Joint Publication 3-35

Deployment and Redeployment Operations

07 May 2007
1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine and principles for planning and executing deployment, joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI), and redeployment of the Armed Forces of the United States. It explains the deployment, JRSOI, and redeployment processes, and planning and execution considerations that may impact United States force projection operations. It discusses the responsibilities and command relationships for supported and supporting combatant commands and Services, and the interaction with other Department of Defense and federal agencies, foreign nations, allies, multinational organizations, and other groups.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders (CCDRs) and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.
b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the CJCS, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

WALTER L. SHARP
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-35
DATED 7 SEPTEMBER 1999


• Discontinues the use of the term “military operations other than war” (MOOTW).

• Expands on the operational/employment focus of deployment and redeployment.

• Introduces the US Transportation Command deployment distribution operations center and combatant command joint deployment distribution operations centers as key entities in synchronizing and optimizing deployment and distribution operations.

• Expands on the linkages with the Defense Transportation Regulation.

• Incorporates the “joint operation planning process” in the deployment and redeployment planning process.

• Updates the terms and discussions for various operational areas as needed.

• Introduces deployment and redeployment operations in the conduct of homeland defense and civil defense.

• Establishes an appendix (Appendix A) providing an overview of the “enablers” supporting the joint deployment and redeployment operations.

• Expands on global force management and force projection.

• Expands on force visibility and in-transit visibility programs.

• Updates the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System activities, functions, and products.

• Incorporates the construct of ‘contingency and crisis’ action planning.

• Establishes a new definition for ‘force visibility’.

• Modifies the definitions for ‘automated identification technology’ and ‘force tracking’.
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COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Provides an Overview of Deployment and Redeployment Operations
• Details the Key Deployment and Redeployment Operations Responsibilities
• Covers the Process of Deployment Planning
• Discusses Predeployment Activities
• Addresses the Movement Phase of Deployment
• Explains Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration
• Provides a Discussion of Redeployment Operations

Overview

The capability to project forces to the operational area and rapidly integrate them into the joint force as directed by the joint force commander is essential.

The deployment, reception, and integration of US air, land, maritime, and special operations forces in support of combatant commander (CCDR) requirements is a series of operational events enabled by logistics. The deployment process begins with planning for force projection under contingency planning or in a crisis. The operation plan (OPLAN) contains a deployment concept and may contain time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) that identifies force requirements and flows the forces into the theater as required by the concept of operations (CONOPS). Deployment operations enable joint forces to conduct campaigns, major operations, and to respond to other contingencies by securing positional advantages that contribute to the achievement of operational and strategic objectives.

At any given time there could be multiple requirements to employ military forces. Each operation could have a different strategic priority, and could be of a different size and scope. To effectively support multiple requirements, and apply the right level of priority and resources to each, requires effective global force management.

The joint deployment process is divided into four iterative and often simultaneous phases: planning, predeployment activities, movement, and joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI).
Deployment planning occurs during both Joint Operation Planning and Execution System contingency planning and crisis action planning. It is conducted at all command levels and by both the supported and supporting commanders. Deployment planning activities include all action required to plan for the deployment and employment of forces.

Predeployment activities are all actions taken by the joint planning and execution community, before actual movement, to prepare to execute a deployment operation. It includes continued refinement of OPLANs, from the strategic to the tactical level at the supported and supporting commands. It includes sourcing forces, completion of operation specific training, and mission rehearsals.

Movement includes the movement of self-deploying units and those that require lift support. It includes movements within the continental US, deployments within an area of responsibility (AOR), and end-to-end origin to destination strategic moves.

JRSOI, is the critical link between deployment and employment of the joint forces in the operation area. It integrates the deploying forces into the joint operation and is the responsibility of the supported CCDR.

Responsibilities

The Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) is responsible for the assignment of forces and resources to the combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands. In addition, SecDef is responsible for transportation planning and operations within the Department of Defense (DOD). The SecDef has designated the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to establish policies and provide guidance to DOD components concerning the effective and efficient use of the defense transportation system.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council, and SecDef, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is assigned specific supervisory and joint operation planning responsibilities in the areas of strategic direction, strategic planning, and joint operation planning.
Executive Summary

**Combatant commanders.** Geographic CCDRs are responsible for coordinating with US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and supporting CCDRs to provide an integrated transportation system from origin to destination during deployment operations.

Supported CCDRs are responsible for deployment operations planned and executed during joint force missions in their AORs. Supported CCDRs have four major responsibilities relative to deployment operations: build and validate movement requirements based on the CONOPS; determine predeployment standards; balance and regulate the transportation flow; and manage effectively.

The primary task for supporting combatant commands is to ensure that the supported CCDR receives the timely and complete support needed to accomplish the mission. Supporting CCDRs have five major deployment responsibilities: source, prepare, and verify forces; ensure units retain their visibility and mobility; ensure units report movement requirements rapidly and accurately; regulate the flow; and coordinate effectively.

Normally, several functional combatant commands are involved in every phase of a joint operation. Four functional combatant commands that could be involved in deployment of the joint force are US Joint Forces Command, US Special Operations Command, United States Strategic Command, and USTRANSCOM.

**Joint task force.** Formation of a joint task force (JTF) may complicate deployment planning and execution because of the diverse elements that may come together to form the JTF. If sufficient planning time is available prior to mission execution (contingency planning), the joint force commander (JFC) and staff should determine specific force requirements, logistic requirements, and personnel replacements with recommended time-phasing based on their CONOPS. For crisis action situations, the JTF establishing authority (normally a combatant command) is usually required to initiate development of the time-phased force and deployment data supporting JTF operations.

**The Military Departments.** The Military Departments retain the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing administrative and logistics support (including Service-unique transportation) for their respective forces. They are also responsible for maintaining personnel trained in joint operation planning that can participate in joint planning. These forces and other DOD agencies may depend on common-user military transportation.
services for unit and individual deployment operations between ports of embarkation (POEs) and ports of debarkation (PODs).

Planning

During deployment operations, supported CCDRs are responsible for building and validating requirements, determining predeployment standards, and balancing, regulating, and effectively managing the transportation flow.

Deployment planners must assess the impact of the operational environment and threats in relationship to the mission. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment must address whether and to what degree a potential threat can interdict, disrupt, or block deployment operations and assist in determining what infrastructure and other support assets may be available.

The primary objective of deployment planning is to provide personnel, equipment, and materiel when and where required by the JFC’s CONOPS. Employment planning considerations that directly impact deployment operations include: identification of force requirements; commander’s intent for deployment; time-phasing of personnel, equipment, and materiel to support the mission; and closure of the forces required to execute decisive operations. These factors guide deployment planning and help determine mission requirements.

Predeployment Activities

Predeployment activities begin when deployment, sustainment, and redeployment requirements are validated by the supported CCDR. Requirements validation confirms the need for the movement requirement and provides detailed shipment data. As the OPLAN, or selected course of action, is approved and transformed into an operation order, the TPFDD is further refined. Once movement requirements are documented and validated, the effort to schedule the appropriate transportation assets can begin. As part of the predeployment phase, deployment planners must incorporate sustainment operations into their plans. Finally, while many predeployment related activities equally apply to redeployment, certain unique activities are required prior to redeployment.
Executive Summary

**Movement**
The movement phase of deployment is composed of three segments: movement from origin to air and/or sea POEs, POE operations, and movement from the POE to POD.

Movement control involves planning, routing, scheduling, and controlling common-user assets and maintaining in-transit visibility of forces and materiel moving through the deployment process. Movement control coordinates transportation resources to enhance combat effectiveness and meet the deployment and sustainment priorities of the supported CCDR. Effective movement control during deployment operations provides the JFC with the capability to monitor and manage deployment execution, and adjust the flow of forces and materiel as necessary.

Innovative and integrated use of command and control systems and information technology makes force tracking through the entire deployment process possible. Visibility of deploying forces and materiel is established through the logistics management construct of asset visibility and the Global Command and Control System-Joint common operational picture. Force tracking during redeployment operations is vital to joint force readiness. Unit integrity should be maintained, to the extent possible, and commanders must have the capability to determine the exact location of unit personnel, equipment, and materiel in the event the redeploying force has to be diverted en route for another mission.

**Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration**

JRSOI is a set of dynamic and complex processes involving numerous organizations requiring training, continuous coordination, and collaboration.

**Reception** is the process of receiving, offloading, marshalling, and transporting of personnel, equipment, and materiel from strategic and/or intratheater deployment phase to a sea, air, or surface transportation point of debarkation to the marshalling area.

**Staging** includes the assembling, temporary holding, and organizing of arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into units and forces, and preparing them for onward movement and employment by the JFC.
Onward movement is the process of moving forces and sustainment from reception facilities and marshalling or staging areas to tactical assembly areas or other operating areas.

Integration is the synchronized transfer of mission-ready forces and capabilities into the CCDR’s force.

JRSOI is the essential process that transitions deploying forces, consisting of personnel, equipment, and materiel arriving in theater into forces capable of meeting the CCDR’s operational requirements.

There are three overarching principles of JRSOI:

Unity of command specifies that a single individual (the supported CCDR) is responsible for the overall coordination of JRSOI activities.

Synchronization links deployed personnel, equipment, and materiel in a timely manner, which expedites buildup of mission capability and avoids saturation at nodes and along lines of communication, thereby enhancing survivability.

Balance applies to managing the TPFDD flow, which allows the supported CCDR to adjust the movement schedule through the intertheater pipeline and the intratheater network to allow a continuous and controlled flow of forces and sustainment into and within the AOR.

Elements. In order to achieve unity of command, synchronization, and balance, JRSOI relies upon essential and enabling elements, which combine in various ways under differing circumstances to make the operations associated with JRSOI possible. Communications systems are the means by which the CCDR maintains unity of command to balance and synchronize joint force activities and achieve mission success. Commanders must ensure that requisite protection measures are enforced consistent with the threat. JRSOI support organizations consisting of one or more combinations of US forces, host-nation assets, contractors, or multinational forces, are a force multiplier because they provide the means to expedite buildup of forces in the AOR.
Redeployment

Redeployment is the transfer of forces and materiel to support another joint force commander’s operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration and/or out-processing. Similar to deployment, redeployment operations encompass four phases; these are redeployment planning, preredeployment activities, movement, and JRSOI. Redeployment operations are dependent on the supported CCDR’s defined end state, concept for redeployment, or requirements to support another JFC’s CONOPS.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine and principles for planning and executing deployment, JRSOI, and redeployment of the Armed Forces of the United States. It explains the deployment, JRSOI, and redeployment processes, and planning and execution considerations that may impact US force projection operations. It discusses the responsibilities and command relationships for supported and supporting combatant commands and Services, and the interaction with other DOD and federal agencies, foreign nations, allies, multinational organizations, and other groups.
CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW

“I reaffirmed what I already knew, that the US military is far ahead of other militaries in the development of our deployment systems, technologies, and distribution doctrine. Other militaries do not have our force projection capability. Concepts like strategic dominant maneuver are interesting, but are not as relevant to them. For other militaries, end-to-end distribution often means using their commercial transportation assets to deliver supplies to forces that are in a benign area and relatively close. They are generally in awe of our assets and force projection capabilities.”

LTG Daniel G. Brown
Deputy Commander, US Transportation Command
An Oral History

1. Introduction

The deployment, reception, and integration of US air, land, maritime and special operations forces in support of combatant commander (CCDR) requirements is a series of operational events enabled by logistics. The focus of this publication is the deployment, joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (JRSOI), and redeployment of forces to support joint operations. Collectively referred to in this publication as “deployment operations,” these activities are planned and executed for the supported commander by both the supported and supporting commanders. The capability to project forces to the operational area (OA) and rapidly integrate them into the joint force as directed by the joint force commander (JFC) is essential. Mission requirements define the scope, duration, and scale of deployment operations. Deployment operations involve the efforts of numerous commands, agencies, and processes. As such, unity of effort is paramount to ensure both effective and efficient mission accomplishment.

a. Operational Planning. The deployment process begins with planning for force projection under contingency planning or in a crisis. Contingency planning enables the CCDRs to define the most probable contingencies and identify force requirements for those contingencies. The operation plan (OPLAN) contains a deployment concept and may contain time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) that identifies force requirements and flows the forces into the theater as required by the concept of operations (CONOPS). The CONOPS, deployment concept, and TPFDD are the basis for deployment planning which includes tailoring forces and identification of training, equipment, sustainment, and movement requirements. Contingency planning allows advanced planning and preparation for deployment, which enable rapid response to crises and unity of effort in execution. Actual joint force deployment is in response to an action or event requiring force projection to accomplish national objectives. Actions or events which could trigger the deployment process include natural disasters, civil support, foreign humanitarian assistance, United Nations (UN) actions and support to regional organizations (e.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] operations), or joint force deployments in response to threats to national interests such as Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM. Deployment in response to a crisis is a complex process, which
includes all actions from planning through force integration. It involves all levels of command from strategic to tactical. Planning and execution begin with the CONOPS and the concept of deployment.

b. Operational Environment. Deployments are a combination of activities to support the JFC’s CONOPS for employment of the joint force. Employment and deployment planning decisions are based on the anticipated operational environment to be encountered in the area of responsibility (AOR) or joint operations area (JOA). The JFC’s operational environment is the composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander. It encompasses physical areas and factors (of the air, land, maritime, and space domains) and the information environment. Included within these are the adversary, friendly, and neutral systems that are relevant to a specific joint operation. Understanding the operational environment helps commanders understand the results of various friendly, adversary, and neutral actions and how this impacts achieving the military end state. The operational environment is generally described by three conditions: permissive, uncertain, or hostile.

(1) Permissive Environment. A permissive environment is an operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control, the intent, and the capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. In this situation, entry operations during deployment are unopposed and the host country is supporting the deployment.

(2) Uncertain Environment. An uncertain environment is an operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended OA. In this situation, entry operations during deployment are generally unopposed but could be opposed at any point during the deployment by forces or individuals not under host government control.

(3) Hostile Environment. A hostile environment is an operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations that a unit intends to conduct. In this situation, the deploying force must conduct forcible entry operations to secure a lodgment for deployment of the joint force to ensure the continuous landing of forces and materiel and provide space for subsequent operations. Should US forces be denied temporary physical access to a specific geographic location, then the JFC should consider the use/formation of an intermediate staging base (ISB) in forced entry operations.

c. Deployment operations enable joint forces to conduct campaigns, major operations, and to respond to other contingencies by securing positional advantages that contribute to the achievement of operational and strategic objectives. This function includes moving or deploying forces into an OA and conducting maneuver to operational depths for offensive and defensive purposes. It also includes enhancing the mobility of friendly forces. The movement and maneuver function encompasses a number of tasks including:

(1) Deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint formations within the OA by any means or mode (air, land, or sea).

(2) Maneuver joint forces to achieve a position of advantage over an adversary.
(3) Provide mobility for joint forces to facilitate their movement and maneuver without delays caused by terrain or obstacles.

(4) Control significant areas in the OA whose possession or control provides either side an operational advantage.

(5) Conduct evacuation operations.

2. National Defense Strategy

The national defense strategy (NDS) supports the national security strategy by establishing a set of overarching defense objectives that guide the Department of Defense (DOD) security activities and provide direction for the national military strategy (NMS). The NDS objectives and implementing instructions serve as links between military activities and the activities of other government agencies in pursuit of national goals. The NDS focuses on how the military instrument of power can be used to achieve national security objectives. The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) articulates NDS in various venues including the quadrennial defense reviews, and the Strategic Planning Guidance. There will be a capability within the military to maintain homeland defense, prevail in the war on terror and irregular warfare, and conduct conventional campaigns. This strategy, with the resultant force structure and basing, requires the ability to rapidly deploy and redeploy forces.


At any given time there could be multiple requirements to employ military forces. Each operation could have a different strategic priority, and could be of a different size and scope. To effectively support multiple requirements, and apply the right level of priority and resources to each, requires effective global force management. Although the emphasis of this publication is on overseas deployments and redeployments, deployments within the homeland are possible in support of homeland defense and civil support. Deployments within the homeland follow the same basic processes as those overseas; however, the timelines can be shorter. The national importance of these missions is reflected in the elevated movement priorities that can be invoked by the President or SecDef. Airlift movement priorities are outlined in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 4120.02, Assignment of Movement Priority. Surface transportation (commercial and organic) within the homeland can be a viable option for units within a reasonable distance of the operational area and should be considered when planning for and conducting these operations.

a. Global Force Management. The global force management process provides global force visibility across OPLANS and on-going operations. Global force visibility is achieved by applying joint force structuring processes and data elements to force planning for contingencies and crises; detailed deployment and employment planning; and sound reporting procedures.
Global force visibility is preserved through effective force and phase planning for contingencies and crises; detailed deployment planning; and sound reporting procedures. The global force management process enables the military to be managed in a way that allows the President and SecDef to deploy the force where and when it is needed. It allows the Joint Staff to rapidly source the force needed for a specific CONOPS from a global, rather than regional, perspective and to surge capabilities when needed into crisis theaters from disparate locations worldwide. The US military’s global presence must be managed dynamically, ensuring that our joint capabilities are employed to the greatest effect. Under this concept, forces are allocated to CCDRs as needed and sourced from anywhere in the world. Supported CCDRs use an approved operational order (OPORD) TPFDD as the primary means of communicating force requirements for an operation. The request for forces (RFF) (i.e., capabilities) process is used to obtain additional requirements not already authorized or approved.

During the initial and subsequent deployments, DOD leadership may use RFFs and deployment orders (DEPORDs) in lieu of the TPFDD. Deployments under subsequent DEPORDs as a result of RFFs can significantly impact the flow of forces. Commanders and their staffs must understand the associated impact of additional force flow that had not been previously planned.

For additional information, see Global Force Management Guidance Fiscal Year (FY) 2005, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures), and CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, (JOPES) Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution).

b. Joint Force Projection. Force projection, the ability to project the military instrument of national power, systematically and rapidly deploys and integrates joint military forces and the concomitant sustainment material in response to requirements across the range of military operations. Force projection allows a JFC to strategically position and concentrate forces to set the conditions for mission success. Force projection, enabled by global force management, forward presence and agile force mobility, is critical to US deterrence and warfighting capabilities. The President and/or SecDef could direct CCDRs to resolve a crisis by employing immediately available forward-presence forces. However, when this response is not sufficient or possible, the rapid projection of forces from other locations may be necessary. Alternatively, responding to the full range of military operations may involve the deployment of forces and materiel within or outside the United States for humanitarian or disaster relief purposes. The requirement remains: to provide joint force capabilities that may include Active Component (AC), Reserve Component (RC), or civilian contract service in a timely and efficient and effective manner consistent with the CONOPS while retaining global force visibility.

(1) Joint force projection, the use of the military instrument of national power, is executed using the JOPES. Figure I-1 outlines joint operation planning activities, functions, and products.

(2) The CONOPS is the basis for force and deployment planning. The CONOPS details the phases of the operation, prioritizes the major missions within each phase, and identifies the forces required to provide those capabilities needed to meet mission requirements. The missions establish the force requirements and the prioritization determines the deployment flow of forces and support into the theater. The missions assigned to a force will determine the pre-deployment, support, and joint force
integration requirements of that force. The CONOPS determines the size and scope of mobilization, deployment, JRSOI, sustainment, and redeployment activities.

See Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations and JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning, for additional details.
(3) Joint force projection encompasses a range of processes, as shown in Figure I-2. The scope of these processes is dependent upon the joint operation. Planning for and execution of these processes normally occurs in a continuous, overlapping, and iterative sequence during each phase and for the duration of the operation. However, each joint operation or campaign usually differs in both sequence and scale. The following paragraphs briefly describe each process as depicted in Figure I-2:

(a) **Mobilization.** Mobilization is the process of assembling and organizing national resources to support national objectives in time of war or other emergencies by assembling and organizing personnel and materiel for active duty military forces, activating the RC including federalizing the National Guard, extending terms of service, surging and mobilizing the industrial base and training bases, and bringing the Armed Forces of the United States to a state of readiness for war or other national emergency.

(b) **Deployment.** Deployment is the movement of forces within operational areas, the positioning of forces into a formation for battle, and/or the relocation of forces and materiel to desired operational areas. Deployment encompasses all activities from origin or home station through destination, specifically including intra-continental United States, intertheater, and intratheater movement legs, staging, and holding areas. The type and nature of deployments vary widely according to CONOPS and the operational environment. Deployment and the deployment process will be described more fully, later in this chapter.

**Figure I-2. Processes for Projecting the Joint Force**
(c) **Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.** The last phase of deployment, JRSOI is the responsibility of the supported CCDR. This phase comprises the essential processes required to transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces capable of meeting operational requirements. JRSOI is the critical link between deployment and employment of the joint forces. The time between the initial arrival of deploying forces and capabilities and operational employment is potentially the period of greatest vulnerability. During this transition period, deploying forces and capabilities may not fully sustain or defend themselves, or contribute to mission accomplishment because some elements may not have attained required mission capability. JRSOI planning is focused on the rapid integration of deploying forces and capabilities to quickly make them functioning and contributing elements of the joint force.

(d) **Employment.** Employment planning prescribes how to apply force and/or forces to attain specified national strategic objectives. The CONOPS establishes the phases, missions, and force requirements of a given operation. It is developed by the JFC and the component commanders using the joint operation planning process.

(e) **Sustainment.** Sustainment is the provision of personnel, logistic and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. Sustainment is ongoing throughout the operation. Sustainment operations must be closely linked to the phases and mission priorities of the CONOPS to ensure mission effectiveness without logistic shortages or excesses, which could reduce the efficiency of the force. Sustainment requirements are projected and planned based on the phases and missions of the operation. Consumption is monitored throughout the operation to support continuous projection of requirements. Force projection of sustainment operations may involve the establishment of support facilities in multiple sites outside the continental United States (OCONUS), including the crisis area. Logistics may be split-based between several theaters (ashore or afloat) and the United States. The location and size of the base or bases supporting the operation is a key factor in operational reach. The sustainment function should be planned by operation phase in the CONOPS. The forces and resources required to establish and maintain these operations should be included in the deployment concept.

(f) **Redeployment.** Redeployment is the transfer of forces and material to support another joint force commander’s operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and material to the home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration and/or out-processing. Commanders must plan and execute redeployment in a manner that optimizes readiness, security, and mobility of redeploying forces to meet new crises. Redeployment will be described more fully later in this chapter.

(4) **Joint Force Mobility.** Mobility is the quality or capability of military forces, which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. Mobility is a function of force, resource, operation, deployment, and sustainment planning. Mobility requires standard procedures; global force visibility; integrated employment and deployment planning;
effective execution of pre-deployment actions; and movement execution supported by networked operation planning, deployment, and transportation information systems.

(a) The contingency OPLAN and its time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) structure must be designed to ensure the Services acquire, train, and equip forces to meet the most probable operation requirements. The design must support rapid transition of the TPFDL to align forces and missions for the phases of an actual crisis. An integration of sustainment forecasts with force projection plans is critical to success. Force alignment to missions within phases must be documented to enable rapid realignment with the actual mission requirements of a crisis. The OPLAN and the TPFDL structure for an OPORD must be designed to preserve unit integrity, agility, mobility, and security should events or conditions require execution of plan branches or sequels. The force structure must be understood by all supporting commands and enable global force visibility to ensure unity of effort and rapid response to actual operational events.

(b) Rapid force projection and force mobility are keystones of US NMS. **Timely response to crisis situations is critical to US deterrent and warfighting capabilities. The timeliness of US response is a function of US forward deployed forces and prepositioned assets, forces with organic movement capability, and adequate strategic and intratheater mobility capability assets.** Overseas presence, tailored to regional requirements, facilitates force projection by providing needed flexibility. The combination of organic force movement and rapid mobility capabilities, bolstered by pre-positioned assets, provides the supported JFC with flexible mobility options that can be tailored to meet any crisis situation. Deployment operations normally involve a combination of organic and common-user lift supported movements using land (road and rail), sea, and air movement resources, as necessary. **Successful movement depends on the availability of sufficient transportation capabilities to rapidly deploy combat forces, sustain them during an operation, and redeploy them to meet changing mission requirements or to return them to home and/or demobilization stations upon completion of their mission.**

(5) **The Strategic Mobility Triad.** Common-user airlift, sealift, and pre-positioned force, equipment, or supplies constitute the strategic mobility triad shown in Figure I-3. Successful response across the range of military operations depends on sufficient port throughput capacity coupled with the availability of sufficient mobility assets to rapidly deploy combat forces, sustain them in an OA as long as necessary to meet US military objectives, and reconstitute and redeploy them to meet changing mission requirements or to return to home and/or demobilization stations upon completion of their mission. To meet this challenge, United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM’s) transportation component commands (TCCs), Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), and Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), exercise operational control (OPCON) of government-owned or chartered transportation assets for use by all DOD elements and, as authorized, other agencies of the US Government or other approved users. Deployment operations normally involve a combination of land (road and rail), sea, and air movement augmented, as necessary by pre-positioned assets.

(a) **Common-User Airlift.** The pool of common-user airlift consists of designated airlift assets from some or all of the following sources: AC and RC; the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF),
when activated; contracted commercial assets; and foreign military or civil carriers, either donated or under contract.

For additional information, see JP 3-17, Joint Doctrine and Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Air Mobility Operations.

(b) Common-User Sealift. Sealift forces are those militarily useful merchant-type ships available to DOD to execute the sealift requirements of the Defense Transportation System (DTS) across the range of military operations. Called “common-user shipping,” these ships will be engaged in the transportation of cargoes for one or more Services from one seaport to another or to a location at sea in the operational area pending a decision to move the cargo embarked ashore. The sealift force is composed of shipping from some or all of the following sources: active government-owned or controlled shipping; government-owned reserve or inactive shipping; US privately owned and operated commercial shipping; US privately owned, foreign flag commercial shipping; and foreign owned and operated commercial shipping.
For additional information, see JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations.

(c) DOD pre-positioned force, equipment, or supplies programs are both land and sea-based. They are critical programs for reducing closure times of combat and support forces needed in the early stages of a contingency. They also contribute significantly to reducing demands on the DTS.

For additional information, see JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.

(6) Operational and Tactical Deployment. There are numerous transportation resources available to a JFC to support deployment operations. The type and number of sources vary by theater and by missions. Normally, operational and tactical deployment is executed through a combination of resources including: organic assets assigned to the CCDR for common transportation service; host-nation support (HNS) negotiated through bilateral or multilateral agreements; multinational civil transportation support organizations; or third-party logistic operations. When needed, theater lift resources and forces may be augmented by either assigning or attaching additional assets.

4. Integrated Planning and Execution Process

JOPES and the joint operation planning process (JOPP) provide the processes, formats, and systems which link planning for joint force projection to the execution of joint operations. Standard processes that provide a common method for addressing force projection requirements enhance unity of effort. JOPES and JOPP share the same basic approach and problem-solving elements, such as mission analysis and course of action (COA) development. Planning for joint operations is continuous across the full range of military operations using two closely related, integrated, collaborative and adaptive processes – the JOPES and the JOPP. The joint operation process supports the systematic, on-demand, creation and revision of executable plans, with up-to-date options, as circumstances require. A premium is placed on flexibility. The incorporation of collaboration capabilities, relational databases, and decision-support tools promotes planning with real-time access to relevant information and the ability to link planners and selected subject matter experts regardless of their location. The goal is shortened planning timelines and current, high-fidelity, up-to-date plans.

a. JOPES use is directed for all joint force projections. JOPES has three operational activities: situation awareness, planning, and execution. JOPES provides the process, structure, reports, plans, and orders that orchestrate the joint planning and execution community’s (JPEC’s) delivery of the military instrument of national power.

For more discussion on JOPES, see CJCSM 3122 Series, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), for information on JOPES, JOPP adaptive processes see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

b. JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the full range of military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting JFCs and to joint force component commands when the components participate in joint planning. This process is designed to facilitate interaction between the commander, staff, and subordinate headquarters (HQ) throughout planning. The JOPP helps commanders
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and their staffs organize their planning activities, share a common understanding of the mission and commander’s intent, and develop effective plans and orders. This planning process applies to contingency planning and crisis action planning (CAP) within the context of the responsibilities specified by the CJCSM 3122 series (JOPES). JOPP also is used by joint organizations that have no specific JOPES responsibilities. Furthermore, JOPP supports planning throughout the course of an operation after the CJCS, at the direction of the President or SecDef, issues the execute order. In common application, JOPP proceeds according to planning milestones and other requirements established by the commanders at various levels. However, the CJCSM 3122 series specifies joint planning and execution community (JPEC) milestones, deliverables, and interaction points for contingency and crisis-action plans developed per the formal JOPES process. Figure I-4 shows the primary steps of JOPP.

*For more discussion on JOPES, see CJCSM 3122 Series, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), and for information on JOPES and JOPP, as adaptive processes, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning*

5. Integrated Employment and Deployment

Deployment operations support employment of forces. Deployment positions mission ready forces to execute the supported commander’s OPLANs. Deployment plans align with the employment and deliver forces when and where they are required. Employment is normally divided into a series of phases. Within those phases, missions are identified and prioritized. Forces are selected based on their ability to execute specific required missions. Any mission may require integrated or synchronized support

![Joint Operation Planning Process Diagram](image-url)
from one or more Service forces. Deployment processes, systems, and plans must provide the supported commander with a joint force and the flexibility to redeploy forces as required to achieve the transition criteria for each phase of the operation and ultimately, mission success.

a. Operation Phase Model. The operation phase model is an element of operational design and is used to arrange operations. It assists the JFC to visualize and think through the entire operation to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space, and purpose. Phasing (Figure I-5) enables commanders to systematically achieve objectives that cannot be attained all at once. It can be used to gain progressive advantages and assist in achieving objectives as quickly and effectively as possible. Phasing also provides a framework for assessing risk to portions of an operation or campaign and planning to mitigate that risk. Phasing the operation assists in framing commander’s intent and assigning tasks to subordinate commanders. By arranging operations and activities into phases, the JFC can better integrate and synchronize subordinate operations in time, space, and purpose; however, phasing is only part of a model and at any given time, the joint force will be operating across several phases simultaneously. As such, a phase represents a definitive stage during which a large portion of the forces and joint/multinational capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities. During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, or events for transitioning from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for potential contingencies. The JFC adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the adversary or operational situation or to react to unforeseen conditions. The transitions between phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force,
often accompanied by changes in command or support relationships. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the design of the OA and should be thoroughly planned to avoid loss of momentum. This challenge demands an agile shift in joint force skill sets, actions, organizational behaviors, and mental outlooks. The operation phase model provides a flexible model to arrange combat and noncombat stability operations. This model can be applied throughout and across the range of military operations. Once the crisis is defined, deter phase actions may include mobilization, tailoring of forces and other predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater; employment of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets to provide real-time and near-real-time awareness of the operational environment; and development of mission tailored command and control (C2), intelligence, force protection, and logistic requirements to support the JFC’s CONOPS. Predeployment activities and the initial deployment into a theater normally occur during the deter phase, however deployment and redeployment can occur during any of the phases. Redeployment operations, particularly for combat units, will often begin during the stabilize phase and should be identified and planned as early as possible. The operation or campaign is concluded when the national strategy end state is achieved and redeployment operations are complete.

For more discussion on phasing, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.

b. Force Planning. The purpose of force planning is to identify all forces needed to accomplish the supported commander’s CONOPS and phase the forces into the theater. It consists of determining the force requirements by operation phase, mission, mission priority, mission sequence, and OA. It includes major force phasing; integration planning; force list structure development; followed by force list development. Force planning is the responsibility of the CCDR supported by the Service component commanders, the Joint Staff J-8 as the global force manager, and Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (CDRUSJFCOM) as the joint force provider. The primary objectives of force planning are to apply the right force to the mission while ensuring force visibility, force mobility, and adaptability. Force planning begins during CONOPS development. The supported commander determines force requirements, develops a TPFDD and letter of instruction (LOI), and designs force modules to align and time-phase the forces in accordance with (IAW) the CONOPS. Major combat forces are selected from those apportioned for planning or allocated for execution and included in the supported commander’s CONOPS by operation phase, mission, and mission priority. The Service components then collaboratively make tentative assessments of the combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) required IAW the CONOPS. After the actual forces are sourced, the CCDR refines the force plan to ensure it supports the CONOPS, provides force visibility, and enables flexibility. The commander identifies and resolves or reports shortfalls.

6. Deployment Process and Phases

a. Deployment Process. The joint deployment process is a dynamic and complicated process, beginning when force projection planning is initiated by a strategic or operational directive and ends when a force arrives at the prescribed destination, integrates into the joint force, and is declared ready to conduct operations by the JFC. Deployment planning occurs during both JOPES contingency planning and CAP. It is conducted at all command levels and by both the supported and supporting commanders. Pre-deployment activities are all actions taken by the JPEC, before actual movement, to prepare to execute a deployment operation. In the simplest form, the movement encompasses two primary nodes,
point of origin and destination. This simplest form occurs in the continental United States (CONUS), operational intertheater and intratheater deployments, and during the movement of self-deploying forces. The more complex form encompasses four primary nodes, point of origin, port of embarkation (POE), port of debarkation (POD), and destination. In the more complex form there are three major movement “legs,” point of origin to POE, POE to POD, POD to destination. The more complex form occurs when forces without organic lift capability deploy from one theater to another on strategic lift capability. The final phase, JRSOI, integrates the deploying forces into the joint operation. Joint force deployment has numerous process stakeholders and process seams, resulting from the multitude of organizations and functional processes involved in deployment planning and execution. Deployment stakeholders include the supported commander, operational commanders of forces, and supporting commanders of forces or organizations with a deployment mission. Ideally, all process stakeholders will endeavor to ensure operational effectiveness (defined by successful mission accomplishment consistent with the supported commander’s CONOPS and deployment efficiency (optimally phased force deployment and sustainment delivery with economical and effective use of available resources). Process seams may occur at functional or organizational interfaces when physical resources or information is transferred. Friction between operational and supporting stakeholders or process seams reduces the operational effectiveness and efficiency of the deployment process. The supported commanders reduce deployment execution friction by:

(1) Linking deployment to employment mission and force requirements;

(2) Minimizing CONOPS changes but providing rapid dissemination of operation changes when they occur;

(3) Effective coordination and collaboration with other process stakeholders;

(4) Requiring accurate and early reporting of movement support requirements;

(5) Following JOPES deployment procedures.

b. Deployment Phases. The joint deployment process is divided into four phases: planning, predeployment activities, movement, and JRSOI. They are iterative and often occur simultaneously throughout an operation. The phases as well as a depiction of the “backward” planning sequence required in deployment planning are outlined in Figure I-6.

(1) Deployment planning occurs during both JOPES contingency planning and CAP. It is conducted at all command levels and by both the supported and supporting commanders. Deployment planning activities include all action required to plan for a deployment and employment of forces. Deployment planning activities must be coordinated among the supported combatant command responsible for accomplishment of the assigned mission, the Services, and the supporting combatant commands providing forces for the joint force mission. Normally, supported CCDRs, their subordinate commanders, and their Service components are responsible for providing mission statements, theater support parameters, intertheater lift requirements, applicable host nation (HN) environmental standards, and pre-positioned equipment planning guidance during predeployment activities. The Services are responsible to organize, train, and equip interoperable forces for assignment to combatant commands and to prepare plans for
their mobilization when required (see Department of Defence Directive (DODD) 5100.1, Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components). Supporting CCDRs are responsible for providing trained and mission-ready forces to the supported combatant command. Service deployment planning activities should be coordinated with supporting combatant command planning activities to ensure that standards specified by the supported CCDR are achieved, supporting personnel and forces arrive in the supported theater fully prepared to perform their mission, and deployment delays caused by duplication of predeployment efforts are eliminated.

(2) Predeployment activities are all actions taken by the JPEC, before actual movement, to prepare to execute a deployment operation. It includes continued refinement of OPLANs, from the strategic to the tactical level at the supported and supporting commands. It includes sourcing forces, completion of operation specific training, and mission rehearsals. As early as possible in pre-deployment, movement requirements are identified and lift support requirements are reported and scheduled. Personnel and equipment movement preparation is competed and verified. Accompanying sustainment is identified and prepared for movement.
(3) **Movement** includes the movement of self-deploying units and those that require lift support. It includes movements within CONUS, deployments within an AOR, and end-to-end origin to destination strategic moves.

(a) Though all forces are initially on the TPFDD, they may not always deploy in that order. During the initial and subsequent deployments, DOD leadership may use RFF and DEPORD as means to effect creation or sourcing of additional force requirements in the TPFDD. The supported commander issues the RFF message when he determines that additional forces, over and above those that have been previously approved by the SecDef, are required to support military operations. Deployments under RFFs or DEPORDs can significantly impact the subsequent flow of forces. Commanders and their staffs must understand the associated risks and impact of additional force flow that has not been previously planned. The TPFDD validation process ensures satisfaction of the deployment standards and controls deployments into and within the operation. Successful deployment movements are characterized by careful planning and flexible execution. Careful and detailed planning ensures that only required personnel, equipment, and materiel deploy, unit movement changes are minimized, and the flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel into theater supports the CONOPS.

(b) Deployment movement occurs in both intertheater and intratheater.

(4) The final phase, JRSOI, is the critical link between deployment and employment of the joint forces in the OA. It integrates the deploying forces into the joint operation and is the responsibility of the supported CCDR. Deployment is not complete until the deploying unit is a functioning part of the joint force. The time between the initial arrival of the deploying unit and its operational employment is potentially the period of its greatest vulnerability. During this transition period, the deploying unit may not fully sustain itself, defend itself, or contribute to mission accomplishment because some of its elements have not attained required mission capability. JRSOI planning is focused on the rapid integration of deploying forces and capabilities to quickly make them functioning and contributing elements of the joint force.

7. Force Visibility

Force visibility shows the current and accurate status of forces at the strategic and operational level; their current mission; future missions; location; mission priority and readiness status. Force visibility provides information on the location, operational tempo, assets and sustainment requirements of a force as part of an overall capability for a CCDR. Force visibility integrates operations and logistics information and facilitates global force management, and enhances the capability of the entire JPEC to adapt rapidly to unforeseen events, to respond and ensure capability delivery. **Force visibility enhances situational awareness and is required to support force sourcing, allocation, assignment of forces; force position; sustainment forecasting and delivery; and forecasting for future force requirements.** It is the responsibility of the JPEC.

a. **Asset visibility (AV) is a subcomponent of force visibility.** It provides commanders and planners with “one stop shopping” for timely and accurate information on the location, movement,
status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment (maintenance and retrograde actions), and supplies by class of supply, nomenclature and unit during deployment operations. AV also includes in-transit visibility (ITV) over equipment, supplies, or personnel.

b. ITV is a component of AV. When applied to an operation, it provides visibility of deploying and redeploying forces as well as sustainment en route to an operation or a unit. ITV, as a component of AV, preserves the link between the in-transit force and that force’s mission within an operation phase through the force requirement number. ITV can be divided into levels of visibility: force movements associated with a specific operation; force movements for a specific phase, mission, and OA/destination; the movements of a force or unit as a capability with a specific mission; visibility of a lift mission; and in the box or item visibility. Patient movement ITV is documented utilizing the USTRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System (TRAC2ES). Movement of all non-unit personnel, equipment, and supplies; and retrograde actions will generally not have transportation and item level visibility unless they are included in a TPFDD.

For more information on force visibility, see Chapter V, “Movement.”

8. Sustainment Delivery

Sustainment delivery is the process of providing and maintaining levels of personnel and materiel required to sustain combat and mission activity at the level of intensity dictated by the CONOPS. Sustainment is ongoing throughout the entire operation and like deployment and redeployment, should be aligned with the mission and mission priorities of each phase. Sustainment delivery must frequently be balanced against force deployment or redeployment requirements because these operations share the same deployment and distribution infrastructure and other resources. However, deployment and force integration can be adversely affected by excess or insufficient sustainment support; hence operation planning must integrate deployment and sustainment operations.

9. Redeployment

“Operation DESERT SHIELD was the fastest build up and movement of combat power across greater distances in less time than at any other time in history. It was an absolutely gigantic accomplishment, and I can’t give credit enough to the logisticians and transporters who were able to pull this off.”

General H. Norman Schwarzkopf

Redeployment operations are normally conducted to reposture forces and materiel in the same theater, to transfer forces and materiel to support another JFC’s CONOPS for employment, or to return personnel and materiel to home station and/or demobilization stations upon completion of their mission. Similar to deployment operations, redeployment planning decisions to reposture, transfer, or return forces and materiel are based on the operational environment in the AOR or JOA at the time of redeployment. The operational environment dictates the level of protection measures required ensuring
an uninterrupted redeployment flow, the redeployment policy of the supported CCDR, and the mobility options needed to support the redeployment. During redeployments to support movement of the joint force, some tactical considerations may be sacrificed for speed, control, and efficiency during movement. These redeployments are: conducted when little or no threat is anticipated that could impede or interdict the transportation flow; seeking the most expeditious means to rapidly move forces and materiel; and focused on the simple movement from one location to another of forces and materiel in support of the joint force mission. Movement at the strategic or operational level could include redeployment of the joint force upon completion of its mission within the AOR and/or JOA. Redeployment planning considerations and execution activities are outlined in Chapter VII, “Redeployment.”

10. Training, Exercises, and Assessments

A robust capability to deploy and redeploy in response to mission taskings is achieved by training and exercising the Armed Forces of the United States as they are intended to employ in the most probable operations as defined by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), with current procedures and supporting system. The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) outlines deployment tasks and supporting tasks at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare for mission-essential task list development.

a. Training. The goal of individual training is to train those personnel responsible for planning and executing deployment operations consistent with current joint deployment and redeployment doctrine. Classroom training for JOPES operators is available through US Joint Forces Command’s (USJFCOM’s) Joint Deployment Training Center (JDTC). Course information and scheduling is available through the JDTC website.

For additional information, see CJCSM 3500.03A, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, CJCSM 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), and CJCSI 3500.01C, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States.

b. Joint and Multinational Exercises. Joint exercises offer an opportunity for joint force personnel to plan and execute deployment operations. Exercises involving multinational forces offer an opportunity for US forces to demonstrate their proficiency at deployment operations to support concepts of operation involving multinational partners, while affording US planners the opportunity to benefit from learning allied and/or coalition capabilities and limitations.

(1) Exercise Planning Considerations. When conducting deployment or redeployment operations in exercises, fundamental considerations must be given to the items shown in Figure 1-7.

(2) Use of Modeling and Simulation. Conduct of computer assisted exercises using modern modeling and simulation (M&S) systems and techniques to simulate execution of real world TPFDDs may be used to identify deficiencies in real world deployment concepts and TPFDD. Deployment exercises can also provide valuable training to joint and Service staffs and can be conducted during exercises sponsored by the CJCS, combatant commands, or Services.

c. Assessments. Joint operation planning prepares for the use of existing capabilities to achieve objectives defined in the NMS. Execution of the resultant plans during contingencies, joint training, and
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Exercises provides a measurement of the nation’s ability to successfully prosecute the NMS within the constraints of available forces and resources. This measurement provides a means of assessing the balance between strategy and capabilities, assessing joint force readiness, and focusing the acquisition of additional resources and capabilities. Assessment is a vital component of joint force training and exercise programs. M&S systems and techniques can significantly enhance assessment capability during deployment planning and exercises. Exercise deployment operations evaluation criteria should be measurable and compatible with the overall exercise constraints. The exercise sponsor should establish broad objectives that can be translated into more specific objectives during exercise planning conferences and reflected within the exercise schedule. At a minimum, the following aspects of exercise deployment operations should be evaluated.

1. Alignment of joint operation, operation planning and deployment doctrine with JOPES procedures.

2. Proper use of JOPES procedures.

Figure I-7. Exercise Planning Considerations

- Developing specific, measurable, and attainable deployment and/or redeployment exercise objectives.
- Providing for sufficient deployment or redeployment actions to support the objectives of the exercise.
- Creating as realistic a deployment or redeployment exercise environment as possible.
- Assessing and evaluating deployment or redeployment operation planning and execution.
- Exercising intelligence support to deployment and redeployment operations.
(3) Effectiveness of the CCDR’s TPFDD structure in providing force visibility.

(4) The interfaces between JOPES, Service deployment systems, and the Global Transportation Network (GTN).

(5) The interface between JOPES, Service, and USTRANSCOM deployment procedures.

(6) Intelligence support for deployment operations.

(7) Movement management plans to include C2, management of the operational environment, and mechanism for enforcement of the CCDR’s concept of operation phase priorities at nodes.

(8) Deployment adaptability to operational events.

(9) Force protection measures employed during deployment operations.

(10) Optimal use of all available component and allied and/or coalition lift assets.

“INTERNAL LOOK was a joint exercise with all Services and component commands represented and thoroughly integrated. . . [Exercise] INTERNAL LOOK provided an essential common framework to participants during the war. When actual deployments began during [Operation] DESERT SHIELD, planners would routinely remark, “We did this on [Exercise] INTERNAL LOOK.”

Certain Victory: The US Army in the Gulf War, by Brigadier General Robert H. Scales
CHAPTER II
RESPONSIBILITIES

“All over the ship the tension that had been slowly building up since our departure was now approaching its climax. Even the Yellow Sea rushing past the ship’s sides seemed to bespeak the urgency of our mission. That night, about half past two, I took a turn around the deck. The ship was blacked out from stem to stern. At their posts and battle stations the crew members were alert and silent, no longer exchanging the customary banter. At the bow I stood listening to the rush of the sea and watched the fiery sparklets of phosphorescence as the dark ship plowed toward the target, the armada of other craft converging on the same area, all now past the point of no return. Within five hours, 40,000 men would act boldly, in hope that 100,000 others manning the thin defense lines in South Korea would not die. I alone was responsible for tomorrow, and if I failed, the dreadful results would rest on judgment day against my soul.”

Thoughts of General Douglas MacArthur in the predawn hours prior to the Inchon landings, Reminiscences, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

1. General

   a. This chapter identifies the responsibilities, roles, and relationships of the commands and agencies involved in deployment operations.

   b. Basic responsibilities for commands and entities involved in joint deployment operations are outlined in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System. Clearly articulating responsibilities is the first step in fully synchronized and coordinated deployment operations supporting the range of military operations.

2. Secretary of Defense

   The SecDef is responsible for the assignment of forces and resources to the combatant commands to perform missions assigned to those commands. In addition, SecDef is responsible for transportation planning and operations within the DOD. The SecDef has designated the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics to establish policies and provide guidance to DOD components concerning the effective and efficient use of the DTS. The SecDef has designated CDRUSJFCOM as the Joint Deployment Process Owner and the Joint Force Provider for forces (except designated forces sourced by United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and USTRANSCOM, and the Commander, United States Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) is designated DODs’ single manager for transportation and the Distribution Process Owner.
3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

As the principal military advisor to the President, National Security Council (NSC), and SecDef, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is assigned specific supervisory and joint operation planning responsibilities in the areas of strategic direction, strategic planning, and joint operation planning. The CJCS’s responsibilities most directly related to deployment operations include the following:

a. Prepares joint logistic and mobility plans to support strategic plans and recommends the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Military Services IAW those plans.

b. Provides for the preparation and review of joint OPLANs that conform to policy guidance from the President and the SecDef.

c. Prepares joint logistic and mobility plans to support joint OPLANs, recommends the assignment of logistic and mobility responsibilities to the Armed Forces IAW those logistic and mobility plans, and ascertains the logistic support available to execute the CCDR’s general war and joint OPLANs. The CJCS also will review and recommend to the SecDef appropriate logistic guidance for the Military Services that, if implemented, will result in logistic readiness consistent with approved plans.

d. Advises the SecDef on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities (including manpower, logistic, and mobility support) identified during the preparation and review of OPLANs and assesses the effect of noted deficiencies and strengths on meeting national security objectives, policies, and strategic plans.

e. Prepares integrated plans for military mobilization.

f. Participates, as directed, in the preparation of multinational plans for military action in conjunction with the other nations’ armed forces.

g. Upon assignment by SecDef, oversees the activities of the combatant commands. Such assignment does not confer any command authority on the CJCS and does not alter the responsibilities of the CCDRs.

h. Reviews the plans and programs of CCDRs to determine their adequacy, consistency, acceptability, and feasibility for the performance of assigned missions.

i. Provides guidance and direction to the CCDRs on aspects of C2 that relate to the conduct of operations.

j. Performs as the Global Force Manager to integrate the force management processes (assignment, apportionment, and allocation of joint forces).
k. Develops a standardized joint deployment planning and execution process, with common data elements and terms, supported by clearly delineated procedures for implementation throughout the JPEC.

l. Establishes procedures (in coordination with the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense [Transportation Policy], the Secretaries of the Military Departments, and the Defense Logistics Agency [DLA]) for the submission of movement requirements by DOD user components to USTRANSCOM and for the submission of evaluated requirements and capabilities by USTRANSCOM and the TCCs to the CJCS.

m. Prescribes a movement priority system in agreement with Uniform Material Movement and Issue Priority System that will ensure responsiveness to meet the needs of the CCDR.

n. Monitors the capabilities of USTRANSCOM common-user transportation resources to provide airlift, sealift, land transportation within the US, common-user ocean terminal service, and aerial port service based upon the requirements of CCDRs and DOD components.

o. Assigns movement priorities in support of DOD components based upon capabilities reported by USTRANSCOM.

p. Apportions strategic lift assets through the CJCSI 3110.01, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), and CJCSI 3110.11E, Mobility Supplement to Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan.

q. Allocates strategic lift assets through the CJCS execute order to the supported CCDR.

r. If required, acts on the recommendations of the CJCS Joint Transportation Board (JTB) with respect to the establishment of priorities and apportionment for the use of airlift, sealift, and surface transportation capability. The JTB monitors the balance between DOD transportation requirements and capabilities through close liaison with the CCDRs and USTRANSCOM. Once armed with CJCS priorities, USTRANSCOM closely collaborates with the CCDR(s) and other CJCS-designated agencies to meet President or SecDef objectives while keeping Joint Staff directorates informed. A joint deployment distribution operations center (JDDOC), established in each geographic CCDR’s AOR and acting in consonance with the CCDR’s priorities, uses reachback linkages to USTRANSCOM, the DLA, USJFCOM, the Services, and other partners to synchronize and optimize the flow of forces and sustainment in, through and out of a theater. Service participation and considerations in transportation decision making are appropriately raised through supported Service components to the CCDR. CDRUSTRANSCOM refers problems with recommended COAs to the JTB for resolution or adjudication if a balance of transportation requirements and capabilities cannot be maintained.

s. Develops, implements, monitors, and assesses joint education and training programs to improve deployment, JRSOI, and redeployment planning and execution.

t. Ensures that deployment planning and execution is assessed during all joint force operations as well as CJCS and combatant command-sponsored joint exercises.
u. The CJCS issues prepare to DEPORDs, deployment orders, and orders for execution of deployment operations after authorization by the SecDef.

See CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, (JOPES) Volume I: (Planning Policies and Procedures), for examples.

4. Geographic Combatant Commands

   a. CCDRs operation planning responsibilities are described in the Unified Command Plan (UCP), JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. Geographic CCDRs are responsible for coordinating with USTRANSCOM and supporting CCDRs to provide an integrated transportation system from origin to destination during deployment operations.

   b. Responsibilities of Supported CCDRs. Supported CCDRs are responsible for deployment operations planned and executed during joint force missions in their AORs. This responsibility includes identification of the movement, timing, and sequence of deploying forces in the TPFDD, reception and integration of supporting units and materiel arriving in theater to support the operation, and assisting these units as required through to redeployment. Working through the US Department of State (DOS), supported CCDRs negotiate HN diplomatic clearances and reception POD access when required, for deploying forces. For air movements, supported CCDRs must ensure that over flight and landing clearances are secured prior to the departure of forces from POEs. Supported CCDRs have four major responsibilities relative to deployment operations: build and validate movement requirements based on the CONOPS; determine predeployment standards; balance and regulate the transportation flow; and manage effectively as reflected in Figure II-1.

      (1) Build and Validate Force and Movement Requirements. Based on an approved CONOPS, the supported CCDR builds and validates force and movement requirements. Building force and movement requirements encompasses the supported commander providing detailed phase, mission, mission priority, and force tracking information. This effort permits force visibility and supports the CONOPS. To facilitate this process, the supported CCDR publishes a TPFDD LOI which provides specific guidance for supporting CCDRs, Services and agencies. The supported CCDR validates movement requirements for all forces and agencies deploying or redeploying in support of an operation by phase. Expeditious and thorough validation of movement requirements requires comprehensive, collaborative, and coordinated procedures. The supported CCDR provides validated movement requirements to the supporting commands and DOD agencies for mission, force, training, sustainment and transportation planning. In addition, supported geographic CCDRs also designate latest arrival and required delivery dates to the force providers and USTRANSCOM. The supported CCDR specifies key employment information regarding when, where, and how forces will be employed by phase. Service component commanders play a key role in advising the supported CCDR regarding the appropriate types and missions for the forces they provide. Employment information provided by the supported CCDR helps to ensure JPEC actions remain consistent with the CONOPS.

      (2) Determine Predeployment Standards. Supported CCDRs establish predeployment standards for augmentation or replacement personnel and forces supporting their operations. Predeployment standards outline the basic command policies, training, and equipment requirements
necessary to prepare supporting personnel and forces for the tactical, environmental, and/or medical conditions in theater. The Services’ and Commander, United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM’s) role is to ensure that designated forces for combatant commands are trained, maintained, and ready IAW these predeployment standards. Predeployment standards help ensure that all supporting personnel and forces arrive in theater fully prepared to perform their mission.

(a) **Preparation for Deployment.** Preparation for deployment is primarily a Service responsibility. Specific responsibility for preparation for overseas deployment rests with the deploying unit or Service in the case of individual augmentees or replacements. For in lieu of and joint sourcing solutions, the resourcing of preparation and training will be IAW Service to Service memorandums of agreement. Usually, the deploying unit commander must acknowledge completion of specified preparation for deployment requirements to the supported command during predeployment activities. In some instances, legal constraints may be in place that affect personnel readiness if specific training requirements have not been completed.

(b) **Predeployment Training.** In addition to preparation for overseas movement, supported CCDRs may identify mission-specific training requirements that supporting individuals or units must complete before operational employment. This training may be conducted at home station prior to deployment or en route to the OA, depending upon the supported CCDR’s deployment
Chapter II

concept. The supported CCDR should, at a minimum, specify theater-unique clothing and equipment requirements and mission-essential tasks to be trained prior to arrival in theater.

PREDEPLOYMENT PREPARATION: TWO PERSPECTIVES

“Prior to a unit’s initial deployment, there was usually time for some final training and organization, but not always. Haste often undermined a unit’s readiness. . . Although the 1st Cavalry [Division] had been training for two years as the 11th Air Assault Division at Fort Benning, its members had received no jungle training and the division was issued M16 rifles only ten days prior to its departure, resulting in a hurried familiarization program.”

“Marines, prior to shipping out to ‘WestPac,’ returned from leave to a staging battalion. Staging battalions provided a final bit of pre-Vietnam refresher training and was a catchall for shots and paperwork before departure. Even Marines who had previously been to Vietnam went through a staging battalion before returning for another tour. . . Marine replacements went through a staging regimen that included three weeks of refresher infantry training, instruction in topics relating to Vietnam — such as booby traps — and the bureaucratic paper-pushing that accompanies all military moves.”


(3) Balance and Regulate the Force Flow. The TPFDD and the validation process, supported by strategic, operational, and tactical movement control organizations, manage the flow of forces and ensure effective interfaces between strategic and intratheater movements. At a minimum the validation process must ensure adaptability to operational events and opportunities. The JRSOI processes must support the CCDR’s requirement for flexibility in mission execution. Often, protection concerns cause the supported CCDR to accelerate the deployment of combat units ahead of support elements. In this situation, planning, agility, and unity of effort of the JPEC is essential to ensure no degradation of combat effectiveness. However, to the maximum extent possible, the supported CCDRs should balance and regulate the flow of forces with the flow of sustainment. Operational environment, available infrastructure, protection risk assessment, and the CONOPS are major factors in determining how to balance the flow of forces and capabilities.

(4) Manage Effectively. Supported CCDRs balance the transportation flow of the joint force through effective employment planning. Balance is primarily a function of effective mission prioritization, alignment of forces, force composition, and force flow but must also consider planned theater distribution (TD) and JRSOI requirements and capabilities. Force composition and transportation flow must accommodate mission requirements providing the supported CCDR with the operational flexibility and freedom of action required for successful mission execution.

c. Responsibilities of Supporting Combatant Commanders. Supporting missions during deployment of the joint force could include; the deployment or redeployment of forces to or from a
supporting combatant command; sponsorship of en route basing or in-transit staging areas; or providing sustainment from theater stocks. Regardless of the supporting mission, the primary task for supporting combatant commands is to ensure that the supported CCDR receives the timely and complete support needed to accomplish the mission. Supporting CCDRs have five major deployment responsibilities:

Figure II-2. Responsibilities of Supporting Combatant Commanders

- **Source, Prepare, and Verify Forces.** Supporting CCDRs are responsible to the supported CCDR for the accurate reporting of their movement requirements data. Unit verification of movement data must begin at the deploying unit level since the deploying unit is most familiar with what it is deploying for the operation. Verified movement requirements data and ITV data in electronic format is compiled at each successive level of command until received by the combatant command from its components. Verified movement requirements data is then provided to the supported combatant command for planning and execution.

  - **NOTE:** TPFDD validation is only performed by the supported CCDR. Certified data from supporting commands, supporting agencies, and subordinate joint task forces (JTFs) is officially validated for USTRANSCOM movement scheduling by the supported CCDR.

(1) **Source, Prepare, and Verify Forces.** Supporting CCDRs are responsible to the supported CCDR for the accurate reporting of their movement requirements data. Unit verification of movement data must begin at the deploying unit level since the deploying unit is most familiar with what it is deploying for the operation. Verified movement requirements data and ITV data in electronic format is compiled at each successive level of command until received by the combatant command from its components. Verified movement requirements data is then provided to the supported combatant command for planning and execution.

(2) **Ensure units retain their visibility and mobility.**

(3) **Ensure units report their movement requirements rapidly and accurately.**
(4) **Regulate the Support Flow.** Supporting CCDRs should establish a movement control system capable of interfacing with USTRANSCOM’s Deployment Distribution Operations Center (DDOC), and the supported CCDR’s movement control systems. The supporting CCDR’s movement control system should regulate the transportation flow of support personnel, forces, equipment, and materiel originating in the AOR and facilitate the flow of transient forces by securing overflight and landing diplomatic clearances and en route basing rights and support (aircraft services, fuel). Supporting combatant command movement control systems must be able to respond to changes or unforeseen circumstances that develop during mission execution. For deployments to another theater, the supporting CCDR should also establish POE support activities, which could include arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG), port support activities (PSAs), port operations group (POG), or movement control organizations to facilitate deployment operations.

(5) **Coordinate Effectively.** The key to success in supporting operations is effective and responsive coordination and collaboration. This is best accomplished by establishing a collaborative process early on and throughout deployment operations. Supporting combatant commands must remain cognizant of the needs of the supported CCDR. Situational awareness is accomplished by supporting combatant commands maintaining a broad operational focus, anticipating requirements, and resolving support issues before they negatively impact joint force operations. Successful coordination by supporting combatant commands facilitates the supported CCDR’s requirement to synchronize deployment and employment needs of the operational mission.

5. **Functional Combatant Commands**

Supported CCDRs capitalize on the power inherent in joint operations by synchronizing the complementary warfighting capabilities of all the Services and supporting commands into a unified effort. Moreover, CCDRs are responsible for unified actions that are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with actions of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations. Because of the numerous process stakeholders, successful deployment operations require unity of effort. Normally, several functional combatant commands are involved in every phase of a joint operation. Four functional combatant commands could be involved in deployment of the joint force; USJFCOM, USSOCOM, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), and USTRANSCOM.

a. **United States Joint Forces Command.** USJFCOM supports deployment operations under its UCP responsibilities as the lead joint force integrator, leader of joint concept development, lead agent for joint force training and the primary conventional joint force provider to CCDRs, which includes serving as the DOD Joint Deployment Process Owner (JDPO). As JDPO, USJFCOM is responsible for maintaining the global capability for rapid and decisive military force power projection. As the JDPO, USJFCOM is responsible for leading the collaborative efforts of the JPEC to improve the joint deployment and redeployment processes, while maintaining the overall effectiveness of deployment and redeployment processes so that all supported joint force commanders and supporting DOD components can execute military force power projection more effectively and efficiently.

(1) As the joint force trainer USJFCOM provides JTF staff training through joint operations staff training programs and simulation-driven JTF command post exercises.
(2) USJFCOM serves as an integrator of capabilities from the five Services, RC, and interagency sources. Additionally, USJFCOM’s integration effort is primarily focused on developing and maintaining technological interoperability among Service systems employed by joint HQ and staffs.

(3) USJFCOM also serves as the joint force provider for conventional forces. Supported by its four Service component commands: US Army Forces Command, US Marine Corps Forces Command, US Fleet Forces Command, and Air Combat Command, USJFCOM identifies conventional force sourcing solutions in response to supported CCDR requirements.

(4) USJFCOM also serves as the joint deployment trainer provided by its JDTC. The JDTC develops standardized Joint Deployment Process curricula to educate and train the DOD and select government/nongovernmental organizations.

For more information on the Joint Deployment Process Owner, see DODD 5158.5, Joint Deployment Process Owner.

b. United States Special Operations Command. USSOCOM involvement in deployment operations is two-fold: USSOCOM-assigned assets may be deployed or redeployed as a result of special operation forces (SOF) mission taskings or USSOCOM may provide SOF mission support to conventional joint force deployment.

(1) On occasion, USSOCOM may require common-user transportation assets to deploy or redeploy SOF. Compared to conventional force operations, SOF deployment operations are relatively small in scale. However, given the nature of most SOF missions, time constraints, planning considerations, or special mission requirements may place unique demands on common-user transportation assets utilized for deployment of SOF.

(2) SOF Mission Support. Several SOF mission areas could directly support joint force deployment operations. Based on mission requirements and the operational environment, SOF could provide the JFC with the capability to set the conditions for entry operations, conduct direct actions to support deployment operations, or provide increased awareness of the operational environment through special reconnaissance. Psychological operations (PSYOP) can be a significant force multiplier through the conduct of mass communication activities that reduce the efficiency of adversary forces and create disaffection within adversary ranks. Use of civil affairs assets can mitigate the extent to which civilian matters negatively impact military operations, provide the JFC with a sensing of HN attitudes and capabilities, and enhance economy of force by reducing the need to divert combat forces from essential duties by planning for and using local resources.

See JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, for additional information.

c. United States Strategic Command. The USSTRATCOM theater planning response cell (TPRC) provides advisors for the supported CCDR. The TPRC will be provided by USSTRATCOM upon supported CCDR request and will report as designated by the geographic CCDR. The TPRC coordinates with the mission-planning facilities of USSTRATCOM for the utilization of nuclear weapons.
d. **United States Transportation Command** USTRANSCOM responsibilities include the following:

1. USTRANSCOM is the DOD Distribution Process Owner. As the DOD Distribution Process Owner, USTRANSCOM oversees the overall effectiveness, efficiency, and alignment of DOD-wide distribution activities, including force projection, sustainment, and redeployment/retrograde operations, and to establish the concepts of operation frameworks relating to the planning and execution of the DOD transportation operations.

2. Provide air, land, and sea transportation and common-user port management at air and sea POE and/or POD for DOD across the range of military operations. Also provide air transportation to numerous non-DOD agencies at the direction of the President or SecDef through the CJCS.

3. RC forces are under USTRANSCOM authority only when mobilized or ordered to active duty for other than training. This includes CRAF and National Defense Reserve Fleet lift assets.

4. Exercise responsibility for global air, land, and sea transportation planning (contingency and crisis action).

5. Act as the DOD focal point for items in the transportation pipeline. Ensure effective interfaces between the GTN and JOPES leading to force ITV.

6. Provide ITV for all force movements supported by transportation activities and all sustainment movements. Report all Service and transportation system interface failures during CAP operations. Report incorrectly prepared, delayed, or frustrated cargo and personnel to the Service, USJFCOM, and the CCDR to support operation decision-making and ensure accurate corrections without loss of visibility.

7. Provide DOD global patient movement in coordination with geographic combatant commands through the DTS.

8. Provide geographic CCDRs with coordinated transportation planning expertise required during the contingency planning process. This includes reviewing the JSCP tasking, analyzing supported CCDR requirements registered in the JOPES for transportation feasibility, and advising the CCDR of changes required to produce a sustainable force deployment concept. In addition, provide plan maintenance support to the supported CCDR as required or directed by the CJCS.

9. Provide deployment lift estimates and total lift asset availability to the President or SecDef and supported CCDRs for development of alternative COAs and optimal flow of forces during CAP. USTRANSCOM will also advise supported CCDRs and the CJCS concerning use of or changes to lift allocations.

10. Assist the supported CCDR and ensure that validated movement requirements are routed and scheduled IAW the CONOPS. Recommend reallocation of strategic lift assets to optimize their
Responsibilities

use and support plan execution during deployment, employment, sustainment, reconstitution, and redeployment.

(11) Single Port Management. In addition to its other responsibilities, USTRANSCOM was designated by the SecDef as the single worldwide manager for common-user POE and POD. Operational experience has shown that the single port manager (SPM) is necessary to improve the planning and execution of port management operations and ensure the seamless transfer of cargo and equipment in any given theater. Under SPM USTRANSCOM, through AMC, operates strategic aerial ports in theaters. Additionally USTRANSCOM, through SDDC, manages seaports of embarkation and debarkation in any given theater. Key aspects of the SPM construct are that SDDC will: provide planners to supported combatant commands to develop seaport management and operations requirements; at the request of the supported CCDR, conduct seaport assessments, establish contact with local seaport authorities, and determine availability of HNS; and deploy a seaport management cell into theater, when required, to act as seaport manager throughout the operation.

(12) Liaison. USTRANSCOM provides liaison officers to all geographic CCDRs to assist in coordination of strategic mobility issues. USTRANSCOM and its components may provide additional technical experts to facilitate planning and execution on an as needed basis as requested by the supported CCDR.

(13) Joint Mobility Control Group. The Joint Mobility Control Group (JMCG) serves as the focal point to orchestrate and optimize DTS operations in support of the CCDRs and other customers. The JMCG provides visibility of movement requirements and C2 of global mobility forces and other assets.

(a) The JMCG consists of eight elements: USTRANSCOM’s DDOC; command center elements of the three TCCs; the SDDC Joint Traffic Management Office; the Joint Intelligence Operations Center - Transportation (JIOC TRANS); the Global Patient Movement Requirements Center; and the Joint Operational Support Airlift Center. The JMCG provides improved customer support through teaming of USTRANSCOM and the TCCs organized to support specific combatant command clients.

(b) USTRANSCOM’s DDOC, organized under its Operations Directorate (J-3), is the nucleus of the JMCG. The DDOC is the single focal point for all combatant command and major shipper customers, including the Office of the SecDef, Joint Staff, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, DLA, and the Services. The DDOC monitors the status of planned and ongoing movements in the DTS through GTN. GTN provides the central database for all scheduled transportation movements. The central database for all transportation requirements is the TPFDD. Once a mission is allocated to a validated TPFDD requirement, GTN will post this mission number into the TPFDD. USTRANSCOM uses several systems (discussed in Appendix A, “Enablers”) to provide the decision support tools needed to determine the best way to move requirements.

(c) Joint Intelligence Operations Center for Transportation. The mission of JIOC TRANS is to provide decisive transportation and operational intelligence to enhance planning, movement, and protection. It provides transportation intelligence products and services to USTRANSCOM, its subordinate component commands, supported CCDRs, and other operational organizations. JIOC
TRANS supports the JMCN by receiving intelligence production requirements, providing assessments of the current military and political situation at en route and destination countries, and providing CDRUSTRANSCOM, supported CCDRs, and other operational organizations with transportation infrastructure information (e.g., capabilities of foreign airfields, ports, rail, road, and inland waterways) that may be used to support routine, crisis, or contingency operations. JIOC TRANS intelligence products assess threats to ongoing, scheduled, and projected strategic air, land, and sea movements and provide basic transportation planning information on the physical features and operational status of foreign transportation infrastructures. These analyses factor facility, country, and throughput data to help determine the modes and required weights of effort of strategic lift forces allocated to accomplish USTRANSCOM global missions.

6. Joint Task Forces

JTF Deployment and/or Redeployment Planning Responsibilities. Formation of a JTF may complicate deployment planning and execution because of the diverse elements that may come together to form the JTF. A significant challenge in JTF deployment operations is in building the TPFDD. This is particularly true during crisis action situations when limited planning time prompts the development of a fully coordinated contingency plan with TPFDD or TPFDL. For effective management of change, JTFs should use a collaborative process and have the authority and capability to make TPFDD adjustments on site at the point of execution.

a. Contingency Planning Responsibilities. If sufficient planning time is available prior to mission execution, the JFC and staff should determine specific force requirements, logistic requirements, and personnel replacements with recommended time-phasing based on their CONOPS developed during mission analysis. Once the concept of operation is approved, planning can continue with the development of the TPFDD or TPFDL as required, supporting JTF operations based on subordinate unit verified movement requirements received from the Service and functional component commands. JTF-verified TPFDD requirements are provided to the JTF establishing authority or supported combatant command for sourcing of shortfalls, validation, and forwarding to USTRANSCOM for transportation feasibility analysis and movement scheduling. Movement information is continually evaluated and updated to ensure that the JTF establishing authority or supported combatant command planners and USTRANSCOM transportation planners are using the most current and accurate TPFDD information for scheduling transportation resources. Redeployment planning should begin early in the JTF planning process and focus on defining the end state conditions, drafting the transition considerations, and developing the redeployment TPFDD necessary to begin redeployment of the force when authorized.

b. CAP Responsibilities. For crisis action situations, the JTF establishing authority (normally a combatant command) is usually required to initiate development of the TPFDD supporting JTF operations. The JTF establishing authority provides forces for planning while the JFC, supported by the JTF component commanders, determines the CONOPS and outlines the sequence of arrival for deploying units. The commands sourcing the JTF components are responsible for inputting unit deployment data in the supporting TPFDD. This is necessary because either the JTF HQ and/or the deploying JTF components may not have access to the Global Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) to provide unit deployment data input or they may not have time to make TPFDD adjustments due to operational time constraints. In some instances, combatant command planners may have to build the
initial TPFDD supporting JTF operations based on their best assessment of JTF needs to support the mission for the first several days of the operation. This initial increment of forces and sustainment should allow the JTF to perform its mission for a period of time, until the commander, joint task force (CJTF) and staff arrive at the crisis scene and can assess the situation more thoroughly and begin making TPFDD adjustments based on actual requirements. In this situation, the CJTF must understand that during the first several days of the deployment the JTF must work within the constraints of the initial TPFDD forces and sustainment increment planned by the combatant command. JTF planners should limit adjustments to this initial TPFDD increment because TPFDD adjustments may have an operational impact by slowing or interrupting the deployment flow. Instead, JTF planners should focus on making adjustments to the TPFDD beginning with the day after the initial combatant command-planned TPFDD increment. During the early days of the operation, combatant command planners must focus on coordinating for uninterrupted support to the JTF until it is ready to assume full planning responsibility for the operation.

See JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters for additional information.

7. Military Departments and Department of Defense Agencies

The Military Departments retain the responsibility for organizing, training, equipping, and providing administrative and logistics support (including Service-unique transportation) for their respective forces. They are also responsible for maintaining personnel trained in joint operation planning that can participate in joint planning and provide JOPES inputs. These forces and other DOD agencies may depend on common-user military transportation services for unit and individual deployment operations between POEs and PODs. In the role of common-user military transportation services, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, DLA, and other DOD agencies are all generically called shipper services. Each Service is responsible for administrative support and performance of transportation operations assigned by CCDRs at either their local shipping installations or throughout the theater. USTRANSCOM, as the DOD Distribution Process Owner, is responsible for coordinating with its components and the Military Services to ensure integration and synchronization of distribution-related requirements. In addition to these responsibilities, logistic elements of the Services that provide key support and enable the operations staff to execute the commander’s requirements for deployment operations are noted below.

a. US Army

(1) The Department of the Army (DA) is responsible for the assignment, preparation, and support of Army forces necessary for employment across the range of military operations. For deployment operations, DA is responsible for training, mobilizing, modernizing, administering, organizing, and demobilizing Army forces. DA also establishes policy and procedures for reconstitution of the Army and is the DOD executive agent for repatriation operations. The majority of Army combat assets cannot self-deploy and must be transported by other DOD assets in support of joint force operations. Army units and their sustainment requirements will be submitted by the Army Service component command for inclusion on the joint force TPFDD by supported combatant command planners for scheduling of common-user transportation assets. However, certain quantities of Army prepositioned stocks in unit equipment sets, sustainment stocks, operational projects, or war reserve stocks for allies may be available either shore-based or afloat to support Army component operations.
(2) DA is responsible for making land transportation available in overseas areas (normally under the combatant command’s Army Service component commander) for the other Services and for coordinating all planning and requirements for the use of DOD-controlled land transportation equipment and facilities. In some overseas areas, the Army Service component command (ASCC) has been assigned common-user land transportation (CULT) responsibility for peacetime land transportation; the ASCC will normally designate the Theater sustainment command to supervise and execute any common user transportation requirements delegated to it. Wartime CULT requirements are the responsibility of the CCDR, and normally the DDOC or the component assigned the mission will consolidate planned wartime movement requirements of all component commands.

See JP 4-09, Global Distribution Management for further information on theater distribution responsibilities.

b. **US Marine Corps.** For deployment operations, the Marine Corps component has a strategic mobility officer (SMO) or an embarkation officer organic to their Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) staffs. SMOs coordinate Marine Corps movement requirements with the supported geographic combatant command, the theater DDOC or its equivalent, and USTRANSCOM. The Marine Corps activates a MAGTF deployment and distribution operations center (MDDOC) within theater to coordinate and provide transportation services to all land-based elements of the MAGTF. As the Marine Corps primary movement control agency within the theater, the MDDOC is responsible for establishing liaison and communications with and forwarding all transportation shortfalls to the theater JDDOC or its equivalent, or to the component commander. If Marine Corps forces are afloat and part of an amphibious task force, they may be commanded by an expeditionary strike group commander. Otherwise, the command relationships established between the commander, amphibious task force and the commander, landing force take precedence.

c. **US Navy**


(2) In large mobilization scenarios, naval advanced logistic support sites (NALSSs) may serve as the primary shore-based reception and transshipment points for personnel, equipment, and materiel.

(3) In lesser mobilization scenarios, the Navy component commander may designate another established naval activity to act in this capacity. In either scenario, the Navy component commander will coordinate and monitor personnel deployment activities for units and individuals. They have full capability to receive, consolidate, transfer and stow supplies and equipment.

(4) The majority of Navy combat assets self-deploy in support of joint force operations and will be documented in the TPFDD. Forces will be validated for movement by the supported CCDR.
and will move to meet latest arrival date, required delivery date, and commander’s timelines. Non self-deploying Navy expeditionary forces including the engineering force, security forces, expeditionary logistics, fleet hospital personnel and equipment, must be time phased to support JFCs. Forces will be validated for movement by the supported CCDR and will move to meet ready-to-load date, available-to-load date, earliest arrival date, latest arrival date, and CCDR’s required date timelines.

(5) The naval forward logistic sites (NFLSSs) in theater receive personnel, equipment, and materiel transshipped through the NALSS for final delivery to the supported forces. The NALSS coordinates with NFLSSs, which are positioned as far forward in the operating area as possible to support Navy forces. NALSSs and NFLSSs also support shore-based aviation units, fleet hospitals, air and surface cargo handlers, naval mobile construction battalions, and other shore-based logistic units. The size and composition of NALSSs and NFLSSs are dependent upon the support required and are tailored by Navy logistic planners for the specific operation or contingency.

(6) The Fleet Numerical Meteorology and Oceanographic Center (FNMOC) can produce the majority of centralized weather products and data to support planning for deployment of US forces. Related products, including climatological data, are available through the Air Force Weather Agency (AFWA).

d. **US Air Force.** Some Air Force mobility and SOF are capable of self-deployment, however, the Air Force relies on common-user transportation to move support forces and sustainment cargo. Within the Air Force forces component, the Logistics directorate is the principal coordinator of Air Force logistics. When required, the director of logistics provides centralized direction and control of deployment, reception, integration, employment, and redeployment of logistic and support assets. AFWA can produce the majority of weather products, including climatological products, and data to support planning for deployment of US forces.

e. **Defense Logistics Agency.** DLA is a CS agency of DOD and is controlled and directed by the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. DLA provides worldwide logistic support to the Military Services, combatant commands, other DOD components, Federal agencies, foreign governments, and international organizations (through Foreign Military Sales). DLA responsibilities are enabled by AV initiatives. AV provides users with timely and accurate information on the location, movement, status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies during force projection operations. DLA manages over 80% of the items and nearly all of the fuel and petroleum products for military usage. During deployment of the joint force, DLA requires common-user transportation to move, stage, and recover its logistic resources in support of joint force operations. Supported combatant command planners are responsible for validating and entering DLA movement requirements into the TPFDD for scheduling by USTRANSCOM. DLA has the logistic responsibilities shown in Figure II-3.

f. **Defense Intelligence Agency.** The mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is to satisfy the full range of foreign military and military-related intelligence requirements in support of joint military operations across the range of military operations. In addition, DIA provides intelligence support for Service weapons acquisition; defense policy making; and the full range of current and long term
military intelligence products. DIA provides military intelligence for counterintelligence, manages and operates the Defense Human Intelligence Service (including the Defense Attaché System), manages all-source DOD collection requirements, serves as national functional manager for measurement and signature intelligence and provides functional management of military intelligence throughout the Intelligence Community.

g. **Defense Information Systems Agency.** The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) is a CS agency responsible for planning, engineering, acquiring, fielding, and supporting global net-centric solutions to serve the needs of the President, Vice President, the SecDef, and other DOD components across the range of military operations. DISA mission areas are: communications; combat support computing; information assurance; joint C2; and joint interoperability support. It provides guidance and support on technical and operational communications and information systems issues affecting the Office of the SecDef, the Military Departments, the CJCS and the Joint Staff, the unified and specified commands, and DOD. DISA ensures the interoperability of the GCCS-J, the defense communications system, theater and tactical C2 systems, NATO and/or allied communication systems, and those national and/or international commercial systems that affect the DISA mission. In addition, DISA supports national security emergency preparedness telecommunications functions of the National Communications System.
h. **National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.** The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA), a DOD CS agency, is a source for imagery intelligence and geospatial information during planning and execution of deployment operations. NGA provides geospatial information and services support including safety of navigation and safety of flight information, imagery and geospatial system technical guidance, and staff assistance to the Military Services, combatant commands, and other DOD components and is the focal point for imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information.

*For more information see JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*

8. **Other Government Agencies**

a. **Department of Homeland Security.** The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) responsibilities include customs, aerial and seaport security, and infrastructure hardening and protection. The department coordinates and leverages resources with different governmental jurisdictions at the federal, state, and local levels. DHS coordinates the transition of multiple agencies and programs into a single, integrated agency focused on protecting the American people and their homeland. A comprehensive national strategy seeks to develop a complementary system connecting all levels of government without duplicating effort. The DHS agencies that impact DOD deployment/redeployment include:

1. **Federal Emergency Management Agency.** The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) coordinates the execution of emergency preparedness actions of all Federal agencies, including deployment of military support for defense support to civilian authorities missions. FEMA HQ is located in Washington DC and operates with ten regional and multiple area offices across the country.

2. **US Coast Guard**

   (a) The US Coast Guard (USCG) is the primary US maritime agency for waterway safety and security. The USCG, a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, supports the geographic combatant commands. The USCG is unique among US military forces because it has statutory law enforcement authority.

   (b) The USCG core competencies include national defense, maritime safety and security, maritime law enforcement, and maritime environmental protection.

   (c) During deployment operations supporting joint force operations, the USCG protects military shipping at US seaports of embarkation (SPOEs) and OCONUS PODs by conducting port security and harbor defense operations in conjunction with Navy coastal warfare forces.

   (d) Major USCG cutters may be deployed to participate in maritime interception and coastal sea control operations, enforce sanctions against other nations, and to conduct theater security cooperation activities. The major cutters of the USCG, like Navy combatants, are self-deploying in support of joint force operations. However, deploying port security units and stocks for sustainment must be time-phased to support Navy component operations and scheduled for movement on common-user transportation assets.
(e) Movement data from port security units and sustainment stocks is validated by supported combatant command planners and entered on the TPFDD.

(f) Port safety responsibilities in the US include the establishment, certification, and supervision of ammunition loading operations, inspection and certification of US flag vessels in the ready reserve fleet, and licensing additional merchant mariners to serve expanded defense shipping needs is integral to the mobilization process.

b. **Department of Health and Human Services.** During natural disasters or civil emergencies, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) assists FEMA and other national agencies in caring for the affected personnel. DHHS movement requirements and deployment and/or redeployment support will be coordinated by FEMA.

*See JP 3-26, Homeland Security, for additional information.*

c. **Department of Transportation.** During national defense emergencies, the Secretary of Transportation has a wide range of delegated responsibilities, including executive management of the nation’s transportation resources in periods of crisis. The Department of Transportation (DOT) also manages the Office of Emergency Transportation, the Federal Aviation Administration, and the Maritime Aviation Administration Ready Reserve Force (RRF). The RRF program was initiated as a subset of the Maritime Administration’s National Defense Reserve Fleet to support the rapid worldwide deployment of US military forces. A key element of strategic sealift, the RRF is specifically structured to transport Army and Marine Corps unit equipment and initial resupply for forces deploying anywhere in the world during the critical period before adequate numbers of commercially available ships can be marshaled. Under national defense emergency conditions and in coordination with DOD agencies and commands, DOT:

1. Develops systems for control of priorities and allocations for moving passengers and materiel by civil transportation;

2. Provides clearance authority for moving out-sized, over-sized, and hazardous military cargo; and

3. Apportions militarily planned and required civil transportation resources;

d. **Department of State.** DOS and DOD are responsible for the operation of the noncombatant evacuation program. Deployments executed as part of a noncombatant evacuation will require coordination with DOS representatives. DOS representatives may have access to embassy evacuation, marshalling, and security plans for the objective country. DOS embassy personnel should have an estimate of the number of US citizens in the country and their locations for noncombatant evacuation redeployment planning. Additionally, DOS coordinates OCONUS overflight and landing rights, diplomatic clearances, and visa and/or passport requirements for all deployment operations.

e. **National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.** The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is a Department of Commerce agency that has worldwide aeronautical data available
and is capable of providing backup weather services in the event that both the FNMOC and AFWA are out of service.

f. **US Customs and Border Protection.** The Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection is responsible for maintaining surveillance of illegal goods entering the United States through DTS PODs. All forces and materiel redeploying to the United States will require US Customs inspection.

g. **United States Department of Agriculture.** The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) is responsible for maintaining surveillance of agricultural products and guarding against potential plant or animal infestations entering the United States through DTS PODs. All forces and materiel redeploying to the CONUS will require USDA inspection.

h. **US Postal Service.** The United States Post Office (USPS) supports joint force operations through movement of essential military mail, including small class IX repair parts. Depending on the scope of the deployment, USPS may require a significant amount of common-user airlift to support forward-deployed forces.

9. **Other Transportation Partners**

The DTS relies heavily on the commercial transportation industry to perform a multitude of services during deployment operations in peacetime and war. These commercial source capabilities span all modes of transportation and may include the use of contracted US or foreign commercial air, maritime assets as well as HNS within a JOA. Commercial rail, trucking, ITV assets and other transportation services may also be contracted to support deployment operations. Deployment planners should consider the implications of the employment of these transportation services as they plan deployment operations.

*Additional information on the commercial transportation industry may be found in the United States Transportation Command’s “DTS Handbook”*
CHAPTER III
PLANNING

“To successfully fight and win wars, we must make war planning our central focus. We will develop the best possible plans using the collective wisdom available among all military planning staffs. The products of our planning efforts must be able to stand up to the strongest scrutiny, including the ultimate test: execution.”

General John M. Shalikashvili
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1993-1997

1. General

Deployment planning is based primarily on mission requirements and the time available to accomplish the mission. During deployment operations (deployment, JRSOI, and redeployment), supported CCDRs are responsible for building and validating requirements, determining predeployment standards, and balancing, regulating, and effectively managing the transportation flow. Supporting combatant commands and agencies source requirements not available to the supported CCDR and are responsible for: verifying supporting unit movement data; regulating the support deployment flow; and coordinating effectively during deployment operations. This chapter discusses several other factors that may impact deployment planning and examines considerations and procedures concerning deployment operations. Based upon the supported CCDR’s guidance, planners must assess the AOR’s environment and determine deployment requirements for supporting the JFC’s CONOPS. Transportation feasibility must be included in the COA development.

For more information on JRSOI and redeployment, see Chapters VI, “Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration” and VII, “Redeployment” respectively.

2. Joint Planning

a. Contingency planning encompasses four levels of planning detail with an associated planning product at each level.

(1) Level 1 - Commander’s Estimate. This level of planning involves the least detail, but requires a developed COA.

(2) Level 2 - Base Plan. This describes the CONOPS, major forces, concepts of support, and anticipated timelines for completing the mission. It normally does not include annexes or a TPFDD.

(3) Level 3 - Concept Plan. A concept plan is an OPLAN in an abbreviated format that may require considerable expansion or alteration to convert it into an OPLAN or OPORD. It includes a base plan with annexes required by the JFC and a supported commander’s estimate of the plan’s feasibility. It may also produce a TPFDD if applicable.

(4) Level 4 - OPLAN. A complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the CONOPS, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a TPFDD.
b. Key Service documents contribute to contingency planning and help confirm availability of forces and resources for performing deployment operations. Service documents supporting deployment planning are shown in Figure III-1. These documents along with the JSCP combine to facilitate the joint planning process.

Figure III-1. Key Service Documents for Deployment Planning
c. Regardless of whether contingency planning or CAP is used, joint planning determines the requirements for joint force employment to achieve the military objectives. Once the supported CCDR’s strategic concept is approved by the CJCS, it becomes the CONOPS upon which further planning is developed. Planning is based on CCDR(s) and Service(s) guidance and joint doctrine. The supporting and subordinate commanders use the supported CCDR’s CONOPS and the apportioned or allocated combat forces as the basis to determine necessary support, including forces and sustaining supplies for the operation (mission analysis). The supported CCDR’s staff organization is established and command relationships are formulated to assist the commander in determining priorities and assigning tasks for conducting deployment operations. Supported CCDRs may task assigned Service components with the majority of responsibility for deployment operations based upon various factors (e.g., dominant user, most capable Service). Each supporting or subordinate commander who is assigned a task in the CCDR’s strategic concept prepares a supporting plan. The CCDR consolidates these plans to build a recommended phasing of forces and support, and performs a transportation analysis of the entire movement from the POE to the final destination. In essence, the supported CCDR uses the information to validate the adequacy of the theater and determine whether the infrastructure is satisfactory for employment of assets, forces, facilities, and supporting systems. Joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE) provides the framework for determining methods of accomplishing the assigned tasks. Following these actions, the supported CCDR, with USTRANSCOM support, hosts the TPFDD refinement conference.

3. General Planning Considerations

Deployment planners must assess the impact of the operational environment and threats in relationship to the mission. JIPOE must address whether and to what degree a potential threat can interdict, disrupt, or block deployment operations and assist in determining what infrastructure and other support assets may be available. In this case, the operational environment consists of infrastructure and information resources. In cases where the joint operations area infrastructure is inadequate, the CCDR’s available options include increasing the infrastructure capability, reducing the deployment flow, or extending allowable force closure times. Additionally, planners may also improve force closure times by planning the delivery of material and personnel into less capable aerial or seaports, fully using the capabilities of our strategic platforms. In planning for deployment, the areas listed in Figure III-2 should be considered. This is by no means a comprehensive listing but is provided to assist the planner.

a. Threat assessment is the first step in understanding the operational risk to deployment operations and developing risk controls to mitigate the perceived threat. The JIPOE process assists the CCDR in formulating planning guidance by identifying significant enemy capabilities and likely enemy COAs. Based on the assessed threat, the CCDR must determine where to accept risk, where to focus protection efforts, and how much of the force should be initially devoted to protection. The threat assessment should include threats to the following:

1. HNS
2. Contracted support
Figure III-2. General Planning Considerations

(3) Nongovernmental organizations
b. **Protection is a critical element of all joint force deployment operations.** It is an inherent command responsibility. Fluid battlefields and the potential ability of adversaries to orchestrate asymmetric threats against US forces require that every means be sought to protect those forces. A thorough intelligence estimate will assist the commander in providing protection against known threats. The threat of enemy interdiction during deployment operations, particularly for forward presence forces, presents a special challenge to the JFC. The challenge is to protect geographically-dispersed deploying forces (which will have limited self-protection capability while configured for deployment) and materiel transiting the various links and nodes of the deployment process. Risk must be assessed and comprehensive protection plans developed to address vulnerabilities and counter potential threats to forces, materiel, infrastructure, and information systems. Comprehensive protection requires the employment of a full array of active and passive measures and the integration and coordination of intelligence and security programs, information operations (IO), risk management (RM) techniques, and safety programs to increase individual awareness of potential threats. Planning for weapons of mass destruction threats should also be considered. In addition, it is also critical to include preparations for protection of the civilian work force and/or HNS workers.


c. **Information Operations.** Deployment operations must be coordinated with planned IO. IO is the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, military deception, PSYOP, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Some of the typical IO capabilities and related activities addressed during a deployment are as follows:
(1) **Information Assurance.** Information assurance is defined as measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Planning and execution of deployment operations is heavily dependent upon assured information systems. Corruption of deployment movement data, transportation scheduling, or C2 systems would have a major, and potentially mission threatening, impact on deployment operations.

(2) **Military Deception.** Deceptions during deployment operations are intended to increase the potential for successful initiation of friendly operations by misleading the adversary as to the time and location of the introduction of forces into the operational area, the location of the main effort, and the command’s operational objectives.

For additional information, see JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

(3) **Psychological Operations.** PSYOP efforts in support of deployment operations may include activities emphasizing noninterference by noncombatants and assisting in deception operations.


(4) **Operations Security.** Deployments, particularly strategic deployment operations, generally have large, distinct signatures. This fact makes masking the movement (or purpose of the movement) of forces and materiel to staging bases within the AOR a critical piece of the operations security (OPSEC) plan. Deployment signatures probably cannot be totally hidden; however, US OPSEC may conceal such details as the composition of the forces or the time and location of the introduction of forces into a theater.


(5) **Public Affairs.** Public affairs (PA) is defined as “Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in DOD.” PA operations assist commanders to create effects. During deployment operations, PA activities allow a JFC to influence an adversary’s (or a potential adversary’s) perception about the friendly force’s intent, capability, and vulnerability. PA activities will not be used as a military deception capability or to provide disinformation to either internal or external audiences.

See JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for further details.

(6) **Civil-Military Operations.** Civil-military operations (CMO) are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace. They are conducted across the range of military operations to address root causes of instability, assist in reconstruction after conflict or disaster, or may be conducted independent of other military operations to support US national
security objectives. CMO can occur in friendly, neutral, or hostile operational areas to facilitate military operations and achieve US objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions that are normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions.

See JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, for additional information.

d. **Risk Management.** Uncertainty and risk are a fundamental part of all military operations including deployment operations. RM is a process that assists decision makers in reducing or offsetting risk. Carefully determining the risks, analyzing and controlling as many hazards as possible, and executing a supervised plan that accounts for those hazards and contributes to the successful application of military force during joint force operations. The RM process provides leaders with a systematic mechanism to aid in identifying and choosing the optimum COA based upon risk for any situation.

*For additional information on RM, see JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.*

e. **Safety.** JFCs make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations. High-tempo deployment operations put personnel at risk. Command emphasis, discipline, and training lessen those risks. Safety in training, planning, and operations is crucial to successful joint force operations and the preservation of combat power.

f. **Infrastructure Assessment.** Understanding the capabilities of the theater infrastructure and the time when assets become available are essential to developing successful deployment operations. An infrastructure assessment is key to understanding the capabilities and limitations of the AOR to support deployment operations. It serves as a basis to determine the forces, equipment, and materiel that must be deployed and facility upgrades required to enhance operations. Infrastructure consists of two general categories: the physical network and the resource network.

1. **Physical Network.** The type, number, and condition of facilities, transportation networks, real estate, and modes of transportation characterize physical networks. Transportation infrastructure strongly influences deployment operations and a robust infrastructure of modern air and seaports, highways, railroads, and inland waterways greatly expedite the throughput of forces, equipment, and supplies. A lesser-developed, austere, or damaged infrastructure impedes deployment operations and may require an early deployment of support capabilities such as joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS), or engineer units. The combatant command engineer and staff prepare an engineering support plan (ESP) as part of the JOPES planning process. Development of the ESP ensures that essential civil engineering capabilities are identified and will be provided at the required locations and at the appropriate times to support the mobilization, deployment, JRSOI, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of the joint force in support of joint operations. The ESP establishes theater-level requirements for facilities, Class IV (construction materiel), and civil engineering capability in support of deployed US forces. The Joint Engineer Planning and Execution System is a tool used to support the combatant command engineer and staff in development of the quantitative aspects of civil engineering support planning and provides the general requirements for the ESP appendix to an OPLAN.
Additional information on ESP can be found in JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, and Appendix 6 to Annex D to Enclosure E of CJCSM 3122.03B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II: Planning Formats.

(2) Resource networks include personnel, organizations, materiel, and equipment operating within the physical network of the deployment and distribution system. The total infrastructure capacity (the actual net capability of the both physical and resource nets) establishes the fixed capacity of the deployment and distribution system. Figure III-3 depicts examples of the infrastructure (physical and resource networks).

g. Information Resources. Receiving detailed information concerning infrastructure and transportation capabilities, maintaining the visibility of assets that will move on that infrastructure, and the ability to C2 this information plays a key role for planning and working deployment operations. Information resources can be divided into intelligence, automation network, and communications systems.

(1) The collection and maintenance of infrastructure information (intelligence) is the purview of the Services and numerous agencies that include the DIA, the supported CCDR’s joint intelligence operations center, USTRANSCOM’s joint intelligence operations center, and Service organic intelligence services. The information collected and available includes information on infrastructure capacity and condition as well as engineering capability (ports, railroads, inland waterways, roads, airfields, bridges, off-road land tractability, power plants, and communications nodes) in most theaters. The characteristics of roads, ports, and rail lines within the theater are sometimes available in digital form. Such information serves as baseline data for planning. For example, the SDDC Transportation Engineering Agency (TEA) compiles unclassified and classified data on many seaports, to include throughput calculations and infrastructure assessments. SDDC TEA also develops and maintains detailed transportation infrastructure networks of various theaters for use in analyzing intratheater transportation capabilities feasibility using the Enhanced Logistics Intratheater Support Tool (ELIST).

(2) The automation network combines all of the information collection devices, automated identification technology (AIT), and automated information systems (AISs) that either support or facilitate the deployment process. Examples of these include ITV, joint personnel asset visibility (JPAV), and GTN.

(3) Communications systems, including networks, are a critical infrastructure that enables the sharing of information and distributed collaborative planning. When combined with automated systems, and a robust communications systems. Information technology enables the efficient and effective management that is critical to deployment operations. Effective information management including joint force-wide culture of information sharing, in turn, enables leaders and planners to fully collaborate in order to make sound and timely decisions regarding deployment operations. Communications systems are intricately managed resource that require detailed planning. Initial phases of a deployment may not have the robust communications network required for extensive use of GCCS-J, Global Combat Support System (GCSS), GTN, and other C2 and information systems. Phasing joint and Service communications systems into the force flow early provides a system that allows the JFC to take advantage of the automated tools available for force and sustainment tracking. With these capabilities, the CCDR has a potent tool for deployment and employment management.
Planning

4. Deployment Planning

a. The primary objective of deployment planning is to provide personnel, equipment, and materiel when and where required by the JFC’s CONOPs. Planning for joint force operations is guided by the procedures in the joint planning process. Both contingency planning and CAP procedures require detailed analysis of the assigned mission to determine mission requirements for employment of the joint force. Employment planning considerations that directly impact deployment operations include: identification of force requirements; commander’s intent for deployment; time-phasing of personnel, equipment, and materiel to support the mission; and closure of the forces required to execute decisive operations. These factors guide deployment planning and help determine mission requirements. Adaptive planning capabilities (such as collaboration and decision-support tools) will improve a transition from contingency planning to CAP. The following paragraphs summarize the activities and interaction that occur during CAP. Refer to JOPES Volume I for detailed procedures.

b. Military operations begin with an event that requires movement of forces somewhere in the world. This can be a planned or no-notice movement. Analyzing the mission leads to the development of COAs and selection of the desired COA, the development of orders, and their transmission, and continues through execution.
Chapter III

(1) **Conduct Initial Mission Analysis.** Based upon early information acquired, planners assess potential scenario developments, mission requirements, and COAs. This requires a thorough and continuous JIPOE to account for a changing operational environment.

(2) **Commander’s Intent for Deployment.** The supported CCDR’s intent for deployment may be detailed in the OPLAN, deployment preparation order, DREPORD, or OPORD. The supported CCDR’s intent for deployment may direct the sequence for deployment of units, individuals, and materiel; identify immediate protection concerns; articulate specific force disposition requirements to support future operations; or identify general deployment timeline requirements needed for operational success. The supported commander’s intent for deployment should, at a minimum, clearly articulate the JFC’s vision for how the deployment can best posture the joint force for decisive operations or operational success.

c. **Time-Phasing of Forces.** Once force requirements are identified, selected forces must be organized and time-phased to support the CONOPs.

(1) Time-phasing is the sequencing of the deployment and arrival and employment of forces based on the organization of forces to accomplish the mission, the commander’s intent, the estimated time required to deploy forces from their point of origin to the operational area, and actual lift availability and port throughput for deployment. In addition to forces, support personnel, equipment, and materiel are time-phased to support the continuous operation of the joint force until the mission is accomplished.

(2) Finding the proper balance between projecting the force rapidly and projecting the right mix of combat power and materiel for the ultimate mission is critical. The commander must seek a balance that provides protection, efficient deployment, adequate support, and a range of response options to enemy activity. The availability of mobility assets is most often a constraining factor, so difficult trade-off decisions continuously challenge supported commanders.

(3) All movement priorities and phasing are based on the supported CCDR’s required date for the deploying force capability. Movement data on the required delivery date, time-phasing of forces, and materiel is documented in the TPFDD. Ideally, forces and supporting materiel are time-phased in a manner that allows the JFC to conduct decisive operations as quickly as possible. Closure of the minimum essential force required to accomplish the mission is a major factor in determining when decisive operations can be conducted.

d. **Force Tracking.** Force tracking is the process of gathering and maintaining information on the location, status, and predicted movement of each element of a unit (including the unit’s command element, personnel, and unit-related supplies and equipment) while in transit to the specified operational area. Force tracking is fundamental to effective force employment and C2 as depicted in Figure III-4. It provides information on transportation closure or physical moves of forces. JFCs must be able to continuously monitor execution of the deployment operation and quickly respond to changing situations and unforeseen circumstances. Once basic mission requirements have been decided, joint force planners must review force tracking options to provide the supported CCDR with the requisite C2 means to monitor and control execution of the deployment.
e. **Force Closure**. Force closure is the point in time when a supported JFC determines sufficient personnel and equipment resources are in the assigned operational area to carry out assigned tasks. Force closure is a function of several elements, most notably lift capacity, C2, POE and/or POD transshipment capability, port capacity, transit time for strategic lift, receipt of overflight and landing diplomatic clearances, and the effectiveness of deployment operations. As a planning factor, force closure is important because decisive operations cannot begin until sufficient forces and capabilities are available to execute the mission. Force closure includes force tracking, risk assessments, force readiness, and mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available (METT-T). The supported commander’s force closure decision must take into account the above factors and the commander’s ability to integrate forces. Decisions affecting transportation mode or routing made prior to and during the early stages of a deployment may have a dramatic impact on joint force closure timelines. For this reason, planners must give careful consideration to the selection of POE and/or POD, scheduling of strategic lift modes, movement control, and JRSOI planning. Inherent in this
complex process is the management of change and the ability to respond with accuracy and flexibility to
dynamic conditions.

f. **Identify Host Nation, Contract, and Command Capabilities.** Within each geographic
CCDR’s AOR, the US organizations available to accomplish deployment operations vary significantly.
Fundamental factors that cause this variance include geographical constraints such as the length of line of
communications (LOCs), capability of HN infrastructure, acquisition and cross-servicing agreement,
anticipated threat and mission. Each Service component possesses unique, specialized forces and
capabilities to support various aspects of deployment operations. The supported CCDR must utilize
this knowledge in assessing HN, contract, and command capabilities available to support key deployment
functions. Depending upon the existing infrastructure, the HN, contract, and command capabilities that
are available may greatly reduce the type and amount of support a CCDR must deploy from outside the
theater. The inputs include requirements for:

1. transportation;
2. facilities;
3. security;
4. communications;
5. supplies;
6. services (life support);
7. labor service; and
8. POD support and other key functions.

g. There are many sources of logistic support that may be applied to enhance deployment operations.
These sources of support may combine in various ways under differing circumstances to make operations
associated with deployment possible. How these combine will depend upon the condition of the HN
infrastructure, what agreements exist (allied or otherwise), and how or if civil augmentation programs, or
cross-Service logistics, are necessary. Figure III-5 lists some sources of logistic support for the joint
planner to consider during COA development.

(1) **Host-Nation Support.** When available, HNS successfully assists in executing deployment
operations. Typical items that the CCDR should negotiate with the HN are shown in Figure III-6.
Maintaining current, comprehensive base support plans and conducting periodic site surveys are critical
for validating HNS agreements required for implementing specific OPLANs and CONPLANs. If
HNS agreements do not exist, or have limited application, then the CCDR, in coordination with the DOS, should immediately start negotiation of HNS agreements and arrangements combined with an integrated contracting plan to obtain necessary support. It is recommended that counterintelligence teams be included for use in screening contractors.

(2) **Multinational Support.** Multinational support is another force multiplier. Many US allies have capabilities or functional units similar to US capabilities. The use of these units can enhance deployment operations, minimize US support requirements, and ensure mission success. The joint planner should consider complementary multinational capabilities during COA development. However, during the planning phase, this capability should be balanced against the potential for competition for US transportation assets to deliver those multinational units into the theater.

(3) **Theater Contract Support.** To optimize contractor support among Services, a central contracting authority (CCA) should be designated. The goal of the CCA is to achieve and maintain controls and optimize contracting resources. Contracting officers should make every effort to ensure that clauses excusing contractor performance in the event of hostilities or war are not included in contracts that augment US forces during contingency or combat operations. SDDC and MSC, for example, routinely use civilian contractors to perform or augment their operations. However, the joint planner should be aware that in some cases wartime exclusion clauses might prevent contractor personnel from delivering goods and services.
"The shape of conflict is changing, too. It may be waged with little or no allied backing, and with unknown host-nation support or infrastructure. Any fighting that we do will probably occur where we are not, distant to our borders, and in a land that cannot adequately receive our ships and planes."

LTC Scott Conrad
Moving the Force: DESERT STORM and Beyond, 1994

### HOST NATION NEGOTIATING CONSIDERATIONS

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Figure III-6. Host Nation Negotiating Considerations

**CIVILIAN CONTRACTORS**

One of the most dramatic lessons to come out of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR is that civilian contractors are an integral part of the total force, particularly when it comes to providing logistical and engineering services . . . LOGCAP [logistics civilian augmentation program] uses a civilian contractor to perform selected logistics and engineering services to augment US forces during military contingency operations . . . The Corps [of Engineers] is also using LOGCAP in unison with Air Force RED HORSE and Navy SEABEE construction troops. RED HORSE and SEABEE trade specialists erect the tents while the Corps uses the LOGCAP contract to
set up latrines, showers, heaters, dining halls, laundries, and other essential life support facilities.

SOURCE: Corps of Engineers News Release
31 January 1996

(4) Civil Augmentation Program. Civil augmentation programs are separate Military Department contracting options most often used when HNS is insufficient or unavailable. They employ pre-existing contracts with US and other vendors to provide support in many areas including facilities, supplies, services, maintenance, and transportation. Additionally, planners should consider initiating contracting services if status-of-forces agreements do not already contain those provisions. The goals of civil augmentation programs are to:

(a) Allow planning during peacetime for the effective use of contractor support in a contingency or crisis;

(b) Leverage global and regional corporate resources as facility and logistic force multipliers;

(c) Provide an alternative augmentation capability to meet facility and logistic services shortfalls; and

(d) Provide a quick reaction to contingency or crisis requirements.

Information concerning the logistics civilian augmentation program (Army), global contingency construction capabilities contract program (Navy) and Air Force contract augmentation program may be found in the applicable Service publications, JP 4-0, Joint Logistic Support, JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, and JP 4-10, Contracting and Contractor Management.

CONTRACTING — OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR

Supporting operations in the Balkans for Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR would have required a much more robust combat support and combat service support military organization had it not been for the use of logistics civilian augmentation program (LOGCAP) . . . LOGCAP has provided much of the critical logistics and engineering services, with costs exceeding $460 million for the first year’s effort. Use of LOGCAP allowed the deployed combat units to focus on critical operational missions and the deployed engineering units to focus on horizontal construction.

On 26 November 1995, Brown & Root (the LOGCAP contractor) was activated to provide an intermediate staging base at Kaposvar and Taszar, Hungary...The initial work focused on renovating old communist barracks to bring them to minimum standards for use by US soldiers. Then working
with the soldiers, the contractor’s staff braved the same harsh weather and site conditions to provide warm tents, hot food, and adequate sanitary facilities during the start-up of operations throughout the theater.

After establishing the intermediate staging base, the contractor was tasked to support the 1st Armored Division’s Task Force Eagle by setting up and operating camps in Croatia and Bosnia. In order to complete all the Bosnia camps by March 1996, Brown & Root was integrated with Army engineer units, Navy Seabees, and Air Force Red Horse engineers on a fast-tracked scenario. Specifically, Brown & Root’s tasks were to —

- Setup 12 camps
- Provide flooring materials for the Army, Navy, and Air Force engineer units charged with setting up all other camps.
- Upgrade camps to meet the Army’s sustaining base standards, replacing soft-side, canvas tents with hardback tents or modular buildings (in areas with the harshest conditions).
- Provide all basic life-support services, such as food services, laundry, water delivery, garbage collection, and shower and sanitary facilities.
- Provide other logistics services such as transportation and cargo handling, vehicle maintenance and washing, port operations, road repair and maintenance, and storage yards.

SOURCE: Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas J. Kolar, Jr.
LOGCAP: Providing Vital Services to Soldiers
The Engineer Professional Bulletin, March 1997

h. Prepare and Send Deployment Directives. At this point in the planning process the supported CCDR has nearly completed the deployment planning process map’s first functional area of mission analysis. Now the supported CCDR begins to give specific deployment guidance in the form of directives. These directives clarify the support that selected Services and nations should expect. Examples of the types of support directed by the supported CCDR may include information from the following agreements.

(1) Common-User Logistics. The term “common user logistics” defines materiel or service support shared with or provided by two or more Services, DOD agencies, or multinational partners to another Service, DOD agency, non-DOD agency, and/or multinational partner in an operation.

(2) Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements. While HNS agreements provide US pre-negotiated support for potential war scenarios, acquisition and cross-servicing agreements (ACSAs) provide the legal authority for the US military and other nation armed forces to exchange logistic goods
and services during contingencies. Unlike HNS agreements, transactions under this program must be reimbursed, replaced in kind, or an exchange of equal value must take place.

5. Synchronizing and Balancing the Flow

Because JOPES is the system used to allocate and sequence movement assets, it is essential that movement data inputs are accurate. The TPFDD is a computer-supported database portion of an OPLAN. It contains time-phased data for moving personnel, equipment, and materiel into a theater. The TPFDD reflects the requirements that strategic and intratheater lifts are assigned against to ensure that the full scope of deployment requirements are identified and satisfied. Successful execution of the CCDR’s plan depends on integrating deployment operations within JOPES. Planners are advised to consider sustainment when planning force projection and to include the sustainment requirement in the time-phased flow.

*For a detailed explanation of the joint planning process, its components, and their functions, see CJCS Manual 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I: Planning Policies and Procedures.*

a. **Confirm Deployment Data.** Data is confirmed prior to entry into JOPES via the TPFDD. TPFDD refinement manipulates and confirms force flow data until the updated information is entered into JOPES.

b. **TPFDD.** The TPFDD establishes the flow of units into the theater. The supported CCDR must carefully balance the force mix and arrival sequence of combat forces and CSS units to ensure that deployment support and throughput requirements can be met. Service components responsible for deployment operations must validate and continuously review the TPFDD to determine its mission support requirements and request changes to its support force structure. As with any dynamic process, external changes in the environment, as well as those within the force, necessitate corresponding changes to the flow of forces (personnel, equipment, and materiel). The following recommended changes to the deployment force structure are requested by the Service component responsible to maintain balance and synchronization (IAW CCDR guidance) to accomplish the mission.

1. **Evaluate TPFDD Movement Requirements.** The command continuously evaluates the mission capabilities of inbound units to ensure that deployment mission requirements can be met in a timely manner.

At the conclusion of the planning phase of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the Task Force Eagle (TFE) commander envisioned a deliberate, balanced deployment. The TFE lead force package augmented the Corps’ national support element in establishing the intermediate staging base in Hungary. The task force would then follow with an engineer heavy force package to conduct a river crossing and open the lines of communications into Bosnia.
It was not until the fourth force package that any substantial combat power would move into the TFE area of operations. With the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), the implementation requirements of the peace agreements required the immediate entry of a sizable combat force. To meet the unanticipated demands of the GFAP timeline, a “minimum essential force” was created, using a mix of employment capabilities and minimum logistic assets. Comprised mainly of Cavalry, Armor and Engineer assets, the force was re-sequenced to lead the task force deployment. This late — and significant — adjustment minimized the early deployment of combat service support assets and reflected the GFAP requirement to rapidly establish a significant and viable military presence. It also tended to desynchronize a wide range of deployment activities including reception, staging, onward movement, and integration as well as movement control.

SOURCE: Initial Impressions Report
Task Force Eagle Initial Operations,
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, May 1996

(2) Recommend TPFDD Changes. All assigned units supporting theater deployment operations report through the chain of command on status of unit (personnel and equipment) capability to perform assigned missions. The command HQ makes TPFDD change recommendations to the supported CCDR based on assigned unit capability, deployment requirements, and projected missions to ensure that sufficient capability is present in theater to maximize support of deployment operations.

c. Analyze capabilities. Dependable transportation feasibility analysis relies on accurate analysis of strategic lift capability and throughput capability. Port throughput data should consider not only port offload capability, but also the theater’s ability to move and sustain forces away from the port. Matching the strategic TPFDD flow to the theater’s reception, staging, and onward movement capability should prevent port saturation and backlogs that slow the build-up of mission capability. Intratheater transportation feasibility may significantly impact upon port-to-port flow. It may show required changes to the type and sequence of strategic lift. It could also reveal whether the number, type, and sequence of units supporting deployment operations are adequate to deliver planned capabilities to the CCDR.

d. Review historical data. Theater infrastructure is studied during the concept development phase before the TPFDD is developed. Meanwhile, CCDRs can use historical data for a feasibility study of the flow of the TPFDD which can be based on the supporting Services components input. If historical data cannot be used, separate TPFDDs specifically for this type of analysis can be built without placing undue pressure on the sourcing units that are actually working on collecting real data.

6. Deployment Planning Requirements and Considerations

a. During deployment planning, all of the requirements to support related activities need to be addressed. These requirements can be broken down into two broad categories: operational and support. Operational requirements include training, protection, and communications systems that support the
visibility of the deployment process. Support requirements include transportation, infrastructure, HNS, sustainment, and land management. Deployment requirements should appear in all planning documents and OPLANs. The planner must ensure an early investment of strategic lift for deployment support capabilities to enable an increased flow of forces into the theater.

b. **Loading Considerations for Deployment.** Planning deployments is based primarily on the commander’s CONOPS for employment. These factors determine the entry operations, deployment concept, and mobility options required to posture a joint force in the theater. An important consideration in posturing forces is to determine how deploying forces should be configured when they arrive in theater. This determines how deploying forces should be loaded for deployment. The manner in which units are loaded is an important factor in determining reception requirements as well as the amount of time units must be supported at the reception and staging areas. Three loading methods are described below.

1. **Combat loading** is the loading of personnel, equipment, and supplies in a manner designed to conform to the anticipated tactical operations of the organization embarked. Each individual item is stowed so that it can be unloaded at the required time. Combat loading is desirable when deploying units must integrate into the force quickly, but is generally the least efficient method for maximizing strategic lift capacities. In cases where strategic lift is constrained, greater use of combat loading may delay force closure. Combat loading includes employing the loading methods of vertical and horizontal stowage and dispersion (spread loading), in order to support the landing plan and to effect selective unloading when required. “Selective unloading” is the controlled unloading and movement ashore of specific items of cargo from assault shipping at the request of the landing force commander.

2. **Unit loading** places units with their equipment and supplies in the same vessels, aircraft, or land vehicles. This method may be more efficient in utilizing strategic lift than combat loading and maintains unit integrity better than administrative loading.

3. **Administrative loading** maximizes troop and cargo space without regard to tactical considerations. However, equipment and supplies must be unloaded and sorted before they can be integrated into the joint force and employed by the JFC.

7. **Enablers**

Enablers are advanced planning and execution tools that assist combatant command planners to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment of US forces. The enhanced C2 inherent in the use of these tools provides the commander with the readiness, deployment, tracking, intelligence, theater movement, and employment details critical to effective deployment operations.

*See Appendix A, “Enablers,” for additional details on deployment support tools and enablers.*
CHAPTER IV
PRE-DEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

“To a conscientious commander, time is the most vital factor in his planning. By proper foresight and correct preliminary action, he knows he can conserve the most precious elements he controls, the lives of his men. So he thinks ahead as far as he can. He keeps his tactical plan simple. He tries to eliminate as many variable factors as he is able. He has a firsthand look at as much of the ground as circumstances render accessible to him. He checks each task in the plan with the man to whom he intends to assign it. Then — having secured in almost every instance his subordinates’ wholehearted acceptance of the contemplated mission and agreement on its feasibility — only then does he issue an order.”

General Mathew B. Ridgway
The Korean War, 1967

1. General

The deployment process begins with planning for force projection under contingency planning or in a crisis. When plans become orders, the JPEC must address a myriad of critical pre-deployment activities. This chapter discusses the activities that begin when deployment, sustainment, and redeployment requirements are validated by the supported CCDR. Requirements validation confirms the need for the movement requirement and provides detailed shipment data. As the OPLAN, or selected COA, is approved and transformed into an OPORD, the TPFDD is further refined. Once movement requirements are documented and validated, the effort to schedule the appropriate transportation assets begins. As part of the predeployment phase, deployment planners must incorporate sustainment operations into their plans. While many pre-deployment related activities equally apply to redeployment, the later part of this chapter will highlight activities required prior to redeployment. Figure IV-1 is the joint force deployment process map. See Annex A to Appendix B for more detail.

a. Requirements Validation and Sourcing. Movement requirements developed during deployment planning must be validated prior to deployment execution. Validation confirms the need for the movement requirement, shipment configuration, dimensions, and routing and ensures that all parties, including the chain of command, are cognizant of the requirement. Movement requirements are validated during execution planning by the supported CCDR who validates all joint force movement requirements for USTRANSCOM movement scheduling. During execution planning, the President/SecDef approved COA or OPLAN is transformed into an OPORD by the supported CCDR. Actual forces, sustainment, and strategic mobility resources are identified and the CONOPs is described in OPORD format. TPFDD refinement that began during deployment planning continues with updated information entered into JOPES. Concurrently, the supporting commanders prepare to source applicable force requirements and verify personnel and cargo details to ensure that the TPFDD reflects accurate OPORD movement requirements. Changes to joint force movement requirements occurring after the supported CCDR validates the TPFDD must be coordinated through the supported CCDR, who revalidates the approved changes prior to any action by USTRANSCOM.
b. **TPFDD Refinement.** For both global and regional operation plan development, the process consists of several discrete phases of TPFDD review and analysis that may be conducted sequentially or concurrently, in whole or in part. TPFDD refinement supports force planning, sustainment planning, transportation planning, shortfall identification, and transportation feasibility analysis. Refinement consists of three phases: Forces, Logistics, and Transportation, with shortfall identification associated with each phase. These three phases are collectively referred to as TPFDD refinement.

See **CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures)** for additional information on TPFDD refinement.

c. **Time-Phased Force Deployment Data Letter of Instruction.** The TPFDD LOI provides planning and execution instructions to the supported combatant command’s components, supporting combatant commands, and supporting agencies as they refine, verify, and manifest their portion of the joint force TPFDD. The intent of the supported CCDR’s supplemental TPFDD LOI is to eliminate confusion, facilitate parallel planning, collaboration, and expedite TPFDD refinement.
by providing component commands, supporting commands, and agencies with a single set of instructions for TPFDD input and management. Use of the TPFDD LOI ensures that actual OPORD movement requirements are properly documented and validated for transportation scheduling.

*For additional information see CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume III (Crisis Action Time-Phaseed Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution). This manual outlines the standard TPFDD LOI that will be used by the joint planning and execution community for all planning and execution scenarios. Supported CCDRs provide additional supplemental guidance for their AOR.*

d. **Actions of the Supported Combatant Commander.** Firm force requirements and priorities are identified during planning following COA selection. Once this occurs, the supported CCDR notifies the JPEC and supporting commands and agencies to source the unsourced force requirements. This signals force-providing organizations and supporting commands and agencies to provide or update specific unit movement data in JOPES for the first increment of movement (normally, the first 7 days of air movement and the first 30 days of sea movement). It also prompts Service logistic and personnel offices to adjust and update sustainment requirements based on the latest and most accurate staff estimates. During this process, the supported CCDR also requests that the Joint Staff and supporting commands and agencies assist in resolving any critical sourcing or resource shortfalls or limitations. When the above actions have been completed, the supported CCDR reviews and validates the lift requirements within the specific TPFDD movement window and notifies USTRANSCOM that the movement requirements are ready for lift scheduling. USTRANSCOM develops transportation schedules to accommodate these requirements after verifying transportation feasibility. Accuracy of TPFDD movement requirements and data is critical to the lift scheduling process because it directly impacts force closure. Errors in lift scheduling or late changes to the validated TPFDD requiring a change in transportation mode (e.g., airlift to sealift) could significantly reduce the supported CCDR’s operational capability or flexibility.

e. **Actions of Supporting Combatant and Service Component Commanders.** Supporting commanders providing forces will identify and task specific units for employment and provide unit movement requirements in JOPES to allow lift scheduling for all elements involved in the deployment. Accuracy is imperative to ensure effective support and to optimize efficiency of lift. It is also very important during this process that supporting combatant and Service component commanders ensure the timely coordination of hazardous materiel data with USTRANSCOM. Service component commanders continue working with their Service and major commands to identify and update estimated sustainment requirements. Service components and supporting combatant commands also schedule movements for self-deploying forces (organic moves) so that the JFC has visibility of all deploying forces.
Chapter IV

The Invasion of Sicily - World War II

“Perhaps the most difficult problem which faced the subordinate formations of the Army arose from continually varying estimates of availability of craft and shipping.”

Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (on planning for the invasion of Sicily July 1943)

f. Schedule Movement. Movement scheduling is an iterative process at every level of supported and supporting commands to transport, move, or deploy the right forces (unit related personnel and equipment) and sustainment (non-unit related personnel, supplies and equipment) to the right place at the right time.

For additional information see Chapter V, “Movement.”

2. Sustainment

a. As part of the predeployment phase, deployment planners must incorporate sustainment operations into their plans. Sustainment is directed at providing and maintaining levels of personnel and materiel required to sustain planned joint force activity at the desired level of intensity for the duration of the operation. Sustainment operations begin nearly simultaneously with deployment operations and include the movement of replacement supplies, equipment, and personnel. Conducting this planning in a collaborative environment allows USTRANSCOM to gain and maintain visibility on all known strategic movement requirements, facilitating responsive support by the strategic mobility triad. In its capacity as DOD’s Distribution Process Owner, USTRANSCOM will collaborate with sustainment providers like DLA and the Services to ensure sustainment requirements are planned and integrated with force projection requirements. Preplanned sealift supporting sustainment requirements is also a part of predeployment activities. Any preplanned sealift support that occurs is a benefit to the supported commander, as it does not detract from the deployment of forces and capabilities by intertheater airlift.

b. The supported commander establishes the policy, procedures, priorities, and LOCs for sustainment activities. The commander will immediately begin to submit demand-based or “pull” sustainment requirements for Services to resupply their forces in theater. In the absence of the commander’s specific guidance and requirements, each of the Services will sustain their forces using Service methodologies, which may include initially “pushing” sustainment to its forces. Sustainment supplies do not always follow the designated deployment LOCs since some supplies (petroleum, oils, and lubricants [POL] and ammunition) require special handling facilities and could result in significant disruption of port activities. Optimizing port throughput will be a primary factor in balancing pull and push sustainment procedures.
c. Sustainment Movement. Sustainment intertheater lift is handled differently than deployment intertheater lift. Time-phased deployment requirements are developed, sourced, refined, and validated in JOPES for USTRANSCOM movement scheduling. Intertheater airlift for the deployment phase of an operation is requested through the JOPES process. Normally, some sustainment is planned as part of the deployment TPFDD developed in JOPES. However, as the operation progresses, intertheater sustainment airlift becomes more requirements-based. Channel service or express service airlift is the normally planned method for the movement of sustainment by air. This process involves sustainment moving on predetermined channels that are established IAW existing regulations.

For additional information see JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, and JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations.

d. Unit-Related and Non-Unit-Related Supplies and Equipment. Supply and support requirements of deploying forces consist of two major categories: unit-related supplies and equipment and non-unit-related supplies and equipment. Unit-related supplies and equipment include a unit’s organic equipment, basic load, and accompanying supplies. Unit-related supplies and equipment are configured (palletized or containerized) and documented for deployment by the unit. Unit planners enter movement data for unit-related supplies and equipment in the TPFDD. Non-unit-related supplies and equipment include all supply sustainment support requirements that are not identified for a specific unit. They include pre-positioned war reserve stock, sustaining supplies, and resupply. Non-unit-related supplies and equipment are configured and documented as cargo increment numbers (CINs) for deployment by the sourcing organization and provided for distribution in theater by the supported combatant command’s logistic agencies. AMC uses CINs to allocate non-unit-related supplies and equipment sustainment lift.

e. Non-unit-related Personnel. Non-unit-related personnel (NURP) are any active duty personnel from any Service (including RC members accessed onto active duty), DOD civilians, contract civilians, and Red Cross personnel who deploy as individuals or as a small group of individuals without a unit. NURP consists of individual military manpower alerted for deployment to serve as individual unit fillers to bring undermanned units to authorized manning levels and casualty replacements in theater. NURP are normally moved via commercial transportation from losing organizations to designated CONUS replacement locations. The Services designated organizations to coordinate strategic lift requirements with USTRANSCOM for
movement of NURP from the United States into theater based on deployment shelf requirements incorporated into the TPFD during planning. Shelf requirements are integrated into transportation and reception plans and used to determine the number and location of CONUS replacement centers and aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) required to support the deployment.

f. Ammunition. **SDDC provides routing instructions for movement of all classes of ammunition entering the DTS.** In a contingency operation, select units may be designated to deploy through select commercial ports with their ammunition basic load. A potential deployment constraint (particularly in HN ports) related to movement of ammunition is net explosive weight. Port safety requirements may restrict the amount of ammunition or other hazardous materials that may move through the port at any given time. Discharge of ammunition at the foreign PODs requires prior coordination with HN authorities to certify the port for ammunition handling and storage, or to obtain the necessary waivers to discharge ammunition through commercial ports. Similar authorization may be necessary for storage of ammunition at ISBs.

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**DEPLOYMENT: WORLD WAR II**

“To deploy these forces overseas was another great matter. Although the US merchant marine ranked second only to Great Britain’s and the country possessed an immense shipbuilding capacity, the process of chartering, assembling, and preparing shipping for the movement of troops and military cargo took time. Time was also needed to schedule and organize convoys, and owing to the desperate shortage of escort vessels, troop movement had to be widely spaced. Convoying and evasive routing, in themselves, greatly reduced the effective capacity of shipping. Moreover, vast distances separated US ports from the areas threatened by Japan, and to these areas went the bulk of forces deployed overseas during the months immediately following Pearl Harbor. Through March 1942, as a result, the outflow of troops to overseas bases averaged only about 50,000 per month, as compared with upwards of 250,000 during 1944, when shipping was fully mobilized and plentiful and the sea lanes were secure.

There seemed a real danger early in 1942, however, that German U-boats might succeed in reducing transatlantic deployment to a trickle — not so much by attacking troop transports, most of which could outrun their attackers, as by sinking the slow cargo ships on which the forces overseas depended for support. Soon after Germany’s declaration of war, the U-boats struck at the virtually unprotected shipping lanes in the western Atlantic, and subsequently extended their attacks to the Gulf of Mexico and Caribbean areas and the mouth of the St. Lawrence. During the spring of 1942 tankers and freighters were torpedoed in plain view of vacationers on east coast beaches. . . .”

**SOURCE:** American Military History, Army Historical Series

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g. For CONUS deployment situations, if a unit is scheduled to move through a commercial seaport with basic load munitions, SDDC must be notified early on to process the necessary

**Pre-deployment Activities**

**DOD explosive safety waivers and USCG permits.** The following information must be provided for waiver and permit purposes: DOD identification code; national stock number; DOT proper shipping name; hazard class, storage compatibility, and fragment distance; UN identification number; round count; net explosive weight; and shipping configuration (e.g., vehicle upload, containerized). SDDC must also activate DOT Exemption 3498 before actual movement of uploaded vehicles can commence. Additionally, all hazardous materials (including ammunition) shipments must be prepared and documented IAW DOD 4500.9-R, Defense Transportation Regulation, Parts II and III and other governing regulations.

h. For OCONUS ports, the geographic CCDR will assign waiver and clearance responsibilities to one of the combatant command’s component commands.

3. Redeployment

**Mission Requirements.** Redeployment of joint force assets may be required at any point during mission execution. Redeployments are planned and executed based on mission requirements and are normally conducted to either reposture forces and materiel in the same theater, to transfer forces and materiel to support another JFC’s operational requirements or, most often, to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization station upon completion of the mission. All systems and procedures used during deployment operations apply to redeployment operations. One key difference is that redeployment operations involving the movement of forces to locations other than home station or demobilization site may focus on reestablishing joint force readiness in addition to redeployment mission requirements. Moreover, redeployments must be planned and executed in a manner that provides for the timely and efficient return of individuals, units, and materiel to facilitate their use in new contingencies.

*For further information see Chapter VII, “Redeployment.”*

4. Assemble and Marshal Forces

Assembly and marshaling involves bringing together people, supplies, and equipment in preparation for final movement. Support functions are established and positioned to expedite and control the movement and throughput of the force through the deployment pipeline.
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CHAPTER V
MOVEMENT

“Operation DESERT SHIELD was the fastest build up and movement of combat power across greater distances in less time than at any other time in history. It was an absolutely gigantic accomplishment, and I can’t give credit enough to the logisticians and transporters who were able to pull this off”

GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander

1. General

   a. Validated movement requirements developed during the planning phase and scheduled for movement during the pre-deployment phase must now be physically moved from origin to the designated aerial/sea ports of debarkation (APODs/SPODs). The movement phase of deployment is composed of three segments: movement from origin to APOEs/SPOEs, POE operations, and movement from the POE to POD. Figure V-1 is the joint force deployment process map, which includes movement. See Annex A, “Joint Deployment Process Map Description” to Appendix B, “Joint Deployment, Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration, and Redeployment Process Map Descriptions” for more detail.

   b. This chapter discusses each of these movement segments in greater detail as well as tracking and controlling the movement of forces and materiel through the deployment process. Movement control involves planning, routing, scheduling, and controlling common-user assets and maintaining ITV of forces and materiel moving through the deployment process. Properly resourced and executed movement control assists commanders in force tracking and provide the capability to adjust the flow as necessary. It also enhances JRSOI of personnel, equipment, and supplies moving over LOCs IAW command directives and responsibilities. Force visibility provides AV for deploying units and supplies and allows for a more responsive supply system. Lastly, since change is an inevitable part of deployment operations, this chapter stresses the need for planners to anticipate adjustments and manage the impact of changes to avoid disrupting or impeding the deployment and sustainment flow.

2. Movement

   The three segments of the movement phase are described below.

   a. Movement from origin to POE.

      (1) Validated movement requirements developed during deployment planning and scheduled during predeployment activities must now be physically moved (by some mode of transportation) from origin to the designated APOEs/SPOEs. USTRANSCOM and its components select APOEs/SPOEs based on the mission, port capabilities, location, and mode characteristics. Airlift and sealift schedules are prepared by USTRANSCOM and coordinated with the supported CCDR. AMC and SDDC
provide call forward instructions to the transportation or traffic management offices that are responsible for scheduling deployment movements using procedures outlined in the Defense Transportation Regulation.

(2) Equipment of deploying forces may be transported to the POE by commercial rail, truck or inland waterway. Using the planning factors developed in the earlier stages of the deployment process the base/installation transportation office requests the necessary DOD and commercial transportation assets (i.e., rail cars, trucks, and containers) to meet movement requirements.

(3) Surface Movement

(a) Military Convoy

1. In CONUS, units may convoy to the POE. The unit reviews policy and guidance for public highway use in CONUS and convoy procedures that apply during peacetime, mobilization,
and deployment. Procedures for highway movement OCONUS (to include Hawaii and Alaska) are found in local command regulations and policies.

2. Organic convoy operations are not visible to USTRANSCOM during peacetime movement. CONUS convoy movements are the responsibility of the respective Service and must be scheduled consistent with SDDC call forward instructions or AMC published strategic lift schedules to ensure correct arrival times at assigned POEs.

For further information on organic convoy operations, see DOD 4500.9-R, Defense Transportation Regulation, Part III, Mobility, Appendix F, Permits for Military Movements on United States Public Highways and Army Convoy Operations and Procedures.

(b) Commercial Movement. Unit vehicles and equipment that are not convoyed to the POE using military transport normally move by commercial rail or truck.

(c) Rail. In CONUS the deploying unit determines its movement requirements and submits them through command channels to the installation transportation officer (ITO) (US Army)/traffic (US Air Force)/transportation (US Marine Corps/US Navy) management office (TMO). The ITO/TMO, in coordination with SDDC, can obtain both commercial and military rail assets based on unit requirements. ITO/TMO personnel validate railcar requirements based on unit rail load plans and the shipping configuration of the items to be deployed. The ITO/TMO maximizes the available loading space to efficiently use rail assets and to reduce the carrier’s transportation charges.

(d) Commercial Truck. The unit movement officer forwards requirements for commercial trucks to the ITO/TMO who validates the requirement and coordinates the commercial transport with SDDC.

For further information on commercial movement, see DOD 4500.9-R, Defense Transportation Regulation, Part II, Cargo Movement, Chapter 201, General Cargo Movement Provisions and Chapter 203, Shipper, Transshipper, and Receiver Requirements and Procedures.

b. POE Operations.

(1) Aerial Port of Embarkation. APOE operations are divided into four areas: marshaling area, alert holding area, call-forward area, and ready line/loading ramp area. Operating within these areas is the deploying unit, the A/DACG, the contingency response element, and the load teams. Movement and documentation of equipment and personnel to the APOE may be in preparation for movement by commercial charter aircraft. If this is the case, actions at the APOE will be IAW commercial carrier instructions and joint Federal travel regulations.

For further information on activities at the APOE, see DOD 4500.9-R, Defense Transportation Regulation, Part III, Mobility, Chapter 303, Deployment Activities.

(2) Seaport of Embarkation
(a) SDDC is the DOD-designated single port manager for all worldwide common user/commercial seaports. Units deploy equipment and supplies by sea through a port that is generally commanded or contracted by SDDC. Where SDDC does not have a transportation terminal battalion or other contractual agreements, a SDDC deployment support team may temporarily operate the SPOE.

(b) USTRANSCOM, through SDDC, directs the deployment of units and sustainment through SPOEs according to the TPFDD. The port call message identifies the earliest/latest dates the unit must arrive at the SPOE for movement processing and vessel loading and gives the unit special instructions for a successful deployment to the SPOE. USTRANSCOM’s responsibilities include: evaluate movement requirements and coordinating vessel selection between SDDC and MSC; prepare and issue port call messages; receive PSAs and direct their activities; receive, stage, and transship unit equipment in the port; establish and direct port communications, safety, physical security policies and procedures; and develop stow plans, supervise vessel loading, inspect vessel readiness, and provide documentation.

For further information on sealift movements, see DOD 4500.9-R, Defense Transportation Regulation, Part III, Mobility, Chapter 303, Deployment Activities, Chapter 305, Redeployment, and Appendix C, Sealift Sources.

c. Movement from POE to POD. Transit times and other limitations associated with movement to POD differ by port, mode, and cargo type. Each has to be evaluated during planning and managed closely during execution. A smooth and coordinated flow of requirements through ports is essential. USTRANSCOM can provide planning assistance for transload and transshipment operations and factors.

3. Movement Control

a. Movement control involves planning, routing, scheduling, and controlling common-user assets and maintaining ITV of forces and materiel moving through the deployment process. Successful employment of military forces depends on assured and timely deployment and support. Movement control coordinates transportation resources to enhance combat effectiveness and meet the deployment and sustainment priorities of the supported CCDR. Effective movement control during deployment operations provides the JFC with the capability to monitor and manage deployment execution, and adjust the flow of forces and materiel as necessary. USTRANSCOM facilitates this effort by providing movement summaries of TCC and organic movements from departure to final destination in theater in coordination with the supported and supporting commanders. USTRANSCOM provides analysis of deployment execution to the Joint Staff, supported combatant commands, and supporting commands and agencies. This analysis includes progress reports, status, problems, port workloads, daily movement statistics, and resolution of problems encountered with common-user transportation means. In addition, movement control must be coordinated and synchronized with JRSOI and a TD plan that describes the in-theater network and system for distribution management. JRSOI focuses on building mission-capable forces as quickly as possible. TD focuses on establishing a distribution management structure and battlefield architecture to maintain visibility and control over forces and materiel arriving for employment in-theater.
b. **Organization for Movement Control.** The supported CCDR has a wide range of options for performing movement control. These options include directing subordinate JFCs and Service components to perform their own movement control or creating a fully integrated joint organization. Regardless of the movement control option selected, the geographic CCDR should task organize the movement control function commensurate with the mission, scope of operations, and geography of the operational area. Normally, the geographic CCDR delegates OPCON of the various parts of the transportation system to the most-capable Service components, but retains the authority to set priorities and apportion and allocate resources and makes the final determination of transportation mode and sources. The geographic CCDR exercises this authority through a theater - joint transportation board, JDDOC or assigns the responsibility to a staff element (normally the command’s senior logistic staff officer) that coordinates closely with the operations staff.

c. **Strategic Movement Control.** Effective strategic movement control requires the coordinated efforts of USTRANSCOM, supporting CCDRs, the supported geographic CCDR, and their components. Strategic movement control begins with identifying total joint force movement requirements and translating those requirements into logistic terms (e.g., barrels, short tons, square feet, passengers). These movement requirements are documented on the appropriate TPFDD and scheduled for strategic deployment in the sequence and priority validated by the supported geographic CCDR. Contingency planning focuses on time-phasing movements and assigning transportation resources to support operations for a set period. Crisis action strategic movement control follows the basic process of contingency planning. The fundamental difference is the reduced amount of time available to reach allocation, scheduling, identification of threats to transportation assets en route to the debarkation ports, en route access or overflight status, and other execution decisions. Early identification of the force and its movement requirements in a collaborative environment are key to rapid crisis action movement planning and execution.

(1) **USTRANSCOM uses the TPFDD to analyze the flow of forces and cargo from their points of origin to final destination in theater.** They distribute the apportioned strategic transportation resources and make adjustments, as necessary, to ensure the unimpeded flow of forces and materiel to the final destination in theater. During this process, CDRUSTRANSCOM follows CJCS guidance and coordinates major decisions with the supported CCDR.

(2) Upon initial execution of an OPORD’s TPFDD, and until the situation stabilizes or the theater matures, CDRUSTRANSCOM and the supported geographic CCDR may have to exercise direct control of movement operations. Repetitive or cyclic validations of projected movement requirements (both mode and destination) may be necessary. In addition, ascertaining transportation asset availability through an accurate TPFDD is critical to optimizing strategic mobility resources and keeping the chain of command appraised of deployment progress.

*For additional information on TPFDD analysis and transportation planning, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System, (JOPES) Volume 1, Planning Policies and Procedures.*
d. USTRANSCOM Deployment Distribution Operations Center. The USTRANSCOM DDOC directs the global air, land, and sea transportation capabilities of the DTS to meet national security objectives provided by DOD. The DDOC fuses capabilities of multi-modal deployment and distribution operations, intelligence, force protection, capacity acquisition, resource management and other staff functions to collaboratively provide distribution options to the warfighter. C2 of the majority of intertheater lift forces and logistic infrastructure is accomplished through the DDOC, which tracks the movement requirement from lift allocation and initial execution through closure at final destination through their support teams. The support team construct provides better upfront planning through collaboration with the supported commander and other key stakeholders. This allows the process to stay in step with commander’s intent as the operation unfolds, makes the movement processes easier and more responsive, and increases visibility of all movement requirements. This geographical orientation of support teams enables a holistic view of all warfighter requirements, provides opportunity to conduct thorough transportation analysis, reduces correspondence management, leverages collaboration technologies, and enables aggregation of requirements within movement windows.

e. Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Centers. The integration of intertheater and intratheater movement control is the responsibility of the supported combatant command and USTRANSCOM. Subsequently, each CCDR has a JDDOC. The JDDOC is a CCDR movement control organization designed to synchronize and optimize national and theater multi-modal resources for deployment, distribution, and sustainment. The JDDOC is normally placed under the control and direction of the combatant command J-4, but may also be placed under other command or staff organizations. The JDDOC’s strength is the ability to reach back to the national partners (USTRANSCOM, USJFCOM, DLA, Army Materiel Command, Joint Munitions Command, Army Field Service Command and the individual Services) to address and solve issues for the supported commander. The DDOC and JDDOC collaborate to link strategic deployment and distribution processes to operational and tactical functions in support of the warfighter. This improves the speed and agility of deploying forces, increases effectiveness and efficiency of supply distribution and enhances the ability to meet constantly changing requirements. Figure V-2 depicts the generic organizational structure for a JDDOC.

f. Theater Movement Control. The supported geographic CCDR controls intratheater movement. Theater movement control plans should provide the supported geographic CCDR with the highest practicable degree of influence or control over movement into, within, and out of theater. The same movement control options used for strategic movement control should be applied to perform theater movement control. Regardless of the option selected, the theater movement control system must allow the supported geographic CCDR the capability to plan, apportion, allocate, coordinate, deconflict transportation requirements, and track the forces and materiel in theater. Moreover, the theater movement control plan must coordinate incoming strategic movements with the TD plan and theater JRSOI operations.

g. Theater Distribution. TD is the flow of personnel, equipment, and materiel within theater to meet the CCDR’s requirements. Effective TD calls for a comprehensive in-theater distribution system that is seamlessly integrated with strategic, operational, and tactical logistic systems. The intent of TD is to deliver critical supplies, under positive control and through a highly visible distribution pipeline, from source to ultimate user. The transition from supply to distribution-based sustainment reduces the need
for layered stockpiles, reduces logistic management personnel in theater, and provides more effective and responsive support to deployed forces. The end result is reduced costs and efficiencies realized in the areas of transportation utilization, supply requisitioning, and theater stockage.
Chapter V

For additional information on theater movement control and theater distribution see JP 4-09, Global Distribution Management.

4. Force Visibility

   a. Innovative and integrated use of C2 systems and information technology makes force tracking through the entire deployment process possible. Visibility of deploying forces and materiel is established through the logistics management construct of AV and the GCCS-J common operational picture (COP). AV is a capability that provides origin-to-destination force tracking and industry-to-end user, in-theater AV. AV is possible through integration of the capabilities provided by AIT, ITV, and the information systems and decision support tools comprising the GTN, GCSS-Joint, and the Web Scheduling and Movement Sub-system of JOPES. Control of the deployment process is exercised through the C2 capabilities of GCCS-J.

   For additional information on the COP see CJCSI 3151.01A, Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements.

   b. Unit Movements. Unit moves involve various combinations of assets to transport personnel, unit-related supplies, and equipment. Except for very small units, it is usual for a unit to be transported as several separate shipments. Force tracking is focused on maintaining visibility of separate unit shipments from origin to destination. Force tracking includes monitoring the elements of a unit until they are reassembled under the commander’s control as a mission-capable force and continues until all units that constitute the specified force assemble and transfer of authority to the supported commander is affected.

   c. Asset Visibility. AV provides the capability to determine the identity, location and status of equipment, and supplies by class of supply, nomenclature, and unit. It includes the ability to determine the status of personnel and patients. It provides visibility over equipment maintenance and retrograde actions. It also includes the capability to act upon that information to improve the overall performance of the DOD logistic practices supporting operations. AV is the foundation upon which DOD-wide AV is based, requiring horizontal integration of supply and transportation activities and one-time data capture. AV includes in-process, in-storage, and in-transit visibility. The function of performing AV is a shared responsibility among deploying forces, supporting commands and agencies, USTRANSCOM, and the supported CCDR. DLA, as Executive Agent for Integrated Data Environment AV and USTRANSCOM with GTN, work collaboratively to ensure supply and in-transit data is shared and fused resulting in a complete seamless picture for end-users. This includes deployment and sustainment operations. Through AV, commanders and staffs can determine whether specific items of supply are readily available in the logistic system or must be deployed with the unit. Total visibility results from integration of requirements and information systems from four areas; requisition tracking, visibility of assets in-storage or in-process, visibility of assets in-transit, and asset management within the theater of operations. In each case, a specified “data repository” serves as a central hub for asset information and visibility.

          (1) Requisition Tracking. The logistics on-line tracking system provides visibility over the status of requisitions. This system also provides status information to GTN to enable it to provide accurate status information when a requisition is in-transit.
(2) **Assets In-Storage or In-Process.** The automated information system (AIS) of each inventory control point will provide visibility of assets that are in-storage or in-process (defined as assets being procured or repaired). AV includes the following inventory levels, as described in DOD 4140.1-R *DOD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation*:

(a) US Army. Direct support authorized stockage lists.

(b) US Marine Corps. Installation supply and Marine expeditionary force support activities.

(c) US Navy. Shipboard and major shore station allowances.

(d) US Air Force. Logistics readiness squadron.

(3) ITV, as a component of force visibility, preserves the link between the in-transit force and that force’s mission within an operation phase through the unit line number (ULN). See Figure V-3 on force visibility.
d. **In-Transit Visibility.** ITV refers to the capability to track the identity, status, and location of DOD units, and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants), and passengers; medical patients; and personal property from origin to consignee or destination across the range of military operations as part of AV.

(1) ITV at the strategic and operational level is a function of JOPES. A TPFDD identifies all the movements associated with a specific operation. Operation ITV, phase and mission ITV, and force requirement visibility are provided by a well-structured TPFDD. Structuring the TPFDD to provide ITV at this level is the responsibility of the supported commander. This level of visibility is required to monitor and project force closure. This level of visibility is enabled by accurate movement requirements reporting; compliance with transportation procedures and schedules; and properly prepared personnel/cargo accompanied by accurate shipping documents. Effective interfaces between JOPES, Service deployment systems and transportation systems are essential. During execution of a crisis action deployment, all deviations should be reported to the Service, global force manager, and the supported commander immediately to minimize operation impact and to ensure rapid resolution of process, training, or interface failures. See Figure V-4 on ITV.

(2) **Accurate Data.** Use of JOPES is directed. ITV begins with the use of JOPES and depends upon accurate, disciplined adherence to force validation and manifesting is essential for unit tracking. Accurate reporting begins with the deploying force. Deploying forces are responsible for confirming accurate force data. The supported CCDR validates the force flow and data to USTRANSCOM. USTRANSCOM is responsible for ensuring the accuracy and timeliness of data IAW DOD 4500.9-R, *Defense Transportation Regulation* into its systems, Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES), and Worldwide Port System (WPS).

(3) **Force tracking.** USTRANSCOM is responsible for tracking forces and equipment embarked on strategic lift using unit line numbers and transportation control numbers. GTN is the central repository for visibility of assets in-transit from origin to destination, including all military, government, and vendor documented shipments. GTN’s database contains shipment status information, booking information, passenger reservation information, aircraft and ship manifests, personal property data, medical patient’s information, and vessel and aircraft scheduling data. GTN provides the capability to track unit movements and sustainment operations globally by integrating the automated movement control systems used by the Services, DOD agencies, and USTRANSCOM. GTN integrates the automated movement control systems used by the Services, DOD agencies, and USTRANSCOM, providing the capability to track unit movements and sustainment operations globally.

e. **Automated Identification Technology.** AIT enables the capture of current and accurate source data through the use of various technologies such as; bar codes, optical memory cards, radio frequency identification tags, and satellite/communication links. AIT integration with logistics information systems is key to the AV effort.

f. **Joint Personnel Asset Visibility.** JPAV gives users access to an integrated database containing information on units and individuals. JPAV, an integral part of AV, provides cross-Service integration of various Service personnel data bases, giving the supported combatant command access to and visibility of personnel resource data for individuals deploying to, employed in, or leaving the AOR and/or JOA,
through the use of C2 systems, satellite communications, and information technology. The databases contain basic identifying information on individuals, such as name, rank, social security number, and Service component. Military skill identifiers, qualifications, and other personnel resource data needed to support personnel tracking and readiness assessments are also contained in these databases. The integrated JPAV database is updated frequently from various sources, including TPFDD, Service component personnel systems, transportation manifesting systems, and casualty reporting and tracking systems.

5. Redeployment

Force tracking during redeployment operations is vital to joint force readiness. Redeployment is not complete until the joint force has completed movement through the redeployment pipeline and emerged at the prescribed destination. Unit integrity should be maintained, to the extent possible, and
commanders must have the capability to determine the exact location of unit personnel, equipment, and materiel in the event the redeploying force has to be diverted en route for another mission. Redeployment force tracking uses the same systems and procedures discussed for deployment operations. Again, GTN and GCCS-J provide the information systems and decision support tools necessary to track the force during the redeployment process.

For more information on redeployment, see Chapter VII, “Redeployment.”

6. Other Considerations

a. Management of Change. Effective deployment execution involves successfully coping with change. More specifically, timely and responsive deployment operations are a direct function of the executing command’s ability to manage changes in joint force organization, phasing, employment sequence, or circumstance and maintain control of deployment execution. Whenever possible, efficient use of scarce resources should be the goal. Managing change in a dynamic environment is best accomplished in a collaborative manner. Optimizing the deployment process is a combat multiplier that enhances joint force effectiveness.

b. Deployment Changes. TPFDD and movement schedule changes during deployment execution are inevitable. Changes in mission requirements, operating environment, or unanticipated circumstances may cause the JFC to modify the organization of forces, command relationships, phasing, or sequence of force employment. Late decisions or changes regarding transportation modes or routing, LOCs, or POEs and/or PODs supporting deployment may have a significant negative impact on the operation, and may cause delayed satisfaction of requirements, delayed movements, bottlenecks at deployment nodes, and increased transportation costs. More importantly, an impeded deployment may jeopardize mission success.

c. Managing the Impact. Since changes during deployment execution are inevitable, planners must anticipate adjustments and manage the impact of changes to avoid disrupting or impeding the deployment flow. Prior planning is the key. Management of change is possible if changes are held to a minimum and require supported combatant command approval. Planners must also:

(1) Understand and anticipate changes;

(2) Provide resources at critical sites to ensure timely reporting of changes;

(3) Develop flexible, responsive steps, at all levels, to capture and properly document changes;

(4) Synchronize all aspects of the required change (e.g., adjusted deployment flow may require different staging or support); and

(5) Ensure that requested changes are consistent with the commander’s intent and CONOPs.

d. Movement in Support of Homeland Defense and Civil Support. Deployments within the homeland follow the same processes as outlined in the preceding paragraphs however the timelines can
be extremely compressed. The national importance of these missions is reflected in the elevated movement priorities that can be invoked by the President or Secretary of Defense. USTRANSCOM can quickly assemble aircraft and flight crews for operations where expedited passenger movement is required. Surface transportation (commercial and organic) can be a viable option in those situations where the distance between the home station and the operational area is relatively short.

For more information on deployment within the homeland, see JP 3-27, Homeland Defense and JP 3-28, Civil Support and CJCSI 4120.02, Assignment of Movement Priorities.
CHAPTER VI
JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION

“Future force projection missions, like those throughout history, will demand well-developed operational and logistical planning, force mix, appropriate sequencing into and out of a theater, and a constant requirement for soldier and unit versatility. Such missions will require leaders and units that can operate in ambiguity and have the agility to adapt and adjust. Set piece thinking does not fit force projection. All of these requirements will occur in a joint or combined environment.”

General Frederick M. Franks, Jr.
Commander, VII Corps, Gulf War
August 1989-June 1991

1. General

a. This chapter presents an overview of the final phase of deployment; JRSOI. This chapter defines the segments, describes the principles and identifies the essential elements of JRSOI as they support and enhance the JFC’s ability to employ joint force capabilities to achieve desired outcomes. As with deployment, JRSOI is a critical operational challenge enabled by logistics. JRSOI is a set of dynamic and complex processes involving numerous organizations requiring training, continuous coordination, and collaboration. Process seams and friction may occur at functional or organizational interfaces when physical resources and information are transferred. The deployment process, of which JRSOI is a part, requires continuous planning that begins with the requirement to deploy forces and ends when units are assembled in the theater and are integrated into the joint forces as a capability fully prepared for employment by the JFC. JRSOI processes described in this chapter are applicable to both deployment and redeployment. Figure VI-1 is the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process map. See Annex B, “JRSOI Process Map Description” to Appendix B, “Joint Deployment, Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration, and Redeployment Process Map Descriptions” for more details.

b. Segments of JRSOI

(1) The ability to execute a mission largely depends on the speed with which deploying forces assemble at the required location and the application of the capability once it is made available to the JFC. JRSOI is the essential process that transitions deploying forces, consisting of personnel, equipment, and materiel arriving in theater, into forces capable of meeting the CCDR’s operational requirements.

(2) Maintaining effectiveness and promoting efficiency in JRSOI facilitates preparation for operations by providing adequately resourced, mission-capable forces to execute the CCDR’s mission. The four segments of JRSOI are described below.

(a) Reception operations include all those functions required to receive and clear personnel, equipment, and materiel through the POD.
(b) Staging assembles, temporarily holds, and organizes arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into forces and capabilities and prepares them for onward movement and tactical operations.

(c) Onward Movement is the process of moving forces, capabilities, and accompanying materiel from reception facilities, marshalling areas, and staging areas to tactical assembly areas (TAAs) and/or operational areas or other theater destinations.

(d) Integration is the synchronized transfer of capabilities into an operational commander’s force prior to mission execution.
c. The supported CCDR is responsible for JRSOI. This includes all actions required to make arriving units operationally ready and the integration of them into the joint force. The capability of strategic lift to move personnel, equipment, and materiel to the reception points (e.g., the PODs) must be matched by the capability to receive and process the force. The CCDR must have visibility of the deployment flow to control the rate as well as the sequencing and processing of deploying forces. Although the CCDR is responsible for JRSOI and other facets of logistics support, this does not relieve supporting commanders of responsibility for detailed oversight of the deployment flow and coordinating changes with the supported commander, when appropriate.

d. JRSOI is an integral part of an operation that enables the assembly of required capabilities for application by the JFC. Successful JRSOI requires command emphasis in planning, training, and synchronization in a collaborative environment. Even self-sustaining units that arrive in-theater are heavily dependent on external support until they are reunited with their equipment and become operational. As deploying units assemble, efforts focus on preparing for future operations and integrating into the joint force.

e. JRSOI provides a common framework to focus joint and Service component capabilities on land, at sea, and in the air into a coherent operation. The context of each JRSOI process may vary reflecting the nature of the operation, METT-T, and civilian considerations. However, deploying forces, regardless of Service, normally undergo some form of reception, staging, onward movement and integration. For example, a fighter squadron and other self-deploying forces may complete JRSOI in a few hours at the reception point or aerial port. Other units may require 30 days or longer to complete the entire process.

2. Principles of Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

a. There are three overarching principles of JRSOI as depicted in Figure VI-2. These principles can assist commanders and their staffs in the planning and execution of JRSOI. CCDRs should consider these principles when planning JRSOI operations.

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**UNITY OF COMMAND**

“Unity of command is the interlocking web of responsibility which is a foundation for trust, coordination, and the teamwork necessary for unified military action. It requires clear delineation of responsibility among commanders up, down, and laterally.”

*JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*

b. **Unity of command specifies that a single individual is responsible for the overall coordination of JRSOI activities.** This individual is the supported CCDR of the theater in which the deploying force flows. The CCDR adjusts resources based upon the deployment flow into the theater. The CCDR also controls the movement of forces in the AOR, provides support to personnel arriving into the theater, and centrally coordinates the efforts of all other key players in the JRSOI process to include supporting CCDRs.
c. **Synchronization links deployed personnel, equipment, and materiel in a timely manner.** A well-synchronized flow expedites buildup of mission capability and avoids saturation at nodes and along LOCs, thereby enhancing survivability. Synchronization requires detailed joint planning, timely and predictable airflow and seaflow, visibility of assets moving through the distribution pipeline, and the ability to adjust movement schedules. Synchronization occurs when the right units, equipment, supplies, and capabilities arrive in the correct order at the appropriate locations, and supporting activities are coordinated in such a fashion to operate in consonance with one another so that the tempo of force deployment, planning, and execution is uninterrupted. This enhances C2 and helps maintain unit integrity. Managing the timing of the TPFDD flow up to the point of movement is a key activity for ensuring that the arrival time of personnel, equipment, and materiel coincide. Force planners and supporting TCCs must ensure that unit integrity is a dominant consideration when planning unit and equipment deployment and/or movement increments to their supporting transportation load plans and movement schedules.
d. Balance applies to managing the TPFDD flow. Managing the TPFDD allows the supported CCDR to adjust the movement schedule for units as mission requirements or conditions change. AV further provides users with timely and accurate information on the location, movement, status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies. Balance is especially relevant to the relationship between deployment and theater distribution. To achieve balance, the flow through the intertheater pipeline and the intratheater network must be regulated and integrated to allow a continuous and controlled flow of forces and sustainment into and within the AOR. Supported CCDRs regulate the transportation flow by ensuring that adequate support and reception assets, effectively coordinated through a theater reception plan, are available or deployed early in the movement schedule to facilitate JRSOI. Continuous flow (balance) is improved by minimizing handling, the number of transfer points, and the number and variety of carriers. Saturation can be avoided, survivability enhanced, and balance achieved by ensuring that personnel, equipment, materiel, and information flow are directed at a rate that can be accommodated at every point along the entire network, from origin to destination. The operational environment, concept of the operations, and available infrastructure are major considerations in determining how to balance the transportation flow and sequence the arrival of combat and CS forces in theater.

SYNCHRONIZATION

DEsert storm synchronization required detailed joint planning, timely and predictable airflow and seaflow. In December, the primary cause of overcrowding (in the vicinity of [ports of debarkation]) was a lack of unit integrity in the sea flow. Property of individual units was frequently dispersed among multiple ships. An analysis of 19 randomly selected combat arms and combat support battalions indicate that, on average, a battalion's equipment arrived on seven vessels over a period of 26 days. On average, combat service support battalions came into port on 17 vessels over a period of 37 days. As an example of one extreme, all the equipment of the 121st Signal Battalion of the 1st Infantry Division (M), one of the lead units from [the continental United States], arrived on two ships within three days of each other. At the other extreme, gear belonging to the 143d Signal Battalion and 1st Maintenance Battalion from Europe was spread over 17 and 26 ships respectively, docking over periods of 25 and 45 days respectively. The disruption of throughput operations caused by dispersion of unit property on multiple ships was further exacerbated when single ships were loaded with partial unit sets bound for two different ports. The failure to synchronize airflow and sea flow and not maintain unit integrity contributed to excessively long stays in port by soldiers awaiting equipment. The consequent over concentration in the staging area strained available reception capability and provided the enemy a vulnerable target over an extended period.

SOURCE: 1st Infantry Division (Forward)
DESERT SHIELD/STORM After Action Report, 30 May 1991
3. Elements of Joint, Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

a. In order to achieve unity of command, synchronization, and balance, JRSOI relies upon essential and enabling elements as shown in Figure VI-3. These elements combine in various ways under differing circumstances to make the operations associated with JRSOI possible.

b. Communications systems are the means by which the CCDR maintains unity of command to balance and synchronize joint force activities and achieve mission success. Joint forces operate in diverse environments and conduct a variety of operations as part of multinational or interagency teams. Rapid force projection, extended LOCs, and potential forcible entry prior to establishing operations in logistical bare-based areas require a communications system infrastructure (to include AV) that is interoperable, flexible, responsive, mobile, disciplined, survivable, and sustainable.

(1) JRSOI operations require effective communication systems with responsive leaders and managers. Communication systems must link the supported CCDR, supporting CCDRs, Service components, deploying units, JRSOI support organizations, and the tactical commanders who will integrate the deploying forces and capabilities into their commands. Reporting and information systems must provide accurate, relevant, and timely information to the appropriate staffs and leaders to plan, integrate, direct, and execute their assigned part of the JRSOI operation.

For more information see CJCSM 3150.16B, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Reporting Structure (JOPESREP), Volume 1.

(2) Effective communication systems must be responsive to the supported CCDR for deployment and JRSOI management. The supported CCDR must be able to influence the outcome
of the deployment. To do this, the commander must know what force capabilities are available and what capabilities will be available in the future. METT-T influenced changes may cause certain units to be in high demand or needed for immediate employment. Communications systems must enable JRSOI C2 elements to locate these units and divert resources to expedite their onward movement.

*For detailed joint communication systems planning guidance, see JP 6-0, Joint Communications Systems.*

c. **Commanders must ensure that requisite protection measures are enforced consistent with the threat.** For JRSOI, the challenge is to protect those forces configured for deployment that are geographically dispersed and possess limited self-protection capability. Risk must be assessed and comprehensive protection plans developed to address vulnerabilities and to counter potential threats to forces, infrastructure, and information systems. Effective and efficient JRSOI operations can reduce force vulnerability by ensuring that units quickly complete the process. Balance and synchronization ensure that forces do not remain static in vulnerable situations and is facilitated by:

   (1) Coordinating the flow (achieving balance) so personnel, equipment, and materiel arrive nearly simultaneously;

   (2) Minimizing the force footprint by time-phasing units so that those elements required to conduct JRSOI deploy initially;

   (3) Synchronizing theater reception, staging, and onward movement capabilities to prevent bottlenecks; and

   (4) Exercising the ability to control and adjust the TPFDD flow and movement schedules (unity of command).


d. **JRSOI support organizations** can consist of one or more combinations of the following: US forces, HN assets, contractors, or multinational forces. These organizations are a force multiplier because they provide the means to expedite buildup of forces in the AOR. Normally, US forces are deployed to support JRSOI operations if the required capability does not exist in the AOR. The necessity to deploy US forces may be reduced if reliable support can be obtained through one of the other sources. To execute JRSOI operations, planners should consider requirements shown in Figure VI-4, and integrate required forces and capabilities early into the deployment process. As units arrive in the AOR, they are in a deploying status with little or no operational capability and will most likely require support. Their requirements should be met until the units assemble and become operational and have been integrated into the gaining command. The list in Figure VI-4 is self-descriptive; however, other Services encompass life support requirements such as meals, water, shelter, sanitation, trash removal, and support elements for operating marshalling and staging areas, and reporting movements to the DOD ITV visibility system. Sustainment of JRSOI is provided by organizations such as Army sustainment brigades, Air Force aerial
e. **HNs can provide valuable resources to support JRSOI operations.** HNS may include support operations at reception facilities, air and naval operating bases, staging facilities, and support areas, and may encompass a wide variety of commodities and services concerning supplies, medical, transportation, facilities, communications, rear area operations, petroleum, military police, prisoners of war and internees, and civil labor. HNS can reduce the need for early arriving forces and materiel to support JRSOI, shrink strategic lift requirements, and minimize the in-theater logistic footprint. In addition to established HNS agreements normally limited to use in war, this support can also be arranged using existing ACSAs or, at the local level, by directly contracting for support and services. HN capabilities should be assessed and validated as early on in the deployment process as possible. In contingency operations, an enormous saving in manpower, units, and equipment is possible by maximizing HNS. This is particularly true in the areas of transportation and specialized equipment.

f. **Multinational support has been a traditional strong point for successful JRSOI.** Historically, the United States has relied upon its allies to assist during major worldwide contingencies and smaller regional emergencies. This support has ranged across the spectrum of JRSOI operations. Complementary and unique multinational capabilities should be considered during planning.
g. Contracting support is another force multiplier and, like HNS, should be planned and coordinated in advance of an actual deployment. Normally, HNS will be considered first before a decision is made to contract for required support. The supported CCDR should ensure the early deployment of contracting, financial management, and legal personnel to accomplish necessary contracting actions. In the context of JRSOI, contract support is the use of foreign or US civilian personnel and/or equipment to perform a function, such as offloading vessels or transporting supplies forward. Using contractor personnel reduces the need for US military personnel.

For further information on contracting support see JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations, JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations, and JP 3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters.

4. Reception

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“Aerial port of debarkation control in joint operations is complex. It requires personnel with special skills, available in sufficient numbers at the earliest opportunity.”

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (1994-1996)
Joint After-Action Report
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a. This section describes reception operations at theater PODs and other reception nodes. Reception is the process of receiving, offloading, marshalling, and transporting of personnel, equipment, and materiel from strategic and/or intratheater deployment phase to a sea, air, or surface transportation point of debarkation to the marshalling area. When the President/SecDef directs deployment of military forces into a theater, their ultimate success substantially depends on how well the process of receiving that force in-theater is executed.

b. Reception must be considered in the planning and CONOPs development. Reception begins with the arrival of deploying forces and equipment into a JOA. During major strategic deployment, the preponderance of personnel arrive in-theater via strategic airlift and most equipment and materiel arrives by strategic sealift. Exceptions to this rule include time-sensitive equipment such as C2 assets and other items identified as critical combat capabilities. Deployment is most often strategic, i.e., intertheater, but can be intratheater. In some cases, intertheater and intratheater airlift will compete for available APOD space and services.

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DESSERT SHIELD RECEPTION

Although personnel were usually flown to the Gulf, most equipment and supplies were sent by sea. Close coordination among the entire transportation network was necessary to ensure that airlifted personnel reached the theater near the date their equipment was scheduled to arrive. Arrival of personnel before their equipment would increase the burden on the Saudi infrastructure. It also would expose troop concentrations in the port areas to possible enemy attack by ballistic missiles, aircraft, and terrorists.

SOURCE: Conduct of the Persian Gulf War
DOD Final Report to Congress, April 1992
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c. An effective interface between the phases of strategic movement to POD and reception is crucial to the overall success of the JRSOI process. Reception capacity, should include at a minimum, strategic lift and delivery capabilities and the overall throughput capabilities of the port. This enables the port to be cleared in an efficient manner. The transition to theater responsibility can be facilitated by USTRANSCOM TCCs in conjunction with the Services and/or joint forces operating the air and sea PODs. Although the primary focus of reception is to receive, offload, marshal, and transport deploying forces, the reception process inevitably shifts from receiving sustainment materials, replacement equipment, and personnel to ultimately supporting redeployment operations of in-theater forces. At PODs, these activities may occur simultaneously with two-way traffic into and out of the theater. In all cases, detailed planning, force tracking, and the principles of movement control as described in Chapter V, Movement, of this publication are essential to the overall success of reception.

d. Seaport and aerial port capacities and throughput capabilities significantly influence the speed with which forces can be deployed, the order in which forces must be deployed and, to a large extent, the types of units that can be deployed. Port efficiency or throughput is a function of the operational environment and the level of port modernization (developed versus undeveloped). Some instances may necessitate improving or constructing port facilities to meet operational requirements. In addition to the PODs and nodes, several other facilities and areas support the reception process.

e. Marshalling is another essential component of the reception process that facilitates port clearance. The timely movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel to a common assembly or holding area gives the commander the first opportunity to reassemble mission capability. This very important task of assembling forces is often complicated by the fact that units may arrive in-theater at separate PODs and at different times. To further enhance port clearance, the CCDR must designate marshalling areas that support unit re-assembly without impeding the arrival ports for follow-on units.

f. DOD uses the single port manager approach for most APOD and seaport of debarkation (SPOD) operations. As outlined in the UCP and USTRANSCOM command arrangements agreement, USTRANSCOM has the mission to provide worldwide common-user aerial and seaport terminal management and may provide terminal services by contract. Thus USTRANSCOM, through AMC and SDDC, will normally manage common-use aerial ports and seaports respectively for the CCDR. In areas not served by a permanent USTRANSCOM presence, USTRANSCOM will deploy an AMC mission support element including aerial port expertise. If mobile C2 is also required, a mission support team or contingency response group (CRG) will deploy as well as an SDDC port management cell to manage the ports in concert with the designated port operator. Based on availability of fixed-port terminals or operational environments or requirement, the port manager may also serve as the port operator.

g. The APOD serves as the primary port of entry for deploying personnel, as well as for early entry forces and capabilities airlifted into theater. APODs may be operated in conjunction with the HN.

(1) **APOD Functions.** Numerous operational and support functions occur at the APOD. Primary operational functions are to receive, offload, marshal, provide essential field services, and
transport deploying forces and capabilities. Tasks include offloading cargo (both equipment and materiel), clearing personnel through air terminals, accomplishing movement control, and maintaining ITV. In addition to operational functions, there are APOD support functions as listed in Figure VI-5.

(2) APOD Service Capabilities. Various organizations provide the operational capabilities needed for APOD reception. For example, AMC through its air mobility squadrons and/or aerial port flights and CRGs provides much of the operational and logistic support needed to receive arriving aircraft; Navy overseas air cargo terminal units unload aircraft and operate air cargo and passenger airheads. Through its cargo transfer capability, the Army provides the required support to interface with the CRG and begin the staging and onward movement phases for the deploying personnel, equipment, and materiel. When performing this mission, the Army element is often referred to as the A/DACG. Marine Corps units may also be given the A/DACG mission. In addition, HNS, provided under the
provisions of an existing agreement or contracted port services, may be used to free up finite reception assets and minimize the logistic footprint at the APOD. Close coordination with HNS activities is necessary to balance the operational requirements of all organizations competing for limited resources.

(3) APOD Infrastructure Optimization. Various factors can impede APOD reception, but the overriding considerations for any airfield operation are parking maximum (aircraft) on the ground (MOG) and working MOG. Parking MOG is the number of aircraft that can fit, or be parked, on the ground. Working MOG pertains to how many parked aircraft can be worked based on available personnel, materials handling equipment (MHE), and ramp space. Optimally, working MOG equals parking MOG. But this is seldom the case, since parking MOG usually exceeds working MOG. Service and HN operators must ensure that their activities do not reduce MOG capacities.

(4) APOD Joint Use. Another consideration is ownership and management of the APOD facility. The APOD may be controlled and/or operated by various HN military and civilian organizations. Additionally, other military and commercial activities may compete for limited facilities. These competing requirements may complicate unity of command and may limit or reduce facility throughput capacities available for reception of forces. To overcome this obstacle, clear C2 relationships must be established by the JFC for all APODs and JRSOI functions.

JOINT ENDEAVOR

In Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, the Army established a heliport to reassemble helicopters that were shipped by air. The heliport occupied a portion of an airfield, which affected the number of aircraft that could be parked on the field. This reduced the throughput of the airfield and consequently slowed the deployment, an Army decision that impacted the strategic flow.

SOURCE: Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (1995- )
Draft Lessons Learned

h. Seaport of Debarkation. The SPOD is perhaps the most important because of its enormous throughput potential as it receives deploying forces and sustainment from surface vessels. Historically, 90 percent of a deploying force’s equipment and materiel are delivered to the theater via strategic sealift. There are three types of seaports that can function as an SPOD: fixed, which are improved, world class ports such as Dammam, Saudi Arabia or Pusan, Korea; unimproved or degraded ports such as those found in Somalia and Haiti; and bare beaches where fixed facilities are unavailable.

(1) SPOD Functions and Responsibilities. Responsibility for essential SPOD functions is shared between HN seaport organizations and US DOD organizations such as MSC and SDDC, military terminal service units, and contractors. Shown in Figure VI-6 are examples of essential SPOD functions.
Through its Army component, Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provides the single port manager for all common-user seaports worldwide. When necessary, in areas where SDDC does not maintain a manned presence, a port management cell may be established to direct water terminal (i.e., fixed, unimproved facility, and/or bare beach) operations, including the work loading of the port operator based on the combatant commander’s priorities and guidance. Depending on the situation, the geographic combatant commander may also request, in their command arrangement agreement with USTRANSCOM, SDDC to operate some or all water terminals in the theater.

JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore
(2) SPOD operations are normally conducted at established fixed water terminal facilities such as a sea or inland water port. Pre-positioned port opening packages are an option available to the CCDR through the different Service’s pre-positioned equipment located either in-theater or afloat. Pre-positioned port opening packages may be capable of operating a water terminal and providing the necessary capability to receive forces.

(3) SPOD water terminals include both seaports and inland water facilities capable of receiving deep draft vessels, coastal vessels, and barges. Many established terminals will have a transportation infrastructure in place such as railways, highways, inland waterways, and adjacent airfields. Although terminal facilities will vary, many will already be equipped to handle roll-on/roll-off vessels, containers, general and bulk cargo, and lighterage.

(4) JLOTS is an option available to receive the force when debarkation at an established port is impractical or not available. In addition, JLOTS may also provide increased capability to operational fixed ports. JLOTS operations are operations in which Navy and Army logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) forces conduct LOTS operations together under a JFC. JLOTS operations are conducted over unimproved shorelines, through fixed ports not accessible to deep draft shipping, and through fixed ports that are inadequate without the use of JLOTS capabilities. JLOTS operations should be considered when port throughput capacity or reception capability is inadequate to support planned joint force operations, or to augment port reception capability to handle the surge of major combat forces during the early stages of deployment operations. The magnitude of JLOTS operations extends from the reception of ships for offload through the onward movement of equipment and materiel to inland marshalling and staging areas.

For further information on JLOTS see JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).

(5) The SPOD will contain facilities and organizations, both military and civilian, to perform many of the APOD functions described earlier. One of the key organizations for SPOD operations is the PSA and/or POG. It is a temporary organization that aids the port commander in receiving, processing, and clearing cargo. The PSA is under the OPCON of the single port manager at common-user seaports. For seaports not designated as common-user seaport, the geographic CCDR will designate the port manager, whereas the POG remains under the OPCON of the LCE and/or landing force support party. PSA and POG functions are shown in Figure VI-7.

i. Transportation systems are crucial to the timely and efficient reception of deploying forces at the SPOD. The supported commander should consider all available resources, geography, transportation capabilities, climate and seasonal changes, and distance between LOC nodes as well as projected requirements for movement of the forces from the SPOD. When selecting a SPOD, the supported commander should consider the transportation infrastructure as well as the capacity of the port to handle potential throughput and surges of deploying forces. A robust rail, road, airport, and inland waterway system will be vital in efficiently receiving and moving the force to staging areas.
Reception Considerations. In order to support operations at the APOD and SPOD, there are conditions that support the JRSOI process that should be considered. The CCDR should determine the type of support units and the composition and/or method of sustainment support necessary to carry out reception. The CCDR may consider most capable Service or dominant user options when configuring the support structure. Figure VI-8 illustrates some reception planning considerations.

(1) **Economy of Resources.** CCDRs should tailor their reception operations to provide efficiency and economy as well as eliminating duplication of limited resources among the Services. The decision by the JFC to establish a joint reception center maximizes use of scarce resources. Efficient resource management of limited transportation assets and reception facilities assists in optimizing reception throughput. Discharge workload should not exceed POD throughput capacity. An option that may accomplish this is a time-phased build-up of reception capabilities. At the same time, however, reception forces must be configured in such a way that they are capable of handling potential surge capacities of strategic deployment and provide intermodal services for transshipment of arriving cargo and supplies.

(2) **Command and Control.** C2 functions are essential to the successful reception of forces into an operational area and are the responsibility of the supported CCDR. Prior to commencement of deployment and reception operations, the JFC should develop an in-theater structure for executing C2 of JRSOI operations. This structure must address the integration of USTRANSCOM assets into the
overall C2 for JRSC to be an efficient operation. Some C2 assets may be pre-positioned in theater, geographically in close proximity to the region, or afloat on MSC or maritime pre-positioning force vessels. Successful execution of a reception operation involves a centralized C2 structure (unity of command), a decentralized execution strategy, and disciplined (synchronized and balanced) movement control. The following C2 functions (mission and situation dependent) are examples of what may be required to successfully execute reception functions at APODs and SPODs:

(a) Maintain unity of effort for all primary and secondary LOC nodes.

(b) Coordinate, control, and monitor US airlift and sealift operations into APODs and SPODs.

(c) Designate marshalling area.

(d) Provide personnel and cargo clearance of arriving forces.

(e) Provide for personnel, equipment, and materiel accountability.

(f) Determine whether a security risk category (SRC) is to be designated as a joint risk category.

(g) Provide movement control of arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel.
(h) Provide visibility over arriving and departing personnel and cargo by input of AV source data into appropriate AIS.

(i) Perform liaison with HN military and civilian officials for coordinating required clearances and support.

(j) Coordinate and control loading and offloading from aircraft and ships.

(k) Coordinate and control personnel and cargo movements from PODs via surface and air to planned holding areas.

(l) Monitor and manage the TPFDD.

(m) Coordinate and control movement of noncombatants.

(n) Provide clearance for intratheater airlift cargo movements.

(o) Provide distribution management for the theater and arriving unit command structures of all arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel.

(p) Provide intermodal services for transshipment of arriving cargo and supplies.

(q) Provide, coordinate, and control construction in support of personnel and cargo movement.

(r) Provide life support facilities.

(3) **Communications.** Effective communications and collaboration, vertically and horizontally, is essential for JRSOI due to the complexity of the operation. Timely and reliable communications should be continuous among all JRSOI participants, both supporting and supported. The following communications functions may be required to successfully execute JRSOI operations:

(a) Establish links between LOC nodes.

(b) Use automation technology. Communications should utilize advanced technologies that will be both an enabler and force multiplier of the reception process. The automated information systems and the COP described in Appendix A (pages A-2 and A-7, respectively) are crucial to ensure that the commander has access to interactive decision quality information (integrated, real-time, AV, etc.) on personnel, installations, finances, and equipment/materiel. The entire JRSOI process, especially reception, should leverage the power of automation. Through GCSS programs, AV can track as well as manage the flow of forces in-theater and through the numerous PODs. Establishing a reliable network to disseminate this valuable information to all Services involved in the reception phase must be a priority for those units with GCSS and GTN capabilities.
(c) **Provide liaison officers (LNOs).** Effective liaison among the Service components and with HN agencies is paramount in order for effective communication to occur during the entire reception operation.

(d) Monitor GTN and JOPES to provide real time force tracking information of deploying forces and non-unit replacement personnel. Monitor AV and GTN to provide real-time tracking of non-unit sustainment items for all organizations and activities.

(e) Provide for reliable and compatible two-way communications between joint forces.

(4) **Protection.** Deploying forces as well as intertheater airlift and sealift assets may be the most vulnerable during loading or discharge. The threat must be considered in light of the concentration of forces within the limited confines of a POD. As units move forward to secondary LOC nodes, they remain vulnerable until fully integrated into a mission-capable force. Protection capabilities and/or measures should be integrated into the reception plan. The CCDR is responsible for providing the assets needed to protect the force throughout the entire reception process. Protection functions should include but are not limited to:

(a) Providing theater air defense.

(b) Maintaining coastal, harbor, and inland waterway defense.

(c) Providing APOD and SPOD facility defense.

(d) Providing military police support.

(e) Establishing joint security coordination center for security oversight.

(f) Preparing for the effects of noncombatant evacuation operations on JRSOI operations.

(g) Providing protection against weapons of mass destruction threats, and

(h) Protect Lines of Communications.

*For further information on security operations see JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.*

(5) **Transportation.** All three elements of a transportation system (mode operations, terminal operations, and movement control) should be integrated early into the TPFDD flow to provide adequate reception capabilities for the deploying forces. These elements may be RC assets that must be mobilized and flow early in the TPFDD. Essential to any JRSOI mission is an executable plan that facilitates intratheater transportation between nodes. The primary transportation nodes and the extended LOCs should be mutually supportive of the principle of unit integrity. To transition from strategic intertheater deployment to in-theater reception, the following transportation functions may be required:
(a) Place port opening force packages at PODs providing hand-off of deploying personnel, equipment, and materiel.

(b) Employ movement control principles. Movement control coordinates all aspects of transportation; modes, nodes, and terminals. It includes Service-unique capabilities, HNS, and supporting commands.

(c) Have a support element for offloading of arriving forces.

(d) Provide intratheater air and surface transportation assets.

(e) Manage and monitor the TPFDD.

(f) Establish theater LOC nodes and links required to meet the anticipated transportation and throughput capacities. Allow for sufficient coordination to ensure timely movement of cargo and equipment through the port to minimize port congestion.

(g) Identify, assess, and provide for required physical transportation capacities and capabilities (ports, airfields, rail and road networks, littoral and inland waterways, and communications infrastructure).

(6) Supply and Services. Supply and services compete for limited strategic lift resources as the priority is on receiving and moving the force forward into the theater. However, sustainment of the force while transitioning into the theater cannot be forgotten, and neither can the resources that will be required to sustain reception. The CCDR must provide arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel with required life support and field services until unit personnel are reunited with their supplies and equipment and become self-sufficient. These services may be RC assets that must be mobilized and flow early in the TPFDD. The following are typical categories of support that may be provided to sustain newly arriving forces in-theater:

(a) Field and life support services such as food, water, lodging, and sanitation.

(b) Maintenance and operator support for deploying equipment, vehicles, helicopters, and aircraft.

(c) Munitions storage and handling.

(d) Petroleum products storing and handling.

(e) Medical support and evacuation.

(f) Mortuary affairs services.

(g) Frustrated cargo storing, handling, and processing.
(7) **HNS** as a potential force multiplier should be planned and coordinated well in advance of an actual deployment. This can best be accomplished through coordination with the US country team (ambassador and staff), if one exists within country. The effect of a well-planned HNS agreement should be a reduction of the US military logistic footprint in-theater and a concurrent reduction in the need for early deployment of supporting units. Some HNS considerations include:

(a) Augmenting reception capabilities early in the deployment cycle with dedicated units if civilian or military HNS are not available at APODs and/or SPODs to quickly throughput combat forces.

(b) Analyzing the PODs and in-theater transportation infrastructure capacity.

(c) Anticipating limited materiel, key services, and HNS in-country.

(8) **Contractor Support** for materiel requirements is another force multiplier and, like HNS, should be planned and coordinated in advance of an actual deployment. Normally, HNS will be considered first before a decision is made to contract for required support. The supported CCDR should ensure early deployment of contracting, financial management, and legal personnel to accomplish the contracting actions. Contracts will not be without cost, nor should deploying forces expect to have unlimited access to local facilities and resources. In most cases, military forces will have to share and compete with HN military, civil, and commercial operations for scarce resources and facilities.

“As we have learned many times, the US can ship supplies and materiel to an objective area much more effectively and efficiently than the objective area can unload and distribute those supplies.”

LTG (Ret.) Joseph M. Heiser
A Soldier Supporting Soldiers, 1992

5. Staging

a. **General.** This section describes the staging process and the activities performed in theater staging areas (SAs). Staging includes the assembling, temporary holding, and organizing of arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into units and forces, and preparing them for onward movement and employment by the JFC. During staging, deploying forces have limited mission capability and may not be self-sustainable. The CCDR must provide facilities, sustainment, life support, and protection until deploying units regain their combat or mission capability. Three essential force-related activities that occur during staging are described in Figure VI-9.

b. A major focus during JRSOI and specifically during staging is building capabilities required by the JFC. Mission success requires:

(1) Defining combat capability.

(2) Defining logistic capability and sustainability.
(3) Defining how to track and visualize combat power.

(4) Establishing an incremental building of combat power.

(5) Prioritizing and adjusting the flow as needed.

(6) Managing and supervising the unit’s progress.

(7) Developing a complementary tracking system that applies to combat operations as well as JRSOI.

c. Force tracking aids in predicting the unit’s arrival time in theater and incremental build of mission capability. The supported CCDR’s staff supports the operational commander in force tracking by providing visibility of deploying forces and materiel through the capability of AV. Force tracking includes the following steps:

(1) Elements are monitored until they are reassembled.

(2) Unit commander reestablishes control of the unit.

(3) Unit becomes capable of sustaining itself.

(4) Unit can perform assigned missions.

(5) Unit completes onward movement and integration.
d. **Staging Areas.** Staging areas (SAs) are specific locations along the LOC. The CCDR usually designates specific locations for staging in order to provide space and focus resources to support staging operations. SAs provide the necessary facilities, sustainment, and other support to enable units to become mission-capable. The size of the deployment and location of the PODs and marshalling areas may necessitate multiple SAs.

(1) In selecting the location of the SAs, the CCDR visualizes where to strategically concentrate forces to enter the OA. The CCDR evaluates the location of TAAs or OAs, geographic constraints, availability of organic and HN assets, transportation infrastructure, distance to the ports, and protection considerations. These factors, along with the physical dimensions of the theater, ultimately determine the location of the theater SAs.

(2) The size of the SA is influenced by numerous variables, including the anticipated flow of forces in-theater, space available, and threat. The TPFDD is an important tool for the CCDR to use in understanding the requirements for SAs.

(3) **Intermediate Staging Base.** The theater operational situation may necessitate the establishment of an ISB outside of the combat zone or JOA prior to inserting the forces. If established, the ISB is an initial theater staging facility. Deploying forces debark from strategic lift, reassemble, and prepare to accomplish assigned missions. The theater may not have the physical infrastructure to support JRSOI and will require the use of air and sea bases outside the region. ISBs serve as a principal staging base in order to secure a lodgment to project the force for the rapid delivery of combat power to an AOR and can perform selected operational-level tasks. An ISB is also used to transition from intertheater lift to intratheater lift to increase the number of points of entry available to the force to mitigate anti-access measures. ISB force projection is depicted in Figure VI-10.

> “Movement is the essence of strategy. This is true even though strategy is not confined to the military art: the implementation of every political decision requires movement. It may be messages that move, or men, or money or munitions.”

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**Stephen B. Jones**

*“Global Strategic Views” in The Impact of Air Power, 1959*

6. **Onward Movement**

a. **General.** This section describes systems and processes for accomplishing the onward movement of deploying forces. Onward movement is the process of moving forces and sustainment from reception facilities and marshalling or SAs to TAAs or other operating areas. Rail, road, inland or coastal waterway, and/or air can be used to accomplish this movement.

b. Some challenges to onward movement are illustrated in Figure VI-11.

c. Efficient onward movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel requires a balanced, integrated system of node operations, movement control, mode operations, and cargo transfer operations. The
Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

Onward movement process encompasses support to all Service components of a joint operation, and often includes HNS. As in all JRSOI activities, onward movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel is prioritized according to the CCDR’s needs. Onward movement is complete when force elements are delivered to the designated location at the designated time.

d. **Onward Movement Functions.** Key elements of the onward movement process are speed of movement and information flow. Speed of movement is vital for protection and mission accomplishment. Information flow encompasses locations and capabilities of forces, projected and actual arrival times at en route and final destinations, and component commands’ ability to effect the movement. Successful onward movement of deploying forces can be viewed in the context of seven critical functions as depicted in Figure VI-12 and explained below.

(1) **Movement Control.** Movement control is the planning, routing, scheduling, and control of personnel and cargo movements over LOCs. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistic Support*, authorizes a CCDR
to establish a joint movement control organization. To ensure a fully integrated and responsive transportation system, the CCDR should consider assigning responsibility for theater transportation movement control to a single joint organization, the JDDOC. This JDDOC must be equipped with sufficient communication and automation capability to ensure adequate interface between strategic and theater transportation systems and the CCDR’s staff. The CCDR may also choose to use one of the existing movement control centers of the Service components. The Army has various movement control organizations while the Marine Corps has movement control centers (MCCs) planned for all deploying units from the Service component level down to the battalion and squadron level. They are the MAGTF MDDOC, the MAGTF movement control center, and the unit movement control centers.

(a) If a joint movement control organization is established using assets from multiple Services, it must conduct joint training to ensure that personnel understand and can operate movement control equipment and C2 processes. The geographic CCDR should task-organize the movement control functions commensurate with the mission, size, and geography of the OA.

“Inadequate control of movement, whether into or out of a theater, results in waste, reduced logistic efficiency and consequently, a loss of potential combat power.”

JP 4-0, Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations

(b) The ITV systems provide a capability vital to coordinated onward movement. They provide a means to track units, personnel, equipment, and materiel en route from reception areas to SAs and forward to the assembly areas. The physical capabilities and limitations of the distribution network, along with the effects of combat, can limit the ability to execute onward movement as planned. Thus, ITV information is critical to successful execution of onward movement to include location, characteristics,
and capacities of roads, aerial ports, and rail lines, combined with current status of highway regulation, traffic circulation and surface distribution plans, and movement programs.

**OPERATION JOINT ENDEAVOR**

At the time of execution, the rail deployment plan was based on an invalidated deployment rate (20 trains per day). At the planned rate of movement, the division could deploy the bridge opening package, open the ground lines of communications, accomplish the transfer of authority, and begin enforcement of the ZOS [zone of separation] by D+30. As the deployment began, it rapidly became apparent that the rail LOC [line of communications] would only throughput about half of the planned deployment rate. As a result, ad hoc force tailoring decisions had to be made to compensate for the reduced rail lift capacity.

**SOURCE:** Initial Impressions Report
Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (1995-)

(2) **Communications.** Movement control elements must be equipped with sufficient communication and systems to ensure adequate interface between strategic and theater transportation systems and the combatant command’s staff. They should be skilled in coordinating and directing theater transportation operations in support of unit movements and/or logistic resupply operations.

(3) **Transportation.** Nodes, main supply routes (MSRs), and HN assistance should be coordinated to maximize the speed of movement. Close coordination is essential for minimizing congestion.
because in most cases the Services, allied units, and the HN populace will be using the same networks. It is essential that capacities and capabilities of the transportation network are balanced against the movement requirements so that nodes and routes are neither saturated nor underutilized. As previously explained, the designated movement control element is responsible for coordinating the use of all theater transportation resources with USTRANSCOM and its TCCs, other combatant commands, and the HN.

(4) **Supply and Services.** En route support nodes along the theater LOC provide security, life support, refueling, limited vehicle maintenance, and vehicle recovery. The size of the support centers will be based upon the available facilities, length of route, and volume of equipment and personnel transiting the sites. Various types of en route facilities that support onward movement include:

(a) Aircraft en route support sites.

(b) Convoy support sites.

(c) Trailer transfer points.

(d) POL transfer points.

(e) Pre-positioned equipment sites.

(f) Pre-stock supply points.

(g) Railheads.

(h) Of the above listed facilities, convoy support sites are among the most critical and provide the bulk of en route support during onward movement. Services provided by convoy support sites may be tailored based upon such factors as distance between LOC nodes; number and location of support bases; and MSRs’ congestion, condition, and protection. Convoy support sites usually provide support in the following areas:

1. Administration and communications.

2. Refueling.

3. Dining and billeting.

4. Latrines.

5. Laundry and showers.

6. Vehicle recovery and maintenance.

7. Medical.
8. MHE and cargo-handling equipment (CHE).


(5) **HNS resources and facilities** are important to the successful employment and deployment of forces. HNs can often provide a variety of services through their national agencies and can support onward movement in a wide range of categories. Some of these categories are shown in Figure VI-13.

(6) **ACSAs** provide US pre-negotiated support for potential war scenarios. ACSAs provide the legal authority for the US military and armed forces of other nations to exchange logistic goods and services. Transactions under this program must either be reimbursed, replaced in kind, or exchanged for equal value, which may not always be the case with HNS agreements.

(7) **Protection.** Protection is critical to onward movement because it minimizes enemy opportunities to inflict serious losses and delays. The threat of enemy interdiction to onward movement of forces presents a special challenge to the commander. The CCDR must assume that interdiction of the LOCs will form an integral part of enemy strategy and must plan operations to preclude them from impacting onward movement.
(a) Geographical CCDRs are faced with many asymmetrical threats as they conduct tactical convoy operations on today’s nonlinear, noncontiguous battlefield. Recent combat operations have evolved by introducing diversified threats that range from vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to complex ambushes employing IEDs, rocket-propelled grenades, and small arms.

(b) Tactical convoys are combat operations. Although contact with enemy organized/uniformed ground forces may not be anticipated, security against anti-US forces, enemy sympathizers, and IEDs must be maintained and the convoy must be prepared to take immediate action against an enemy threat. To accomplish this, tactical convoys require additional planning and coordination beyond normal line-haul operations today’s operational environment. One of the main enemy tactics of the nonlinear operational environment is to target the convoy’s LOC, supplies, and other government resources. To defeat this tactic, each tactical convoy must be prepared to take the necessary actions in the face of ambush and defeat enemy forces once contact is gained thus retaining the initiative and deterring future attacks.

ARAB-ISRAELI WAR

During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, an Israeli commando team of 12 men and a jeep-mounted recoilless (RCL) rifle were inserted at 2400 hours along the Baghdad-Damascus Highway about 100 km north of Damascus, near a bridge crossing a deep ravine. The bridge was rigged for demolition, ambush positions were laid out covering the bridge approaches, with hasty minefields covering the ambush positions. At dawn, an Iraqi tank brigade, moving on transporters, began crossing the bridge. After several vehicles had crossed, the bridge was destroyed, and the exits from the bridge approaches interdicted by the RCL, thus isolating the convoy on the road. The immobilized vehicles were then destroyed by aircraft on-call, and by commandos using satchel charges. In this manner, approximately 50 Iraqi tanks were destroyed, and the road remained closed for several days (during a critical part of the war), due to fear of additional ambushes.

SOURCE: 1973 War Lessons Learned

For further information, see Field Manual (FM) 4-01.45, Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 4-11.3H, Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 4-01.3, Air Force Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP[I]) 3-2.58, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations.

(c) Protecting the LOCs. The JFC is responsible for LOC security. It may be necessary to commit combat capabilities to secure LOCs to ensure that the incremental build of combat power is not interrupted. In addition, alternatives such as rerouting or mode substitution may be required, i.e., air and sea LOCs to replace or supplement ground LOCs, if preventive and preemptive measures fall short.
7. Integration

a. General. This section describes the integration process and key integration requirements to successfully unite deploying forces into the theater command structure. Integration is the synchronized transfer of mission-ready forces and capabilities into the CCDR’s force. Integration may take hours or days. The complexity and time required for integration depends on the size, contingency conditions, coordination and planning. C2, communications, and security are the priority of effort during the integration phase. Integration is complete when the receiving commander establishes C2 over the arriving unit and the unit is capable of performing its assigned mission. Force tracking, which occurs as the force builds combat power, culminates in force closure as reported by the commander of the unit. Force closure is defined as “the point in time when a supported JFC determines that sufficient personnel and equipment resources are in the assigned operational area to carry out assigned tasks.”

(1) During execution, the deploying force commander reports that the levels of readiness prescribed by the supported CCDR have been achieved and that integration into the higher HQ is imminent. The supported CCDR is concerned with the following:

(a) Location of the forces.

(b) Capability of the forces.

(c) Projected and actual arrival time at destination.

(d) Commander’s capability to effect the movement.

(e) Additional transportation needed (modes, quantities).

(2) By definition, integration is the final element of JRSOI and is normally accomplished concurrently with other force projection and JRSOI tasks. It can occur anywhere along the JRSOI continuum and is normally the last JRSOI element to be completed. There are two major prerequisites to integration; the unit must be mission-capable and must be integrated into the C2 processes of its higher HQ.
(3) Tracking the components of building mission capability as a precursor to integration is essential for overall mission success. In order to track mission capabilities, the components of mission capabilities must be known and are listed below.

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MISSION CAPABILITY COMPONENTS

Operational Capability
Mobility and Survivability
Logistic Capability
Communication Capability
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b. Monitoring mission capability, early and continuous coordination, and planning can help reduce integration time. Units can establish predeployment liaisons to exchange information, standard operating procedures (SOPs), and communication networks, as well as plan for and prioritize an in-theater incremental buildup of combat power. Once established, the liaison is maintained to update information (intelligence, situation, mission, deployment timeline) to expedite the in-theater integration.

c. Integration Functions. Unlike the functions described in reception, staging, and onward movement, the emphasis during integration is on C2 and communications of personnel, equipment, and materiel as they enter the theater and prepare for integration. Critical to this is the COP as described in Appendix A. Force tracking of mission capability components helps predict when in-country integration can begin and how long it will take to complete. Protection is still critical but may be easier as security forces reestablish their military capability during staging and onward movement. However, to accomplish integration of the force, the logistic support should be transferred from JRSOI supporting organizations to the gaining command.

(1) Upon notification of deployment, a liaison between the deploying unit and receiving HQ should be established to enhance integration. This liaison is conducted through formal liaison teams attached to the arriving and receiving HQ (the preferred method) or remotely through communication channels. The size and make-up of the liaison teams are based on the mission and operational conditions.

(2) Effective liaison enhances the commander’s confidence in planning, coordinating, and executing integration. Subordinate commanders may use an LNO to obtain necessary information such as common coordination measures; tactics, techniques, and procedures; SOPs; rules of engagement; terms; symbology; and exercises.
CHAPTER VII
REDEPLOYMENT

“Wars never end cleanly and this one was no exception. The cease-fire occurred more quickly than anyone had expected. The postwar process that had existed only in concept was now imminent. Even before Schwarakopf and the Iraqi delegation had finished at Safwan on March 3, troops had begun “smelling the barn,” while the media, politicians, and loved ones in the United States up the drumbeat to return soldiers home.”

Certain Victory: The US army in the Gulf War
by Brigadier General Robert H. Scales

1. General

Redeployment is defined as the transfer of forces and materiel to support another joint force commander’s operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to home/demobilization stations for reintegration/out-processing. This chapter describes the major activities inherent in moving deployed forces and materiel from their current deployed locations into another theater for employment or to home/demobilization stations on completion of the mission. Similar to deployment, redeployment operations encompass four phases; these are redeployment planning, pre-redeployment activities, movement, and JRSOI. Redeployment operations are dependent on the supported CCDR’s defined end state, concept for redeployment, or requirements to support another JFC’s CONOPs. Figure VII-1 is the joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process map. See Annex C, “Joint Redeployment Process Map Description” to Appendix B, “Joint Deployment, Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration, and Redeployment Process Map Descriptions” for more detail.

2. Redeployment Planning

a. Redeployment planning is the responsibility of the losing supported commander or the gaining supported commander when the redeployment is to a new operational area. Operational employment normally ends with termination or transition of the joint force mission. Operations terminate when stated national strategic end state conditions or objectives are achieved. Transition occurs when control of the ongoing mission is transferred to another organization or when a change of mission is brought about by changing circumstances or objectives. Decisions made concerning the termination of operations, separation of belligerents, withdrawal timetables, residual forces and reserve stocks to remain in the host country will shape the pace and nature of the redeployment.

b. Planning Considerations. Planners must take into consideration a multiple number of issues that will directly influence their redeployment planning. The following issues have already been covered in Chapter III, however specifics relating directly to redeployment are discussed below.

(1) Intelligence Preparation. Identification of the threats to forces as they assemble and stage for redeployment can be obtained by the JTF joint intelligence operations center and the theater
joint intelligence operations center for redeployment planning. The primary intelligence objective during
redeployment planning is to **determine the threat to redeploying forces**. Again, the nodes and links
in the redeployment process represent numerous potential targets for an adversary. In addition, perceived
threats to the redeployment mission must be evaluated in terms of the existing operational environment
and the results of any cease-fire or political negotiations. These factors shape the pace and nature of the
redeployment. Based on the assessed threat, the JFC must determine **where to accept risk**, **where to
focus protection efforts**, and **how many joint force assets must be dedicated** to the protection mission.

(2) **Protection.** Protection is as important during redeployment operations as during any
other stage of a joint operation. The **operational environment** is a key indicator in determining the
level of protection measures required to ensure an uninterrupted redeployment flow. The time between
redeployment preparation and operational employment at the new destination or return to the home
Redeployment and/or demobilization station is potentially a period of great vulnerability for the redeploying unit commanders should closely evaluate protection measures during redeployment planning to provide for the security of the command and reduce the vulnerability of redeploying elements to acts of violence, terrorism, or war. Local security remains the foremost protection concern. As the joint force assembles for redeployment, commanders must continuously enforce active and passive protection measures until the redeployment mission is complete.

(3) Information Operations. Several IO capabilities and related activities may be required to support redeployment. Typical IO capabilities and related activities addressed during redeployment are as follows:

(a) Military Deception (if required). Deception operations may be required to support redeployment, depending upon the nature of the current operational mission or the post-redeployment mission. Deceptions during redeployment operations may be intended to disguise the purpose of recent joint force operations or to increase the potential for successful friendly operations by misleading the adversary as to the time and location of the relocation of forces in theater or their introduction into another theater.

(b) Operations Security. Redeployments, like deployments, have large, distinct signatures. This fact makes masking the movement (or purpose of the movement) of forces and materiel to staging bases in the AOR and/or JOA a critical piece of the OPSEC plan. Redeployment signatures probably cannot be totally hidden; however, for protection reasons, such details as force composition, movement schedules, troop and equipment concentration sites, and the time and location of destination arrival may be concealed.

(c) Public Affairs. PA activities provide the means for the JFC to keep Service members, their families, and the American public informed about joint force operations, particularly as redeployment and demobilization draws near. Previous experience has shown that the Armed Forces of the United States often receive great pressure from Congress, families of deployed Service members, and the American public at large at the completion of operations to rapidly return deployed Service members to their home and/or demobilization stations. Redeployment and demobilization are a public relations and Service member information challenge that requires creative planning and execution. PA activities targeted at the appropriate audiences will reduce Service member frustrations and public relations problems.

(d) Civil-Military Operations. CMO facilitate redeployment operations by minimizing civilian interference with US military operations and planning and coordinating with local civilian authorities for the use of in-country facilities and resources. CMO may support protection operations by planning for and using civil police to augment security forces or to provide a conduit for information of intelligence value from the local populace.

(4) Infrastructure Assessment. Depending upon the LOCs, ports, and airfields selected to support redeployment, infrastructure information such as detailed port and airfield facilities and throughput information should be readily available. This information must be updated to reflect any
changes to or loss of port or airfield facilities or throughput capacity based on acts of war, terrorism, or vandalism occurring during operations.

(5) **Force Health Protection.** The force health protection construct provides health support to Service members throughout their military service, to include comprehensive health surveillance and services during the redeployment phase of operations.

*Standardized procedures for conducting redeployment health surveillance are detailed in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, Update Procedures for Deployment Health Surveillance and Readiness, Feb 2002.*

(6) **Personnel Services Support.** Personnel services support levels must be planned for and conducted during individual and unit redeployment to enable the tracking and accountability of personnel.

(7) **Force Tracking.** Force tracking during redeployment operations is vital to joint force readiness. Redeployment is not complete until the joint force has completed movement through the redeployment pipeline and emerged at the prescribed destination. Unit integrity should be maintained, to the extent possible, and commanders must have the capability to determine the exact location of unit personnel, equipment, and materiel in the event the redeploying force has to be diverted en route for another mission. Redeployment force tracking uses the same systems and procedures discussed for deployment operations. Again, GCCS-J provides the information systems and decision support tools necessary to track the force during the redeployment process.

c. The **supported commander’s** guidance for redeployment is normally detailed in the redeployment plan or it may also be articulated in the command redeployment policy. The commander’s guidance directs the sequence for redeployment of units, individuals, and materiel and provides guidance on responsibilities and priorities for recovery and reconstitution. It also provides guidance on transition requirements during mission handover, directs personnel accountability and actions processing, and addresses HNS.

(1) The **sequence of movement** for redeploying personnel, equipment, and materiel is determined based on the following operational factors: the redeployment mission; the operational environment and associated protection concerns; the supported CCDR’s guidance or redeployment policy; and mission handover or recovery requirements. Effective joint operation planning melds these factors into the redeployment concept to develop a movement sequence that is operationally sound, transportation feasible, and meets the commander’s guidance.

(2) **Priorities and guidance for recovery activities** are outlined in the redeployment OPLAN or in the supported CCDR’s redeployment policy. Recovery activities are focused on returning the joint force to full readiness while preparing for redeployment and returning control of HN territory and infrastructure to civil or other authorities. Recovery activities may include: assembling unit elements of the joint force for accountability and maintenance; downloading and repackaging ammunition and war reserve materiel (WRM); disposal operations, such as recovery of battle-damaged equipment; decontamination; marking, recovering, and disposing of hazards, such as unexploded ordnance; proper
disposal of joint force-generated hazardous wastes; or repairing critical HN life support infrastructure (e.g., water purification, sewage treatment, electrical power, or medical). The supported CCDR establishes priorities and provides guidance to accomplish these tasks as expeditiously as possible, consistent with other joint force mission requirements.

3. Pre-Redeployment Activities

a. Force redeployment requirements are mission based and developed throughout the joint operation planning process. The supported CCDR adjusts the basic TPFDD LOI as necessary to plan and execute redeployment operations IAW established movement priorities. Forces and materiel will often not redeploy in the order used for deployment because of continuing operational missions or transition requirements. Generally, unit movement requirements are based on actual deployment movements minus those items of equipment that were destroyed, captured, lost, or transferred to in-theater war reserve stocks.

b. Identification of support activities. In order to conduct effective and efficient redeployment operations, specific individuals, units, equipment, and supplies must be identified and allocated to support the redeployment operation. Additionally, the supported CCDR must identify an organizational structure early in the planning process to control and execute the redeployment. Medical care, life support, and other services, as well as supplies and materiel, must be provided to redeploying units and organizations until redeployment is completed. HN and contract support play a vital role in redeployment operations. Coordination must be made for various support functions, to include convoy support centers, communications, MHE, POE support, and other key support functions. As the redeployment operation progresses, support is incrementally scaled down as the size of the force awaiting redeployment gets smaller. Once all redeploying equipment has been processed, the designated senior logistic support element ceases operations and redeploys by strategic airlift.
c. **Priority for redeployment.** After completion of operational requirements, forces may move to designated SA to prepare for redeployment. Forces designated to support follow on operations begin recovery and reconstitution. Redeployment preparation includes reestablishing unit integrity and accountability of individuals and equipment prior to redeployment. Redeploying units, or their parent commands, are responsible for actions and support of redeployment staging areas. Staging area actions include:

1. Turn-in of excess supply stocks and pre-positioned equipment.
2. Reconstituting and cross leveling of supplies and equipment.
3. Identify requirements for pallets, flatracks, and containers.
4. Repacking and loading provided assets for movement.

d. **Structure the Force.** Preparation for redeployment is the first step in either returning deployed forces to operational readiness in preparation for follow on missions or preparing to return deployed forces to home station or demobilization site. Recovery and reconstitution prepares the force for the next crisis and begins in theater, immediately upon completion of operational requirements. Preparation for redeployment includes performing all required personnel, supply, and inspection activities necessary to redeploy personnel, equipment, and materiel and/or restore the joint force’s capability to conduct future operations.

   1. **Personnel actions.** After completion of operational activities, personnel actions are initiated, as required. Required individual personnel actions may include: medical screening; processing decorations and awards; processing fitness or evaluation reports; and updating or completing personnel and finance records. Completion of these actions must be planned and coordinated with ongoing redeployment activities and executed in an expeditious and thorough manner because of their impact on morale and unit readiness.

   2. **Redistribution of supplies and materiel.** Redistribution is a key factor in redeploying and reconstituting supplies and materiel for future operations. Significant national resources are invested in supplies and materiel to support joint operations. Following are some of the guidelines for redistribution:

      a. Non-unit redeployed equipment and supplies are redistributed according to plans developed by the Joint Staff and the Services with input from the CCDRs.

      b. A significant amount of sustainment material may be intransit when a requirement is reduced. This material must be diverted or redirected as required. Discipline in maintaining intransit AV will facilitate this part of redeployment planning. Forces waiting for redeployment should consume theater stocks and materiel/distribution management centers should cease requisitioning from outside the theater, to the extent possible.

      c. Priority of effort is generally for forces committed to approved OPLANS. However, political agreements or commitments in a combined operation may alter redistribution efforts. Other
Redeployment

recipients may include host countries, Service materiel commands, DLA, and Government Services Administration distribution centers.

(d) In the redistribution process, equipment may be available for foreign military sales or grant programs, such as excess defense articles, to support national interests and policies.

(e) During this process, procedures should be established for the proper management of hazardous and other waste products. The safe retrograde and long-term disposition of equipment with residual contamination requires a thorough understanding of the associated risks and the minimum requirements necessary to mitigate those risks. This information allows detailed planning for equipment consolidation sites and decontamination assets required by the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear retrograde support element. The safety of service and transport personnel is of foremost concern during the retrograde of equipment with potential residual or low-level contamination.

(3) **Documenting retrograde cargo.** Commanders must ensure that cargo documentation, accountability, and accuracy is as thorough as possible. The rush to return to the home/demobilization station will bring about severe problems unless command emphasis is placed on accurately marking and documenting retrograde cargo. Of particular concern are the accurate identification, labeling, and handling of hazardous material. Unit movement data provided to TCCs must be correct in order to properly document cargo to prepare manifests for redeployment. Maintaining unit integrity during redeployment is as critical to readiness as it is during deployment. ITV of the cargo must be maintained to facilitate diversion en route, if required.

(4) **Conducting required inspections.** Supported commanders are responsible for establishing a military customs inspection program (MCIP) to ensure that redeploying personnel, equipment, and materiel are in compliance with customs and agricultural requirements for their redeployment destination. US Customs clearance and USDA inspection and wash-down of all personnel, equipment, vehicles, and retrograde cargo redeploying to the United States is IAW DODD 5030.49, DOD Customs and Border Clearance Program. Foreign requirements for forward presence forces returning to the home station must be determined and inspections coordinated with the HN. An approved MCIP must be in place prior to redeployment to clear personnel, cargo, and battle-damaged equipment returning to the United States for disposition.

(5) **TPFDD.** Redeployment operations are executed utilizing the JOPES process. Normally, redeployment TPFDDs are developed with the redeployment plan during force employment planning and updated and refined during redeployment preparations. Redeploying forces are tailored and prioritized for redeployment based on the supported CCDR’s intent expressed in the OPLAN or redeployment policy. During redeployment preparation, unit movement data is updated to reflect changes to the automated unit equipment lists caused by combat, maintenance, or supply losses. Subordinate organizations and component commands must verify unit movement data to the supported CCDR for redeployment TPFDD validation. USTRANSCOM develops the redeployment strategic movement schedule after receiving the validated TPFDD from the supported CCDR.
4. Movement

a. **Requirements validation.** Movement execution begins with validation of the movement requirements in JOPES. Requirements validation for redeployment is conducted using the same process used during deployment operations. Redeploying units confirm readiness, movement available dates, passengers, and cargo details to their higher commands that verify total unit movement requirements to the supported CCDR. The supported CCDR receives component redeployment data, merges this data into the redeployment TPFDD, and makes adjustments to the redeployment flow as necessary. Once adjustments are complete, the supported CCDR validates the lift requirements within the specific TPFDD movement window for USTRANSCOM movement scheduling by confirming that the TPFDD accurately reflects current movement requirements. USTRANSCOM conducts a transportation feasibility review and coordinates unresolved transportation conflicts with the supported CCDR for resolution. The end result of this process is a supported CCDR approved redeployment TPFDD that units use to prepare for movement.

b. **Schedule movement.** Movement scheduling is an iterative process conducted at every level of command with the objective of getting the right personnel, equipment, and materiel to the right place at the right time. Once validated TPFDD requirements are received from the supported CCDR, strategic lift assets are scheduled and registered in JOPES. These movement schedules are also utilized by commands supporting redeployment operations for movement planning, coordination, and execution. After strategic lift schedules are developed, units and/or installations receive call forward messages from USTRANSCOM elements in theater directing movement to APOEs and SPOEs in designated time windows. Redeploying commands assess their ability to meet strategic lift schedules, make adjustments, and plan unit moves accordingly. Lift shortfalls and available lift are identified to the TCCs. Prior to redeployment, movement control elements confirm movement clearances with HN agencies.

c. Redeployment movements are governed by the supported CCDR’s policy for redeployment, the theater movement control plan, and the orders generated by theater movement control agencies.

(1) **Movement to POEs.** Some units may move to POE with organic lift assets. However, the majority of redeploying units generally require a combination of organic and theater transportation assets. Organic lift movements are normally coordinated by the redeploying unit’s transportation managers and controlled by the established theater movement control architecture. The theater movement control agency is responsible for management of common-user movements to the POEs as well as synchronization and integration of intertheater lift with intratheater lift to ensure an optimum flow of forces and sustainment into and out of the theater.

(2) **Conduct POE operations.** Activities at the POE focus on marshalling, capturing ITV data, and loading individuals, units, equipment, and materiel on designated transportation assets. POE operations begin the strategic leg of the redeployment process and are managed by USTRANSCOM elements in theater. Essential actions are accomplished at the POE to complete and finalize all unit movement responsibilities. The result is the load and launch of the strategic conveyance. Critical information is provided to C2 and forward support elements to facilitate efficient onward movement of
the force to the POE. Personnel, cargo, and equipment are staged and sequenced in the established
departure POE unit marshalling areas. Inspections are conducted within the departure POE alert holding
area and/or call forward areas IAW the Defense Transportation regulations and joint procedures and
policies. This includes safety, customs, and agricultural inspections and equipment wash down. Cargo
and personnel are loaded on lift platforms provided by USTRANSCOM. Reports are provided with
status of units, cargo, personnel, lift, terminals, and loading operations. Additionally, reports are submitted
to track the departure of individual lift and associated loads.

(3) **Movement to PODs.** Strategic movement from POE to POD is controlled by
USTRANSCOM. Force tracking during redeployment operations is vital to joint force readiness.
Redeployment is not complete until the joint force has completed movement through the redeployment
pipeline and emerged at the prescribed destination. Unit integrity should be maintained, to the extent
possible, and commanders must have the capability to determine the exact location of unit personnel,
equipment, and materiel in the event the redeploying force has to be diverted en route for another
mission. Redeployment force tracking uses the same systems and procedures discussed for deployment
operations.

5. **Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration**

   a. **POD Operations.** Responsibility for JRSOI from a POD during redeployment operations is
determined by the post-redeployment mission of the redeploying force. Redeployment for further
employment will involve JRSOI in the new AOR and/or JOA. Redeployment to the home and/or
demobilization station or point of origin for return to peacetime positioning or demobilization will involve
POD JRSOI coordinated and executed by the Services and USTRANSCOM for common-user
PODs and by the respective Service or unit for forces redeploying by organic assets to non common-
user PODs.

   b. Onward movement by common-user or commercial lift from a common-user surface POD to
the home and/or demobilization station or point of origin is arranged by SDDC in conjunction with
Service and/or the force-designated movement control center (MCC) or element. Onward movement
from AMC APODs is the responsibility of AMC, and from commercial and/or non-AMC military
APODs onward movement is the responsibility of the personnel assistance points or ITO and/or traffic
management office responsible for the geographic area of those ports.

   c. Conduct destination reception.

      (1) Destination reception includes all actions necessary to fully recover the unit to include its
assigned personnel and equipment. Locations are designated by receiving commands.

      (2) Demobilization of RC forces is considered during redeployment planning and should
provide for the expeditious return, reintegration, and out-processing of RC personnel based on Service
demobilization plans and policies. However, consideration must be given to the supported commander’s
immediate post operations requirements. The supported commander’s post operations mission and
priorities should take precedence over all other redeployment planning. When units or individuals redeploy, reintegration processing must be done prior to returning active duty members to their permanent duty stations or demobilizing RC members. Reintegration includes medical and security debriefs, clothing and equipment turn-in, and update of personnel and finance records.

*For more information on JRSOI, see Chapter VI, “Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.”*
1. General

Commanders and staffs at the JTF level and above must have the capability to successfully conduct deployment operations; i.e., to plan, execute, and monitor each deployment. The CCDR uses a variety of enablers, including processes, systems, and equipment to manage movement flow, obtain AV, and achieve balance and synchronization. Deployment enablers provide that capability in the form of processes, systems, and equipment providing commanders with the flexibility in adapting to changing situations. **Enablers are processes, systems, and equipment that facilitate accomplishment of the assigned mission.** Rapid force projection operations require enablers that improve deployment and redeployment planning and execution, thereby improving overall mission response time, and also possess the necessary flexibility to adapt to changing situations. Deployment and redeployment enablers required to support joint force operations include interoperable joint and Service systems and procedures, robust supporting facilities and infrastructure, and agile information management and communications systems. This appendix describes select enabling tools that allow the commander to:

a. Conduct planning (Planning)

b. Provide C2 (Execution)

c. Maintain accurate deployment information (Situational Awareness)

2. Automated Information Systems

The goal of automated information systems is to provide the CCDR with increased situational awareness. Automated C2 systems are used to exchange information among the CCDRs, national partners, the Service HQ, and Service and functional component commands. The exchange, processing, and analysis of data and information are continuous throughout mission execution. Necessarily the systems must be interoperable. **Interoperability is the condition achieved when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between user systems and equipment.** It is a function of commonality, compatibility, and standardization of equipment and systems and standardization of procedures.

*See JP 6-0, Joint Communications System, for additional information on interoperability.*

3. The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System

JOPES comprises the system applications that are used to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment activities associated with joint operations.
4. The Global Command and Control System – Joint

a. GCCS-J is the DOD’s computerized system of record for strategic C2 functions. GCCS-J enables warfighters to plan, execute, and manage military operations. The system helps JFCs synchronize the actions of air, land, maritime, space, and special operations forces. It has the flexibility to be used in a wide range of operations ranging from actual combat to humanitarian assistance. GCCS-J provides CCDRs a complete picture of the operational environment and the ability to order, respond, and coordinate communications system information. GCCS-J is a comprehensive automated communications systems designed to improve the JFC’s ability to manage and execute joint operations. GCCS-J interoperates with Service and agency communications systems, providing a global network of military and commercial communications systems that the JFC uses to send and obtain critical information. GCCS-J supports the exchange of information from the President/SecDef to CCDRs and their components. GCCS-J incorporates procedures, reporting structures, automated information processing systems, and communications connectivity to provide the information necessary to effectively plan, deploy, sustain, employ, and redeploy forces.

(1) WebPlanner. WebPlanner is the environment supporting and providing access to integrated sets of planning and execution components that support the joint military planning process.

(2) Force Deployment Management Tool. The force deployment management tool provides the capability to query and retrieve force information from a Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS) database and assign selected forces to specified and implied tasks to support a COA.

(3) Defense Collaborative Tool Suite. The Defense Collaborative Tool Suite provides audio conferencing, video teleconferencing, shared spaces, white boards, shared applications, and chat, which can significantly enhance the planning process.

(4) JOPES Editing Tool (JET). JET provides the capability to create, add, modify, delete, and generate deployment-related information contained in a TPFDD. It offers the ability to retrieve records using any characteristics that exist in ULN details. It does not provide the ability to tailor an output report, view non-TPFDD DTS movements, or review more than the rudimentary details more than one requirement at a time. JET can perform TPFDD editing on multiple ULNs based on information retrieved.

(5) Rapid Query Tool (RQT). RQT provides a powerful, relatively quick, read-only capability to develop many user-defined formatted and tabular reports that focus directly on TPFDD related issues. RQT cannot track any non-TPFDD movements in the DTS. Saving a snapshot as a quick reference file saves time in retrieval of a snapshot at the cost of not capturing any TPFDD changes made since the snapshot was taken. RQT offers the ability to save the full report and its format as a Data File, retrieving it in another application or e-mailing it to any SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) recipient as a Word document, Excel spreadsheet, or ASCII file.

(6) Web JOPES Information Trace (JSIT). Web JSIT provides a quick means to find details, dual tasking, and scheduling and movement data on specific TPFDD requirements.
must be in the TPFDD and moving through the DTS and output reports cannot be tailored. A user will need to be familiar with the TPFDD and ULN or force module identification number requirements which can only be viewed one record at a time.

b. Global Combat Support System. GCSS provides end-to-end information interoperability across CS functions and between CS and C2 functions in support of combatant command and JTF CS requirements. GCSS is a query application that provides real-time read only information on DOD CS and CSS activities for use in C2 functions. It builds on existing technology, products, procedures, and integration strategies. The primary objective for GCSS is to provide a fused and CS/CSS picture of the operational environment to the warfighter as a whole. The GCSS CCDR/JTF application is focused on supporting the combatant command and JTF levels. The intent is to supply the commanders with read-only access to authoritative comprehensive CS/CSS information from various CS databases and accurately portrays CS status. GCSS operates on the global command and control system (GCCS) common operating environment (COE) platform and is not Service specific. The COP-combat support enhanced (CSE) and Web Portal applications reside within the secure COE and use various Microsoft and GCCS tools to project, save, or transfer query results either through GCCS or Windows applications.

(1) GCSS Portal. GCSS Portal is a web-based application that provides a browser view of similar data available on COP-CSE, and other web-based resources. GCSS Portal resides on the SIPRNET that functions as a gateway to various web-based resources for the GCSS community. The Portal uses the WebCOP application to display objects from the results of queries or plotting vessels and aircraft on a map like COP-CSE.

(2) WebCOP. WebCOP provides COP map functionality to the Portal. WebCOP provides a real-time view of vessel, aircraft, seaport, and airfield locations, along with plotted unit symbols from a TPFDD. WebCOP is accessed from the Tools tab of the GCSS Portal.

(3) COP-Combat Support Enhanced. COP-CSE plots sites, vessels, aircraft, and units to a world map where further drill downs on the objects can be accomplished.

c. Common Operational Picture. COP provides a graphical display of friendly, hostile, and neutral units, assets, overlays, and/or tracks pertinent to operations, and is a key tool for commanders in planning and conducting joint operations. The GCCS-J COP may include relevant information from the tactical to the strategic level of command. COP provides commanders an understanding of the disposition of friendly and enemy forces. It is a tool to help predict force movement in combat. The purpose of COP is to provide common data and associated information to the appropriate levels of command. This includes every level, up to and including NSC. The CCDR has control of the data and information overlays within the CCDRAOR. A combatant command uses the common tactical picture (CTP) as a baseline to build a COP. Information is gathered into the common tactical data set and is fed into the CTP along with filters (e.g., airlift missions) and overlays (a map, diagrams, etc.) resulting in a COP.

d. Deployment Visualization Tool. The deployment visualization tool (DVT) is a GCCS segment that can monitor forces through TPFDD for an operational area. DVT can be used to plot both actual and planned deployment data to a tactical display and overlaying air, vessel, and unit tracks reported through Integrated Command Communications System Framework (ICSF). DVT can display TPFDD
information graphically, on the tactical display or through PowerPoint. DVT is a read-only tool and cannot manipulate the JOPES database while accessing data.

(1) **Integrated Geo-Spatial and Temporal Views.** DVT provides integrated geo-spatial map-based view and temporal views of data. DVT also provides a COP-like map on ICSF.

(2) **Planned and Actual Data Views.** DVT uses JOPES scheduling and movement data to display planned versus actual views of data by color-code, what is planned, in-transit, and arrived. DVT color codes are: Blue = Not Closed, Yellow = Partially Closed and Green = Fully Closed.

e. **Readiness Assessment System – Output Tool (RAS-OT).** RAS-OT is a SIPRNET application providing query-based access to readiness data. RAS-OT provides decision type information on the status-of-force readiness. The query functionality supports retrieval, analysis, and export of current or historical information on the total force, status of each Service in the areas of personnel, equipment readiness and condition, and select JOPES data. RAS-OT provides the means to generate reports in four views: Summary, Graphic, Tabular, and Pipes.

*See DODD 7730.65, DOD Readiness Reporting System, for additional information.*

f. **Global Decision Support System (GDSS).** GDSS is the worldwide C2 system for execution of airlift and air refueling across the range of military operations. GDSS contains essential information used to monitor and manage all in-progress DOD air mobility missions throughout the world, including all active duty, Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and commercial airline aircraft on AMC airlift missions, plus all operational DOD air-refueling missions. GDSS has automated tools to track aircraft and aircrew movement and aid the decision-making process. In addition, GDSS provides the control center with C2 information from the AMC Deployment Analysis System and Command and Control Information Processing System the wing-level C2 planning and execution system.

g. **Global Transportation Network.** GTN is the system of record for ITV data for shipments moving within the DTS. GTN is also the automated C2 information system that enables USTRANSCOM and its components to provide global transportation management, as well as ITV to others within the JPEC. GTN integrates supply, cargo, passenger, and unit requirements and movements with airlift, air refueling and sealift schedules and movements to provide ITV of personnel, materiel, and military forces. The system also provides a planning capability for current and future transportation operations and furnishes the movement and scheduling portion of the GCCS-J. GTN integrates ITV data into a single view of DTS. GTN creates ITV information by consolidating and integrating data from many other automated system sources (e.g., GDSS, GATES, Joint Air Logistics Information System, Consolidated Air Mobility Planning System (CAMPs), Worldwide Port System (WPS), Transportation Coordinator’s - Automated Command and Control Information System and Munitions Transportation Management System called “GTN data feeds.”) GTN organizes and displays vital transportation asset and resource information to assist USTRANSCOM in understanding, identifying, and implementing various transportation options and COAs.

*The classified GTN home page is located at https://www.gtn.transcom.smil.mil. The unclassified GTN home page is located at https://www.gtn.transcom.mil, and requires the use of a Web browser*
h. **Single Mobility System (SMS).** SMS is a web-based application, both SIPRNET and Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNET) that provides visibility of common user air, sea, and land transportation assets and provides aggregated reporting of cargo and passenger movements. SMS collects plane, ship and truck movement data from other computer systems such as GTN, CAMPS, and GDSS2. SMS provides requirements planners and unit scheduler’s visibility of planned and scheduled air missions, MSC ship schedules, commercial liner service, seaport reference data, and movement of US security risk category cargo. There are three phases in SMS: Air Mobility, Sea Mobility, and Land Mobility.

1. **Air Mobility.** The Air Mobility phase of SMS is a web-based tool that provides visibility of scheduled air mobility missions and requirements early in the planning process. All command levels of all DOD units, wings, and HQ can use SMS as a tool to display missions.

2. **Sea Mobility.** The Sea Mobility phase provides visibility over sealift requirements through SDDC’s Integrated Booking System and WPS, and MSC’s Integrated Command, Control, and Communications reporting system. SMS also offers a sealift assets database, a voyage finder, port locator, and a shipping cost calculator.

3. **Land Mobility.** The Land Mobility phase provides visibility over hazardous materials. The arms, ammunition, and explosives (AA&E) movement link in SMS allows access to the database that tracks and records positions for movement of SRC cargo in the US, inclusive of AA&E.

i. **Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST).** JFAST is a subsystem of GTN and is an analytical tool for making detailed estimates of resources required to transport military forces (including cargo, personnel, and sustainment). JFAST is used by the combatant commands as a planning and forecasting tool for deployment planning. The system determines the transportation feasibility of the TPFDD (from origin through arrival at the POD) and generates summary data via charts, tables, maps, and other visual aids. JFAST determines closure dates, congestion points, lift utilization, and shortfalls. JFAST products include delivery profiles and lateness analysis, required lift by day versus lift available, and port workload by level of activity based on capacity. JFAST has five major capabilities: TPFDD analysis, air/land/sea movement simulation and analysis, sustainment calculation, TPFDD construction from scratch, and several useful utilities. The JFAST model contains separate air, land, and sea schedulers and operates in either a stand-alone or networked environment.

1. **TPFDD Analysis.** TPFDD Analysis is used to review a TPFDD to determine which records qualified for analysis, analyze records that did not qualify, and identify requirements that missed the latest arrival date.

2. **Notional Requirements Generator.** The Notional Requirements Generator provides the capability to create notional movement requirements when no plan currently exists. Force selection and CONOPs can be recorded along with expected levels of activity, climate, and days of supply. This capability allows a planner to execute ad hoc queries and perform “what if” analysis.
(3) **Transportation Analysis.** The transportation analysis function includes model setup, execution, and output analysis for land, air, and sea modes of military transportation.

j. **Enhanced Logistics Intratheater Support Tool.** ELIST is a feasibility planning and modeling system for deployment analysis. ELIST performs detailed intratheater deployment studies to analyze effects of force modernization and new force structures and changes to the DTS and to check transportation feasibility of contingency operations. ELIST enables planners to explore and model the impact of theater infrastructure limitations (through combat loss, weather, or limited HN access) and make adjustments to infrastructure and assets at any point in time in the flow. Through ELIST, planners have the ability to accurately define the infrastructure and consider the throughput capability available for a specific plan.

k. **Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System II (TC-AIMS II).** TC-AIMS II is a joint AIS for unit move and ITO and transportation management office functionality. TC-AIMS II integrates fielded Service-unique systems and selects functions from systems to provide day-to-day traffic management capabilities and to support deployment, redeployment, and sustainment of US forces from within, and to, installations and overseas theaters of operations. Integration of systems for TC-AIMS II include: the Marine Corps MAGTF Deployment Support System II and Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System; the Air Force Cargo Movement Operations System; and the Army Transportation Coordinator-Automated Command and Control Information System, and Department of the Army Movements Management System-Redesign System.

l. **Joint Force Requirements Generator II.** The joint force requirements generator II (JFRG II) is a TPFDD editing application designed to satisfy deployment planning and execution requirements at both home stations and remote command centers. JFRG II can: Import and JOPES executable TPFDDs, enabling the uploading and refinement of existing JOPES plans, of the creation and download of new TPFDDs. It can be used to modify and update reference data, generate a data trouble reports, and maintain interfaces with JOPES and TC-AIMS II. It is used to build force structures to meet mission, source required forces, develop and assess phasing/travel mode, compute sustainment requirements, and estimate airlift and sealift requirements.

m. **Deliberate and Crisis Action Planning and Execution Segments (DCAPES).** DCAPES provides near real-time integrated C2, planning, and execution monitoring information to Air Force functional users in operations, logistics, manpower, and personnel, providing a single integrated planning environment. With DCAPES, Air Force planners can rapidly and accurately identify and source personnel, equipment, and sustainment capabilities to meet the CCDR’s operations plan requirements. Additionally, the DCAPES enables senior Air Force decision-makers to rapidly adjust operations plans to accommodate everchanging scenarios.

n. **Port Simulation Model (PORTSIM).** PORTSIM is a time-stepped, discrete event simulation of SPOE and SPOD during a force deployment. PORTSIM provides scenario-specific, force clearance profiles and reports on the use of port assets. PORTSIM can determine a port’s reception, staging, clearance, and throughput capabilities. The model identifies systems or infrastructure constraints and provides port-specific, time-phased force clearance profiles. PORTSIM interfaces with the integrated
computerized deployment system (ICODES), calculates the impact of JLOTS, incorporates 2- and 3-
dimensional visualization for training, and interfaces with ELIST to facilitate theater analysis.

o. **Integrated Computerized Deployment System.** ICODES is a decision support system for
developing ship stow plans. It assists in developing stow plans by matching vessel characteristics against
cargo being offered for shipment. ICODES develops stow plans for up to four specific ships concurrently
and checks for access and hazard violations. ICODES can automatically attempt to maintain unit
integrity in stow plans it develops. Once stow plans are completed, ICODES automatically generates
ship manifests and templates cargo items onto ship drawings. ICODES can produce customized
reports which detail both the process of constructing stow plans and results of the process, and builds a
database that provides details on the availability of external ship ramps and the facilities for ports around
the world.

p. **Global Status of Readiness and Training System.** GSORTS is an internal management
tool used by the CJCS, Services, combatant commands, CS agencies, and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense. GSORTS indicates the level of selected resources and training status required to undertake
the missions for which a unit was organized or designed. GSORTS provides the NSC and planners
with accurate and timely unit identification, location, assignment, and resource information for the registered
units and organizations of the Armed Forces of the United States, DOD agencies, and certain foreign
and international organizations involved in military operations.

q. **Base Resource and Capability Estimator (BRACE).** The BRACE is the planning tool to
model military air terminal operations. BRACE simulates airfield on loading, offloading, en route, and
recovery base operations, including ground activities such as cargo handling, refueling, maintenance,
and aircraft parking. The model can be used to: estimate airfield throughput capability; estimate air,
ground, and other resources required to support a given level of throughput at an airfield; and validate
MOG values used in existing air transportation models such as JFAST.

r. **USTRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System.** TRAC2ES
is an automated decision support tool that functions as a single C2 system that can be used in peacetime
and contingencies. It provides visibility of in-theater patients requiring evacuation, available transportation
assets, available hospital beds (by medical specialty), and patient ITV. TRAC2ES accommodates
three modes of operation: deliberate planning, forecasting, and reactive replanning at both the intertheater
and intratheater level.
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Commanders and staffs at the JTF level must have the capability to plan, execute, and monitor the deployment operations. Deployment enablers provide that capability in the form of processes, systems, and equipment. Enablers also provide Commanders with the necessary flexibility to assist in adapting to changing situations that they will encounter. This appendix describes selected enabling tools that allow the commander to:

a. Conduct planning (Planning)

b. Command and Control (Execution)

c. Maintain accurate deployment information (Situational Awareness)

This annex provides descriptions of select tools available to the CJTF for use in planning, executing and monitoring a force deployment. Figure A-A-1 is a matrix of the available tools. It is intended as a quick reference for the staff officer looking for the right tool to solve the problem at hand.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOOL</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>FEATURE(S)</th>
<th>FUNCTIONS</th>
<th>PROPOONENT</th>
<th>USER(S)</th>
<th>TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Global Command and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J)</td>
<td>Provides procedures, outlines processes and suite of information systems for planning and execution</td>
<td>Provides Guidance &amp; Procedures and Information Systems Architecture</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>USJUFCOM Joint Deployment Training Center (JDTC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adaptive Course of Action (ACOA)</td>
<td>Conduct distributed planning and decision making</td>
<td>Near real-time collaboration capability</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>JDTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES Editing Tool (JET)</td>
<td>Create, add, modify, delete, and generate deployment information</td>
<td>Retrieve records using ULN data characteristics</td>
<td>Execution</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>JDTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid Query Tool (RQT)</td>
<td>Develop user defined formatted reports</td>
<td></td>
<td>Situation Awareness</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>JDTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Web JOPES System Information Trace (WJSIT)</td>
<td>TPFDD information moving through the DTS</td>
<td>Provides details, dual tasking, scheduling and movement</td>
<td>Planning</td>
<td>✓ ✓ ✓</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>JDTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Combat Support System (GCSS)</td>
<td>Provide integrated CSS/GSS picture</td>
<td>COP map functionality, plots sites, vessels, aircraft, units</td>
<td>Situation Awareness</td>
<td>✓ ✓</td>
<td>DISA</td>
<td>JDTC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure A-A-1. Enabling Tools**
### ENABLING TOOLS (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOOL</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>FEATURE(S)</th>
<th>FUNCTIONS</th>
<th>PROПONENT</th>
<th>USER(S)</th>
<th>TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GCSS Portal Gateway to web-based resources</td>
<td>Uses WebCOP to display objects</td>
<td>DISA</td>
<td>JTF, CCDR, Intermediate Headquarters, Planners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Common Operational Picture (COP)</td>
<td>Provides disposition of friendly and enemy forces</td>
<td>Graphic display of friendly, hostile, and neutral units, overlays, and tracks</td>
<td>DISA</td>
<td>JTF, CCDR, Intermediate Headquarters, Planners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment Visualization Tool (DVT)</td>
<td>Plot actual and planned deployment data</td>
<td>Display TPFDD information graphically</td>
<td>DISA</td>
<td>JTF, CCDR, Intermediate Headquarters, Planners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Readiness Assessment System Output Tool (RAS OT)</td>
<td>Retrieval and analysis of Global Status or Resources and Training System data</td>
<td>Provide personnel, equipment readiness information</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>JTF, CCDR, Intermediate Headquarters, Planners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Decision Support System (GDSS)</td>
<td>C2 system for execution of strategic airlift and air refueling</td>
<td>Track aircraft and aircrew movement</td>
<td>Air Mobility Command (AMC)</td>
<td>Airlift Planners</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Transportation Network (GTN)</td>
<td>Provide global transportation management, and ITV</td>
<td>Organize and display transportation asset information</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**GCCS-J MODULES**

**Figure A-A-1. Enabling Tools (cont.)**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOOL</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>FEATURE(S)</th>
<th>FUNCTIONS</th>
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<th>USER(S)</th>
<th>TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Single Mobility System (SMS)</td>
<td>Provide visibility of common user air, sea, and land transportation assets</td>
<td>Collect plane, ship and truck movement data from other systems</td>
<td>Planning, Execution</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>JTF, CCDR, Intermediate Headquarters, Planners</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Flow Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST)</td>
<td>Compares TPFDD requirements to lift capability</td>
<td>Rapid planning and replanning of INTERtheater transportation</td>
<td>Planning, Execution</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>JTF, CCDR, Intermediate Headquarters, Planners</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM and JDTC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Logistics Intragtheater Support Tool (ELIST)</td>
<td>Planning and modeling system for deployment analysis</td>
<td>Rapid planning and replanning of INTERtheater transportation</td>
<td>Planning, Execution</td>
<td>SDDC TEA</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System II (TC-AIMS II)</td>
<td>Provide day-to-day traffic management capabilities</td>
<td>Integrates fielded Service-unique systems and select functions</td>
<td>Planning, Execution</td>
<td>US Army</td>
<td>TRADOC Deployment Training Facility (DTF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Force Requirements Generator II (JFRG II)</td>
<td>Build force structure</td>
<td>Modify and update reference data, interface with JOPES and TC-AIMS II</td>
<td>Planning, Execution</td>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>JTF, CCDR, Intermediate Headquarters, Planners</td>
<td>USMC EWTG LANT</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure A-A-1. Enabling Tools (cont.)
## ENABLING TOOLS (cont.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TOOL</th>
<th>PURPOSE</th>
<th>FEATURE(S)</th>
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<th>USER(S)</th>
<th>TRAINING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Port Simulator (PORTSIM)</td>
<td>Determine seaport reception, staging, clearance, and throughput capabilities</td>
<td>Identifies infrastructure constraints, interfaces with ICODES and ELIST</td>
<td>SDDC TEA</td>
<td>JTF, CCDR, Intermediate Headquarters, Planners</td>
<td>SDDC TEA</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES)</td>
<td>Develop ship stow plans</td>
<td>Generate ship manifests, produce customized reports</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>JTF, CCDR, Intermediate Headquarters, Planners</td>
<td>RADOC Deployment Training Facility (DTF)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS)</td>
<td>Indicates status of unit resources and training</td>
<td>Unit identification, location, assignment, and resource information</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
<td>JTF, CCDR, Intermediate Headquarters, Planners</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Base Resource and Capability Estimator (BRACE)</td>
<td>Model military air terminal operations</td>
<td>Estimate throughput capability, validate maximum on ground</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>Airlift Planners</td>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure A-A-1. Enabling Tools (cont.)*
Annex A to Appendix A

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APPENDIX B
JOINT DEPLOYMENT, AND JOINT RECEPTION, STAGING, ONWARD MOVEMENT, AND INTEGRATION, AND REDEPLOYMENT PROCESS MAP DESCRIPTIONS

Annex A  Joint Deployment Process Map Description
Annex B  JRSOI Process Map Description
Annex C  Joint Redeployment Process Map Description
1. Analyze Mission

Military operations begin with an event that requires movement of forces to somewhere in the world. This can be a planned or no-notice movement. The process begins with development of COAs, includes selection of the desired COA, and ends with the development of orders and their transmission.

a. Receive Initial Notification. Units receive informal notification of impending operations.

b. Conduct Initial Mission Analysis. Based on early information acquired, planners assess potential scenario developments, mission requirements, and COAs.

   (1) Evaluate Deployed Location Requirements, Capabilities, and available WRM. Planners collect intelligence on theater terrain, weather, infrastructure, and pre-positioned equipment and/or supplies.

   (2) Review Installation Capabilities and Support Requirements. Deployment installations assess the operational tempo, movement requirements, facilities, equipment, and deploying force support requirements.

c. Receive Warning Order. Formal notification is received which directs deployment planning and preparation.

d. Receive TPFDD Guidance. Supported CCDR tailors basic TPFDD LOI as necessary to plan and execute specific mission. Force providers add guidance to subordinate HQ as necessary.

2. Structure Forces

A critical step in planning military operations is to identify all forces required to meet the mission. Force structuring includes establishing the command structure, tasking assigned forces (including AC and RC or other assigned forces) and ends with a defined force to accomplish mission objectives.

a. Source, Tailor, and Prioritize Force Structure. Deploying units are sourced and task organized to meet mission requirements and to fill supported combatant command, JTF, or component force requirements. Combatant commands, JTFs, or components prioritize force flow within the overall structure based on operational needs and strategic lift limitations.

   (1) Develop Deployment Data. Deploying units provide passengers (PAX) and/or equipment lists for TPFDD refinement.
Figure B-A-1. Joint Force Deployment Process
(2) Verify Accompanying Supplies. Ensure that units identify planned accompanying supplies.

b. Establish Command Relationships. Joint Staff confirms supported command, supporting combatant command, and agency relationships by message for a given operation.

c. Flow Requirements. The supported CCDR identification of a requirement should not be influenced on how or when requirements can be moved. Too many times the ability (or inability) to flow requirements has actually changed the requirement itself. Though flow can always be adjusted, what the CCDR deems “required for mission accomplishment” should not. Bottom line is that it is a requirement, and it must be moved. Proper planning will permit the time needed to develop transportation COAs.

3. Validate Deployment Data

Execution procedures are used by combatant command components, supporting combatant commands, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported commander and USTRANSCOM that all information records in a TPFDD are not only error-free for automation purposes, but also accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements. Unit readiness, movement dates, passengers, and cargo details should be confirmed with the unit before validation occurs.

a. Refine and Submit Deployment Data. Force structure must be further described in terms of deployment data to facilitate logistic planning, movement, and sustainment. The result of this process is the development of the TPFDD. The TPFDD translates operational requirements into logistic terms (i.e., how much, when, and where) to deploy, prioritize, and schedule the flow of the force into the theater.

b. Receive Supported CCDR-Approved TPFDD. Supported CCDR receives Service component force requirement and deployment data and merges this data into its TPFDD. The supported combatant command then reviews, analyzes, and prioritizes flow as necessary and sends the end product to USTRANSCOM for a transportation feasibility review. The completed review is coordinated with the supported combatant command for resolution of transportation conflicts. The end result of this process is the supported CCDR-approved TPFDD. Deploying units prepare for movement based on this TPFDD. Changes may occur during deployment, and incremental changes affecting units are implemented as required.

4. Prepare the Force (Personnel, Supplies and Equipment)

Multiple actions, events, and activities must be accomplished to get the force ready to deploy. Planned requirements (represented by the TPFDD) are communicated to tasked units and supporting agencies, which take actions to prepare and organize the actual people, supplies, and equipment for movement. This process also includes getting support organizations prepared to conduct deployment operations.
5. Schedule Movement

Movement scheduling is an iterative process at every level of supported and supporting commands to transport, move, or deploy the right people, supplies, and equipment to the right place at the right time.

a. Receive Strategic Movement Schedule. As received from validated TPFDD requirements, strategic lift assets are scheduled and registered in JOPES. These movement schedules are utilized by commands in support of movement planning, coordination, and execution.

b. Receive SDDC Port Call. As strategic sealift schedules are being developed, units and/or installations receive SDDC deployment support command call forward messages directing movement to SPOEs in designated windows. For amphibious operations and other self-deploying units, SDDC port calls do not apply.

c. Assess Lift Schedule. Commands assess ability to meet strategic lift schedules. Allocation of ULNs to carriers is accomplished in JOPES. ULN lift shortfalls and available lift are identified to the TCCs.

d. Build and Publish Schedule of Events. Movement instructions are published IAW JOPES carrier schedules and priority of force movement.

e. Confirm Movement Clearances. Movement control elements confirm movement diplomatic and ground movement clearances with HN, state, and governmental agencies.

6. Assemble and Marshal Forces

Assembly and marshalling involves bringing together people, supplies, and equipment in preparation for final movement. Support functions are established and positioned to expedite and control the movement and throughput of the force through the deployment pipeline.

a. Assemble Personnel and Cargo. Conducted within home and/or intermediate marshalling areas in support of movement preparations.

b. Conduct Unit Inspection, Load Equipment, and Process Documentation. Preparations and inspections for movement operations are completed. Documentation is married up with cargo and equipment. Note: This also includes the labeling of cargo/equipment with proper military shipping labels and affixing radio frequency identification tags and/or other automated identification technologies.

c. Sequence Loads. Loads are staged and sequenced in support of movement to POEs based upon priority of force movement schedules.

d. Establish Support Organizations at POE. POEs deployment support organizations, identified in subparagraph 4.a. above, are established in support of movement operations.
7. Move to POE.

   a. Movement to the designated POEs is conducted IAW movement instructions.


8. Conduct POE Operations

   Port operations begin the strategic leg of the deployment pipeline. Essential actions are accomplished at the POE to complete and finalize all unit movement responsibilities. The result is the load and launch of the strategic conveyance. Critical information is provided to C2 and forward support elements to facilitate efficient onward movement of the force to the POD.

   a. Arrive and Report Status. Arrival of forces and equipment at the designated departure POEs. Arrival reporting is done by the deployment support organizations and unit as directed.

   b. Assemble and Sequence Loads. Personnel, cargo, and equipment are staged and sequenced in the established departure POE unit marshalling areas.

   c. Conduct POE Inspections and Complete Final PAX and/or Cargo Documentation. These inspections are conducted within the departure POE alert holding area and/or call forward areas IAW the Defense Transportation regulations and joint procedures and policies.

   d. Load Lift and Report Status are conducted within the departure POE loading ramp areas. Load lift reports are submitted as directed between the POE support agencies, unit, and component forces.

   e. Submit Departure Reports. Departure Status reports are submitted by the deployment support organizations IAW Service guidance to the command element(s) in support of JOPES reporting requirements.

9. Move to POD

   Movement to the designated PODs is conducted IAW movement instructions.
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1. Conduct Port of Debarkation Operations

   a. The deploying force will arrive in the theater at APODs and SPODs. Reception is the process of expeditiously offloading, marshalling, and transporting equipment, personnel, and materiel to complete the strategic deployment phase to a sea, air, or surface transportation POD. Reception operations at the POD include all those functions necessary to receive and clear unit personnel and equipment through the POD.

   b. Receive Personnel and Cargo. Personnel and cargo are offloaded at terminals. The support organization analyzes ITV data to determine how and where the arriving personnel and cargo are to be moved to appropriate holding areas. Status reports are provided to higher HQ. The units are advised of the general situation and may be tasked for personnel to work on various work parties (i.e., drivers for off-loading, PSA, security, cargo off-load).

   c. Process Personnel and Cargo for Movement and Prepare Documentation. Personnel and cargo are received and processed for movement. Unit personnel and cargo may move on unit equipment and/or common-user transportation. Appropriate documentation is prepared for subsequent movement.

   d. Move to Staging Area. Unit personnel and cargo will usually move to an SA. In some situations, unit personnel and cargo may move directly to the TAA. If movement is to an SA, preparations begin there for onward movement to the TAA. In certain instances, the POD, SA, and TAA may be collocated; however, this is not recommended.

   e. Conduct Movement Control Operations. Movement control elements coordinate, monitor, and report movement IAW movement instructions. The movement control system also establishes procedures with HN, commercial contractors, and allied forces on the use of available transportation resources.

2. Prepare the Force (Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment)

   a. Units arrive at the SA and begin preparations for movement to the TAA. Staging is the assembling, temporary holding, and organization of arriving personnel and materiel into units and forces, followed by preparation for onward movement and tactical operations. Support activities in the SA provide life support until units become self-sustaining. In the SA, C2 organizations are stood up to monitor status, receive reports, prioritize movement, provide local security, monitor throughput of subordinate units, and forward status to higher HQ. The force is prepared for movement to the TAA. Equipment and cargo, including WRM, are received, accounted for, and distributed. Units prepare for onward movement by assembling, processing, and accounting for personnel; performing maintenance and operations checks on equipment; and verifying and/or modifying load plans for movement from the SA to TAA. When the unit has received its movement mission, adequate intelligence, and is task-organized in accordance with command guidance, it makes final movement preparations and departs the SA.
## Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Process

### Joint Functional Areas

<table>
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<th>Reception</th>
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<th>Integration</th>
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<td>Conduct Port of Debarkation Operations</td>
<td>Prepare the Force (Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment)</td>
<td>Complete Force Integration</td>
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<tr>
<td>Receive Personnel and Cargo</td>
<td>Process Personnel and Cargo for Movement and Prepare Documentation</td>
<td>Establish Command and Control (C2), Security, and Unit Area</td>
<td>Integrate with Combat Service Support</td>
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<td>Move to Staging Areas</td>
<td>Coordinate Support Requirements</td>
<td>Assemble and Process Personnel</td>
<td>Conduct Field Training Exercise and Rehearsals</td>
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<td>Conduct Training and Perform Equipment Operability Checks</td>
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</table>

### Staging

- Assemble and Marshal Forces
- Onward Movement
- Conduct Tactical Assembly Area Operations
- Complete Force Integration

- Coordinate Support Requirements
- Conduct Force Assembly and Accountability
- Integrate Command, Control, Communications, Systems with Gaining Command
- Integrate with Combat Service Support
- Conduct Field Training Exercise and Rehearsals
- Confirm Mission Readiness

### Figure B-B-1. Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration Process.
b. Establish C2, Security, and Unit Area. C2 and command post operations are established and liaison elements are sent to higher, adjacent, external, and subordinate organizations as the mission requires. C2 is established with higher HQ and units maintain close coordination with higher HQ as they make final preparations. Units ensure that security operations are established IAW the security plan.

c. Report Status. Units continuously monitor the status of preparation in key operational and logistic areas as they prepare for the mission and report status to higher HQ. Movements and the status of units and forces should be reported from all nodes where JRSOI operations are being conducted.

d. Coordinate Support Requirements. Coordination is established with the SA support activities to provide logistic support and services.

e. Assemble and Process Personnel. Units prepare for onward movement by assembling, processing, and accounting for personnel. Personnel are accounted for and processed IAW command guidance, JRSOI directives, and unit standing operating procedure. Units are task-organized to execute the mission based on combatant command guidance and the operational environment.

f. Receive Equipment, WRM, and Supplies. Units receive their equipment, equipment augmentation, WRM, and supplies as required. Equipment, cargo, and supplies are received, accounted for, and distributed IAW logistic guidance. Units perform maintenance and operational checks on equipment.

g. Conduct Training and Perform Equipment Operability Checks. Training is conducted in key mission-essential tasks. Equipment is checked to ensure that it is combat ready and mission capable.

3. Assemble and Marshal Forces

a. Assembly and marshalling involves bringing together people, supplies, and equipment in preparation for onward movement. Onward movement is the process of moving units and accompanying materiel from reception facilities and marshalling or staging areas to TAAs or other theater destinations, moving arriving non-unit personnel to gaining commands, and moving arriving sustainment materiel from reception facilities to distribution sites. Support functions are established and positioned to expedite and control the onward movement of the force to the TAA.

b. Process Personnel and Cargo for Movement and Prepare Documentation. Load plans are developed and checked to ensure that essential equipment and supplies can be transported. External movement requirements are identified and movement requests are submitted.

c. Sequence Loads. Loads are sequenced to ensure the most efficient use of available transportation assets. Safety and security of the force are also considered when making decisions during sequence planning.

d. Coordinate Movement Security Requirements. Units ensure that security operations are established IAW the security plan and monitor the movement.
4. **Onward Movement**

   a. The unit moves to the TAA IAW movement and security instructions.

   b. Move to TAA. Units depart SAs for the TAA.

   c. Conduct Movement Control Operations. A movement control element coordinates movement requirements with the security force and confirms that movement clearances have been approved. Departure, en route, and arrival status are monitored and reported.

5. **Conduct Tactical Assembly Area Operations**

   a. The TAA is a location designated by the CCDR where units will transfer authority to their gaining commands and from which they can be integrated into the force and be tactically employed. Units arrive at the TAA and continuously monitor the status of preparation in key operational and logistic areas as they prepare for the mission. Coordination is also made for TAA security operations. Unit reports to higher HQ ready for operations when JRSOI operations are completed.

   b. Establish C2, Security, and Unit Area. C2 or command post operations are established and liaison elements are sent to higher, adjacent, external, and subordinate organizations as the mission requires. C2 is established with higher HQ, and units maintain close coordination with higher HQ as they make final preparations.

   c. Report Status. Units continuously monitor the status of preparation in key operational and logistic areas as they prepare for the mission and report status to higher HQ. Movements and the status of units and forces should be reported from all nodes where JRSOI operations are being conducted.

   d. Coordinate Support Requirements. Coordination is established with the TAA support activities to provide logistic support and services.

   e. Conduct Force Assembly and Accountability. Units perform a final unit assembly accountability of equipment, supplies, and personnel and report status to the gaining and losing command.

6. **Complete Force Integration**

   a. Integration is the process of establishing force projection units into coherent operational units under the C2 of the supported CCDR. The JRSOI process ends when the unit commander has reported ready for operations and the unit integrates with its higher HQ. The unit is integrated with logistics and operational components of the gaining command and completes any final command directed training and activities before being committed to operational missions.

   b. Integrate Communications Systems with Gaining Command. Communications systems are completely integrated between the gaining command, supporting commands, units, JRSOI organizations, and commanders at all levels to facilitate the timely and accurate exchange of critical information. The receiving commander must establish positive C2 over the arriving unit in the TAA.
c. Integrate CSS. The unit establishes direct support relationships with various support elements in the CSS structure to include supply, services, maintenance, and medical.

d. Conduct Field Training Exercises and Rehearsals. Units conduct field training exercises and rehearsals as part of final training preparation.

e. Confirm Mission Readiness. Commanders report their units status IAW the readiness criteria established by the supported CCDR and confirm when ready to execute their assigned missions.
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1. Analyze Mission

   a. Redeployment operations will normally begin when the unit is notified that its mission is complete or when it has received orders to redeploy to another theater in support of other missions.

   b. Receive Initial Notification. Units receive informal notification of impending redeployment via any communication means.

   c. Conduct Initial Mission Analysis. Based on early information acquired, planners assess current tactical situation and unit status and conduct preliminary analysis of redeployment mission requirements.

   d. Receive Warning Order and TPFDD Guidance. Formal notification received which directs redeployment planning and preparation. The supported CCDR tailors basic TPFDD LOI as necessary to plan and execute redeployment operations. Unit commanders provide additional guidance to subordinate HQ as necessary.

   e. Identify HN, Contract, Command Capabilities, and Support Requirements. Commanders at all levels assess HN, contract, command capabilities, and support requirements for movement, to include facilities, security, supply and services, and equipment processing and turn-in. Additionally, the requirements for customs, environmental protection, and agricultural inspections are reviewed.

2. Structure Forces

   a. A critical step in planning is to identify all forces selected to redeploy, as well as the forces that will support the operation. Redeploying forces receive guidance on reconstitution and reorganization, including equipment disposition. Support force structuring includes establishing the command structure and assigning redeployment tasks to forces, and ends with a defined force to accomplish redeployment mission objectives.

   b. Move to TAA. Upon completion of tactical operations and based on combatant command guidance, the unit will move to designated TAA.

      (1) Conduct Reconstitution and Reorganize. Upon arrival in the TAA, units conduct recovery and reconstitution; reorganization; and await movement instructions from their supporting movement control element or higher HQ.

      (2) Process Personnel and Equipment. Units account for and process personnel, identify and process excess equipment, clean, decontaminate, pack and load unit equipment IAW customs and/or agriculture guidance, and develop initial unit movement data.
**Joint Force Redeployment Process**

### Joint Functional Areas

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Joint Processes</th>
<th>Analyze Mission</th>
<th>Structure Forces</th>
<th>Refine Deployment Data</th>
<th>Prepare the Force (Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Joint Processes</td>
<td>Receive Initial Notification</td>
<td>Receive Warning Order and TPFDD Guidance</td>
<td>Move to Tactical Assembly Area</td>
<td>Refine and Submit Deployment Data</td>
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<td>JOINT FORCE REDEPLOYMENT PROCESS</td>
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<tr>
<td>Identify Host Nation, Contract, and Command Capabilities and Support Requirements</td>
<td>Identify Equipment Status to Include War Reserve Materiel (WRM) and Excess Materiel</td>
<td>Develop Redeployment Data</td>
<td>Receive Supported Combatant Commander-Approved Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data (TPFDD)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Identify Containers, Flat Racks, Material &amp; Cargo Handling Equipment, Pallets, &amp; Local Transportation Requirements</td>
<td>Turn-In WRM and Excess Materiel</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Coordinate Host Nation and Contract Support Requirements</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Conduct Movement Coordination and Support Meeting</td>
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<td>Develop Initial Load and/or Stow Plans</td>
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### REDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

**JOINT FORCE REDeployment** **Process**

**MOVEMENT**

**REDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES**

**FURTHER EMPLOYMENT OR DEMOBILIZATION**

Figure B-C-1. Joint Force Redeployment Process
c. Tailor and Prioritize Force Structure. Redeploying and supporting units are task-organized to meet redeployment mission requirements and to fill combatant command, JTF, or component force requirements. Combatant commands, JTFs, or components prioritize force flow within the overall structure based on operational needs and strategic lift limitations.

d. Develop Redeployment Data. Redeploying units provide PAX and/or equipment lists for TPFDD refinement.

e. Identify Equipment Status to Include WRM and Excess Materiel. Redeploying units must assess equipment status and coordinate the turn-in of WRM and excess equipment IAW Service HQ turn-in or disposition instructions.

3. Refine Redeployment Data

a. Units confirm readiness, movement available dates, PAX, and cargo details to higher commands. Combatant command components and supporting commanders provide confirmation to the supported commander, who validates to USTRANSCOM that the data in the TPFDD is error-free and accurately reflects the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements.

b. Refine and Submit Redeployment Data. The redeployment force structure must be further described in terms of redeployment data to facilitate logistics planning, movement, and sustainment. The result of this process is the development of the TPFDD. The TPFDD translates operational requirements into logistic terms (i.e., how much, when, and where) to deploy, prioritize, and schedule the flow of the force out of the theater to home station or to another operational location.

c. Receive Supported CCDR-Approved TPFDD. The supported CCDR receives Service component force requirements and/or redeployment data and merges this data into its TPFDD. The supported CCDR then reviews, analyzes, and re-prioritizes flow as necessary and sends the end product to USTRANSCOM for a transportation feasibility review. The completed review is coordinated with the supported CCDR for resolution of transportation conflicts. The end result of this process is the supported CCDR-approved TPFDD. Redeploying units prepare for movement based on this TPFDD. Changes may occur during redeployment and incremental changes affecting units are implemented as required.

4. Prepare the Force (Personnel, Supplies, and Equipment)

a. Multiple actions, events, and activities must be accomplished to get the force ready to redeploy. Planned requirements (represented by the TPFDD) are communicated to tasked units and supporting agencies, who take action to prepare and organize the actual people, supplies, and equipment for movement. This process also includes getting support organizations prepared to conduct redeployment operations. Preparations are made to process WRM and excess materiel.

b. Establish Support Organizations. Task organize to support requirements for movement control elements (e.g., A/DACG, MCCs, POGs, CRG).
c. Conduct Movement Coordination and Support Meeting. Commands at all levels review planning and execution status and assign tasks to resolve support issues.

d. Identify Containers, Flat Racks, MHE, CHE, Pallets, and Local Transportation Requirements. Supporting activities receive container and/or 463L pallet requirements from units, assess capability to meet these requirements, and determine MHE and/or CHE requirements to move containers and pallets from storage sites to unit areas.

e. Coordinate HN and Contract Support Requirements. HN and contract support play a vital role in redeployment operations. Coordination must be made for various functions to include convoy support centers, communications, MHE, POE support, and other key support functions.

f. Turn-in WRM and Excess Materiel. Units must clean, process, and turn-in WRM and excess materiel IAW Service disposition instructions.

g. Develop Initial Load and/or Stow Plans. Based on anticipated types of lift, units develop initial load and/or stow plans.

5. Schedule Movement

a. Movement scheduling is an iterative process at every level of supported and supporting commands in order to get the right people, supplies, and equipment to the right place at the right time.

b. Receive Strategic Movement Schedule. As received from validated TPFDD requirements, strategic lift assets are scheduled and registered in JOPES. These movement schedules are utilized by commands in support of movement planning, coordination, and execution.

c. Receive SDDC Port Call. As strategic sealift schedules are being developed, units and/or installations receive SDDC area command call forward messages directing movement to SPOEs in designated windows. For amphibious operations, SDDC port calls do not apply.

d. Assess Lift Schedule. Commands assess ability to meet strategic lift schedules. Allocation of ULN(s) to carriers is accomplished in JOPES. ULN lift shortfalls and available lift are identified to the TCCs.

e. Build and Publish Schedule of Events. Movement instructions are published in support of JOPES carrier schedules and priority of force movement.

f. Confirm Movement Clearances. Movement control elements confirm movement diplomatic and ground movement clearances with HN, state, and governmental agencies.
6. Assemble and Marshal Forces

   a. Assembly and marshalling involves bringing together people, supplies and equipment in preparation for movement. Support functions are established and positioned to expedite and control the movement from TAA to SAs and throughput of the force through the redeployment pipeline.

   b. Move to SA. Upon receipt of movement instructions from higher HQ and the supporting movement control element, forces are moved to the SA.

   c. Assemble Personnel and Cargo. Personnel and cargo assembly is conducted within the SA and/or intermediate marshalling areas in support of movement preparations.

   d. Conduct Unit Inspection, Load Equipment, and Prepare Documentation. Preparations and inspections for movement operations are completed. In preparation for agricultural inspections, units wash down equipment either in the SA or at the POE. Documentation is prepared and attached to cargo and equipment.

   e. Sequence Loads. Loads are staged and sequenced in support of movement to POEs based upon priority of force movement schedules.

   f. Establish Support Organizations at POE. POE redeployment support organizations, identified in subparagraph 4.b above, are established in support of movement operations.

7. Move to POE

   a. Movement to the designated POEs is conducted IAW movement instructions.


8. Conduct POE Operations

   a. Port operations begin the strategic leg of the redeployment process. Essential actions are accomplished at the POE to complete and finalize all unit movement responsibilities. The result is the load and launch of the strategic conveyance. Critical information is provided to C2 and forward support elements to facilitate efficient onward movement of the force to the POE.

   b. Arrive and Report Status. Arrival of forces and equipment at the designated POEs. Arrival reporting is completed in accordance with Service guidance.

   c. Assemble and Sequence Loads. Personnel, cargo, and equipment are staged and sequenced in the established departure POE unit marshalling areas.

   d. Conduct Inspections and Complete Final PAX and/or Cargo Documentation (Safety, Customs, and Agricultural). Inspections are conducted within the departure POE alert holding area and/or call
forward areas IAW the Defense Transportation regulations and joint procedures and policies. This includes safety, customs, and agricultural inspections and equipment wash down.

e. Load Lift, Report Status, and Submit Departure Reports. Cargo and personnel are loaded on lift. Reports are provided with status of units, cargo, personnel, lift, terminals, and loading operations. Additionally, reports are submitted to track the departure of individual lift and associated loads.

9. Prepare to Receive the Force

Prepare Installation to Receive Equipment. Support organizations analyze ITV data to determine how and where the arriving equipment is to be moved to appropriate holding areas. Support organizations review reporting procedures to higher HQ. Redeploying units are advised of the general situation while supporting units may be tasked for personnel to support various work parties (e.g., drivers for off-loading, PSA, security, cargo off-load).

10. Move to POD

Movement to the designated PODs is conducted IAW movement instructions.

11. Conduct POD Operations

a. POD operations include all actions taken to download and process unit personnel and equipment at an aerial or SPOD and may include customs and agricultural inspections.

b. Receive Personnel and Cargo. Passengers, unit equipment, and cargo are downloaded, moved to temporary holding areas, and consolidated for movement to final destination. Units may assist with download and movement of equipment. Customs and agricultural inspections may be conducted if they were not conducted at the POE, were considered inadequate, or to meet other requirements.

(1) Submit Arrival Reports. Redeployment support organizations submit arrival reports.

(2) Conduct Unit Reception. Unit reception will normally include a formal welcome by a flag officer or designated representative, a reception with band, and other morale-boosting activities for returning units.

c. Coordinate Transportation for Onward Movement. Support organizations arrange transportation of personnel and equipment from POD to installation and support noncommercial movements.

d. Process Personnel and Equipment for Movement. Support organizations process and coordinate movement documentation (e.g., manifests, government bills of lading) for the materiel and equipment that flows through the POD.
e. Complete Unit Inspections and Process Movement Documents. Unit personnel moving organic vehicles, helicopters, or other unit cargo perform required maintenance, repairs, and safety inspections. Units also coordinate required movement clearances.

f. Report Status and Submit Departure Reports. Units provide higher HQ and the Service component with unit status and departure reports.

12. Conduct Destination Reception

a. Destination reception includes all actions necessary to fully recover the unit to include its assigned personnel and equipment. Reserve components return to demobilization stations. Locations are designated by receiving commands.

b. Arrive Destination. Receiving installations provide assistance, as required, to include personal property assistance, equipment processing and storage, and providing MHE and commercial transportation assets.

c. Conduct Unit Reception. Unit reception may include a formal or informal ceremony which may be a follow-on to the reception at the POD.

d. Process Personnel and Equipment. Installations and units conduct personnel and equipment processing operations.

e. Demobilization of Reserves. Reserve units and individuals are demobilized and returned to home station.

f. Prepare for Future Missions. Upon complete recovery of unit personnel and equipment, units can begin preparation for future missions.
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The development of JP 3-35 is based upon the following primary references:

1. **US Government Publications**
   b. Title 10 United States Code.
   c. Unified Command Plan.

2. **DOD Publications**
   a. DODD 2000.12, *DOD Combating Terrorism Program*.
   b. DODD 5030.49, *Customs Inspections*.
   c. DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Subordinate Components*.
   e. DOD 4500.9-R, *Defense Transportation Regulation Part I, Passenger Movement*.
   f. DOD 4500.9-R, *Defense Transportation Regulation Part II, Cargo Movement*.
   g. DOD 4500.9-R, *Defense Transportation Regulation Part III, Mobility*.
   h. DOD 4500.9-R, *Defense Transportation Regulation Part IV, Management and Control of Intermodal Containers and System 463L Equipment*.

3. **CJCS Publications**
   a. CJCSI 3110.01C, *Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)*.
   b. CJCSI 3141.01C, *Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Contingency Plans*.
   c. CJCSI 3151.01A, *Global Command and Control System Common Operational Picture Reporting Requirements*.
   d. CJCSI 3500.2C, *Joint Training Master Plan*.
   e. CJCSI 5120.02, *Joint Doctrine Development System*.
f. CJCSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).*

g. CJCSM 3122.02, *Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution.*

h. CJCSM 3122.03, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II: (Planning Formats).*

i. CJCSM 3150.05, Joint Reporting Structure, Situation Monitoring Manual.


k. CJCSM 3500.04D, *Universal Joint Task List.*


m. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.*


o. JP 2-0, *Intelligence Support.*


q. JP 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.*

r. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations.*

s. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.*


u. JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations, Volumes I and II.*


w. JP 3-11, *Operations Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments.*


e. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters.*


hh. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs.*

ii. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistic Support.*


mm. JP 4-01.6, *Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).*

nn. JP 4-02, *Health Service Support.*

oo. JP 4-05, *Joint Mobilization Planning.*


qq. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System.*

4. **Army Publications**


   b. FM 55-10, *Movement Control.*

   c. FM 55-65, *Strategic Deployment.*
Appendix C

d. FM 100-17, *Mobilization, Deployment, Redeployment, Demobilization.*

e. FM 100-17-3, *Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.*

5. US Marine Corps Publications


d. OH 4-11, *Maritime Prepositioned Deployment.*

6. US Navy Publications


b. NDP 5, *Naval Planning.*


d. NWP 4-01, *Naval Transportation.*

e. NWP 4-01.1, *Navy Expeditionary Shore Based Logistics Support & RSOI Operations.*


b. AFDD 2-6, *Air Mobility Operations.*

c. Air Force Instruction 10-403, *Deployment Planning and Execution.*

8. Multi-Service Publications

a. FM 4-01,45, MCRP 4-11.3H, NTTP 4-01.3, AFTTP(I) 3-2.58, *Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Tactical Convoy Operations.*

b. Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum, Updated Procedures for Deployment Health Surveillance and Readiness, February 2002.
APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to the United States Joint Forces Command, Attn: Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Joint Forces Command. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

3. Suppression

This publication supersedes JP 3-35, 7 September 1999, Joint Deployment and Redeployment Operations and JP 4-01.8, 13 June 2000, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO:          CDRUSJFCOM NORFOLK VA/JWFC/
   INFO:        JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC/J4-JDD/J7-JEDD/

   Routine changes should be submitted to the Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), JEDD, 7000 Joint Staff Pentagon, Washington, DC  20318-7000.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the CJCS that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Director, J-7, Joint Staff, when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

   c. Record of Changes:

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5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be IAW DOD Regulation 5200.1 R, *Information Security Program*.

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications


b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nations must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attache Office ) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20330-7400.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications. This JEL CD-ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when received can be locally reproduced for use within the combatant commands and Services.
GLOSSARY
PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AA&E arms, ammunition, and explosives
AC active component
ACSA acquisition and cross-servicing agreement
A/DACG arrival/departure airfield control group
AFWA Air Force Weather Agency
AIS automated information system
AIT automated identification technology
AMC Air Mobility Command
AOR area of responsibility
APOD aerial port of debarkation
APOE aerial port of embarkation
ASCC Army Service component command
AV asset visibility

BRACE Base Resource and Capability Estimator

C2 command and control
CAMPS Consolidated Air Mobility Planning System
CAP crisis action planning
CCA central contracting authority
CDR combatant commander
CDRUSJFCOM Commander, United States Joint Forces Command
CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, United States Transportation Command
CHE cargo-handling equipment
CIN cargo increment number
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJTF commander, joint task force
CMO civil-military operations
COA course of action
COE common operating environment
CONOPS concept of operations
CONUS continental United States
COP common operational picture
CRAF Civil Reserve Air Fleet
CRG contingency response group
CS combat support
CSE combat support enhanced
CSS combat service support
CTP common tactical picture
CULT common-user land transportation
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<td>Department of the Army</td>
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<td>deployment and distribution operations center</td>
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<td>deployment order</td>
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<td>GATES</td>
<td>Global Air Transportation Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCCS</td>
<td>Global Command and Control System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCCS-J</td>
<td>Global Command and Control System-Joint</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCSS</td>
<td>Global Combat Support System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDSS</td>
<td>Global Decision Support System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSORTS</td>
<td>Global Status of Resources and Training System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTN</td>
<td>Global Transportation Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAW</td>
<td>in accordance with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICODES</td>
<td>integrated computerized deployment system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICSF</td>
<td>integrated command communications system framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>intermediate staging base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITO</td>
<td>installation transportation officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITV</td>
<td>in-transit visibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-7</td>
<td>operational plans and interoperability directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDDOC</td>
<td>joint deployment distribution operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDPO</td>
<td>joint deployment process owner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JDTC</td>
<td>Joint Deployment Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JET</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) editing tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFAST</td>
<td>Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFRG</td>
<td>joint force requirements generator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIOC TRANS</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Operations Center - Transportation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLOTS</td>
<td>joint logistics over-the-shore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMCG</td>
<td>Joint Mobility Control Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint operations area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPP</td>
<td>joint operation planning process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPAV</td>
<td>joint personnel asset visibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPEC</td>
<td>joint planning and execution community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRSOI</td>
<td>joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSIT</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) information trace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTB</td>
<td>Joint Transportation Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCE</td>
<td>logistics combat element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOI</td>
<td>letter of instruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOTS</td>
<td>logistics over-the-shore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;S</td>
<td>modeling and simulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCC</td>
<td>movement control center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCIP</td>
<td>military command inspection program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MDDOC</td>
<td>MAGTF deployment and distribution operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METT-T</td>
<td>mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available-time available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MHE</td>
<td>materials handling equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOG</td>
<td>maximum (aircraft) on ground</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSC</td>
<td>Military Sealift Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSR</td>
<td>main supply route</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NALSS</td>
<td>naval advanced logistic support site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDS</td>
<td>national defense strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NFLS</td>
<td>naval forward logistic site</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGA</td>
<td>National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIPRNET</td>
<td>Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>national military strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NURP</td>
<td>non-unit-related personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OA</td>
<td>operational area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCONUS</td>
<td>outside the continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAX</td>
<td>passengers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POD</td>
<td>port of debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POE</td>
<td>port of embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POG</td>
<td>port operations group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POL</td>
<td>petroleum, oils, and lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PORTSIM</td>
<td>port simulation model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>port support activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAC-OT</td>
<td>readiness assessment system - output tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Reserve Component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>request for forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RM</td>
<td>risk management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RQT</td>
<td>rapid query tool</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Ready Reserve Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>staging area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDDC</td>
<td>Surface Deployment and Distribution Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIPRNET</td>
<td>SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>strategic mobility officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMS</td>
<td>single mobility system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standing operating procedure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPM</td>
<td>single port manager</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOD</td>
<td>seaport of debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOE</td>
<td>seaport of embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRC</td>
<td>security risk category</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAA</td>
<td>tactical assembly area</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC-AIMS II</td>
<td>Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for Movement System II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TCC</td>
<td>transportation component command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TD</td>
<td>theater distribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEA</td>
<td>Transportation Engineering Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMO</td>
<td>transportation management office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDL</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPRC</td>
<td>theater planning response cell</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRAC2ES</td>
<td>transportation command regulating and command and control evacuation system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJTL</td>
<td>Universal Joint Task List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULN</td>
<td>unit line number</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCG</td>
<td>United States Coast Guard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USJFCOM</td>
<td>United States Joint Forces Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USPS</td>
<td>United States Postal Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>United States Special Operations Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USTRANSCOM</td>
<td>United States Transportation Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WPS</td>
<td>Worldwide Port System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WRM</td>
<td>war reserve materiel</td>
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</table>
PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02 will reflect this publication as the source document for these terms and definitions.

**asset visibility.** Provides users with information on the location, movement, status, and identity of units, personnel, equipment, and supplies. It facilitates the capability to act upon that information to improve overall performance of the Department of Defense’s logistics practices. Also called AV. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

automated identification technology. A suite of tools for facilitating total asset visibility source data capture and transfer. Automated identification technology includes a variety of devices, such as bar codes, magnetic strips, optical memory cards, and radio frequency tags for marking or “tagging” individual items, multi-packs, equipment, air pallets, or containers, along with the hardware and software required to create the devices, read the information on them, and integrate that information with other logistic information. Also called AIT. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition, and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

common-user sealift. The sealift services provided on a common basis for all Department of Defense agencies and, as authorized, for other agencies of the US Government. The Military Sealift Command, a transportation component command of the US Transportation Command, provides common-user sealift for which users reimburse the transportation accounts of the Transportation Working Capital Fund. (JP 3-35)

force closure. The point in time when a supported joint force commander determines that sufficient personnel and equipment resources are in the assigned operational area to carry out assigned tasks. See also closure. (JP 3-35)

force movement control center. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

force tracking. The process of gathering and maintaining information on the location, status, and predicted movement of each element of a unit including the unit’s command element, personnel, and unit-related supplies and equipment while in transit to the specified operational area. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

force visibility. The current and accurate status of forces; their current mission; future missions; location; mission priority; and readiness status. Force visibility provides information on the location, operational tempo, assets, and sustainment requirements of a force as part of an overall capability for a combatant commander. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
**intermediate staging base.** A tailorable, temporary location used for staging forces, sustainment and/or extraction into and out of an operational area. Also called ISB. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**logistic and movement control center.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**naval advanced logistic support site.** An overseas location used as the primary transshipment point in the theater of operations for logistic support. A naval advanced logistic support site possesses full capabilities for storage, consolidation, and transfer of supplies and for support of forward-deployed units (including replacements units) during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval advanced logistic support sites, with port and airfield facilities in close proximity, are located within the theater of operations but not near the main battle areas, and must possess the throughput capacity required to accommodate incoming and outgoing intertheater airlift and sealift. When fully activated, the naval advanced logistic support site should consist of facilities and services provided by the host nation, augmented by support personnel located in the theater of operations, or both. Also called NALSS or Naval ALSS. (JP 3-35)

**naval forward logistic site.** An overseas location, with port and airfield facilities nearby, which provides logistic support to naval forces within the theater of operations during major contingency and wartime periods. Naval forward logistic sites may be located in close proximity to main battle areas to permit forward staging of services, throughput of high priority cargo, advanced maintenance, and battle damage repair. Naval forward logistic sites are linked to in-theater naval advanced logistic support sites by intratheater airlift and sealift, but may also serve as transshipment points for intertheater movement of high-priority cargo into areas of direct combat. In providing fleet logistic support, naval forward logistic site capabilities may range from very austere to near those of a naval advanced logistic support site. Also called NFLS or Naval FLS. (JP 3-35)

**port support activity.** A tailorable support organization composed of mobilization station assets that ensures the equipment of the deploying units is ready to load. The port support activity operates unique equipment in conjunction with ship loading operations. The port support activity is operationally controlled by the military port commander or terminal transfer unit commander. Also called PSA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**redeployment.** The transfer of forces and materiel to support another joint force commander’s operational requirements, or to return personnel, equipment, and materiel to the home and/or demobilization stations for reintegration and/or out-processing. (JP 3-35)

**staging.** Assembling, holding, and organizing arriving personnel, equipment, and sustaining materiel in preparation for onward movement. The organizing and preparation for movement of personnel, equipment, and materiel at designated areas to incrementally build forces capable of meeting the operational commander’s requirements. (JP 3-35)
staging area. 1. Amphibious or airborne - A general locality between the mounting area and the objective of an amphibious or airborne expedition, through which the expedition or parts thereof pass after mounting, for refueling, regrouping of ships, and/or exercise, inspection, and redistribution of troops. 2. Other movements - A general locality established for the concentration of troop units and transient personnel between movements over the lines of communications. Also called SA. (JP 3-35)

tactical assembly area. An area that is generally out of the reach of light artillery and the location where units make final preparations (pre-combat checks and inspections) and rest, prior to moving to the line of departure. (JP 3-35)

total asset visibility. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

validation. 1. A process associated with the collection and production of intelligence that confirms that an intelligence collection or production requirement is sufficiently important to justify the dedication of intelligence resources, does not duplicate an existing requirement, and has not been previously satisfied. 2. In computer modeling and simulation, the process of determining the degree to which a model or simulation is an accurate representation of the real world from the perspective of the intended uses of the model or simulation. 3. Execution procedure used by combatant command components, supporting combatant commanders, and providing organizations to confirm to the supported commander and United States Transportation Command that all the information records in a time-phased force and deployment data not only are error free for automation purposes, but also accurately reflect the current status, attributes, and availability of units and requirements. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)
All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-35 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 Project Proposal**
- Submitted by Services, combatant commands, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and combatant commands
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2 Program Directive**
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and combatant commands
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, combatant command or

**STEP #3 Two Drafts**
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4 CJCS Approval**
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and combatant commands
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

**STEP #5 Assessments/Revision**
- The combatant commands receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised