such a service, even if the foreign air carrier provides less costly and more convenient service. Since the vast majority of DOD-funded air transportation, operational or otherwise, has historically been provided by US-owned or chartered air assets, this authority imposes few practical constraints on US operational commanders. In certain circumstances, however, it may apply.

For example, US forces may be prohibited from using appropriated funds to contract with a foreign air carrier for transportation between two destinations outside the United States if a US air carrier was “reasonably available.” On the other hand, the Fly America Act might not apply if the same service was provided by a foreign government as reimbursement for US supplies or services provided under an ACSA. **Operational commanders should consult staff legal counsel to determine the precise applicability of the Fly America Act.**
8. Cargo Preference Act

The Cargo Preference Act of 1904, 10 USC 2631, requires that all items procured for or owned by the Military Departments and defense agencies be carried exclusively in US-flag vessels that are available at fair and reasonable rates. Since the DOD has the capability and experience to quickly acquire US-registered vessels, there are few instances in which it would constrain US forces’ ability to participate in MNL operations. As with the Fly America Act, however, this law could limit a US operational commander’s ability to accept sea transportation of US defense goods as reimbursement for US supplies or services provided under an ACSA. In this case, the responsible US commander should consult staff judge advocate or legal counsel to determine whether authority exists or should be requested to negotiate an alternate form of reimbursement.
APPENDIX D
US CONTRACTING CONSIDERATIONS IN MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

1. General

During the planning phase of a multinational operation, US planners must address several issues relating to contracting operations, contractors, and contractor personnel. These issues should be addressed in such documents as the SOFAs, the TAs, and in both multinational and national OPLANs. The issues include:

   a. Assignment of an in-theater Head of Contracting Activity for all US forces participating in the operation.
   b. The status of US citizen, civilian contractors in the country, and protection of contractor personnel.
   c. Use of third-country subcontractors or personnel.
   d. Limitations on the physical presence of contractors; that is, boundaries within which contractors are to operate.
   e. Payment of customs duties by contractors when entering the country.
   f. Payment of corporate or individual taxes.
   g. Payment by contractors of taxes on goods bought in the operational area.
   h. Environmental matters to be addressed, including transportation and disposal criteria and locations for hazardous waste and scrap.

2. Principles of Contingency Contracting

   a. The MNFC establishes rules, policies and procedures applicable to contracting activities in the operational area. However, contracting by US forces participating in a MNF is subject to the same laws and regulations that apply to contracting generally, including the requirement for fair and open competition. Therefore, it is important that the rules, policies and procedures developed by the MNFC be consistent with US contracting law and regulations. Appropriate personnel, including contracting officers and staff legal counsel, should assist the MNFC in developing the MNF contracting rules, policies and procedures. Such rules may, for example, take into consideration that simplified acquisitions (contracts up to $200,000 for non-personal services, supplies or constructions during contingency operations) are not subject to the laws (10 USC 2304) requiring full and open competition. Other exceptions to the “full and open” competition rules applicable to contingency operations include limited source purchases, compelling urgency, based on international agreements, national security, and public interest (can only be invoked by head of the agency).
b. The contracting rules established by the MNFC are designed to ensure that the MNFC’s logistic priorities are fully supported. A Multinational Acquisition and Contracting Board (MACB) may be established to develop and promulgate procurement policies and priorities on behalf of the MNFC, in conjunction with the TACO, if an MJLC is established. The MACB may assist with developing and disseminating the restricted items list.

c. The senior US procurement official will coordinate with the civil-military operations staff officers of both the US JTF and the MNF to assure that the staff officers understand the total requirements being levied on the host nation through contracting and through requests for HNS.

d. To the extent allowed by law, US policy in some operations may be to award contracts to local suppliers in order to support the local economy and contribute to “nation building.”

e. US political and military objectives in some operations may be aided by obtaining contract administration services either from the host nation or another allied and/or coalition nation.

3. Execution of Multinational Contracting Operations

a. Contracting operations in multinational operations require a detailed understanding of customer requirements. Because of the diverse and unique needs of the various nations, these requirements will be much more complex than for US joint operations. Knowledge of these requirements will help assure customer satisfaction and assure that the basis for reimbursement is accurate and complete.

b. There must be a clear understanding of the standards of performance required of the contractor. Achieving such understanding can be a complex undertaking given the varied cultures and languages that US commanders may encounter. Because of political ramifications, defining clear performance standards is especially relevant when arranging contractor support from an MNF partner or a host nation.

c. The senior US procurement official in-theater will coordinate with the MNF MACB and TACO (if established) to assure that the US benefits from any leveraging available from consolidating requirements for multiple nations. Leveraging possibilities may be developed by the TACO and the JLCC, or by the contracting officer on the staff of the MNFC. Leveraging probably will be particularly effective in CUL areas, such as fuel procurement and distribution, construction materials, transportation, staging areas, and lodging.

d. A US warranted contracting officer should be attached to the TACO or staff element at the MNF HQ to take full advantage of available leveraging possibilities.

e. US contracting law and procedures will be used by US contracting officers during multinational operations. The techniques will include purchasing locally and using BOAs to
leverage consolidated requirements and to simplify the procurement process. BOAs are particularly useful when procuring theater-wide supplies and services, such as office supplies, food, vehicle maintenance, and construction materiel.
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The development of JP 4-08 is based upon the following primary references:

1. Title 10, United States Code, Chapters 20, 138.
2. Title 22, United States Code.
4. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 2700.01, *International Military Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States and Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations*.
5. DODD 2000.8, *Cooperative Logistic Supply Support Agreements*.
7. DODD 2010.8, *Department of Defense Policy for NATO Logistics*.
8. DODD 2010.9, *Mutual Logistic Support Between the United States and Governments of Eligible Countries and NATO Subsidiary Bodies*.
9. DODD 2030.8, *Trade Security Controls on DOD Excess and Surplus Personal Property*.
12. DODD 4500.9, *Transportation and Traffic Management*.
13. DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*.
16. DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements*.
17. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.


27. JP 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations.*


41. JP 4-02, *Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations*.


43. JP 4-03, *Joint Bulk Petroleum Doctrine*.

44. JP 4-04, *Joint Doctrine for Civil Engineering Support*.


46. JP 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*.

47. JP 5-00.2, *Joint Task Force Planning and Guidance Procedures*.

48. NATO Logistics Handbook

49. Military Committee (MC) 319/1, *NATO Principles and Policies for Logistics*.


52. MC 336/1, *The Movement and Transportation Concept for NATO*.

53. AJP-4, *Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine*.

54. AJP-4.4, *Allied Joint Movement and Transportation Doctrine*.


56. AJP-4.6, *Multinational Joint Logistic Centre Doctrine*.

57. AJP-4.10, *Allied Joint Medical Support Doctrine*.

58. Allied Logistics Publication (ALP) 1 (D), *Procedures for Logistic Support Between NATO Navies and Naval Port Information*.


60. ALP 4.2, *Land Forces Logistics Doctrine*.


APPENDIX F
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center Code JW100, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

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### GLOSSARY

#### PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Standardization Program</td>
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<td>ACSA</td>
<td>acquisition and cross-servicing agreement</td>
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<td>ADAMS</td>
<td>Allied Deployment and Movement System</td>
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<td>AE</td>
<td>aeromedical evacuation</td>
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<td>AECA</td>
<td>Arms Export Control Act</td>
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<td>Air Force contract augmentation program</td>
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<td>Allied Logistic Publication</td>
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<td>advanced logistic support site</td>
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<td>Air Mobility Command</td>
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<td>allied movement coordination center</td>
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<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>basic ordering agreement</td>
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<td>command and control</td>
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<td>C3I</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and intelligence</td>
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<td>CAO</td>
<td>chief administrative officer</td>
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<td>CAOC</td>
<td>combined air operations center</td>
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<td>CJ-4</td>
<td>combined-joint logistics officer</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>combined joint task force (NATO)</td>
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<td>CMAA</td>
<td>Cooperative Military Airlift Agreement</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>chief medical officer</td>
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<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<td>combatant command (command authority)</td>
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<td>communications zone</td>
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<td>construction capabilities contract program</td>
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<td>common-user logistics</td>
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<td>detailed deployment plan</td>
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<td>Defense Finance and Accounting Service</td>
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<td>director of mobility forces</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>international organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>intermediate staging base</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMEB</td>
<td>joint civil-military engineering board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>joint force air component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JF</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFUB</td>
<td>Joint Facilities Utilization Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLCC</td>
<td>joint logistics coordination center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JLOC</td>
<td>joint logistics operations center</td>
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<td>JMC</td>
<td>joint movement center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTCC</td>
<td>joint transportation coordination cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTLM</td>
<td>Joint Theater Logistics Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>JTMS</td>
<td>joint theater movement staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>LCC</td>
<td>logistics component command</td>
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<tr>
<td>LN</td>
<td>lead nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOA</td>
<td>letter of offer and acceptance</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOGCAP</td>
<td>logistics civilian augmentation program (Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACB</td>
<td>multinational acquisition and contracting board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDCC</td>
<td>medical coordination cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILU</td>
<td>multinational integrated logistic unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MJLC</td>
<td>multinational joint logistic center</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
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<td>MNLC</td>
<td>multinational logistic center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOA</td>
<td>memorandum of agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>military operations other than war</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOU</td>
<td>memorandum of understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTW</td>
<td>major theater war</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NSE</td>
<td>national support element</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
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<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>port of debarkation</td>
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<tr>
<td>POE</td>
<td>port of embarkation</td>
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<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>petroleum, oils, and lubricants</td>
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<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>prisoner of war</td>
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<tr>
<td>RAMCC</td>
<td>regional air movement coordination center</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSN</td>
<td>role specialist nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSOI</td>
<td>reception, staging, onward movement, and integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFOR</td>
<td>Stabilization Force</td>
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<td>STANAG</td>
<td>standardization agreement (NATO)</td>
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<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>technical arrangement</td>
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<td>TACO</td>
<td>theater allied contracting office</td>
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<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPFDL</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment list</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNOSOM</td>
<td>United Nations Operations in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations protection force</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
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PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

US terms and definitions relating to multinational logistics differ in varying degrees from terminology approved by NATO or other international organizations. The following definitions are either approved DOD definitions, as contained in JP 1-02, or upon approval of JP 4-08 will be included in JP 1-02. Personnel planning, training, or preparing for NATO, UN, ABCA or other operations conducted according to non-US doctrine, should consult the relevant documents for applicable terminology. See, for example, AAP-6 for official NATO terms and definitions.

acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis with US allies or coalition partners that allow US forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. Authority to negotiate these agreements is usually delegated to the combatant commander by the Secretary of Defense. Authority to execute these agreements lies with the Secretary of Defense, and may or may not be delegated. Governed by legal guidelines, these agreements are used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies, or exercises to correct logistic deficiencies that cannot be adequately corrected by national means. The support received or given is reimbursed under the conditions of the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Also called ACSA. (JP 1-02)

administrative control. Direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support, including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, discipline, and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. Also called ADCON. (JP 1-02)

alliance. An alliance is the result of formal agreements (i.e., treaties) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 1-02)

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)
**base.** 1. A locality from which operations are projected or supported. 2. An area or locality containing installations which provide logistic or other support. 3. Home airfield or home carrier. (JP 1-02)

**civil augmentation program.** Standing, long-term contacts designed to augment Service logistic capabilities with contract support in both preplanned and short notice contingencies. Examples include US Army Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program, US Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, and US Navy Construction Capabilities Contract. (JP 1-02)

**civil-military operations.** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)

**coalition.** An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. (JP 1-02)

**combatant command (command authority).** Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

**combat service support.** The essential capabilities, functions, activities, and tasks necessary to sustain all elements of operating forces in theater at all levels of war. Within the national and theater logistic systems, it includes but is not limited to that support rendered by service forces in ensuring the aspects of supply, maintenance, transportation, health services, and other services required by aviation and ground combat troops to permit those units to accomplish their missions in combat. Combat service support encompasses those activities at all levels of war that produce sustainment to all operating forces on the battlefield. Also called CSS. (JP 1-02)
**combatting terrorism.** Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called CBT. (JP 1-02)

**combined.** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., combined navies.) (JP 1-02)

**commonality.** A quality that applies to materiel or systems: a. possessing like and interchangeable characteristics enabling each to be utilized, or operated and maintained, by personnel trained on the others without additional specialized training; b. having interchangeable repair parts and/or components; and c. applying to consumable items interchangeably equivalent without adjustment. (JP 1-02)

**common servicing.** That function performed by one Military Service in support of another Military Service for which reimbursement is not required from the Service receiving support. (JP 1-02)

**common-user item.** An item of an interchangeable nature that is in common use by two or more nations or Services of a nation. (JP 1-02)

**common-user logistics.** Materiel or service support shared with or provided by two or more Services, Department of Defense (DOD) agencies, or multinational partners to another Service, DOD agency, non-DOD agency, and/or multinational partner in an operation. Common-user logistics is usually restricted to a particular type of supply and/or service and may be further restricted to specific unit(s) or types of units, specific times, missions, and/or geographic areas. Also called CUL. (JP 1-02)

**communications zone.** Rear part of a theater of war or theater of operations (behind but contiguous to the combat zone) that contains the lines of communications, establishments for supply and evacuation, and other agencies required for the immediate support and maintenance of the field forces. Also called COMMZ. (JP 1-02)

**concept of logistic support.** A verbal or graphic statement, in a broad outline, of how a commander intends to support and integrate with a concept of operations in an operation or campaign. (JP 1-02)

**contracted logistic support.** Support in which maintenance operations for a particular military system are performed exclusively by contract support personnel. Also called CLS. (JP 1-02)

**coordinating authority.** A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have...
the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

counterterrorism. Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JP 1-02)

country team. The senior, in-country, US coordinating and supervising body, headed by the chief of the US diplomatic mission, and composed of the senior member of each represented US department or agency, as desired by the chief of the US diplomatic mission. (JP 1-02)

cross-servicing. A subset of common-user logistics in which a function is performed by one Military Service in support of another Military Service and for which reimbursement is required from the Service receiving support. (JP 1-02)

deployment. 1. In naval usage, the change from a cruising approach or contact disposition to a disposition for battle. 2. The movement of forces within operational areas. 3. The positioning of forces into a formation for battle. 4. The relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. (JP 1-02)

depot. 1. supply -- An activity for the receipt, classification, storage, accounting, issue, maintenance, procurement, manufacture, assembly, research, salvage, or disposal of material. 2. personnel -- An activity for the reception, processing, training, assignment, and forwarding of personnel replacements. (JP 1-02)

directive authority for logistics. Combatant commander authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the effective execution of approved operation plans. Essential measures include the optimized use or reallocation of available resources and prevention or elimination of redundant facilities and/or overlapping functions among the Service component commands. (JP 1-02)

direct liaison authorized. That authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. Direct liaison authorized is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting direct liaison authorized informed. Direct liaison authorized is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Also called DIRLAUTH. (JP 1-02)

distribution. 1. The arrangement of troops for any purpose, such as a battle, march, or maneuver. 2. A planned pattern of projectiles about a point. 3. A planned spread of fire to cover a desired frontage or depth. 4. An official delivery of anything, such as orders or supplies. 5. The operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistic system to deliver the “right things” to the “right
place” at the “right time” to support the geographic combatant commander. 6. The process of assigning military personnel to activities, units, or billets. (JP 1-02)

distribution system. That complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military materiel between the point of receipt into the military system and the point of issue to using activities and units. (JP 1-02)

dominant user concept. The concept that the Service that is the principal consumer will have the responsibility for performance of a support workload for all using Services. (JP 1-02)

enabling force. Early deploying forces that establish critical capabilities to facilitate deployment and initial employment (including sustainment) of a force. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

evacuation. 1. The process of moving any person who is wounded, injured, or ill to and/or between medical treatment facilities. 2. The clearance of personnel, animals, or materiel from a given locality. 3. The controlled process of collecting, classifying, and shipping unserviceable or abandoned materiel, US or foreign, to appropriate reclamation, maintenance, technical intelligence, or disposal facilities. 4. The ordered or authorized departure of noncombatants from a specific area by Department of State, Department of Defense, or appropriate military commander. This refers to the movement from one area to another in the same or different countries. The evacuation is caused by unusual or emergency circumstances and applies equally to command or non-command sponsored family members. (JP 1-02)

executive agent. A term used to indicate a delegation of authority by the Secretary of Defense to a subordinate to act on the Secretary’s behalf. An agreement between equals does not create an executive agent. For example, a Service cannot become a Department of Defense executive agent for a particular matter with simply the agreement of the other Services; such authority must be delegated by the Secretary of Defense. Designation as executive agent, in and of itself, confers no authority. The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent. An executive agent may be limited to providing only administration and support or coordinating common functions, or it may be delegated authority, direction, and control over specified resources for specified purposes. Also called EA. (JP 1-02)

facility. A real property entity consisting of one or more of the following: a building, a structure, a utility system, pavement, and underlying land. (JP 1-02)

force protection. Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy.
Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02)

**Foreign humanitarian assistance.** Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. FHA operations are those conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions. Also called FHA. (JP 1-02)

**Foreign military sales.** That portion of United States security assistance authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended. This assistance differs from the Military Assistance Program and the International Military Education and Training Program in that the recipient provides reimbursement for defense articles and services transferred. Also called FMS. (JP 1-02)

**Host nation.** A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

**Host-nation support.** Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. (JP 1-02)

**Humanitarian and civic assistance.** Assistance to the local populace provided by predominantly US forces in conjunction with military operations and exercises. This assistance is specifically authorized by title 10, United States Code, section 401, and funded under separate authorities. Assistance provided under these provisions is limited to (1) medical, dental, and veterinary care provided in rural areas of a country; (2) construction of rudimentary surface transportation systems; (3) well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities; and (4) rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities. Assistance must fulfill unit training requirements that incidentally create humanitarian benefit to the local populace. Also called HCA. (JP 1-02)

**International logistics.** The negotiating, planning, and implementation of supporting logistic arrangements between nations, their forces, and agencies. It includes furnishing logistic support (major end items, materiel, and/or services) to, or receiving logistic support from, one or more friendly foreign governments, international organizations, or military forces, with or without reimbursement. It also includes planning and actions related to the intermeshing of a significant element, activity, or component of the military logistic systems or procedures of the United States with those of one or more foreign governments, international organizations, or military forces on a temporary or permanent basis. It includes planning and actions related to the utilization of United States logistic policies, systems, and/or procedures to meet requirements of one or more foreign governments, international organizations, or forces. (JP 1-02)
**international organization.** Organizations with global mandates, generally funded by contributions from national governments. Examples include the International Committee of the Red Cross, the International Organization for Migration, and United Nation agencies. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

**interoperability.** 1. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. 2. (DOD only) The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02)

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

**joint logistics.** The art and science of planning and carrying out, by a joint force commander and staff, logistic operations to support the protection, movement, maneuver, firepower, and sustainment of operating forces of two or more Military Departments of the same nation. (JP 1-02)

**lead nation.** One nation assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of logistic support for all or a part of the multinational force and/or headquarters. Compensation and/or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties involved. The lead nation may also assume the responsibility to coordinate logistics of the other nations within its functional and regional area of responsibility. (JP 1-02)

**lead Service or agency for common-user logistics.** A Service component or Department of Defense agency that is responsible for execution of common-user item and service support in a specific combatant command or multinational operation as defined in the combatant or subordinate joint force commander’s operation plan, operation order, and/or directives. (JP 1-02)

**letter of offer and acceptance.** Standard Department of Defense form on which the US Government documents its offer to transfer to a foreign government or international organization US defense articles and services via foreign military sales pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act. Also called LOA. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**line of communications.** A route, either land, water, and/or air, that connects an operating military force with a base of operations and along which supplies and military forces move. Also called LOC. (JP 1-02)

**logistic assessment.** An evaluation of: a. the logistic support required to support particular military operations in a theater, country, or area; and b. the actual and/or potential logistic support available
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for the conduct of military operations either within the theater, country, or area, or located elsewhere. (JP 1-02)

**logistic estimate of the situation.** An appraisal resulting from an orderly examination of the logistic factors influencing contemplated courses of action in order to provide conclusions concerning the degree and manner of that influence. (JP 1-02)

**logistics.** The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**logistics over-the-shore operations.** The loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of deep draft-capable, fixed port facilities in friendly or nondefended territory and, in time of war, during phases of theater development in which there is no opposition by the enemy; or as a means of moving forces closer to tactical assembly areas dependent on threat force capabilities. Also called LOTS operations. (JP 1-02)

**logistic sourcing.** The identification of the origin and determination of the availability of the time-phased force and deployment data nonunit logistic requirements. (JP 1-02)

**materiel.** All items (including ships, tanks, self-propelled weapons, aircraft, etc., and related spares, repair parts, and support equipment, but excluding real property, installations, and utilities) necessary to equip, operate, maintain, and support military activities without distinction as to its application for administrative or combat purposes. (JP 1-02)

**military operations other than war.** Operations that encompass the use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. Also called MOOTW. (JP 1-02)

**movement control.** 1. The planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo over lines of communications. 2. An organization responsible for the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over lines of communications. Also called movement control center or MCC. (JP 1-02)

**multinational force.** A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02)

**multinational force commander.** A general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the multinational force commander’s command authority is determined by the participating nations. Also called MNFC. (JP 1-02)
**multinational integrated logistic support.** Two or more nations agree to provide logistic assets to a multinational force under operational control of a multinational force commander for the logistic support of a multinational force. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**multinational integrated logistic support unit.** An organization resulting when two or more nations agree to provide logistics assets to a multinational logistic force under the operational control of a multinational commander for the logistic support of a multinational force. Also called MILU. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**multinational logistics.** Any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition, including those conducted under United Nations mandate. Multinational logistics includes activities involving both logistic units provided by participating nations designated for use by the multinational force commander as well as a variety of multinational logistic support arrangements that may be developed and used by participating forces. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**multinational logistic support arrangement.** Any arrangement involving two or more nations that facilitates the logistic support of a force (either the forces of the countries participating in the arrangement or other countries). (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**multinational operations.** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

**nation assistance.** Civil and/or military assistance rendered to a nation by foreign forces within that nation’s territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Nation assistance programs include, but are not limited to, security assistance, foreign internal defense, other US Code title 10 (DOD) programs, and activities performed on a reimbursable basis by Federal agencies or international organizations. (JP 1-02)

**national support element.** Any national organization or activity that supports national forces that are a part of a multinational force. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by the nation. Also called NSE. (JP 1-02)

**naval advanced logistic support site.** An overseas location used as the primary transshipment point in the theater of operations for logistic support. A naval advanced logistic support site possesses full capabilities for storage, consolidation, and transfer of supplies and for support of forward-deployed units (including replacements units) during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval advanced logistics support sites, with port and airfield facilities in close proximity, are located within the theater of operations but not near the main battle areas, and must possess the throughput capacity required to accommodate incoming and outgoing intertheater airlift and sealift. When fully activated, the naval advanced logistic support site should consist of facilities and services provided by the host nation, augmented by support personnel located in the theater of operations, or both. Also called NALSS or Naval ALSS. (JP 1-02)
**naval forward logistic site.** An overseas location, with port and airfield facilities nearby, which provides logistic support to naval forces within the theater of operations during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval forward logistic sites may be located in close proximity to main battle areas to permit forward staging of services, throughput of high priority cargo, advanced maintenance, and battle damage repair. Naval forward logistic sites are linked to in-theater naval advanced logistic support sites by intratheater airlift and sealift, but may also serve as transshipment points for intertheater movement of high-priority cargo into areas of direct combat. In providing fleet logistic support, naval forward logistic site capabilities may range from very austere to near those of a naval advanced logistic support site. Also called NFLS or Naval FLS. (JP 1-02)

**nongovernmental organizations.** Transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. Nongovernmental organizations may be professional associations, foundations, multinational businesses, or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities (development and relief). “Nongovernmental organizations” is a term normally used by non-United States organizations. Also called NGOs. (JP 1-02)

**operational control.** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1-02)

**operations security.** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)
**peacekeeping.** Military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (ceasefire, truce, or other such agreement) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. (JP 1-02)

**peace operations.** A broad term that encompasses peacekeeping operations and peace enforcement operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain peace. Also called PO. (JP 1-02)

**pipeline.** In logistics, the channel of support or a specific portion thereof by means of which materiel or personnel flow from sources of procurement to their point of use. (JP 1-02)

**planning factor.** A multiplier used in planning to estimate the amount and type of effort involved in a contemplated operation. Planning factors are often expressed as rates, ratios, or lengths of time. (JP 1-02)

**rationalization.** Any action that increases the effectiveness of allied forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the alliance. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher alliance needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support or improved interoperability, and greater cooperation. Rationalization applies to both weapons and/or materiel resources and non-weapons military matters. (JP 1-02)

**redistribution.** The utilization of logistic resources after Transfer of Authority necessary for the fulfillment of the commander’s combat missions. The logistic resources are designated in peacetime and will become assigned to the NATO commander in crisis and conflict. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**restricted items list.** A document listing those logistic goods and services for which nations must coordinate any contracting activity with a commander’s centralized contracting organization. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**role specialist nation.** A nation that has agreed to assume responsibility for providing a particular class of supply or service for all or part of the multinational force. Also called RSN. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**security.** 1. Measures taken by a military unit, activity, or installation to protect itself against all acts designed to, or which may, impair its effectiveness. 2. A condition that results from the establishment and maintenance of protective measures that ensure a state of inviolability from hostile acts or influences. 3. With respect to classified matter, the condition that prevents unauthorized persons from having access to official information that is safeguarded in the interests of national security. (JP 1-02)

**security assistance.** Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related
services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. (JP 1-02)

security assistance organization. All Department of Defense elements located in a foreign country with assigned responsibilities for carrying out security assistance management functions. It includes military assistance advisory groups, military missions and groups, offices of defense and military cooperation, liaison groups, and defense attaché personnel designated to perform security assistance functions. Also called SAO. (JP 1-02)

standardization. The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility. (JP 1-02)

status-of-forces agreement. An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of local officials. To the extent that agreements delineate matters affecting the relations between a military force and civilian authorities and population, they may be considered as civil affairs agreements. Also called SOFA. (JP 1-02)

support. 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

sustainability. The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. (From the definition of “military capability” in JP 1-02.)

sustainment. The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (JP 1-02)

tactical control. Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred
between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)

terrorism. The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

theater. The geographical area outside the continental United States for which a commander of a combatant command has been assigned responsibility. (JP 1-02)

time-phased force and deployment data. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including the following: a. In-place units; b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation; c. Routing of forces to be deployed; d. Movement data associated with deploying forces; e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces; and f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (JP 1-02)

transportation system. All the land, water, and air routes and transportation assets engaged in the movement of US forces and their supplies across the range of military operations, involving both mature and immature theaters and at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. (JP 1-02)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 4-08 is in the Logistics series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1** Project Proposal
- Submitted by Services, combatant commands, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and combatant commands
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2** Program Directive
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and combatant commands
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, combatant command, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3** Two Drafts
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4** CJCS Approval
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and combatant commands
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

**STEP #5** Assessments/Revision
- The combatant commands receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director, J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised

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**Steps:**
- **STEP #1** Project Proposal
- **STEP #2** Program Directive
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- **STEP #4** CJCS Approval
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