Joint Publication 3-18

Joint Forcible Entry Operations

16 June 2008
PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing joint forcible entry operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the Joint Staff, commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

STEPHEN M. GOLDFEIN
Major General, USAF
Vice Director, Joint Staff
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SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-18
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• Adds a discussion of principles for forcible entry operational success
• Covers multinational considerations
• Discusses maintaining operational area access
• Revises the discussion of command relationships
• Adds coverage of forcible entry and the joint planning process
• Reorganizes the chapter which discusses integration and synchronization and supporting operations
• Modified the definitions of the terms ‘lodgment’ and ‘Marine expeditionary brigade’
• Deleted the terms ‘air control operations,’ ‘alert,’ ‘connectivity,’ and ‘communications center’
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Provides an Overview of Forcible Entry Operations
• Covers Command and Control Considerations
• Describes Planning for Forcible Entry Operations
• Explains Integration and Synchronization of Forcible Entry Operations
• Covers Supporting Operations
• Describes Logistic Considerations

Overview

Forcible entry operations are joint in nature. “Forcible entry” is a joint military operation conducted against armed opposition to gain entry into the territory of an adversary by seizing a lodgment as rapidly as possible in order to enable the conduct of follow-on operations or conduct a singular operation. A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations (a lodgment may be an airhead, a beachhead, or a combination thereof). Lodgment requirements depend upon the objective(s) of the overall operation or larger campaign. A lodgment may have established facilities and infrastructure. Forcible entry planning must consider the political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure realities.

Principles for Forcible Entry Operational Success

Achieve surprise. Planners should strive to achieve surprise regarding exact objectives, times, methods, and forces employed in forcible entry operations. The degree of surprise required depends on the nature of the operation to be conducted.

Control of the air. Air superiority should be achieved in the operational area to protect the force during periods of critical vulnerability and to preserve lines of communications. At a minimum, the joint force must neutralize the enemy’s offensive air and missile
capability and air defenses to achieve local air superiority over the planned lodgment.

**Control of space.**  
**Space superiority** allows the joint force commander (JFC) access to communications, weather, navigation, timing, remote sensing, and intelligence assets without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.

**Control of the sea.**  
**Control of the sea** in the operational area enables the joint force to project power ashore in support of the joint forcible entry operation and to protect sea lines of communications.

**Isolate the lodgment.**  
The joint force **attacks or neutralizes any enemy capabilities with the potential to affect the establishment of the lodgment.**

**Gain and maintain access.**  
**Gaining and maintaining access** is a critical precondition for successful forcible entry. In any given operational area, numerous and diverse limitations to access will present themselves.

**Neutralize enemy forces within the lodgment.**  
The joint force must **neutralize enemy forces within the lodgment** to facilitate the establishment of airheads and beachheads within the operational area and to provide for the immediate protection of the force.

**Expand the lodgment.**  
The joint force **quickly builds combat power** in order to: enhance security and the ability to respond to enemy counter attacks; enable continuous landing of troops and materiel; and, facilitate transition to subsequent operations.

**Manage the impact of environmental factors.**  
**Managing the impact of environmental factors** refers to overcoming the effect of land and sea obstacles; anticipating, preventing, detecting, and mitigating adversary use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive weapons; and, determining the impact of climate, weather, and other natural occurring hazards.

**Integrate supporting operations.**  
**Intelligence, information operations, civil-military operations, and special operations (SO)** are key to setting the conditions for forcible entry operational success. These enablers must be integrated into the operation from initial planning through completed execution and transition.
Executive Summary

Forcible Entry Capabilities

The Armed Forces of the United States have the capability to conduct three primary forcible entry operations: amphibious assault, airborne assault, and air assault. Based upon mission analysis, these operations may be used singularly or in combination to open one or multiple entry points.

**Amphibious assault operations.**

An amphibious force, composed of an amphibious task force (ATF) and a landing force (LF), together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations, may project power directly against the enemy in a coup de main or may attack across a beach and/or by vertical envelopment to establish a lodgment to enable the introduction of follow-on forces. In addition to serving as a forcible entry assault force, such forces are capable of conducting follow-on operations from the lodgment.

**Airborne assault operations.**

Airborne forces may be used as the assault force or used in combination with other capabilities for a forcible entry; or they may conduct follow-on operations from a lodgment. As an assault force, airborne forces parachute into the objective area to attack and eliminate armed resistance and secure designated objectives.

**Air assault operations.**

Air assault forces execute forcible entries using fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft. Air assault forces can deploy from land-based facilities and naval platforms. These forces can rapidly project combat power throughout the depth of an operational area.

Force Employment

The JFC should determine the forcible entry capability or combination of capabilities needed to accomplish the mission. Unity of command is vital when amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations are combined. All elements of the joint force and supporting commands should understand the commander’s intent, concept of the operation, scheme of maneuver, and coordination requirements.

If the decision is made to use a combination of forcible entry capabilities to seize a lodgment, the JFC must decide whether to conduct the forcible entries as concurrent or integrated operations. Concurrent operations occur when a combination of amphibious assault, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entry operations are
conducted simultaneously, but as **distinct operations with separate operational areas and objectives**. Integrated forcible entry operations result when amphibious assault, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entries are conducted simultaneously within the same operational area and with objectives that are mutually supporting.

**Command Relationships**

**Joint force commander authority.**

JFCs have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they are organized and trained.

The combatant commander may organize the forcible entry force as a subordinate joint task force (JTF) or the forcible entry force may be organized from an existing component. An initiating directive will provide guidance on command relationships and other pertinent instructions for the duration of the forcible entry operation.

**Functional component commanders.**

The multiple complex tasks confronting the JFC may challenge the JFC’s span of control and ability to oversee and influence each task. Designating a **joint force functional component commander** for a particular functional area allows resolution of joint issues at the functional component level and enhances component interaction at that level. In a large operation, delegating control of the forcible entry operation to a functional component commander will permit the JFC to focus on other responsibilities in the operational area. Based on the JFC’s guidance, the forcible entry operation may be conducted by functional component commanders.

**Amphibious task force and landing force commanders.**

If the forcible entry operation is an amphibious assault, it will include air and land assaults that originate from the sea. The JFC will organize the amphibious force in such a way as to best accomplish the mission based on the concept of operations (CONOPS). **The command relationships established among the commander, ATF (CATF), commander, LF (CLF), and other designated commanders of the amphibious force is an important decision.** An establishing directive is essential to ensure unity of effort within the amphibious force. Normally, a support relationship is established between the CATF and CLF by the JFC or establishing authority.
Command and control of special operations forces.

When directed, Commander, US Special Operations Command provides continental United States-based special operations forces (SOF) to a geographic combatant commander (GCC). The GCC normally exercises combatant command (command authority) of assigned and operational control of attached SOF through a commander, theater special operations command (TSOC), a subunified commander. When a GCC establishes and employs multiple JTFs and independent task forces (TFs) concurrently, the TSOC commander may establish and employ multiple joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTF/TF SO requirements. Accordingly, the GCC, as the common superior, normally will establish support or tactical control command relationships between the JSOTF commanders and JTF/TF commanders.

Forcible Entry and the Joint Planning Process

Joint planning is conducted through a disciplined process by policies and procedures established in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and joint operation planning process. In addition to facilitating contingency planning, these processes have additional procedures for crisis action planning and for time-sensitive development of operation orders when a forcible entry operation requirement occurs with little or no warning.

Forcible entry operations require extensive joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). The primary purpose of JIPOE is to support the JFC’s decision-making and planning by identifying, analyzing, and estimating the enemy’s centers of gravity, critical factors, capabilities, limitations, requirements, vulnerabilities, intentions, and courses of action that are most likely to be encountered by the entry force.

Time, distance, physical attributes of the operational area, agreement/arrangement with other host nations, or the nature of the crisis may dictate the deployment of a joint force to staging areas outside the US. Likewise, authorizations may be required to conduct advance force operations in the operational area to prepare the operational environment for the introduction of combat forces. Commanders and operational planners may have to compress planning timelines to meet time-sensitive mission requirements.
Executive Summary

Integration and Synchronization

Forcible entry operations are normally conducted during the “Seize the Initiative” or “Dominate” phase of a joint operation. Within the context of the “Seize the Initiative” or “Dominate” phase of a joint operation established by a higher-level JFC, the forcible entry operation commander may establish additional phases that fit the forcible entry CONOPS. Forcible entry operations may be planned and executed in the following five phases: (1) Preparation and Deployment (Phase I); (2) Assault (Phase II); (3) Stabilization of the Lodgment (Phase III); (4) Introduction of Follow-on Forces (Phase IV); and, (5) Termination or Transition Operations (Phase V).

Planning for each phase must include branch and sequel planning. Transitions between these phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command or support relationships. The activities that predominate during a given phase, however, rarely align with neatly definable breakpoints. The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a manner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing commander’s objectives, desired effects, measures of effectiveness, priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the organization of the operational area.

Supporting Operations

Special operations forces. SO are an integral part of forcible entry operations and these actions and operations are integrated to complement the achievement of strategic and operational objectives. SOF may be employed prior to forcible entry operations to collect intelligence, seize key terrain, organize and train guerrilla forces, and conduct other activities that facilitate the introduction of conventional forces. In the execution stages of a forcible entry operation, SOF can seize objectives, interdict targets (especially those than can severely disrupt the assault to open entry points), and conduct other operations to support the main force. In the closing stages of the operation, SOF can play a key role in transition or termination by working with host nation, multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental partners.
Fires. In forcible entry operations, the initial assault forces are building combat power in the operational area from nothing as quickly as possible. They will normally have very minimal or no artillery support available for fire support in the early stages of the operation. **Fires from aircraft (manned and unmanned) and/or naval platforms (surface/subsurface) take on added importance to compensate for the lack of artillery.** The supported commander established the priority, timing, and effects of all fires within the boundaries of the operational area that has been designated.

Intelligence support. The JFC uses intelligence to: decide what, why, when, where, and how to attack; determine forcible entry capabilities needed and task organization required to seize initial objective(s); support targeting and combat assessment; and anticipate future operations. Counterintelligence (CI) helps the JFC maintain the element of surprise essential to forcible entry operations by supporting operations security (OPSEC) and deception.

Information operations. **Information operations (IO) are integral to successful military operations and are key during forcible entry operations.** The full impact of IO on friendly, neutral, and hostile forces should be considered with the key goal of IO achieving and maintaining information superiority for the United States and its allies. IO are described as the integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and OPSEC, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversary human and automated decision-making while protecting our own. Supporting IO capabilities (information assurance, physical security, physical attack, CI, and combat camera) have military purposes other than IO, but either operate in the information environment or have impact on the information environment.

Logistics

Logistic planning for the phases of forcible entry operations occurs concurrently, not sequentially. Within the context of forcible entry operations, logistics enables movement and maintenance of forces from preparation and initial deployment to the envisioned end state of the operation or larger campaign. This requires commanders to plan and establish the logistic systems that flow sufficient logistics through the lodgment(s) created to support follow-on operations. Logistic
planning must account for early resupply of initial assault forces as these forces will generally be employed with limited on-hand capacities.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides joint doctrine for planning, executing, and assessing joint forcible entry operations.
“Joint warfare is team warfare. Effective integration of joint forces exposes no weak points or seams to an adversary. They rapidly and efficiently find and exploit the adversary’s critical vulnerabilities and other weak points as they contribute most to mission accomplishment. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders may choose the capabilities they need from the forces at their disposal.”

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

1. Forcible Entry

   a. “Forcible entry” is a joint military operation conducted against armed opposition to gain entry into the territory of an adversary by seizing a lodgment as rapidly as possible in order to enable the conduct of follow-on operations or conduct a singular operation. A lodgment is a designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations (a lodgment may be an airhead, a beachhead, or a combination thereof). Lodgment requirements depend upon the objective(s) of the overall operation or larger campaign (see Figure I-1). A lodgment may have established facilities and infrastructure. Forcible entry planning must consider the political, military, economic, social, informational, and infrastructure realities. Commanders and staffs visualize and analyze civil considerations in terms of relevant areas, structures, capabilities, organizations, people, and events.

   b. Forcible entry operations are joint in nature. There are many Service-unique forcible entry capabilities, techniques, and procedures the Nation has developed since World War II, primarily consisting of amphibious assault, airborne assault, and air assault operations. Despite these Service-oriented capabilities, techniques, and procedures, forcible entry operations are inherently joint as evidenced by the need for using resources (e.g., command and control [C2], transportation, sustainment) from all elements of Department of Defense (DOD) and often other resources (multinational, other government agencies, etc.).

2. United States National Military Strategy and Joint Forcible Entry Operations

   a. The National Military Strategy (NMS) supports the aims of the National Security Strategy and implements the National Defense Strategy. It describes the Armed Forces’ plan to achieve military objectives in the near term and provides the vision for ensuring they remain decisive in the future. The NMS establishes three supporting military objectives: protect the United States against external attacks and aggression, prevent conflict and surprise attack, and prevail against adversaries.
b. To achieve these objectives, the Armed Forces must effectively project and sustain power in distant environments where adversaries may seek to deny access. To be credible both as a deterrent and as a viable military option for policy enforcement, the Armed Forces of the US must be capable of deploying and fighting to gain access to geographical areas controlled by forces hostile to US interests. Swift and decisive victory in these cases requires forcible entry and the ability to surge follow-on forces. Alerting rapid deployment forces for employment or moving naval expeditionary forces toward the area of the crisis is a show of force that is politically significant in a strategic context.

3. Principles for Forcible Entry Operational Success

To set favorable conditions for operational success, the following principles apply for forcible entry operations:

a. Achieve Surprise. Planners should strive to achieve surprise regarding exact objectives, times, methods, and forces employed in forcible entry operations. The degree of surprise required depends on the nature of the operation to be conducted. Achieving surprise is dependent upon comprehensive information operations (IO) planning (especially operations security [OPSEC] and military deception [MILDEC]) followed by disciplined execution by the joint force. Surprise is not a necessary condition for
operational success (particularly when the force has overwhelming superiority), but it can significantly reduce operational risk.

b. **Control of the Air.** Air superiority should be achieved in the operational area to protect the force during periods of critical vulnerability and to preserve lines of communications (LOCs). At a minimum, the joint force must neutralize the enemy’s offensive air and missile capability and air defenses to achieve local air superiority over the planned lodgment. **The joint force controls the air through integrated and synchronized air operations, including missile defense.** Air interdiction of enemy forces throughout the operational area enhances the simultaneity and depth of the forcible entry operation.

c. **Control of Space.** Space superiority allows the joint force commander (JFC) access to communications, weather, navigation, timing, remote sensing, and intelligence assets without prohibitive interference by the opposing force.

d. **Sea Control.** Control of the sea in the operational area enables the joint force to project power ashore in support of the joint forcible entry operation and to protect sea lines of communications (SLOCs). Protection of SLOCs ensures the availability of logistic support required to sustain operations and support the transition to continuing operations by follow-on forces.

e. **Isolate the Lodgment.** The joint force attacks or neutralizes any enemy capabilities with the potential to affect the establishment of the lodgment. These capabilities include enemy ground, sea, and air forces that can be committed to react to joint force assaults, indirect fire systems and theater missile systems that can range the lodgment, and related C2 systems.

f. **Gain and Maintain Access.** Gaining and maintaining access is a critical precondition for successful forcible entry. In any given operational area, numerous and diverse limitations to access will present themselves. Access may be restricted due to diplomatic, economic, military, or cultural factors. Ports, airfields, and infrastructures may also be physically limited.

(1) Commanders conducting forcible entry operations should leverage the basing, access, and security cooperation agreements established as well as the regional expertise developed through pre-crisis engagement activities at the national and regional levels.

(2) When planning indicates the future requirement for a forcible entry operation, appropriate shaping efforts or activities could focus on identifying and neutralizing an adversary’s anti-access capabilities. Shaping could include the expansion of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to locate natural and man-made impediments to access.

g. **Neutralize Enemy Forces Within the Lodgment.** The joint force must neutralize enemy forces within the lodgment to facilitate the establishment of airheads and
beachheads within the operational area and to provide for the immediate protection of the force. Planning considerations should include identification of enemy infrastructure which may be of value for future use by friendly forces. Limiting physical damage will lessen the time needed to rebuild.

h. **Expand the Lodgment.** The joint force quickly builds combat power in order to: enhance security and the ability to respond to enemy counter attacks; enable continuous landing of troops and materiel; and, facilitate transition to subsequent operations.

i. **Manage the Impact of Environmental Factors.** Managing the impact of environmental factors refers to overcoming the effect of land and sea obstacles; anticipating, preventing, detecting, and mitigating adversary use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive weapons; and, determining the impact of climate, weather, and other natural occurring hazards.

j. **Integrate Supporting Operations.** Intelligence, IO, civil-military operations (CMO), and special operations (SO) are key to setting the conditions for forcible entry operational success. These enablers must be integrated into the operation from initial planning through completed execution and transition.

### 4. Operational Applications of Forcible Entry Operations

Generally, joint operations and campaigns involve six phases, as illustrated in Figure I-2. The geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) vision of how a joint operation should unfold will drive decisions regarding the phasing of an operation. Within the context of the phases established by a GCC, subordinate JFCs and component commanders may establish additional phases that fit their concept of operations (CONOPS). A forcible entry operation will normally be conducted during phases II (Seize the Initiative) or III (Dominate) of a joint operation.
a. **Seize the Initiative.** A forcible entry operation may be the JFC’s opening move to seize the initiative. For example, a JFC might direct friendly forces to seize and hold an airhead and/or a beachhead to ensure the continuous landing of troops and materiel and provide the maneuver space to conduct follow-on operations. The establishment of the lodgment, followed by the arrival and preparation of follow-on forces, usually marks the end of the forcible entry sub-phase of the operation and a transition to further offensive operations to seize the initiative or dominate. Operation CHROMITE is an example of forcible entry as a major operation with a campaign.

### OPERATION CHROMITE

On September 15, 1950, eighty-three days after North Korea invaded South Korea, a joint command of the United States, Joint Task Force 7, initiated Operation CHROMITE by conducting an amphibious assault on the port of Inchon on Korea’s west coast.

Operation CHROMITE took place on the heels of the retreat of the United States and Republic of Korea forces down the Korean Peninsula in June and July to an enclave on the peninsula’s southern tip. The primary objectives were to land a large force behind the bulk of the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA), recapture South Korea’s capital, Seoul, cut NKPA logistic lines, and provide an “anvil” against which the US Eighth Army, attacking from the south, would crush the NKPA.

Joint Task Force 7 commenced operations at 0630 on September 15th with an assault against the critical island of Wolmi-Do following massive bombardment. By 1800 on September 16th, main landings on Inchon had secured a beachhead.

Various Sources

b. **Dominate.** Forcible entry operations during the dominate phase of a campaign may be used for the following purposes: a coup de main, conducting operational movement and maneuver to attain positional advantage (see Operation CHROMITE vignette), or as a military deception.

   (1) **Coup de Main.** A forcible entry may be designed as a coup de main that will achieve decisive results. Often conducted by small forces conducting short duration, limited objective attacks against opponents with modest but still lethal capabilities, these operations are seldom studied in detail but may be the most likely type of forcible entry in the near future. Operation URGENT FURY (1983) and Operation JUST CAUSE (1989-90) are specific examples of the use of simultaneous operations overwhelming an enemy’s ability to respond. The capitulation of enemy forces usually marks the end of the dominate phase of the operation and a transition to further operations to stabilize and enable civil authority.
(2) Military Deception. The mere existence of a forcible entry capability may be used by the JFC in any phase as a show of force or to force enemy movement even without mounting a forcible entry operation, as with the amphibious demonstration during Operation DESERT STORM (1991).

For further information on phasing, refer to Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

5. Forcible Entry Capabilities

Forcible entry capabilities can be used to force enemy action or inaction. It can be used for deterrence, as a show of force, or as a demonstration, like the amphibious demonstration during Operation DESERT STORM (1991). As long as the potential for a forcible entry exists, the enemy must guard against such operations. This may result in the thinning of enemy combat power at the decisive point selected by the JFC (e.g., during Operation DESERT STORM, two US Marine air-ground task forces (MAGTFs) were embarked on Navy amphibious shipping in the Persian Gulf. As a result, the Iraqis deployed units to defend the Kuwait coastline in anticipation of an amphibious assault that never materialized.) The Armed Forces of the United States have the capability to conduct three primary forcible entry operations: amphibious assault, airborne assault, and air assault. Based upon mission analysis, these operations may be used singularly or in combination to open one or multiple entry points.

a. Amphibious Assault Operations. An amphibious force (AF), composed of an

A US Navy Wasp Class Amphibious Assault Ship underway in the Pacific Ocean.
amphibious task force (ATF) and a landing force (LF), together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations, may project power directly against the enemy in a coup de main or may attack across a beach and/or by vertical envelopment to establish a lodgment to enable the introduction of follow-on forces. In addition to serving as a forcible entry assault force, such forces are capable of conducting follow-on operations from the lodgment. AFs may also be inserted as a follow-on force. An AF with a forcible entry capability may be forward-deployed to quickly initiate or join other forces in a forcible entry operation or as a show of force.

Appendix A, “Amphibious Assault Operations,” and JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, provide more specifics on amphibious operations.

b. Airborne Assault Operations. Airborne forces may be used as the assault force or used in combination with other capabilities for a forcible entry; or they may conduct follow-on operations from a lodgment. As an assault force, airborne forces parachute into the objective area to attack and eliminate armed resistance and secure designated objectives. Airborne forces may also be employed from a lodgment in additional joint combat operations appropriate to their training and equipment. Airborne forces offer the JFC an immediate forcible entry option since they can be launched directly from the continental United States without the delays associated with acquiring intermediate staging bases or re-positioning of sea-based forces.

c. Air Assault Operations. Air assault forces execute forcible entries using fixed-and rotary-wing aircraft. Air assault forces can deploy from land-based facilities and naval platforms. These forces can rapidly project combat power throughout the depth of an operational area.

Appendix B, “Airborne and Air Assault Operations,” provides more specifics on airborne and air assault operations.

OPERATION URGENT FURY

Operation URGENT FURY, the US battle plan for the rescue of American citizens in Grenada, began during the early hours of October 25, 1983 when an elite squad of Navy SEALs [sea-air-land teams], trained in special seaborne operations, landed near St. George’s to secure the Governor’s residence. A short time later, US Marines landed at Pearls Airport on the northeast side of the island aboard armed helicopters from the amphibious assault ship Guam. The Guam was part of a nine-ship task force supporting the operation off the coast of Grenada. Meanwhile, in the south of the island at the Point Salines Airport, Army Rangers (flown in from Savannah, Georgia) conducted an airborne assault to seize the airport. After fierce fighting in the Point Salines area, some six hundred Cubans were captured. This assault allowed
elements of the 82nd Airborne Division to air-land there. In the meantime, US Marines who had landed at Pearls had reembarked on the Guam and were taken by sea to the west side of the island. These Marines landed at Grand Mal Bay just to the north of St. George’s. They secured the Texaco oil farm and the Beau Se’jour wireless relay station with little problem. They quickly overcame resistance from Grenadian troops defending the outskirts of St. George’s and relieved the US Navy SEALs at the Governor General’s mansion.

The capital was taken with little fighting. Its defenses had been softened by repeated air attacks from US planes flying from the USS Independence offshore. The main Grenadian Army camp at Calivigny Point to the east of Point Salines was taken by elements of the 2nd Ranger Battalion on October 27. By October 28 all of the major military objectives had been achieved. By this time over six thousand US troops were on the island.

SOURCE: The Battle for Grenada
Mark Adkin, 1989

6. Multinational Considerations

Forcible entry operations with multinational partners are planned and conducted much the same as a US joint force operation. However, there are a number of aspects that are unique to multinational operations that the commander of a US joint force may not encounter that must be taken into consideration. Attaining unity of effort through unity of command for a multinational operation may not be politically feasible, but it should be a goal. There must be a common understanding among all national forces of the overall aim of the multinational force and the plan for its attainment.

For additional information, see JP 3-16, Multinational Operations. For information specific to US participation in NATO operations see the appropriate Allied joint publications and Allied tactical publications.
CHAPTER II
COMMAND AND CONTROL

“... a superior command system may serve as a force multiplier and compensate for weaknesses... such as numerical inferiority or the politically induced need to leave the initiative to the enemy.”

Martin van Creveld
Command in War, 1985

1. Purpose

This chapter provides guidance on the employment options, organization of the forcible entry operational area, command relationships, and major C2 functions that support the conduct of joint forcible entry operations.

2. Force Employment

The JFC should determine the forcible entry capability or combination of capabilities needed to accomplish the mission. Unity of command is vital when amphibious, airborne, and air assault operations are combined. Forcible entry is usually a complex operation and should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. All elements of the joint force and supporting commands should understand the commander’s intent, concept of the operation, scheme of maneuver, and coordination requirements.

   a. If the decision is made to use a combination of forcible entry capabilities to seize a lodgment, the JFC must decide whether to conduct the forcible entries as concurrent or integrated operations. **Concurrent operations** occur when a combination of amphibious assault, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entry operations are conducted simultaneously, but as **distinct operations with separate operational areas and objectives** (e.g., the amphibious assault operation around Pearl’s Airport and the airborne operation at Point Salinas in Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY). **Integrated forcible entry operations** result when amphibious assault, airborne, and/or air assault forcible entries are conducted simultaneously **within the same operational area and with objectives that are mutually supporting** (e.g., the airborne operation in support of the amphibious assault landings in Normandy during Operation OVERLORD). Integrated forcible entry operations feature the complementary employment of forces and seek to maximize the capabilities of the respective forces available to the commander.

   b. The distinction between concurrent and integrated operations has implications for organizing forces, establishing command relationships, and applying force to accomplish the mission. **The JFC must consider the unique aspects of the specific operation** and should organize the force, establish command relationships, and apply force in a manner that fits the current situation. Factors that may impact the establishing authority’s decision include the following:
(1) The responsibility for the preponderance of the mission.

(2) Time, phase, and duration of the operation.

(3) Force capabilities.

(4) Threat.

(5) C2 capabilities.

(6) The operational environment.

(7) Recommendations from subordinate commanders.

(8) Follow-on missions, anticipated operations, or transition considerations based upon the objective(s) of the overall operation or larger campaign plan.

(9) The diplomatic and politico-military environment.

3. Organization of the Forcible Entry Operational Area

   a. Maintaining Operational Area Access. JFCs establish and maintain access to operational areas where they are likely to operate, ensuring forward presence, basing (to include availability of airfields), freedom of navigation, and cooperation with allied and/or coalition nations to enhance operational reach. In part, this effort is national or multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater air and sea LOCs.

   b. Operational area is an overarching term encompassing more descriptive terms for geographic areas in which military operations are conducted. Operational areas include, but are not limited to area of operations (AO), amphibious objective area (AOA), and joint special operations area (JSOA). The JFC may designate operational areas on a temporary basis to facilitate the coordination, integration, and deconfliction among joint force components and supporting commands. Operational areas have physical dimensions comprised of some combination of air, land, and maritime domains and are defined by geographical boundaries.

   c. Area of Operations. JFCs may define AOs for land and maritime forces. AOs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for the land and maritime component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs may designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. For example, the joint force land component commander (JFLCC) may assign subordinate commanders separate AOs within an assigned airborne or air assault AO, or an AOA. These subordinate commanders employ the full range of joint and Service doctrinal control measures and graphics to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, safeguard friendly forces and civilians, and promote unity of effort.
d. **Amphibious Objective Area.** An AOA is described as a geographical area, delineated in the initiating directive, for purposes of C2, within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the AF. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the AF’s mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations.

e. **Joint Special Operations Area.** The JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, assigned by a JFC to the commander of a joint SO force to conduct SO activities. The JFC may establish a JSOA when geographic boundaries between special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces are the most suitable control measures. Establishment of a JSOA for SOF to conduct operations provides a control measure and assists in the prevention of fratricide. The commander, joint special operations task force (CDRJSOTF) may also request the establishment of a JSOA. When a JSOA is designated, the CDRJSOTF is the supported commander within the designated JSOA. The CDRJSOTF may further assign a specific area or sector within the JSOA to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the SOF mission, operational environment, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of SOF deployed into a JSOA. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare (UW) operations.

f. **Airspace Control Area.** The airspace control area for the forcible entry operation is that airspace laterally defined by the boundaries that delineate the operational area. This airspace may include sub-areas. This airspace may entail any operational area and is a means of planning and dividing responsibility. While an operational area is in existence, airspace control within the operational area is in accordance with JFC guidance, the airspace control plan, and airspace control order.

g. **Control and Coordination Measures.** Control and coordination of forcible entry operations pose a particularly difficult challenge to all elements of the joint force. In addressing this challenge, the JFCs and appropriate commanders may employ various control and coordination measures that will facilitate the execution of operations and, at the same time, protect the force to the greatest possible degree. These measures include, but are not limited to, boundaries that circumscribe operational areas; control measures to facilitate joint force maneuver; fire support coordination measures (FSCMs); and airspace coordinating measures.

### 4. Command Relationships for Forcible Entry Operations

a. **JFC Authority.** JFCs have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they are organized and trained.

b. The combatant commander (CCDR) may organize the forcible entry force as a subordinate joint task force (JTF) or the forcible entry force may be organized from an
existing component. An initiating directive will provide guidance on command relationships and other pertinent instructions for the duration of the forcible entry operation.

See JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, for guidance.

c. **Functional Component Commanders.** The multiple complex tasks confronting the JFC may challenge the JFC’s span of control and ability to oversee and influence each task. Designating a joint force functional component commander for a particular functional area allows resolution of joint issues at the functional component level and enhances component interaction at that level. In a large operation, delegating control of the forcible entry operation to a functional component commander will permit the JFC to focus on other responsibilities in the operational area. Based on the JFC’s guidance, the forcible entry operation may be conducted by functional component commanders. If organized under functional lines, the following information is relevant.

1. **Joint Force Land Component Commander.** The JFLCC’s overall responsibilities and roles are to plan, coordinate, and employ designated forces/capabilities for joint land operations in support of the JFC’s CONOPS. The JFLCC will normally command forcible entry operations that involve airborne assaults or air assaults that originate from land bases, and will typically designate the commander, airborne/air assault force (CAF).

2. **Joint Force Maritime Component Commander.** The joint force maritime component commander’s (JFMCC’s) overall responsibilities and roles are to plan, coordinate, and employ designated forces/capabilities for joint maritime operations in support of the JFC’s CONOPS. The JFMCC will normally command forcible entry operations that involve amphibious operations or air assaults that originate from the sea, and typically will designate and establish the command relationship between the commander, ATF (CATF) and the commander, LF (CLF) based on the mission, nature and duration of the operation, force capabilities, and C2 capabilities.

3. **Joint Force Air Component Commander.** The joint force air component commander (JFACC) synchronizes and integrates the actions of assigned, attached, and supporting air capabilities/forces in time, space, and purpose in support of the JFC’s CONOPS. The JFACC must closely coordinate with the supported functional component commander or JTF commander to establish airspace control and air defense plans in support of the forcible entry operation as discussed below.

d. **ATF and LF Commanders.** If the forcible entry operation is an amphibious assault, it will include air and land assaults that originate from the sea. The JFC will organize the amphibious force in such a way as to best accomplish the mission based on the CONOPS. The command relationships established among the CATF, CLF, and other designated commanders of the amphibious force is an important decision. An establishing directive is essential to ensure unity of effort within the amphibious force. Normally, a support relationship is established between the CATF and CLF by the JFC or establishing authority.
For additional information on C2 by functional component commanders, see JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, and JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime Operations. For further details on amphibious command relationships, see JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

e. C2 of Special Operations Forces. When directed, Commander, US Special Operations Command provides continental United States-based SOF to a GCC. The GCC normally exercises combatant command (command authority) of assigned and operational control of attached SOF through a commander, theater special operations command (TSOC), a subunified commander. When a GCC establishes and employs multiple JTFs and independent task forces (TFs) concurrently, the TSOC commander may establish and employ multiple joint special operations task forces (JSOTFs) to manage SOF assets and accommodate JTF/TF SO requirements. Accordingly, the GCC, as the common superior, normally will establish support or tactical control command relationships between the JSOTF commanders and JTF/TF commanders.

f. Forcible Entry Employing a Combination of Forces. Forcible entry operations employing a combination of airborne, air assault, SOF, and amphibious forces (to include multinational forces with these capabilities), may be under the command of the JFC or a Service or functional component commander and must be closely coordinated. The command relationships between the JFC and subordinate component commanders are critical to success of these operations. Once the forcible entry has been accomplished, follow-on or transition operations may require changes in command relationships to support

Effective and efficient airspace management complements and supports the joint force commander's operational objectives.
the JFC’s campaign plan. Supporting operations will be coordinated with the supported commander.

g. Command Relationships During Planning. Forcible entry operations can have unique command relationships during the planning phase to ensure that air, land, maritime, space, and SO considerations are factored into decisions made concerning the conduct of the forcible entry operation.

5. Airspace Control

Airspace management increases combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace with a minimum of restraint placed on airspace users — all while complementing and supporting the JFC’s operational objectives. C2 of airspace requires two key elements: a control authority and a control system.

For further details on airspace control, refer to JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.

a. Airspace Control Authority. The JFC normally designates an airspace control authority (ACA), who has overall responsibility for establishing and operating the airspace control system. The ACA monitors, assesses, and controls operational area airspace and directs changes in accordance with the JFC’s intent.

(1) Airspace Control Authority During Amphibious Operations. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations, and JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control, provide detailed discussions on airspace control during amphibious assault operations.

(2) Airspace Control Authority During Airborne/Air Assault Force Operations. When an airborne/air assault force is the supported entry force in a forcible entry operation, the air component commander for the operation or JFACC (if designated) may use airborne C2 assets to enhance coordination and control of joint air operations and airspace management.

(a) The distances involved and the duration of airborne and air assault operations may require establishing special air traffic control facilities or special tactics teams to extend detailed control into the objective area.

(b) The volume of air traffic throughout the airhead demands careful coordination to limit potential conflict and to enable the success of mission-essential operations within the airhead. A high-density airspace control zone (HIDACZ) may be established around a drop zone (DZ) or landing zone (LZ), which includes sufficient terrain and airspace to permit safe and efficient air traffic control. The HIDACZ can be nominated by the ground force commander and should, at a minimum, include the airspace bounded by the airhead line. Within the HIDACZ, all aircraft flights should be coordinated with the DZ, LZ, and the agency responsible for controlling the joint airspace. The air mission commander coordinates with the assault force commander to select the time on target and the direction of approach into and through the airhead.
b. Airspace Control System. The forces involved in the operation largely determine the choices available to the ACA in designating an airspace control system to control joint air operations; system interoperability will also be a major determining factor. For the airspace control system to function effectively, the ACA must maximize and enhance the capabilities of the collective force using existing control systems.

1. **Airspace Control System During Amphibious Operations.** In this situation, the tactical air control system will normally be the system used to control joint air operations within the AOA. The system provides the capability for autonomous airspace control operations, airspace management, and air defense operations and consists of two elements: the **Navy tactical air control system (NTACS)** and the **Marine air command and control system (MACCS)**. NTACS controls the initial phase of the operation. Air control is incrementally transferred from NTACS to MACCS as the force is established ashore. Once control has been passed ashore, NTACS takes a back-up role to MACCS for landward air operations but may continue to control seaward air operations in a subordinate role to MACCS.

2. **Airspace Control System During Airborne/Air Assault Force Operations.** The ACA will normally control the airspace through the **theater air control system (TACS)** and the **Army air-ground system (AAGS)** in forcible entries. Situations may limit establishment of ground systems and require airborne or seabased systems to conduct airspace control. Commanders and staffs should closely monitor and plan the employment of critical communication nodes within TACS/AAGS.

6. **Air Defense Command and Control**

   The operational area, including ingress and egress routes, must be fully protected by an integrated air defense system consisting of air, land, maritime, and space assets. The joint force is particularly vulnerable to attacks by enemy aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles during the early stages of a forcible entry. Accordingly, the primary objectives for air defense operations are to assist in gaining air superiority. The area air defense commander (AADC) is responsible for integrating the joint force air defense effort. All available surface-to-air assets should be incorporated into the overall air defense plan and comply with procedures and weapons control measures established by the AADC. The AADC will exercise a degree of control of all systems through established guidelines, determination of weapons control status, and JFC-approved procedural controls.

   a. **Air Defense C2 During an Amphibious Assault**

      1. The AADC bears overall responsibility for defensive counterair operations of the joint force. The AADC may, however, divide the airspace into regions or sectors with regional air defense commanders (RADCs) or sector air defense commanders (SADCs) to enhance the decentralized execution of the defensive counterair operations.

      2. The CATF is usually designated RADC for the airspace allocated for amphibious operations. The CATF and CLF will coordinate active defense plans and
procedures with the establishing authority of the amphibious operation and the AADC. The CATF usually assigns an air defense commander (ADC), normally on the most capable air defense platform, to carry out air defense operations. The ADC coordinates with the tactical air control center (TACC) afloat to maintain a current air picture. If the ADC is not collocated with the TACC afloat, close coordination between the ADC and TACC afloat is essential.

(3) As LF air defenses are established ashore, the CLF will coordinate with the CATF to create an airspace sector and assume responsibility as SADC for the landward sector of the airspace allocated to the AF. Upon concurrence from the CATF, the ADC will pass responsibility of the landward sector to the LF control agency while retaining overall ADC responsibility in the AOA as well as coordination duties with the JFC’s AADC and ACA.

(4) When an AOA is established, airspace assigned to the AF usually includes a margin of airspace surrounding the AOA called the amphibious defense zone (ADZ). An ADZ is the area encompassing the AOA and the adjoining airspace required by accompanying naval forces for the purpose of air defense. The actual size and shape of an ADZ is dependent upon capabilities of air defense platforms assigned to the CATF; the size of the AOA; and agreement between the AF’s RADC, the AADC, and adjacent ADC. Within the ADZ, the AF air defense agency maintains positive identification of all aircraft and conducts air defense within established rules of engagement (ROE) and air defense procedures.

b. Air Defense C2 During Airborne/Air Assault

(1) During air movement to the operational area, the AADC will normally control air defense operations from an airborne platform (e.g., Airborne Warning and Control System). In practice, extended distances from staging bases to designated AOs may require the AADC to delegate control responsibilities to an air control element on board the airborne platform. Initial air defense assets may be limited to fighter aircraft only. Control of these aircraft will normally be exercised through established procedural controls.

(2) Forces initially entering the AO will be accompanied by organic short-range air defense systems that must be integrated into the air defense C2 architecture. Planned procedural control measures and guidelines may be established by the AADC to expedite integration of assets.

(3) With force buildup and the introduction of follow-on forces into the lodgment area, more robust high to medium altitude air defense systems will likely become available. These systems must establish communications with the AADC’s C2 agency and be incorporated into the established air defense system.

(4) Once established, designated AADC control and reporting centers will normally assume air defense control responsibilities for forces external to an established AOA or AO as defined by the JFC or the initiating directive.
(5) **Specific implications for forces supporting CAF are addressed below.**

(a) Participating naval aircraft may be placed under the control of the appropriate C2 agency.

(b) In some circumstances, naval air defense systems aboard participating ships may be limited. Accordingly, the AADC must take measures to ensure that a supporting AF is protected by other means.

7. **Communications**

Communications systems supporting forcible entry operations must be **interoperable, agile, trusted, and shared.** Interoperability can be achieved through commonality, compatibility, standardization, and liaison. To support agile forces and operational concepts, the communications system must also be agile. The joint force must have confidence in the capabilities of the network and the validity of the information made available by the network. Sharing allows for the mutual use of information services or capabilities between entities in the operational area. Typical forcible entry operations communications will employ single and multichannel tactical satellites (TACSATs); commercial satellite communications (SATCOM); and single-channel ultrahigh frequency (UHF), very high frequency, and high frequency radios. The communications system directorate of a joint staff (J-6) is responsible for providing input to orders and plans, and coordinating communications system support and services during operations.

a. **Communications System Planning.** Once the JFC establishes the specific C2 organization for the forcible entry operation, the information exchange requirements are established as communications system planning begins. Communications system planning must be an integral part of joint force planning. The J-6 is responsible for planning and establishing the communications system and the communications estimate of supportability during course of action (COA) development and selection under the crisis action planning (CAP) process. Communications system planning must be conducted in close coordination with the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) to identify specialized equipment and dissemination requirements for some types of information. Because communications systems must be built-up at the objective area, some aspects of communications support are unique in forcible entry operations.

For further details on communications system planning, refer to JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

b. **Communications Support for Amphibious Force Operations.** Communications requirements vary with the size and composition of the AF and must support the specific needs of each phase of the operation. Plans must accommodate the potential increase in requirements for long-range communications to support dispersed forces over extended distances. **Communications for amphibious assault operations must integrate C2 systems** that control naval surface fire support, ship-to-shore movement, joint air operations, assault vehicle control, surface fire support, and logistics. The CATF
coordinates C2 system requirements with the CLF and other forces within the AF and establishes an integrated C2 plan. The plan, designed to fully support the operation plan (OPLAN), reflects the requirements of the JFC, CATF, CLF, and other subordinate commanders as appropriate.

(1) The CATF is responsible for the following:

(a) Preparation and promulgation of a coordinated plan for employment of AF communications during the operation.

(b) Acquisition and assignment of necessary communications assets to subordinate elements of the force.

(c) Providing necessary shipboard C2 facilities and services in support of the embarked LF.

(d) Development of a coordinated communications plan for the ATF for inclusion in the overall C2 systems support plan.

(e) Development and promulgation of a plan for communications connectivity with other maritime forces.

(2) The CLF is responsible for the following:

(a) Development of a coordinated communications plan for the LF component of the AF for inclusion in the overall force C2 systems support plan.

(b) Development and promulgation of a plan for communications connectivity with other ground forces ashore.

(c) Establishment of computer and network requirements while embarked.

(d) Identification of connectivity requirements prior to movement ashore for follow-on operations, if required.

(3) Other commanders of the AF are responsible for determination of their C2 systems requirements and submission of those requirements.

c. Communications Support for Airborne/Air Assault Force Operations. Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition, geography, and location of the joint force and the senior headquarters. Significant considerations for airborne and air assault operations include the use of intermediate staging bases (ISBs) and airborne C2 platforms, which can add to the complexity of managing the communications architecture. Airborne/air assault forces will initially deploy with a limited communications capability, largely based on UHF SATCOM. Communications
support becomes more robust as signal units and equipment enter the operational area via airdrop or are air landed into the airhead.

(1) **C2 relationships, nets, frequency management, codes, navigational aids, and any other communication issues must be resolved before the assault phase begins.**

(2) **Long-range radio communications may be necessary** with US-based forces or ISBs to facilitate control of personnel, supplies, and equipment into the airhead or lodgment. **Long-range communications are initially established from higher to lower headquarters.** The higher headquarters may be on land, sea, or air and may maintain contact through retransmission and relay sites. The communications plan must ensure interoperability with the overall joint force communications architecture and provide the redundancy for CAF and subordinate commanders to adequately command and control operations.

(3) **Ground commanders in airlift aircraft may communicate with the chain of command over the Army secure en route communications package.** Normally, the airlift mission commander and the airborne force commander are in the same aircraft. The senior ground commander can advise embarked ground commanders of changes in the ground tactical situation or to the air movement plan.

(4) **Airborne/air assault forcible entry operations require the use of redundant airborne and ground command posts.** Normally, a joint force airborne command post will operate from a joint airborne communications center and command post, while a command post from the airborne/air assault force will operate from fixed-wing platform with required communications installed or a specially configured C2 rotary-wing aircraft.

(5) **TACSAT downlink and other en route communications systems** can be used to communicate with United States Air Force (USAF) special tactics teams, air mobility liaison officers, contingency response elements, and contingency response teams in objective areas. The use of **special navigational aids and homing devices** to direct aircraft to specified areas (e.g., a designated DZ) may be necessary. Specialized airborne/air assault force personnel (e.g., special tactics teams or long-range surveillance units) are equipped with **navigational aids, global positioning systems**, and **homing devices**. These teams will be employed early to guide the airborne/air assault forces, and provide reconnaissance, surveillance, visual flight rules service, and limited instrument flight rules air traffic control service. Other joint force assets such as SOF or Marine force reconnaissance elements are also capable of performing some of these functions.

8. **Rules of Engagement**

   a. ROE are developed by the Joint Staff and CCDRs and reviewed and approved by the President and Secretary of Defense (SecDef) for promulgation and dissemination. ROE ensure actions, especially force employment, are consistent with military objectives, domestic and international law, and national policy. Joint forces operate in accordance with
applicable ROE, conduct warfare in compliance with international laws, and fight within restraints and constraints specified by their commanders. Properly developed ROE must be clear, tailored to the situation, reviewed for legal sufficiency, and included in training. ROE typically will vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation. The challenge for a JFC is to ensure that the ROE for a forcible entry operation provides the commander with the flexibility to accomplish the mission, while assuring adherence to political, legal, operational, and diplomatic factors the force may encounter. The ROE also provides a specified level of protection to those persons and/or objects entitled to protected status.

For additional information on ROE, see Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.

b. Forcible entry operations are normally characterized by a high operational tempo and violent execution. Circumstances may require unexpected changes to ROE. Commanders must be attuned to changes in the tactical and political situations, specifically as they relate to ROE, and ensure that members of their force receive timely notification of ROE changes.

c. To mitigate unnecessary loss of life and unintended collateral damage, commanders should ensure that members of their force are adequately trained in the application of force; from nonlethal to lethal.

9. Fratricide Prevention

a. The complexity of forcible entry operations increases the potential for fratricide and demands efforts by all elements of the joint force to deliberately reduce the risk of fratricide. Friendly force tracking provides JFCs with enhanced situational awareness that can help to reduce fratricide.

b. Primary Mechanisms for Fratricide Prevention. Detailed integration of maneuver and fire support is required to prevent fratricide. Coordination center personnel seek to prevent fratricide through close coordination at all levels by maintaining situational awareness. Use of FSCMs, coordination of position areas, and the consideration of the locations of friendly forces during target analysis all contribute to safeguarding friendly units.

For further details on preventing fratricide, refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats; JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support; JP 3-09.1, Laser Designation Operations, JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support (CAS); and JP 3-52, Joint Airspace Control.
CHAPTER III
PLANNING

“Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple before the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations before-hand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: How much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can see who is likely to win or lose.”

Sun Tzu, c. 500 BC
The Art of War

1. Purpose

This chapter provides information on planning forcible entry operations. Existing joint planning processes and considerations are used in planning these operations.

2. Forcible Entry and the Joint Planning Process

Joint planning is conducted through a disciplined process by policies and procedures established in the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and joint operation planning process (JOPP) (see Figure III-1). In addition to facilitating contingency planning, these processes have additional procedures for crisis action planning and for time-sensitive development of operation orders when a forcible entry operation requirement occurs with little or no warning.

   a. Forcible entry operations require extensive joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE). The primary purpose of JIPOE is to support the JFC’s decision-making and planning by identifying, analyzing, and estimating the enemy’s centers of gravity, critical factors, capabilities, limitations, requirements, vulnerabilities, intentions, and COAs that are most likely to be encountered by the entry force.

   b. Time, distance, physical attributes of the operational area, agreement/arrangement with other host nations, or the nature of the crisis may dictate the deployment of a joint force to staging areas outside the US. Likewise, authorizations may be required to conduct advance force operations in the operational area to prepare the operational environment for the introduction of combat forces. Commanders and operational planners may have to compress planning timelines to meet time-sensitive mission requirements. **Time-sensitive situations will likely demand:** establishing joint staffs and exchanging liaison personnel as soon as command relationships are defined; conducting parallel planning at all command levels; establishing the supporting intelligence architecture from national to tactical levels; pre-positioning airlift and sealift with supported units; loading unit sets of equipment on surge sealift ships at US or allied seaports of embarkation (SPOEs); directing the movement of sea-based pre-positioned equipment to the operational area; embarking personnel and equipment at US or allied aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs); and conducting reconnaissance operations.
c. Forcible entry will require well-trained, well-prepared, joint forces capable of executing operations on short-notice. It is essential that all key elements associated with the operation are included in the planning forum from the onset. This ensures resources needed are available in a timely manner and that ample time is available for preparation. When operations require specialists, it is essential that the requirements are identified early and those organizations are included in planning.

3. Forcible Entry Planning Considerations

JOPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions across the range of military operations. The process is designed to facilitate interaction between commander, staff, and subordinate headquarters throughout planning. Often forcible entry planning occurs within CAP. The JFC, staff, and subordinate and/or supporting commanders and staffs follow JOPP and consider the following factors when developing forcible entry operations.

a. **Initiation.** The President, SecDef, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may initiate planning for forcible entry operations to develop military options to respond to a potential or actual crisis. Additionally, GCCs and other commanders may initiate planning on their own authority when they identify a planning requirement not directed by higher authority.
b. **Mission Analysis.** The joint force mission describes the essential task or set of tasks, together with the purpose, clearly indicating the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. In analyzing a forcible entry operation, the JFC and staff consider:

2. A thorough JIPOE, including:
   - Threat to joint forces en route to, and operating in, the operational area.
   - Geography of the operational area.
   - Lodgment terrain and infrastructure, with a critical eye on the ability to support follow-on operations.
3. Operational reach and approach.
4. Forces available including multinational and indigenous.
5. Time available.
6. Strategic and operational aims, including the military end state.
7. Command relationships and force composition.
8. Combat power required to achieve operational objectives.
9. Operational restrictions that may inhibit subordinate commanders.
10. Initial staff estimates.
11. Media and public perception.
12. Political environment.

*For more discussion on staff estimates, see JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.*

c. **COA Development.** In the development of a forcible entry COA, five phases are addressed: preparation and deployment, assault, stabilization of the lodgment, introduction of follow-on forces, and termination or transition. To produce a valid COA the following should be considered (Chapter IV, “Operations,” further expands on the five phases):

1. **Phase I (Preparation and Deployment).** Considerations include the following:
(a) Determine the forcible entry option(s) to be executed, how those operations will support campaign success, and the command relationships required.

(b) Determine deployment sequencing of forces that supports gaining access into the objective area, the initial assault, reinforcement, and the introduction of follow-on forces.

(c) Determine requirements for local air and maritime superiority to conduct the forcible entry operation.

(d) Determine forcible entry go/no-go criteria.

(e) Determine logistic factors and establishing airhead and beachhead resupply responsibilities.

(2) **Phase II (Assault).** Considerations include the following:

(a) Analyzing objectives and potential lodgment with regard to:

1. The proposed ground tactical plan.
2. Potential capability for air and sea landing of personnel and equipment.
3. Space within the lodgment and maneuver space for future operations.
4. Vulnerability to interdiction and counterattacks.

(b) Operating facilities and/or infrastructure to support operations.

(c) Identify forces securing airheads and/or beachheads (e.g., advance, pre-assault, and landing forces).

(d) Reception of reinforcing forces (if required) and follow-on forces for subsequent operations.

(3) **Phase III (Stabilization of the Lodgment).** Considerations include the following:

(a) Identify the requirements for reinforcing forces and projected deployment flow, with attention to:

1. Cross-loading among lift assets.
2. Task-organized by arrival sequence.
(b) Identify potential restrictions and/or limitations in force flow, and eliminating and/or reducing accordingly.

(c) Establish redundancy of force capability in deployment flow for added flexibility.

(d) Establish call-forward procedures for reinforcing forces, if required.

(e) Calculate throughput capability of ports of debarkation.

(f) Determine preparation requirements needed to reinforce forces for combat on arrival.

(g) Determine requirements for expansion of the lodgment.

(h) Establish force link-up procedures.

(4) **Phase IV (Introduction of Follow-on Forces).** Considerations include the following:

(a) Identifying tasks for follow-on forces.

(b) Preparing for arrival of follow-on forces.

(c) Coordinating arrival and/or disposition of any allocated maritime pre-positioning force (MPF) and Army pre-positioned stocks (APS).

(5) **Phase V (Termination or Transition).** Considerations include the following:

(a) Continuing planning and coordination actions initiated in early phases.

(b) Planning for reconstitution and redeployment of the assault force.

(c) Planning to terminate the forcible entry portion of the joint operation.

(d) Planning for transition to follow-on operations or termination of the entire joint operation. Planning for follow-on operations may include planning requirements for the use of nonlethal weapons.

(e) Planning for hand over to civil authorities (if applicable).

d. **COA Analysis and Wargaming.** The commander and staff will analyze each COA separately according to the commander’s guidance to bring out relevant factors in each COA. Wargaming provides the means for the commander and participants to analyze a COA and obtain insights not otherwise discernable.
e. **COA Comparison.** The staff will evaluate COAs using governing factors identified during the wargame in order to identify the COA with the highest probability of success.

f. **COA Approval.** The staff determines the best COA and presents a recommendation to the commander for approval.

g. **Plan or Order Development.** Contingency planning results in plan development, while CAP typically will lead directly to operation order (OPORD) development.

*JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, provides guidance regarding JOPES and JOPP.*
CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONS

“Success in war depends upon the Golden Rule of War. Speed—Simplicity—Boldness.”

GEN George S. Patton
Inscribed in his field notebook

1. Purpose

This chapter provides information on the execution of forcible entry operations. Section A describes the five phases of a forcible entry operation and discusses the integration and synchronization of these operations in the context of the forcible entry phases. Section B focuses on supporting operations such as intelligence, IO, and SO in support of forcible entry operations.

SECTION A. INTEGRATION AND SYNCHRONIZATION

2. Introduction

a. General. This section highlights some common issues and considerations that integrate and synchronize activities during a forcible entry operation. The discussion that follows is not a checklist, but may be used by JFCs and staffs as appropriate to meet their specific needs.

b. Rehearsals. In order to integrate, synchronize, and confirm the timing of an operation, the JFC may choose to conduct a rehearsal (other benefits of rehearsals are listed in Figure IV-1). Rehearsals at the operational level range in scope from joint force exercises (driven by resource, time, space, and force availability constraints), to command post exercises supported by computer aided-simulations, to commanders and/or key personnel conferences. The decision to conduct rehearsals will be influenced by the time available and by OPSEC considerations.

3. Forcible Entry Operations Phases

Forcible entry operations are normally conducted during the “Seize the Initiative” or “Dominate” phase of a joint operation. Within the context of these phases established by a higher-level JFC, the forcible entry operation commander may establish additional phases that fit the forcible entry CONOPS. Forcible entry operations may be planned and executed in the five phases listed in Figure IV-2. Planning for each phase must include branch and sequel planning. Transitions between these phases are designed to be distinct shifts in focus by the joint force, often accompanied by changes in command or support relationships. The activities that predominate during a given phase, however, rarely align with neatly definable breakpoints. The need to move into another phase normally is identified by assessing that a set of objectives are achieved or that the enemy has acted in a
manner that requires a major change in focus for the joint force and is therefore usually event driven, not time driven. Changing the focus of the operation takes time and may require changing commander’s objectives, desired effects, measures of effectiveness, priorities, command relationships, force allocation, or even the organization of the operational area.

For further information on phasing in joint operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

a. **Preparation and Deployment (Phase I).** Forcible entry operations are conducted by organizations whose force structures permit rapid deployment into the objective area. Joint forces may deploy directly to the operational area or to staging areas to prepare for subsequent operations.

   (1) **Planning.** The JFC, the component commanders, and their staffs must be intimately involved in planning and executing the deployment of forces to the operational area. Planning must begin as early as possible, including developing contingencies during peacetime. Staffs should plan all phases, including transition.

   (2) **Movement.** Forcible entry operations involve movement planning from both strategic and operational perspectives. These operations involve movement from
marshalling areas as well as loading and departure from ports and ISBs for the sequenced movement of forces to objective area(s) in accordance with the OPORD. During this phase, the forcible entry force will typically conduct rehearsals of the operation as time and resources permit.

(3) **Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.** Increased intelligence collection efforts focus on gathering information to satisfy priority intelligence requirements that the JFC requires and determining if the required conditions for the assault have been established (e.g., local air superiority has been achieved). **Reconnaissance and surveillance assets** (e.g., SOF) may be inserted into the objective area during this phase as part of this effort. SOF may be introduced to the area well in advance of a possible assault to conduct special reconnaissance or UW to develop and prepare the area. UW and the use of surrogate forces can significantly reduce opposition to the assault.

(4) **Transition to Assault.** During Phase I, the joint force sets the conditions that are required for a successful assault, achieving air, sea, and space superiority and isolating the lodgment. Air interdiction, naval surface fire support (NSFS), SOF missions, and/or other actions to prepare assault objectives will normally occur prior to the commitment of assault forces. In other situations, political or operational considerations may preclude such actions prior to the initiation of the assault phase of the operation.
b. Assault (Phase II). Phase II begins with joint force assaults to seize initial objectives in the lodgment and concludes with the consolidation of those objectives.

(1) Initial Assaults. Initial assaults are designed to surprise and overwhelm the enemy with decisive force and to protect assault forces as they accomplish assigned missions. SOF may be employed to precede assault forces to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the operational area; and/or to conduct reconnaissance, surveillance, and interdiction operations well beyond the initial assault objectives. Opening entry points will involve actual assault by various combinations of amphibious and airborne forces to achieve a coup de main or enable follow-on operations through the seizure of existing ports and airfields or the establishment of expeditionary facilities. SOF may be used in combination with naval forces to conduct assaults to open entry points. Planning for this phase may include pre-assault strikes by cruise missiles, armed unmanned aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft, attack helicopters, and/or NSFS to destroy enemy forces in the objective areas and/or enemy ground force reserves, aircraft, theater missiles, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and naval forces that could disrupt the operation. Assault forces may use multiple approaches and entry points to deceive the adversary and diminish his ability to observe, orient, decide, and act.

(2) Overcoming Obstacles. The JFC will be faced with natural and man-made obstacles intended to restrict or halt movement that allows the enemy to mass its forces and repel the assault. Naval mine countermeasures (MCM) forces may be required to conduct

Planning for the initial assault phase may include pre-assault strikes by cruise missiles, armed unmanned aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft, attack helicopters, and/or naval surface fire support.
MCM operations in order to clear transit and assault lanes of sea-based mines and/or obstacles in order to facilitate rapid movement of landing forces and follow-on forces from the sea. Combat engineers enhance the mobility of assault forces on land by clearing roads and airfields of explosive hazards, mines, and obstacles and by conducting forward aviation combat engineering operations.

(3) **Main Assault.** Landing forces will enter objective areas via parachute assault, air landing forces, helicopter-borne air assault, and/or amphibious assault. Throughout the assault phase, **landed forces must have immediately available joint fire support** to destroy, interdict, or suppress enemy forces and missile defense. The joint force must maintain the initiative and rapidly prepare to receive follow-on forces to develop the combat power necessary to secure the lodgment. CAS and naval surface fire support are critical resources during the assault. Depending on resources available to the JFC, the **introduction of landing forces may be combined with simultaneous strikes against other key enemy assets** throughout the operational area in order to prevent the enemy’s ability to react effectively.

(4) **Transition to Stabilizing the Lodgment.** The assault may be capped by offensive, defensive, or retrograde operations as described by the JFC’s operational concept, and by the introduction of follow-on forces to assist in securing the lodgment and continue on to follow-on operations without an operational pause.

c. **Stabilization of the Lodgment (Phase III).** Stabilization involves **securing the lodgment** to protect the force and ensure the continuous landing of personnel and materiel, **organizing the lodgment** to support the increasing flow of forces and logistic resource requirements, and **expanding the lodgment** as required to support the joint force in preparing for and executing follow-on operations. Force buildup begins with the securing of objectives by assault forces and must be consistent with the overall operation or campaign plan with regard to the proper balance of combat forces and logistics required to conduct subsequent operations. The joint force takes immediate steps to optimize lodgment throughput capabilities.

(1) **Securing the Lodgment.** Whether the forcible entry is envisioned as the establishment of a lodgment to enable future combat operations, or as a coup de main, the lodgment must be secured and protected in order for it to serve as an entry point for follow-on forces and sustainment. Based on the JFC’s analysis of the threat and available forces, the lodgment is expanded as required. Lodgment security is continuous and enables organization and expansion.

(2) **Organizing the Lodgment.** Details concerning the introduction of follow-on forces must be prepared during the planning phase of the operation. Commanders introduce reinforcing forces as required based on the tactical situation. All means of delivery are exploited to maximize combat power in the lodgment. Aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) and seaports of debarkation (SPODs) must be secured and repaired as necessary. Appropriate logistic and communications infrastructure must be established as quickly as possible to facilitate the reception of follow-on forces.
The joint force must maintain the initiative and rapidly prepare to receive follow-on forces to develop the combat power necessary to secure the lodgment.

(3) **Expanding the Lodgment.** Expansion is when the lodgment is not fully established and the introduction of combat power significantly contributes to the development of the security situation. During the expansion, the capacity of ground forces to maintain the lodgment in the face of a coherent enemy response should significantly increase.

(4) **Transition to Introducing Follow-on Forces.** Though intended to conduct follow-on operations, in extreme circumstances, follow-on forces may be required to assist assault forces in the seizure of initial objectives, or may be used to help secure and defend the lodgment. Provisions must be made to clear follow-on supplies and equipment immediately from offload points to maximize airlift and sealift efficiency. The joint force must avoid an unnecessary operational pause. The tempo of operations directed against the enemy must be maintained to prevent the enemy from reorganizing and effectively countering the establishment of the lodgment.

d. **Introduction of Follow-on Forces (Phase IV).** *(Note: This phase is required when subsequent operations are planned for conduct in or from the lodgment.)* Follow-on forces provide the JFC with increased flexibility to conduct operations as required by operational conditions; once the lodgment has been established with APODs and SPODs, a joint security area may be identified and developed to facilitate and provide security for subsequent support operations. Follow-on forces and equipment may flow via air LOCs and SLOCs into the APODs and SPODs located within the now-established lodgment. During this phase, joint logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations commence in earnest.
Follow-on forces may also deploy to the operational area to link up with pre-positioned equipment. Initially, airfield operations may be conducted in a combat environment. Airfield operations and security should conform to currently published guidance and in accordance with any valid intra-service agreements or plans. Once the airfield is secure and open for full operations, improvements can be made to provide the capacity for aircraft maintenance and parking. Follow-on force equipment will largely flow from pre-positioned stocks.

(1) Maritime Pre-Positioned Force and Army Pre-Positioned Stocks Employment. MPF and APS options provide the JFC with significant combat capabilities to initiate or prosecute follow-on operations. Fundamental requirements for MPF or APS operations include intertheater lift and a secure environment (e.g., arrival airfields, ports, and/or beaches) for arrival, off-load, and assembly of forces. These are the conditions that will be achieved during the stabilization phase of a forcible entry operation.

(a) MPF. The purpose of an MPF operation is to rapidly establish a MAGTF ashore that is prepared to conduct the full range of military operations.

(b) APS. APS, when available, provides the GCC or designated subordinate JFC with a similarly responsive brigade size armored force to be employed rapidly in response to a crisis situation. Like the MPF, this capability consists of the equipment required by brigade combat teams (BCTs) and enabling units to conduct a wide range of operations.
(2) **Follow-on Force Preparation for Subsequent Operations.** Ideally, all follow-on forces will be organized and tailored so they are ready for combat upon arrival in the lodgment; however, in most situations, follow-on forces will require a period of time to link up with equipment, organize, and prepare for operations that follow the forcible entry. The following organizations can enable the start of subsequent operations.

(a) **Contingency Response Group (CRG).** The CRG is composed of Air Force assets, trained and equipped to accompany dedicated Army airborne and air assault forces to establish airfield operations. The CRG’s mission is to prepare the lodgment airfield for follow-on forces by providing engineer, explosive ordnance disposal, security, communications support, and airfield support assets needed to support the forcible entry effort.

(b) **The Tactical Air Control Party (TACP).** The TACP performs both airspace and ground control for aircraft supporting the lodgment.

(c) **Maneuver Enhancement Brigade.** This Army brigade provides protection and enhances the mobility of supported forcible entry forces. During forcible entry the brigade supports BCTs with tailored engineer; military police; chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear; and other supporting capabilities required for successful forcible entry operations.

e. **Termination or Transition Operations (Phase V).** The transition from a forcible entry operation to subsequent operations or termination must be an integral part of predeployment planning. A *successful forcible entry operation is completed in one of two ways:* attainment of the campaign objectives (termination); or completion of the operational objectives wherein a lodgment is established for follow-on combat operations (transition).

(1) **Achievement of Operation or Campaign Objectives.** If the forcible entry operation accomplishes the strategic objectives, then the JFC may be directed to **reconstitute and redeploy the joint force** either to home station or to some other theater of operations.

(2) **Achievement of Operational Objectives.** In many cases, a forcible entry operation will probably be only one phase of a campaign or major operation. As such, the **forcible entry operation establishes the conditions for follow-on operations.** Follow-on forces generally focus on executing sequels to the forcible entry operation that are designed to achieve additional campaign objectives. These sequels include the full range of military operations across the operational phases depicted in JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, (e.g., seize the initiative, dominate, or stabilize phases) as part of the larger operation.

*For further details on stability operations, refer to JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. For further details on interagency coordination, refer to JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.*
For additional information regarding transition, refer to DODD 3000.05, Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations.

4. Integration and/or Synchronization Considerations

The following discussion illustrates the type of activities that may occur at the JFC level to integrate and synchronize a forcible entry operation. This list is not all-inclusive, but presents activities for JFCs and staffs to consider when synchronizing a typical forcible entry operation. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, reflects six phases for an operation: shape; deter; seize the initiative; dominate; stabilize; and enable civil authority. The number and types of phases for forcible entry operations, as with all operations, may vary. As phasing is a key synchronization action, these activities are organized into the five phases of forcible entry operation presented earlier in this chapter. The example assumes that a combination of forcible entry capabilities will be used to obtain a lodgment as the initial operation of a larger campaign. These phases are normally sequential but may overlap. During planning, commanders must establish conditions for transitioning from one phase to another. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy or to react to unforeseen situations.

a. Phase I: Preparation and Deployment

   (1) An accurate time-phased force and deployment list (TPFDL) is developed up through level 4 detail.

   (2) The JFC assigns complementary and/or deconflicted missions to components.

   (3) Operational areas are designated.

   (4) Command relationships are delineated.

   (5) Rehearsals are conducted.

   (6) The intelligence effort for components is prioritized.

   (7) Initial air apportionment decisions are made.

   (8) Targeting guidance is disseminated.

   (9) Desired arrival sequence of forces in the operational area is matched to available transportation and validated with the time-phased force and deployment data.

   (10) Integration and/or synchronization with other (if any) operations is completed.
(11) Plan for the use and integration of the military activities that support strategic communication themes and messages — IO, public affairs (PA), and defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD).

(12) Deception operations are executed.

(13) Advance force operations (e.g., countermine, air superiority, space superiority, preparation of the operational environment, and isolation) to include SOF conducting special reconnaissance and UW are executed.

(14) Sustainment activities and/or requirements are planned.

(15) Plan for casualty operations is formulated.

(16) Fire support coordination and airspace coordinating measures are formulated.

b. **Phase II: Assault**

(1) Air apportionment is reassessed and revised.

(2) H-Hour synchronization is completed among components.

(3) Modifications to existing plans and branches and/or sequels are deconflicted.

(4) Operational areas are activated.

(5) Fire support coordination and airspace coordinating measures are activated.

(6) Pre H-Hour activities and/or staging are completed.

(7) Supported and supporting relationships among components are modified, as required.

(8) Provide for casualty evacuation.

(9) Link up with assault follow-on echelon and/or SOF.

c. **Phase III: Stabilization of the Lodgment**

(1) Terrain management issues are addressed.

(2) Runways, aprons, taxiways, and parking areas are repaired and maintained to support continuous air landed operations.

(3) Airspace management is coordinated.
(4) Provide for medical evacuation.

(5) TPFDL flow is managed.

d. **Phase IV: Introduction of Follow-on Forces**

(1) Force sequencing is adjusted continuously.

(2) Battle handover is completed.

(3) Reconstitution and/or redeployment of assault forces (e.g., embark the LF for a subsequent mission) is completed.

(4) Joint security operations issues are addressed.

(5) AOA is dissolved.

e. **Phase V: Termination or Transition Operations**

(1) Joint force and/or component missions and command relationships are reorganized.

(2) Priorities of support are shifted.

(3) Transition to further operations in the “seize the initiative,” “dominate,” or “stabilize” phase of the joint operation.

**SECTION B. SUPPORTING OPERATIONS**

5. **Special Operations Forces**

SO are an integral part of forcible entry operations and these actions and operations are integrated to complement the achievement of strategic and operational objectives. SOF may be employed prior to forcible entry operations to collect intelligence, seize key terrain, organize and train guerrilla forces, and conduct other activities that facilitate the introduction of conventional forces. In the execution stages of a forcible entry operation, SOF can seize objectives, interdict targets (especially those than can severely disrupt the assault to open entry points), and conduct other operations to support the main force. In the closing stages of the operation, SOF can play a key role in transition or termination by working with host nation, multinational, interagency, and intergovernmental partners.

*See JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, for more information on SOF.*
MILITARY DECEPTION OPERATIONS
UTILIZING SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES DURING DESERT STORM

From 29 January until 16 February 1991, Naval Special Warfare Task Group elements conducted near-shore and off-shore reconnaissance missions in support of US Central Command’s deception strategy to fix Iraqi attention on a potential amphibious assault by US Marines. The special reconnaissance missions resulted in the collection of information, established a naval presence along the Kuwaiti coast, and focused the attention of the Iraqi command on a possible maritime invasion. The deception effort culminated in a large-scale operation on the night of 23-24 February 1991, the eve of the ground offensive, which simulated a beach reconnaissance and clearing operation. The deception campaign prevented Iraqi units at the beaches from reinforcing those being attacked in the west.

SOURCE: United States Special Operations Command History, 2d Edition

6. Fires

In forcible entry operations, the initial assault forces are building combat power in the operational area from nothing as quickly as possible. They will normally have very minimal or no artillery support available for fire support in the early stages of the operation. Fires from aircraft (manned and unmanned) and/or naval platforms (surface/subsurface) take on added importance to compensate for the lack of artillery. The supported commander established the priority, timing, and effects of all fires within the boundaries of the operational area that has been designated.

JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-02 Amphibious Operations, provide more information on fire support.

7. Intelligence Support and Considerations

a. The JFC uses intelligence to: decide what, why, when, where, and how to attack; determine forcible entry capabilities needed and task organization required to seize initial objective(s); support targeting and combat assessment; and anticipate future operations (see Figure IV-3). Counterintelligence (CI) helps the JFC maintain the element of surprise essential to forcible entry operations by supporting OPSEC and deception.

See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, to identify the primary providers of intelligence assigned to or supporting the JFC, and the diverse products and services available to satisfy joint force intelligence requirements.
b. Intelligence considerations for the five phases of a forcible entry operation are described below.

(1) Preparation and Deployment (Phase I). Specific considerations during this phase include the following:

(a) Establishing the Intelligence Architecture. The intelligence architecture must be capable of supporting joint forces en route to and within the operational area. Architecture planning must consider establishing connectivity over long distances between the joint force, the supporting theater joint intelligence operations center, and other intelligence organizations (to include federated intelligence partners) outside the operational area.

(b) Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment. JIPOE is a key input to mission analysis and the process continues to refine and update intelligence products to provide commanders and staffs the means to successfully prosecute operations.
For further guidance on intelligence support, refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, and JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

(2) **Assault (Phase II).** The joint force is most vulnerable to enemy action during the assault phase. Effective indications and warnings of enemy reaction to the assault and force protection are paramount concerns during this phase.

(3) **Stabilization of the Lodgment (Phase III) and Introduction of Follow-on Forces (Phase IV).** In the remaining phases of the operation, intelligence assets within the lodgment increase in numbers and contribute to an enhanced collective intelligence capability. If the joint force headquarters deploys into the lodgment, the J-2 must ensure the availability of sufficient assets to assure uninterrupted intelligence support to the joint force. The J-2 should anticipate an increase in the demand for human intelligence and CI assets to conduct interrogation, intelligence collection, and support liaison with the host nation country team and with any multinational forces introduced into the lodgment.

(4) **Termination or Transition Operations (Phase V).**

(a) **Termination of Operations.** Intelligence assets continue to support the JFC’s operations requirements and address the potential for resurgent hostilities by either conventional or unconventional forces. Intelligence support may be required for such activities as minefield clearing, infrastructure reconstruction, foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), or restoring civil law and order, while continuing the key task of intelligence support to force protection.

(b) **Transition to Follow-on Operations.** Once a forcible entry has been successfully executed as the first phase of a larger campaign, the JFC shifts the focus of intelligence support from establishing the lodgment to sustained operations. Intelligence support for sustained operations, planned during the initial phase of the operation and continually refined as the forcible entry operation progresses, now allows for a seamless transition that allows the JFC to begin execution of the specific sequel that will achieve campaign objectives. In some instances, follow-on operations will be in the form of stability operations or other forms of civil-military actions. These operations encompass a variety of activities that vary in their respective intelligence support requirements. Some operations such as a show of force, attacks and raids, and noncombatant evacuations may require the same level of support demanded by combat operations. Other operations such as FHA or counterdrug operations may not involve large scale combat, but will, nevertheless, still require intelligence support to plan and execute.
8. Information Operations

IO are integral to successful military operations and are key during forcible entry operations. The full impact of IO on friendly, neutral, and hostile forces should be considered with the key goal of IO achieving and maintaining information superiority for the United States and its allies. IO are described as the integrated employment of the core capabilities of EW, computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), MILDEC, and OPSEC, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversary human and automated decision-making while protecting our own (see Figure IV-4). Supporting IO capabilities (information assurance, physical security, physical attack, CI, and combat camera) have military purposes other than IO, but either operate in the information environment or have impact on the information environment.

See JP 3-13, Information Operations, for more information.

a. "Information assurance" is described as measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities.

b. IO is a key part of setting the conditions for forcible entry operational success; IO efforts will be central to achieving surprise and isolating the lodgment and will also be an important enabler for gaining control of the operational environment and neutralizing enemy forces. OPSEC and MILDEC, combined with the other IO core and supporting

![Figure IV-4. Information Operations Support to Forcible Entry](image-url)
capabilities will be the heart of achieving operational and tactical surprise during the forcible entry operation.

(1) OPSEC attempts to deny critical information about friendly forces to the adversary. Forcible entry forces preparing for deployment have large, distinct signatures. Masking the movement of forces to staging bases and to the operational area is critical to ensure OPSEC. These movements may not be totally hidden; however, such detail as the composition of the forces or the time and location of the forcible entry should be concealed. The object is to surprise, confuse, or paralyze the enemy. OPSEC procedures must be planned, practiced, and enforced during training, movement, and operations.


(2) MILDEC misleads adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. MILDEC operations must be closely coordinated with the overall operational scheme of maneuver and other IO efforts. The deception operation will have little effect if it is compromised by poor OPSEC or conflicts with concurrent PSYOP. Successful military deceptions require sufficient resources, leadership, and linked objectives and goals from the strategic to tactical level. A well known example of MILDEC supporting forcible entry operations was Operation FORTITUDE prior to Operation OVERLORD (1944) used to convince the enemy that the Allied objective was the port of Calais instead of the actual landing sites in Normandy. For forcible entry operations, MILDEC operations may be planned and executed to complete the following:

(a) Deceive the enemy as to the time, location(s), and strategic and/or operational purpose of the forcible entry.

(b) Focus enemy attention and effort away from actual assault objectives.

(c) Cause the enemy to disperse forces to defend all possible airheads and beachheads in the operational area so the enemy cannot mass decisive force to deny joint force assaults.

(d) Induce the enemy to piecemeal resources.

(e) Desensitize the enemy to US actions by appearances of “routine” activities.

(f) Force the enemy to maintain heightened states of alert and/or readiness for extended periods of time.

For further details on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.
c. IO capabilities will also play an integral role in isolating the lodgment. The lodgment must not only be isolated from nearby enemy military forces, but also from command and control centers outside the operational area. CNO and electronic warfare (EW), supported by physical attack on C2 networks, will play a decisive role in this isolation.

d. EW includes any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The JFC’s plan must be developed to ensure complementary use of assets and weapons systems to effectively disrupt and/or destroy enemy C2 and weapons systems, while protecting joint force capabilities.

See JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, for additional detail on EW.

e. CNO stems from the increasing use of networked computers and supporting information technology infrastructure systems by military and civilian organizations. CNO, along with EW, is used to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt, deny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructure. For the purpose of military operations, CNO are divided into computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND), and related computer network exploitation (CNE) enabling operations. CNA consists of actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. CND involves actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems and computer networks. CND actions not only protect DOD systems from an external adversary but also from exploitation from within, and are now a necessary function in all military operations. CNE is enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks.

f. Related Information Operations Capabilities

(1) Defense Support to Public Diplomacy. DSPD consists of activities and measures taken by DOD components, not solely in the area of IO, to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the US Government. DSPD requires coordination with both the interagency and among DOD components.

(2) Public Affairs. A PA plan should be prepared and conducted upon execution/detection of the forcible entry operation. PA planning must anticipate detection of all but small covert operations by the enemy and the press.

(3) Civil-Military Operations. Properly executed CMO during forcible entry operations can reduce potential friction points between the civilian population and the joint force, specifically by eliminating interference with military operations and limiting the impact of military operations on the populace. CMO encompass the activities taken by a commander to establish and maintain effective relations between military forces and civil
authorities, the general population, and other civil institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas where those forces are employed. Use of civil affairs (CA) forces and units specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct CA operations in support of CMO can assist the commander.

*For further details on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.*
CHAPTER V  
LOGISTICS

“The great question of the campaign was one of supplies.”

General William T. Sherman  
*Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, 1875*

1. General

Within the context of forcible entry operations, logistics enables movement and maintenance of forces from preparation and initial deployment to the envisioned end state of the operation or larger campaign (see Figure V-1). This requires commanders to plan and establish the logistic systems that flow sufficient logistics through the lodgment(s) created to support follow-on operations. Logistic planning must account for early resupply of initial assault forces as these forces will generally be employed with limited on-hand capacities.

*For additional information on deployment and redeployment planning, see JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations, and for logistic consideration, planning, and execution see the JP 4-0 Series.*

2. Specific Logistic Considerations for Supporting Forcible Entry Operations

Logistic planning for the phases of forcible entry operations occurs concurrently, not sequentially. Planning should address the logistic core capabilities as identified in Figure V-2. The following specific planning considerations supplement those detailed in JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*, and JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

a. Phase I (Preparation and Deployment)

(1) Identify and coordinate for ISBs as required.

(2) Identify time-phased logistic requirements.

(3) Develop prioritized transportation requirements.

(4) Analyze capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities of APODs and APOEs, SPODs and SPOEs, coastal areas for JLOTS, and operational area infrastructure to support projected operations.

(5) Determine air, land, and sea LOC requirements to support forcible entry and subsequent operations.
(6) Determine logistic factors and establish airhead and beachhead resupply responsibility.

(7) Analyze force health protection and health service support planning considerations.

(8) Analyze and/or assess multinational support and contractor capabilities to support operations.

(9) Analyze and recommend changes to TPFDL flow to ensure that adequate support will be available.

(10) Integrate and synchronize logistic support of initial and subsequent flow of forces into the operational area.

b. **Phase II (Assault)**

(1) Analyze potential lodgment area to ensure continuous air and sea landing of personnel, equipment, and logistic resources, as well as availability of facilities.

(2) Provide adequate medical support and evacuation to support concurrent or integrated assaults by amphibious, airborne, air assault, and SOF.
c. **Phase III (Stabilization of the Lodgment)**

(1) Project and/or resolve restrictions and/or limitations in the capability to support force flow.

(2) Determine means of delivery and capacities to maximize combat power.

(3) Identify and plan advanced logistic bases in support of the joint force operational concept. Unless additional forcible entry operations are anticipated, planning for follow-on operations will be in accordance with standard joint force logistic planning doctrine in JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*.

(4) Seek methods to maximize and expand throughput capabilities of APODs and SPODs.

(5) Develop provisions to clear reinforcing supplies and equipment from off-load points.
(6) Analyze requirements to expand the lodgment with regard to maximum on ground capabilities, throughput, and infrastructure.

d. **Phase IV (Introduction of Follow-on Forces)**

   (1) Identify mission support requirements for follow-on operations.

   (2) Begin MPF and APS afloat operations.

   (3) Continue buildup of preplanned supplies.

   (4) Initiate general engineering and construction plans for support to follow-on operations.

   (5) Plan for reconstitution and redeployment of the assault force for follow-on operations.

e. **Phase V (Termination or Transition Operations)**

   (1) Redeploy and/or reconstitute assault forces as appropriate.

   (2) Plan for preparing the force for follow-on, out-of-area operations, such as redeployment to another geographical area.

   (3) Once plans have formally addressed and integrated all seven core logistic capabilities, the force should be well prepared to begin the application of those functions that support operational execution (see Figure V-2).
1. Purpose

This appendix provides an overview of amphibious assault operations. For detailed information on amphibious assault and other amphibious operations, see JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*.

2. Amphibious Operations

Factors that influence a commander’s decision to elect an amphibious assault as the type of forcible entry operation to be conducted include its mobility, flexibility in task organization, ability to rapidly build up combat power ashore, and sustainability. Amphibious assault operations can exploit the element of surprise and capitalize on enemy weakness by projecting combat power at the most advantageous location and time. As with other types of forcible entry operations, the threat of an amphibious assault can induce enemies to divert forces, establish or reinforce defensive positions, divert major resources, or disperse forces.

a. Characteristics. An amphibious assault is a complex operation normally requiring well coordinated support from the entire joint force and thus is best executed by a well trained and rehearsed joint force. An amphibious operation is executed within a clearly defined operational area, either an AOA or an AO with a HIDACZ. This operational area includes land surfaces, water surfaces and subsurfaces, and the airspace above them.

b. Amphibious Force Composition. An AF is composed of an ATF and an LF together with other forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations.

   (1) An ATF is defined as a Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations.

   (2) An LF is defined as a Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations.

3. Organization and Command

a. Establishing Authority. The establishing authority is the JFC, Service component commander, or functional component commander assigned overall responsibility for the operation. The establishing authority is responsible for establishing communications channels with assigned forces to facilitate planning prior to promulgation of the initiating directive, and for coordinating requirements which cannot be met from within the AF. The command relationship established during amphibious assault operations is an important decision. The type of relationship chosen should be based on the mission, nature and
duration of the operation, force capabilities, C2 capabilities, and recommendations from subordinate commanders. Relationships and detailed principles and guidance for an amphibious assault are described in JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations*.

b. **Principles of Amphibious Organization.** Considerations that govern task organization of forces for any combat operation apply to amphibious operations. However, the organization for execution of the amphibious operation reflects complex interrelationships at every level among the elements of the LF, naval forces, SOF, and participating Air Force forces. These interrelationships dictate that special emphasis be given to task grouping and economy.

1. **Task Grouping.** After the mission is analyzed and necessary forces are allocated, they are assigned to task groups according to their respective functions in support of the amphibious operation.

2. **Economy.** Amphibious operations make extensive demands on shipping. Limited availability of these assets requires that the landing force be composed of only those units necessary to accomplish the mission. There must, however, be a balance between resource constraints and the decisive force necessary to successfully conduct a forcible entry operation.

3. **Chains of Command.** The JFC, or establishing authority, has the authority to organize forces to best accomplish the assigned mission based on the CONOPS. The JFC ensures unity of effort in achieving the amphibious objectives by establishing unity of command over AFs. Accordingly, he or she will choose a command relationship between the CATF and CLF appropriate to the mission. Elements of the AF (ATF and LF) may be embarked on the same platforms, but responsible to different, or parallel, chains of command. Such parallel chains create special requirements for coordination. The CATF is a Navy officer responsible for the Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. The CLF is a Marine Corps or Army officer responsible for the Marine and/or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations.

c. **Navy Forces.** The Navy component of the AF, which may consist of US and multinational forces, is organized according to the separate functional tasks required to meet the operational requirements. The key operational characteristics upon which the Navy organization is based include movement, force protection, power projection, functional control, NSFS, surveillance, deception, logistics, and SO. Each task group may be organized separately, or several may be combined based upon operational requirements.

d. **Landing Forces**

1. **Landing Force.** The LF component of the AF is composed of Marine Corps, Army, or both forces. It consists of command, combat, combat support, and combat service support forces. It is task-organized to conduct ship-to-shore movement of personnel and materiel by air and surface. It also coordinates NSFS and external air support and provides assault support, CAS, and logistics to landing force units during the assault phase of an
amphibious operation. Both the MPF and, when available, APS-3 (afloat) programs are ideally suited to support Phase IV (Introduction of Follow-on Forces) of a forcible entry operation.

(2) Marine Air-Ground Task Force. A MAGTF is comprised of a command element, a ground combat element, an aviation combat element, and a logistics combat element (LCE). (Army and multinational forces are composed of elements similar to the MAGTF when conducting amphibious assault operations. However, the exact composition of their forces will depend on the situation and the needs of the JFC.) The MAGTF will vary in size depending on the requirements of the AF mission. Notional task organizations include the Marine expeditionary force (MEF), Marine expeditionary brigade (MEB), and Marine expeditionary unit (MEU).

(3) Marine Expeditionary Force. The MEF may range in size from less than one full division to several divisions, an aircraft wing or wings, and a Marine logistics group or groups. A division-sized MEF consists of one division, one wing, and one Marine logistics group; the ground combat element includes nine infantry battalions in three regiments. Normally, a force of this size would include one artillery regiment, a tank battalion, an assault amphibious battalion, a light armored reconnaissance battalion, a combat engineer battalion, and a reconnaissance battalion. The aviation combat element consists of a Marine aircraft wing with fixed-wing and vertical and/or short takeoff and landing aircraft. The LCE of a MEF is a Marine logistics group that can provide supplies, maintenance, engineering, motor transport, and medical and dental care for 60 days.

(4) Marine Expeditionary Brigade. The MEB is a mid-sized MAGTF that provides CCRDs with an extremely flexible expeditionary force. Commanded by a general officer, a MEB is normally built around a ground combat element of a reinforced infantry regiment. The aviation combat element consists of a Marine aircraft group with fixed-wing and vertical and/or short takeoff and landing aircraft squadrons. The LCE is a combat logistics regiment that is organized to provide the full spectrum of combat service support to the MEB. As an expeditionary force, the MEB is capable of rapid deployment and employment via amphibious shipping and strategic airlift and sealift, marrying with maritime or geographical pre-positioning force assets or any combination thereof. The MEB is a complete fighting force with a self-sustainment capability of 30 days. It can function alone, as a logical follow-on force to the MEU, a part of the JTF, or as the lead element of a MEF.

(5) Marine Expeditionary Unit. The MEU is comprised of a reinforced infantry battalion and a reinforced aircraft squadron. Usually sea-based, the MEU is the most responsive MAGTF. The LCE of a MEU is a combat logistics battalion. It normally is prepared to operate with 15 days of ammunition, supplies, and medical support. It can be reinforced or resupplied rapidly. Usually embarked aboard three to five Navy amphibious ships, the MEU may also be airlifted. Two to three MEUs usually are deployed forward or standing ready for immediate movement to forward combat areas or peacetime crisis points.
(6) **Maritime Pre-positioning Force and Army Afloat Pre-positioning.** See Chapter IV, “Operations,” for a discussion of the MPF and APS-3 (afloat) programs.

e. **Air Force Forces**

(1) When self-deploying Air Force forces are made available to support an amphibious operation by the JFC, they will normally be task-organized under the command of an Air Force officer who is established by the JFC as a supporting commander with the CATF established as a supported commander.

(2) When the Air Forces supporting the amphibious operation are provided by the USAF component of the joint force, the Air Force component commander should provide a USAF liaison officer to advise the CATF concerning the total air effort in the AOA.

f. **Advance Force.** The advance force precedes the main AF to begin shaping and gathering information on the operational area. Forward-deployed AFs normally have an embarked naval special warfare task unit, consisting of a sea-air-land platoon, a special boat unit detachment, and US Marine Corps reconnaissance units. These forces may conduct reconnaissance, hydrographic surveys, and direct action missions, which will provide critical information to the CATF and CLF. A naval special warfare liaison detachment is normally available to the CATF for these missions.

g. **Planning Relationships.** Operational planning for an amphibious operation is designed to ensure that both ATF and LF considerations are adequately factored into the operational decision. The CATF and CLF are responsible for preparation of the overall plan and are coequal in planning matters.

4. **Termination of the Amphibious Operations**

When the amphibious mission has been completed, the CATF and CLF will recommend termination of the amphibious operation and, if required, the disestablishment of the AOA or AO, as appropriate. The JFC, or other designated superior commander, provides positive instructions governing termination of the operation and, if possible, command arrangements, force dispositions, and operations to be in effect following termination of the amphibious operation.

5. **Transition**

As conditions permit, the buildup of forces and supplies for follow-on operations is conducted as specified in the initiating directive. The termination of the amphibious operation depends on the accomplishment of the AF mission. The establishment of the LF ashore may be specified as one of the conditions. When the AF mission is to establish a lodgment, the beachhead must be secure and sufficient forces must be established ashore to ensure continuous landings to support subsequent operations. C2 systems and supporting arms coordination facilities must be established ashore, and the CLF must be ready to assume responsibility for subsequent operations. When follow-on operations are to be
Amphibious Assault Operations

classified.
1. Purpose

This appendix provides an overview of airborne and air assault operations.

2. Airborne and Air Assault Operations

Joint airborne and air assault operations involve the air movement and delivery of specially trained combat forces and logistic support into an objective area to execute a mission. Airborne and air assault forces provide the commander with the unique ability to quickly respond on short notice and mass rapidly on critical targets. Airborne operations are executed by specially trained forces and can be launched at a considerable distance from the target area with such speed as to cause tactical or operational surprise and prevent effective action by the enemy. Airborne forces can secure and/or destroy critical installations, facilities or terrain; reinforce US and multinational forces; and conduct a show of force or attack an adversary in isolated areas. Air assault operations increase mobility and freedom of action by providing operational and tactical mobility for both the offense and defense. Air operations enable forces to reduce time and space limitations normally encountered in movement of assault forces by land, cross terrain obstacles, bypass hostile areas, and attack, destroy, and/or seize objectives deep in enemy territory. Each component can significantly contribute to the successful execution of airborne and air assault operations.

a. Concept. Airborne and air assault forces are capable of conducting operations in support of strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. They land intact with weapons, ammunition, and other combat equipment and are prepared for combat immediately. Airborne forces aggressively seize and hold objectives until linkup is accomplished. An airborne operation usually terminates upon seizure of the objective, linkup with other ground forces, or extraction. Air assault operations are deliberate, precisely planned, and vigorously executed to strike over extended distances.

b. Characteristics. Airborne and air assault forces share many of the same capabilities. They can extend the battlefield, move, and rapidly concentrate combat power quicker than land forces. Airborne and air assault forces also share the same limitations. They are dependent on the availability of airlift assets, fire support, and combat service support resources; they are highly vulnerable to enemy attack by ground and air forces while en route to the LZ and/or DZ; and are equally assailable when operating in open terrain against an armored threat or WMD. Environmental conditions and adverse weather can also impact performance. There are four phases of airborne operations: marshalling, air movement, landing, and ground tactical phases. Air assault operations have five phases: staging, loading, air movement, landing, and ground tactical phases.
3. Organization and Command

a. Planning. From the time an operation is announced until it is completed or terminated, echelons of participating components coordinate continuously. The commander, joint task force initiates airborne and/or air assault operations with a planning directive to participating units. The directive is distributed through normal command channels and pertinent information is issued to subordinate units. After receipt of a directive and preparation of initial estimates and studies, the commanders, staffs, and representatives of supporting forces meet in a joint conference to develop a CONOPS. The CONOPS forms the basis for the preparation of the commander’s planning directive and development of OPLANs and OPORDs, including a list of forces in support, a schedule of events, and stated conditions under which the operation will begin, be delayed, altered, or terminated.

b. Coordination. Airborne and air assault commanders begin planning operations with a visualization of the ground tactical plan and work through a reverse-planning sequence. Planning for airborne and air assault operations is as detailed as time permits. For airborne operations, this sequence includes the development of a ground tactical plan, landing plan, air movement plan, and marshalling plan. For air assault operations the sequence is the same, but instead of a marshalling plan, loading and staging plans are developed. Direct liaison and coordination between the logistic support agencies of the participating components and other supporting forces occur during the preliminary planning stages. For airborne and air assault operations, intelligence systems assist in accomplishing strategic objectives, including all factors which will impact the arrival of forces into the objective area, establishment of airheads and lodgments, and linkup of forces in preparation for follow-on operations. Also included in the planning process are the following: counterair, IO, logistics, joint fire support, force protection, special operations, engineer support, PA, and military police. When developing the OPLAN, the JFC anticipates that assault forces may face natural and man-made obstacles that are intended to restrict their movement so that the enemy can mass its forces and repel the assault. Combat engineers facilitate insertion of assault forces and prepare the onward movement to the objective by clearing breaches, roads, and airfields of mines and obstacles.

c. Command. The JFC may initiate joint airborne and/or air assault operations in support of strategic and/or operational objectives. The complexity of airborne and air assault operations and their vulnerability require an exceptional degree of unity of effort and operational coherence. The initiating directive is an order to the airborne and/or air assault commander to conduct the operation. It is issued by the JFC delegated overall authority for the operation. JFCs establish command relationships and assign authority to subordinates based on the operational situation, the complexity of the mission, and the degree of control needed to ensure that strategic intent is satisfied.

d. Control. Airspace C2, established boundaries, ability to communicate, and the effective employment of intelligence and EW are key elements in facilitating effective C2 of airborne and air assault operations. The airborne force commander establishes a standard C2 system by defining the functions and responsibilities of key personnel, ensuring that all
preliminary operational planning is accomplished, and publishing OPLANs and orders. Air assault operations feature extended distances and speed of execution. To work swiftly under pressure, efforts must be integrated and synchronized. Effective liaison between operational elements of an airborne and/or air assault operation and with higher authorities will facilitate mutual understanding, unity of purpose, and unity of action.

e. **Forces**

(1) US Army Airborne forces are committed to combat by parachute assault, air landed operations, or by a combination of these two methods. Normally, airborne operations are initiated by parachute assault conducted by an airborne infantry brigade combat team. Parachute assault permits delivery of combined arms teams into the airhead in less time than air landed operations require. Once the assault phase is initiated, it is followed by one or more of the following: a defensive phase; an offensive phase; or an extraction phase.

(2) The initial assault stresses the coordinated action of small units to seize initial objectives before the advantage of surprise has worn off. After the initial assault landings accomplish the initial ground missions, commanders must organize the airhead line. Airborne forces defend to protect and retain areas or installations seized during the assault phase of the operation. Because an airborne assault is most often conducted in the enemy rear, an all-around defense is required. Units can be airlanded on terrain under the control of friendly forces near the line of contact or on secured locations in the enemy’s rear; however, it takes time to land a sizable force and a secured LZ is necessary. Even when multiple LZs are employed, it takes longer to mass forces in the airhead during airland operations than during parachute operations. Subsequent operations can include continued defense of the airhead, linkup, passage of lines, relief, withdrawal, or offensive operations, to include exploitation or further airborne and/or air assaults.

(3) Air Assault. Whether performed from the sea or from an ISB on land, aviation and combined arms provides the JFC with a remarkably agile fighting force capable of conducting both offensive and defensive operations. The air assault attack (hasty or deliberate) is the basic type of offensive operation conducted by air assault forces. Other types of offensive strategies include exploitation, pursuit, secure and defend, reconnaissance in force, and raids. Defense is a coordinated effort by a force to defeat an attacker and prevent the enemy from achieving its objectives. An air assault force screening force provides early warning over an extended frontage. Guard force missions, covering force missions, reinforcement of committed units, linkup operations, gap crossing operations, security operations, limited visibility operations, and ship-to-shore operations must all be considered during air assault operations.

(4) Sustainment. Minimum sustainment elements accompany airborne forces into the airhead or lodgment. They perform most essential services in the marshalling area or they defer them. Sustainment is normally divided into three echelons during deployment: assault, follow-on, and rear echelons. Sustainment of these forces is helped by distribution of supplies, resupply by air including planned resupply, immediate airdrop resupply, and
emergency airdrop resupply requests; maintenance during airborne operations; transportation; and health services support. The air assault force is supported by both organic and external elements organized to push supplies, materiel, fuel, and ammunition forward by air. The exact organization and disposition of the assault and follow-on sustainment elements is a function of the air assault force’s mission and anticipated follow-on operations.

4. Termination or Transition

   a. Airborne/air assault operations will normally transition combat operations to follow-on forces. However, the JFC should prepare contingency plans for the possibility that follow-on forces are unable to relieve the airborne/air assault force. The follow-on operation would be one of the following:

      (1) Withdrawal or evacuation of units.

      (2) Linkup with ground forces.

      (3) Exfiltration.

      (4) Breakout from encirclement.

   b. As conditions permit, the build up of forces and supplies continues and follow-on operations commence. The airfield transitions from being seized, to being improved for use as an airbase suitable for joint operations.
APPENDIX C
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-18 is based upon the following primary references:

1. **Department of Defense Publications**


2. **Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications**

   a. CJCSI 3110.10D, *Command, Control, Communications, and Computer System Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP).*


   c. CJCSI 5120.02, *Joint Doctrine Development System.*


   e. CJCSM 3122.03C, *JOPES Volume II, Planning Formats.*

   f. CJCSM 3122.02C, *JOPES Volume III, (Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and Deployment Execution).*

   g. JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.*

   h. JP 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.*


   k. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations.*

   l. JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats.*

   m. JP 3-02, *Amphibious Operations.*

   n. JP 3-03, *Joint Interdiction.*

   o. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations.*
Appendix C


q. JP 3-09.3, *Close Air Support (CAS)*.


s. JP 3-11, *Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Environments*.


z. JP 3-17, *Air Mobility Operations*.


dd. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.

ee. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.


jj. JP 3-61, *Public Affairs*.

kk. JP 4-0, *Joint Logistics*. 
References

ll. JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore (JLOTS).

mm. JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

nn. JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint Operations.

oo. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning.

pp. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

3. Multi-Service Publications


4. US Army Publications

a. FM 3-0, Operations.

b. FM 3-05, Army Special Operations Forces.

c. FM 4-0, Combat Service Support.

d. FM 90-4, Air Assault Operations.

e. FM 90-26, Airborne Operations.

5. US Naval Publications

a. Naval Doctrine Publication 1, Naval Warfare.

b. NTTP 3-02.2, Supporting Arms Coordination in Amphibious Operations.

6. US Marine Corps Publications

a. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication (MCDP) 1, Strategy.

b. MCDP 1-2, Campaigning.

c. MCDP 1-3, Tactics.

d. MCDP 3, Expeditionary Operations.

e. MCDP 6, Command and Control.

7. **US Air Force Publications**


   b. AFDD 2-1.1, *Counterair Operations*.

   c. AFDD 2-1.2, *Strategic Attack*.

   d. AFDD 2-1.3, *Counterland Operations*.

   e. AFDD 2-1.8, *Counter-Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Operations*.

   f. AFDD 2-5, *Information Operations*. 
APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

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Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

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The lead agent for this publication is the US Army. The Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (J-7).

3. Supersession


4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO: HQDA WASHINGTON DC//DAMO-SSP//
   INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD//
   CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//JT10//

   Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

   b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.
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5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be in accordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, *Information Security Program*.

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b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside the combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400.

c. CD-ROM. Upon request of a JDDC member, the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with current joint publications.
## GLOSSARY
### PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<td>AADC</td>
<td>area air defense commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>AAGS</td>
<td>Army air-ground system</td>
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<td>ACA</td>
<td>airspace control authority</td>
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<td>APOD</td>
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<td>CI</td>
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<td>CJCSI</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLF</td>
<td>commander, landing force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNA</td>
<td>computer network attack</td>
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<tr>
<td>CND</td>
<td>computer network defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNE</td>
<td>computer network exploitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CNO</td>
<td>computer network operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CRG</td>
<td>contingency response group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSPD</td>
<td>defense support to public diplomacy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DZ</td>
<td>drop zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>electronic warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glossary Term</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSCM</td>
<td>fire support coordination measure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIDACZ</td>
<td>high-density airspace control zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISB</td>
<td>intermediate staging base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-6</td>
<td>communications system directorate of a joint staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>joint force air component commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFLCC</td>
<td>joint force land component commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFMCC</td>
<td>joint force maritime component commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JIPOE</td>
<td>joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JLOTS</td>
<td>joint logistics over-the-shore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JOPP</td>
<td>joint operation planning process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSOA</td>
<td>joint special operations area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSOTF</td>
<td>joint special operations task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCE</td>
<td>logistics combat element</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LF</td>
<td>landing force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LZ</td>
<td>landing zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MACCS</td>
<td>Marine air command and control system</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAGTF</td>
<td>Marine air-ground task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCDP</td>
<td>Marine Corps doctrine publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCM</td>
<td>mine countermeasures</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEB</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary brigade</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine expeditionary unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>MILDEC</td>
<td>military deception</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MPF</td>
<td>maritime pre-positioning force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>national military strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSFS</td>
<td>naval surface fire support</td>
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<tr>
<td>NTACS</td>
<td>Navy tactical air control system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTTP</td>
<td>Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPORD</td>
<td>operation order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PA</td>
<td>public affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RADC</td>
<td>regional air defense commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>sector air defense commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SATCOM</td>
<td>satellite communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SecDef</td>
<td>Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOC</td>
<td>sea line of communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>special operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOD</td>
<td>seaport of debarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPOE</td>
<td>seaport of embarkation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACC</td>
<td>tactical air control center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACP</td>
<td>tactical air control party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACS</td>
<td>theater air control system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACSAT</td>
<td>tactical satellite</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>task force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPFDL</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment list</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSOC</td>
<td>theater special operations command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UHF</td>
<td>ultrahigh frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UW</td>
<td>unconventional warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Unless otherwise annotated, this publication is the proponent for all terms and definitions found in the glossary. Upon approval, JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, will reflect this publication as the source document for these terms and definitions.

**air assault.** The movement of friendly assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service support) by rotary-wing aircraft to engage and destroy enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. (JP 3-18)

**air assault force.** A force composed primarily of ground and rotary-wing air units organized, equipped, and trained for air assault operations. (JP 3-18)

**air assault operation.** An operation in which assault forces (combat, combat support, and combat service support), using the mobility of rotary-wing assets and the total integration of available firepower, maneuver under the control of a ground or air maneuver commander to engage enemy forces or to seize and hold key terrain. (JP 3-18)

**airborne operation.** An operation involving the air movement into an objective area of combat forces and their logistic support for execution of a tactical, operational, or strategic mission. The means employed may be any combination of airborne units, air transportable units, and types of transport aircraft, depending on the mission and the overall situation. (JP 3-18)

**air control operations.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

**airhead.** 1. A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous air landing of troops and materiel and provides the maneuver space necessary for projected operations. Normally it is the area seized in the assault phase of an airborne operation. 2. A designated location in an operational area used as a base for supply and evacuation by air. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

**airhead line.** A line denoting the limits of the objective area for an airborne assault. The airhead line is bounded by assault objectives that are operationally located to ensure that enemy fires cannot be brought to bear on the main objective and for friendly forces to conduct defensive operations in depth. (JP 3-18)

**alert.** None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)
amphibious assault. The principal type of amphibious operation that involves establishing a force on a hostile or potentially hostile shore. (JP 3-02)

amphibious objective area. A geographical area (delineated for command and control purposes in the order initiating the amphibious operation) within which is located the objective(s) to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of sufficient size to ensure accomplishment of the amphibious force’s mission and must provide sufficient area for conducting necessary sea, air, and land operations. Also called AOA. (JP 3-02)

amphibious task force. A Navy task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. The amphibious task force, together with the landing force and other forces, constitutes the amphibious force. Also called ATF. (JP 3-02)

assault. 1. The climax of an attack, closing with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting. 2. In an amphibious operation, the period of time between the arrival of the major assault forces of the amphibious task force in the objective area and the accomplishment of the amphibious task force mission. 3. To make a short, violent, but well-ordered attack against a local objective, such as a gun emplacement, a fort, or a machine gun nest. 4. A phase of an airborne operation beginning with delivery by air of the assault echelon of the force into the objective area and extending through attack of assault objectives and consolidation of the initial airhead. (JP 3-18)

beachhead. A designated area on a hostile or potentially hostile shore that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing of troops and materiel, and provides maneuver space requisite for subsequent projected operations ashore. (JP 3-02)

combined arms team. The full integration and application of two or more arms or elements of one Military Service into an operation. (JP 3-18)

commander, amphibious task force. The Navy officer designated in the order initiating the amphibious operation as the commander of the amphibious task force. Also called CATF. (JP 3-02)

commander, landing force. The officer designated in the order initiating the amphibious operation as the commander of the landing force for an amphibious operation. Also called CLF. (JP 3-02)

communications center. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

connectivity. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

covering force. 1. A force operating apart from the main force for the purpose of intercepting, engaging, delaying, disorganizing, and deceiving the enemy before the enemy can attack the force covered. 2. Any body or detachment of troops which
provides security for a larger force by observation, reconnaissance, attack, or defense, or by any combination of these methods. (JP 3-18)

forcible entry. Seizing and holding of a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. (JP 3-18)

landing force. A Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to conduct amphibious operations. The landing force, together with the amphibious task force and other forces, constitute the amphibious force. Also called LF. (JP 3-02)

lodgment. A designated area in a hostile or potentially hostile operational area that, when seized and held, makes the continuous landing of troops and materiel possible and provides maneuver space for subsequent operations. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

Marine expeditionary brigade. A Marine air-ground task force that is constructed around a reinforced infantry regiment, a composite Marine aircraft group, and a combat logistics regiment. The Marine expeditionary brigade, commanded by a general officer, is task-organized to meet the requirements of a specific situation. It can function as part of a joint task force, as the lead echelon of the Marine expeditionary force, or alone. It varies in size and composition, and is larger than a Marine expeditionary unit but smaller than a Marine expeditionary force. The Marine expeditionary brigade is capable of conducting missions across the full range of military operations. Also called MEB. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

seize. To employ combat forces to occupy physically and to control a designated area. (JP 3-18)

staging base. 1. An advanced naval base for the anchoring, fueling, and refitting of transports and cargo ships as well as replenishment of mobile service squadrons. 2. A landing and takeoff area with minimum servicing, supply, and shelter provided for the temporary occupancy of military aircraft during the course of movement from one location to another. (JP 3-18)

vertical envelopment. A tactical maneuver in which troops, either air-dropped or air-landed, attack the rear and flanks of a force, in effect cutting off or encircling the force. (JP 3-18)
All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. **Joint Publication (JP) 3-18** is in the **Operations** series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1 - Initiation**
- Joint Doctrine Development Community (JDDC) submission to fill extant operational void
- US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) conducts front-end analysis
- Joint Doctrine Planning Conference validation
- Program Directive (PD) development and staffing/joint working group
- PD includes scope, references, outline, milestones, and draft authorship
- Joint Staff (JS) J-7 approves and releases PD to lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant command, JS directorate)

**STEP #2 - Development**
- LA selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the first draft (FD)
- PRA/USJFCOM develops FD for staffing with JDDC
- FD comment matrix adjudication
- JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing
- Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment matrix
- FC Joint working group

**STEP #3 - Approval**
- JS J-7 prepares publication for signature
- JSDS prepares JS staffing package
- JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for signature

**STEP #4 - Maintenance**
- JP published and continuously assessed by users
- Formal assessment begins 24-27 months following publication
- Revision begins 3.5 years after publication
- Each JP revision is completed no later than 5 years after signature

**ENHANCED JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITY**

**JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATION**