PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States when they operate as part of a multinational force. It describes joint organizational structures essential to coordinate air, land, maritime, space, and special operations and it addresses operational considerations that the commander and staff should consider during the planning and execution of multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by
the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WALTER L. SHARP
Lieutenant General, USA
Director, Joint Staff
SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-16
DATED 5 APRIL 2000

• Revises the discussion of range of multinational military operations
• Adds coverage of security cooperation
• Adds a discussion of the National Security Council
• Eliminates coverage of foreign operational control
• Reorganizes and clarifies the discussion of multinational command structures
• Explains civil-military relations and interagency, intergovernmental organization, and nongovernmental organization coordination
• Combines planning and execution considerations into one chapter
• Adds a discussion of building and maintaining a multinational force
• Expands coverage of the joint function of protection
• Provides extensive guidance on information sharing
• Adds a discussion of spectrum management
• Adds an appendix covering the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team
• Adds an appendix covering United Nations and Other Intergovernmental Organizations Considerations
• Removes the terms “affiliation training” and “coalition coordination cell” from JP 1-02
• Modifies the definitions of the terms “joint information bureau” and “status-of-forces agreement”
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

- Covers the Fundamentals of Multinational Operations
- Discusses Command and Coordination Relationships
- Provides Guidance on Planning and Execution Considerations

Overview

*Operations conducted by forces of two or more nations are termed “multinational operations.”*

Multinational operations are usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an intergovernmental organization such as the United Nations or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. An alliance is a relationship that results of a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. *Operations conducted with units from two or more allies are referred to as combined operations.* A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalitions are formed by different nations with different objectives, usually for a single occasion or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. *Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations.*

*A nation’s decision to employ military capabilities is always a political decision.*

Nations form partnerships in both regional and worldwide patterns as they seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance operations, and engage in peace operations. Cultural, diplomatic, religious, psychological, economic, technological, and informational factors all influence and impact multinational operations and participation.

Nature of Multinational Operations

*Respect*

In assigning missions, the commander must consider that national honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing nation as combat capability. All partners must be included in the planning process, and their opinions must be sought in mission assignment.

*Rapport*

US commanders and staffs should establish rapport with their counterparts from partner countries, as well as the multinational
force commander (MNFC). This requires personal, direct relationships that only they can develop.

**Knowledge of Partners**

US commanders and their staffs should have an understanding of each member of the multinational force (MNF). Much time and effort is expended in learning about the enemy; a similar effort is required to understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values of each partner.

**Patience**

Effective partnerships take time and attention to develop. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational partners requires untiring, even-handed patience. This is easier to accomplish within alliances but is equally necessary regarding prospective coalition partners.

**Security Cooperation**

Security cooperation refers to Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation.

Based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders (CCDRs) and designated executive agents develop plans and employ forces and personnel in peacetime to protect and promote US interests and regional objectives.

Security cooperation activities demonstrate US commitment, lend credibility to its alliances, enhance regional stability, provide a crisis response capability, and build capacities of potential coalition partners while promoting US influence and access.

**Command and Control of United States Forces in Multinational Operations**

Forces participating in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command.

**National Command.** The President always retains and cannot relinquish national command authority over US forces. National command includes the authority and responsibility for organizing,
directing, coordinating, controlling, planning employment, and protecting military forces. The President also has the authority to terminate US participation in multinational operations at any time.

**Multinational Command.** Command authority for a MNFC is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. Command authority could range from operational control (OPCON), to tactical control (TACON), to designated support relationships, to coordinating authority.

**Operational Control.** While the President cannot relinquish command authority, in some multinational environments it might be prudent or advantageous to place appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making this decision, the President carefully considers such factors as mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement.

**Tactical Control.** TACON is another form of command authority exercised during multinational operations. It provides for the detailed (and usually local) direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish the missions or tasks assigned. The commander of the parent unit continues to exercise OPCON and administrative control over that unit unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

**Support.** Supporting relationships may also be established among participating forces in multinational operations.

**Coordinating Authority.** In many cases, coordinating authority may be the only acceptable means of accomplishing a multinational mission. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which command and control (C2) may be exercised.
Executive Summary

Multinational Force Commander

MNFC is a generic term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the MNFC’s command authority is determined by the participating nations or elements. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. Due to the often complex command relationships in a MNF, an operation could have numerous MNFCs.

Multinational Command Structures

No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command but one absolute remains constant; political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. Organizational structures include the following:

Integrated Command Structure. Multinational commands organized under an integrated command structure provide unity of effort in a multinational setting. A good example of this command structure is found in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup.

Lead Nation Command Structure. A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation. The lead nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. A good example of the lead nation structure is Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan wherein a US-led headquarters provides the overall military C2 over the two main subordinate commands: one predominately US forces and the other predominately Afghan forces.

Parallel Command Structures. Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers.
Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if at all possible.

Political and Military Considerations

In responding to situations requiring a multinational response, nations pick and choose if, when and where they will expend their national blood and treasure. Nations also choose the manner and extent of their foreign involvement for reasons both known and unknown to other nations. **The only constant is that a decision to “join in” is, in every case, a calculated political decision by each potential member of a coalition or alliance.** The nature of their national decisions, in turn, influences the multinational task force’s (MNTF’s) command structure.

Numerous factors influence the military capabilities of nations. The operational level commander must be aware of the specific constraints and capabilities of the forces of participating nations, and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. MNTF commanders (similar to joint task force commanders) at all levels may be required to spend considerable time consulting and negotiating with diplomats, host nation officials, local leaders, and others; their role as diplomats should not be underestimated. MNTF commanders will routinely work directly with political authorities in the region.

The basic challenge in multinational operations is the effective integration and synchronization of available assets toward the achievement of common objectives. This goal may be achieved through unity of effort despite disparate (and occasionally incompatible) capabilities, rules of engagement, equipment, and procedures. To reduce disparities among participating forces, minimum capability standards should be established and a certification process developed.

In most multinational operations, the differing degrees of national interest results in varying levels of commitment by alliance and coalition members. While some countries might authorize the full range of employment, other countries may limit their country’s forces to strictly defensive or combat service support roles. However, no offer of national support should be declined outright. Instead, every offer should be vetted through a CCDR or MNFC, and the interagency process and recognized as support to the campaign being held in reserve.
Unified Action

Unified action is the synergistic application of all instruments of national and multinational power; it includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces. This concept is applicable at all levels of command. In a multinational environment, unified action synchronizes and/or integrates multinational operations with the operations of intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies in an attempt to achieve unity of effort in the operational area.

MNFCs must integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the operational area. All MNTF commanders are responsible to plan and conduct unified actions in accordance with the guidance and direction received from the national commands, alliance or coalition leadership, and superior commanders.

Training of forces within the MNTF command for specific mission standards enhances unified action. The MNFC should consider establishing common training modules or certification training to ensure assigned forces are trained for the missions assigned. Such training and certification of forces can occur prior to deployment to the MNTF operational area or after deployment.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States when they operate as part of a MNF. It describes joint organizational structures essential to coordinate air, land, maritime, space, and special operations and it addresses operational considerations that the commander and staff should consider during the planning and execution of multinational operations.
CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

“We are . . . guided by the conviction that no nation can build a safer, better world alone. Alliances and multilateral institutions can multiply the strength of freedom-loving nations. The United States is committed to lasting institutions like the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, the Organization of American States, and NATO as well as other long-standing alliances. Coalitions of the willing can augment these permanent institutions. In all cases, international obligations are to be taken seriously. They are not to be undertaken symbolically to rally support for an ideal without furthering its attainment.”

National Security Strategy 2002

1. Multinational Operations Overview

Multinational operations are operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. Other possible arrangements include supervision by an intergovernmental organization (IGO) such as the United Nations (UN) or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Commonly used terms under the multinational rubric include allied, bilateral, coalition, combined, combined/coalition or multilateral. However, within this publication the term multinational will be the term used to describe these actions.

a. An alliance is a relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members.

b. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Coalitions are formed by different nations with different objectives, usually for a single occasion or for a longer period while addressing a narrow sector of common interest. Operations conducted with units from two or more coalition members are referred to as coalition operations.

2. Strategic Context

a. Nations form partnerships in both regional and worldwide patterns as they seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests, ensure mutual security against real and perceived threats, conduct foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations, and engage in peace operations (PO). Cultural, diplomatic, religious, psychological, economic, technological, and informational factors all influence and impact multinational operations and participation. However, a nation’s decision to employ military capabilities is always a political decision.

b. While the United States will retain the capability to act alone, the current US National Security Strategy reflects that “America will implement its strategies by organizing coalitions
— as broad as practicable — of states able and willing to promote a balance of power that favors freedom.”

c. US commanders should expect to conduct military operations as part of a multinational force (MNF). These operations could span the range of military operations and require coordination with a variety of US Government (USG) agencies, military forces of other nations, local authorities, IGOs, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).

d. Much of the information and guidance provided for unified action and joint operations remains applicable to multinational operations. However, commanders and staffs must account for differences in partners’ laws, doctrine, organization, weapons, equipment, terminology, culture, politics, religion, and language. There is no “standard template” and each alliance or coalition normally develops its own protocols and operation plans (OPLANs) to guide multinational action. However, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) does have a significant standardization process for doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP).

3. Range of Multinational Military Operations

Every multinational operation is unique. Key considerations (see Appendix A, “Planning Considerations for Multinational Operations”) involved in planning and conducting multinational operations are affected by the international situation, perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members. Multinational operations vary in size, purpose, and combat intensity across the range of military operations (see Figure I-1).

a. Many of the missions associated with crisis response and limited contingency operations, such as disaster relief and FHA operations, will not require combat. Others, such as Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, can be extremely dangerous and require a significant effort to protect friendly forces while accomplishing the mission; therefore, US forces must be
Fundamentals of Multinational Operations

prepared to conduct the full range of military operations in support of multinational military operations.

b. Individual **major operations and campaigns** often contribute to a larger, long-term effort (e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM is part of the Global War on Terrorism [GWOT]). Multinational actions supporting GWOT, for example, include significant efforts from all instruments of national power coordinated and synchronized worldwide.

c. The prudent use of military capabilities in **military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence** activities often helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations or groups below the threshold of armed conflict.

For more detailed discussion on the range of military operations, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations.

4. **Nature of Multinational Operations**

   After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that “mutual confidence” is the “one basic thing that will make allied commands work.” While the tenets discussed below cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort.

a. **Respect.** In assigning missions the commander must consider that national honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing nation as combat capability. All partners must be included in the planning process, and their opinions must be sought in mission assignment. Understanding, consideration, and acceptance of partner ideas are essential to effective communication, as are respect for each partner’s culture, religion, customs, history, and values. Junior officers in command of small national contingents are the senior representatives of their government within the MNFs and, as such, should be treated with special consideration beyond their US equivalent rank. In many cultures they are given command at a junior age because of direct blood links to their nation’s leadership. Without genuine respect of others, rapport and mutual confidence cannot exist.

b. **Rapport.** US commanders and staffs should establish rapport with their counterparts from partner countries, as well as the multinational force commander (MNFC). This requires personal, direct relationships that only they can develop. Good rapport between leaders will improve teamwork among their staffs and subordinate commanders and overall unity of effort.

c. **Knowledge of Partners.** US commanders and their staffs should have an understanding of each member of the MNF. Much time and effort is expended in learning about the enemy; a similar effort is required to understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, religion, customs, history, and values of each partner. This will ensure the effective integration of MNF partners into the operation and enhance the synergistic effect of the coalition forces.
d. **Patience.** Effective partnerships take time and attention to develop. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational partners requires unflagging, evenhanded patience. This is easier to accomplish within alliances but is equally necessary regarding prospective coalition partners.

5. **Security Cooperation**

Security cooperation refers to Department of Defense (DOD) interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (HN).

a. Based on guidance from the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), the combatant commanders (CCDRs) and designated executive agents (EAs) develop plans and employ forces and personnel in peacetime to protect and promote US interests and regional objectives. A security cooperation plan (TSCP) is primarily a strategic planning document intended to link planned regional engagement activities with national strategic objectives.

*For more information on the EA designation process and EA authorities, see Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5101.1, DOD Executive Agent.*

(1) In formulating their SCP, geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) and EAs evaluate ongoing security cooperation activities, forecast current and future regional requirements and opportunities, and justify fiscal requests to support their efforts. Since many of these activities involve the use of US funds, commanders must understand and adhere to required procedures and restrictions on their use.

(2) Each SCP contains detailed regional information in six activity categories: multinational exercises; nation assistance, including foreign internal defense (FID), security assistance programs, and planned humanitarian and civic assistance activities; multinational training; multinational education for US personnel and personnel from other nations; military contacts; and arms control and treaty monitoring activities.

b. Security cooperation activities demonstrate US commitment, lend credibility to its alliances, enhance regional stability, provide a crisis response capability, and build capacities of potential coalition partners while promoting US influence and access.

(1) In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, security cooperation activities include periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, multinational exercises, port visits, freedom of navigation exercises, foreign military training, foreign community support, and military-to-military contacts including security assistance offices (SAOs), military assistance advisory groups, and a Personnel Exchange Program.

(2) Strategic reconnaissance operations can enhance security cooperation by providing a continuous worldwide presence that allows monitoring and quick reaction at all levels throughout the range of military operations.
For additional guidance on security cooperation, refer to Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3113.01A, Responsibilities for the Coordination and Review of Security Cooperation Strategies.

6. Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability

a. International rationalization, standardization, and interoperability (RSI) with friendly nations is important for achieving practical cooperation, efficient use of research, development, procurement, support, and production resources; and effective multinational warfighting capability without sacrificing US warfighting capabilities.

b. RSI should be directed at providing capabilities for multinational forces to:

   (1) Efficiently integrate and synchronize operations using common or compatible doctrine.

   (2) Communicate and collaborate at anticipated levels of multinational force operations, particularly to prevent fratricide and exchange data, information, and intelligence in accordance with (IAW) appropriate security guidelines, either as printed, digital, or electronic media.

   (3) Share consumables consistent with relevant agreements and applicable law.

   (4) Care for casualties.

   (5) Enhance military effectiveness by optimizing individual and combined capabilities of military equipment.

   (6) Increase military efficiency through common or compatible Service support and logistics.

   (7) Establish overflight and access to foreign territory through streamlined clearance procedures for essential personnel.

   (8) Assure technical compatibility by developing standards for equipment design, employment, maintenance, and updating so that those nations that are likely to participate are ready to go. Extra sets of equipment may be necessary so that non-equipped nations are not excluded. Such compatibility must include secure and non-secure communications equipment and should address other equipment areas to include: ammunition specifications, truck components, supply parts, data transmission streams, etc.

Detailed guidance on RSI may be found in CJCSI 2700.01, International Military Agreements for Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability Between the United States, Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations.
c. **Rationalization.** In the RSI construct, rationalization refers to any action that increases the effectiveness of allied and/or coalition forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the alliance and/or coalition. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher alliance needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support or improved interoperability, and greater cooperation. Rationalization applies to both weapons and materiel resources and non-weapons military matters.

d. **Standardization.** Unity of effort is greatly enhanced through standardization. The basic purpose of standardization programs is to achieve the closest practical cooperation among alliance or coalition partners through the efficient use of resources and the reduction of operational, logistic, communications, technical, and procedural obstacles in multinational military operations.

(1) Standardization is a four-level process beginning with efforts for compatibility, continuing with interoperability and interchangeability measures, and culminating with commonality (see glossary definitions). The DOD is actively involved in several multinational standardization programs, including NATO’s main standardization fora, the five-nation (United States, Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and New Zealand) Air and Space Interoperability Council, the American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies’ Program (ABCA), and the seven-nation (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, United Kingdom, and United States) Multinational Interoperability Council (MIC). The United States also participates in the Combined Communications-Electronics Board, an Australian, Canadian, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States Naval command, control, communications, and computers organization working to achieve standardization and interoperability in communications systems.

(2) Alliances provide a forum to work towards standardization of national equipment, doctrine, and TTP. Standardization is not an end in itself, but it does provide a framework for commanders and their staffs to use. Coalitions, however, are by definition created for a single purpose and usually (but not always) for a finite length of time and, as such, are ad hoc arrangements. They may not provide commanders with the same commonality of aim or degree of organizational maturity as alliances.

(3) Alliances usually have developed a degree of standardization with regard to administrative, logistic, and operational procedures. The mechanisms for this standardization are international standardization agreements (ISAs). ISAs can be materiel or non-materiel in nature. Non-materiel related ISAs should already be incorporated into US joint and Service doctrine and TTP. The five paragraph operation order is one common example. However, in the case of maritime doctrine and TTP, allied publications (APs) often govern US forces. Materiel ISAs are implemented into the equipment design, development, or adaptation processes to facilitate standardization. In NATO, ISAs are known as standardization agreements (STANAGs) and APs and are instruments that must be used to establish commonality in procedures and equipment. The quadripartite standing agreements (QSTAGs) agreed to within the ABCA are another type of ISA. The existence of these ISAs does not mean that they will be automatically used during an alliance’s multinational operation. Their use should be clearly specified in the OPLAN or operation order. In addition, these ISAs cannot be used as vehicles for obligating financial resources or transferring resources.
(4) Multinational publications (MPs) are a series of unclassified ISAs (maritime operational and procedural publications) specifically developed by NATO. MPs provide signatory nations with common doctrine, techniques, training, procedures, and information for planning and conducting operations and exercises. These publications are available through a NATO sponsor to all nations.

(5) Standardization agreements like APs, MPs, STANAGs and QSTAGs provide a baseline for cooperation within a coalition. In many parts of the world, these multilateral and other bilateral agreements for standardization between potential coalition members may be in place prior to the formation of the coalition. However, participants may not be immediately familiar with such agreements. The MNFC must disseminate ISAs among the MNF or rely on existing standing operating procedures (SOPs) and clearly written, uncomplicated orders. MNFCs should identify where they can best standardize the force and achieve interoperability within the force; in communications, logistics, or administration, for example. This is more difficult to accomplish in coalition operations since participants have not normally been associated together prior to the particular contingency. The same considerations apply when non-alliance members participate in an alliance operation. However, ISAs should be used where possible to standardize procedures and processes.

e. **Interoperability.** Interoperability is an essential requirement for multinational operations. Nations whose forces are interoperable can operate together effectively in numerous ways. Less interoperable forces have correspondingly fewer ways to work together. Although frequently identified with technology, important areas of interoperability may include doctrine, procedures, communications, and training.

(1) Factors that enhance interoperability start with understanding and applying the nature of multinational operations in paragraph 4. Additional factors include planning for interoperability and sharing information, the personalities of the commander and staff, visits to assess multinational capabilities, a command atmosphere permitting positive criticism and rewarding the sharing of information, liaison teams, multinational training exercises, and a constant effort to eliminate sources of confusion and misunderstanding. The establishment of standards for assessing the logistic capability of expected participants in a multinational operation should be the first step in achieving logistic interoperability among participants. Such standards should already be established for alliance members.

(2) Factors that inhibit interoperability include restricted access to national proprietary defense information; time available; any refusal to cooperate with partners; differences in military organization, security, language, doctrine, and equipment; level of experience; and conflicting personalities.
“Even the soldiers of a Democracy cannot always understand the reasons back of strategic situations. Political and military reasons are worked out in cabinets and general staffs and soldiers obey orders.”

Newton D. Baker, Secretary of State under President Woodrow Wilson

1. **National Security Structure**

Under the US Constitution, the President is the commander and chief. He has broad authority to direct both the movement of US personnel and the initiation of military action by US forces. However, advice from several key individuals and organizations help determine the overall level of US military involvement in multinational operations.

a. **The National Security Council (NSC).** The NSC is the President’s principal forum for considering national security and foreign policy matters with senior national security advisors and cabinet officials. The NSC also serves as the President’s principal arm for coordinating these policies among various government agencies. The NSC is chaired by the President.

For additional information, see National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-1, Organization of the National Security Council System.

b. **Military.** The DOD is organized to conduct military actions throughout the range of military operations as directed by the President to support national or international objectives. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are the military advisers to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense.

(1) The Secretary of Defense is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the DOD. Subject to the direction of the President and US law, he has authority, direction, and control over the DOD.

(2) The CJCS acts as the principal military advisor to the President, the NSC, and the Secretary of Defense.

(3) CCDRs lead one of the geographic or functional combatant commands established by Title 10, United States Code (USC), section 161 (or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan). CCDRs exercise combatant command (command authority) over assigned forces. To effectively bring all instruments of national power to theater and regional strategies as well as campaign and OPLANs, CCDRs are augmented with representatives from other USG agencies.

(a) A joint interagency coordination group (JIACG) participates in contingency, crisis action, and transition planning. Representing USG agencies at the headquarters (HQs) of the geographic
and selected functional combatant commands, each JIACG is a multifunctional, advisory element that represents the civilian departments and agencies and facilitates information sharing across the interagency community, IGOs, NGOs, and the combatant commands. It provides regular, timely, and collaborative day-to-day support for planning, coordination, preparation, and implementation of interagency activities.

For more information on JIACGs, see JP 3-08, Vol I, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

(b) The political advisor (POLAD) uses knowledge of US alliance, coalition, and regional matters to assist military commanders in translating political objectives into military strategy. Each GCC is assigned a foreign service officer (FSO) by the Department of State (DOS) to act as the POLAD. By exception, the DOS may assign a POLAD to component or subordinate command levels. Those not assigned a FSO may be assigned a civil service POLAD. The POLAD coordinates with the primary political and military personnel (either US or MNF, as appropriate).

c. **Diplomatic.** DOS is structured to support US relations with other countries and IGOs. Through the DOS, the United States maintains over 272 diplomatic and consular posts around the world. As the principal foreign policy advisor to the President, the Secretary of State is responsible for the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of US foreign relations. Unless otherwise directed by the President, the Secretary of State is also responsible for coordination of interagency activities of the USG both outside the United States and with US missions to IGOs. Other key personnel and agencies within DOS include:

1. **DOS Geographic Bureaus.** Six geographic bureaus within DOS are the focal point for the formulation and implementation of regional foreign policy strategies requiring interagency coordination. The geographic bureaus’ focus is similar to the GCCs’ regional focus (although the geographic borders differ). GCCs proposing military activity in a region must coordinate with the appropriate geographic bureau.

2. **Chief of Mission (COM).** The COM, with the title of ambassador, minister, or charge d’affaires, is the senior US official at diplomatic missions. The US diplomatic mission to a HN includes the representatives of all in-country USG departments and agencies. US missions to multinational organizations and alliances such as the Organization of American States, NATO, and the UN include representatives of USG departments and agencies routinely engaged in activities with those organizations.

3. **Country Team.** The country team is a council of the senior officials representing each USG agency or activity operating in a host country. The country team works together under COM direction to identify their problems and pool their skills and resources to best serve US national interests. The country team has no legal standing or formal structure. When appropriate, the GCC and US military area commander may send representatives to the country team meetings, or may choose to work through the United States defense representative to coordinate combatant command-related issues. The GCC also coordinates directly with the COM on policy and strategy issues. Through the
country team, the COM ensures that all USG activities in the country are coordinated and in harmony with each other.

For detailed information on interagency coordination, see JP 3-08, Volumes I and II, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

2. Command and Control of United States Forces in Multinational Operations

Although nations will often participate in multinational operations, they rarely, if ever, relinquish national command of their forces. As such, forces participating in a multinational operation will always have at least two distinct chains of command: a national chain of command and a multinational chain of command (see Figure II-1).

a. National Command. As Commander and Chief the President always retains and cannot relinquish national command authority over US forces. National command includes the authority and responsibility for organizing, directing, coordinating, controlling, planning employment,
and protecting military forces. The President also has the authority to terminate US participation in multinational operations at any time.

b. **Multinational Command.** Command authority for a MNFC is normally negotiated between the participating nations and can vary from nation to nation. Command authority could range from operational control (OPCON), to tactical control (TACON), to designated support relationships, to coordinating authority.

1. **Operational Control.** While the President cannot relinquish national command authority, in some multinational environments it might be prudent or advantageous to place appropriate US forces under the OPCON of a foreign commander to achieve specified military objectives. In making this decision, the President carefully considers such factors as mission, size of the proposed US force, risks involved, anticipated duration, and rules of engagement (ROE).

   a. Normally, OPCON of attached US forces is exercised only for a specific time frame or mission and includes the authority to assign tasks to US forces already deployed by the President and to US units led by US officers. US commanders will maintain the capability to report to higher US military authorities in addition to foreign commanders. For matters perceived as illegal under US or international law, or outside the mandate of the mission to which the President has agreed, US commanders will first attempt resolution with the appropriate foreign commander. If issues remain unresolved, the US commanders refer the matters to higher US authorities.

   b. Within the limits of OPCON, a foreign commander cannot change the mission or deploy US forces outside the operational area agreed to by the President. Nor may the foreign commander separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change the US force’s internal organization.

   c. Other MNF participants will normally exercise constraints similar to those described in (a) and (b) above over their own forces on behalf of their governments.

2. **Tactical Control.** TACON is another form of command authority exercised during multinational operations. It provides for the detailed (and usually local) direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish the missions or tasks assigned. The commander of the parent unit continues to exercise OPCON and administrative control over that unit unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

3. **Support.** Supporting relationships may also be established among participating forces in multinational operations. It is important to ensure that both the supported and supporting commander understand:

   a. The degree of authority that the supported commander is granted.

   b. The responsibilities of the supporting commander.
(c) The opportunities for establishing mutual support arrangements among participating forces.

(d) The opportunities, limitations, and/or conditions under which logistic support may be provided to forces of other nations.

(4) **Coordinating Authority.** In many cases, coordinating authority may be the only acceptable means of accomplishing a multinational mission. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which command and control (C2) may be exercised. Normally, it is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Use of coordinating authority requires agreement among participants, as the commander exercising coordinating authority does not have the authority to resolve disputes. For this reason, its use during operations should be limited.

3. **Multinational Force Commander**

   a. MNFC is a generic term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. **The extent of the MNFC’s command authority is determined by the participating nations or elements.** This authority could range in degree from OPCON or TACON, to directing support relationships, or to being the coordinating authority between the various nations. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. **The MNFC’s primary duty is to unify the efforts of the MNF toward common objectives.** Due to the often complex command relationships in a MNF, an operation could have numerous MNFCs.

      (1) MNFCs at the strategic level are analogous to the US GCC level.

      (2) MNFCs at the operational level may be referred to as subordinate MNFCs. This level of command is roughly equivalent to the US commander of a subordinate unified command or joint task force (JTF).

   b. **Nations do not relinquish their national interests by participating in multinational operations.** This is one of the major distinguishing characteristics of operating in the multinational environment. Commanders must be prepared to address issues related to legality, mission mandate, and prudence early in the planning process. **In multinational operations, consensus often stems from compromise.**

4. **Overview of Multinational Command Structures**

   No single command structure meets the needs of every multinational command but one absolute remains constant; political considerations will heavily influence the ultimate shape of the command structure. However, participating nations should strive to achieve unity of command for the operation to the maximum extent possible, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities clearly defined and understood by all participants. While command
relationships are fairly well defined in US doctrine, they are not necessarily part of the doctrinal lexicon of nations with which the United States may operate in coalition or combined operations.

a. **Organizational Structure.** The basic structures for multinational operations fall into one of three types: integrated, lead nation, or parallel command.

(1) **Integrated Command Structure.** Multinational commands organized under an integrated command structure provide unity of effort in a multinational setting (see Figure II-2). A good example of this command structure is found in NATO where a strategic commander is designated from a member nation, but the strategic command staff and the commanders and staffs of subordinate commands are of multinational makeup. The key factors in an integrated combined command are:

(a) A designated single commander.

(b) The staff is composed of representatives from all member nations.

(c) Subordinate commands and staffs are integrated into the lowest echelon necessary to accomplish the mission.

(2) **Lead Nation Command Structure.** A lead nation structure exists when all member nations place their forces under the control of one nation (see Figure II-3). The lead nation command can be distinguished by a dominant lead nation command and staff arrangement with subordinate elements retaining strict national integrity. A good example of the lead nation structure
is Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan wherein a US-led HQ provides the overall military C2 over the main subordinate commands: one predominately US forces and the other predominately Afghan forces.

(a) A lead nation command may also be characterized by an integrated staff and multinational subordinate forces. Integrating the staff allows the commander to draw upon the expertise of allied or coalition partners in areas where the lead nation may have less experience.

(b) Rotational command, a variation of lead nation command sometimes found in combined commands, allows each participating nation to be the lead nation in turn. To be effective, command tour lengths should be adjusted so that participating nations may alternate exercising the authority of the lead nation. However, command tours should not be so short to be operationally meaningless. An example of this type command is the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) which has 12-month command tours that rotate between the participants.

3 Parallel Command Structures. Under a parallel command structure, no single force commander is designated (see Figure II-4). The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. This can be accomplished through the use of coordination centers (see paragraph 7b). Nonetheless, because of the absence of a single commander, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if at all possible.

b. Regardless of how the MNF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component, often called a national command element, to ensure effective administration of its forces. The national component provides a means to administer
and support the national forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations. In an administrative role, these national components are similar to a Service component command at the unified command level in a US joint organization. The logistic support element of this component is referred to as the national support element.

For additional information on multinational logistic support, see JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.

5. Alliance Command Structures

a. In combined commands, national political objectives are addressed and generally subsumed within MNF objectives at the alliance treaty level. Typically, alliance command structures have been carefully developed over extended periods of time and have a high degree of stability and consensus; doctrine and standardization characterize alliances. Established command structures may be modified or tailored for particular operations, especially when combined operations include non-allied members. However, using an alliance’s structures for purposes other than those for which their integrated structures were designed, or in operations for which they have not had the lead time necessary to develop integrated plans and structures, may result in behavior that more closely approximates that of a coalition.
b. Combined command relationships often reflect either an integrated command structure or a lead nation command structure. Alliances typically have established command structures, support systems, and standardized procedures. In combined operations, such structures should be used to the maximum practical extent. Combined command and force structures often mirror the degree of allied member participation. Subordinate commands are often led by senior military officers from member nations. Effective operations within an alliance require that the senior political and military authorities be in agreement on the type of command relationships that will govern the operations of the forces. Notwithstanding peacetime command relationships, the political sensitivities associated with actual operations will impact command relationships and operating procedures.

6. Coalition Command Structures

Coalitions often form in response to unforeseen crises that occur outside the area or scope of an established alliance or when the response requires more than an alliance can handle. Interestingly, coalition command relationships routinely evolve as a coalition develops. Coalitions are most often characterized by one of two basic structures: lead nation or parallel. In coalition operations, member nations may initially desire to retain even more control of their own national forces than is generally associated with combined operations. At the outset of a coalition, nations are often reluctant to grant extensive control over their forces to one lead nation. Coalition counterparts are also sensitive to actions that might be construed as preferential to the lead nation’s interests.

a. One means of ensuring that the HQ is representative of the entire coalition is to augment the HQ staff with representatives from the participating coalition members, such as designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This provides the coalition commander with representative leadership, a ready source of expertise on the capabilities of the respective coalition members, and facilitates the planning process.

b. During formation of the coalition, the early integration of the multinational national command elements into the coalition planning process can greatly accelerate building of unity of effort and reinforce the tenets of multinational operations. National command elements represent the national command channels from each individual nation within the multinational command. Meetings with the MNFC provide the setting for open, candid input from participating nations.

c. Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This situation occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces. The command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition (see Figure II-5) provides a good example of the intricate web of command structures possible. In that case, the US performed as the lead nation for a coalition of non-Arab countries while Saudi Arabia functioned as the lead nation for the Arab coalition members. A friendly forces coordinating council (since renamed to coalition coordination center [CCC]) provided the coordination conduit between the non-Arab (US-led) forces and the Arab/Islamic (Saudi-led) command structures. Terms in the figure reflect the terminology in use during the operation.
7. Coalition Coordination

There are two key structural enhancements that should improve the coordination of MNFs: a liaison network and coordination centers.
a. **Liaison Network.** The need for effective liaison is vital in any MNF. Differences in doctrine, organization, equipment, training, and national law demand a robust liaison structure to facilitate operations. Not only is the use of liaison an invaluable confidence-building tool between the MNFC and lower levels of different nationalities, but it is also a significant source of information for the MNFC. During multinational operations, US forces will establish liaison early with forces of each nation, fostering a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitating the ability to integrate and synchronize operations, assisting in the transfer of vital information, enhancing mutual trust, and developing an increased level of teamwork.

   (1) Liaison is often accomplished through the use of liaison teams. These teams must be knowledgeable about the structure, capabilities, weapons systems, logistics, communication systems, and planning methods that are employed within their commands. Liaison requirements for US forces participating in multinational operations are usually greater than anticipated or staffed. Personnel liaison requirements must be identified early during the planning process and staffed accordingly. Team members should be language qualified or provided interpreter support. Although understanding language and culture are key factors to successful liaison operations, professional knowledge and functional expertise are far more important and influential.

   (2) Special operations forces (SOF) have proven particularly effective in integrating MNFs. Their language capabilities, cultural awareness, and experience in working and training with other countries’ militaries typically allow them to improve coordination and minimize misunderstanding during MNF operations. Specifically, SOF can assist the MNFC by:

   (a) Assessing foreign military capabilities.

   (b) Training foreign military forces.

   (c) Advising foreign military forces and governmental agencies.

   (d) Assisting foreign forces in executing specific missions or contingency operations.

   (e) Facilitating force integration for multinational operations.

   *For additional information on FID, see JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID).*

b. **Coordination Centers.** Another means of increasing MNF coordination is the use of a multinational coordination center (MNCC). US commanders should routinely advocate creation of such a center in the early stages of any coalition effort, especially one that is operating under a parallel command structure. It is a proven means of integrating the participating nations military forces into the coalition planning and operations processes, enhancing coordination and cooperation, and supporting an open and full interaction within the coalition structure. Normally, the MNCC is focused upon coordination of coalition force operations, which will most likely involve classified information. The addition of a civil-military operations center (CMOC) is
recommended for coordination with the International Humanitarian Community (IHC). Additional coordination centers may be established to coordinate multinational logistics, functional areas, and media affairs.

(1) Initially, a coordination center can be the focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, alert and warning, host-nation support (HNS), movement control, and training. However, as a coalition matures, the role of the coordination center can be expanded to include command activities.

(2) When a coordination center is activated, member nations provide a staff element to the center that is comprised of action officers who are familiar with support activities such as those listed above. Coalition nations should be encouraged to augment this staff with linguists and requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with their parent HQ. Apart from a central CCC such as the MNCC, a number of functional coordination centers may also be established within an overall combined logistics coordination or support command for either an alliance or coalition operation. Activities centrally coordinated or controlled by such centers would include movement control, centralized contracting, theater-level logistic support operations, overall medical support, and infrastructure engineering. One key to the success of such centers is the early establishment and staffing with functionally skilled personnel to exercise appropriate control of designated activities.

8. Control of Multinational Operations

The degree of control exercised in an MNF is dictated by the MNF structure and the command relationships between members of the MNF. In general, the more centralized the command structure, the greater the MNF’s ability to achieve unity of effort. Integrated command structures, operating within their alliance framework, afford the greatest degree of control. A parallel structure, with its separate lines of command, typically offers the least control and ability to achieve unity of effort. Lead nation structures can exhibit a wide range of control depending on the command relationships assigned.

a. Under normal circumstances, more control over the MNF is available during multinational operations within the framework of an alliance. Command relationships within the alliance are likely to be well defined and nations are also more likely to relinquish greater control over their forces.

b. Coalition structures tend to have less control than those associated with alliances. This is not unexpected since coalitions are, by definition, ad hoc arrangements, normally formed in response to a specific event or crisis. Coalition partners, at least at the outset of the coalition, are unlikely to yield much of their national control to a lead nation.
9. Civil-Military Relations and Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination

a. In many operating environments, the MNF interacts with a variety of entities requiring unified actions by the MNFC, including nonmilitary governmental agencies, IGOs, and NGOs. These groups play an important role in providing support to HNs. Additionally the MNF should be aware of private sector firms (e.g., businesses, contractors working for the military) operating in the area of operations (AO). Though differences may exist between military forces and civilian agencies, short-term objectives are frequently very similar.

b. Relationships. The MNFC’s relationship with these organizations will vary depending on the nature of the contingency and the particular type of organization involved.

   (1) Relationships with other governmental agencies (US and those of other nations) and IGOs (UN and alliance structures) will often be marked by a degree of formality that may duplicate or at least resemble a supported and/or supporting command relationship. It is important that any interagency structure relationships be clearly defined with respect to military support before commencement of operations, if possible. In some cases, other agencies may be lead agent for operations with military forces providing support. In some cases, the lead agency is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between allied and coalition forces and the agencies involved. The President, normally through the Secretary of Defense, should provide clear guidance regarding the relationships between US military commanders and USG agencies.

   (2) To achieve the greatest unity of effort, the roles, missions, efforts, and activities of the IHC must be factored into the commander’s mission analysis within the coalition AO. Acknowledgement, respect, and mutual cooperative leveraging of capabilities among all parties is critical to achieve operational end states. A cooperative, as well as coordinated, atmosphere with the IHC should be established. The CCDR should use the various interagency coordination tools, such as the JIACG, POLAD, and appropriate agency/command representatives to enhance planning. Every effort should be made to formally include interagency coordination factors and requirements in annex V to the appropriate concept plans (CONPLANs) and OPLANs.

   (3) In addition, the OPLAN should provide guidance to the MNFC regarding relationships with and support to NGOs and IGOs operating within the operational area. Because many of these organizations do not operate within the military or governmental hierarchy, the relationship between an MNFC, NGOs, and IGOs is neither supported nor supporting. An association or partnership may more accurately describe the relationship that exists between them. Communicating clearly, recognizing each other’s limitations, and building consensus and cooperation are critical stepping stones to achieving a unified effort. A transition plan is essential when relieving, replacing, or relinquishing control to NGOs and IGOs. This must begin as early as possible in the planning cycle for such operations.

c. Coordination Centers. MNFCs can achieve significant positive results in accomplishing their missions and shaping better conditions by finding positive ways to interact with these organizations. One means of enhancing the working relationship between NGOs/IGOs when there is no command relationship...
is through their integration with existing coordination centers, as described in subparagraph 7b. While the MNFC cannot always exert command influence over these entities, it is possible to operate through a process of cooperation, communication, consensus, collaboration, and coordination to achieve mutual interests. The CMOC can be useful in deconflicting and coordinating operations among these groups, ensuring unity of effort.

For additional information, see JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations.

d. **Agreements.** The DOS leads USG negotiations with IGOs and other nations’ agencies. Although Congress has tightly restricted the delegation of authority to negotiate and sign agreements with foreign nations, forces, and agencies to DOS, the interagency environment permits establishing formal agreements between the military and civilian government agencies. Such agreements can take the form of memoranda of understanding or terms of reference. When appropriate, heads of agencies and military commanders negotiate and cosign plans. Concluding these negotiations prior to the commencement of operations offers the best chance for success. There are regulatory and statutory fiscal constraints involving agreements between the Armed Forces of the United States and other US governmental and nongovernmental agencies. A staff judge advocate should be consulted before negotiating or entering into any agreements outside DOD.

For more detail on interagency coordination and on agencies expected to be involved, see JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations.

**NSPD-1,** Organization of the National Security Council System, *provides that the management of the development and implementation of national security policies by multiple agencies of the USG shall usually be accomplished by National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees.*

**NSPD-44,** Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization, *establishes that the Secretary of State “shall coordinate and lead integrated United States Government efforts, involving all US departments and agencies with relevant capabilities, to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction efforts.”*
CHAPTER III  
PLANNING AND EXECUTION CONSIDERATIONS

“Effectively planned and executed multinational operations should, in addition to achieving common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom of action and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support.”

FM3-31/MCWP 3-40.7

SECTION A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Political and Military Considerations

   a. Any number of different situations could generate the need for a multinational response, from man-made actions (such as interstate aggression) to natural disasters (like an earthquake). In responding to such situations, nations pick and choose if, when, and where they will expend their national blood and treasure. Nations also choose the manner and extent of their foreign involvement for reasons both known and unknown to other nations. The only constant is that a decision to “join in” is, in every case, a calculated political decision by each potential member of a coalition or alliance. The nature of their national decisions, in turn, influences the multinational task force’s command structure. In a parallel command structure, national forces essentially operate under their own doctrine and procedures within the guidelines determined by the strategic national guidance and are not significantly impacted by multinational influences. Under the integrated and lead nation command structures, more multinational involvement and interaction occurs. As such, this chapter will primarily focus on issues affecting those two structures.

   b. Capabilities. As shown in Figure III-1, numerous factors influence the military capabilities of nations. The operational level commander must be aware of the specific constraints and capabilities of the forces of participating nations, and consider these differences when assigning missions and conducting operations. Multinational task force (MNTF) commanders (similar to JTF commanders) at all levels may be required to spend considerable time consulting and negotiating with diplomats, HN officials, local leaders, and others; their role as diplomats should not be underestimated. MNTF commanders will routinely work directly with political authorities in the region. Even within their own command, political limitations and constraints on the employment of the forces can significantly influence daily operations.

   c. Integration. The basic challenge in multinational operations is the effective integration and synchronization of available assets toward the achievement of common objectives. This goal may be achieved through unity of effort despite disparate (and occasionally incompatible) capabilities, ROE, equipment, and procedures. To reduce disparities among participating forces, minimum capability standards should be established and a certification process developed. Identified shortcomings should be satisfied by either bilateral or multilateral support agreements (formal or informal) prior to the deployment of forces to the operational area. This process relies heavily upon detailed coordination between national leadership, prospective forces, and the MNFC. The degree of involvement of each participant is likely to be primarily a political
Chapter III

d. Employment. In most multinational operations, the differing degrees of national interest results in varying levels of commitment by alliance and coalition members. While some countries might authorize the full range of employment, other countries may limit their country’s forces to strictly defensive or combat service support roles. However, no offer of national support should be declined outright. Instead, every offer should be vetted through a CCDR or MNFC, and the interagency process and recognized as support to the campaign being held in reserve. This process helps maintain the allies, friends, and coalition partners’ support and enhances the relationship. Additionally, multinational support will help increase the perceived legitimacy of operations domestically as well as internationally.

*For additional information regarding legitimacy, see JP 3-0, Joint Operations.*
2. Building and Maintaining a Multinational Force

a. Building a multinational force starts with the political decisions and diplomatic efforts to create a coalition or spur an alliance into action. Discussion and coordination between potential participants will initially seek to sort out basic questions at the national strategic level. These senior level discussions could include organizations like the UN or NATO, existing coalitions or alliances, or individual nations. The result of these discussions should:

1. Determine the nature and limits of the response.
2. Determine the command structure of the response force.
3. Determine the essential strategic guidance for the response force to include military objectives and the desired end state.

b. Command Issues. When the response force is resident within an alliance, the procedures and structure of the alliance will normally determine the strategic and operational level leadership for the response force. When the response force is based in a coalition (or a lead nation structure in an alliance), the designated lead nation will normally select both the strategic and operational level leadership.

c. These designated strategic level military leaders will coordinate strategic level military requirements and actions between participating nations. In an alliance such as NATO, this would normally be the alliance’s military commander. In a coalition, the US equivalent of the strategic level commander is normally the appropriate GCC. The MNFC will also promulgate the essential strategic guidance to all members and provide initial guidance to the operational commander. Essential guidance should contain the following information:

1. The purpose of the operation.
2. A mission statement for the MNTF.
3. Broad objectives and tasks for the MNTF.
4. Desired end state and guidance on termination or transition.
5. Participating nations and expected initial contributions.
7. Specific national limitations, concerns, or sensitivities.

d. The MNFC, in coordination with member nations, will normally name the subordinate MNFC. The subordinate MNFC is the operational level commander assigned to direct MNTF operations. The MNTF is similar to a subordinate command or JTF and is the operational level
portion of the respective MNF. Integrated MNTFs, such as the NATO-led ISAF will have embedded MNTF personnel throughout the HQ. Lead nation MNTF HQ, like Multinational Forces-Iraq, will be manned primarily by lead nation personnel and augmented by liaison personnel from other MNTF countries. Some integration in staff functions is possible but the bulk of the work will be handled within the lead nation structure. Figure III-2 illustrates an example of the various command levels.

e. Once formed, efforts to maintain a MNF will routinely task the MNF leadership at all levels. In nearly every action or event, military and political interests will compete for primacy. National interests and restrictions may clash with military plans before, during, and after operations. In some cases, national restrictions may seem wholly out of line with national contributions. This tension between national elements is not new, but commanders at all levels must be prepared to deal with it. As discussed earlier, nations join multinational efforts for a variety of reasons, both known and unknown. Their continued participation has similar known and unknown elements. National will, popular support, and the perceived achievement of stated objectives are just some of the factors that might influence continued national participation.
Planning and Execution Considerations

However, prudent mission analysis and planning can significantly ease the MNFC’s job and provide a more stable multinational force.

3. Mission Analysis and Assignment of Tasks

   a. The MNFC’s staff should conduct a detailed mission analysis. This is one of the most important tasks in planning multinational operations and should result in a revised mission statement, commander’s intent, and the MNFC’s planning guidance. As part of the mission analysis, force requirements should be identified; standards for participation published (e.g., training level competence and logistics, including deployment, sustainment, and redeployment capabilities); and funding requests, certification procedures, and force commitments solicited from an alliance or likely coalition partners.

   b. Before the MNTF staff can develop proposed courses of action (COAs), the MNFC must conduct an estimate of the situation. This will allow the MNFC to analyze, in an organized manner, the many factors that will affect the accomplishment of the assigned mission(s). This estimate should address the respective capabilities, political will, and national interests of the MNTF components. Additionally, expected interagency contributions and involvement of each nation should be addressed. This is a critical step as each nation determines its contribution to the operation. National force commitments, even in an established alliance, are not automatic. Based upon these national contributions, and after determining the tasks necessary to achieve the objectives that support mission accomplishment, the MNFC should assign specific tasks to the elements of the MNTF most capable of completing those tasks. If there are several elements that can complete a particular task, the MNFC should consider assigning that task in a manner that ensures that all elements can make meaningful contributions to the end state.

4. Language, Culture, and Sovereignty

   a. Language. Differing languages within an MNF can present a real challenge to unity of effort. US forces cannot assume that the predominant language will automatically be English, and specifying an official language for the MNF can be a sensitive issue. Language content is conveyed by word choice, mannerisms, and other means, with information loss, miscommunications, and misunderstandings having a negative effect on operations. The time required to receive information, process it, develop plans from it, translate the plans, and distribute them to multinational partners can adversely impact the speed and tempo of operations. Commanders may lessen these difficulties by early identification of translator support and the use of multilingual liaison personnel. Contractor support for interpreters and translators should be addressed during the planning phase. HN resources may be very important and may serve an especially important role if available during the initial stages of the deployment. In addition, the importance of staffing HQ with qualified liaison personnel cannot be minimized. This will usually place additional demands upon US commanders for liaison personnel, but they are critical to the success of any multinational mission.

   b. Culture. Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity — the result of language, values, religious systems, societal norms, history, and economic and
social outlooks. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, and other unique cultural traditions important to allies and coalition members, consistent with the situation.

c. **Linguists and Area Experts.** To assist with cultural and language challenges, the MNTF employs linguists and area experts, often available within and through the Service components or from other governmental agencies. In some instances, members of Service forces may be especially familiar with the operational area, its cultures, and languages as a result of special training (e.g., foreign area officers), previous assignments, or heritage. The use of such abilities should be maximized to facilitate understanding and communications. Appropriate security measures should be taken to ensure that contracted linguists or area experts recruited to assist the commander are not able to jeopardize the operation through espionage or subversion.

d. **Sovereignty Issues.** Sovereignty issues will be among the most difficult problems the MNFC must resolve or mitigate. Often, the MNFC will be required to accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus, in addition to traditional command concepts. Political sensitivities must be recognized and acknowledged.

(1) MNFCs should coordinate with the DOS, country teams, ambassador/COM to the respective HN, if available, on any sovereignty issues which cannot be resolved at the MNFC level. Examples of sovereignty issues include: collecting and sharing information, basing, overflight rights, aerial ports of debarkation, seaports of debarkation, location and access, railheads, border crossings, and operations in the territorial sea. Normally, such issues will be formally resolved with HNs through the development of appropriate technical agreements to augment existing or recently developed status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) or status of mission agreements.

(2) The commander may also create structures such as committees to address sovereignty issues. These committees may be chaired by military or nonmilitary representatives of the HN to facilitate cooperation and build trust. These organizations could facilitate operations by reducing sensitivities and misunderstandings and removing impediments. In many cases SAOs, NGOs, and IGOs resident in the HN can help establish good will with the HN. In some cases, these organizations may also be called upon to assist in the conduct of operations or establishing a congenial relationship in the HN.

5. **Legal Considerations**

a. Commanders must ensure that MNTF forces comply with applicable national and international laws during the conduct of all military operations. Participating nations should provide commanders with access to legal advice throughout the operation to ensure there is a comprehensive understanding of any national differences.

b. US forces will comply with the law of war during all military operations. US commanders will ensure that the DOD Law of War Program is implemented IAW DOD and Service directives,
and that adequate procedures are in place to ensure that all violations of the law of war are promptly reported and thoroughly investigated IAW those directives.

c. **Treatment of Detainees.** During the conduct of modern military operations, MNTF personnel must be prepared to detain a wide variety of individuals who fall into different categories under the law of war. Regardless of the category or status of a detainee, MNTF forces are required to properly control, maintain, protect, and account for all detainees IAW applicable domestic law, international law, and policy. For this reason, and because the excessive use of force or the perceived mistreatment of detainees can also seriously undermine public confidence in MNTF operations, it is imperative that MNFCs provide clear guidance for detainee operations in a joint environment.

*For additional information, see JP 3-63, Detainee Operations.*

d. **Military Justice.** Jurisdiction over US forces suspected of committing a criminal offense will be decided on a case by case basis IAW applicable international agreements with HN civil authorities. It is US policy to retain jurisdiction in all criminal cases to the fullest extent possible. Foreign military commanders exercising OPCON or TACON over US forces will not administer discipline.

6. **Doctrine, Training, and Resources**

a. **Doctrine.** Some nations possess doctrine and training programs with a full treatment of strategic, operational, and tactical issues. Other nations have doctrine and training programs smaller in both scope and capability to match their national goals and objectives. When the Armed Forces of the United States participate in multinational operations, US commanders should follow multinational doctrine and procedures that have been ratified by the United States. For multinational doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures where applicable and consistent with US law, policy, and guidance. An example is the MNF SOPs developed by 33 nations within the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) in the Asia-Pacific region. It seeks to identify common starting points for the rapid activation and forming of a MNTF for crisis response situations and is based upon US doctrine, other nations’ doctrines, UN concepts, and NATO doctrines (see Appendix C, “United Nations and Other Intergovernmental Organizations Considerations”).

> “Doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way military forces think about, train for, plan, and execute operations. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allied Administrative Publication-6, ‘NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions’ (English and French), defines doctrine as the ‘Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.’ The principles and tenets of doctrine take into account all of the basic elements of a military force: weapons and other systems; skill
levels; experience and training; deployment and sustainment capabilities; organizational issues; C2 philosophy and issues; and command arrangements. Doctrine deals primarily with extant capabilities. Doctrine is not about what is to be done, but about how it is to be accomplished. Doctrine is neither strategy nor policy, though it often influences and is influenced by both.

Coalition partners using very different national doctrines will obviously have problems harmonizing their efforts, even if they enjoy a high degree of technical interoperability. Forces operating on different fundamental principles will lack unity of effort, and could even work at cross-purposes. Areas where commonality of doctrinal approach is particularly critical include intelligence, command and control, operations and planning, logistics, and communications. Subsidiary functions of force protection, deployment, coalition combat identification rules of engagement, and civil-military cooperation are also key. Finding ways to harmonize doctrine is therefore an important means to ensure improved coalition operations.

Multinational Interoperability Council
Coalition Building Guide, Change 1, 17 April 2006

b. Training and Resources. When the situation permits, MNFCs at all levels should seek opportunities to improve the contributions of member nation forces through training assistance and resource sharing consistent with agreements between alliance and/or coalition members. This could include the sale or loan of equipment; consistent and shared doctrine; common TTP; and participation in multinational exercises. GCCs will include this information in their SCP.

(1) The sale or loan of equipment and the sharing of logistic resources are normally covered under either the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) or the NATO Mutual Support Act and require a negotiated acquisition and cross-servicing agreement (ACSA) or foreign military sales (FMS) agreement.

For more information on ACSA, see CJCSI 2120.01, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements, and DODD 2010.9, Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements.

(2) Multinational exercises are key components of training, future collaboration, and doctrine refinement. GCCs should ensure all exercises (and other security cooperation opportunities) are fully annotated on their annual SCP and supported to the maximum extent possible. Interagency support and participation is also highly desirable. Exercise types may include command post exercises, battlestaff exercises, and field exercises. Simulation support can complement most exercises. Exercises can also assist in training potential core elements for future operations. NATO’s multinational library includes a series of multinational exercise publications used for training multinational maritime forces.
## US PACIFIC COMMAND’S MULTINATIONAL PLANNING AUGMENTATION TEAM

The climate of cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region is very conducive to multilateral dialogue and the development of effective strategic, operational, and tactical planning and execution skills to meet on-going and emergent security challenges. Many of the necessary planning skills and personal relationships used to form effective multilateral partnerships can be found within the Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) program.

The MPAT is made up of a cadre of experienced military planners, capable of rapidly augmenting a multinational force headquarters, to plan and execute coalition military operations primarily at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. The primary focus of MPAT is to improve multinational interoperability at the operational level of command.

MPAT is not a program with formal participatory agreements. The key factor in program success to date has been the informal ad hoc nature of the program. Without memorandums of agreement, terms of reference, or other more formal arrangements, the program has been able to share information and all participants have been able to jointly develop concepts and procedures without formal policy constraints – a key inhibitor to multinational interoperability when working with other nations.

The MPAT program includes military planners from all interested nations and also incorporates expertise from international & nongovernmental organizations and the United Nations. The MPAT program belongs to all interested nations.

**SOURCE:** www.mnfsop.com – MPAT Portal and MNF SOP Portal

*For more information on MPAT, see Appendix B, “Multinational Planning Augmentation Team.”*

### 7. Protection

a. Protection focuses on conserving the joint force’s fighting potential in **three primary ways** — **active offensive and defensive measures** (such as air defense) that protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary infrastructure, and lines of communications (LOCs) from an enemy’s attack; **passive measures** (such as concealment) that make friendly forces, systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy; and **applying technology and procedures** to reduce the risk of fratricide. As the MNFC’s mission requires, the protection function may also extend beyond force protection to encompass protection of MNF noncombatants; the forces, systems, and civil infrastructure of friendly nations; and IGOs/NGOs.

b. The **protection function** encompasses a number of tasks, including:
(1) Collecting information for indications and warning.

(2) Providing air, space, and missile defense.

(3) Protecting noncombatants, including conducting noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) when required.

(4) Providing physical security for forces and means.

(5) Conducting defensive countermeasure operations, including counter-deception and counterpropaganda operations.

(6) Providing chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE) defense.

(7) Conducting information operations (IO).

(8) Securing and protecting flanks and LOCs.

(9) Conducting CBRNE consequence management.

(10) Conducting antiterrorism operations.

(11) Establishing capabilities and measures to prevent fratricide.

c. There are protection considerations that affect planning in every joint operation. The greatest risk — and therefore the greatest need for protection — is during campaigns and major operations that involve large-scale combat against a capable enemy. These typically will require the full range of protection tasks, thereby complicating both planning and execution. Although the operational area and joint force may be smaller for crisis response or limited contingency operations, the mission can still be complex and dangerous, with a variety of protection considerations. Permissive operating environments associated with military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence still require that commanders consider protection measures commensurate with potential risks. These risks may include a wide range of threats such as terrorism, criminal enterprises, environmental threats/hazards, and computer hackers. Thorough research and detailed information about the operational environment, training, and joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment can ensure adequate protection measures.

d. Force protection includes measures taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against DOD personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the integrated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the adversary. Force protection measures span the entire breadth of operations from home station to deployed locations.
because threats to deployed forces are found in all of those locations. It does not include actions to defeat the adversary or protect against accidents or weather. Force protection is achieved through the tailored selection and application of multilayered active and passive measures, within the operational area, across the range of military operations with an acceptable level of risk.

See JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and JP 4-02, Health Service Support, for information on planning force protection and an expanded discussion of protection.

(1) Commanders must understand that other nations do not necessarily execute force protection in the same way as the US Military. Some nations’ armed forces may or may not be willing or able to assume more risk than US forces. US commanders, whether under US control or under a command relationship to a multinational force, must continuously assess threats and vulnerabilities while implementing appropriate force protection countermeasures IAW published GCC directives.

(2) Special consideration must be given to personnel with duties that require interaction with local populations, such as civil affairs (CA), psychological operations (PSYOP), human intelligence, counterintelligence, and local contract liaison. Separate assessments should be conducted to determine the appropriate protection requirement in order to facilitate the accomplishment of their tasks.

(3) Throughout multinational operations, risk management should be used to reduce or offset risk by systematically identifying, assessing, and controlling risk. The risk management process helps commanders make decisions that weigh risk against mission accomplishment.

(4) Another significant problem facing the multinational force is the potential for fratricide. Unfamiliar procedures, lack of a common language, and differing operational terms of reference can increase this risk. MNF support or liaison teams can greatly assist in assessing and reducing the fratricide risk to the multinational force by recommending operational coordination measures and technological solutions.

(5) Finally, commanders must understand that US forces, as part of a multinational force, can potentially be a greater target. As a result of US global leadership, adversaries may view attacks against US Service members as attractive. Commanders must maintain security programs to protect Service members, civilian employees, family members, facilities, information, and equipment under their responsibility.

8. Rules of Engagement

a. Obtaining concurrence for ROE from national authorities is a time consuming but essential process and should begin early in the planning process. Even though the participants may have similar political mandates, ROE may differ among the nations represented. In many cases, commanders of deployed member forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation in the ROE development process. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE should be sought, but may not be achievable. In any event, the MNFC should reconcile differences as
much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their national policies.

b. It is essential that adjacent or mutually supporting formations and forces understand each others’ ROE, as it cannot be assumed that each will react in an identical fashion to a given situation. Without this understanding, events could result in misperceptions, confusion, and even fratricide.

c. US forces assigned OPCON to a MNTF will follow the ROE of the MNTF unless otherwise directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. US forces will be assigned and remain OPCON to a foreign MNFC only if the CCDR and higher authority determine that the ROE for that MNTF are consistent with US policy guidance on individual and unit self-defense as contained in the standing rules of engagement (SROE). The SROE serve as the default ROE and are applicable at all times during multinational operations. US forces assigned to the OPCON or TACON of a multinational force will additionally follow ROE of the multinational force for mission accomplishment if authorized by a Secretary of Defense order.

For additional information on SROE, see CJCSI 3121.01B, Standing Rules of Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of Force for US Forces.

SECTION B. OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

9. Unified Action

a. Unified action is the synergistic application of all instruments of national and multinational power; it includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces. This concept is applicable at all levels of command. In a multinational environment, unified action synchronizes and/or integrates multinational operations with the operations of intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies in an attempt to achieve unity of effort in the operational area (see Figure III-3).

b. MNFCs must integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the operational area. All MNTF commanders are responsible to plan and conduct unified actions IAW the guidance and direction received from the national commands, alliance or coalition leadership, and superior commanders.

c. Training of forces within the MNTF command for specific mission standards enhances unified action. The MNFC should consider establishing common training modules or certification training to ensure assigned forces are trained for the missions assigned. Such training and certification of forces can occur prior to deployment to the MNTF operational area or after deployment. Certification of forces should be accomplished by a team composed of members from all nations providing military forces to the MNFC.
10. Intelligence

a. Every interrelated intelligence operation of the intelligence process — planning and direction, collection, processing and exploitation, analysis and production, dissemination and integration, and evaluation and feedback — is substantively affected in multinational operations. In some international operations or campaigns, JFCs will be able to use ISAs (e.g., NATO STANAG) as a basis for establishing rules and policies for conducting joint intelligence operations. Since each multinational operation will be unique, such agreements may have to be modified or amended based on the situation. The following general principles provide a starting point for creating the necessary policy and procedures (see Figure III-4).

(1) **Maintain Unity of Effort.** Each nation’s intelligence personnel need to view the threat from multinational as well as national perspectives. A threat to one element of an alliance or coalition by the common adversary must be considered a threat to all alliance or coalition elements.
(2) **Make Adjustments.** There will be differences in intelligence doctrine and procedures among the coalition partners. A key to effective multinational intelligence is the readiness to make the adjustments required to resolve significant differences such as:

(a) How intelligence is provided to the commander, the commander’s staff, and forces.

(b) Procedures for sharing information among intelligence agencies.

(c) The degree of security afforded by different communications systems and procedures.

(d) Administrative requirements.

(3) **Plan Early and Plan Concurrently.** National command channels need to determine what intelligence may be shared with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. NATO and the United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces Command have developed and exercised intelligence policies and procedures that provide examples of how multinational planning can be done in advance.
Planning and Execution Considerations

US CENTRAL COMMAND COALITION INTELLIGENCE CENTER

“We were established in 2001 at the beginning of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Under J-2 we were established for the purpose of facilitating and sharing of intelligence. In the beginning there was some operational tactical intelligence that we shared with our coalition members and that information was limited to just Afghanistan. But as the mission expanded into Iraq, we also had to expand our purpose of sharing and discussing information while establishing analytical teams to address specific questions from both the Coalition and the US. Our Center is the forum where most of those discussions take place.

The Coalition countries are all invited to have membership in the Intelligence Center. We put in perspective the nation’s involvement with operations. Not every country has an intelligence interest and not every country has an intelligence officer assigned to US Central Command (USCENTCOM). Those that do have an intelligence officer assigned at USCENTCOM will participate with us on a daily basis. Those that do not have an intelligence officer, but do have intelligence interests, usually go through their country’s senior national representative or through the operations officer to consult with us and discuss with us issues of common interest.”

Colonel Evilio Otero, Jr
Chief, Coalition Intelligence Center
USCENTCOM Coalition Village

(4) Share All Necessary Information

(a) Coalition members should share all relevant and pertinent intelligence about the situation and adversary consistent with national disclosure policy (NDP) and theater guidance. However, information about intelligence sources and methods should not be shared with coalition members until approved by the appropriate authority.

(b) Force protection is a mission inherent to any commander, and intelligence support to that mission is critical. Every effort must be made to share any data that could impact on the commander’s force protection mission.

(c) When information relating to a particular source cannot be shared, the intelligence derived from that source should still be provided to other multinational partners. The intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2) must establish procedures for separating intelligence from sources and methods. Intelligence agencies often produce highly classified reports that contain compartmented information. To the greatest extent possible, this information should be disseminated using a tear line. A tear line enables the J-2, G-2, and/or S-2 to keep information above the tear line (compartmented data) and disseminate the intelligence below. Having intelligence production agencies use such tear lines will greatly facilitate intelligence sharing.
(d) The joint force J-2 must obtain the necessary authorizations for foreign disclosure officers (FDOs) and designated intelligence disclosure officials (DIDOs) from the Defense Intelligence Agency as soon as possible. J-2 personnel must be knowledgeable of the specific foreign disclosure policy, procedures, and regulations for the operation. The assignment and use of qualified and certified FDOs and DIDOs will enhance the efficient flow of intelligence.

(5) Conduct Complementary Operations

(a) Intelligence efforts of the nations must be complementary. Each nation will have intelligence system strengths and limitations and unique and valuable capabilities. HN security services’ capabilities, for example, will contribute significantly to force protection. Furthermore, planning with friendly nations to fill shortfalls, especially linguists requirements, may help overcome such limitations.

(b) All intelligence resources and capabilities should be made available for application to the whole of the intelligence problem. Establishing a multinational collection management element is essential for planning and coordinating multinational collection operations.

See JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations, for further details.

b. Other Considerations. It is important to consider the ramifications of labeling information about an operational area as intelligence, especially when interacting with nonmilitary organizations. In many cultures, the perception of intelligence connotes information gathered on a nation’s citizenry to exploit it. Further, attempts to exchange information with many NGOs/IGOs would likely be stifled as they strive to maintain political neutrality throughout the world and would not associate in any perceived intelligence gathering attempts. Therefore, unclassified facts and/or data should be referred to as information in order to facilitate its exchange throughout the operational area for the purpose of fostering mutual interests in resolving or deterring conflict or providing support.

c. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT). Multinational operations require interoperable GEOINT data, applications, and data exchange capabilities. Whenever possible, participants should agree to work on a standard datum and ensure that all products utilize that datum. A multinational GEOINT plan must coordinate all products for use by member forces, including access approval procedures and blending assets into a cohesive production program.

See JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, for further details.
11. Information Sharing

“Coalition forces continue to play a vital role in current, and likely all future operations in the US Central Command (USCENTCOM) area of responsibility (AOR). The information sharing challenge is extremely complicated with multiple coalitions, international organizations, and alliances participating in different operations. Many nations participate in multiple communities. These include the 66-nation Global Counterterrorism Forces, the 51-nation Multinational Coalition Forces-Iraq, the 11-nation Combined Naval Forces Central Command, the 33-nation International Security Assistance Forces for Afghanistan, the 26-member nation North Atlantic Treaty Organization, as well as the traditional 6 Gulf Cooperation Council member states and our 25 regional AOR countries. USCENTCOM needs to be able to electronically share information with these various communities of interests quickly and efficiently to successfully conduct coalition operations.”

Jill L. Boardman/Donald W. Shuey
“CENTRIXS; Supporting Coalition Warfare World-Wide”
April 2004

a. National Disclosure Policy. The release of classified information to multinational partners is governed by NDP. Detailed guidance must be provided to the senior US commander by the chain of command IAW National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 119, “Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations” and NDP-1, “National Policy and Procedures for the Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations.” Detailed written guidance may be supplemented with limited delegation of disclosure authority where appropriate (e.g., combined force protection purposes). However, the senior US officer needs to become personally concerned with the issues of intelligence sharing and releasing of information early in the process to ensure that the commander’s requirements have been clearly stated and understood; that the guidance issued is supportive of those requirements; and that the procedures to be followed are supportable by the MNFC.


b. Communications and Processing Architectures. Due to the perishable nature of pertinent, releasable intelligence, it is imperative that a system be devised for and by the MNF members that is capable of transmitting the most important intelligence rapidly to units. Frequently this system relies on the distribution of standardized equipment by one country’s forces to ensure commonality. The system must also be firmly rooted in a network of coalition liaison officers (LNOs) at major intelligence production or communication centers, to provide redundant intelligence communications channels to their parent nation, and to determine and obtain intelligence uniquely suited for that nation’s mission in time to exploit it.
(1) Several nations maintain separate classified internet and communications systems. For US forces, the SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET) is the primary classified architecture.

(2) Unclassified Networks are an Operational Imperative. In addition to classified networks, an unclassified network using the Internet (commercially encrypted if available) for multinational operations is a communications backbone. In Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE, in response to the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster, the use of the Asia Pacific Network (APAN) unclassified internet network was an operational imperative to rapidly collaborate and coordinate with participating nations, IHC, and affected nations’ governments and militaries. Because of multilevel security issues, classified networks can rarely provide the necessary collaborative communications required.

c. Coordination. Within alliances, it is common for intelligence procedures, practices, and standardized agreements to be established and tested prior to actual use. Coalitions, however, are frequently created and disbanded relatively quickly. Coalition participants typically compensate for the lack of standardization through coordination between national leadership and prospective forces. As mentioned above, coordinating the elements of communications architectures is essential. Additional areas requiring extensive coordination include the friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum, use of space and/or space assets, geographical location of intelligence collection assets, and targets of intelligence collection. Intelligence processing centers should be multinational in character, serving the MNFC but also recognizing intelligence that has value in support of national missions. However, establishment of these multinational processing centers, particularly in the case of ad hoc coalitions, will require extensive personal involvement and support from the MNFC and the corresponding nation in order to make this a functioning reality. Again, the MNFC priority intelligence requirements should serve as the milestones to fully focus the intelligence effort. The answers can only be gained through effective coordination at all levels.

12. Communications

a. Communications are fundamental to successful multinational operations. Planning considerations include frequency management, equipment compatibility, procedural compatibility, cryptographic and information security, identification friend or foe, and data-link protocols. MNFC should anticipate that some forces from MNTF will have direct and near immediate communications capability from the operational area to their respective national political leaderships. This capability can facilitate coordination of issues, but it can also be a source of frustration as leaders external to the operational area may be issuing guidance directly to their deployed national forces. Many communications issues can be resolved through equipment exchange and liaison teams. When exchanging equipment, special consideration must be paid to the release of communications security devices as well as the level of classification released to individual countries per NDP and any applicable exemptions.

b. Communications requirements vary with the mission, size, composition, geography, and location of the MNTF. It is critical that operations and communications planners begin the
coordination process early to ensure both US and MNF communication requirements are identified and sourced prior to operations. Interoperability is often constrained by the least technologically proficient participant. Effective communications support must be established to enable control over diverse, widely dispersed air, maritime, ground, and space elements. Access to both military and commercial satellites should be an early planning requirement to support widely dispersed elements. The MNFC should address the need for integrated communications among all participating forces early in the planning phase of the operation. MNTF planning and technical communications systems control centers should be established as soon as possible to coordinate all communications.

c. In all multinational operations a broadband, unclassified network will be a critical requirement for multinational coordination with all actors and stakeholders within the MNTF operational area. The IHC and affected nations’ governments and militaries will use unclassified, commercially encrypted networks as their primary collaboration and coordination tool. Satellite access to broad band Internet capability must be planned as an operational necessity, if not currently available within the MNTF operational area.

d. LNO teams should be sent to other MNF HQs to facilitate integration of operations. These LNO teams should deploy with sufficient communications equipment to conduct operations with their respective HQs. Consideration should also be given to possible degradation of communications due to the extended distances over which the MNTF must operate and the impact of enemy exploitation of the electromagnetic spectrum. Urban operations present other difficulties due to interference from physical structures or frequency overlaps. Planning for communications support must also include provisions which allow execution of required communications under adverse conditions. Additionally, US law requires prior international and implementing agreements defining quid pro quo payments for allied use of the Defense Information Systems Network and military satellite communications assets.

13. Land Operations

In most multinational operations, land forces are an integral, and central, part of the military effort. The level and extent of land operations in a multinational environment is largely a function of the overall military objectives, any national caveats to employment, and the forces available within the MNTF.

a. National doctrine and training will normally dictate employment options within the MNTF. Nations with common TTP will also experience far greater interoperability. Effective use of TSCP events may significantly reduce interoperability problems even for countries with widely disparate weapons systems.

b. The MNFC may assign the responsibility for land operations to an overall multinational force land component commander (MNFLCC) or a task force (TF) within the MNTF command structure (for example: TF South, TF North). Such TFs may include elements from a single nation or multiple nations depending on the situation and the interoperability factors of the nations involved. In addition, the MNFC may also assign an AO to the MNFLCC or TF based upon concept of the operations. Figure III-5 contains a representative sample of MNFLCC responsibilities.
c. The MNFC will also establish supported and supporting relationships between the land component command or TF and other MNTF components (maritime, air, and special operations).
based upon mission requirements to assist in prioritizing actions, assist in establishing the main effort, and
to establish formal command/coordination channels between the components for a specific operation,
mission, or phase.

d. A key aspect of land operations will be sustainability. The following factors will impact
the sustainability of land operations:

(1) Manpower requirements.
(2) Medical requirements and capabilities.
(3) Maintenance.
(4) Supply.
(5) Storage facilities.
(6) Transportation.
(7) Technical support and requirements.
(8) Common sourcing of support.

e. Land operations provide the MNFC with a multifunctional force that can transition from
support operations to combat operations quickly based upon the mission requirements.

See JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations, for more details.

14. Maritime Operations

In a multinational environment, the operational aim for maritime forces is to exercise sea
control or project power ashore, to ensure maritime operations are integrated with the other
major MNTF operational functions of land, air, and SOF, and to support the MNFC’s intent and
guidance in achieving the MNTF mission. Maritime forces are primarily navies, however, they
may include maritime-focused air forces, amphibious forces, or other government agencies
charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea.

a. As with land forces, maritime operation responsibility will normally be assigned to a
multinational force maritime component commander (MNFMCC) or a designated TF. Figure
III-6 contains a representative sample of MNFMCC responsibilities.

b. The MNFC can also assign a maritime AO to the MNFMCC or naval TF within the MNTF
operational area, based upon the concept of operations (CONOPS). The MNFC will also establish
supported and supporting relationships between the MNFMCC (or TF) and other MNTF components
(land, air, special operations forces) based upon mission requirements to assist in prioritizing actions,
assist in establishing the main effort, and to establish formal command/coordination channels between the components for a specific operation/mission or phase.

c. A key aspect of maritime operations will be sustainability. The following factors will impact the sustainability of maritime operations:

1. Available surface ships (combat and amphibious).
2. Available submarine assets.
4. Supply.
5. Storage facilities.
d. Maritime operations provides the MNFC with a multifunctional force that can transition from “support operations” to “combat operations” fairly quickly based upon the mission requirements.

15. Air Operations

a. Air operations provide the MNFC with a responsive and flexible means of operational reach. The MNFC can execute deep operations rapidly, striking at decisive points and attacking centers of gravity. Further, transportation and support requirements can be greatly extended in response to emerging crisis and operational needs. Multinational air operations are focused on supporting the MNFC’s intent and guidance in achieving the MNTF mission and at the same time, ensuring air operations are integrated with the other major MNTF operational functions (land, maritime, and special operations forces).

b. Overall MNTF air operations will normally be assigned to a multinational force air component commander (MNFACC). MNFACC responsibilities include the planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of air capabilities/force made available based on the MNFC’s air apportionment decision (see Figure III-7). The MNFC will also establish supported and supporting relationships between the MNFACC or TF and other MNTF components based on MNTF mission requirements, to assist in prioritizing actions and to establish formal command/coordination channels between the components for a specific operation/mission or phase.

c. Air Operations Planning. An integral part of the MNFC’s planning efforts is the concept of air operations. The MNFACC is responsible for air operations planning, and develops the concept for air operations describing how the multinational assets made available are envisioned to be employed in support of the MNFC’s overall objectives. Both US component commanders and MNFCs must provide highly trained liaison staffs to ensure integration, coordination, and synchronization of their operations. Air planning should also include the use of logistic air assets and airfields. This is especially important for the coordination of tactical air operations with logistic operations, especially the air movement of supplies, their unloading, and rapid clearance from aerial ports. In the event that no established multinational guidance is available, planning considerations for multinational air operations should resemble those for joint air operations.

See JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations, for details on the air planning process.

d. Airspace Control. The primary purpose of airspace control is to increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, effective, and flexible use of airspace with minimal restraint imposed on the users. International agreements, enemy and friendly force structures, deployments and resupply operations, commanders’ concepts and operations, and operating environments such as foreign countries, the high seas, and amphibious objective areas will necessitate different specific arrangements for airspace control.

(1) Responsibility. The responsibility for airspace control rests with the MNFC, who normally designates an airspace control authority (ACA) to coordinate the airspace control
The broad responsibilities of the ACA include establishing, coordinating, and integrating the use of the airspace control area. Subject to the authority and approval of the MNFC, the ACA develops broad policies and procedures for airspace control and for the coordination required among nations’ forces.

(2) When operating outside of a combat environment and within the borders of another sovereign nation, the ACA may perform coordination rather than control over the airspace. In those situations, the ACA must establish an effective relationship with the HN airspace authority. Also, in addition to increasing effectiveness, the HN interests are likely to include safe domestic civil aviation, efficient commercial aviation, and international overflight rights. Integrating airspace control efforts will have a positive impact in the overall relationship between the HN and the MNF.

(3) The ACA establishes an airspace control system that is responsive to the needs of the MNFC, integrates the MNTF airspace control system with that of the HN, and coordinates and deconflicts user requirements. Centralized direction by the ACA does not imply assumption of OPCON over any assets. Matters on which the ACA is unable to obtain agreement shall be referred to the MNFC for resolution. The responsibilities of ACA and MNFACC are interrelated and
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should normally be assigned to one individual. If this is not possible, the ACA staff should be collocated with the MNFACC staff.

e. **Air Defense.** Air defense operations must be coordinated with other operations, both on and over land and sea. The MNFC normally designates an area air defense commander (AADC) to ensure an integrated defensive effort by the MNTF. The responsibilities of the MNFACC, AADC, and ACA are interrelated and are normally assigned to one individual. When the situation dictates, the MNFC may designate a separate AADC and/or ACA. In those combined operations where separate commanders are required and designated, close coordination is essential for unity of effort, prevention of fratricide, and deconfliction of combined air operations.

f. **Sustainment.** The following factors will significantly influence sustainability during air operations:

1. Available air frames (fixed- and rotary-wing).
2. Landing fields/air base support infrastructure.
3. Weather.
5. Supply.
7. Transportation.
8. Technical support and requirements.
9. Common sourcing of support.
10. Secure LOCs.
11. Medical support requirements and capabilities.

16. **Space Operations**

a. MNFCs depend upon and exploit the advantages of space-based capabilities. During this phase, space capabilities are limited to already deployed assets and established priorities for service. Space systems offer global coverage and the potential for real time and near real time support to military operations. As a point of contact for military space operations, United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) enables commands to have access to space capabilities and systems. As situations develop, priorities for space services may change to aid the MNFC in assessing the changing environment.
Most importantly, MNFCs and their components need to anticipate “surge” space-based capabilities needed for future phases due to the long lead times to reprioritize or acquire additional capability.

b. **Space Integration into MNF Operations.** Allied or coalition forces will have many of the same requirements for space support as do US forces. Sharing of intelligence products is controlled according to intelligence guidelines. Multispectral imagery products are normally unclassified and will be of great benefit to other MNFs. Weather data is also readily available to share, as is global positioning system navigation support. Of special importance is providing warning and defense against attack from theater ballistic missiles. USSTRATCOM is responsible for assisting in development of missile warning architectures and providing this information to MNFs in a process called “shared early warning.”

c. **Space Coordinating Authority (SCA).** During campaigns or major operations, it is important to have a SCA for space operations and support within the MNF structure to appropriately represent the space requirements of the MNFC. With each MNF component and many allies having their own organic space capability, there is the possibility of redundancy among, and interference between, space operations, as well as conflicting support requests reaching USSTRATCOM. To prevent such occurrences, the MNFC should appoint a MNF SCA. The MNFC should consider the mission, nature and duration of the operation, preponderance of space force capabilities, and the C2 (including reach-back) in selecting the appropriate individual/agency. MNF coordinating authority is normally retained at the MNF level, but may be delegated to a component.

*For additional information on space operations, see JP 3-14, Space Operations.*

17. **Special Operations**

a. SOF provide the MNTF with a wide range of specialized military capabilities and responses. SOF can provide specific assistance in the area of assessment, liaison, and training of host country forces within the MNTF operational area. Special operations responsibility will normally be assigned to a multinational forces special operations component commander (MNFSOCC) or to a TF within the MNTF command structure. The TF may be made up of SOF from one nation or multiple nations depending on the situation and the interoperability factors of the nations involved. Figure III-8 contains a representative sample of MNFSOCC responsibilities.

b. SOF may deploy teams ahead of the multinational operations to evaluate capability of non-US units and identify training necessary to integrate them into the overall plan. This capability is enhanced by routine interaction of SOF with non-US military units as a regular function, such as the FID mission, to include combat aviation advisory support functions. SOF can conduct liaison to multinational surface and air units, taking advantage of their language and cultural capabilities. SOF can provide training to HN or multinational forces to overcome existing shortfalls identified during the assessment.

*For specific details on special operations, see JP 3-05, Doctrine for Joint Special Operations, and JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense.*
c. **Psychological Operations Support.** PSYOP should be incorporated into all multinational operations. The MNFC must ensure that all PSYOP activities, regardless of national origin, are coordinated. PSYOP planning must begin early, preferably before deployment, to prepare a population for the arrival of multinational forces and develop communication channels that can be used from day one of the operation. PSYOP provides the commander with the ability to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. A detailed analysis of a country’s culture, political climate, and military organization can help the MNFC to effectively apply PSYOP to communicate policy, provide information, and persuade groups to cooperate with friendly forces. US PSYOP are approved in US channels regardless of the composition of the MNTF chain of command.
d. Civil Affairs Support. CA provides the military commander with expertise on the civil component of the operational environment. The commander uses CA capabilities to analyze and influence the local populace through specific processes and dedicated resources and personnel. As part of the commander’s civil-military operations (CMO), CA conducts operations nested within the overall mission and intent. CA contributes significantly to ensuring the legitimacy and credibility of the mission. The key to understanding the role of CA is recognizing the importance of leveraging each relationship between the command and every individual, group, and organization in the operational environment to create a desired effect and achieve the overall objectives. CA units can provide support to non-US units in multinational operations. Planners coordinating CA support must factor in the fact that the majority of US CA units are in the Reserve Component.

PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION TEAMS —DISTRICT-LEVEL CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS

In early 2003 Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) deployed provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) to Gardez, Bamian, and Kunduz in order to establish a permanent presence in urban centers other than in Kabul. A United Kingdom (UK)-led PRT deployed to Mazar-e Sharif on 10 July 2003 within the CFC-A military structure. A second deployed to Maimana in June 2004. Soon after, a total of 16 PRTs had been established across Afghanistan. The teams led by the US, and the New Zealand-led PRT in Bamian, operate within CFC-A. Those led by the UK (Mazar, Maimana), Germany (Kunduz, Feyzebad) and The Netherlands (Pol-e Khumri) within International Security Assistance Force assigned territory.

Although operating within different military command structures, and emphasizing different aspects of activity and composition as determined by the local conditions and terrain, the core tasks of each of the PRTs are consistent across the network, and with North Atlantic Treaty Organization Operation Plan 10302: a PRT is a combination of international military and civilian personnel based in provincial areas of Afghanistan with the aim of extending the authority of the Afghan central government and helping to facilitate development and reconstruction, primarily by contributing to an improved security environment. PRTs also aim to support reform of the Afghan security sector (security sector reform) – the demobilization and disarmament of militias; building an accountable national army and national police force under democratic control; stamping out the drugs trade; and building a legal system.
Originally, the Mazar-e Sharif PRT’s area of responsibility covered five provinces: Jawzjan, Balkh, Samagan, Sar-е Pol, and Faryab, although direct control of the last was subsequently passed to the new UK-led PRT based at Meymana. The military component of the PRT is around 110 strong, including Danish, Swedish, and Romanian troops. There are also civilian representatives from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for International Development, the Afghan Transitional Administration, the US State Department, United States Agency for International Development, and the Government of Afghanistan. While the core structure of the PRT remains constant, the make-up of the PRT may change as it responds to changing circumstances and its evolving role.

SOURCE: Multiple Sources

(1) CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations to consolidate and achieve US-objectives. CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions which are normally the responsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur before, during, or after other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. CMO may be performed by designated CA, by other military forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces. As with so many other areas, CMO must be coordinated to accomplish the MNFC’s mission. The activities of multinational CA resources should be prioritized through the MNTF’s CMO plan to maximize the benefit of these resources. Commanders should liaise with civil authorities, local populace, NGOs, and IGOs. Additionally, coordination with the country team and other DOS organizations such as the coordinator for reconstruction and stabilization and associated local humanitarian reconstruction and stabilization teams, advance civilian teams, and/or provincial reconstruction teams provide a unique “force multiplier” capability to overall MNTF CMO.

(2) Incorporating liaison and coordination procedures into CONPLANs and OPLANs (especially annex G and annex V) will facilitate proper education, training, and exercising between military and civilian personnel and assist the commander in transitioning responsibility, when directed, to the appropriate organizations upon mission completion. One method to facilitate unified action and conduct on-site interagency coordination for CMO is to establish a CMOC. The CMOC serves as the primary coordination interface for the Armed Forces of the United States and humanitarian organizations, IGOs, NGOs, multinational military forces, and other civilian agencies of the USG. The CMOC facilitates continuous coordination among the key participants with regard to CMO and CA operations from local levels to international levels within a given AO, and develops, manages, and analyzes the civil inputs to the common operational picture. Army CA units have a standing CMOC capability and can form the core of the MNF CMOC.

18. Spectrum Management

Effective spectrum management is essential to integrate and deconflict multinational force use of the spectrum for communications, C2, sensor operations, IO, electronic warfare, and force protection. The varieties of systems which partner nations may depend upon, the number of suppliers, indigenous systems that use the spectrum, and fidelity of use and interference data make spectrum management far more demanding in multinational operations than in joint operations.

19. Information Operations

a. The development of capabilities, tactics, techniques, procedures, plans, intelligence, and communications support applicable to IO requires coordination with the responsible DOD components and allied/coalition nations. Coordination with allies above the joint force commander (JFC)/MNFC level is normally affected within existing defense arrangements, including bilateral arrangements. DOD, with the support of USSTRATCOM and through the Joint Staff, coordinates US positions on all IO matters discussed bilaterally or in multinational organizations to encourage interoperability and compatibility in fulfilling common requirements. Direct discussions regarding multinational operations in a specific theater are the responsibility of the GCC.

b. The Multinational IO Cell

(1) When the JFC is also the MNFC, the joint force staff should be augmented by planners and subject matter experts from the MNTF. All MNTF member nations should be represented in the IO cell in positions to contribute, when possible, to each of the elements of IO. IO planners should seek to accommodate the requirements of the MNTF with the goal of using all the available IO resources. Direct representation enables multinational IO assets to be used efficiently and ensures that the multinational IO plan is coordinated with all other aspects of the multinational operation.

See JP 3-13, Information Operations.

(2) In the case where the JFC is not the MNFC, it may be necessary for the JFC to brief the MNFC and staff on the advantages of IO as a part of military strategy to achieve US and MNF goals. The JFC should propose organizing a multinational IO cell. If this is not acceptable to the MNFC, the JFC should assume responsibility for using IO as a part of military strategy within the joint force to support US and MNF objectives.

c. Multinational IO Planning. Planning IO to support multinational operations is more difficult because of complex approval and security issues, differences in the level of training of involved forces, interoperability of equipment, and language barriers.

(1) How to plan multinational IO is the prerogative of the MNFC. The size, composition, and mission of the MNF, as well as diplomatic considerations, may influence how multinational IO is planned. Coordination at the IO cell level with detailed planning at the
individual element level would give multinational IO planning the most consistency with US IO planning procedures.

(2) The multinational IO plan should directly and demonstrably support the objectives of the MNFC. This is particularly important when joint force planners are attempting to acquaint a non-US MNFC with the advantages of IO as a part of military strategy.

(3) The subordinate JFC may undertake planning and execution of independent IO in support of multinational objectives.

See CJCSI 6510.01D, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND).

SECTION C. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

20. Multinational Logistics

a. Logistic support for multinational operations differs fundamentally from single nation joint operations. Participating MNTF forces each represent different sovereign nations with different cultures and approaches to logistic support. This has profound implications for how the US should organize, prepare, and execute the logistic support of US elements within the MNF and presents unique challenges for GCCs, subordinate JFCs, Services, and DOD agencies. Although many of the principles of logistics for joint and multinational operations are the same, multinational logistics involves distinctive C2 principles.

(1) The United States is a member of various alliances and multinational forums — such as NATO and the ABCA Armies Program — that have developed doctrine and procedures for supporting multinational logistic operations. When participating in NATO or other multinational operations, US forces will conform to previously approved international agreements, where applicable.

(2) However, US GCCs also face unique challenges arising from regionally specific coalition structures, capabilities, and operational requirements. Although each MNTF nation is responsible for logistic support of its national forces, the execution of multinational logistics must be a collective responsibility of the nations comprising the MNTF. This collective responsibility is critical and cannot be overstressed.

(3) Multinational logistics must be flexible, responsive, predictive, and should provide timely sustainment throughout the entire MNTF. The multinational logistic plan should incorporate the logistic requirements and capabilities of the entire MNTF to ensure sustained and synchronized execution. The intent is to provide the MNFC with the timely introduction and proper mix of support units and resources into the operational area. Achieving this goal will require considerable cooperation and continuous coordination between the logistic support and operational elements and it must begin during the initial planning phase and continue through the operation’s termination.
b. **Responsibility.** The responsibility for providing logistic support to national component forces ultimately resides with their nations, unless previously agreed to IAW alliance implementing arrangements (IAs) or ISAs. Varying degrees of mutual logistic support exist in multinational operations and must be planned to complement partners' capabilities and minimize weaknesses. To require each MNTF nation to perform all logistic functions separately would be inefficient, expensive, and logistically hinder the MNFC's ability to influence operations. The synergy required for successful multinational logistics is centralized control and coordination of common services and common funding for logistic services where appropriate (e.g., transportation, billeting) to reduce overall costs.

c. **Differences.** Among the participating nations, there will be differences in logistic doctrine, organizational capabilities, SOPs, terminology and definitions, methods for computing requirements, organizational policies, and automated data processing (ADP) support systems. These differences must be understood by all, harmonized where realistically possible, and accounted for during planning and execution. IAs and ISAs should be clearly specified in OPLANs to ensure their use by multinational formations. Multinational logistic planning must occur simultaneously and concurrently with operation planning. Such plans should be developed in consonance with prospective participating nations to achieve logistic efficiencies. The challenge of planning is in simultaneously supporting an ongoing operation while developing the support organization, bilateral and multilateral agreements and associated C2 mechanisms to achieve unity of effort. To the extent that concurrent planning occurs, many of these challenges may be avoided or minimized.

d. **Authority.** In multinational operations, the MNFC must be given sufficient authority over logistic resources to ensure that operational priorities can be effectively supported. Sovereign nations are reluctant to give MNFCs directive authority for logistics. However, the MNFC should have the authority to redistribute logistic assets as a temporary expedient to meet unanticipated or emergency situations. In some cases, the MNFC may exercise control over the various national logistic units. In other cases, the MNFC may have only coordinating authority. The degree of authority will depend upon existing agreements and ad hoc arrangements negotiated with participating nations and/or as identified in the campaign plan and/or OPLAN. The MNFC may delegate to component commanders (land, maritime, air) only the level of coordinating authority granted by the individual nations. The MNFC may establish a logistic coordination or control center headed by a senior logistic coordinator to control or coordinate common or theater-level logistic support within the operational area. Some of the major support issues that must be resolved include the following:

(1) Consistent with the principle that no property or supplies may be transferred to another nation without explicit legal authority, ensure that the mutual logistic support for US forces is IAW existing statutory authority. The Foreign Assistance Act, the Arms Export Control Act, ACSA authority, the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (as amended), the Fly America Act, and the Cargo Preference Acts all address the degree of support that the United States can provide to or receive from other nations. In addition, specific legislative language contained in DOD authorization or appropriation acts may limit US ability to receive and/or provide logistic support from and/or to allies.
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(2) Identification of common supplies and services that might be provided by one nation or a multinational organization.

(3) Establishing if, when, and how a MNFC will be provided authority over national logistic assets (to include authority for redistribution of national supplies under emergency conditions). This requires a national decision by participating nations.

(4) Availability and use of common and/or up-front funding for establishing cost effective contracts, establishing multinational HQ, and general and/or common support.

(5) Development of policies and procedures to account and reimburse for logistic services and supplies exchanged between the United States and other nations under existing ACSA.

(6) Establishment of responsibility and release procedures for national assets, as authorized.

(7) Development of the means to maintain national asset accountability (from the national sustaining base to the front line units).

(8) Ensuring compatibility and interoperability of communications networks to include tactical communications, tactical data links, joint data network, and ADP interfaces between national logistic organizations of the MNTF and national support systems, and how to integrate information classification requirements.

(9) Prioritization, C2, allocation, and use of common infrastructure capabilities (e.g., ports, airfields, roads) to support military and civil operations.

(10) Identification and distribution of those ISAs (STANAGs, QSTAGSs) that can facilitate the provision of multinational logistic support.

e. Planning. Often, little planning time is available prior to a multinational operation. However, to the extent that planning time is available, logistic support planning should be conducted concurrently with operational planning. Since such planning is critical, it will be frequently necessary to share partial or incomplete planning data (or data not fully approved) with prospective partners. Staffs should evaluate the level of standardization and interoperability among participating nations and, where situations permit, come to agreement on which nations will be responsible for providing logistic support functions for the MNTF, the task organization of the logistic units to support the MNTF, and the procedures and methods for how the support will be provided. At the MNTF HQ, the focus should be on measuring the requirements of executing the campaign plan, providing advance estimates of these requirements to national units, and ensuring that proper controls are in place to deconflict and permit movement and processing. Frequently, planning HQ, especially logistic planning HQ, are staffed with temporarily assigned personnel. To facilitate early planning, such personnel must be identified and made available in a timely manner.
(1) There are three generally accepted methods of executing cooperative logistics in a MNTF. These can be used singularly or in combination.

(a) In the lead nation construct, a nation accepts responsibility to provide one or more logistic functions within a specified geographic area in support of the MNTF.

(b) Using pooled assets and resources, two or more nations form an integrated logistic support structure to provide supply or support functions to the MNTF.

(c) In a role specialization agreement, a nation accepts responsibility to provide a particular class of supply or service for all or most of the MNTF.

(2) Regardless of the mutual support method(s) used, it is imperative that national decisions and commitments to lead or participate in such arrangements be provided early during the planning cycle. Assuming a lead nation or role specialization nation status does not grant the US forces any additional legal authority to provide support to coalition partners on a nonreimbursable basis.

(3) The role specialist nation (RSN) mission in NATO can be implemented for a NATO operation that includes member and nonmember nations. Specific planning considerations should address the US military role as the RSN for a specific logistic commodity and the on-demand support level available when another nation provides a specified commodity as the RSN.

(a) During the planning process, components and DOD agencies should prepare, develop, and disseminate specific policies and procedures for potential RSN applications in NATO and other multinational operations.

(b) US participation as an RSN often is constrained by legal authorities. This factor must be considered early in the planning process so that any required agreements or arrangements can be put in place prior to the operation.

f. Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements Authority. Normally, USG acquisitions must be accomplished by means of a Federal Acquisition Regulation contract. Transfers of defense goods and services to foreign nations must generally be done through a FMS case. Often, in coalition operations, these methods may prove to be cumbersome, time consuming, and inefficient. Under ACSA authority (Title 10 USC Section 2341), the Secretary of Defense can enter into agreements for the acquisition of or cross servicing of logistic support, supplies, and services on a reimbursable, replacement-in-kind, or exchange for equal value basis. These agreements can be with eligible nations and international organizations of which the United States is a member. The ACSA is a broad overall agreement which is generally supplemented by an IA. The IA contains points of contact and specific details of the transaction and payment procedures under which orders for logistic support supplies and services are placed. Neither party is obligated until the order is accepted.

Significant restrictions for ACSA use exist. For additional information, see JP 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations.
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g. **Arms Export Control Act Title 22 US Code.** An AECA FMS agreement negotiated between the United States and an allied and/or coalition country or organization is the preferred agreement for operations other than short-term emergent emergency operations. The primary instruments are the letter of request from the country or organization requesting logistic support and the letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) from the United States. Within this agreement, the basic ordering agreement (BOA) may be included to establish an account for ordering a wide range of undefined materiel requirements, unknown at the signing of the LOA. A BOA is particularly useful for food, fuel, medical materiel, ammunition, unscheduled repairs, and repair parts. Using a BOA, the full range of logistic support from routine through emergency requirements may be provided, including weapon systems and major end items if necessary. The LOA provides a formal contractual agreement and includes the use of established logistic systems in the FMS community. Many of the countries interface directly with US logistic systems. US logistic systems, procedures, and methods of financial accounting are institutionalized and documented by DOD 5105.38-M, *Security Assistance Management Manual*, to support eligible country’s armed forces today. For the purposes of training and standardization the emergency operation’s systems should be the same as those used for the routine peacetime operations. Many countries are already trained and use the familiar FMS process.

1. The two basic elements are a signed LOA and funded accounts to support the country’s requirements. The full range of materiel, supplies, and services, including weapon systems and major end items, may be provided under the AECA.

2. Benefits of the AECA and/or FMS system include the following:
   
   a. Use of standard logistic systems.

   b. Complete financial accountability.

   c. Control of materiel IAW the country and/or organization’s assigned force activity designator and the priority assigned individual requests.

   d. Handling of “nonstandard” item requisitions. Existing FMS logistic systems are set up to support these requirements.

   e. May prevent an excessive drawdown on US forces’ logistic support and/or unit organic supplies and equipment.

   f. Transportation of materiel to the operational area, particularly ammunition, may be provided utilizing the country’s assets and handling system, thereby reducing the transportation requirements on the Defense Transportation System during a crisis situation.

h. **Contingency Contracting.** Contracting is another essential source of logistic support. In respect to multinational logistics, the most important type of contracting will be theater support contracting. Theater support contracting is the process of contracting for locally available supplies, services, and construction in immediate support of deployed units, either at staging locations, interim support bases, or
forward operating locations. It can be especially applicable to support of reception, staging, and onward movement of forces. Properly used, contracting is an effective force multiplier for deployed forces during a contingency. It can serve to reduce dependence on the continental United States based logistic system. Contracting can have a potential positive effect in dealing with imposed force structure and personnel ceiling requirements, allow more nations to participate, and enhance infrastructure recovery. Satisfying requirements for supplies and services through theater support contracting can improve response time and reduce logistic footprints. Contracting can augment the existing logistic support capability, providing an additional source for critically required supplies and services. However, as indicated for HNS, the contractor resources available in theater are to be prioritized by the MNFC or the designated logistic coordinator. In doing so, consideration must be given to the impact of local contracting upon the HN’s economy and infrastructure. In most operations, the use of theater support contracts will have a positive economic effect that can help lead to the attainment of the eventual end state within the operational area and timing of withdrawal. External support contractors such as one of the Services civil augmentation programs may also be used as an alternative source of support; however, their use in theater must be addressed in a SOFA or other international agreement, where applicable, for such issues as taxes, cross border fees, and landing fees.

(1) Contingency contracting will not replace HNS or the existing supply systems where these systems are available or operational. However, deployments most likely to require employment of contingency contracting are those occurring in areas of the world where there are few, if any, HNS agreements.

(2) Most recent deployments of US forces have been to multinational operations supporting contingencies in remote areas of the world. The trend of world events suggests that such operations will become more probable in the future. Whether for FHA, PO, NEO, war, or other contingencies, such operations may require the creation of multinational contracting coordination centers staffed by personnel from all forces operating in the theater.

(3) Contingency contracting warrants special treatment because of the complex nature of the acquisition process and the need to support operational forces. This necessitates that the CCDRs formulate comprehensive implementation plans and operation specific policies, to include a deliberate risk assessment, that will support this essential element of the logistic chain. This will ensure that proper contracting methods are employed in the procurement of supplies and services and military forces receive the required logistic resources to perform their mission. It will also ensure that the associated risks in utilizing contingency contracting support (force protection, health issues, environmental considerations, potential loss of critical support, etc.) are properly analyzed and addressed in the operational plan.

21. Host-Nation Support

a. **HNS will often be critical to the success of a multinational operation.** In general, centralized coordination of HNS planning and execution will help ensure that HNS resources
are allocated most effectively to support the MNTF’s priorities. The more limited HNS resources are in
the operational area, the greater the requirement for centralized management.

b. NATO doctrine recognizes the importance of centralized HNS coordination and gives NATO
commanders the authority to:

(1) Prioritize HNS requirements.

(2) Negotiate HNS agreements, on behalf of nations, with a HN.

(3) Coordinate HNS allocation with “sending” nations and a HN.

c. In US-led multinational operations, nations typically negotiate their own HNS agreements.
Nevertheless, participating nations should coordinate their HNS arrangements with the MNFC,
who in turn should coordinate HNS allocation with the HN.

d. **Host-Nation Support Coordination Cell (HNSCC).** To assist the MNFC in HNS
coordination activities, a HNSCC may be established. One of the most important functions of
the HNSCC is to assist the MNFC and legal counsel in developing technical arrangements (TAs) that involve logistic matters such as: infrastructure, financial management, purchasing and contracting, engineering, environment, hazardous material storage, landing and port fees, medical operations and support, border customs, tariffs, and real estate.

(1) In US-led multinational operations, the MNFC needs to involve participating nations
in the negotiation of either commonly worded separate bilateral TAs or a single set of agreements
applicable to the entire MNTF.

(2) **Staffing.** The HNSCC should be staffed with specialists familiar with developing
and executing HNS agreements. In addition, consideration should be given to including
representatives of the HN within the HNSCC to:

(a) Facilitate coordination and identification of resources for potential use by the
MNTF.

(b) Provide interpretation and translation services to the HNSCC staff.

(3) **Information Requirements.** In order to effectively plan and coordinate HNS
allocation, the HNSCC needs up-to-date information on HNS logistic capabilities and on-going
HNS allocation to MNTF contingents throughout the operation. To ensure that it receives such
information, the HNSCC must maintain close contact with the HN and with MNTF contingents.

(4) **Coordinating Activities.** In conducting its operations, the HNSCC coordinates closely
with appropriate CMOC organizations, the multinational joint logistics center, and the HN’s
representatives.
e. HNS is generally furnished IAW an agreement negotiated prior to the start of an operation. HNS agreements are normally established in diplomatic channels between a nation or a MNTF and a receiving nation. These are normally umbrella-type agreements that are augmented by TAs detailing the specific support to be provided and the type/amount of reimbursement.

f. During crises, it may be necessary for the US GCC to request authority to negotiate bilateral HNS agreements for the purpose of providing logistic assistance to other nations. Such negotiations must be conducted expeditiously in coordination with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and the State Department, and in compliance with applicable DODDs. Alternatively, the MNFC may be authorized to negotiate HNS agreements on behalf of force contributing nations, with their prior concurrence. This approach, which NATO doctrine endorses, simplifies and streamlines the process and reduces the amount of time required to put such agreements into place.

g. **Available HNS Infrastructure.** Analysis of the physical infrastructure in the HN is critical to understanding force sustainability. MNTF logistic planners should evaluate what facilities and services (such as government, law enforcement, sanitation, power, fuel, and medical support) exist as viable support for local consumption and support of coalition forces.

   (1) First, assess the ability of the HN to receive MNTF personnel and equipment (e.g., ports and airfields).

   (2) Second, determine the capability of transportation systems to move forces once they arrive in theater.

   (3) Third, evaluate availability of logistic support.

   (4) The impact of obtaining HNS upon the host country’s national economy must also be considered, along with possible environmental impacts upon HNs. These must be recognized and addressed during the planning process.

   (5) In addition, specific technical agreements in many areas (e.g., environmental cleanup, levying of customs duties and taxes, hazardous material and/or waste storage, transit and disposal) must be developed to augment SOFAs that may have been concluded with HNs.

22. **Health Service Support**

   a. Multinational support operations are complicated by a number of characteristics that impact fundamentally upon the provision of health service support (HSS).

      (1) Unique nature of every individual operation.

      (2) Geographic, topographic, and climatic variations of the operational area.

      (3) Numbers of individual nations involved in each operation.
(4) Variations in national standards of HSS and equipment.

(5) Language and communications differences.

(6) Political complexity and dynamic nature of each operational scenario.

(7) Mission of medical support forces.

(8) Differences in individual national objectives and/or restrictions for participation in operations and integration of overall mission goals.

(9) Medical staffs face unique problems affecting the health of multinational personnel deployed on operations. Therefore, operational HSS requires clearly defined and distinctive guidance.

(10) HSS plans must be tailored to each operation and meet the demands of geography, individual national needs, language, and communication difficulties. Plans must be capable of rapid implementation, but at the same time be flexible enough to manage rapidly changing operational demands.

(11) Every deployed multinational force must have a surgeon and/or chief medical officer who has direct access to the MNFC. Working in coordination with the MNTF staff, they should recommend guidance and/or standards to follow in multinational operations.

(12) Each deployed national contingent that has HSS personnel must have a single designated individual who has the clinical responsibility for all national HSS matters.

b. HSS Standards for Multinational Operations. To qualify to participate in the MNF (and for subsequent multinational resourced medical treatment, patient movement, and personal disability compensation), national contingents and individuals allocated or contracted to multinational operations must meet the basic standards of individual health and physical fitness laid down by the staff chief medical officer.

(1) Contributing nations bear ultimate responsibility for ensuring the provision of HSS to their forces allocated to multinational operations. This may be discharged in a number of ways, including agreements with other nations or the appropriate multinational planning staffs and MNFCs.

(2) International Conventions for the Treatment of the Sick and Wounded. HSS for operations will comply with provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Persons, to include detainees, entitled under the terms of the Conventions shall, without discrimination, receive medical treatment on the basis of their clinical needs and the availability of HSS resources.

(3) Standards of HSS. Operational HSS to multinational forces must meet standards that are acceptable to all participating nations. Care provided to US forces participating in a multinational
Chapter III

operation must meet US standards.

(4) Estimation of Medical Risk. Estimation of medical risk and the associated casualty rates is the responsibility of the individual nation with HSS advice of the multinational operational staffs.

See JP 4-02, Health Service Support, for further details.

23. Personnel Recovery

a. Personnel recovery (PR) is the sum of military, diplomatic, and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. PR may occur through diplomatic initiatives, NGOs, coalition actions, or through any combination of these options. PR operations include the inherent capabilities of recovering equipment. In coalition operations, PR does not include NEO, peacetime search and rescue (SAR), or salvage operations.

b. The MNFC must make a careful assessment of each MNTF nation’s PR capability and procedures. Normally, each nation and/or component is responsible for conducting its own PR missions. However, participants may possess a variety of PR capabilities ranging from civil PR to dedicated combat PR. Therefore, the MNFC may designate an individual or establish an organization and procedures to coordinate this mission among all participants.

c. Coalition Personnel Recovery Center (CPRC). The MNFC may create a CPRC to act as the MNTF point-of-coordination for all actions associated with the recovery of personnel and associated equipment within the MNTF operational area. Functions of the CPRC include:

(1) Coordinate PR operations both within the MNTF and with external organizations.

(2) Advise the MNFC or designated component commander on PR incidents and requests.

(3) Coordinate requests for augmentation to support recovery operations as required.

d. PR operations may extend across national lines of responsibility. Operational flexibility, interoperability, and multisystem redundancy are the primary factors in successful PR operations.

See JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, for information on how to organize a comprehensive joint/combined PR network.

24. Administration and Personnel Support

Regardless of how the MNTF is organized operationally, each nation furnishing forces normally establishes a national component to ensure effective administration of its forces. These national components are similar in function to the US Service component at the combatant commands. The national component provides a means to administer and support the national
forces, coordinate communication to the parent nation, tender national military views and recommendations directly to the multinational commander, and facilitate the assignment and reassignment of national forces to subordinate operational multinational organizations.

25. Media Relations

a. Commanders at all levels should expect regular encounters with journalists who show up in their assigned operational areas. In general, open and independent reporting are the principal means of coverage of military operations. Some reporters will embed with the units and stay with them for an extended period of time. Some embedded reporters will be registered by the joint force and will carry identifying credentials issued by the MNTF or, as appropriate, Geneva Convention cards.

“Fewer than 30 reporters accompanied the entire invasion force to Normandy, France, on 6 June 1944. In contrast, more than 500 journalists appeared within hours to cover combat operations in Grenada in 1983 and Panama in 1989. At the beginning of Operation DESERT STORM in 1991, more than 1,600 news media and support personnel were present, and some 1,500 reported on hurricane relief operations in Florida in 1992. Reporters provided live television and radio coverage of the night amphibious landing that marked the beginning of Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia in 1992 and the end of the United Nations operation during Operation UNITED SHIELD in 1995. More than 1,700 media representatives covered the initial phases of peacekeeping operations in the American sector of Bosnia in 1996.”

Maj Barry Veneble, USA
Military Review
January-February 2002

(1) The criteria for credentialing journalists are established within the MNTF. Credentialing is not intended to be a control measure or means to restrict certain media outlets from access. It is primarily a method of validating individuals as journalists and providing them with information that enhances their ability to report on activities within the operational area.

(2) Additionally, media must be credentialed to ensure they have official status under the Geneva Conventions in the event of capture. Others may be covering military operations without such credentials. Commanders should not provide information to noncredentialed, unregistered journalists without guidance from the MNTF public affairs officer or the MNTF information bureau director, as appropriate.

b. In multinational operations, responsibilities for establishing media ground rules, credentialing media, and, if necessary, expulsion of media, are developed and implemented through appropriate multinational command and staff channels. Reporters should be encouraged to register at the press information centers (PICs), allied PICs, joint information bureau, or equivalent organization. Planning should facilitate the interaction between the military and the national and international press organizations. Each nation has its own viewpoint on media freedom and access, and the MNFC should consider this
during planning. Respect for the viewpoints of other nations must be demonstrated even if they are contrary to that of the United States.

See JP 3-61, Public Affairs, for additional details.

26. Meteorology and Oceanography

The effective understanding of meteorology and oceanography and the application of that knowledge during mission execution could significantly contribute to the success of a multinational operation. The state of the atmosphere and oceans can be a force multiplier or detractor. Successful commanders use the environment to their advantage. In multinational operations, early planning is critical. Differences in language, techniques, data formats, and communications must be overcome prior to any operation. To ensure that meteorological and oceanographic (METOC) forces of all participating nations operate together, the MNFC should designate a senior METOC officer to coordinate METOC support. This officer will ensure that all METOC forces operate from a coordinated planning forecast, and that all METOC requirements are met. The senior METOC officer should also consider using multinational resources of data when available.

“From the harsh winter at Valley Forge during the Revolutionary War to the raging sandstorm in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, weather has played an important role in war. Historically, atmospheric conditions invariably would favor one side over the other, but weather’s capricious nature quickly could reverse the advantage, sometimes during the course of a single battle. Often the combatants with a better understanding of the weather would emerge victorious. Today, advances in technology have allowed the military to provide commanders on the battlefield sophisticated weather forecasts, which they use to their advantage as they deploy ground troops or target precision-guided munitions...”

Military forecasters met an immediate challenge in the first week of Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, when “the mother of all dust storms” descended on the country. ‘It was the largest sandstorm in the geographical area and the most severe in terms of wind speed and low visibility in over a decade. Fortunately, military forecasters predicted this major storm five days before it occurred. That was particularly impressive, because the storm didn’t exist in advance and then move into the region, but developed in the war zone.’”

Mark Canton
“Weather and War”
March 2004

27. Environmental

a. Environmental considerations should be integrated in multinational operations. To the extent practicable and consistent with mission accomplishment, commanders should take environmental factors into account during planning, execution, and conclusion of a multinational operation. Commanders should also clearly identify guidance that may be different from the
normal practices of the member nations and obtain agreement from participating nations. Besides agreeing on common goals and objectives for the operation, commanders of participating MNF should reach some understanding on environmental protection measures during the operation. Failure to accomplish this may result in misunderstandings, decreased interoperability, and a failure to develop and implement a successful environmental annex and plan for the operation. Additionally the failure to consider environmental impacts on the HN could result in an erosion of support or acceptance for the MNF within the HN.

b. Environmental considerations include the following:

   (1) Air pollution from ships, vehicles, aircraft, and construction machinery.

   (2) Cleanup of base camps and other occupied areas to an appropriate level.

   (3) Protection of endangered species and marine mammals in the operational area.

   (4) Environmental safety and health.

   (5) Hazardous material management.

   (6) Hazardous waste disposal.

   (7) Medical and infectious wastes management and disposal.

   (8) Natural and cultural resources protection.

   (9) Noise abatement, including noise from aircraft operations.

   (10) Pesticide, insecticide, and herbicide management to control non-point pollution.

   (11) Resource and energy conservation through pollution prevention practices.

   (12) Solid waste management and disposal.

   (13) Oil and hazardous substance spills prevention and controls.

   (14) Water pollution from sewage, food service, and other operations.

For a further discussion of environmental considerations refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.
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APPENDIX A
PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

Multinational operations as described in this publication cover a wide spectrum of subjects. The checklist below provides an MNFC with a planning tool for multinational operations directed through either an integrated or lead nation scenario. Operations conducted in a parallel command relationship will normally follow national planning guidance and doctrine (JP 3-33). Where possible, this checklist will attempt to highlight only those items unique to multinational operations.

Detailed planning checklists for JTF directorates can be found in JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters. Most material contained in those checklists is applicable to MNTF directorates as well.

Strategic Level Considerations:

_____ Has the political-military estimate been completed and coordinated with national-level coalition/combined partners? Have the coalition/combined partners reached agreement on the appropriate response?

_____ Has the lead nation, in coordination with other coalition/combined partners, developed the strategic military guidance for the operation? Does this strategic guidance contain:

______ A clear description of political objectives?
______ A broad outline of any military activity envisioned?
______ The desired end-state?
______ Key planning assumptions?
______ Any constraints or restraints on military operations or actions?

_____ Has a mission analysis been accomplished?

_____ Has the commander’s mission statement been provided?

_____ Has an analysis of the situation, opposition forces, friendly forces, and restrictions been conducted?

_____ Have COAs been developed?

_____ Has a preferred COA been selected?

_____ Has the commander’s intent been provided/developed?
Appendix A

____ Have ROE been agreed upon by military commanders and national policy makers?

____ Has a CONOPS been developed and approved by the national and interagency partners?

____ Has a confirmation of capabilities and/or forces to be contributed been obtained from our national and interagency partners, to include government capabilities/forces and likely IGO, NGO, and/or private sector contributors?

____ Has an OPLAN been developed based on the approved CONOPS?

____ Have annexes to OPLANs/CONPLANs (annexes G and V) been developed to effectively support multinational and/or interagency coordination and operations?

____ Has the OPLAN been approved by national and interagency partners?

____ Has the operational-level commander been appointed?

____ Has strategic communication guidance been included in the OPLAN?

____ Has the appropriate coordination been conducted with the DOS Office of the Coordinator for Stability and Reconstruction, their associated local humanitarian reconstruction and stabilization teams, United States Agency for International Development, and/or the US embassy country team(s) in the specific operational area?

Operational Level Considerations

____ Have command relationships been established between the MNFC and national forces?

____ Has a MNTF HQ been established?

____ Have critical billet requirements been identified?

____ Has a theater foreign disclosure authority been identified? Has a policy and a plan for the control, release, and dissemination of sensitive information been promulgated?

____ Have the personnel for the multinational staff been chosen to reflect the required functional skills, training level, language skill and avoidance of historic animosities?

____ Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?

____ Do liaison elements have appropriate linguistic, communications, logistic, and office support capabilities in place?
Planning Considerations for Multinational Operations

____ Has the command structure been designed to minimize layers to a more horizontal organization?

____ Have 24-hour command centers been provided for if required?

____ Have C2 arrangements been made to include appropriate IGO and NGO officials in coordinating functions?

____ Have multinational legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?

____ Have the multinational partners with a lesser C2 capability been provided appropriate liaison personnel and interpreters (if necessary), operators, and maintainers to enable interaction with the commander and other multinational members?

____ Have arrangements been made for intra- and inter-staff communication among same nation staff members?

____ Have the strategic and military end-states been identified? Are the conditions tangible in military terms? Are they contained in the mission statement?

____ Has the end state and exit strategy been articulated as part of the commander’s vision for subordinates?

____ What is the exit strategy?

____ What constitutes mission success?

____ Has a mission analysis been conducted?

____ Has planning guidance been developed and issued?

____ Does it contain the commander’s intent?

____ Are the ROE established? Do they require adjustment?

____ Have COAs been developed?

____ Has a preferred COA been selected?

____ Has the commander’s intent been provided/developed?

____ Has the deployment time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) been completed and validated?
____ Have the non-US forces relying on strategic mobility for deployment and/or redeployment been included in the TPFDD?

____ Has the deployment plan been deconflicted with NGO and contractor transportation requirements in order to avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure?

____ Has the probable cost of the multinational operations been determined and are there mechanisms in place to track the cost?

____ Have logisticians assessed the feasibility and/or supportability and risks of the mission?

____ Is the MNFC aware of existing agreements among participating nations in the form of bilateral or multilateral arrangements, funding, and training?

____ Have SOFAs been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations? Who has been designated to negotiate technical agreements to implement SOFAs?

____ Do the resources allocated to the force protection component of the mission balance with the potential political ramifications of failure to protect the force?

____ Have the cultural, social, political, and economic dynamics of the operational area been fused with the traditional study of geographic and military considerations to form an intelligence estimate that identifies threat centers of gravity, as well as high-value and high-payoff targets? Does the plan consider these issues in a way that facilitates operations and end state?

____ Have determined efforts been made to pool information with applicable NGOs, to increase efficiency of operations through coordination and eliminate redundancy in operations?

____ To what extent are riot control agents authorized for use?

____ Are forces, communication system capabilities, and logistic support robust enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?

____ Has coordination been accomplished with multinational members regarding communication equipment capability?

____ Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment?

____ Has the terrain and environment been considered while planning for the communication system network?

____ Have common databases been provided for?
Planning Considerations for Multinational Operations

____ Has the nation most capable of providing an integrated, interoperable communication system network been selected to serve as network manager for the multinational communication system infrastructure?

____ Have agreements on cryptographic, communications and/or ADP security issues, and other planning factors been reached among all multinational components? Are compatible materials available?

____ Have arrangements been made and/or established to allow contract multinational foreign nation employees to work on C2 staffs without exposure to ADP and classified information used in daily operations?

____ Have the nations agreed to work on a standard datum and produce all products to that datum?

____ Has a multinational geospatial information and services (GI&S) plan been produced and disseminated which designates all GI&S products for use?

____ Have special, adequate, and supportable intelligence sharing and foreign disclosure procedures been established?

____ Have the intelligence requirements been clearly stated to focus the collection effort?

____ Has the adversary’s use of space assets been analyzed and have requests for denying militarily useful space information to the adversary been considered?

____ Have efforts been made to place sufficient intelligence collection resources under the control of (or at least immediately responsive to) the MNFC?

____ Have efforts been made to assign intelligence gathering tasks IAW the MNFC’s intelligence requirements and according to the capability of the multinational equipment under MNTF control?

____ Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information into multinational centralized processing and exploitation centers?

____ Can targeting materials be disseminated rapidly?

____ Has the MNFC’s authority to redistribute logistic assets and services been defined and agreed to?

____ What, if any, ACSA exist between participating nations?
Does principal logistics civil augmentation program structure have an overall officer in charge or main point of contact for C2 of contract personnel?

Do other legal authorities permit the provision of logistic support to participating nations?

Have reimbursement or replacement-in-kind procedures been developed and agreed to?

Have contractor procedures been established?

Is there a means in place which authorizes exchange of mutual logistic support of goods and services between the MNTF countries and accounts for the amounts received?

Has a logistic determination been made, (i.e., what countries will provide what piece of the logistics system, health services to include ground and air evacuation and health service logistics)?

Have logistic reporting procedures been established and promulgated throughout the force?

Can the HN provide support and, if so, have negotiations to secure support either been established or completed?

Are the mission economic and infrastructure repair plans known and being complied with by all nations, Services, and units?

Has HNS been evaluated in the deployed location(s) to determine the logistic requirements?

Has an assessment of HN medical capabilities and a determination of availability to support MNF HSS requirements been accomplished?

Have coordinating centers been established for personnel movement, medical support, ground and air evacuation, contracting, infrastructure engineering, and logistic operations?

Is a transitional plan available to facilitate deployment and operational assumption of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency or alliance?

Has funding been identified to support operations and/or to provide reimbursement of expenditures from existing budgets?
Planning Considerations for Multinational Operations

_____ Will common funding be available to support multinational common costs and expenditures?

_____ Has it been determined if or to what extent operational-related expenses will be reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by the participating nations?

_____ Are medical facilities identified to support the operation? Are evacuation plans, both intra- and inter-theater, in place?

_____ Are CBRNE weapon threats known and are troops and medical facilities prepared to cope with their possible use?

_____ Are graves registration and mortuary procedures in place to service multinational casualties, to include recognition of cultural differences in dealing with casualties?

_____ Have IO activities been planned to support the operation?

_____ Have IO assets been requested?

_____ Have procedures been established for coordination and approval of IO activities?

_____ Have PSYOP personnel been integrated into analysis, targeting, and planning?

_____ Have population and resource control measures and the subordinate commander’s authority to impose them been included in the MNTF plan?

_____ Are there adequate CA personnel on hand to assist planners?

_____ Are there special operations personnel available to develop and execute unconventional military options for the commander?

_____ Has a public affairs plan been promulgated that:

_____ Provides a contingency statement to use in response to media queries before initial public release of information concerning the MNF and its mission?

_____ States who (from which nation and when, or all nations simultaneously) makes the initial public release concerning the MNTF and its mission?

_____ States agreed-upon procedures for the subsequent release of information concerning the MNF and its national components?
_____ Is predeployment media training complete?

_____ Is the relationship between the inevitable media coverage of tactical operations and future strategic decisions understood by all commanders?

_____ Have requirements for combat camera support been arranged?

_____ Has an operation historian been designated and staff authorized?

_____ Is a mechanism in place for the collection, assessment, and reporting of lessons learned?

_____ Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?

_____ What are the redeployment and/or withdrawal plans for multinational forces? Is the departure of forces to be accomplished under tactical conditions?

_____ What are the environmental standards to be met by withdrawal in humanitarian or other peaceful operations?

_____ What forces, equipment, and supplies will remain behind? Has disposal of equipment and supplies been properly planned?

_____ What are the C2 and command arrangements for departure?

_____ Who will support forces that remain behind?

_____ Have the C2 systems support required for the diminishing MNTF presence been identified?
1. **Overview**

   a. The MPAT program is a rapidly maturing multinational program established in the aftermath of the events surrounding East Timor’s drive for independence. MPAT was established by the Commander, US Pacific Command (USPACOM), in consultation with the chiefs of defense of various nations in the Asia-Pacific region in early 2000. The impetus for the program is to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment and/or augmentation of MNTF HQ.

   b. MPAT is not a program with formal participatory agreements. The key factor in program success to date has been the informal ad hoc nature of the program. Without memorandums of agreement, terms of reference, or other more formal arrangements, the program has been able to share information, and all participants have been able to jointly develop concepts and procedures without the normal formal policy constraints – a key inhibitor to multinational interoperability when working with other nations.

2. **Multinational Planning Augmentation Team Composition**

   a. MPAT is an international cadre of military planners from nations with interests in the Asia-Pacific region. Participation has grown from 5 nations in 2000 to 33 nations in 2005.

   b. Members are capable of augmenting a MNF HQ established to plan and execute coalition operations in response to military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence operations and small scale contingencies. Planners learn from each other the common procedures for activating, forming, and employing a coalition task force HQ and associated planning processes. This is done through a series of multinational workshops – called MPAT TEMPEST EXPRESS staff planning workshops. The MPAT cadre also participates in USPACOM and other nations’ multinational exercises.

   c. Participation also includes representation from UN organizations, IGOs, and NGOs.

   d. The MPAT Secretariat resides with Pacific Command Exercises Directorate.

3. **Multinational Force Standing Operating Procedures**

   a. One of the first actions in the MPAT initiative was the development of procedures for the operation of a MNTF HQ. The MNF SOP recognizes the existence of shared national interests in the region and seeks to standardize some basic concepts and processes that will promote habits of cooperation, increased dialogue, and provide for baseline MNTF operational concepts. Further, this SOP serves as a centerpiece for the MPAT workshops and exercises aimed at improving interoperability and MNTF operational readiness within the Asia-Pacific region. The purpose of the SOP is straight forward:
(1) Increase the speed of a MNF initial response.

(2) Improve interoperability among the participating forces.

(3) Enhance overall mission effectiveness.

(4) Support unity of effort.

b. The MNF SOP is not a USPACOM document, nor is it signed by any of the participants. It has been developed by the combined efforts of all the MPAT nations as a multinational document to provide the foundation of multinational crisis response. The SOP is also unclassified and available for use by any nation in combined or coalition operations.

c. The procedures contained in the MNF SOP are primarily focused for use by a MNTF HQ for use at the lower end of the conflict spectrum. These include numerous missions such as PO (which includes peacekeeping & peace enforcement), humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, military assisted NEO, SAR/PR, combating terrorism and FID.

4. Organization

The MPAT is not a standing, billeted organization or TF. It is a cadre or pool of trained planners with MNF operations planning expertise that have developed relationships from participation in MPAT events. Outlined below (see Figure B-1) is a list of potential key MNTF staff billets or functional areas that can be filled with MPAT personnel from the various MNF participating nations.

_for additional information on the MPAT concept refer to the unclassified MPAT web site. URL: < www.mnfsop.com >. This web site acts as the portal for the MPAT program, MNF SOP, and the APAN network home page. The updated MNF SOP can be obtained via this portal and the latest MPAT information can be found through this site._
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APPENDIX C
UNITED NATIONS AND OTHER INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS CONSIDERATIONS

“Despite growing global interdependence, war remains a common feature of the international landscape, occurring among different national, ethnic, and religious communities unwilling to live together and settle their disputes peacefully. Although today’s conflicts are often cloaked in the rhetoric of ethnic, religious and cultural dissent, for the most part, wars erupt over political power. The international community today faces some 40 unresolved conflicts, about average for the post-Cold War era…The conflicts are widely distributed, and the level of hostilities varies considerably. Most are smoldering conflicts, but at any one time intense fighting typically characterizes 5-10 cases. Although the vast majority of these conflicts primarily involve groups fighting within states, the distinction between internal and external conflict is becoming blurred: the loss of life and impact on neighboring states requires that the international community consider intervention in both cases.

Outside military forces alone are unlikely to achieve lasting results in most of these conflicts…The purpose of multinational forces is to stop the fighting and assist in bringing about a fair and lasting resolution of conflict, not to achieve a military victory. Therefore, multilateral military efforts should be a subordinate part of an overall campaign that includes diplomacy and humanitarian activities. The multinational forces must be prepared for combat, but their use must be designed to create conditions for a lasting peace. In most cases, they will need to support political and humanitarian efforts effectively. For these reasons, the subordination of multinational military operations to international political guidance is essential.”

General Andrew Goodpaster, USA
“When Diplomacy Isn’t Enough”

1. General

a. There are over 30 IGOs throughout the globe. These organizations represent a variety of global and regional issues and concerns. Unlike NGOs, IGOs represent political entities (e.g., the European Union, African Union); however both can have a significant impact on multinational military-related operations. US military participation in multinational efforts directed or supported by IGOs is primarily an Executive Branch decision subject to numerous constraints and restrictions.

b. Besides interoperability, which allows operational efficiency, political consensus is a necessary condition for multinational success. Political consensus depends on at least three conditions.

(1) Legitimacy. Multinational operations must be based on a defined end state, international law and a clear mandate. Normally a recognized IGO such as the UN would act to initiate or endorse the multinational activity under consideration. This organization would also
provide political guidance, endorsement of coalition strategic goals, and endorse the desired end state. Additionally, this same organization would either designate or accept the offered services of a lead nation.

(a) **UN Sponsored and led Operation (Blue Helmet).** Based upon Chapter 6, UN Charter. UN establishes a UN mission with a UN designated military component and force commander (FC) who reports to the special representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) and, in turn, to the UN Security Council. Forces are funded by the UN for UN sponsored operations.

(b) **UN Authorized Lead Nation Operation.** Used when requirements exceed the capabilities of the UN. Uses the lead nation construct (as outlined previously in this JP). It is referred to as a “coalition of the willing” and is normally based upon Chapter 7, UN Charter (can have Chapter 6 also as authority in some situations). The lead nation appoints the MNFC and the lead nation reports to the UN Security Council. The lead nation, in conjunction with participating nations agreements, funds the operations.

(c) **UN Authorized Regional Organization Operation.** Used when requirements exceed UN capabilities and a regional organization (e.g., NATO) is available for executing the multinational mission. The regional organization appoints the FC and the regional organization reports to the UN Security Council. It is based upon Chapter 8, UN Charter. The regional organization, in conjunction with participating nations agreements, funds the operations.

(2) **Open Political Consultation.** Open political consultation allows all participating nations to be part of the decision-making process. With a firm legal basis and a designated lead nation, in-depth political consultation is made possible through the creation of a political authority in which each participating nation will be represented at an appropriate level (e.g., ambassador). Military participation in this process should be provided by a corresponding military authority.

(3) **Political Control.** Through all phases of the operation, political direction of the operation will be carried out through the political, not military, authority. The lead nation should coordinate these political and military activities, implement decisions, and report to the international community.

(a) Functional links between the political and military authority should be established as appropriate. In particular, the political authority would be responsible for selecting or endorsing a strategic military option and for providing the initial military direction to the multinational commander.

(b) In the conduct of operations, political control would be exercised by providing directives to the coalition commander IAW each nations’ intent and ROE. These directives may be guided by periodic reports on the progress of the operation and situation assessments from the coalition commander.
2. Considerations

a. According to the UN, a complex emergency refers to “a humanitarian crisis in a country, region or society where there is total or considerable breakdown of authority resulting from internal or external conflict and which requires an international response that goes beyond the mandate or capacity of any single and/or ongoing UN country programme.” US doctrine may refer to this situation as a crisis and complex contingency operation.

b. Due to a number of factors, complex emergencies have become much more frequent since the end of the Cold War. However, they seemingly share similar characteristics, including:

(1) Reappearance of nationalistic, territorial, religious, or ethnic ambitions or frictions such as occurred in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Africa.

(2) Mass population movements as people are internally displaced or become refugees in another country while searching for security, food, water, and other essentials.

(3) Severe disruption of the national economic system and destruction of vital infrastructure. In some cases, the disruption is caused by one faction to cause further deterioration of national services when they are most needed. Such efforts are often intended to incite or further foment public dissatisfaction and weaken the central government or authority.

(4) General decline in food security resulting from political decisions, discriminatory policies, food shortages, disruption of agriculture, droughts, floods, inflation, and lack of finances. Malnutrition can quickly ensue in local areas and may degenerate into widespread starvation.

c. Humanitarian crises can result from a combination of man-made and natural disasters, such as large numbers of people experiencing droughts, cyclones, crop failures, or floods even as they are engulfed in civil war, are invaded, or as their governments fail. Natural disasters alone can overwhelm the resources of already severely stressed governments, with sadly predictable effect on the people.

3. Humanitarian Assistance Organizations

a. Some IGOs are specifically targeted at humanitarian assistance missions and operations to provide relief and response during/following complex emergencies and disasters. US FHA programs are conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or man-made disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. FHA provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The foreign assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the HN civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing FHA. In general, humanitarian assistance must be provided IAW the basic humanitarian principles of humanity, impartiality, and neutrality.
b. Two IGOs, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), perform specific, internationally-recognized functions.

(1) The ICRC, a unique humanitarian organization based in Geneva, is the civilian organization designated in the 1949 Geneva Conventions to ensure that prisoners of war and civilians in war are treated IAW the law of war.

(2) The IFRC, also headquartered in Geneva, has 178 national Red Cross or Red Crescent Society affiliates, one of which is the American Red Cross. IFRC affiliates provide a number of diverse services which may include:

(a) Response to local, national, and international disasters.

(b) Support for military personnel and their families.

(c) Extensive training in disaster assistance, shelter management, mass feeding, damage assessment, first aid, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and mother and baby care.

c. UN agencies and organizations primarily focused on humanitarian assistance include:

(1) The United Nations Office of the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs or the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is often chosen as the lead agency to assist and coordinate humanitarian assistance organizations’ planning and operations in a complex emergency. UNHCR is the organization charged with the responsibility for refugees and internally displaced persons.

(2) The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights was created in 1994 to provide human rights monitors to investigate and to prevent abuses of human rights; to support UN special prosecutors by collecting and verifying evidence of crimes against humanity; to provide education about international human rights and practice; and to support host countries in administering justice.

(3) The United Nations Children’s Fund provides long-term expert consultation and material support in collaboration with the host government and key host country nationals for projects to strengthen health services, especially for children and women; water purification and distribution; and sanitation.

(4) The World Food Program (WFP) obtains, transports, and stockpiles food. Direct assistance, the face-to-face distribution of WFP food at household or camp level, is done by NGOs or other civilian organizations.

(5) The World Health Organization (WHO) is the UN agency charged with promoting and protecting the health of the world’s population. WHO’s Department of Emergency and Humanitarian Action responds to complex emergencies and natural disasters.
4. United States Perspective

a. The Political-Military Environment. Within the Executive Branch, DOS is the lead foreign affairs agency, assisting the President in foreign policy formulation and execution. As such, DOS oversees the coordination of DOD external political-military (POLMIL) relationships with overall US foreign policy. External POLMIL relationships of DOD include:

1. Bilateral military relationships.
2. Coalition military forces.
3. Multilateral mutual defense alliances.
4. Treaties and agreements involving DOD activities or interests, such as technology transfer, armaments cooperation and control, international aviation, law of the sea, nuclear regulation, and environmental pollution.
5. Use of US military assets for humanitarian or peace operations (including those conducted under UN auspices).

b. Theater Focus. The GCC implements DOD external POLMIL relationships within the area of responsibility. The CCDR’s regional focus is similar to the regional focus of DOS’s geographic bureaus, though the geographic boundaries differ. Most other USG foreign affairs agencies are regionally organized as well, again with varying geographic boundaries. Within a theater, the GCC is the focal point for planning and implementation of regional and theater military strategies that require interagency coordination. In contrast, the DOS focal point for formulation and implementation of regional foreign policy strategies requiring interagency coordination is the geographic bureau at DOS HQ in Washington, DC. Although the GCC will often find it more expeditious to approach the US COM for coordination of an activity in a HN, often the political effect of the proposed US military activity goes far beyond the boundaries of the HN. In such cases, the GCC should not assume that the approval of the COM corresponds to region-wide approval of DOS, but instead should ascertain that the COM has received instructions from DOS.

c. During contingency operations, coordination between DOD and other USG agencies will normally occur within the National Security Council Policy Coordination Committees and, if directed, during development of the POLMIL plan. During lesser operations and operations not involving armed conflict, the CCDR’s staff may deal directly with a COM or members of the country team regarding issues that do not transcend the boundaries of the HN. In some operations, a special envoy of the President or a SRSG may be involved.

d. The JIACG is an interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of USG civilian and military experts accredited to the CCDR and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported CCDR, the JIACG provides the CCDR with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other USG
Appendix C

civilian agencies and departments. JIACGs complement the interagency coordination that takes place at the strategic level through the National Security Council System. Members participate in contingency, crisis action, and transition planning, and provide links back to their parent civilian agencies to help synchronize JTF operations with civilian agencies.
The development of JP 3-16 is based upon the following primary references.

1. Executive Branch Documents
   a. NSPD-1, *Organization of the National Security Council System*.
   d. NSDM 119, *Disclosure of Classified United States Military Information to Foreign Governments and International Organizations*.

2. Department of Defense Documents
   a. DODD 2010.9, *Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements*.
   b. DODD 2311.01E, *DOD Law of War Program*.
   d. DODD 5100.1, *Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components*.
   e. DODD 5101.1, *DOD Executive Agent*.
   g. DODD 5530.3, *International Agreements*.
   h. Department of Defense Instruction 8110.1, *Multinational Information Sharing Networks Implementation*.

3. Joint Policy, Doctrine, and Other Publications
   a. CJCSI 2120.01, *Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements*. 
b. CJCSI 2700.01B, *International Military Agreements for Rationalization, Standardization, and Interoperability (RSI) Between the United States, Its Allies and Other Friendly Nations.*

c. CJCSI 3113.01A, *Responsibilities for the Coordination and Review of Security Cooperation Strategies.*


e. CJCSI 5120.02, *Joint Doctrine Development System.*

f. CJCSI 5715.01B, *Joint Staff Participation in Interagency Affairs.*

g. CJCSI 6510.01D, *Informational Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND).*

h. CJCSI 6510.06, *Communication Security Releases to Foreign Nations.*

i. CJCSI 6610.01B, *Tactical Data Link Standardization Implementation Plan.*

j. CJCSI 6711.01A, *Exchange of Communications.*

k. CJCSI 6740.01A, *Military Telecommunications Agreements and Arrangements Between the United States and Regional Defense Organizations or Friendly Foreign Nations.*

l. CJCS Manual 6120.01D, *Joint Multi-Tactical Data Link Operating Procedures.*

m. JP 1, *Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States.*

n. JP 0-2, *Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).*


q. JP 2-0, *Joint Intelligence.*

s. JP 2-03, *Geospatial Intelligence Support to Joint Operations.*
t. JP 3-0, *Joint Operations.*
u. JP 3-01, *Countering Air and Missile Threats.*
v. JP 3-03, *Joint Interdiction.*
w. JP 3-05, *Doctrine for Joint Special Operations*.


bb. JP 3-08, *Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization Coordination During Joint Operations*.

c. JP 3-09, *Joint Fires Support*.


e. JP 3-14, *Joint Doctrine for Space Operations*.


ii. JP 3-33, *Joint Task Force Headquarters*.

jj. JP 3-34, *Joint Engineer Operations*.


ll. JP 3-52, *Joint Doctrine for Airspace Control in the Combat Zone*.


qq. JP 4-0, *Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations*.
Appendix D

rr. JP 4-02, *Health Service Support*.

ss. JP 4-08, *Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations*.

tt. JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

uu. JP 6-0, *Joint Communications System*.

vv. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum of Policy 43, *Military Telecommunications Agreements and Arrangements Between the United States and Regional Defense Organizations or Friendly Foreign Nations*.


1. **User Comments**

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to: Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These comments should address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, and appearance.

2. **Authorship**

The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director for Operations (J-3).

3. **Supersession**

This publication supersedes JP 3-16, 5 April 2000, *Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations*.

4. **Change Recommendations**

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted:

   TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC/J3/
   INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC/J7-JEDD/*
   CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA/JT10/

   *Use when Joint Staff J-7 is not the lead agent

Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Doctrine Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plans and Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CICS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine.

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directorate will include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The Military Services and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes to source documents reflected in this publication are initiated.
c. Record of Changes:

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5. Distribution of Publications

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### GLOSSARY

**PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AADC</td>
<td>area air defense commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>American, British, Canadian, Australian Armies Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>airspace control authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACSA</td>
<td>acquisition and cross-servicing agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>automated data processing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AECA</td>
<td>Arms Export Control Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AO</td>
<td>area of operations</td>
</tr>
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<td>AP</td>
<td>allied publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>APAN</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOA</td>
<td>basic ordering agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRNE</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCC</td>
<td>coalition coordination center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCDR</td>
<td>combatant commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCSM</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>civil-military operations</td>
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<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
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<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
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<tr>
<td>COM</td>
<td>chief of mission</td>
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<td>CONOPS</td>
<td>concept of operations</td>
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<td>CONPLAN</td>
<td>concept plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPRC</td>
<td>coalition personnel recovery center</td>
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<tr>
<td>DIDO</td>
<td>designated intelligence disclosure official</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>DODD</td>
<td>Department of Defense directive</td>
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<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>EA</td>
<td>executive agent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FC</td>
<td>force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>FDO</td>
<td>foreign disclosure officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>FHA</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance</td>
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<td>FID</td>
<td>foreign internal defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMS</td>
<td>foreign military sales</td>
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<td>FSO</td>
<td>foreign service officer</td>
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</table>
## Glossary

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GCC</td>
<td>geographic combatant commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>GEOINT</td>
<td>geospatial intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>GI&amp;S</td>
<td>geospatial information and services</td>
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<tr>
<td>GWOT</td>
<td>Global War on Terrorism</td>
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<td>HN</td>
<td>host nation</td>
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<td>HNS</td>
<td>host-nation support</td>
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<tr>
<td>HNSCC</td>
<td>host-nation support coordination cell</td>
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<tr>
<td>HQ</td>
<td>headquarters</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSS</td>
<td>health service support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>implementing arrangement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAW</td>
<td>in accordance with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
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<tr>
<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>IHC</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IO</td>
<td>information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISA</td>
<td>international standardization agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J-2</td>
<td>intelligence directorate of a joint staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>JFC</td>
<td>joint force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>JIACG</td>
<td>joint interagency coordination group</td>
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<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>LNO</td>
<td>liaison officer</td>
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<td>LOA</td>
<td>letter of offer and acceptance</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>line of communications</td>
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<tr>
<td>METOC</td>
<td>meteorological and oceanographic</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIC</td>
<td>Multinational Interoperability Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNCC</td>
<td>multinational coordination center</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>multinational force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNFACC</td>
<td>multinational force air component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNFC</td>
<td>multinational force commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNFLCC</td>
<td>multinational force land component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNFCMCC</td>
<td>multinational force maritime component commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNFSOCC</td>
<td>multinational force special operations component commander</td>
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<td>MNTF</td>
<td>multinational task force</td>
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<td>MP</td>
<td>multinational publication</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPAT</td>
<td>Multinational Planning Augmentation Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>NDP</td>
<td>national disclosure policy</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
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<td>NSC</td>
<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>NSDM</td>
<td>national security decision memorandum</td>
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<td>NSPD</td>
<td>national security Presidential directive</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>operation plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIC</td>
<td>press information center (NATO)</td>
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<td>PO</td>
<td>peace operations</td>
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<td>POLAD</td>
<td>political advisor</td>
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<td>POLMIL</td>
<td>political-military</td>
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<td>PR</td>
<td>personnel recovery</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
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<td>QSTAG</td>
<td>quadripartite standardization agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RSI</td>
<td>rationalization, standardization, and interoperability</td>
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<td>RSN</td>
<td>role specialist nation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAO</td>
<td>security assistance office</td>
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<td>SAR</td>
<td>search and rescue</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>space coordinating authority</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOF</td>
<td>special operations forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>status-of-forces agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOP</td>
<td>standing operating procedure</td>
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<tr>
<td>SROE</td>
<td>standing rules of engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SRSG</td>
<td>special representative to the Secretary-General</td>
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<tr>
<td>STANAG</td>
<td>standardization agreement (NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TA</td>
<td>technical arrangement</td>
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<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<tr>
<td>TF</td>
<td>task force</td>
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<tr>
<td>TPFDD</td>
<td>time-phased force and deployment data</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSCP</td>
<td>theater security cooperation plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>United States Code</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>USPACOM</td>
<td>United States Pacific Command</td>
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<td>USSTRATCOM</td>
<td>United States Strategic Command</td>
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<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WPF</td>
<td>World Food Program</td>
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acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Agreements negotiated on a bilateral basis with US allies or coalition partners that allow US forces to exchange most common types of support, including food, fuel, transportation, ammunition, and equipment. Authority to negotiate these agreements is usually delegated to the combatant commander by the Secretary of Defense. Authority to execute these agreements lies with the Secretary of Defense, and may or may not be delegated. Governed by legal guidelines, these agreements are used for contingencies, peacekeeping operations, unforeseen emergencies, or exercises to correct logistic deficiencies that cannot be adequately corrected by national means. The support received or given is reimbursed under the conditions of the acquisition and cross-servicing agreement. Also called ASCA. (JP 1-02)

affiliation training. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

airspace control in the combat zone. A process used to increase combat effectiveness by promoting the safe, efficient, and flexible use of airspace. Airspace control is provided in order to reduce the risk of friendly fire, enhance air defense operations, and permit greater flexibility of operations. Airspace control does not infringe on the authority vested in commanders to approve, disapprove, or deny combat operations. Also called airspace control; combat airspace control. (JP 1-02)

alliance. The relationship that results from a formal agreement (e.g., treaty) between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 1-02)

area of influence. A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander’s command or control. (JP 1-02)

area of interest. That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. Also called AOI. (JP 1-02)

area of operations. An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and maritime forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Also called AO. See also area of responsibility. (JP 1-02)

area of responsibility. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1-02)
civil affairs. Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. Also called CA. See also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil affairs activities. Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills, in areas normally the responsibility of civil government, to enhance conduct of civil-military operations. See also civil affairs; civil-military operations. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. See also civil affairs; operation. (JP 1-02)

civil-military operations center. An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States Government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and intergovernmental organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. Also called CMOC. See also civil affairs activities; civil-military operations; operation. (JP 1-02)

coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also alliance. (JP 1-02)

coalition action. Multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for single occasions or longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest. See also alliance; coalition; multinational operations. (JP 1-02)

coalition coordination cell. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning
tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)

**combined.** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies. (When all allies or services are not involved, the participating nations and services shall be identified, e.g., combined navies.) (JP 1-02)

**commonality.** A quality that applies to materiel or systems: a. possessing like and interchangeable characteristics enabling each to be utilized, or operated and maintained, by personnel trained on the others without additional specialized training; b. having interchangeable repair parts and/or components; and c. applying to consumable items interchangeably equivalent without adjustment. (JP 1-02)

**coordinating authority.** A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)

**force protection.** Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP. (JP 1-02)

**functional component command.** A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (JP 1-02)

**geospatial intelligence.** The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth. Geospatial intelligence consists of imagery, imagery intelligence, and geospatial information. Also called GEOINT. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 2-03.)
Global Information Grid. The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The Global Information Grid includes owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services, other associated services and National Security Systems. Also called GIG. (JP 1-02)

host nation. A nation that receives the forces and/or supplies of allied nations, coalition partners, and/or NATO organizations to be located on, to operate in, or to transit through its territory. Also called HN. (JP 1-02)

host-nation support. Civil and/or military assistance rendered by a nation to foreign forces within its territory during peacetime, crises or emergencies, or war based on agreements mutually concluded between nations. Also called HNS. See also host nation. (JP 1-02)

information assurance. Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (JP 1-02)

information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (JP 1-02)

interagency. United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. (JP 1-02)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 1-02)

intergovernmental organization. An organization created by a formal agreement (e.g., a treaty) between two or more governments. It may be established on a global, regional, or functional basis for wide-ranging or narrowly defined purposes. Formed to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. Examples include the United Nations, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the African Union. Also called IGO. (JP 1-02)

interoperability. 1. The ability to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks. 2. The condition achieved among communications-electronics systems or items of communications-electronics equipment when information or services can be exchanged directly and satisfactorily between them and/or their users. The degree of interoperability should be defined when referring to specific cases. (JP 1-02)
**joint.** Connotes activities, operations, organizations, etc., in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. (JP 1-02)

**joint force commander.** A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1-02)

**joint information bureau.** Facility established by the joint force commander to serve as the focal point for the interface between the military and the media during the conduct of joint operations. When operated in support of multinational operations, a joint information bureau is called a “multinational information bureau.” Also called JIB. See also public affairs. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**joint interagency coordination group.** An interagency staff group that establishes regular, timely, and collaborative working relationships between civilian and military operational planners. Composed of US Government civilian and military experts accredited to the combatant commander and tailored to meet the requirements of a supported combatant commander, the joint interagency coordination group provides the combatant commander with the capability to collaborate at the operational level with other US Government civilian agencies and departments. Also called JIACG. (JP 1-02)

**lead nation.** One nation assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of logistic support for all or a part of the multinational force and/or headquarters. Compensation and/or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties involved. The lead nation may also assume the responsibility to coordinate logistics of the other nations within its functional and regional area of responsibility. (JP 1-02)

**military capability.** The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability. a. force structure — Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise US defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, air wings. b. modernization — Technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipments. c. unit readiness — The ability to provide capabilities required by the combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. This is derived from the ability of each unit to deliver the outputs for which it was designed. d. sustainability — The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to achieve military objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing for and maintaining those levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to support military effort. (JP 1-02)

**mission.** 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. 2. In common usage, especially when applied to lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a task. 3. The dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular task. (JP 1-02)
**multinational.** Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. (JP 1-02)

**multinational doctrine.** Fundamental principles that guide the employment of forces of two or more nations in coordinated action toward a common objective. It is ratified by participating nations. (JP 1-02)

**multinational force.** A force composed of military elements of nations who have formed an alliance or coalition for some specific purpose. Also called MNF. See also multinational force commander; multinational operations. (JP 1-02)

**multinational force commander.** A general term applied to a commander who exercises command authority over a military force composed of elements from two or more nations. The extent of the multinational force commander’s command authority is determined by the participating nations. Also called MNFC. (JP 1-02)

**multinational integrated logistic support.** Two or more nations agree to provide logistic assets to a multinational force under operational control of a multinational force commander for the logistic support of a multinational force. (JP 1-02)

**multinational logistics.** Any coordinated logistic activity involving two or more nations supporting a multinational force conducting military operations under the auspices of an alliance or coalition, including those conducted under United Nations mandate. Multinational logistics includes activities involving both logistic units provided by participating nations designated for use by the multinational force commander as well as a variety of multinational logistic support arrangements that may be developed and used by participating forces. (JP 1-02)

**multinational logistic support arrangement.** Any arrangement involving two or more nations that facilitates the logistic support of a force (either the forces of the countries participating in the arrangement or other countries). (JP 1-02)

**multinational operations.** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. See also alliance; coalition; coalition action. (JP 1-02)

**multinational staff.** A staff composed of personnel of two or more nations within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

**multinational warfare.** Warfare conducted by forces of two or more nations, usually undertaken within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (JP 1-02)

**national support element.** Any national organization or activity that supports national forces that are a part of a multinational force. Their mission is nation-specific support to units and common support that is retained by the nation. Also called NSE. (JP 1-02)
nongovernmental organization. A private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Also called NGO. (JP 1-02)

operation. 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)

operational control. Command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority) and may be delegated within the command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Operational control is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions; it does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. See also combatant command (command authority); tactical control. (JP 1-02)

protection. 1. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability of mission-related military and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information, and infrastructure deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given operational area. 2. Measures that are taken to keep nuclear, biological, and chemical hazards from having an adverse effect on personnel, equipment, or critical assets and facilities. Protection consists of five groups of activities: hardening of positions; protecting personnel; assuming mission-oriented protective posture; using physical defense measures; and reacting to attack. 3. In space usage, active and passive defensive measures to ensure that United States and friendly space systems perform as designed by seeking to overcome an adversary’s attempts to negate them and to minimize damage if negation is attempted. (JP 1-02)

psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations
is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

**public affairs.** Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)

**rationalization.** Any action that increases the effectiveness of allied forces through more efficient or effective use of defense resources committed to the alliance. Rationalization includes consolidation, reassignment of national priorities to higher alliance needs, standardization, specialization, mutual support or improved interoperability, and greater cooperation. Rationalization applies to both weapons and/or materiel resources and non-weapons military matters. (JP 1-02)

**role specialist nation.** A nation that has agreed to assume responsibility for providing a particular class of supply or service for all or part of the multinational force. Also called RSN. (JP 1-02)

**security cooperation.** All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 1-02)

**security cooperation activity.** Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the US military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan. (JP 1-02)

**standardization.** The process by which the Department of Defense achieves the closest practicable cooperation among the Services and Department of Defense agencies for the most efficient use of research, development, and production resources, and agrees to adopt on the broadest possible basis the use of: a. common or compatible operational, administrative, and logistic procedures; b. common or compatible technical procedures and criteria; c. common, compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, weapons, or equipment; and d. common or compatible tactical doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility. (JP 1-02)

**status-of-forces agreement.** An agreement that defines the legal position of a visiting military force deployed in the territory of a friendly state. Agreements delineating the status of visiting military forces may be bilateral or multilateral. Provisions pertaining to the status of visiting forces may be set forth in a separate agreement, or they may form a part of a more comprehensive agreement. These provisions describe how the authorities of a visiting force may control members of that force and the amenability of the force or its members to the local law or to the authority of
local officials. Also called SOFA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)

**support.** 1. The action of a force that aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit that helps another unit in battle. 3. An element of a command that assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (JP 1-02)

**supported commander.** 1. The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who receives assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and who is responsible for ensuring that the supporting commander understands the assistance required. See also support; supporting commander. (JP 1-02)

**supporting commander.** 1. A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. This includes the designated combatant commands and Department of Defense agencies as appropriate. 2. In the context of a support command relationship, the commander who aids, protects, complements, or sustains another commander’s force, and who is responsible for providing the assistance required by the supported commander. (JP 1-02)

**sustainability.** See military capability. (JP 1-02)

**tactical control.** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements or maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. When forces are transferred between combatant commands, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over these forces must be specified by the Secretary of Defense. Tactical control provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. Also called TACON. (JP 1-02)
JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication (JP) 3-16 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

STEP #1 Project Proposal
- Submitted by Services, combatant commands, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and combatant commands
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

STEP #2 Program Directive
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and combatant commands
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, combatant command or

STEP #3 Two Drafts
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff

STEP #4 CJCS Approval
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and combatant commands
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

STEP #5 Assessments/Revision
- The combatant commands receive the JP and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7, will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each JP and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised