Joint Publication 3-32

Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations

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PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for the command and control of joint maritime operations throughout the range of military operations. It addresses command relationships and the considerations, procedures, and options for conducting joint maritime operations under a functional component commander. This includes the establishment, authority, and responsibilities of a joint force maritime component commander and the formation, functions, and organization of a joint force maritime component command element and staff. It also discusses the maritime operating environment and its relationship to the environments of other functional and Service component commanders.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by
the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WALTER L. SHARP
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
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COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Discusses Organization for and Fundamentals of Joint Maritime Operations
- Describes the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander’s Authority, Command Relationships, and Responsibilities
- Describes Joint Maritime Operations Planning and Processes

Overview

Joint maritime operations are performed with capabilities/forces in support of the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force.

Maritime power is employed to gain or exploit command of the sea, maintain sea control, and/or project power and defense from the sea, unilaterally or in conjunction with or to support other joint or multinational, air, land, maritime, space, and special operations. The qualities that characterize maritime forces include readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility.

The joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) is the joint force commander’s (JFC’s) maritime warfighter. The JFC normally designates a JFMCC to command and control joint maritime operations. As a functional component commander, the JFMCC has authority over assigned and attached forces and forces/assets made available for tasking to perform operational missions.

Options for Organizing the Joint Maritime Force

The JFC has several options for organizing the joint maritime force.

JFCs can conduct operations through subordinate joint task forces, Service components, functional components, a combination of Service and functional components, or, in operations of limited scope and duration, the JFC may retain control and use the joint staff to direct and execute maritime operations.

JFCs may decide to establish a functional component command to integrate planning; reduce their span of control, and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information flow, unity of effort, weapons system management, component interaction or control over the scheme of maneuver.
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Joint Force Maritime Component Commander
Authority and Responsibilities

The joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC) has authority over forces or military capabilities made available to perform operational missions. JFMCC responsibilities include, but are not limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, tasking, and synchronization of joint maritime operations based on the JFC’s concept of operations (CONOPS) and maritime apportionment decisions.

The authority and command relationships of the JFMCC are established by the JFC. The JFMCC typically exercises operational control over assigned and attached forces. Additionally, the JFMCC may exercise tactical control over other military capabilities/forces made available for tasking. The JFC may also establish a support relationship between components to facilitate operations.

The JFMCC executes or contributes to the operational functions supporting JFC goals. These operational functions apply in varying degrees across the range of military operations, including those that involve multinational forces and interagency support.

Integration with Joint Campaign Planning

All campaigns are joint in nature, and most of them involve maritime operations. Joint planning at the JFMCC headquarters is predominantly focused on the operational level of war. Maritime force planning links the tactical employment of maritime forces to operational and strategic objectives. Focus at the command level is on operational art — the use of military forces to achieve strategic objectives through the design, organization, and execution of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.

JFMCC planning must be in consonance with the guidance of senior commanders and must support the JFC CONOPS and should support other component commanders as well. The JFMCC’s operational concept is typically built upon the following missions: sea control; maritime power projection and projection of defense from sea to land; deterrence; strategic sealift; forward maritime presence; and, seabasing operations.
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Integration with Joint Targeting Process

Joint Publication 3-60, Joint Targeting, provides standard terminology and procedures that govern JFC targeting responsibility and execution. These basic tenets are amplified by JFC guidance that adapts them to specific missions and force capabilities for each component.

Commanders must clearly understand the joint targeting process in order to arrange for fires that support their own objectives while satisfying the tasking of the JFC. Effective coordination, deconfliction, and synchronization maximize the strategic, operational, and tactical effects of joint targeting. The JFMCC and other components must employ adaptive and flexible joint targeting procedures that ensure: compliance with JFC objectives, guidance, and intent, rules on the use of force, rules of engagement and collateral damage concerns; coordination, synchronization and deconfliction of targets; fratricide avoidance; rapid response to time-sensitive targets; minimal duplication of effort; expeditious combat assessment; and, common perspective of all targeting on the adversaries’ center of gravity.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine for the command and control of joint maritime operations throughout the range of military operations. The JFC may retain command and control of joint maritime operations and use the joint force staff to plan and execute on the JFC’s behalf. The JFC may also organize and conduct maritime operations through the Service component commanders in the joint force. This publication addresses the operational relationships, policies, and procedures for command and control of joint maritime operations through the designation of a JFMCC.
Executive Summary

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

“Whosoever can hold the sea has command of everything.”

Themistocles (524-460 B.C.)

1. General

a. This publication provides fundamental principles and doctrine for the command and control (C2) of joint maritime operations (JMO) throughout the range of military operations in order to help ensure unity of effort for the joint force. The joint force commander (JFC) may retain C2 of JMO and use the joint force staff to plan and execute on the JFC’s behalf. The JFC may also organize and conduct maritime operations through the Service component commanders in the joint force. This publication addresses the operational relationships, policies, and procedures for C2 of JMO through the designation of a joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC). Commanders of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces (JTFs) should establish implementation policies and procedures within their commands. Variations to the relationships and procedures contained herein may be necessary to accommodate specific needs, but such variations must be the exception rather than the rule.

b. The nature of today’s complex global environment and the evolution of the Armed Forces of the United States, especially brought about by tremendous technology advances in communications and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems and improved weapons capabilities, affect how forces organize, train, equip, and fight. Equally important in determining how a commander organizes joint forces and capabilities to accomplish assigned missions are the adversary’s nature and capabilities and the environment (e.g., geography, accessibility, climate, infrastructure).

c. Finally, this publication presents the JFMCC’s operating procedures and delineates guidance for the formation, functions, and organization of the command. Appendices A through H provide guidance on the typical functions, responsibilities, organization, and planning processes for a JFMCC.

2. Maritime Domain

a. National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-13 defines the maritime domain as “All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.” It further states that a key component of an active, layered maritime defense is achieved through maritime domain awareness (MDA). MDA is described as “the effective understanding of anything associated with the global maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.” However, for joint doctrine purposes, the term battlespace awareness is used. The battlespace for a commander may include parts of all domains (air, land, maritime, and space).
Chapter I


b. The Maritime Domain. Joint doctrine further defines the maritime domain as “the oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas and the airspace above these, including the littorals.” Per Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, “The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.”

c. Command of the sea is necessary to accomplish control within the maritime domain. This objective is achieved by establishing maritime superiority or maritime supremacy in the operational area. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, defines maritime superiority as “that degree of dominance of one force over another that permits the conduct of maritime operations by the former and its related land, maritime, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.” Maritime supremacy is defined as “that degree of maritime superiority wherein the opposing force is incapable of effective interference.”

3. Joint Maritime Operations

JMO are those maritime operations performed with maritime capabilities/forces, and other forces assigned, attached, or made available, in support of the JFC’s operation or campaign objectives, or in support of other components of the joint force.

a. Maritime power is employed to gain or exploit command of the sea, maintain sea control, and/or project power and defense from the sea. This can be accomplished unilaterally, in conjunction with, or to support other joint or multinational, air, land, maritime, space, and special operations, or interagency activities. The qualities that characterize maritime forces include readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility.

b. The JFC normally designates a JFMCC to command and control joint maritime operations. As a functional component commander, the JFMCC has authority over assigned and attached forces and forces/assets made available for tasking to perform operational missions.

For detailed information on JFMCC responsibilities with respect to strategic and theater nuclear operations, deterrence missions and strategic sealift, see JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction; JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System, and JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations.

c. The JFC normally designates a commander from the Service whose forces are principally represented as the functional component commander (e.g., a Navy commander serving as JFMCC; an Army or Marine Corps commander as joint force land component commander [JFLCC]; an Air Force commander as joint force air component commander [JFACC]; and an appropriate special operations forces commander as joint force special operation component commander [JFSOCC]). The JFC augments the designated JFMCC staff as necessary to complete the following:
(1) Reflect the composition of assigned maritime forces.

(2) Properly execute the JFMCC staff mission.

(3) Fulfill joint, multinational, and interagency requirements.

4. Organizing Joint Forces

   a. A JFC has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the concept of operations (CONOPS). Figure I-1 depicts the possible components in a joint force to show that joint forces can be organized by Service component, functional component, or a combination of both.

   See JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), for more details.

   b. As the JFC’s maritime warfighter, a JFMCC manages the maritime military environment and a wide range of maritime assets.

   c. The JFC develops a CONOPS for assigned missions and organizes forces appropriately. Sound organization should provide for unity of effort, centralized planning and direction, and decentralized execution including authority to rapidly exercise initiative across increasingly dynamic operations. Clear definition of mission and goals is the essential first step in the mission planning process. Centralized planning and direction is essential for controlling and coordinating the efforts of the forces. Decentralized execution and initiative are essential because no one commander can control the detailed actions of a large number of units or individuals, or predict the opportunities which may unfold.

   d. The joint force organization should be sufficiently flexible to meet the planned phases of operations and any development that may necessitate a change in operations.

5. Options for Organizing the Joint Maritime Force

   JFCs can conduct operations through subordinate JTFs, Service components, functional components, a combination of Service and functional components, or, in operations of limited scope and duration, the JFC may retain control and use the joint staff to direct and execute maritime operations.

   a. **Weighing Options.** The JFC and staff must consider the advantages and disadvantages of each option before making the final decision to organize under a particular option.

   b. JFCs may decide to establish a functional component command to integrate planning; reduce their span of control, and/or significantly improve combat efficiency, information sharing, unity of effort, weapons system management, component interaction or control over the scheme of maneuver. When the JFC designates a JFMCC, the JFMCC’s authority and responsibility is also defined by the JFC.
Considerations for Employing a Joint Force Maritime Component

When designated, a JFMCC is the single maritime voice regarding maritime forces and requirements and makes recommendations to the JFC regarding prioritization and allocation of joint maritime force assets, and synchronization of maritime operations with overall operations. The following are some considerations for employing a joint force maritime component:

a. **Planning.** The need for detailed, coordinated, concurrent, and parallel planning is a consideration when deciding whether the JFC should establish a JFMCC. While JFMCC-integrated planning is focused primarily on employment, the JFMCC may also be tasked to integrate planning of multi-Service maritime forces for deployment, transition, and redeployment/reconstitution at a level subordinate to that of the JFC.
b. **Duration.** The length of an operation may be sufficient to warrant the establishment of a single maritime commander. The decision to establish a JFMCC should consider the time required for personnel and staff sourcing and training, the establishment of C2, and communications system support architecture.

c. **Maritime Perspective.** A JFMCC will provide the JFC with focused maritime expertise to enhance the detailed planning, coordination, and execution of joint operations.

d. **JFC Span of Control.** A JFMCC will resolve joint maritime issues when task or organizational complexities limit the JFC’s effective span of control. For instance, the JFC will direct publication of an airspace control order when assets from more than one component might use overlapping operational areas.

e. **Multinational Operations.** A JFMCC (or a combined force maritime component commander) will integrate multinational maritime forces into the overall operation on a level commensurate with the capabilities they provide.

f. **Timing.** The decision to establish and designate a JFMCC ideally will occur during the concept development phase of the campaign plan, permitting the JFMCC to fully participate and to maximize unity of effort.
CHAPTER II
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR COMMAND AND CONTROL
FOR JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS

“When a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Service, the functional component commander’s staff should reflect the composition of the functional component command to provide the commander with the expertise needed to effectively employ the forces made available.”

JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

1. Establishing Authority

a. JFCs exercising operational control (OPCON) of forces at the combatant commander (CCDR), commander of subordinate unified commands, or JTF commander level have the authority to organize forces to control military operations in order to best accomplish assigned missions. The JFC establishes subordinate commands, assigns responsibilities, establishes or delegates appropriate command relationships and establishes coordinating instructions to optimize the capabilities of each subordinate. These actions help to clearly focus and synchronize efforts while providing subordinate commanders flexibility and opportunity to exercise the initiative required to maintain the joint forces’ operational tempo and unity of effort.

b. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, describes functional commands as being established to provide direction and control of certain functions and types of operations. The JFC who establishes a functional component command has the authority to designate its commander. Normally, the Service component commander with the preponderance of forces to be tasked to perform that function will be designated as the functional component commander. However, the JFC will always consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities and C2 capabilities when selecting a commander.

c. The functional component commander typically is a Service component commander. When this is the case, the functional component commander typically retains the responsibilities associated with Service component command for those assigned forces. However, the functional component commander must be cognizant of the constraints and restraints imposed on the capability of the forces as well as those responsibilities retained by the Service component commanders.

d. The JFC assigns the specific responsibilities and authority of a functional component commander. The establishment of a functional component commander must not affect the command relationships between the Service component commanders and the JFC or Service headquarters.

e. When a JFMCC is designated, normally the JFC will designate an area of operations (AO). Based on the nature of the operations, the geography, the adversary, and the operations and activities of other elements of the joint force, this AO can be dynamic and evolving as the operation or campaign matures. The AO should be of sufficient size to allow for movement,
maneuver, and employment of weapons systems as well as other force projection and inherent warfighting capabilities. The AO must also provide the operational depth for required logistics and force protection (FP). Within the AO, the JFMCC establishes the battlespace geometry that both allows for independent yet supporting operations of subordinate elements while enabling the synchronization of employment of forces across all components. The AO may not encompass the entire littoral area, however, it should be large enough for the JFMCC to accomplish the mission and protect the maritime force. The AO may include air, land, and sea.

f. When the JFC designates a JFMCC AO, the JFMCC is the supported commander within the AO. As supported commander, the JFMCC integrates and synchronizes maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this integration and synchronization, JFMCC has the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing of fires within his AO. All missions within a theater and/or joint operations area (JOA) must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall objective.

(1) Synchronization of efforts within land or maritime AOs with theater- and/or JOA-wide operations is of particular importance. To facilitate synchronization, the JFC establishes priorities that will be executed throughout the theater and/or JOA, including within the land and maritime force commander’s AOs.

(2) In coordination with the land and/or maritime force commander, those commanders designated by the JFC to execute theater- and/or JOA-wide functions have the latitude to plan and execute these JFC prioritized operations within land and maritime AOs. If those operations
would have adverse impact within a land or maritime AO, the commander must either readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the appropriate component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

2. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Authority and Responsibilities

JFMCC responsibilities include, but are not limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, tasking, and synchronization of JMO based on the JFC’s CONOPS and maritime apportionment decisions. Specific responsibilities that normally are assigned to the JFMC are included in Figure II-1.

a. Command Relationships Applicable to the JFMCC. The authority and command relationships of the JFMCC are established by the JFC. The JFMCC typically exercises OPCON over assigned and attached forces. Additionally, the JFMCC may exercise tactical control over other military capabilities/forces made available for tasking. The JFC may also establish a support relationship between components to facilitate operations.

For additional information on command relationships, see JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).

(1) Establishing a JFMCC provides the JFC another option for managing operations of forces by achieving a more manageable span of control.

(2) The JFMCC, as the focal point for planning and executing the maritime portion of the JFC’s campaign plan, may prepare a supporting operation plan (OPLAN) that provides the intent, CONOPS and supporting details. The JFMCC also directs current operations while continuing to plan and prepare for future assigned operations. The JFMCC shares equally with the other component commanders in the requirement to synchronize operations in support of achieving overall mission objectives.

(3) The JFMCC is responsible for making maritime apportionment recommendations to the JFC. Maritime forces in excess of requirements to accomplish the maritime missions assigned by the JFC should be made available for tasking by other appropriate component commanders.

(4) The JFMCC also requests forces of other component commanders when necessary for the accomplishment of the maritime mission. The JFMCC’s requirements for additional forces are a factor in the apportionment recommendations of other component commanders.

b. Maritime Support. A JFMCC can ease the burden on the CCDR’s and/or subordinate JFC’s staff, free them to focus more on strategic aspects of the campaign, and provide a single maritime headquarters (HQ) for coordination with the other components. Regardless of organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders are responsible for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces: internal administration, training, logistics and Service-unique intelligence operations. The JFMCC must be aware of all such Service-specific responsibilities.
c. **JFMCC Functions.** The JFMCC executes or contributes to the operational functions supporting JFC goals. These operational functions apply in varying degrees across the range of military operations, including those that involve multinational forces and interagency support (see Figure II-2).
(1) **Command and Control.** The JFMCC commands assigned and attached forces, prepares OPLANs, and executes operations in support of the assigned tasks and strategic goals as directed by the JFC. Upon JFC approval of the JFMCC’s plan, the JFMCC exercises specified authority and direction over forces/capabilities in the accomplishment of the assigned mission. The JFMCC publishes daily targeting orders for the execution of maritime operational activity and special procedures. The JFMCC must also maintain liaison with other functional/Service components and agencies and provide representation on boards, groups, and cells. These include the information operations (IO) cell, joint targeting coordination board, joint planning group (JPG) and the civil-military operations center, among others. Such JFMCC representation is essential to ensure that joint force operations are coordinated and achieve unity of effort.

(2) **Coordination and Deconfliction.** The JFMCC must ensure that forces/capabilities are coordinated within the maritime force and with other component commanders. Where appropriate, the JFMCC may make coordination and deconfliction recommendations to the JFC, to include, but not limited to:

(a) Airspace management.

(b) Land space management.

(c) Waterspace management.

![Figure II-2. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Functions](image-url)
(d) Fire support.

(e) Coordination with interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations.

(3) **Communications System Support.** The JFMCC has responsibility for:

(a) Developing and integrating the JMO communications system architecture and plans that support the JFC’s operational requirements.

(b) Establishing the policy and guidance for implementation and integration of interoperable JMO communications system to exercise command in the execution of the JFMCC mission.

(c) Providing guidance on JMO communications matters to the JFC.

(d) Providing recommendations to the JFC on joint maritime communications operations.

(e) Any other communications requirements as assigned.

(f) The JFMCC may delegate authority for the accomplishment of joint communications tasks that are under the OPCON of the JFMCC. When the establishment of a JFMCC staff occurs, Service components can be tasked to provide communications resources necessary to establish the C2 architecture.

*See Appendix A, “Communications System Support.”*

(4) **ISR**

(a) The JFMCC provides the operational requirements and continuous feedback to the JFC to ensure optimum maritime and littoral ISR support. Maritime forces typically bring a rich complement of sensors and sensor fusion capability. Close coordination with other component commanders and the JFC’s communications system directorate (J-6) early in joint planning are essential to creating architectures and sensor employment plans that provide the best mix of ISR services throughout the joint force. Organic asset control is not the only issue for negotiation and accommodation. Access to maritime ISR sensor products and to those produced by theater and national sensors is critical to effective C2 capability.

(b) All major tactical combat forces normally share access to the joint intelligence architecture. The JFMCC prioritizes requests for information (RFIs).

*See Appendix B, “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance.”*

(5) **Movement and Maneuver.** The JFMCC, responsible at the operational level for movement and maneuver of assigned forces, directs subordinate commanders in the execution
of force level operational tasks, advises the JFC of their movement, and coordinates with other functional/Service components and other agencies in supporting JFMCC missions.

(6) **Fires.** Joint fires can be in support of gaining sea control/maritime superiority/maritime supremacy, in support of projecting power ashore/interdiction/fire support, projecting defense inland from the sea, and other missions. The JFMCC is responsible for the planning and employment of operational fires within the assigned AO, both in terms of developing and integrating multidimensional attacks on the adversary’s centers of gravity (COGs) and in terms of shaping the JFMCC AO. The JFMCC should provide guidance for the employment of JFMCC forces’ fires.

*See Appendix D, “Fire Support.”*

(7) **FP.** The JFMCC is responsible to the JFC for all aspects of maritime FP. The JFMCC creates force protection plans and sets priorities for JFMCC forces. FP is part of each mission assigned as a function routinely conducted by maritime forces. FP includes the following elements:

(a) Antiterrorism.

(b) Physical security.

(c) Personal security.

(d) FP planning.

(8) **Logistic Support.** Each Service is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces, except when logistic support is otherwise provided for by agreement with national agencies, multinational partners or by assignments to common, joint or cross-servicing. The supported combatant command can determine whether or not common servicing would be beneficial within the theater or designated area. The JFMCC makes recommendations concerning the distribution of material and services commensurate with priorities developed for JFMCC operations. A CCDR may delegate responsibility for a common support capability to the JFMCC. The JFMCC will usually assume logistic coordination responsibilities for all Services and forces operating from a sea base.

(9) **Planning.** The JFMCC assists the JFC in long-range or future planning, preparation of campaign and joint OPLANs, and associated estimates of the situation. JFMCC planning responsibilities include:

(a) Develop a maritime OPLAN to best support joint force objectives as assigned.

(b) Develop maritime courses of action (COAs) within the framework of the JFC-assigned objective or mission, the forces available, and the commander’s intent.
(c) Coordinate JFMCC planning with higher, lower, adjacent, and multinational HQ.

(d) Determine JFMCC forces required and coordinating deployment planning in support of the selected COAs.

(e) Coordinate the planning and execution of maneuver operations with other missions.

(10) The JFMCC makes recommendations to the JFC on the employment and support of JFMCC forces. Such recommendations can include, but are not limited to:

(a) Force structure requirements.

(b) Integration and employment of multinational maritime forces.

(c) JFMCC force scheme of maneuver.

(d) Priorities of effort for JFMCC forces.

(e) Designation of operational limitations.

(f) Intelligence collection priorities.

(g) Space support to the JFMCC forces.

(h) Measures of performance assessments.

3. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Staff and Organization

a. Core Staff. The JFMCC’s staff is typically built from an existing Service component/force staff and then augmented with appropriate Service staff representation as soon as practical. For example, recent history reflects that the JFMCC organization is typically organized from the Service (Navy) component or a Navy numbered fleet command assigned to the CCDR. These staffs require advanced planning, appropriate training, and frequent exercises for efficient operations. Liaison elements from and to other components facilitate coordination.

b. Augmented JFMCC Staff Organization. Appendix E, “Joint Force Maritime Component Commander’s Staff,” depicts a notional staff organization for a joint force maritime component. The organization of the Service component core staff forming the nucleus of the joint force maritime component typically is the first priority. The augmented staff’s standard operating procedures (SOPs) normally form the baseline for the joint force maritime component SOPs.

c. Sourcing JFMCC Forces. For more details, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures). During contingency planning, forces are apportioned in
the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan process. Apportioned forces are those forces available to a CCDR for contingency planning purposes. They may be more or less than those actually allocated by the Secretary of Defense for execution planning or actual execution. When planning during a crisis, the JFC designates forces during the crisis action planning (CAP) process.

(1) As the JFC develops the CONOPS, Service and functional components conduct concurrent planning. During this process, the JFC will task the Service and functional components to provide estimates of forces required to attain mission goals and objectives. Because the JFMCC will typically employ forces from several Services, and possibly multinational forces, and/or interagency assets, the JFMCC should provide force estimates in terms of capabilities required rather than specific forces. It is important to note, however, that specific forces/capabilities may be needed for specific missions. When specifying capabilities required, it is essential that capacity (the ability to employ the capability concurrently across the required number of locations) and endurance (the ability to sustain employment until operational objectives are met) are also clearly defined.

(2) After the JFMCC’s requirements have been received, the JFC works with the components to source the actual forces needed if not already assigned or attached. If additional forces are needed, the JFC will submit a request for forces (RFF) or request for capability to meet the stated requirements. Secretary of Defense approval is required for the transfer of forces from the military departments or other CCDRs. Forces will be sourced through the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System process. Service components typically designate specific units to the JFC for transfer to the JFMCC.

(3) Once the forces have been sourced, the JFC can plan and conduct operations. While the JFMCC, like other functional component commanders, provides recommended phasing of forces to the JFC, the JFMCC normally does not control the maritime portion of the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD). Based on component recommendations, the JFC develops the integrated TPFDD and assigns the required delivery dates.

For more details, see CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).

4. Liaison, Board, and Cell Requirements

   a. Command relationships and the nature of the mission to be accomplished are the primary determinants when defining liaison requirements. Effective liaison is essential to overall success. The JFMCC prioritizes liaison with other components in order to coordinate the planning and execution of operations. The JFMCC must also consider existing liaison requirements from the assigned Service components when establishing liaison requirements with other designated Service and functional component commanders. JFC boards, centers, and cells must have the appropriate JFMCC representation through liaison officers (LNOs) or virtual presence via a collaborative environment.

   b. Liaison personnel generally represent the interests of their commanders and serve to promote understanding of the commander’s intent at both the sending and receiving HQs.
c. The JFMCC’s senior LNO sent to the JFC or other component’s staff, (e.g., JFACC, JFLCC, and/or JFSOCC), interacts with the commander and senior staff. To be credible and effective, the senior LNO should have the authority to communicate directly with the JFMCC should the situation warrant.

d. The JFMCC requirements can include liaison with:

   (1) Other components of the joint force.

   (2) JFC staff.

   (3) Major subordinate commands.

   (4) Multinational forces.

   (5) Interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations.

e. **LNO Organization.** Reciprocal arrangements can provide other component and Service subject matter experts (SMEs) required for efficient prosecution of JFMCC objectives in the AO.

f. **LNO Responsibilities.** JFMCC LNO/LNO team responsibilities include:

   (1) Maintaining familiarity with issues of the JFMCC, including specific information requirements from each staff section.

   (2) Knowing the current situation of the JFMCC; including the commander’s intent, commander’s critical information requirements, TPFDD issues, and CONOPS.

   (3) Conveying the JFMCC’s intent and guidance concerning assigned operations and all activities within the JFMCC’s assigned AO to the commander and staff.

   (4) Keeping the commander and staff updated on the JFMCC’s priority, timing, and effects for supported actions.

   (5) Monitoring and interpreting the maritime battle situation for the commander and staff.

   (6) Staying informed of the operational status of units.
“LNOs [liaison officers], whether individually or in teams, perform several critical functions that are consistent across the full range of military operations. The extent to which these functions are performed is dependent on the mission and the charter established by the sending organization commander they represent. A successful LNO performs four basic functions: monitor, coordinate, advise and assist.”

Naval Warfare Publication 5.02, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Joint Task Force Liaison Operations

5. Joint Force Commander Staff Options for Joint Maritime Operations

The JFC normally designates a JFMCC. On rare occasions, however, there may be situations where designation of a JFMCC is not required. Typically, this would occur when a conflict or situation is of limited duration, scope, or complexity. In cases where the JFC does not designate a JFMCC, the JFC may elect to directly task maritime forces. If this option is exercised, the JFC’s staff assists in planning and coordinating maritime operations for JFC approval. The JFC can elect to centralize selected functions (planning, coordinating, and tasking) within the staff to provide direction, control, and coordination of the joint force.
CHAPTER III
Joint Maritime Operations Planning

“A 19th-century sailor would be bewildered by a modern warship, but regardless of the appearance of ships, there is one element, the most important of all, that remains unchanged - the man himself. Human nature in all the changing years has altered but little. It is the human element in warfare which may, if understood by the commander, prove to be the only way of converting an impossibility into a successful reality. With trained men and proper materials, the commander’s task is reduced to the preparation of good plans.”

War Instructions, US Navy, 1944

1. Integration with Joint Campaign Planning

All campaigns are joint in nature, and most of them involve maritime operations. Joint planning at the JFMCC HQ is predominantly focused on the operational level of war. Maritime force planning links the tactical employment of maritime forces to operational and strategic objectives. Focus at the command level is on operational art — the use of military forces to achieve strategic objectives through the design, organization, and execution of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles.

a. JFMCC planning must be in consonance with the guidance of senior commanders, must support the JFC’s CONOPS, and should support other component commanders as well. The JFMCC’s operational concept is typically built upon the following missions:

(1) Sea control.

(2) Power projection and projection of defense from the sea and inland (e.g., ship to shore defense of assets on the JFC’s defended asset list).

(3) Deterrence.

(4) Strategic sealift.

(5) Forward maritime presence.

(6) Seabasing operations.

b. Other specified and implied tasks can involve planning and directing naval operations (e.g., undersea operations, mine operations, strike operations, interdiction, amphibious and expeditionary operations, maritime interception operations, foreign humanitarian assistance and noncombatant evacuation operations, and civil support operations), as well as providing communications system support and FP.
2. Planning Considerations and Process

   a. The JFMCC’s operational level planning must simultaneously support the strategic and operational requirements of the JFC and also frame the tactical-level planning requirements of subordinate commanders and assigned forces/capabilities.

   b. JFMCC planning is derived from, and directly supports, the JFC’s guidance and intent. Its format, content, and time-phasing must be consistent with the expectations at the JFC level and should be consistent with those used by other components, when possible. Maritime operations planning involves simultaneous efforts to address near-term and far-term operations, and must be flexible enough to enable dynamic synchronization with overall joint force operations.

   c. Many maritime forces are multimission capable. Maritime planners must be able to fully recognize and integrate different capabilities, requirements, and limitations of assigned and attached forces, and capabilities/forces made available for tasking from other components. It is important to understand the crucial implications of multimission tasking for offensive, defensive, as well as logistic operations. Factoring these implications into JFMCC decisions regarding delegation of command relationships and decisions regarding employment of multimission platforms is paramount. Some capabilities of multimission ships and other maritime forces may be made available to other components in direct support based on the operational need, the JFMCC’s apportionment recommendation, and the JFC’s apportionment decision.

   d. The JFMCC’s operational-level maritime plan delineates how to integrate and coordinate joint maritime operations to achieve the JFC’s operation or overall campaign objectives. This plan, capable of being modified daily, is a compilation of subordinate requests and plans used to achieve mission objectives based on dynamics and the campaign’s tempo. It frames the daily operational planning conducted by the JFMCC staff and assigned forces.

   Detailed information on a notional JMO organization and processes, under a functional construct, is provided in Appendix G, "Notional Joint Maritime Operations Organization and Processes."

3. Organization for Planning

   The JFMCC’s forces/capabilities may consist of subordinate commanders and forces from any Service and may include multinational forces. The JFMCC’s subordinate commanders use the JFMCC’s operational-level plans to develop their specific maritime tactical plans. Although a notional JFMCC organization is discussed in Appendix E, “Joint Force Maritime Component Commander’s Staff,” the planning organization functions are addressed in this chapter.

   a. Transition. When a JFMCC staff is established from an existing Service component staff, they must plan and transition from Service component responsibilities to JFMCC-level responsibilities. When the geographic combatant commander designates Service component commanders and staffs as contingency JFMCCs, transition plans or more general SOPs should be developed to guide the transition. Specific billet migrations for the resident Service staff and
specific augmentation billets from external sources provide the foundation on which to build the staff transition.

b. **Post-Transition.** Once initial planning products and orders are complete, the staff should be organized to conduct execution phase planning. This effort will include time-flow of planning documents and appropriate production of necessary products through the planning staff. The responsibility for planning is coordinated between the maritime future plans center (MFPC) and the operations center (OPS). While the top level, cross-directorate coordinating functions will need to continue, development of specific plans and the integration of those plans will occur within the planning directorate. The size and specific composition of the MFPC and OPS must be appropriate to the scope and complexity of maritime activity. The planning organization should include long-range planning, near-term planning, and all liaisons that tie maritime plans at the JFMCC level with those of other components and other maritime command echelons.

(1) **Long-Range Planning.** The MFPC is the organizational element that typically conducts long-range planning. The MFPC’s primary responsibility is OPLAN development and maritime force deployment planning. The MFPC usually works on planning for events 72 hours and beyond. Force deployment planning conducted by the MFPC in the planning directorate must be in concert with transition team operational planning. The deployment planners need to understand the capabilities of available assets and sequencing priorities associated with a COA or CONOPS. The JFMCC’s planning staff must be aware that the timing and sequencing priority may be affected by the JFC’s overall concept of deployment.

(2) **Near-Term Planning.** The JFMCC OPS has primary responsibility for operational planning within 72 hours. The OPS is usually subdivided into current operations and future operations branches. Current operations is responsible for operations out to 24 hours and the future operations branch is responsible for operations from 24 to 72 hours out. A dynamic operational environment often requires rapid replanning in parallel with mission change orders for the maritime force. The principal products of the OPS are situation reports, daily maritime intentions messages, maritime deconfliction plans, synchronization of operations joint air tasking order, and other near-term coordination products. (See Appendix G, “Notional Joint Maritime Operations Organization and Processes.”) OPS, or a subordinate cell assigned to it, plans maritime targeting, including required coordination with targeting cells of other components. This function includes targeting that supports JFMCC requirements and those assigned by the JFC in support of other components.

4. **Joint Maritime Operations Targeting Process**

   JP 3-60, *Joint Targeting*, provides standard terminology and procedures that govern JFMCC targeting responsibility and execution. These basic tenets are amplified by JFC guidance that adapts them to specific missions and force capabilities for each component.

   a. Commanders must clearly understand the joint targeting process in order to arrange for fires that support their own objectives while satisfying the tasking of the JFC. Effective coordination, deconfliction and synchronization maximize the strategic, operational, and tactical
effects of joint targeting. The JFMCC and other components must employ joint targeting procedures that ensure:

1. Compliance with JFC objectives, guidance and intent, rules on the use of force, rules of engagement (ROE), and collateral damage concerns.

2. Coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction of targets.

3. Fratricide avoidance.

4. Rapid response to time-sensitive targets (TSTs).

5. Minimal duplication of effort.

6. Expeditious combat assessment (CA).

7. Common perspective of all targeting on the adversaries’ COG.

b. Targeting Process. Once the JFC provides targeting guidance, subordinate component commanders can recommend to the JFC how best to use their assigned forces/capabilities to achieve the JFC’s objectives. The JFC may retain central targeting authority or delegate it to the subordinate component commander best able to accomplish it. Key functions include synchronization, integration, deconfliction, fratricide avoidance targeting, and force allocation. Components typically will nominate targets to the JFC’s designated targeting authority for centralized servicing and will provide the direct support sortie requirements plan for central targeting support. Typically, LNOs acting in support of their component commander actively participate in the targeting. For example, if the JFACC is designated the targeting authority, the JFMCC provides target input to the joint guidance, apportionment, and targeting team directly via collaborative tools or JFMCC LNOs. The JFMCC is charged with establishing procedures and mechanisms to manage its part of the joint targeting function. The JFMCC must be prepared to coordinate and employ alternative procedures for any aspect of the joint targeting process should established procedures require change to keep pace with execution. The theater joint intelligence center (JIC) normally provides targeting support to the JFC and components. This is supplemented by continental United States reach-back services.

For additional information, see JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

c. In addition to these targeting measures, there is a growing need for real time operational targeting capability, which reflects the very dynamic environment that grows from taking advantage of our force agility and highly trained personnel. This unstructured, often chaotic process must also be considered and supported.

d. Targeting for JFMCC Operations/JFMCC Distributed Targeting. The JFMCC directs the maritime segment of the joint targeting process within an organizational framework tailored to the scope of the maritime targeting requirements. A combination of maritime force
sensors, access to various intelligence products and the robust mission planning and imagery processing capabilities resident in maritime assets (e.g., aircraft carriers, large-deck amphibious ships, command ships, surface combatants, submarines, and aircraft) offer the JFMCC a potentially significant distributed targeting arrangement. SOPs for employing these capabilities must be consistent with the targeting direction from the JFC and with specific arrangements for the shared use of sensors.

e. The JFMCC’s targeting structure must be agile enough to react to rapidly changing events at sea, in the seaward littoral, and the landward littoral, as well as to project power and defense inland in support of other component commanders while providing for efficient and continuous execution of all phases of the joint targeting process. Deliberate targeting supports the standard targeting cycle established by the JFC. Additional dynamic targeting procedures are required to support time-sensitive targeting requirements. The JFMCC’s targeting process should mirror the standard joint process as closely as possible. The JFMCC provides long-term, top level planning guidance that highlights the commander’s intent for fires. Subordinate units submit targeting requests for servicing either by the JFMCC’s own targeting capability or for consideration by the JFC’s targeting authority, if necessary.

f. OPS normally is responsible for organizing and executing the JFMCC’s targeting responsibilities. The joint targeting process cuts across traditional functional and organizational boundaries. Operations, plans, and intelligence specialists are the primary active participants, but other functional areas, such as logistics, weather, law, and communications may also support the process. Close coordination, cooperation, and communications are essential. Depending on technical capabilities resident inside and outside the JFMCC staff, portions of the targeting effort may need to be delegated to subordinate units best equipped and manned for it.

g. The servicing of RFIs is a key element of the targeting process. Standard format RFIs are essential for compiling information necessary for all aspects of the joint targeting process. In order to service joint force RFIs in a timely manner, the JFMCC’s process must be synchronized with that used by the JFC targeting authority. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) or OPS will typically coordinate the JFMCC’s RFI submissions in accordance with procedures established by the JFC and existing joint doctrine.

h. **Component Targeting Board.** The JFMCC typically organizes a maritime component targeting board to function as an integrating center for maritime targeting oversight and review. Primary direction is provided by OPS. This maritime targeting board must be a joint activity with representatives from the JFMCC staff, all component LNOs, and major subordinate units. It provides a forum for review of joint targeting guidance and joint apportionment that advises the JFMCC on alternatives for achieving the JFC’s theater plans and campaign objectives. The board acts to consider the capabilities of the JFMCC force and other component forces. Specific responsibilities include:

(1) Assigning maritime target priorities.
(2) Developing a general asset/platform allocation plan to service the prioritized target list for refinement by the strike cell.

Additional details on the strike cell may be found in Appendix D, “Fire Support.”

(3) Assisting subordinate units with translating JFMCC objectives, guidance, and desired effects into the targeting effort.

(4) Providing targeting guidance based on major plans and priorities.

(5) Providing pre-execution review of JFMCC’s major plans.

(6) Specifying the desired effects of joint targeting in the maritime AO.

(7) Recommending supplemental ROE to enhance the effectiveness of fires missions.

(8) Recommending changes to the JFC’s restricted target and no-strike lists.

(9) Developing a prioritized target list to submit to the JFC for inclusion in the joint integrated prioritized target list.

(10) Considering potential nonscheduled fires that can be held in reserve for direct (close battle) support.

(11) Identifying requests for supporting fires from other component commanders.

(12) Coordinating with other component targeting to avoid duplication of effort and reduce the risk of fratricide.

i. Staff Support to Targeting

(1) Intelligence support to the targeting process is provided by the J-2. Specific responsibilities include:

(a) Providing coordination of ISR resources, reporting, products, and services that support meeting the JFMCC’s targeting requirements within an operationally effective timeline.

(b) Recommending collection priorities for JFC, theater, and national tasking.

(c) Coordinating with the operations directorate to support collection requirements.

(d) Conducting/coordinating CA of lethal and nonlethal effects for further action by the operations directorate.
(e) Ensuring dissemination of products in useable forms to meet end user needs.

(2) Operations and plans directorate responsibilities include:

(a) Managing the targeting board and related boards (including the CA board and IO working group) and providing target meeting results to each subordinate unit and supporting forces.

(b) Ensuring the J-2 has the required information/priorities for target development, target acquisition, and CA.

(c) Assisting in CA for JFMCC with support from the staff, each subordinate unit, and other functional components.

(d) Application and modification of special instructions (SPINS) in support of defensive and offensive tactical air operations.

(3) Operations directorate responsibilities include:

(a) Determining the availability of resources to carry out the IO plan and to coordinate intelligence and assessment support for IO.

(b) Serving as the primary advocate for IO (lethal and nonlethal) targets nominated for attack throughout the target nomination and review process established by the JFMCC.

(c) Providing meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) support, products, and services to support JFMCC targeting requirements.

(4) Logistics directorate responsibilities include:

(a) Updating weapons inventories.

(b) Identifying critical or key logistic issues specific to JFMCC targeting.

(c) Assisting the J-2 in identifying adversary logistic targets (e.g., fuel storage depots and pipelines, ordnance depots and movement centers, distribution infrastructure and hubs to include airports and seaports) that can affect the adversary’s sustainment capability.

(d) Assisting the J-2 with review of target selection for unnecessary adverse environmental impacts (e.g., dams and oil fields).

(5) Staff judge advocate responsibilities include advising the JFMCC and the targeting board on:

(a) Applicable international and domestic laws.
(b) Law of armed conflict issues.

(c) ROE/SPINS.

(d) Other pertinent issues surrounding target recommendations and decision processes.

(6) Subordinate unit responsibilities include:

(a) Identifying requirements and nominating targets to the JFMCC.

(b) Providing representation to the targeting board and related boards/working groups.

(c) Recommending priorities for CA collection requirements to the JFMCC J-2.

(d) Appraise the JFMCC of weapons and weapons systems availability.

5. Planning Products

   a. Initial output from the JFMCC planning process focuses primarily on JFC COA development conducted in accordance with JP 5-0, *Joint Operations Planning*. JFMCC-developed maritime planning products must also support the planning processes of other functional commanders (refer to JP 3-30, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations* and JP 3-31, *Command and Control for Joint Land Operations*) by providing:

      (1) Support requests.

      (2) Allocation of forces/capabilities available.

   b. Planning products include long-range contingency planning, adjusted near-term refinements, provisions for very near-term CAP, and tactical adjustments. The JFMCC provides the maritime input to JFC OPLANs and operation orders (OPORDs) to convey how the maritime force intends to help achieve JFC objectives. The JFMCC plan describes the relationship or arrangement of major assigned operations that support the JFC’s strategic and operational objectives.

   c. The OPORD describes the synchronization of specific tasks that result in an employment of joint/multinational maritime force capabilities for a major operation. The format for the OPORD generally follows that found in CICSM 3122.01, *Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Vol I: (Planning Policies and Procedures).*

   d. Maritime forces inputs to OPLANs and OPORDs are distributed internally to maritime forces and externally to the JFC, Service, and functional component commanders for information. If OPLAN or OPORD maritime forces inputs describe a branch or sequel to the current plan,
they are distributed externally to the JFC for approval and to the Service, functional component commanders, and maritime force subordinate commanders for information. Once approved, the JFC provides additional instructions to the maritime forces that are tailored for operations in the near-term. These directives are contained in the appropriate sections of the tasking order.

e. Daily intentions messages are the primary means of directing the maritime operational-level planning and execution, and thus are useful to indicate to other component commanders the amount of progress made toward accomplishing the goals of the direct maritime tasks list and other component commander tasks lists.
APPENDIX A
COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SUPPORT

1. Communications System Support Considerations

a. The JFMCC is responsible for planning and activating all validated joint maritime communications links that are consistent with the overall campaign plan and allow accomplishment of the JFC directives. The ability to exchange information via reliable and secure communications with the JFC, joint force staff, component commanders, and forces is key to the successful integration of the joint maritime operation. Planners must also take into consideration communication requirements when dealing with host nations and international agencies. Compliance with the Department of Defense (DOD) joint technical architecture is the assumed baseline for the JFMCC communications system support architecture.

b. The designation of a JFMCC and selection of a HQ must be made based upon the mission and C2 requirements (at a minimum) imposed by the JFC’s explicit, implied, and potential tasking. Communications system support requirements of the JFMCC generally include:

(1) An accurate and reliable multidimensional (air, land, maritime, and space) common operational picture (COP).

(2) Robust and redundant secure over-the-horizon communications.

(3) Significant wide-band reach back access to theater and national information resources.

(4) A suite of tactical links that connect with organic, theater, and national sensors to create an accurate operational picture.

(5) Provisions for connecting with specific C2 systems of multinational components and nongovernmental agencies.

2. Integrated Communications System Support

a. The JFC has the responsibility for developing the overarching communications plan in concert with input from subordinate and component commands. Based on guidance from the JFC, the JFMCC develops the assigned operations portion of the communications plan. The plan is then provided to the JFC to develop and coordinate employment of forces and to support the overall campaign. Individual Service component commands have the overall responsibility for providing communications system support to their own forces unless otherwise directed.

b. The existing joint theater communications system (TCS) is directed, established, and managed by the JFC. This system provides theater-wide communications system connectivity between all components and elements. The TCS also addresses communications connectivity requirements to
ensure the appropriate interface between Service component forces and C2 that permits timely execution of assigned missions.

c. Tactical communications in the AO are phased in and established as specified in the OPLAN and/or OPORD being supported/executed.

d. Sensors are key elements in the JFC’s communications architecture, with national, theater, and organic component systems all serving as nodes in a joint sensing network. Sensor capability resident in the joint maritime force may be tasked exclusively to support the joint force collection plan, may be dedicated to exclusive use by the JFMCC or may be netted so that it partially serves both levels as the operational environment requires. Sensor tasking procedures and allocation of collection products should be negotiated early in the planning process and clearly defined in supporting plans and tactical procedures, and must also be able to adapt quickly to changing requirements. JFMCC access to theater and national sensor mission products may enhance the situational awareness, targeting, and operational assessment capabilities of the maritime force depending on the persistence, accuracy, and fusion standard for the data they provide.

3. Role of the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Communications System Directorate

a. The JFMCC J-6 provides communications system functional expertise to the JFMCC. The J-6 staff’s role is to focus on key communications issues that can have an adverse effect on the JFMCC portion of the campaign. Routine communications system management is the responsibility of the JFC and the subordinate component commands.

b. Communications system hardware is normally a Service component responsibility. However, the JFMCC designates specific JFMCC force communications functions on an exception basis. Only communications issues affecting the conduct of the operational mission are of concern to the JFMCC J-6.

c. Guidance to supporting commanders is provided in formal SOPs and operation tasks (OPTASKs). Specific JFMCC J-6 staff responsibilities are provided in Appendix E, “Joint Force Maritime Component Commander’s Staff.”
1. Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Considerations

The JFC’s staff develops an overall collection strategy and posture for the execution of the ISR mission. The JFMCC’s plan includes assets to satisfy joint maritime operations requirements and information collection.

2. Role of Intelligence Support Within the Joint Force Maritime Component Commander’s Staff

a. Like the JFC, JFMCC is both a broker of intelligence support for those in subordinate commands as well as the executive agent for intelligence support tasks that may be required by the JFMCC maritime CONOPS or directed by higher authority. The JFMCC has primary responsibility for coordinating maritime intelligence efforts. Based on JFC guidance, the JFMCC develops intelligence and reconnaissance plans for component operations and provides feedback to the JFC on maritime-related issues affecting joint operations. The JFMCC defines intelligence responsibilities and prioritized maritime-related intelligence requirements of tactical forces. Finally, the JFMCC provides representation for the maritime component at the JFC’s joint targeting coordination boards.

b. The JFMCC and the J-2 staff must understand the intelligence requirements of the JFC, other component commanders (e.g., JFACC, JFLCC) and subordinate JFMCC commands so they can focus on the timely integration and synchronization of relevant all-source intelligence into JFMCC operations. The overall objective is to provide the JFMCC with an accurate, timely, and relevant knowledge about the threat and the surrounding environment. Specific JFMCC J-2 staff responsibilities are provided in Appendix E, “Joint Force Maritime Component Commander’s Staff.”

3. The Joint Force Maritime Component Commander’s Intelligence Directorate and Staff Considerations

a. Size and Composition. The size and composition of the JFMCC J-2 staff are dependent upon the JFMCC organization and scope of the operation. Typical joint intelligence functions will include planning and direction, collection management, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback of intelligence. Normally, the JFMCC needs access to national, theater, and tactical intelligence systems/data. The JFMCC also requires:

   (1) Core analysis capability.

   (2) Ability to provide indications and warnings.

   (3) ISR collection management skills.
(4) Targeting capability.

(5) Systems and administrative support.

b. **Augmentation of Staff.** When a Service component commander is activated as a JFMCC, the core intelligence staff normally becomes responsible for operational-level intelligence matters. Because such responsibility can be a significant expansion of the scope and depth normally executed, augmentation of the JFMCC J-2 staff will likely be required. A notional JFMCC J-2 organization consists of an intelligence watch, intelligence plans, intelligence analysis, collections, cryptology, counterintelligence (CI), and intelligence systems cells.

(1) Augmentation requirements are determined by the nature of the contingency, specific skills required to execute the mission, and the depth of intelligence capability in the existing staff. The JFMCC J-2 organization normally mirrors the JFC core J-2 and/or JIC organizations.

(2) The following skilled personnel and skill sets should be considered when there is a need to augment the JFMCC J-2 staff:

(a) Targeting SMEs.
(b) Special security administrators.
(c) Cryptologic resource coordinator and signals intelligence analysts.
(d) Collection management personnel.
(e) Intelligence analysts.
(f) Imagery exploitation analysts.
(g) Geospatial information analysts.
(h) Intelligence LNOs (representing each component Service).
(i) Production and dissemination personnel as required (coalition).
(j) Systems administrators to assist with component and coalition support.
(k) Human intelligence (HUMINT)/CI coordination.
(l) Unmanned vehicles support personnel for unmanned aerial vehicles, surface unmanned vehicles, underwater unmanned vehicles, and other intelligence collection platform operators/interpreters.
(3) The following organizational resources should be considered when there is a need to augment the JFMCC intelligence directorate staff:

(a) National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). These nationally sourced teams are composed of intelligence and communications experts from the Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, or any combination of those agencies. Requests for NIST augmentation should be considered early in planning and coordinated with the JFC.

(b) Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE). Combatant commanders have theater JICs who are focused on geographic or functional responsibilities. A subordinate joint force, when established, also normally forms a JISE to be the focus for intelligence in support of the JFC, joint staff and components. When a JISE is required, personnel augmentation and communications equipment and procedures can be tailored and deployed to fit the operating environment. The JISE normally assists with collection management, analysis, and dissemination. Some theaters have provisions to augment the JFMCC J-2 with JISE-like support. Specific requests for JISE augmentation should be coordinated with the joint force intelligence directorate.

(c) Joint Force Intelligence Directorate Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Staff Element (J-2X). During joint operations, CI and HUMINT both complement each other and work together to provide intelligence and FP. To help ensure that these staff elements are in a position to accomplish the necessary goals, the JFC normally establishes a J-2X staff element. The J-2X staff element manages, coordinates and deconflicts those activities to include coordinating force CI and protection activities and HUMINT operations.

c. **Coordination with the JFC.** The JFMCC’s J-2 staff is required to chair, co-chair, or participate in JFC-sponsored coordination boards and conferences. Some of the more significant boards include:

1. Joint captured material exploitation center.
2. Joint reconnaissance committee.
3. Joint planning group.
5. Joint targeting coordination board.
1. General

Movement and maneuver of maritime forces, when combined with the element of surprise, provide a significant advantage over adversaries and allow the commander to rapidly concentrate forces where necessary. They are also key attributes upon which the JFMCC CONOPS is built, applying directly to the key maritime areas such as control of the sea and maritime AO, power projection from sea to land, deterrence, strategic sealift, forward maritime presence, and other specified and implied tasks as assigned.

a. The JFMCC plans, controls, and coordinates operational level movement and maneuver to gain a positional advantage over the adversary. The objective for operational maneuver is usually focused on an adversary’s COG.

b. A prime attribute of maritime forward presence is the ability to, on short notice and with no host-nation notification or approval, conduct a show of force in an area of increased tension or a show of support to friends and allies. While these are typically peacetime operations conducted by a Service component commander, a JFMCC can conduct them by using maneuver and movement.

*The joint force commander tasks the joint force maritime component commander concerning employment of maritime operations.*
c. Maneuver and movement of maritime forces are integral aspects of joint operations. Examples of maneuver and movement include undersea warfare (USW), strategic sealift, movements of other military forces, convoy operations, and amphibious operations. During maritime operations, the use of information, initiative, and decisive force is applied through maneuver to dominate specific regions of the environment, in all dimensions, at the chosen time and place. Maintaining awareness in the transition from the open ocean to littoral areas is key to the continuing conduct of maneuver on and from the sea, allowing the JFMCC to focus on the adversary’s COG.

d. Whether at sea or from the sea, maneuver can guide application of power projection in support of the land battle. The concepts for maneuver are articulated in JFC and JFMCC tasking documents, and include timing, sequencing, method, and location of entry into the assigned AO.

e. Maritime interception operations, which restrict a vessel’s ability to move and maneuver, isolates a vessel of interest from outside support, enhances free use of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) for friendly operations, assures law and sanction enforcement, and enforces and provides security for maritime operations.

2. Key Considerations

a. The notional JFMCC staff organization discussed in Appendix E, “Joint Force Maritime Component Commander’s Staff,” provides for the integration of staff from the appropriate Services into the JFMCC staff. It is essential that staffs from each Service participate in the planning process for all operational level movement and maneuver to ensure that all Service-specific capabilities are considered. A key to maximizing capabilities of the JFMCC force is in understanding the requirements of each assigned command. One example of requirements is a joint amphibious operation where the commander of the landing force (e.g., Marine expeditionary unit, Marine expeditionary brigade, or Marine expeditionary force) requires a sufficient AO or amphibious objective area to effectively employ his aviation combat element, requiring coordination with the JFACC, the airspace control authority (ACA), and area air defense commander (AADC), with careful consideration of fire support coordinating measures and boundaries. The inherent mobility of JFMCC units must also be preserved in deconfliction plans worked out between components.

Refer to JP 3-02, Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations, for more information.

b. Operational and tactical level maneuver and movement of maritime forces, both significant counter-targeting measures, are integral in defense planning considerations such as JFMCC support to, or execution of, assigned ACA or AADC responsibilities. As described in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, maneuver must be synchronized with fires and interdiction. Such synchronization provides one of the most dynamic tools available to the JFC.

c. Coordination of waterspace is a requirement unique to the joint maritime component. The JFMCC will coordinate the operations of forces/capabilities in order to prevent mutual interference between maritime elements as well as with commercial shipping, multinational
forces, and other units. Specifically for submarine operations, JFMCC will liaise with the theater submarine operating authority for the establishment of:

(1) Waterspace management (WSM) procedures relative to use of friendly antisubmarine weapons.

(2) Prevention of mutual interference guidance to prevent submerged collisions between friendly submarines, between submarines and friendly surface ship towed bodies and arrays, and between submarines and any other hazards to submerged navigation (e.g., explosive detonations, weapon jettison areas, research submersible operations, oil drilling).

d. The JFMCC will provide necessary information to the JFC and other component commanders, specifically JFACC, to prevent inadvertent engagement of friendly forces and physical interference among maritime forces.

e. The JFC normally tasks the JFMCC to make recommendations concerning the employment of forces for maritime operations within the JFMCC’s AO. This includes:

(1) Organizing for combat.

(2) Developing a JFMCC force scheme of maneuver and a fire support plan to support the JFC’s campaign plan.

(3) Identifying interdiction targets or objectives within the JFMCC’s AO.

(4) Establishing priorities of effort.

(5) Coordinating, integrating, and synchronizing operational reconnaissance.

(6) Coordinating/planning operational fires that impact maneuver.

(7) Integrating multinational forces in maritime operations.
1. **General**

   a. This appendix provides information regarding JFMCC fires, staff organization, and the execution and assessment of fires at the operational level.

   b. Operational fires accomplish specific missions and create conditions for success in the AO. Such operations can focus on accomplishing JFMCC objectives or serve as support to other components. In addition to providing fires, the JFMCC must also prepare to direct a multidimensional fires operation using assigned forces/capabilities.

2. **Maritime Fires Mission**

   Maritime fires consist of strike and fire support. The extended range, speed, and versatility of maritime forces and the associated fires capabilities they provide, combine to make strike fires the salient operational capability of JFMCC forces. With assets that include fires-capable units, the JFMCC is a significant fires provider for various operations of the JFC campaign.

   a. **Types of Fires.** Fires from maritime platforms can produce a full range of effects and are a critical component of maritime power and defense projection from sea-to-land missions. Examples of maritime missions employing fires at targets ashore or over land include interdiction, close air support, suppression of enemy air defenses, counterair (offensive and defensive), and naval surface fire support (direct and general).

   b. **Shaping the AO.** The use of fires is one of the principal means of shaping the JFMCC AO. IO, employed to affect adversary information and information systems, are also integral to this process. The JFMCC’s interests are those theater-wide adversary forces, functions, facilities, and operations that impact JFMCC plans and operations. As a significant strike and fire support provider, the JFMCC works closely with the JFC and component commanders to coordinate fires for maximum operational effect.

   c. **Interdiction.** Joint interdiction operations are a key focus for JFMCC fires. Fires from maritime assets may be major active elements of interdiction. The key attributes in the JFC’s joint interdiction operations are the flexibility, maneuverability and speed of JFMCC fires assets and freedom from host nation permissions.

3. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Fires Assets**

   a. Concentrated fires, even from dispersed JFMCC forces, are possible because of the maneuverability of JFMCC forces and the extended range of their fires.

   b. JFMCC resources for fires encompass forces/capabilities assigned by the JFC and may include:
(1) Sea- or shore-based aircraft including fixed- or rotary-wing assigned to theater naval forces, Marine air-ground task force, or other aircraft made available for tasking.

(2) Armed and attack helicopters.

(3) Surface- and subsurface-launched cruise missiles and torpedoes.

(4) Surface gunnery, including naval surface fire support (NSFS).

(5) Surface-, subsurface- and air-launched mines.

(6) Air, land, maritime, and special operations forces.

(7) Unmanned vehicles.

4. Fires Synchronization and Coordination

a. The JFMCC must synchronize and coordinate fires in support of the JFC’s objectives. Because of the highly specialized nature of some assigned operations, maritime fires require a high degree of coordination between component and subordinate commanders. And, as discussed in Appendix C, “Movement and Maneuver,” fires need to be synchronized with maneuver and interdiction.

b. The JFMCC synchronizes operational fires and C2 by the active participation of the JFMCC strike, NSFS cell, supporting arms coordination center, and landing force fire support planners, where available, and as required.

See JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for additional information.

c. **JFMCC Targeting Functions.** The targeting functions and responsibilities of the JFMCC are to:

(1) Advise on application of operational fires.

(2) Identify fires requirements from other components.

(3) Provide apportionment recommendations.

(4) Recommend JFMCC assets for JFC allocation.

(5) Advise on fires asset distribution (priority) of JFMCC forces.

(6) Develop JFMCC priorities, timing, and effects for interdiction within the JFMCC AO.
(7) Develop JFMCC targeting guidance and priorities.

(8) Develop a prioritized target nomination list for submission to the JFC.

(9) Integrate/deconflict fires activity with the JFC and other component commanders or forces.

(10) Plan, coordinate, and supervise the execution of JFMCC deep supporting fire operations.

(11) Coordinate with designated airspace control authorities for all planned airspace requirements.

(12) Staff and man the JFMCC time-sensitive strike branch in the assigned operations cell.

d. Successful application and synchronization of fires requires rigorous practice prior to commencement of operations with as many actual forces as possible.

5. Air Tasking Order/Airspace Control Order

The air tasking order (ATO) delineates tasked sorties allocated by the JFACC after the JFC’s air apportionment decision in support of the JFC’s campaign. While intended to be a methodically planned document, operations frequently force dynamic changes which may be received only a few hours before launch. The ATO codifies tasked sorties, capabilities and/or forces, assigned targets and specific missions to components, subordinate units, and tactical C2 agencies. The airspace control order provides airspace coordination measures to deconflict the employment of air assets throughout the joint force operational area. It is published either as part of the ATO or as a separate document and provides the details of approved requests for airspace control measures.

See JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, JP 3-52, Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone, and Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-56.1, Naval Air Operations Center Organization and Processes, for additional details.

6. Combat Assessment

CA addresses the effectiveness of overall joint targeting in light of the JFC’s objectives, guidance and intent. CA gives both the JFMCC and the JFC a broad perspective on the total effects of joint targeting against the adversary at both the operational and strategic levels. Pre- and post-mission reconnaissance are required as part of CA. For example, the product of the CA effort directly impacts the survivability of air assets, by avoiding unnecessary restrikes on targets, hitting key targets again which were not destroyed, and freeing assets to take on additional tasking.
APPENDIX E
JOINT FORCE MARITIME COMPONENT COMMANDER’S STAFF

“A joint staff should be established for commands comprised of more than one Service. The staff of the commander of a combatant command, subordinate unified command, joint task force, or subordinated functional component (when a functional component command will employ forces from more than one Service) must be composed of Service members that comprise significant elements of the joint force. Positions on the staff should be divided so that Service representation and influence generally reflect the Service composition.”

JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)

1. General

   a. The JFMCC organizes staff and forces to meet JFC and higher authority objectives. The JFMCC organization must be capable of meeting mission requirements to ensure success in a complex joint and multinational environment. Maritime force representation, component commander liaison, and C2 connectivity must all be robust.

   Specific C2 technical issues are presented in Appendix A, “Communications System Support,” and Appendix D, “Fire Support.”

   b. The JFMCC organizes his staff in a manner that best supports achievement of the JFC’s objectives. Since formation of a new HQ for every mission is both time-consuming and inefficient, the staff organization is usually based upon an existing command element. The JFMCC’s staff may need to be augmented with additional personnel. Ideally, the JFMCC and the deputy will come from different Services or, at a minimum, from different warfare specialties and key JFMCC staff positions should be filled by other Service component personnel, as appropriate. This concept should be replicated throughout the staff leadership to ensure an understanding of the distinct capabilities of each JFMCC Service component and to optimize employment of the forces. Figure E-1 is a depiction of one option for a notional JFMCC staff organization. While the staff responsibilities and J-code assignments noted are in accordance with JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), the JFMCC also has the option to organize the staff and forces as necessary to meet JFC objectives.


2. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Staff Responsibilities

   Each staff section must be organized, manned, and equipped to accommodate national and allied/coalition operations, if required. Figure E-1 includes J-codes for ease of clarification.

   a. Personnel. Most personnel and administrative actions are handled through the joint force manpower and personnel directorate (J-1) down to the Service component level. The JFC
and JFMCC are normally responsible for monitoring current and projected unit strengths through the daily personnel status, casualty reports, and critical reports of personnel shortages. The JFC and JFMCC will analyze these reports and determine their effects on assigned operations. Although the JFMCC J-1 is not in the formal personnel reporting chain, a critical function of J-1 is to provide all necessary order writing and other administrative support for JFMCC LNOs. This requires close coordination with the operations directorate (J-3) and plans directorate (J-5) to ensure that both the core JFMCC staff and the supplemental staff are assembled without delay and with all necessary support to begin work quickly.

Refer to JP 1-0, Personnel Support to Joint Operations, or NWP 5-02, Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Task Force (JTF) Liaison Operations, for additional details.

**NOTE:** Figure E-1 depicts a notional staff; it is not intended to be prescriptive. The actual JFMCC staff organization may require some staff members to have dual responsibilities. Additionally, the location of certain sections and the specific special assistant staff will often vary, depending on the organization of the core staff and the mission at hand.
b. **Intelligence.** The primary role of J-2 is to provide intelligence support to the JFMCC. The following intelligence-related actions are the responsibility of the J-2 staff:

(1) Maintain an intelligence watch.

(a) Coordinate and maintain technical control over specialty multidiscipline intelligence and CI support to the commander and subordinate elements.

(b) Establish an all-source intelligence cell in, or adjacent to, the joint operations center. The all-source cell is supported, as required, by available multinational intelligence assets that remain under national control.

(c) Complete an initial intelligence estimate and maintain updates as required by the operational situation.

(d) Establish and maintain intelligence collection, and contact of interest (COI), and critical contact of interest (CCOI) management systems.

(e) Complete all-source analysis and dissemination.

(f) Establish and maintain enemy order of battle and databases to support operations and planning.

(g) Act as central point of contact for reports from subordinate staffs.

(h) Provide higher HQ JIC with a prioritized list of and track outstanding COIs/CCOIs. Ensure answers are directed correctly when received from supporting agencies.

(i) Assign and task intelligence resources within forces made available.

(j) Establish a targeting cell within the all-source cell, as necessary, to support the component deep operations cell.

(k) Assist other staff in developing and refining essential elements of friendly information.

(l) Plan and coordinate appropriate CI and necessary antiterrorism/FP intelligence operations.

(m) Develop Annex B (Intelligence) to the JFMCC forces OPORDs.

(n) Provide regular intelligence summaries and reports, as required, to the following:
1. Higher HQ (JFC).

2. Multinational force national HQ and other addressees designated by the JFC (if a multinational operation).

3. Adjacent and subordinate units.

4. Any subordinate specialty unit.

(2) Maintain overall security of assigned intelligence spaces.

(3) Maintain digital topographic data to support the COP and provide analysis in support of the joint operation planning process.

(4) Examples (not all inclusive) of JFMCC J-2 billets in addition to the directorate may include a targeteer, targeting support, air COP, land COP, battle damage assessment (BDA), communication intelligence, electronic intelligence, cryptographic, ISR, and database personnel.

Refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, for additional details.

c. Operations. The J-3 is responsible for the coordination, integration, and synchronization of all current operations. The J-3 staff assists the commander in the discharge of assigned responsibilities for the direction and control of operations, beginning with planning and following through until specific operations are completed. The flexibility and range of modern forces require close coordination and integration for effective unity of effort. The J-3 staff’s responsibilities include, but are not limited to, the following tasks:

(1) Organizing the operational aspects of the HQ.

(2) Recommending ROE.

(3) Manning and supporting the OPS.

(4) Collecting and analyzing joint/Service feedback and/or lessons learned.

(5) Planning for and coordinating operational maneuver.

(6) Coordinating civil-military operations.

(7) Coordinating maritime C2.

(8) Coordinating foreign humanitarian assistance.

(9) Coordinating maritime mine warfare operations (offensive and defensive).
(10) Maintaining liaison with other staffs, agencies, and JFC counterparts to maintain awareness regarding operations.

(11) Providing METOC and space operations support, products, and services to the JFMCC.

(12) Developing short-term joint plans and exercising staff supervision or cognizance over the conduct of the following:

(a) Operational maritime operations.

(b) Rear area protection and security.

(c) C2. (This function requires close coordination with the J-6.)

(d) IO. (This function requires close coordination with civil affairs and public affairs.)

(e) Measures to prevent friendly force or neutral unit engagements.

(f) Combat search and rescue to include the establishment of the component rescue coordination center if that responsibility is not assigned to another component or formed by the JFC.

(g) Reconnaissance.

(h) Mine operations.

(13) Examples (not all inclusive) of JFMCC J-3 billets in addition to the directorate may include a deputy operations director, warfare (air, surface, subsurface, strike, mine, sea combat commander) specialists, METOC, IO, fire support, TST, ISR, and battle watch personnel.

d. Logistics. The logistics directorate (J-4) formulates and implements logistic plans within the assigned operational area for forces assigned or attached to the JFMCC force. The JFMCC J-4 oversees the implementation of logistic plans by monitoring the logistic requirements of the JFMCC components. The JFMCC J-4 also performs an analysis for logistic impacts on operations. The J-4 staff’s responsibilities include the following tasks:

(1) Monitoring and coordinating the logistic functions and requirements for maritime operations.

(2) Advising the JFMCC concerning logistic matters affecting joint, combined, and coalition support to maritime operations.
(3) Preparing and/or assisting the Service components with the preparation of logistic support for the assigned operational area and the logistic annexes of JFMCC OPLANs and OPORDs.

(4) Recommending priorities to the JFMCC, within the guidelines established by the JFC, for the allocation of logistic resources among assigned forces in the operational area.

(5) Participating in joint/multinational logistic boards and centers that directly impact on assigned operations.

(6) Maintaining liaison with the other JFMCC staff, agencies and JFC counterparts to stay current with logistic, operational, and intelligence issues.

(7) Planning, providing, and maintaining levels of personnel, materiel, and consumables needed to sustain the planned levels of combat activity for the estimated duration and at the desired level of intensity with close coordination with the J-3 and J-5.

(8) Integrating existing information technologies, logistic automated information systems, and joint decision support and visualization tools, which support the JFMCC logistics common operating picture with close coordination with the J-6.

Refer to Appendix F, “Logistics,” for more details.

e. Planning. The J-5 is responsible for the development of long-range plans and:

(1) Supports theater OPLAN and concept plan development.

(2) Supports employment planning, delineating application of force/forces to attain specified military objectives.

(3) Conducts exercise planning in coordination with the exercises and training directorate (J-7/JED).

(4) Mans and supports the maritime planning center.

(5) Examples (not all inclusive) of additional JFMCC J-5 billets; future plans deputy directorate, current plans deputy directorate, warfare specialists (air, surface, subsurface, strike, mine, and sea combat commander) amphibious, logistics, IO, fire support, TST, ISR, liaison officers, deconfliction, and other support personnel.

f. Communications System Support. The J-6 provides all types of communications system connectivity among all components and major subordinate elements. The following actions are the responsibility of the communications system directorate:
(1) Advising the JFMCC and staff on communications matters that have or potentially may have an impact on operations.

(2) Establishing the JFMCC system control center:

(a) To provide operational and tactical level network operational direction to subordinate naval forces.

(b) To provide prioritization of activation, restoration, and retrograde of JFMCC transport, networks, and systems.

(c) To provide and prioritize JFMCC communications requirements requiring external support to higher authority:

1. Communications forces and equipment using Joint Staff RFF format.

2. Satellite communications, both military and commercial.


4. Gateway accesses.

5. Circuit activations.

(3) Preparing JFMCC communications plans, annexes, and operating instructions required for JFMCC operations by (typically) addressing:

(a) Communications support principles and CONOPS that parallel the operational phases.

(b) Transport architectures:

1. Satellite (both military and commercial) support and architectures that (typically) includes Defense Satellite Communications System, ground mobile forces, Iridium, Challenge Athena, international maritime satellite, ultrahigh frequency, and extremely high frequency.

2. Terrestrial commercial transport support and architecture.

3. Radio requirements by publishing a communications-electronics operating instruction.

(c) Information assurance procedures:

1. Communications security (COMSEC).
a. COMSEC call out message.

b. Intertheather COMSEC package.

c. COMSEC violations.

d. COMSEC requests.

e. COMSEC management principles.

2. Computer network defense.

a. Defense architecture.

b. Intrusion reporting process.

c. Information security process.

d. Information assurance vulnerability alert process.

e. COMSEC monitoring principles and training.

(d) Network architectures:

1. Data network services.

a. SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network.

b. Non-secure Internet Protocol Router Network.

c. Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).

d. Officer in tactical command information exchange system/tactical data information exchange system.

e. Tactical digital information links/links (normally OPTASK COP) in coordination with J-3.

2. Voice network services.

a. Radio.

b. Defense Switched Network (Plain Old Telephone Service).

d. Commercial.

3. Video network services.
   b. Video Information Exchange System.
   c. JWICS.

4. System architectures and configurations.
   a. Global Command and Control System.
   b. Maritime COP.

5. Applications.
   a. Collaboration.

   g. Exercises and Training. The J-7/JED can be established for exercise and training support of assigned forces. The J-7/JED is responsible for the development of long-range training plans and exercises to include the following:

   (1) Advising the JFMCC and staff on exercise and training matters.

   (2) Developing exercise and training plans in support of joint force development.

   (3) Assessing training and exercise requirements to support assigned forces.

   (4) Providing exercise and training recommendations to JFC regarding joint and multinational force interoperability.

   (5) Coordinating the development of joint related training requirements, including multinational training, within assigned forces.

   (6) Assessing training and exercise requirements to support joint forces.

   (7) Conducting exercise training planning in coordination with J-5.

   (8) Ensuring official records are maintained in accordance with the appropriate Service Records Disposition Schedule. Contact supporting records managers as required.
h. **Public Affairs.** Public affairs personnel advise the JFMCC and staff on public affairs issues including:

1. Advising the JFMCC and staff on public affairs matters.
2. Developing appropriate strategies relative to public affairs issues.
3. Coordinating with JFC and other component staffs, including media organizations, regarding JFMCC operations.
4. Preparing for and supporting embedded media across all aspects of operations (planning through execution).
1. General

As defined in JP 4-0, *Logistic Support of Joint Operations*, the following are the six functions of logistics: supply, maintenance, health services, transportation, other services, and general engineering. Each Service is responsible for the logistic support of its own forces, except when it is otherwise provided for by agreements with national agencies or allies or by common or cross-servicing agreements or directives.

2. Directive Authority for Logistics

   a. CCDRs exercise directive authority for logistics and may delegate this authority for a common support capability. The CCDR may delegate directive authority for as many common support capabilities to a subordinate JFC as required to accomplish the subordinate JFC’s assigned mission. In joint operations the geographic CCDR, through the functional/Service components and DOD agencies (primarily Defense Logistics Agency), ensures the effective and efficient execution of logistics and personnel services, consistent with the overall campaign plan. A CCDR’s exercise of directive authority for logistics includes the authority to issue such directives to subordinate commanders (including peacetime measures) as are necessary to ensure:

      (1) Execution of approved OPLANs.
      (2) Effectiveness and economy of operations.
      (3) Prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping functions among the Service component commands.
      (4) Integration by logistic personnel of existing information technologies, logistic automated information systems, and joint decision support and visualization tools.

    b. A CCDR’s directive authority for logistics does not:

      (1) Discontinue Service responsibility for logistic support.
      (2) Discourage coordination by consultation and agreement.
      (3) Disrupt effective procedures or efficient use of facilities or organization.

    c. Under crisis action, wartime conditions, or where critical situations make diversion of the normal logistic process necessary, the logistic authority of CCDRs enables them to use all facilities and supplies of all forces assigned and/or attached to their commands as necessary for the accomplishment of their missions.
3. Common-User Logistics

a. The JFC has the responsibility to develop the overarching campaign plan in concert with the CCDR’s guidance and with input from the Service component commands, functional component commands, and DOD agencies. In concert with the JFC planning effort, the JFMCC must develop the assigned operations portion of the campaign plan, which is provided to the JFC to assist in developing and coordinating deployment/employment of forces and support of the overall campaign plan. Individual Service component commands have overall responsibility for providing logistic support to their own forces unless otherwise directed.

See JP 4-07, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Common-User Logistics During Joint Operations, for additional details.

b. Service component forces are often required to provide significant levels of JOA-wide common-user logistics (CUL) support to other Service components, multinational partners, and other organizations (such as other governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations). For example, Navy JOA-wide CUL support requirements are normally provided by the parent fleet commanders (i.e., Commander, US Fleet Forces Command and Commander, US Pacific Fleet) from which the unit deploys. However, these requirements are carried out under the auspices of a US Navy component commander or a numbered fleet commander and are not a JFMCC responsibility. US Marine Corps forces (MARFOR) may provide limited CUL support to other Service component forces, based on the plan.

c. In some cases, the JFMCC may direct selected CUL support within the assigned operational area; however, authority to direct logistics is not resident in the JFMCC command authority. (See JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States) When required, JFMCC CUL authority can be derived from one of two sources: CCDR delegation of specific maritime-operation-focused CUL authority or the use of short-term inter-Service support agreements between the Service components.

d. With this limited CUL authority, the JFMCC can direct CUL support to be provided between Service component units. This operations-focused CUL can include temporary task organization or the development of support relationships of selected JFMCC logistic units. The JFMCC logistic staff must ensure that JFMCC-directed CUL requirements do not conflict or interfere with CCDR-directed JOA-wide CUL requirements.

NOTE: Operations-focused CUL support is separate and distinct from JOA-wide CUL requirements.

4. Logistic Planning

a. The following provides a nonexhaustive checklist of JFMCC logistic planning considerations:

(1) Logistic plans should be integrated with CCDR annexes as well as JFC, Service component, and multinational partner logistic plans.
(2) Logistic personnel must be involved early in the staff planning and undertake an analysis of the logistic support capabilities of each of the COAs being considered.

(3) CUL requirements must be properly planned and coordinated with JFC-directed CUL requirements.

(4) Logistic personnel will determine the location and accessibility of key supply points.

b. The JFMCC logistic planners will identify those issues not already identified by the JFC logistic reports that are to the assigned operations.

5. Boards and Centers

a. JFMCC Participation on Logistic Boards and Centers. The JFMCC is not routinely the lead for JFC-level logistic boards and centers. The JFMCC logistic directorate normally participates on those selected CCDR/subordinate JFC boards and centers of critical importance to the success of the maritime portion of the campaign. The joint transportation board and the joint movement center, both of which are transportation-related, may have significant impact on the maritime portion of the joint campaign and are examples of higher-level logistic boards on which the JFMCC must participate. Among other functions, the JFMCC staff must ensure logistic movements and plans minimize the maneuvers required and the time required to support resupply of forces at sea. Other boards and centers of significant importance to the JFMCC include the joint material priorities and allocation board and the joint petroleum office. To ensure proper focus, JFMCC participation on these boards must be treated as separate and distinct from the Service component participation on those same boards and centers (see Figure F-1).

b. JFMCC Lead on Logistic Boards and Centers. The JFMCC does not normally convene separate joint logistic boards and centers except when needed to coordinate critical CUL support within the JFMCC AO. Possible JFMCC-established boards and centers may include a movement center and materials priorities allocation board.

(1) A JFMCC-level joint movement center is built on the lead Service movement control agency and will include staff members from the other Services. The movement center will also:

(a) Facilitate coordination and prioritization of movement within the JFMCC AO.

(b) Be subordinate to the JFC joint movement center.

(c) Ensure that JFMCC movement requirements do not conflict with JFC-directed movements.
Appendix F

Figure F-1. Possible Joint Logistic Boards and Centers

(2) A JFMCC materials priorities allocation board performs similar functions for critical supply items. The JFMCC can combine the two centers/boards into one distribution management center. The JFMCC, in any case, must ensure that the capability exists to adequately control movement and cross-level critical logistic resources.

6. Functions of the Logistic Center

   a. The JFMCC logistic center provides critical functional expertise to the commander in the areas of logistics. Logistic center primary staff officers focus on key logistic issues that may have an adverse effect on the maritime portion of the joint campaign.

   b. In general, the JFMCC logistic center manages by exception only. Routine administrative, personnel, and logistic management is the responsibility of the JFC and subordinate Service component commands.
The joint force maritime component commander must ensure that the capability exists to adequately control movement and cross-level critical logistic resources.
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1. **Introduction**

   a. This appendix provides a notional model for the organization and associated processes through which the JFMCC may command and control the maritime component of a joint force. The JFMCC staff organization uses a common planning process to support high level operational planning of the JFC, the lower level maritime specific operational planning at the JFMCC level, and subordinate commander tactical planning. The JFC staff uses a synchronization process to ensure coordination between component commanders. Similarly, the JFMCC staff uses a synchronization process to ensure coordination between subordinates. All levels of command have processes for analysis and assessment when execution occurs.

   b. Collaboration is critical to the integration of planning, synchronization, and execution processes and allows multiple echelons of C2 to work together. Analysis and feedback are additional key elements that allow elements of the joint organizations and processes to respond to emerging events on the battlefield. The products associated with the processes allow modification of the desired outcome in response to emergent battlefield events, or alteration of plans to adapt to opportunities (see Figure G-1).

2. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Organization**

   a. The JFMCC staff is organized to support the commander by:

      (1) Integrating planning and assessment efforts with higher HQ, other component commanders, and the JFMCC’s subordinate maritime commanders across the maritime force.

      (2) Synchronizing warfighting functions and mission areas throughout the maritime force.

      (3) Coordinating maritime response to emergent battlefield events.

   b. The JFMCC staff is divided into organizational elements called centers and cells that are collectively called the maritime operations center (MOC) (refer to Figure G-2). Centers are manned 24 hours a day during the planning and execution of maritime operations. Cells meet as required for specific tasks. There are six centers dedicated to major maritime functions: knowledge management, intelligence and analysis, operations, logistic coordination, future planning, and support. These centers to some degree correspond to (and are typically sourced by) traditional N-codes or G-codes of a Service component commander’s staff, but with more functional interrelationships. In addition, two centers, (knowledge management and support) perform necessary supporting functions relevant to all centers such as administration, information technology, communications, personnel, etc.
(1) The knowledge management center (KMC) establishes processes and business rules for information management within the JFMCC staff. This organizational innovation recognizes the increasing importance of high quality, timely information to the effectiveness of an organization’s C2. Central to the integration of supporting cells is an information management organization that matches information needs to SMEs throughout the JFMCC organization. Both maritime task plan (MTP) and maritime support request (MSR) databases are managed centrally by the KMC. The KMC is organized into four cells: information management, MSR management, MTP management, and information technology/communications.
(2) The maritime intelligence and analysis center (MIAC) evaluates the planning and execution of maritime operations and coordinates with subordinate staffs. It supports the assessment of the progress of each phase toward accomplishment of the JFMCC’s objectives and evaluates accomplishment of tasks based on the approved measures of effectiveness and performance for each task and objective. It also is the JFC’s source for adversary maritime force intelligence, target development, and BDA. This combination of analysis, assessment, and intelligence responsibilities requires the MIAC be staffed with a range of warfighters, analysts, and intelligence specialists. The MIAC has three main cells: intelligence plans and assessment,
intelligence support, and intelligence operations. Intelligence specialists are also assigned as needed to other cells throughout the organization, such as the current operations and indications and warnings cell and for time-sensitive targeting in the fires cell within the OPS. While it has the most interaction with the OPS, it also has vital relationships with future plans center (FPC), maritime support center (MSC), the operations assessment cell, the information operations cell, and the antiterrorism and force protection cell.

(3) The OPS is the primary agent for JFMCC operational level coordination, synchronization, and guidance of near-term planning and execution. The OPS resolves resource allocation conflicts with other components and tactical commanders during planning and once the plan has transitioned to execution. It contains two major cells, the future operations cell (FOC) and the current operations cell. The MOC provides near-term planning integration and synchronization, monitors task execution, and coordinates changes to the MTP requested by subordinates. It also coordinates the management of ISR assets with the appropriate subordinates and the MIAC. The MOC OPS manages the JFMCC maritime COP and facilitates the engagement of TSTs.

(4) The maritime logistics coordination center provides functional expertise to the JFMCC in the areas of logistics in the areas of supply, maintenance, transportation, general engineering, health services, and general services.

(5) The FPC assists the JFMCC in long-range planning and preparation of the JFMCC’s contribution to the JFC’s campaign plan. The FPC provides the core group of planners to the JFC’s JPG and the JFMCC’s maritime planning group (MPG), normally chaired by the plans director or its deputy. The JFMCC MPG also includes representatives from other centers or supporting cells as required. The FPC is responsible for producing the JFMCC’s estimate of supportability and the maritime supporting plan and for ensuring the JFC’s campaign plans are correct with regard to JFMCC capabilities, command relation requirements, and battlespace geometry. The FPC identifies planning situations requiring branch or sequel plans, and may assist FOC in CAP if required.

(6) The MSC provides the expertise needed to carry out supporting functions that cut across the planning, execution, and assessment spectrum. Rather than spread this subject matter expertise throughout the other centers, the MSC allows more efficient information sharing, focused on serving decision makers information requirements. The MSC is organized into the following functional areas: personnel and administrative support, METOC, medical, chaplain, public affairs, staff judge advocate, antiterrorism and force protection, and doctrine, training and lessons learned assessment.

3. Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Planning

a. The JFMCC uses a planning process that integrates Navy and Marine Corps planning into a consistent, scalable process. It can be used for all types of planning carried out at all echelons and in any timeframe.
b. The JFMCC is involved in campaign planning, contingency planning, and CAP. The JFMCC planning process interfaces with the joint contingency planning process during the development of supporting plans. Supporting plans are developed once the CCDR’s concept has been approved and a plan has been developed. Maritime supporting plans address the tasks identified for JFMCC forces and define the planned actions of assigned and augmenting forces. The JFMCC planning process interfaces with the CAP process beginning in situation development and throughout the process as JFMCC planners develop new plans, or expand or modify existing plans.

c. The JFMCC planning process is defined below. This JFMCC planning process can be worked at all levels of planning within the maritime planning environment — (i.e., the strategic, operational, and tactical levels).

   (1) **Step 1 — Mission Analysis.** Mission analysis is the first step in planning, and it drives the JFMCC planning process. Its purpose is to review and analyze orders, guidance, and other information provided by higher HQ and to produce a JFMCC mission statement.

   (2) **Step 2 — COA Development.** During COA development, planners use the mission statement approved during mission analysis (which includes the higher HQ commander’s tasking and intent), commander’s intent, and commander’s planning guidance to develop COA(s).

   (3) **Step 3 — COA Analysis.** COA analysis (wargaming) involves a detailed assessment of each COA as it pertains to the adversary and the battlespace. Each friendly COA is wargamed against selected threat COAs. COA analysis assists planners in identifying strengths and weaknesses, associated risks, and asset shortfalls for each friendly COA.

   (4) **Step 4 — COA Comparison and Decision.** In COA comparison, the commander evaluates all friendly COAs against established criteria and against each other. The JFMCC staff and system management center commanders identify their preferred COA and the commander then selects the COA that will best accomplish the mission.

   (5) **Step 5 — Plans/Orders Development.** The staff uses the commander’s COA decision, mission statement, and commander’s intent and guidance to develop orders that direct unit actions.

   (6) **Step 6 — Transition.** Transition is the orderly handover of a plan or order as it is passed to those tasked with execution of the operation. It provides those who will execute the plan or order with the situational awareness and rationale for key decisions necessary to ensure there is a coherent shift from planning to execution.

4. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander Planning Integration**

   a. The process of integrating the planning and execution efforts of the JFMCC includes at a minimum: participating in campaign/JFC planning, developing maritime operational plans, coordinating maritime tactical plans, ensuring operational and tactical synchronization, executing
maritime operations, and providing assessment and feedback to plans and execution. The naval planning process is used within the JFC campaign level, maritime operational level, and individual tactical level. The use of a collaborative information environment (CIE) allows these processes to occur in parallel, making the process far less sequential than the overview above may imply.

b. Preliminary JFC guidance and joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace are the primary inputs needed to start the planning and execution process. The CIE allows JFMCC and subordinate planners to observe and participate in the planning process. The JFMCC assembles operational planning teams, as required, composed of future plans and future operations planners, to transition the campaign plan from the JFC to JFMCC level.

c. The synchronization of tactical level planning takes the resultant tactical plans and ensures they are resourced, coordinated, and objective-oriented. This is also where requirements of other components are provided for in a single integrated MTP. Once execution commences, dynamic replanning occurs based on feedback provided by the various assessment mechanisms. This requires constant reassessment of the campaign plan and the JFC OPORD as required. The control of the execution of the plan in the face of adversary opposition is performed by the battle watch organization. It ensures that emergent issues are resolved quickly and passed to the appropriate planning group or assessment group to provide feedback.
APPENDIX H

ACHIEVING MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS
THROUGH GLOBAL NETWORKING

“The heart of the maritime domain awareness program is accurate information, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of all vessels, cargo, and people extending well beyond our traditional maritime boundaries.”

President George W. Bush, January 20, 2002

1. Overview

a. NSPD-41/HSPD-13 establishes “…US policy, guidelines, and implementation actions to enhance US national security and homeland security by protecting US maritime interests. It directs the coordination of United States Government maritime security programs and initiatives to achieve a comprehensive and cohesive national effort involving appropriate Federal, state, local and private sector entities.”

b. NSPD-41/HSPD-13 directs a coordinated and integrated government-wide effort to enhance the security of the maritime domain through a National Strategy for Maritime Security, and eight supporting plans:

(1) Maritime Domain Awareness.

(2) Global Maritime Intelligence Integration.

(3) Domestic Outreach.

(4) Coordination of International Efforts and International Outreach.

(5) Maritime Operational Threat Response.

(6) Maritime Infrastructure Recovery.

(7) Maritime Transportation System Security.


c. Together, the National Strategy for Maritime Security and its supporting plans represent a comprehensive national effort to promote global economic stability and protect legitimate activities, while preventing hostile or illegal acts within the maritime domain.

d. The maritime domain is a global thoroughfare for the commerce that sustains our national prosperity and is vital to our national security. The maritime domain has relatively few access barriers and provides an expansive pathway to the global commons.
Appendix H

e. Achieving MDA is a key enabler of this active, layered maritime defense in depth. The US must deploy the full range of its operational assets and capabilities to prevent the maritime domain from being used by terrorists, and hostile States to commit acts of terrorism and criminal or other unlawful or hostile acts against the US, its people, economy, property, territory, allies, and friends, while recognizing that maritime security policies are most effective when the strategic importance of international trade, economic cooperation, and the free flow of commerce are considered appropriately.

f. Achieving awareness of the maritime domain is challenging as the vastness of the oceans and seas, the great length of shorelines, and size of port areas provide both concealment and numerous access points to the land. It requires integrating all-source intelligence, law enforcement information, and open-source data and information from public and private sectors, both nationally and internationally.

2. Global Networking the Maritime Domain — The Global Maritime Common Operational Picture

a. The primary method for information sharing, situational awareness, and collaborative planning in the maritime domain is through a global maritime COP. The global maritime COP is developing into a near-real time, dynamically tailorable, network-centric virtual information grid shared by US federal, state, local agencies and international partners with maritime interests and responsibilities providing the means to monitor activities, identify trends, and differentiate anomalies. Global maritime COP data will be accessible to all users within the limits of security, policy, or regulations.

b. Once established, the JFMCC will contribute to the active, layered defense of the US and our interests in a number of vital ways. Key among them is providing input to the global maritime COP concerning matters and events within the assigned operational area. As an element of a global network of joint, Service, and functional commands as well as other designated US and multinational organizations, each JFMCC contributes information from his/her own operational area that enhances awareness for the collective network.

c. By networking maritime regions and resources into a common “global” maritime picture, useful data can be presented in a form that supports a wide range of planning, decision, execution and assessment requirements and support CCDR requirements to achieve an AOR-wide, single integrated COP. The maritime data can range from a global “snapshot” to the detailed information required by the JFMCC and subordinate echelons within their specific operational area (see Figure H-1). For example, the “global” maritime COP could aid in reducing possible seams between JFMCCs when tracking a high interest vessel transiting between adjacent operational areas. This global maritime COP could provide the situational awareness and information for JFMCC to plan early and execute an active, layered defense at the outer boundaries and detect, deter, and defeat (if required) this potential threat as early and distant from US interests as possible.
GLOBAL MARITIME COMMON OPERATIONAL PICTURE

COMBATANT COMMANDERS

Strategic
Operational
Multinational and Interagency

Compilation of a single Global Maritime Common Operational Picture

Global Networking

JFMCC CENT
JFMCC EUR
JFMCC SOUTH (Notional)

Global Networking

COMUSNAVCENT
COMUSNAVEUR
COMUSFLTFORCOM
COMUSNAVSOUTH
COMPACFLT

Global Networking

Numbered Fleet Commanders

JFMCC CENT
JFMCC EUR
JFMCC SOUTH (Notional)

Numbered Fleet Commanders

COMNAVSPECWARCOM

Global Networking

Global Operational (Component)

Operational (Component)

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Figure H-1. Global Maritime Common Operational Picture
3. Maximize Battlespace Awareness to Support Effective Decision Making

“America, in this new century, again faces new threats. Instead of massed armies, we face stateless networks; we face killers who hide in our own cities. We must confront deadly technologies. To inflict great harm on our country, America’s enemies need to be only right once. Our intelligence and law enforcement professionals in our government must be right every single time.”

President George W. Bush, January 17, 2002

As described above, the global maritime COP provides the means to network US federal, state, and local agencies with maritime interests and responsibilities, thereby enhancing MDA and overall battlespace awareness. Enhanced awareness facilitates timely, better-informed decision making. As both a contributor to and user of that network, the JFMCC is able to leverage information provided by other participants to enhance awareness and inform decision making. MDA and battlespace awareness do not direct actions, but enables expeditious, more precise action by the JFMCC and subordinate commanders. Individual JFMCCs will collect, analyze, and disseminate data, information, and intelligence into a “global” maritime COP; and use that information by applying functional and operational knowledge in the context of known and potential threats for their assigned operational area. MDA is an enabler that allows the JFMCCs to make effective decisions and act early against a vast array of maritime threats to the security of the US, its interests, allies, and friends.
APPENDIX J
ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

1. Introduction

a. This appendix provides key definitions, factors, and organization regarding antisubmarine warfare (ASW) at the operational level of war.

b. Control of the maritime domain is typically critical to joint force operations. US joint forces maintain the capability to destroy enemy naval forces, suppress enemy sea commerce, protect vital sea-lanes, and establish maritime superiority in support of a joint or multinational operation. Control of the undersea portion of the operational area is vital to the success of joint operations. A principal threat in the maritime domain comes from enemy submarines. To counter this threat, the JFC will coordinate, and when required, integrate assets from the joint force to conduct ASW during all phases of the joint operation or campaign.

c. Although often viewed as a Navy-only mission, the JFMCC may utilize a variety of joint forces and capabilities (air, land, maritime, space, and special operations) to facilitate or conduct ASW. At the operational level of war, ASW will have joint implications. In particular, given the nature of the operating environment, the size of the area to be covered, and the requirement to find, fix, track, target, and engage enemy submarines, the use of persistent national and joint ISR is one of the essential resources to ASW mission accomplishment. For example, the monitoring, tracking, and engagement of enemy submarines in port or transiting on the ocean surface may be effectively accomplished by non-Navy aircraft, satellites, special forces, or other joint assets.

d. While the JFC is responsible for ASW planning inside the JOA, coordination of ASW plans and activities with commands outside the JOA will be essential and may require close coordination with other government agencies, multinational partners, and host nations.

2. Undersea Warfare and Antisubmarine Warfare

a. USW operations are conducted to establish dominance in the underwater environment, which permits friendly forces to accomplish the full range of potential missions and denies an opposing force the effective use of underwater systems and weapons. It includes offensive and defensive submarine, antisubmarine, and mine warfare operations.

For more information regarding mine warfare operations, see JP 3-15, Barriers, Obstacles, and Mine Warfare for Joint Operations.

b. ASW is operations conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use of submarines. ASW is a subset of USW.
3. Antisubmarine Warfare Planning Considerations

a. ASW missions will be centrally planned, typically under the direction of the JFMCC or a Navy component commander and executed in a decentralized manner in support of the JFC’s concept of operations. ASW is extremely complex, requiring the coordination and integration of multiple platforms and systems in order to mitigate the risks posed by enemy submarines. ASW planning should include consideration of the submarine threat, operational environment, force planning, ISR, communications systems, and command and control.

b. Understanding the Operational Environment. Because it is difficult to detect and track submarines operating underwater, a thorough understanding of the operational environment is a key tenet of success. Only after through analyses of the physical environment and adversary systems will the JFC be able to properly develop the concept of operations.

(1) Physical Environment. The physical characteristics of the maritime domain have a significant impact on ASW execution. The highly variable acoustic properties of the underwater environment will impact the ability to detect, identify, track, and engage enemy submarines. Factors that may affect these properties include surface shipping (including that of the joint force and commercial shipping), inherent environmental noise and oceanographic properties, and seasonal weather patterns. Acoustic sensor placement will be highly dependent on the acoustic properties of the waterspace. Because acoustics will not be the sole detection capability, an environmental assessment will be required to identify the requirements for non-acoustic detection systems (such as satellite imagery).

(2) Adversary Forces. A thorough understanding of the adversary’s ability to conduct submarine warfare is essential. Intelligence efforts must focus on the both the physical attributes of specific enemy platforms, their supporting physical and C2 infrastructure, and past and anticipated employment patterns.

c. Force Planning. ASW may require joint and combined forces and capabilities. Maritime forces must be identified early to account for long transit times. Initial force planning considerations should include utilization of prepositioned capabilities, early deployment of surface and subsurface forces, and reassignment of forward deployed forces to the ASW operation. Early presence of joint forces may be essential in seizing the initiative.

d. Concept of Operations. The objective of ASW operations is to assist in the establishment or maintenance of maritime superiority by denying enemy submarines influence in the operational area. This is accomplished through detection, identification, tracking, and engagement of enemy submarines. Unlocated enemy submarines often have the most influence in the JOA, possibly affecting fleet maneuver and commercial shipping operations. A single unlocated submarine could result in a significant operational, political, or economic impact. The JFC should designate enemy submarines as time-sensitive targets and develop and implement a comprehensive plan to reduce this influence.

(1) Focused operations. The operational key to limiting the influence of unlocated submarines is to focus the ASW effort to hold enemy submarines at risk and secure friendly maneuver areas.
(a) Preventing enemy submarines from entering open ocean areas through ASW efforts focused on enemy bases and littoral chokepoints may deny much of the maritime environment to enemy submarine operations. **When possible, planned targeting of enemy naval facilities neutralizing submarines prior to getting underway and disrupting critical infrastructure supporting submarine operations is the most effective defense against enemy submarine operations.** Dynamic targeting of enemy submarines may also be possible when the enemy submarine remains on the surface, but once permitted to enter open ocean areas and submerge, the level of effort required to neutralize the threat increases significantly.

(b) Protection of surface units or commercial shipping may require emphasis on ASW near operating areas, SLOCs, chokepoints, friendly and neutral ports, or other critical areas.

(c) When the focus of the ASW effort is upon enemy submarines in port, the number of assets required to neutralize the threat typically decreases. It is also more likely that other joint forces (e.g., JFACC and JFSOCC assets) may be employed. Once enemy submarines submerge, their detection, identification, tracking and engagement becomes much more difficult and the ASW capabilities more limited and Navy-centric.

*For further details on time-sensitive targets and targeting, refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.*

(2) **ISR.** Detection of submarines can have a significant impact on maritime operations. Even if engagement of enemy submarines is prevented by ROE or other considerations, the ability to track enemy submarine movement will shrink the area of influence from all possible areas of enemy submarine operations to the known location of the submarine. **The integration of intelligence and operations through a comprehensive ISR concept of operations is essential to the conduct of ASW.** The theater ASW commander (TASWC) should maintain direct liaison with the Joint Intelligence Center (JIC).

(a) Successful ASW prosecution requires fusing intelligence, oceanographic data, surveillance, cueing, multiple sensors, sensor technologies, and coordination between multiple platforms and staffs. Joint and national ISR capabilities must be incorporated into this process.

(b) Sensor employment must be considered closely in the concept of operations. Planners must take into consideration the acoustic properties of the operational environment. Sensor platforms should be placed to optimize sensor performance while minimizing the threat to the sensor platform. Acoustics are not be the sole detection and tracking mechanism. ISR planning should emphasize that all joint sensors, including those not historically associated with ASW, may provide information for application at both the operational and tactical levels of war.

(c) ISR visualization through a common operating picture will maximize MDA and enhance ASW execution. Care must be taken, however, to ensure that the uncertainty inherent in ASW operations is taken into consideration; distinction must be made between suspected location of unlocated submarines and known submarine positions.

*For further details on ISR, refer to JP 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Operations.*
e. **Communications Planning.** A survivable, networked joint communication system is essential to facilitate ISR, coordinate multi-platform execution, manage the waterspace, and prevent fratricide. Information connectivity, exchange, and integration at all levels can help maximize maritime domain awareness and mission accomplishment.

4. **Antisubmarine Warfare Organization**

   a. Each geographic combatant commander (GCC) operates theater ASW commanders (TASWCs), through the NCC. Each NCC appoints submarine operating authorities (SUBOPAUTHs). The TASWC and SUBOPAUTH closely coordinate submarine operations. In some cases, the TASWC and SUBOPAUTH responsibilities may be shared by a single commander.

   b. **Theater ASW Commander**

      (1) The TASWC is the Navy commander assigned to develop plans and direct assigned assets to conduct ASW within an assigned operational area. The TASWC may exercise either operational or tactical command and control of assigned assets. The TASWC is normally designated as a task force or task group commander subordinate to a navy component commander or joint force maritime component commander. Figure J-1 describes current TASWC designations.

      (2) The TASWC conducts ASW operations as permitted by ROE. When a joint task force is established and a JOA is activated, the TASWC supports the JFC, through the JFMCC (if established) or NCC in the conduct of ASW within the JOA, while remaining responsible to the GCC, through the NCC, for ASW operations outside the JOA. The JFC may assign forces directly to the TASWC. The TASWC supports other maritime commanders (i.e. strike group commanders) in the conduct of tactical ASW and typically provides ASW support to afloat forces as they transit through or operate in the assigned operational area.

      (3) The TASWC must ensure all assigned forces understand WSM and PMI elements in effect. As changes to elements of WSM and PMI are promulgated by SUBOPAUTH, the TASWC must ensure widest dissemination.

   c. **Submarine Operating Authority (SUBOPAUTH)**

      (1) The SUBOPAUTH is the Navy commander responsible for ensuring safety, PMI, providing WSM, and controlling the submarine broadcast for assigned submarines within a designated operational area.

      (a) Within their operational area, SUBOPAUTHs employ WSM to permit the rapid and effective engagement of hostile submarines while preventing inadvertent attacks on friendly submarines. Similar to fire support coordination measures on land, WSM may facilitate reducing or eliminating coordination requirements for the engagement of undersea targets or impose requirements for specific coordination before engagement of targets. Along with other control measures, WSM and associated...
procedures help ensure that surface and air fires do not jeopardize submarine safety or interfere with other attack means.

(b) PMI is waterspace allocation and procedures designed to prevent submerged collision between friendly submarines, between submarines and friendly surface ships’ towed bodies, and between submarines and any other underwater event.

(2) To effectively employ all available ASW forces and prevent interference with US and multinational submarine forces, the TASWC and SUBOPAUTH must closely coordinate WSM and PMI issues and planning.
The development of JP 3-32 is based upon the following primary references:

1. **General**

2. **Joint Publications**
   a. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)*.
   c. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*.
   d. JP 2-0, *Intelligence Support to Joint Operations*.
   f. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*.
   g. JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats*.
   h. JP 3-02, *Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations*.
   i. JP 3-03, *Joint Interdiction*.
   k. JP 3-09, *Joint Fire Support*.
   m. JP 3-13, *Information Operations*.
   o. JP 3-16, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*.
Appendix K

q. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.

r. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

s. JP 3-52, Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone.


u. JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs.

v. JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations.

w. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

x. JP 4-0, Logistic Support of Joint Operations.

y. JP 4-01, Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System.

z. JP 4-01.2, Sealift Support to Joint Operations.


bb. JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).

c. JP 4-01.8, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration.


ee. JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

ff. JP 4-09, Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution.


3. Navy Publications

a. Naval Doctrinal Publication 4, Naval Logistics.

b. Navy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (NTTP) 4-02.1, Navy HSS Logistics.

c. NTTP 4-02.2, Patient Movement.
d. NTTP 4-02.7, *HSS in a CBR Environment*.

e. Navy Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-09.1, *Navy Strike and Fire Support*.


g. NWP 3-20 Series, *Surface Warfare*.

h. NWP 3-21 Series, *Antisubmarine Warfare*.

i. NWP 4-01, *Naval Transportation*.

j. NWP 4-01.1, *Navy Expeditionary Shore-Based Logistic Support and RSOI Operations*.

k. NWP 4-01.4, *Underway Replenishment*.

l. NWP 4-04.1, *Seabee Operations in the MAGTF*.

m. NWP 4-07, *Naval Maintenance*.

n. NWP 4-08, *Naval Supply Operations*.

o. NWP 4-09 Rev A, *Other Logistic Services*.

p. NWP 4-10, *Naval Conventional Ordnance Management*.

q. NWP 4-11, *Environmental Protection*.

r. NWP 5-01 Rev A, *Naval Operational Planning*.

APPENDIX L
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrine and Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the United States Navy. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

TO: COMUSFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA//N3/N5/
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD/
CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOC GP/
CNO WASHINGTON DC//N5/N51/N512/
COMNAVWARDEVCOM NEWPORT RI//N5/

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.

c. Record of Changes:

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<th>DATE ENTERED</th>
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Appendix L

4. Distribution of Printed Publications

   a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through the Service publication centers listed below (initial contact) or USJFCOM in the event that the joint publication is not available from the Service.

   b. Individuals and agencies outside the combatant commands, Services, Joint Staff, and combat support agencies are authorized to receive only approved joint publications and joint test publications. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

   c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrative support responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, Support of the Headquarters of Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands.

   By Military Services:

   Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL
          1655 Woodson Road
          Attn: Joint Publications
          St. Louis, MO 63114-6181

   Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center
              2800 Eastern Boulevard
              Baltimore, MD 21220-2896

   Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point
          700 Robbins Avenue
          Bldg 1, Customer Service
          Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099

   Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications)
                 814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321
                 Albany, GA 31704-0321

   Coast Guard: Commandant (G-OPD)
               US Coast Guard
               2100 2nd Street, SW
               Washington, DC 20593-0001
d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.

5. Distribution of Electronic Publications


b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.
Appendix L

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## GLOSSARY

### PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AADC</td>
<td>area air defense commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>airspace control authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATO</td>
<td>air tasking order</td>
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<tr>
<td>BDA</td>
<td>battle damage assessment</td>
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<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>combat assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAP</td>
<td>crisis action planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCOI</td>
<td>critical contact of interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>CI</td>
<td>counterintelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIE</td>
<td>collaborative information environment</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<tr>
<td>COG</td>
<td>center of gravity</td>
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<tr>
<td>COI</td>
<td>contact of interest</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMSEC</td>
<td>communications security</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
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<tr>
<td>CUL</td>
<td>common-user logistics</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>FOC</td>
<td>future operations cell</td>
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<td>FP</td>
<td>force protection</td>
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<td>FPC</td>
<td>future plans cell</td>
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<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSPD</td>
<td>homeland security Presidential directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMINT</td>
<td>human intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
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<td>ISR</td>
<td>intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance</td>
</tr>
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<td>J-1</td>
<td>manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>J-2X</td>
<td>joint force intelligence directorate counterintelligence and human intelligence staff element</td>
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<td>J-3</td>
<td>operations directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>J-4</td>
<td>logistics directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFLCC</td>
<td>joint force land component commander</td>
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<td>JFMCC</td>
<td>joint force maritime component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFSOCC</td>
<td>joint force special operations component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIC</td>
<td>joint intelligence center</td>
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<tr>
<td>JISE</td>
<td>joint intelligence support element</td>
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<td>JMO</td>
<td>joint maritime operations</td>
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<td>joint operations area</td>
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<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JPG</td>
<td>joint planning group</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>JWICS</td>
<td>Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System</td>
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<td>KMC</td>
<td>knowledge management center</td>
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<tr>
<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>MDA</td>
<td>maritime domain awareness</td>
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<tr>
<td>METOC</td>
<td>meteorological and oceanographic</td>
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<tr>
<td>MFPC</td>
<td>maritime future plans center</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIAC</td>
<td>maritime intelligence and analysis center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOC</td>
<td>maritime operations center</td>
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<td>maritime planning group</td>
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<td>MSC</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTP</td>
<td>maritime task plan</td>
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<td>NCC</td>
<td>Navy component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>NIST</td>
<td>national intelligence support team</td>
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<td>NSFS</td>
<td>naval surface fire support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSPD</td>
<td>national security Presidential directive</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTTTP</td>
<td>Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>NWP</td>
<td>Navy warfare publication</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
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<td>operation order</td>
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<td>OPS</td>
<td>operations center</td>
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<td>OPTASK</td>
<td>operation task</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFF</td>
<td>request for forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>RFI</td>
<td>request for information</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<td>SME</td>
<td>subject matter expert</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standard operating procedure</td>
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<td>SPINS</td>
<td>special instructions</td>
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<td>TCS</td>
<td>theater communications system</td>
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<td>TF</td>
<td>task force</td>
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<td>task group</td>
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<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
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<tr>
<td>TST</td>
<td>time-sensitive target</td>
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air defense. Defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack. Also called AD. (JP 3-01)

air tasking order. A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also called ATO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-30)

all-source intelligence. 1. Intelligence products and/or organizations and activities that incorporate all sources of information, most frequently including human resources intelligence, imagery intelligence, measurement and signature intelligence, signals intelligence, and open-source data in the production of finished intelligence. 2. In intelligence collection, a phrase that indicates that in the satisfaction of intelligence requirements, all collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting systems and resources are identified for possible use and those most capable are tasked. (JP 1-02; JP 2-0)

antisubmarine warfare forces. Forces organized primarily for antisubmarine action. May be composed of surface ships, aircraft, submarines, or any combination of these, and their supporting systems. (JP 3-32)

antiterrorism. Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military and civilian forces. Also called AT. (JP 1-02; JP 3-07.2)

apportionment. In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. (JP 1-02)

area air defense commander. Within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force, the commander will assign overall responsibility for air defense to a single commander. Normally, this will be the component commander with the preponderance of air defense capability and the command, control, and communications capability to plan and execute integrated air defense operations. Representation from the other components involved will be provided, as appropriate, to the area air defense commander’s headquarters. Also called AADC. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02; JP 1)
at sea. Includes the following maritime areas: foreign internal waters, archipelagic waters, and territorial seas; foreign contiguous zones; foreign exclusive economic zones; the high seas; and US-exclusive economic zone, territorial sea, and internal waters. (JP 1-02)

**battle damage assessment.** The estimate of damage resulting from the application of lethal or nonlethal military force. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**campaign.** A series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

**campaign plan.** A joint operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a given time and space. (JP 5-0)

**campaign planning.** The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of an operation plan for a campaign. Campaign planning may begin during contingency planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but is normally not completed until after the President or Secretary of Defense selects the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (JP 5-0)

**center of gravity.** The source of power that provides moral or physical strength, freedom of action, or will to act. Also called COG. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**civil-military operations.** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-57)

**close air support.** Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly forces and that require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**combatant command.** A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and
with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02; JP 5-0)

**combat assessment.** The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: (a) battle damage assessment; (b) munitions effectiveness assessment; and (c) reattack recommendation. Also called CA. (JP 1-02; JP 3-60)

**command and control.** The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

**command relationships.** The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

**concept of operations.** A verbal or graphic statement that clearly and concisely expresses what the joint force commander intends to accomplish and how it will be done using available resources. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. Also called commander’s concept or CONOPS. (JP 5-0)

**contingency.** A situation requiring military operations in response to natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or as otherwise directed by appropriate authority to protect US interests. (JP 5-0)

**convoy.** 1. A number of merchant ships and/or naval auxiliaries usually escorted by warships and/or aircraft—or a single merchant ship or naval auxiliary under surface escort-assembled and organized for the purpose of passage together. 2. A group of vehicles organized for the purpose of control and orderly movement with or without escort protection that moves over the same route at the same time and under one commander. (JP 3-32)

**counterair.** A mission that integrates offensive and defensive operations to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority. Counterair missions are designed to destroy or negate enemy aircraft and missiles, both before and after launch. (JP 1-02; JP 3-01)

**counterintelligence.** Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02; JP 2-0)

**course of action.** 1. Any sequence of activities that an individual or unit may follow. 2. A possible plan open to an individual or commander that would accomplish, or is related to the accomplishment of the mission. 3. The scheme adopted to accomplish a job or mission. 4. A line of conduct in an engagement. 5. A product of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System concept
development phase and the course-of-action determination steps of the joint operation planning process. Also called COA. (JP 5-0)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to a nation, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

critical information. Specific facts about friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities vitally needed by adversaries for them to plan and act effectively so as to guarantee failure or unacceptable consequences for friendly mission accomplishment. (JP 1-02)

deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests. (JP 1-02; JP 3-13.4)

defensive counterair. All defensive measures designed to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy or negate enemy forces attempting to penetrate or attack through friendly airspace. Also called DCA. (JP 3-01)

direct support. A mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly to the supported force’s request for assistance. Also called DS. (JP 1-02)

essential elements of friendly information. Key questions likely to be asked by adversary officials and intelligence systems about specific friendly intentions, capabilities, and activities, so they can obtain answers critical to their operational effectiveness. Also called EEFI. (JP 1-02; JP 3-09.1)

expeditionary force. An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

fires. The use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

fire support. Fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. (JP 1-02; JP 3-09.3)

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations
to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

**human intelligence.** A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called HUMINT. (JP 1-02; JP 2-01.2)

**information operations.** The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02; JP 3-13)

**intelligence.** The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, evaluation, analysis, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations. The term is also applied to the activity which results in the product and to the organizations engaged in such activity. (JP 2-0)

**intelligence requirement.** 1. Any subject, general or specific, upon which there is a need for the collection of information, or the production of intelligence. 2. A requirement for intelligence to fill a gap in the command’s knowledge or understanding of the operational environment or threat forces. (JP 1-02; JP 2-0)

**intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.** An activity that synchronizes and integrates the planning and operation of sensors, assets, and processing, exploitation, and dissemination systems in direct support of current and future operations. This is an integrated intelligence and operations function. Also called ISR. (JP 1-02; JP 2-01)

**interdiction.** 1. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s military surface capability before it can be used effectively against friendly forces, or to otherwise achieve objectives. 2. In support of law enforcement, activities conducted to divert, disrupt, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy, as appropriate, vessels, vehicles, aircraft, people, and cargo. (JP 3-03)

**interoperability.** 1. The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. 2. (DOD only) The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint force.** A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**joint force air component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making
recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating air operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force air component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFACC. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**Joint Force Commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

**Joint Force Land Component Commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking land forces; planning and coordinating land operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force land component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFLCC. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned, attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and assets; planning and coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. Also called JFMCC. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**Joint Integrated Prioritized Target List.** A prioritized list of targets approved and maintained by the joint force commander. Targets and priorities are derived from the recommendations of components and other appropriate agencies, in conjunction with their proposed operations supporting the joint force commander’s objectives and guidance. Also called JIPTL. (JP 1-02; JP 3-60)

**Joint Intelligence Operations Center.** An interdependent, operational intelligence organization at the Department of Defense, combatant command, or joint task force (if established) level, that is integrated with national intelligence centers, and capable of accessing all sources of intelligence impacting military operations planning, execution, and assessment. Also called JIOC. (JP 2-0)

**Joint Intelligence Support Element.** A subordinate joint force element whose focus is on intelligence support for joint operations, providing the joint force commander, joint staff, and components with the complete air, space, ground, and maritime adversary situation. Also called JISE. (JP 1-02; JP 2-01)

**Joint Operations.** A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)
**joint operations area.** An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Also called JOA. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**joint planning group.** A planning organization consisting of designated representatives of the joint force headquarters principal and special staff sections, joint force components (Service and/or functional), and other supporting organizations or agencies as deemed necessary by the joint force commander. Also called JPG. (JP 5-0)

**joint targeting coordination board.** A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. Also called JTCB. (JP 1-02; JP 3-60)

**joint task force.** A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subunified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. Also called JTF. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

**littoral.** The littoral comprises two segments of battlespace: 1. Seaward: the area from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. 2. Landward: the area inland from the shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**logistics.** The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations that deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition of construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and d. acquisition or furnishing of services. (JP 1-02)

**maneuver.** 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land forces in a position of advantage over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the air, on the ground, or on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship, aircraft, or vehicle, to cause it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in the operational area through movement in combination with fires to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**maritime domain.** The oceans, seas, bays, estuaries, islands, coastal areas, and the airspace above these, including the littorals. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)
maritime domain awareness. The effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of a nation. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

maritime environment. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

maritime forces. Forces that operate on, under, or above the sea to gain or exploit command of the sea, sea control, or sea denial and/or to project power from the sea. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

maritime power projection. Power projection in and from the maritime environment, including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces or logistic support or to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons’ range of friendly forces. Maritime power projection may be accomplished by amphibious assault operations, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations. (JP 3-32)

maritime superiority. That degree of dominance of one force over another that permits the conduct of maritime operations by the former and its related land, maritime, and air forces at a given time and place without prohibitive interference by the opposing force. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

maritime supremacy. That degree of maritime superiority wherein the opposing force is incapable of effective interference. (JP 3-32)

military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. Also called MILDEC. (JP 1-02; JP 3-13.4)

mine warfare. The strategic, operational, and tactical use of mines and mine countermeasures. Mine warfare is divided into two basic subdivisions: the laying of mines to degrade the enemy’s capabilities to wage land, air, and maritime warfare; and the countering of enemy-laid mines to permit friendly maneuver or use of selected land or sea areas. Also called MIW. (JP 1-02; JP 3-15)

multinational force. A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

multinational operations. A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02; JP 3-05)

national intelligence support team. A nationally sourced team composed of intelligence and communications experts from Defense Intelligence Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, or other intelligence community agencies as required. Also called NIST. (JP 2-0)

**naval operation.** 1. A naval action (or the performance of a naval mission) that may be strategic, operational, tactical, logistic, or training. 2. The process of carrying on or training for naval combat in order to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 3-32)

**offensive counterair.** Offensive operations to destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles, launch platforms, and their supporting structures and systems both before and after launch, but as close to their source as possible. Offensive counterair operations range throughout enemy territory and are generally conducted at the initiative of friendly forces. These operations include attack operations, suppression of enemy air defenses, fighter escort, and fighter sweep. Also called OCA. (JP 3-01)

**operational art.** The application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs—supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces. Operational art integrates ends, ways, and means across the levels of war. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**operational control.** Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (JP 1)

**operational level of war.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve strategic objectives within theaters or other operational areas. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**operation plan.** 1. Any plan for the conduct of military operations prepared in response to actual and potential contingencies. 2. In the context of joint operation planning level 4 planning detail, a complete and detailed joint plan containing a full description of the concept of operations, all annexes applicable to the plan, and a time-phased force and deployment data. It identifies the specific forces, functional
support, and resources required to execute the plan and provide closure estimates for their flow into the theater. Also called OPLAN. (JP 5-0)

physical security. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. 2. (DOD only) In communications security, the component that results from all physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons. See also communications security; security. (JP 1-02; JP 6-0)

prevention of mutual interference. In submarine operations, procedures established to prevent submerged collisions between friendly submarines, between submarines and friendly surface ship towed bodies and arrays, and between submarines and any other hazards to submerged navigation (e.g., explosive detonations, research submersible operations, oil drilling rigs, etc.) (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02; JP 3-61)

reconnaissance. A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or adversary, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Also called RECON. (JP 1-02; JP 2-0)

rules of engagement. Directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which United States forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered. Also called ROE. (JP 1-02)

sea control operations. The employment of naval forces, supported by land and air forces as appropriate, in order to achieve military objectives in vital sea areas. Such operations include destruction of enemy naval forces, suppression of enemy sea commerce, protection of vital sea lanes, and establishment of local military superiority in areas of naval operations. (JP 3-32)

Service component command. A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations, and installations under that command, including the support forces that have been assigned to a combatant command or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

standard operating procedure. See standing operating procedure. (JP 1-02)

standing operating procedure. A set of instructions covering those features of operations which lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss of effectiveness. The procedure is applicable unless ordered otherwise. Also called SOP. (JP 1-02; JP 3-31)
**strategic level of war.** The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve these objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**strike.** An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a capability. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**support.** 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02; JP 1)

**supported commander.** 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**supporting commander.** 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. This includes the designated combatant commands and Department of Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 3-0)

**surveillance.** The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**synchronization.** 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. 2. In the intelligence context, application of intelligence sources and methods in concert with the operation plan to ensure intelligence requirements are answered in time to influence the decisions they support. (JP 2-0)

**tactical control.** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1)
**targeting.** The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and matching the appropriate response to them, considering operational requirements and capabilities. (JP 1-02; JP 3-0)

**task force.** A component of a fleet organized by the commander of a task fleet or higher authority for the accomplishment of a specific task or tasks. Also called TF.

**task group.** A component of a naval task force organized by the commander of a task force or higher authority. Also called TG.

**theater antisubmarine warfare commander.** A Navy commander assigned to develop plans and direct assigned and attached assets for the conduct of antisubmarine warfare within an operational area. Normally designated as a task force or task group commander and responsible to a Navy component commander or joint force maritime component commander. Also called TASWC. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**time-phased force and deployment data.** The Joint Operation Planning and Execution System database portion of an operation plan; it contains time-phased force data, non-unit-related cargo and personnel data, and movement data for the operation plan, including the following: a. In-place units; b. Units to be deployed to support the operation plan with a priority indicating the desired sequence for their arrival at the port of debarkation; c. Routing of forces to be deployed; d. Movement data associated with deploying forces; e. Estimates of non-unit-related cargo and personnel movements to be conducted concurrently with the deployment of forces; and f. Estimate of transportation requirements that must be fulfilled by common-user lift resources as well as those requirements that can be fulfilled by assigned or attached transportation resources. Also called TPFDD. (JP 1-02)

**time-sensitive target.** A joint force commander designated target requiring immediate response because it is a highly lucrative, fleeting target of opportunity or it poses (or will soon pose) a danger to friendly forces. Also called TST. (JP 1-02; JP 3-60)

**under sea warfare.** Operations conducted to establish and maintain control of the underwater environment by denying an opposing force the effective use of underwater systems and weapons. It includes offensive and defensive submarine, antisubmarine, and mine warfare operations. Also called USW. (Upon approval of this change to the existing publication, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and will be included in JP 1-02.)

**unmanned aerial vehicle.** A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semiballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles. Also called UAV. (JP 1-02; JP 3-52)

**waterspace management.** The allocation of waterspace in terms of antisubmarine warfare attack procedures to permit the rapid and effective engagement of hostile submarines while preventing
inadvertent attacks on friendly submarines. Also called WSM. (Upon approval of this change to
the existing publication, this term and its definition will modify the existing term and its definition and
will be included in JP 1-02.)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-32 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program Directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC Joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

**ENHANCED JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY**

**JP 1-0**
- PERSONNEL

**JP 2-0**
- INTELLIGENCE

**JP 3-0**
- OPERATIONS

**JP 4-0**
- LOGISTICS

**JP 5-0**
- PLANS

**JP 6-0**
- COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS

**JP 1**
- JOINT DOCTRINE

**JP 2**
- PERSONNEL
  - JOINT INTELLIGENCE
  - JOINT OPERATIONS

**JP 3**
- LOGISTICS
  - PLANS
  - COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS