Joint Pub 3-0

Doctrine for Joint Operations

1 February 1995
This second edition of Joint Pub 3-0, “Doctrine for Joint Operations,” represents yet another major milestone in the ongoing efforts to improve joint doctrine. It reflects our commitment to regularly revise and refine joint publications to ensure consistency, applicability, and readability.

This vital keystone publication forms the very core of joint warfighting doctrine and establishes the framework for our forces’ ability to fight as a joint team. It is the linchpin of the joint doctrine publication hierarchy; and for good reason. The fundamental concepts and principles contained in Joint Pub 3-0 provide a common perspective from which to plan and execute joint and multinational operations. This comprehensive document addresses almost every aspect of joint warfighting at each level of war and across the range of military operations. I cannot overemphasize the critical role Joint Pub 3-0 plays in how joint operations are conducted.

I challenge each commander to not only understand the principles of Joint Pub 3-0, but also teach them to their subordinates and train their organizations using these battle-tested tenets. Otherwise, we will not have real doctrine. To that end, I solicit your assistance to ensure the widest distribution of this and all joint publications, and to promote their use at every opportunity.

JOHN M. SHALIKASHVILI
Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
PREFACE

1. Scope

Joint Pub 3-0 is the keystone document of the joint operations series. It provides fundamental principles and doctrine for the conduct of joint and multinational operations.

2. Purpose

This publication sets forth doctrine to govern the joint activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, as well as the doctrinal basis for US military involvement in multinational and interagency operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders and prescribes doctrine for joint operations and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the joint force commander (JFC) from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission.

These principles and guidance also may apply when significant forces of one Service are attached to forces of another Service or when significant forces of one Service support forces of another Service.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications, this publication will take precedence for the activities of joint forces unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where applicable.

3. Application

a. Doctrine and guidance established in this publication apply to the commanders of combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces, and subordinate components of these commands.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER'S OVERVIEW

- Discusses the Strategic Environment within which Joint Operations take place
- Lists the Fundamental Principles of Joint Operations
- Covers Planning Guidelines for War and Military Operations Other than War
- Describes the Considerations for the Conduct of Joint Operations During War
- Provides Principles for Military Operations Other than War
- Discusses Considerations for Multinational Operations

Range of Military Operations

The range of military operations stretches from war to military operations other than war.

War. When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may employ the military instrument of national power to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Operations other than war are an aspect of military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace.

Military Operations Other Than War Involving the Use or Threat of Force. When other instruments of national power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on
favorable terms. The general goals of US military operations during such periods are to support national objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace. Such operations involve a greater risk that US forces could become involved in combat than operations conducted to promote peace.

Military Operations Other Than War Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force. Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains US influence in foreign lands. These operations, by definition, do not involve combat, but military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to a changing situation.

National Strategic Direction

National security strategy and national military strategy, shaped by and oriented on national security policies, provide strategic direction for combatant commanders. Combatant commanders, in turn, provide guidance and direction through their combatant command strategies and plan for the employment of military forces, in conjunction with interagency and multinational forces, in the conduct of military operations.

The Strategic Goal and Conflict Termination

National military strategy attempts to promote peace, deter aggression, and, failing that, fight and win. But in the larger context, defeating an enemy military force is rarely sufficient to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis. Properly conceived conflict termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military force endure. To facilitate conception of effective termination criteria, US forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict. This principle holds true for both war and military operations other than war.
Executive Summary

The three levels of war (strategic, operational, and tactical) are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels are strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply to war and to operations other than war. The levels are defined based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives.

Joint Warfare

To achieve assigned objectives, joint forces conduct campaigns and major operations. Functional and Service components of the joint force conduct subordinate and supporting operations, not independent campaigns. Joint force commanders (JFCs) synchronize the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations. The goal is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally.

Organization of an Operational Area

Joint force commanders (JFCs) may define operational areas or joint areas that consist of:

Joint Operations Areas

An area of land, sea, and airspace defined by a geographic combatant or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC conducts military operations.

Joint Special Operations Areas

An area of land, sea, and airspace for use by a joint special operations component or Joint Special Operations Task Force for the conduct of special operations.

Joint Rear Areas

Facilitates the protection and operation of bases, installations, and forces that support combat operations.
Amphibious Objective Areas

**Amphibious Objective Area.** An area that includes the objectives to be secured by an amphibious task force. It needs to be large enough for necessary sea, air, land, and special operations.

Areas of Operations

**Area of Operations (AOs).** JFCs may define AOs for land and naval forces. These areas do not encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces.

Areas of Interest

**Area of Interest.** JFCs designate areas of interest to monitor enemy activities outside the operational area.

Theaters of war and subordinate theaters of operations.

When warranted, geographic combatant commanders may designate **theaters of war** and, perhaps, subordinate **theaters of operations** for each major threat. Geographic combatant commanders may also establish combat zones and communications zones.

**Combatant Command Strategic Planning**

**JFCs develop concepts of operations and issue mission-type orders.** Planning for employment of joint teams begins with articulating and understanding the **objective, purpose of the operations, and commander’s intent** (the commander’s vision of the end state to be achieved). JFCs issue prioritized **mission-type orders** to subordinate commanders and define command relationships to facilitate mission accomplishment consistent with their concept of operations.

**The Campaign**

A campaign is a series of **related joint major operations** that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives. A campaign plan describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose.

**Campaigns are joint. They must synchronize operations, remain simple, and be focused on the objective.** Campaigns serve as the focus for the conduct of war and often in operations other than war. A wartime campaign is the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations—as well as interagency and multinational operations—in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national and multinational objectives. Campaigns, especially in multinational efforts, must be **kept simple** and focused on **clearly defined objectives.**
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operational art is characterized by:</th>
<th>Operational Art</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Synergy</strong></td>
<td><strong>Synergy</strong>. Integrate and synchronize operations in a manner that applies force from different dimensions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Simultaneity and Depth</strong></td>
<td><strong>Simultaneity and Depth</strong>. Bring force to bear on the opponent’s entire structure in a near simultaneous manner to overwhelm and cripple enemy capabilities and the enemy's will to resist.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Anticipation</strong></td>
<td><strong>Anticipation</strong>. Remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Balance</strong></td>
<td><strong>Balance</strong>. Refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force, as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted to disrupt an enemy's balance.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Leverage</strong></td>
<td><strong>Leverage</strong>. Gain, maintain, and exploit advantages in combat power across all dimensions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Timing and Tempo</strong></td>
<td><strong>Timing and Tempo</strong>. Conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Operational Reach and Approach</strong></td>
<td><strong>Operational Reach and Approach</strong>. Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or the continental United States, directly affects operational reach. In particular, advanced bases underwrite the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from enemy action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with increasing power and ferocity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Forces and Functions</strong></td>
<td><strong>Forces and Functions</strong>. Campaigns and operations can focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions, or a combination of both.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arranging Operations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Arranging Operations</strong>. The best arrangement will often be a combination of simultaneous and sequential operations to achieve the desired end state conditions quickly and at the least cost in personnel and other resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Centers of Gravity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Centers of Gravity</strong>. The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy’s sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them.</td>
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Direct versus Indirect Approach

**Direct versus Indirect.** To the extent possible, JFCs attack enemy centers of gravity directly. Where direct attack means attacking into an opponent's strength, seek an indirect approach.

Decisive Points

**Decisive Points.** (Usually geographic in nature) Correctly identifying and controlling decisive points can gain a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action.

Culmination

**Culmination.** Synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination and help commanders control the tempo of their operations.

Termination

**Termination.** Before forces are committed, JFCs must know how the NCA intends to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure.

Planning Considerations

Control and Coordinating Measures

JFCs employ various maneuver and movement control and fire support coordinating measures to facilitate effective joint operations to include:

Boundaries

**Boundaries.** Boundaries define surface areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations. In land and sea warfare, a boundary is a line by which areas between adjacent units or formations are defined. Theater air sorties
Executive Summary

are not constrained by land boundaries, per se. However, because the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, JFCs promulgate airspace control measures to deconflict the multiple uses required of this space.

The fire support coordination line (FSCL) is a permissive fire control measure, established and adjusted by the land force commander, in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. It is not a boundary; synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land force boundary. It applies to all fires of air, land, or sea weapons systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. Short of the FSCL, all fires are controlled by the land force commander. Beyond the FSCL, coordination and restrictive measures are used to avoid conflicting or redundant operations. Forces attacking targets beyond the FSCL must inform all affected commanders to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide.

Joint Operations in War

Land and naval force commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs. These priorities, along with the JFC's theater-wide interdiction priorities are reflected in the apportionment (air) decision. The joint force air component commander (JFACC) will use these priorities to plan and execute the theater-wide interdiction effort.

The JFACC is normally the supported commander for air interdiction and counterair and may be the supported commander for strategic attack.

The joint force maritime component commander or Navy component commander is normally the supported commander for sea control operations.
JOINT OPERATIONS IN WAR

CONSIDERATIONS BEFORE

PREPARING THE THEATER PROTECTION
ISOLATING THE ENEMY SPACE
MOVEMENT TO ATTAIN PHYSICAL ENVIRONMENT
OPERATIONAL REACH

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

CONSIDERATIONS AT THE OUTSET OF COMBAT

FORCE PROJECTION SPECIAL OPERATIONS
DIMENSIONAL SUPERIORITY PROTECTION
DIRECT ATTACK OF ENEMY STRATEGIC CENTERS OF GRAVITY

SUSTAINED COMBAT

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OFFENSE AND DEFENSE
LINEAR AND NONLINEAR OPERATIONS
ATTACK OF ENEMY STRATEGIC CENTERS OF GRAVITY
SYNCHRONIZING MANEUVER AND INTERDICTION
INTERDICTION JOINT FIRE SUPPORT
COMBAT ASSESSMENT
Military operations other than war encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war.

Although military operations other than war are often conducted outside the United States, they also include military support to US civil authorities.
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Multinational Operations

US military operations are often conducted with the armed forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives.

Multinational operations, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance or coalition. An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.
Conclusion

This publication describes how to think about directing, planning, and conducting joint and multinational operations, as well as interagency operations, across the range of military operations (war and operations other than war). It guides the planning and execution of combatant command strategy, campaigns, and joint operations.
**CHAPTER I**
THE STRATEGIC CONCEPT

“The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a team. This does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders choose the capabilities they need from the air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces at their disposal. The resulting team provides joint force commanders the ability to apply overwhelming force from different dimensions and directions to shock, disrupt, and defeat opponents. Effectively integrated joint forces expose no weak points or seams to enemy action, while they rapidly and efficiently find and attack enemy weak points. Joint warfare is essential to victory.”

*Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States”*

1. **Introduction**

   a. The above quote reflects the central philosophy necessary for successful joint operations. **Joint team success requires unity of effort**—common action throughout the joint force in pursuit of common objectives.

   b. **Joint Pub 3-0 provides guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and their subordinates** for the direction, planning, execution, and support of campaigns and operations—in war and in operations other than war. **This guidance includes:**

      • The **strategic context** within which JFCs operate in supporting national security policies and implementing national military strategy.

      • **Principles, concepts, and other general considerations** that assist JFCs to integrate and synchronize operations and achieve unity of effort.

2. **Security Environment**

   a. **Contemporary threats** faced by the Armed Forces of the United States are more ambiguous and regionally focused than during the Cold War. **Combatant commanders may confront a variety of factors that challenge the stability of countries and regions and threaten US national interests and security** within their areas of responsibility (AORs). These instabilities can lead to increased levels of competition, a wide variety of attempts at intimidation, drug trafficking, insurgencies, regional conflicts, and civil war. It is difficult to predict which nations or groups may threaten our interests and how and when such threats will emerge.

   b. Even in a time of relative peace, **geographic combatant commanders will be challenged by regional factions seeking to expand their influence by coercion or force**. Some of these potential opponents have large, modern, conventional military forces equipped with high-quality systems comparable to those of the Armed Forces of the United States. An adversary’s possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD); ballistic missiles; viable air, land, and naval forces; and sophisticated special operations forces constantly challenge a geographic combatant commander’s ability to deter armed conflict and, if necessary, to fight and win.
Regional challenges will often involve an adversary whose system of beliefs interprets differently such fundamental ideas as right and wrong, the value of human life, and the concept of victory and defeat. What appears to be fanatical to US forces may be completely rational to our opponent. Understanding cultural differences is important if friendly forces are to establish the military conditions necessary to achieve strategic goals.

3. Range of Military Operations

The United States acts to meet various challenges, protect national interests, and achieve strategic aims in a variety of ways depending on the nature of the strategic environment. Figure I-1 shows the range of military operations.

a. War. When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities on terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.

b. Operations Other Than War. Operations other than war are an aspect of military operations that focus on deterring war and promoting peace. Chapter V, “Military Operations Other Than War,” discusses operations other than war in more detail.

- Military Operations Other Than War Involving the Use or Threat of Force

  - In spite of efforts to promote peace, conditions within a country or region may result in armed conflict. When other instruments of national
power are unable to influence a deteriorating or potentially hostile situation, military force may be required to demonstrate US resolve and capability, support the other instruments of national power, or terminate the situation on favorable terms. The general goals of US military operations during such periods are to support national objectives, deter war, and return to a state of peace. Such operations involve a greater risk that US forces could become involved in combat than operations conducted to promote peace.

- Combatant commanders, at the direction of the National Command Authorities (NCA), may employ US forces to deter an adversary’s action. The physical presence of these forces, coupled with their potential employment, can serve as a deterrent and facilitate achieving strategic aims. Should this deterrence fail, force may be required to compel compliance, for example, in the form of raids or strikes. Other such operations include peace enforcement, counterterrorism, enforcement of sanctions, support to insurgency and counterinsurgency, maritime interception, and evacuation of noncombatants.

- At any point when force or the threat of its use is contemplated, those responsible for ordering, planning, or executing such action should remember Clausewitz’s dictum that the use of force and violence introduces the fear, physical strain, and the uncertainty that are some of the hallmarks of the nature of warfare. Just as there are important political, diplomatic, and legal differences between war and operations other than war, there is also a singularly important threshold where using military force of any kind or the threat of its use comes into play. In the range of military operations, this threshold is the distinction between combat and noncombat operations.

- Military Operations Other Than War Not Involving the Use or Threat of Force. Use of military forces in peacetime helps keep the day-to-day tensions between nations below the threshold of armed conflict and maintains US influence in foreign lands. Such operations include humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, nation assistance, security assistance, foreign internal defense, counterdrug operations, arms control, support to US domestic civil authorities, evacuation of noncombatants, and peacekeeping. Such operations are typically joint in nature and may involve forward-presence forces or units deployed from another theater or continental United States (CONUS) or a combination of both. These operations, by definition, do not involve combat, but military forces always need to be prepared to protect themselves and respond to a changing situation.

c. Simultaneous Nature of Theater Operations

- Operations other than war can involve simultaneous actions within an AOR. These actions may or may not involve the use of force at times; part of the theater could also be in a wartime state. In such situations, geographic combatant commanders should pay particular attention to integrating and coordinating the effects and activities of forces toward
a common purpose that supports attaining theater, national, and multinational strategic objectives.

- Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose. Disaster relief operations, for example, are peacetime military operations with a humanitarian purpose. A strike or raid—such as Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the 1986 joint operation to coerce Libya to conform with international laws against terrorism—can be an example of a military operation for a specific purpose of compelling action or deterrence. Often, however, military operations will have multiple purposes, such as the 1992-1993 operations in Somalia (Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE) that combined humanitarian assistance efforts with peace enforcement operations.

- In war and operations other than war, combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs work with US ambassadors, the Department of State, and other agencies to best integrate the military with the diplomatic, economic, and informational instruments of national power.

4. National Strategic Direction

National security strategy and national military strategy, shaped by and oriented on national security policies, provide strategic direction for combatant commanders. Combatant commanders, in turn, provide guidance and direction through their combatant command strategies and plans for the employment of military forces, in conjunction with interagency and multinational forces, in the conduct of military operations. These strategies integrate national and military objectives (ends), national policies and military concepts (ways), and national resources and military forces and supplies (means). Figure I-2 illustrates national strategic direction.

a. National Security Strategic Content. The United States approaches its global commitments with a strategy founded on deterrence and buttressed by the capability to project power to safeguard its national interests. Successful military operations may not, by themselves, achieve the desired strategic end state. Military activities across the full range of operations need to be synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on common national aims. (See definition of national security strategy in glossary.)

b. National Military Strategy. (See glossary.) National military strategy is derived from the national security strategy. National military strategy attempts to promote peace, deter aggression, and, failing that, fight and win. But in the larger context, defeating an enemy military force is rarely sufficient, in and of itself, to ensure a long-term solution to a crisis. The national military strategy and defense policy provide strategic guidance for the employment of military forces. The National Military Strategy (NMS) provides advice of the Chairman, in consultation with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the combatant commanders, to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense as to the recommended NMS and fiscally constrained force structure required to attain the national security objectives. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides guidance for planning purposes to the combatant commanders and the Chiefs of the Services to accomplish tasks and missions based on current military
capabilities. This guidance capitalizes on US strengths and permits it to exploit the weaknesses of those who may threaten our national interests. The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based military advice provided to the NCA.

5. Executing National Security Strategy

In war and operations other than war, combatant commanders are the vital link in the chain of command established by the NCA (the President and Secretary of Defense, or their duly deputized alternates or successors). Directives flow from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the combatant commanders, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national and alliance and/or coalition strategic objectives.

a. The Total Force

- To meet future requirements, the Services and US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), under additional authority established in title 10, United States Code, section 167, have organized, trained, and equipped Active and Reserve component forces, military retirees, DOD civilian personnel, contractor personnel, and host-nation personnel. The Reserve and Active components are fully integrated partners in executing US military strategy. This total force policy
Chapter I

reinforces public support for US military operations.

- **Trained and ready forces** that are rapidly and strategically deployable and initially self-sufficient are **required for response to spontaneous, unpredictable crises.** Such forces are usually drawn from the **active force structure** and are tailored into joint organizations that capitalize on the unique and complementary capabilities of the Services and USSOCOM. In many cases, **Reserve component forces** are required to facilitate the deployment of such forces or provide capabilities that are necessary for a robust, versatile joint force.

- Reserve component forces provide the Nation with unique and complementary capabilities in time of war or national emergency, or at such other times as the national security requires. **JFCs and their subordinates should be knowledgeable of the capabilities and limitations of both Active and Reserve component forces,** blending them in such a manner as to maximize the overall capability of the joint force. JFCs and their staffs need to be familiar with Reserve component callup authority and response times.

b. **Military Operations as Part of a Multinational Force.** Military operations in regional crises may often involve coalitions different from familiar, longstanding alliance structures. Joint forces should be prepared for combat operations and operations other than war with forces from other nations. When assessing the theater strategic environment, **geographic combatant commanders consider international security agreements, formal and informal command relationships with allies, collective security strategies, global and regional stability, and regional interrelationships.** United Nations resolutions may also provide the basis for use of military force. See Chapter VI, “Multinational Operations” for more information.

c. **Military Operations With Nonmilitary Organizations**

- **Combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs are likely to operate with agencies representing other US instruments of national power, with foreign governments, and with nongovernmental and international organizations** in a variety of circumstances. Such agencies and organizations often operate employing “management” or “direction” rather than “command.” They may be the lead effort during many operations other than war, with military organizations providing support. In the absence of a formal command structure, **JFCs may be required to build consensus to achieve unity of effort.** In some cases, a lead agency is prescribed by law or regulation, or by agreement between the agencies involved.

- The interagency environment does not preclude establishing formal agreements between the military and civilian agencies of government. Such agreements can take the form of **memorandums of understanding or terms of reference.** Heads of agencies and authorized military commanders negotiate and co-sign plans. Robust liaison facilitates understanding, coordination, and mission accomplishment.
d. National Strategic Direction. The NCA, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct the national effort that supports combatant and subordinate commanders to ensure:

“Our military forces are one team—in the game to win regardless of who carries the ball. This is no time for “Fancy Dans” who won’t hit the line with all they have on every play, unless they can call the signals. Each player on this team—whether he shines in the spotlight of the backfield or eats dirt in the line—must be an all-American.”

General Omar N. Bradley, USA: Statement to the House Armed Services Committee, 19 Oct 1949

• Military objectives are defined, understood, and achievable.

• Active Service forces are ready for combat and Reserve component forces are appropriately mobilized and readied to join active forces.

• Intelligence systems and efforts focus on the operational area, including opposing nations and their armed forces.

• Strategic direction is current and timely.

• Defense and other governmental agencies support the JFC’s employment of forces.

• The CONUS base and other combatant commands are ready to provide needed support.

• Allies and coalition partners are available when appropriate.

• Forces and supplies deploy into the operational area in a timely manner to support the JFC’s concept of operations.

e. Combatant Commands

• With the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President, through the Secretary of Defense, establishes combatant (unified or specified) commands for the performance of military missions and prescribes the force structure of such commands. Commanders of combatant commands are responsible to the NCA for the preparedness of their commands and for the accomplishment of the military missions assigned to them.

• The NCA exercise authority and control of the armed forces through a single chain of command with two distinct branches. The first runs from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, directly to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The second branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands, runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. Combatant commanders are therefore the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces that conduct military operations designed to achieve national strategic objectives.

• The term “combatant commander” refers to the commander in chief (CINC) of both geographically and functionally organized combatant
commands. The term “geographic combatant commander” refers to a combatant commander with a geographic AOR assigned by the NCA. Functional combatant commanders support geographic combatant commanders or may conduct operations in direct support of the NCA.

- Based on guidance and direction from the NCA, combatant commanders prepare strategic estimates, strategies, and plans to accomplish the missions assigned by higher authority. Supporting combatant commanders and their subordinates ensure that their actions are consistent with the supported commander’s strategy.

- General responsibilities for combatant commanders are established by law (title 10, United States Code, section 164) and expressed in the Unified Command Plan and Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

6. The Estimate Process and Strategy

a. The term “estimate” implies a one-sided evaluation of a two or more sided issue where many of the pertinent facts are unknown or distorted. The estimate assists in clarifying problems and devising integrated solutions to complex problems, thus reducing surprise and shock. A continuous estimate process provides a framework for disciplined reason even under the most trying circumstances. The estimate is the central focus for strategic, operational, and tactical analysis that needs to be maintained over time and in the face of continuing change. The first questions in any estimate are the following: What is the mission? What is the desired end state? What has changed? What are the resulting possibilities and consequences?

b. Combatant commanders develop and modify strategic estimates based on their assigned tasks after reviewing the strategic environment, the various threats, the nature of anticipated operations, national and alliance strategic direction, and forces available. Functionally oriented combatant commanders develop estimates for each theater they support. Operations in one theater often affect other theaters. The interrelationships among theaters, therefore, are important in the assessment of a theater’s strategic environment and development of the strategic estimate.

c. The estimate process is continuous, with the combatant commander’s staff contributing to the product. The strategic estimate itself acts as the basis for strategy, plans, and actions that occur in response to deliberate taskings or crises. Where a subordinate commander’s estimate of the situation is typically used for near-term decisions and may lead to an operation plan, the combatant commander’s strategic estimate results in operational concepts and courses of action—broad statements of what is to be accomplished. One of the critical parts of the estimate process is defining the strategic end state to be achieved.

d. Supported by the strategic estimate(s), combatant commanders develop strategies consistent with national policy and plans. These strategies translate national and multinational direction into concepts to meet strategic and joint operation planning requirements. Combatant commanders’ plans provide strategic direction; assign missions, tasks, forces, and resources; designate objectives; provide authoritative direction; promulgate rules of engagement.
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(ROE) (approved by the NCA); establish constraints and restraints; and define policies and concepts to be integrated into subordinate or supporting plans. Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations,” discusses combatant command strategic planning in more detail. Appendix B, “The Estimate Process,” provides a format for a strategic estimate.

7. The Strategic Goal and Conflict Termination

a. Properly **conceived conflict termination criteria** are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military force endure. To facilitate conception of **effective termination criteria**, US forces must be **dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict** by achieving the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution.

b. The design and implementation of leverage and knowing how and when to terminate a conflict are involved in **operational art** and are discussed in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.” Because the nature of the termination will shape the futures of the contesting nations, it is fundamentally important to understand that **conflict termination is an essential link between national security strategy, NMS, and posthostility aims**--the desired outcome. This principle holds true for both war and military operations other than war.

- **Political Considerations.** There are two general means for obtaining objectives by force. The **first** seeks domination or overthrow of the opponent’s military strength and political policy--an imposed settlement. The **second** seeks concession through coordinated military and negotiating actions. War is an instrument of policy. **Negotiating power in armed conflict springs from two sources:** military success and military potential. **Military success** provides military, geographic, political, psychological, or economic advantage and the quid pro quo for negotiations. **Military potential** establishes the threat of further advantage accruing to the possessor, which forces the opposing nation to consider a negotiated conclusion. Negotiating an advantageous conclusion to conflict requires time and power and the demonstrated will to use both. In addition to imposed and negotiated termination, there is an **armistice** or **truce**, which is a **negotiated intermission in hostilities**, not a peace. In effect, it is a device to buy time pending negotiation of a permanent settlement or resumption of hostilities. A nation needs to consider the advantages accruing to a truce and the prospects for its supervision.

- Even when pursuing an imposed termination, the government requires **some means of communication with the opponent(s)**. Declarations of intentions, requirements, and minor concessions may speed conflict termination, as the enemy considers the advantages of early termination versus extended resistance in the light of fading leverage.

- **The issue of conflict termination centers on national will and freedom of action.** Once the opponent’s strategic aim shifts from maintaining or extending gains to reducing losses, the possibilities for negotiating an advantageous termination **improve**. Military, economic, diplomatic, and informational effort need to be coordinated toward causing that shift and, once made, toward exploiting it. **Conflict termination should be considered from the outset of**
planning and should be refined as the conflict moves toward advantageous termination.

- **Military Considerations**

  - In its strategic context, military victory is measured in the achievement of the overall political aim and associated termination objectives. Operational and tactical victory is measured by its contribution to strategic success. Military objectives may differ significantly for a negotiated settlement than for an imposed one. Military strategic advice to political authorities regarding national military objectives for termination should include estimates of military feasibility, adequacy, and acceptability and estimates of the time, costs, and military forces required to achieve the objectives. Implementing military commanders need to understand the overall political aim and military objectives for termination and should request clarification from higher authority in the absence of the political authorities.

  - Another military consideration is the follow up political exploitation of completed military action and the military role in the transition to peace. This exploitation includes matters such as military government, civil affairs, and humanitarian assistance and requires early planning and coordination both at the national level and in theater among diplomatic, military, and political leadership.

Coalition commanders communicate war termination conditions to Iraqi military leadership during Operation DESERT STORM.
“As we consider the nature of warfare in the modern era, we find that it is synonymous with joint warfare.”

Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States”

1. General

a. Joint operations doctrine reflects the nature of modern warfare and the strategic requirements of our nation. It is built on a sound base of warfighting theory and practical experience. It applies the principles of war (Figure II-1 and Appendix A, “Principles of War”), the fundamentals of joint warfare (as developed in Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” Chapter III), and other key concepts consistent with the policies of our government. It seeks to provide JFCs with a broad range of options to defeat an enemy in war or to conduct operations other than war. It is a doctrine that recognizes the fundamental and beneficial effects of teamwork and unity of effort, and the synchronization of military operations in time, space, and purpose. The first fundamental for employment of United States joint forces is to achieve strategic aims as rapidly as possible, with the least possible loss of American lives.

b. Advances in technology are likely to continue to increase the tempo, lethality, and depth of warfare. Joint doctrine should be flexible enough to recognize the impact of emerging technologies and integrate emerging advances that may provide the Armed Forces of the United States with a decisive advantage.

2. The Levels of War

a. General

- The levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions. Although there are no finite limits or boundaries between them, the three levels, in general, are strategic, operational, and tactical. They apply to both war and operations other than war.
Levels of command, size of units, types of equipment, or types of forces or components are not associated with a particular level. National assets such as intelligence and communications satellites, previously considered principally in a strategic context, are an important adjunct to tactical operations. Actions can be defined as strategic, operational, or tactical based on their effect or contribution to achieving strategic, operational, or tactical objectives, but many times the accuracy of these labels can only be determined during historical studies.

Advances in technology, information age media reporting, and the compression of time-space relationships contribute to the growing inter-relationships between the levels of war. The levels of war help commanders visualize a logical flow of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to the appropriate command. However, commanders at every level must be aware that in a world of constant, immediate communications, any single event may cut across the three levels.

b. The Strategic Level

The strategic level is that level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Strategy is the art and science of developing and employing armed forces and other instruments of national power in a synchronized fashion to secure national or multinational objectives. The NCA translate policy into national strategic military objectives. These military objectives facilitate theater strategic planning.

A geographic combatant commander usually participates in discussions with the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and with allies and coalition members. The theater strategy is thus an element that relates to both US national strategy and operational activities within the theater. Strategy, derived from policy, is the basis for all operations.

c. The Operational Level

The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on operational art—the use of military forces to achieve strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will be employed and should influence the enemy disposition before combat. It governs the deployment of those forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from battle, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives.

Operational art helps commanders use resources efficiently and effectively to achieve strategic objectives. It provides a framework to assist commanders in ordering their thoughts when designing campaigns and major operations. Operational art helps commanders understand the conditions for victory before seeking battle, thus avoiding unnecessary battles. Without operational art, war would be a set of disconnected
engagements, with relative attrition the only measure of success or failure.

• Operational art requires broad vision, the ability to anticipate, and effective joint and multinational cooperation. Operational art is practiced not only by JFCs but also by their senior staff officers and subordinate commanders. Joint operational art looks not only at the employment of military forces but also at the arrangement of their efforts in time, space, and purpose. Joint operational art, in particular, focuses on the fundamental methods and issues associated with the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces. Operational art is discussed in greater detail in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.”

• Among many considerations, operational art requires commanders to answer the following questions:

  • What military (or related political and social) conditions must be produced in the operational area to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends)

  • What sequence of actions is most likely to produce that condition? (Ways)

  • How should the resources of the joint force be applied to accomplish that sequence of actions? (Means)

  • What is the likely cost or risk to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions?

  d. The Tactical Level. Tactics is the employment of units in combat. It includes the ordered arrangement and maneuver of units in relation to each other and/or to the enemy in order to use their full potential. An engagement is normally short in duration and fought between small forces, such as individual aircraft in air-to-air combat. Engagements include a wide variety of actions between opposing forces in the air, on and under the sea, or on land. A battle consists of a set of related engagements. Battles typically last longer; involve larger forces such as fleets, armies, and air forces; and could affect the course of a campaign.

3. Unified Action

  a. Whereas the term “joint operations” is primarily concerned with the coordinated actions of the Armed Forces of the United States, the term “unified action” has a broader connotation. The concept of unified action (sometimes referred to as unified operations) is illustrated in Figure II-2 and highlights the synchronized application of all of the instruments of national and multinational power and includes the actions of nonmilitary organizations as well as military forces.

  b. All JFCs are responsible for unified actions that are planned and conducted in accordance with the guidance and direction received from senior authorities (i.e., NCA, alliance or coalition leadership, superior commander). JFCs should ensure that their joint operations are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces (multinational operations) and nonmilitary organizations (government agencies such as the Agency for International Development (AID), nongovernmental organizations such as religious relief agencies, corporations, international agencies such as the International Red Cross, and even the United Nations). Activities and operations with such nonmilitary organizations can be complex
and may require considerable effort by JFCs, their staffs, and subordinate commanders, especially during operations other than war.

**c. Combatant commanders typically play a pivotal role in unifying actions** (all of the elements and actions that comprise unified actions are normally present at the CINC’s level). **Subordinate JFCs also synchronize their operations** directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in the operational area.

4. **Joint Warfare**

a. **The integration of all US military capabilities**--often in conjunction with forces from other nations, other US agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and United Nations forces and capabilities--**is required to generate decisive joint combat power**. JFCs synchronize these capabilities and contributions in time, space, and purpose.

b. To achieve assigned objectives, **joint forces conduct campaigns and major operations**. Functional and Service components of the joint force **conduct subordinate and supporting operations**, **not independent campaigns**.

> “Campaigns represent the art of linking battles and engagements in an operational design . . . oriented on the enemy’s strategic and operational centers of gravity . . . They serve as the unifying focus for our conduct of warfare . . . Campaigns of the Armed Forces of the United States are joint.”

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Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States”
c. The overarching operational concept in Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” is that JFCs synchronize the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to achieve strategic and operational objectives through integrated, joint campaigns and major operations. The goal is to increase the total effectiveness of the joint force, not necessarily to involve all forces or to involve all forces equally. Campaigns reflect the nature of the operation directed by the NCA (strategic nuclear, peacekeeping, and conventional operations, among others).

5. Command Relationships

For detailed guidance, refer to Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

a. General

- The NCA exercise authority and control of the armed forces through a single chain of command with two distinct branches, as shown in Figure II-3. The first runs from the President, to the Secretary of Defense, directly to the commanders of combatant commands for missions and forces assigned to their commands. The second branch, used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant command, runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments. The Military Departments, organized separately, each operate under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary.
of Defense. The Secretaries of the Military Departments exercise the authority, direction, and control through the individual Chiefs of the Services of their forces that are not specifically assigned to combatant commanders.

- The authority vested in the Military Departments in the performance of their role to “organize, train, equip, and provide” forces runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Secretaries of the Military Departments to the Chiefs of the Services forces. This administrative control recognizes the preparation of military forces and their administration and support, unless such responsibilities are specifically assigned by the Secretary of Defense to another component of the Department of Defense. The responsibilities and authority exercised by the Military Departments are subject by law to the authority provided to the commanders of combatant commands in their exercise of their combatant command authority.

- Unity of effort in joint forces is enhanced through the application of the flexible range of command relationships identified in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).” Joint force command relationships are an array of options JFCs can use to adapt the organization of assigned forces to situational requirements and arrange component operations in time, space, and purpose.

b. Combatant Command (Command Authority) (COCOM)

- COCOM is the command authority over assigned forces vested only in the commanders of combatant commands by title 10, US Code, Section 164, or as directed by the President in the Unified Command Plan, and cannot be delegated or transferred.

- Basic Authority. As shown in Figure II-4, COCOM is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. COCOM should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through the subordinate JFCs, Service, and/or functional component commanders. COCOM provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as

COMBATANT COMMAND (COMMAND AUTHORITY) BASIC AUTHORITY

- Organizing and employing commands and forces.
- Assigning tasks.
- Designating objectives.
- Directing military operations, joint training, and logistics.

Figure II-4. Combatant Command (Command Authority)
the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

- Combatant commanders may exercise COCOM:
  - Through Service component commanders.
  - Through functional component commanders, if established for a particular purpose, such as the special operations component.
  - Through a commander of a subordinate unified command (unified command only).
  - Through the commander of a joint task force (JTF) reporting directly to the CINC.
  - Through a single-Service force commander reporting directly to the CINC. Normally, missions requiring operations of a single-Service force will be assigned to the applicable Service component commander. A CINC may establish a separate single-Service force but normally does so only under exceptional circumstances.
  - Directly over specific operational forces that, because of the mission assigned and the urgency of the situation, must remain immediately responsive to the CINC.

- Directive Authority for Logistic Matters. Commanders of combatant commands may exercise directive authority for logistics (or delegate directive authority for a common-support capability). The exercise of directive authority for logistics by a combatant commander includes the authority to issue directives to subordinate commanders, including peacetime measures, necessary to ensure the following: effective execution of approved operation plans; effectiveness and economy of operation; and prevention or elimination of unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the Service component commands.

c. Operational Control (OPCON)

- OPCON may be exercised at any echelon at or below the level of the combatant command and can be delegated or transferred. OPCON is inherent in COCOM and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish assigned missions.

- OPCON should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component commanders. OPCON in and of itself does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and geographic joint operations areas of subordinate JFCs.
Chapter II

d. Tactical Control (TACON)

- TACON is the command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks. TACON may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support; the commander of the parent unit continues to exercise those responsibilities unless otherwise specified in the establishing directive.

- TACON is typically exercised by functional component commanders over military capability or forces made available for tasking.

The commander of an Amphibious Task Force may exercise tactical control over attached forces for specific operations.

e. Support

- Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. The NCA establish such relationships between combatant commanders when deployment and execution orders are issued to ensure the combatant commander tasked to achieve national objectives receives the support needed from other combatant commanders. JFCs may establish support relationships within the joint force to enhance unity of effort for given operational tasks, emphasize or clarify priorities, provide a subordinate with an additional capability, or combine the effects of similar assets.
• **Mutual Support.** Mutual support is the action that units render each other against an enemy because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.

• **General Support.** General support is the action that is given to the supported force as a whole rather than to a particular subdivision thereof.

• **Direct Support.** Direct support is a mission requiring a force to support another specific force and authorizing it to answer directly the supported force’s request for assistance.

• **Close Support.** Close support is the action of the supporting force against targets or objectives that are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or coordination of the supporting action with fire, movement, or other actions of the supported force.

• Establishing supported and supporting relationships between components is a useful option to accomplish needed tasks. Each subordinate element of the joint force can support or be supported by other elements.

• As defined in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” “Unless limited by the establishing directive, the commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency.” The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported commander and take such action to fulfill them as is within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks.

• The establishing directive indicates the purpose in terms of the effect desired and the scope of the action to be taken. It also should include:

  • The forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort.
  • The time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort.
  • The priority of the supporting mission relative to the other missions of the supporting force.
  • The authority, if any, of the supporting force to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency.

  • The degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

f. Other Authorities

• Administrative Control (ADCON). ADCON is the direction or exercise of authority over subordinate or other organizations in respect to administration and support including organization of Service forces, control of resources and equipment, personnel management, unit logistics, individual and unit training, readiness, mobilization, demobilization, and discipline and other matters not included in the operational missions of the subordinate or other organizations. ADCON is synonymous with administration and
support responsibilities identified in title 10, US Code. This is the authority necessary to fulfill Military Department statutory responsibilities for administration and support. ADCON may be delegated to and exercised by commanders of Service forces assigned to a combatant commander at any echelon at or below the level of Service component command. ADCON is subject to the command authority of combatant commanders.

- **Coordinating Authority.** Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship between commanders, not an authority by which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority may be exercised by commanders or individuals at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Coordinating authority is the authority delegated to a commander or individual for coordinating specific functions and activities involving forces of two or more Services, functional components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved but does not have the authority to compel agreement. The common task to be coordinated will be specified in the establishing directive without disturbing the normal organizational relationships in other matters. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. Coordinating authority is not in any way tied to force assignment. It will be assigned based on the missions and capabilities of the commands or organizations involved.

- **Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH).** DIRLAUTH is that authority granted by a commander (any level) to a subordinate to directly consult or coordinate an action with a command or agency within or outside of the granting command. DIRLAUTH is more applicable to planning than operations and always carries with it the requirement of keeping the commander granting DIRLAUTH informed. DIRLAUTH is a coordination relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised.

6. **Organization of Forces**

For detailed guidance, refer to Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

a. General

- JFCs have full authority to assign missions, redirect efforts, and direct coordination among subordinate commanders. JFCs should allow Service tactical and operational groupings to function generally as they were designed. The intent is to meet the needs of JFCs, while maintaining the tactical and operational integrity of Service organizations.

- Joint forces are specifically designated, composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, and commanded by a JFC with a joint staff. Joint forces include combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, and joint task forces. An appropriate order assigns or attaches personnel and units to joint forces.
The manner in which JFCs organize their forces directly affects the responsiveness and versatility of joint force operations. The first principle in joint force organization is that JFCs organize forces to accomplish the mission based on the JFCs’ vision and concept of operations. Unity of effort, centralized planning, and decentralized execution are key considerations. JFCs may elect to centralize selected functions within the joint force, but should strive to avoid reducing the versatility, responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces.

Organization of joint forces also need to take into account interoperability with multinational forces. Complex or unclear command relationships and organizations can be counterproductive to developing synergy among multinational forces. Simplicity and clarity of expression are critical.

b. Combatant Commands

A combatant command is a unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense, and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities.

The UCP defines geographic AORs for selected combatant commands, including all associated land, water areas, and airspace. Such AORs are referred to as theaters. By establishing geographic combatant commands (theater commands), the NCA decentralize the authority to plan, prepare, and conduct military operations within that theater to the geographic combatant commander, consistent with strategic guidance and direction.

Other combatant commanders are assigned functional responsibilities such as transportation, special operations, or strategic operations. Functionally oriented combatant commands can operate across all geographic regions or can provide forces for assignment to other combatant commanders. These combatant commands can also conduct operations while reporting directly to the NCA.

Combatant commanders receive strategic direction from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and are responsible to the Secretary of Defense for accomplishing assigned missions.

Combatant commanders may directly control the conduct of military operations or may delegate that authority and responsibility to a subordinate commander. Such an arrangement allows the subordinate commander to control operations while the combatant commander supports the operation with forces and resources. This relationship is frequently referred to as a two-tiered system, and was successfully employed in Operations URGENT FURY (Grenada, 1983), JUST CAUSE (Panama, 1989), and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY (Haiti, 1994).

The two types of combatant commands are unified and specified.
c. Unified Commands

- **Unified commands** are typically established when a broad continuing mission exists requiring execution by significant forces of two or more Military Departments and necessitating single strategic direction or other criteria found in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),” are met.

- The commanders of unified commands may establish:

  - **Subordinate unified commands** when authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct operations on a continuing basis.

  - **Functional component commands** when such a command structure enhances the overall capability to accomplish the mission of the establishing commander. Functional component commands may also be established by commanders of subordinate unified commands and JTFs.

- **JTFs** to accomplish missions with specific, limited objectives and which do not require overall centralized control of logistics. JTFs may also be established by the Secretary of Defense and commanders of subordinate unified commands and existing JTFs.

d. Specified Commands

- **Specified commands** are normally composed of forces from one Military Department, but may include units and staff representation from other Military Departments.

- The commander of a specified command has the same authority and responsibilities as the commander of a unified command except that no authority exists to establish subordinate unified commands.

e. Subordinate Unified Commands

When authorized through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, **commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands** (also called subunified commands) to conduct operations.
operations on a continuing basis in accordance with the criteria set forth for unified commands. A subordinate unified command may be established on a geographic area or functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified commands have functions and responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified commands and exercise OPCON of assigned commands and forces within the assigned joint operations area (JOA) or functional area.

f. Joint Task Forces

• A JTF is a joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a subordinate unified command commander, or an existing JTF commander.

• Commanders of JTFs (CJTFs) are responsible to the JTF-establishing authority and exercise OPCON over assigned forces and normally exercise OPCON over attached forces. JTF staffs are normally augmented with representatives from component commands of the establishing headquarters.

• JTF operations are normally operational in nature, conducted to achieve operational-level objectives.

• A JTF is dissolved by the proper authority when the purpose for which it was created has been achieved or when it is no longer required.

g. Service Components

• All joint forces include Service components. Administrative and logistic support for joint forces are provided through Service components. The JFC also may conduct operations through the Service component commanders, or at lower echelons, Service force commanders. Service forces may be assigned or attached to subordinate joint forces without the formal creation of a Service component of that joint force. This relationship is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy, ease of long-range planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational integrity of Service components. These conditions apply when most of the required functions in a particular dimension are unique to a single-Service force, or when Service force capabilities or responsibilities do not significantly overlap.

• Conducting operations through Service components has certain advantages, which include clear and uncomplicated command lines. Logistics remain a Service responsibility, with the exception of arrangements described in Service support agreements or as otherwise directed by the combatant commander.

• Responsibilities of the Service component commander include:

  • Making recommendations to the JFC on the proper employment of the forces of the Service component.

  • Accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.

  • Selecting and nominating specific units of the parent Service component for assignment to subordinate forces. Unless otherwise directed, these units revert to the control of the Service component commander when such subordinate forces are dissolved.
• Other responsibilities as discussed in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

• Regardless of the organizational and command arrangements within joint commands, Service component commanders retain responsibility for certain Service-specific functions and other matters affecting their forces, including internal administration, training, logistics, and Service intelligence operations.

• The relationship between commanders of Service forces is determined by the JFC. In addition to logistic support arrangements, one component may support another with forces or operations in a variety of command relationships as previously described.

h. Functional Components

• JFCs may establish functional components to provide centralized direction and control of certain functions and types of operations when it is feasible and necessary to fix responsibility for certain normal, continuing functions, or when it is appropriate and desirable to establish the authority and responsibility of a subordinate commander. These conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the similar capabilities and functions of forces from more than one Service be directed toward closely related objectives and unity of command and effort are primary considerations. For example, when the scope of operations is large, and JFCs need to divide their attention between major operations or phases of operations that are functionally dominated--and synchronize those operations--it may be useful to establish functionally oriented commanders responsible for the major operations. JFCs may conduct operations through functional components or employ them primarily to coordinate selected functions. (NOTE: Functional component commands are component commands of a joint force and do not constitute a “joint force” with the authorities and responsibilities of a joint force as described in this document even when composed of forces from two or more Services.)

• Functional component can be appropriate when forces from two or more Services operate in the same dimension or medium. A joint force land component commander (JFLCC) is one example. Functional component staffs should be joint with Service representation in approximate proportion to the mix of subordinate forces. Functional component staff's require advanced planning for efficient operations. Joint staff billets for needed expertise and individuals to fill those billets should be identified. Such individuals should be used when joint staffs are formed for exercises and actual operations. Liaison elements from and to other components facilitate coordination.

• The nature of operations, mix of Service forces, and command and control capabilities are normally primary factors in selecting the functional component commander.

• Functional component commanders -- such as the joint force air component commander (JFACC), the JFLCC, the joint force maritime component commander (JFMCC), and the joint force special operations
component commander (JFSOCC) -- have the responsibilities of both superior and subordinate commanders as described in Joint Pub 0-2, “Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF).”

• The JFC must designate the military capability that will be made available for tasking by the functional component commander and the appropriate command relationship(s) the functional component commander will exercise over that military capability (e.g., a JFSOCC normally has OPCON of assigned forces and a JFACC is normally delegated TACON of the sorties or other military capability made available). JFCs may also establish a supporting and/or supported relationship between components to facilitate operations. Regardless, the establishing JFC defines the authority and responsibilities of functional component commanders based on the concept of operations and may alter their authority and responsibilities during the course of an operation.

i. Combination

• Most often, joint forces are organized with a combination of Service and functional components with operational responsibilities.

• Joint forces organized with Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force components will still have special operations forces organized as a functional component.

• JFCs will normally designate a JFACC, whose authority and responsibilities are defined by the establishing JFC based on the JFC’s concept of operations.

j. Figure II-5 depicts possible components in a joint force. It is presented as an example only.
7. Command and Control

a. Command and control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Command, in particular, includes both the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources to accomplish assigned missions.

b. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. Command requires visualizing the current state of friendly and enemy forces, then the future state of those forces that must exist to accomplish the mission, then formulating concepts of operations to achieve that state. JFCs influence the outcome of campaigns and major operations by:

- Assigning missions.
- Designating the priority effort(s).
- Prioritizing and allocating resources.
- Assessing risks to be taken.
- Deciding when and how to make adjustments.
- Committing reserves.
- Staying attuned to the needs of subordinates and seniors.
- Guiding and motivating the organization toward the desired end.
c. Control is inherent in command. To control is to regulate forces and functions to execute the commander’s intent. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to accomplish their intent and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

d. Control serves its purpose if it allows commanders freedom to operate, delegate authority, place themselves in the best position to lead, and synchronize actions throughout the operational area. Moreover, the C2 system needs to support the ability of commanders to adjust plans for future operations, even while focusing on current operations. Skilled staffs work within command intent to direct and control units and resource allocation to support the desired end. They also are alert to spotting enemy or friendly situations that may require changes in command relationships or organization and advise the commander accordingly.

e. The related tools for implementing command decisions include communications, computers, and intelligence. Space-based systems provide commanders capabilities such as surveillance, navigation, and location that greatly facilitate command. The precision with which these systems operate significantly upgrades the speed and accuracy of the information that commanders exchange, both vertically and laterally.

f. Effective command at varying operational tempos requires reliable, secure, and interoperable communications. Communications planning increases options available to JFCs by providing the communications systems necessary to pass critical information at decisive times. These communication systems permit JFCs to exploit tactical success and facilitate future operations. Nonetheless, command style is dictated by the commander, not by the supporting communication system. Joint Pub 3-56, “Command and Control Doctrine for Joint Operations,” discusses C2 of joint operations.

g. Liaison is an important aspect of joint force C2. Liaison teams or individuals may be dispatched from higher to lower, lower to higher, laterally, or any combination of these. They generally represent the interests of the sending commander to the receiving commander, but can greatly promote understanding of the commander’s intent at both the sending and receiving headquarters.

8. Organization of an Operational Area

a. To assist in the coordination and deconfliction of joint action, JFCs may define operational areas or joint areas. The size of these areas and the types of forces employed within them depend on the scope and nature of the crisis and the projected duration of operations. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, geographic combatant commanders can employ the following operational areas (illustrated in Figure II-6):

- Joint Operations Area (JOA). A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a JTF commander)
conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area. JOAs are also appropriate when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters.

- **Joint Special Operations Area (JSOA).** A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities, for use by a joint special operations component or joint special operations task force for the conduct of special operations. JFCs may use a JSOA to delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

- **Joint Rear Area (JRA).** The JRA facilitates the protection and operation of bases, installations, and forces that support combat operations. JRAs are not necessarily contiguous with areas actively engaged in combat. JRAs may include intermediate support bases and other support facilities intermixed with combat elements. The JRA is particularly useful in nonlinear combat situations.

- **Amphibious Objective Area.** The amphibious objective area includes the objectives to be secured by an amphibious task force. It needs to be large enough for necessary sea, air, land, and special operations. Refer to

- **Area of Operations.** JFCs may define areas of operations (AOS) for land and naval forces. AOSs do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the JFC, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. Component commanders with AOSs typically designate subordinate AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These commanders employ the full range of joint and Service doctrinal control measures and graphics to delineate responsibilities, deconflict operations, and promote unity of effort. Refer to associated discussion of “boundaries” in Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.”

- **Area of Interest (AI).** JFCs at all levels can designate AIs to monitor enemy activities outside the operations area. An AI is usually larger in size than the operational area and encompasses areas from which the enemy can act to affect current or future friendly operations.

b. When warranted, geographic combatant commanders may designate theaters of war and, perhaps, subordinate theaters of operations for each major threat. Geographic combatant commanders can elect to directly control operations in the theater of war or theater of operations, or may establish subordinate joint forces for that purpose, allowing themselves to remain focused on the broader theater (i.e., the AOR).

- **Theater of War.** In time of war, the NCA or a geographic combatant commander may elect to define a theater of war within the geographic combatant commander’s AOR. The theater of war is that area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander’s entire AOR and may contain more than one theater of operations.

- **Theater of Operations.** Geographic combatant commanders may further define one or more theaters of operations--that area required to conduct or support specific combat operations--within the theater of war. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. Subordinate unified commanders are typically assigned theaters of operations.

- **Combat and Communications Zones (COMMZ).** Geographic combatant commanders may also establish combat zones and COMMZs, as shown in Figure II-7. The combat zone is an area required by forces to conduct large-scale combat operations. It normally extends forward from the land force rear boundary. The COMMZ contains those theater organizations, lines of communication (LOCs), and other agencies required to support and sustain combat forces. The COMMZ usually includes the rear portions of the theaters of operations and theater of war and reaches back to the CONUS base or perhaps to a supporting
combatant commander’s AOR. The COMMZ includes airports and seaports that support the flow of forces and logistics into the operational area. It is usually contiguous to the combat zone but may be separate--connected only by thin LOCs--in very fluid, dynamic situations.

This example depicts a CINC’s AOR in which a theater of operations has been designated. The combat zone includes that area required for the conduct of combat operations. The COMMZ in this example is contiguous to the combat zone.

Figure II-7. Combat and Communications Zones
CHAPTER III
PLANNING JOINT OPERATIONS

“Nothing succeeds in war except in consequence of a well prepared plan”

Napoleon I, 1769-1821

1. General

a. Planning for employment of joint teams begins with articulating and understanding the objective, purpose of the operations, and commander’s intent (the commander’s vision of the end state to be achieved). CINCs and JFCs reporting directly to the NCA receive guidance and direction from the NCA through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. CINCs refine the guidance and direction for subordinate JFCs. Subordinate JFCs then translate this guidance and theater strategy into clearly defined and attainable objectives. JFCs then conduct campaigns and operations to accomplish these objectives.

b. JFCs issue prioritized mission-type orders to subordinate commanders and define command relationships to facilitate mission accomplishment consistent with their concept of operations. Missions are assigned to subordinate commanders, not staff officers or coordination authorities. With receipt of the mission goes the authority and responsibility to conduct operations in accordance with the superior commander’s intent and concept of operations.

2. The Link Between National and Combatant Command Strategies

a. In peacetime, national policy, national security strategy, defense policy, and NMS are sources of guidance for combatant commanders and Chiefs of the Services. The Joint Strategic Planning System provides strategic direction; assigns missions, tasks, forces, and resources; and designates objectives and ROE. They also establish constraints and restraints and define policies and concepts to be integrated into combatant command strategies and plans.

b. US and alliance and/or coalition strategic objectives are the basis for combatant command strategies. Combatant commanders design strategic concepts and develop plans to accomplish these objectives within their geographic or functional areas. Combatant commanders plan against specific tasks in the JSCP and also strive to anticipate additional conditions when employment of US forces may be called for. In those cases, combatant commanders may develop and maintain the framework of plans even in peacetime. The nature of regional instabilities, however, is such that some plans might be formulated just before employment of US forces or even concurrently.
a. General

- **Combatant command strategic planning in peacetime provides the framework** for employing forces in peacetime and in response to crises. Combatant command planners develop **peacetime assessments** that **ease transition to crisis or war** as well as to postconflict. Peacetime intelligence and logistic assessments, for example, are essential for force projection operations and rapid transition to combat operations.

- When directed by the NCA to conduct military operations, **the combatant commanders refine peacetime strategies and modify existing plans** or develop campaign plans as appropriate. The result, expressed in terms of **military objectives, military concepts, and resources** (ends, ways, and means), provides guidance for a broad range of activities.

b. Determining the Strategic End State and Supporting Military Conditions

- **The desired end state should be clearly described** by the NCA before Armed Forces of the United States are committed to an action. **An end state is the set of required conditions that achieve the strategic objectives.** There may be a preliminary end state--described by a set of military conditions--when military force is no longer the principal means to the strategic aim. There may also be a broader end state that typically involves returning to a state of peace and stability and may include a variety of diplomatic, economic, informational, and military conditions. The relative emphasis among these instruments of national power will vary according to the nature of the crisis.

- Although **military end state conditions** normally will represent what combatant commanders want their campaigns to achieve, **commanders are rarely concerned with only those conditions.** Often, combatant commanders may be required to support the other instruments of national power as directed by national and multinational leadership.

- **Defining the end state**, which may change as the operation progresses, and ensuring it supports achieving national objectives are the critical first steps in the estimate and planning process. Additionally, clearly defining the desired end state **reduces the wasting of scarce resources and helps clarify (and may reduce) the risk associated with the operation.** In order to clearly describe the desired end state, planners should consider what may be necessary to end the armed conflict and the period of postconflict activities likely to follow. **Commanders at all levels should have a common understanding of the conditions that define success before initiation of the operation.**

- **Achieving the desired end state seldom, if ever, ends US national efforts to protect interests in a situation.** The term “end state” simply represents the set of conditions necessary to resolve a crisis and transition from predominant use of the military instrument of national power to other instruments.
c. The Strategic Estimate

- The strategic estimate is a tool available to combatant commanders and subordinate JFCs as they develop campaign plans and subordinate campaign and operation plans. JFCs use strategic estimates developed in peacetime to facilitate the employment of military forces across the range of military operations. The strategic estimate is more comprehensive in scope than estimates of subordinate commanders, encompasses all strategic concepts, and is the basis for combatant command strategy.

- In the strategic estimate, commanders focus on the threat and consider other circumstances affecting the military situation as they develop and analyze courses of action. Items contained in strategic estimate are shown in Figure III-1.

- The result of the estimate is a visualization of the current enemy and friendly situation, including opportunities available for exploitation. The estimate includes a visualization of what these states must look like to accomplish the mission and a clear expression of alternatives to achieve that state. Commanders employ the estimate to consider the enemy’s likely intent and courses of action (COAs) and compare friendly alternatives that result in a decision.

- The strategic estimate process is continuous and based on direction from national and multinational leadership. Estimates for the current operation can often provide the basis for estimates for future operations.

- JFCs develop strategic estimates after reviewing the strategic environment, potential threats, the nature of anticipated operations, and national strategic direction. The strategic estimate process helps clarify the strategic end state and supporting military conditions. Both supported and supporting JFCs prepare strategic estimates based on assigned tasks. Combatant commanders who support multiple JFCs prepare estimates for each supporting operation.

d. Theater Strategic Concepts

- Theater strategic concepts are statements of intent as to what, where, and how operations are to be conducted in broad, flexible terms. These statements must incorporate a variety of factors, including nuclear and conventional deterrence, current or potential alliances or coalitions, forces available, C2 capabilities, intelligence assets, anticipated postconflict measures, mobilization, deployment, and sustainability. Theater strategic concepts allow for the employment of theater nuclear forces, conventional and special operations forces, space assets, military assistance from all Services and supporting commands, and interagency and multinational forces in each COA.

- Theater strategic concepts should provide for unity of effort and strategic advantage. Strategic advantage is the favorable overall relative power relationship that enables one nation or group of nations to effectively control the course of politico-military events to ensure the accomplishment of objectives through national, international, and theater efforts.

- Combatant commanders use the advantages and capabilities of assigned, attached, and supporting military forces, as well as alliance, coalition, and interagency relationships and military assistance enhancements in theater as the basis of military power. Combatant commanders also consider the other instruments of national power for their contribution to gaining and maintaining strategic advantage.

- Though geographic and functional responsibilities of the combatant commanders may differ, there are several common strategic considerations. Strategic concepts must integrate ends, ways, and means and consider:

  - Protection of US citizens, forces, and interests and implementation of national policies.
  - Integration of deterrence measures and transition to combat operations.
  - Adjustments for multinational, interagency, or United Nations circumstances.
  - Identification of conflict termination criteria and postconflict objectives and measures.
  - Identification of potential military requirements across the range of military operations.
  - Support for security assistance or nation assistance.
  - Inputs to higher strategies or subordinate planning requirements.

4. The Campaign

a. General

- A campaign is a series of related major operations that arrange tactical, operational, and strategic actions to accomplish strategic and operational objectives. A campaign plan describes how these operations are connected in time, space, and purpose. Within a campaign, major operations
Planning Joint Operations

consist of coordinated actions in a single phase of a campaign and usually decide the course of the campaign.

• **Campaigns are joint.** They serve as the focus for the conduct of war and often in operations other than war. A wartime campaign is the synchronization of air, land, sea, space, and special operations--as well as interagency and multinational operations--in harmony with diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts to attain national and multinational objectives.

• Based on strategy adopted during the crisis action planning procedures, combatant commanders design campaigns to accomplish national or multinational strategic military objectives. They plan and execute campaigns by applying operational art. How commanders apply operational art will vary with the nature of operational conditions, the nature of the strategic objectives, the time and space available in the theater, and the number and type of forces involved.

• **Campaigns**, especially in multinational efforts, must be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. The more complex the campaign or the more players involved, the more time and effort it takes to plan and coordinate. Whenever possible, JFCs at all levels should plan far enough in advance to allow subordinates sufficient time to react to guidance and conduct their own planning and rehearsals.

• **JFCs consider the strategic environment** during the estimate and planning process in order to determine potential constraints. Constraints may include the availability and capability of forces, sustainment or ROE. These constraints often limit the JFC’s freedom of action and influence the timing and form of the campaign.

• Once military operations are contemplated, **planning for campaigns and major operations becomes a continuous process.** Before initiation of combat operations, commanders must also focus on future operations. During operations, commanders must refine their focus on future operations by assessing the outcome of current operations.

• **Campaigns and major operations can span a wide variety of situations,** from quick-hitting, limited-objective operations to much more extensive requirements. Planning and, indeed, doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures should accommodate this variety of potential scenarios and should provide JFCs a flexible range of capabilities and options from which to organize forces and plan and conduct operations.

• Campaign planning, like all joint operation planning, is based on evolving assumptions. It is characterized by the need to plan for related, simultaneous, and sequential operations and the imperative to accomplish strategic objectives through these operations. Campaign planning is as much a way of thinking about warfare as it is a type of planning.
On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of the rest of the world, including most other Arab nations, united in condemnation of that action. On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT SHIELD began. Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression and to force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations Security Council passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave Kuwait, finally authorizing “all necessary means,” including the use of force, to force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.

The United States led in establishing a political and military coalition to force Iraq from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military campaign to accomplish these ends took the form, in retrospect, of a series of major operations. These operations employed the entire capability of the international military coalition and included operations in war and operations other than war throughout.

The campaign—which included Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and the subsequent period of postconflict operations--can be viewed in the following major phases:

- DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP (to include crisis action planning, mobilization, deployment, and deterrence).
- DEFENSE (with deployment and force buildup continuing).
- OFFENSE.
- POSTWAR OPERATIONS (to include redeployment).

Deployment and Force Buildup. While diplomats attempted to resolve the crisis without combat, the coalition’s military forces conducted rapid planning, mobilization, and the largest strategic deployment since World War II. One of the earliest military actions was a maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military potential to Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was unopposed. The Commander in Chief, US Central Command (USCINCCENT), balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable deterrent capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further deploy, and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization, and deployment continued throughout this phase.

Defense. While even the earliest arriving forces were in a defensive posture, a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of sufficient coalition air, land, and maritime combat capability. Mobilization and deployment of forces continued. Operations security (OPSEC) measures, operational military deceptions, and operational psychological operations were used to influence Iraqi dispositions, expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degrade their abilities to resist USCINCCENT’s selected COA before engaging enemy forces. This phase ended on 17 January 1991, when Operation DESERT STORM began.

Offense. Operation DESERT STORM began with a major airpower effort--from both land and sea--against strategic targets; Iraqi air, land, and naval forces; logistic infrastructure; and C2. Land and special operations forces supported
b. **Fundamentals of Campaign Plans**

• **Campaign plans are unique**, with considerations that set them apart from other plans. These plans synchronize operations by establishing command relationships among subordinate commands, by describing the concept of operations, by assigning tasks and objectives, and by task-organizing assigned forces. Fundamentals of campaign plans are shown in Figure III-2.

• Although not formally part of the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), campaign planning encompasses both the deliberate and crisis action planning processes. If the scope of contemplated operations requires it, campaign planning begins with or during deliberate planning. It

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This air effort by targeting forward-based Iraqi air defense and radar capability. The objectives of this phase were to gain supremacy in the air, significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information to enemy commanders, destroy enemy forces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of movement. This successful air operation would establish the conditions for the attack by coalition land forces.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth, land forces repositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using extensive OPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge of movements to the enemy. Two Army corps moved a great distance in an extremely short time to positions from which they could attack the more vulnerable western flanks of Iraqi forces. US amphibious forces threatened to attack from eastern seaward approaches, drawing Iraqi attention and defensive effort in that direction.

On 24 February, land forces attacked into Iraq and rapidly closed on Iraqi flanks. Under a massive and continuous air component operation, coalition land forces closed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in large numbers. To the extent that it could, the Iraqi military retreated. Within 100 hours of the start of the land force attack, the coalition achieved its strategic objectives and a cease-fire was ordered.

Postwar Operations. Coalition forces consolidated their gains and enforced conditions of the cease-fire. The coalition sought to prevent the Iraqi military from taking retribution against its own dissident populace. Task Force Freedom began operations to rebuild Kuwait City.

The end of major combat operations did not bring an end to conflict. The coalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian relief, security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal, and humanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President Bush announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of northern Iraq. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief supplies over the Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who had participated in Operation DESERT STORM eventually redeployed to Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint and multinational relief operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations associated with the redeployment and demobilization of forces.
Chapter III

**FUNDAMENTALS OF CAMPAIGN PLANS**

- Provide broad strategic concepts of operations and sustainment for achieving multinational, national, and theater strategic objectives.
- Provide an orderly schedule of decisions.
- Achieve unity of effort with air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces, in conjunction with interagency, multinational, nongovernmental, private voluntary, or United Nations forces, as required.
- Incorporate the combatant commander’s strategic intent and operational focus.
- Identify any special forces or capabilities the enemy has in the area.
- Identify the enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance for defeating them.
- Identify the friendly strategic and operational centers of gravity and provide guidance to subordinates for protecting them.
- Sequence a series of related major joint operations conducted simultaneously in depth.
- Establish the organization of subordinate forces and designate command relationships.
- Serve as the basis for subordinate planning and clearly define what constitutes success, including conflict termination objectives and potential posthostilities activities.
- Provide strategic direction; operational focus; and major tasks, objectives, and concepts to subordinates.
- Provide direction for the employment of nuclear weapons as required and authorized by the National Command Authorities.

*Figure III-2. Fundamentals of Campaign Plans*

continues through crisis action planning, thus unifying both planning processes. The degree to which the amount of work accomplished in deliberate planning may serve as the core for a campaign plan is directly dependent on the particular theater and objectives. (Joint Pubs 5-0, “Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations,” and 5-00.1, “JTPP for Campaign Planning,” can be used to assist in this process.) Based on the campaign plan, *appropriate elements are then translated into the operation order format of JOPES for execution*. Although not formally submitted under JOPES, campaign plans may require review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
c. Campaign plans form the basis for developing subordinate campaign plans and supporting plans and, under uncertain circumstances, the framework or a series of operation plans for phases of campaigns.

• **Subordinate Campaign Plans.** Subordinate JFCs may develop subordinate campaign plans or operation plans that accomplish (or contribute to the accomplishment of) theater strategic objectives. Thus, subordinate unified commands typically develop campaign plans to accomplish assigned missions. Also, JTFs can develop and execute campaign plans if missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration. **Subordinate campaign plans should be consistent with the strategy, guidance, and direction** developed by the combatant commander and should **contribute to achieving combatant command objectives.**

• **Supporting Plans**

  • Supporting plans are prepared by subordinate and supporting commanders to satisfy the requirements of the supported commander’s plan. Typically, supporting commands’ plans provide augmentation forces, force enhancements, or functional support such as logistics, communications, and transportation.

  • Supporting plans address such discrete operations as nuclear and chemical operations, mobilization, deployment and redeployment operations, and Service support operations, as well as plans for generating and focusing national resources in one or more theaters.

• **When the NCA, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, direct a combatant command to conduct specified military operations, other combatant commands are identified to support those operations.** For example, during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, US Central Command was designated the supported command, with most other combatant commands providing support.

5. **Operational Art**

JFCs employ operational art, in concert with strategic guidance and direction received from superior leaders, in developing campaigns and operations. The fundamental elements of operational art are shown in Figure III-3 and discussed below.

a. **Synergy**

• **JFCs employ air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in a wide variety of operations in war and in operations other than war.** JFCs not only attack the enemy’s physical capabilities but also the enemy’s morale and will. Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” contains the basis for this multidimensional concept—one which describes how JFCs can apply all dimensions of joint capability to accomplish their mission.

• **When required to employ force, JFCs seek combinations of forces and actions to achieve concentration in various dimensions, all culminating in attaining the assigned objective(s)** in the shortest time possible and with
minimal casualties. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. Engagements with the enemy may be thought of as symmetrical, if our force and the enemy force are similar (for example, land versus land) or asymmetric, if forces are dissimilar (for example, air versus sea, sea versus land). As Joint Pub 1. “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States,” indicates, JFCs are uniquely situated to seize opportunities for asymmetrical action and must be especially alert to exploit the tremendous potential combat power of such actions. See discussion of leverage below.

- It is difficult to view the contributions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in isolation. Each may be critical to the success of the joint force, and each has certain unique capabilities that cannot be duplicated by other types of forces. Given the appropriate circumstances, any dimension of combat power can be dominant--and even decisive--in certain aspects of an operation or phase of a campaign, and each force can support or be supported by other forces. The contributions of these forces will vary over time with the nature of the threat and other strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances. The challenge for supported JFCs is to integrate and synchronize the wide range of capabilities at their disposal into full dimensional operations against the enemy.

- The synergy achieved by synchronizing the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces in joint operations and in multiple dimensions enables JFCs to project focused capabilities that

![Figure III-3. Facets of Operational Art](image-url)
present no seams or vulnerabilities to
an enemy to exploit. JFCs are
especially suited to develop and project
joint synergy given the multiple unique
and complementary capabilities
available only within joint forces.

• The synergy of the joint force depends
on a shared understanding of the operational
case. JFCs integrate and synchronize operations in a manner
that applies force from different
dimensions to shock, disrupt, and
defeat opponents. The JFC’s vision of
how operations will be conducted
includes not only how to arrange
operations but also a clear
understanding of the desired end state.

b. Simultaneity and Depth. The
corcepts of simultaneity and depth are
foundations of deep operations theory. The
intent is to bring force to bear on the
opponent’s entire structure in a near
simultaneous manner that is within the
decisionmaking cycle of the opponent. The
goal is to overwhelm and cripple enemy
capabilities and enemy will to resist.

• Simultaneity is a key characteristic of
the American way of war. It refers to the simultaneous application of
capability against the full array of
deployed enemy capabilities and sources of
strength. This does not mean that all
elements of the joint force are
employed with equal priority or that
even all elements of the joint force will
be employed. It refers specifically to
the concept of attacking appropriate
enemy forces and functions in such a
manner as to cause confusion and
demoralization. Simultaneity in
joint force operations contributes
directly to an enemy’s collapse by
placing more demands on enemy forces
and functions than can be handled. For
distances while surface forces are able to maneuver more rapidly and project their influence at increasing depths. To be effective, JFCs should not allow an enemy sanctuary or respite. Joint force operations should be conducted across the full breadth and depth of the operational area, creating competing and simultaneous demands on enemy commanders and resources. Just as with simultaneity, the concept of depth seeks to overwhelm the enemy throughout the battle area from multiple dimensions, contributing to its speedy defeat or capitulation. Interdiction, for example, is one manner in which JFCs add depth to operations.

- The concept of depth applies to time as well as to space (geographically). Operations extended in depth, in time as well as space (geographically), shape future conditions and can disrupt an opponent’s decision cycle.

- Depth contributes to protection of the force by destroying enemy potentials before its capabilities can be realized and employed.

- Simultaneity and depth place a premium on situational awareness at the operational level. JFCs should exploit the full capabilities of the joint force and supporting capabilities to develop and maintain a clear picture of events in the operational area as well as their linkage to future operations and attainment of strategic objectives.

c. Anticipation

- Anticipation is key to effective planning. JFCs should remain alert for the unexpected and for opportunities to exploit the situation. JFCs consider what might happen and look for the signs that may bring the possible event to pass. They continually gather information by personally observing and communicating with subordinates, higher headquarters, other forces in the operational area, and allies and coalition members. JFCs avoid surprise by monitoring operations as they unfold and signaling to their staff and subordinate units the actions they are to take to stay in control of events as much as possible. JFCs also realize

Victorious coalition forces during Operation DESERT STORM attacked, overwhelmed, and continued with relentless pressure on the retreating opposition.
Planning Joint Operations

the impact of operations and prepare for their results, such as the surrender of large numbers of opposing forces.

• Situational awareness is a prerequisite for commanders and planners to be able to anticipate opportunities and challenges. Knowledge of friendly capabilities and enemy capabilities, intentions, and likely COAs enables commanders to focus joint efforts where they best and most directly contribute to achieving objectives.

• Intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) can assist JFCs in defining likely or potential enemy COAs, as well as the indicators that suggest the enemy has embarked on a specific COA. As such, IPB can significantly contribute to a JFC’s ability to anticipate and exploit opportunities.

• Anticipation is not without risk. Commanders and planners that tend to lean in anticipation of what they expect to encounter are more susceptible to operational military deception efforts by an opponent. Therefore, commanders and planners should carefully consider the information upon which decisions are being based. Where possible, multiple or redundant sources of information from various dimensions should be employed in the decisionmaking process.

d. Balance

• Balance is the maintenance of the force, its capabilities, and its operations in such a manner as to contribute to freedom of action and responsiveness. Balance refers to the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities within the joint force as well as the nature and timing of operations conducted.

• JFCs strive to maintain friendly force balance while aggressively seeking to disrupt an enemy’s balance by striking with powerful blows from unexpected directions or dimensions and pressing the fight. Deception, special operations, manipulation of the electromagnetic spectrum, direct attack of enemy strategic centers of gravity, interdiction, and maneuver all converge to confuse, demoralize, and destroy the opponent. Denial of enemy reconnaissance, intelligence, surveillance, and target acquisition activities contributes to the protection of friendly forces. Even as the joint force defeats one enemy force, it prepares to turn and strike another. High-tempo joint operations set the conditions for battle. JFCs prepare to shift as conditions change and new challenges are presented. Through continuous planning and wargaming, the commander strives never to be without options.

• JFCs designate priority efforts and establish appropriate command relationships to assist in maintaining the balance of the force.

• Preserving the responsiveness of component capabilities is central to operational art. Combinations of operations and organization of the joint force should maintain or expand force responsiveness, not inhibit it. Decentralization of authority can contribute to responsiveness by reducing the distance in time and space between decisionmakers and ongoing operations.
e. Leverage

• Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare for Armed Forces of the United States,” describes achieving leverage (that is, gaining, maintaining, and exploiting advantages in combat power across all dimensions) among the forces available to JFCs as “the centerpiece of joint operational art.” Force interaction with respect to friendly force relationships can be generally characterized as supported (the receiver of a given effort) or supporting (the provider of such an effort). The command relationships that provide the framework for arranging for such support are discussed extensively in joint doctrine, including elsewhere in this publication. A principal JFC responsibility is to assess continuously whether force relationships enhance to the fullest extent possible the provision of fighting assistance from and to each element of the joint force in all dimensions. Support relationships afford an effective means to weight (and ensure unity of effort for) various operations, each component typically receiving and providing support at the same time. For example, a land component may be supported for a deep maneuver, a JFACC for theater counterair and direct attack of enemy centers of gravity, a maritime component for sea control and an amphibious forcible entry, and a special operations component for direct action and other missions. The potentially large number of such relationships requires the close attention not only of JFCs but also their components to plan and execute.

• Force interaction with regard to enemy forces is another way for JFCs to achieve concentration in the various dimensions. JFCs arrange symmetrical and asymmetrical actions to take advantage of friendly strengths and enemy vulnerabilities and to preserve freedom of action for future operations. The history of joint operations highlights the enormous lethality of asymmetrical operations and the great operational sensitivity to such threats. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Asymmetrical operations are particularly effective when applied against enemy forces not postured for immediate tactical battle but instead operating in more vulnerable aspects--operational deployment and/or movement, extended logistic activity (including rest and refitting), or mobilization and training (including industrial production). Thus, JFCs aggressively seek opportunities to apply asymmetrical force against an enemy in as vulnerable an aspect as possible--air attacks against enemy ground formations in convoy (the air and SOF interdiction operations against German attempts to reinforce its forces in Normandy), naval attacks against troop transports (US attacks against Japanese reinforcement of Guadalcanal), and land operations against enemy naval, air, or missile bases (allied maneuver in Europe in 1944 to reduce German submarine bases and V-1 and V-2 launching sites). There are literally dozens of potential modes of attack to be considered as JFCs plan the application of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces against the various aspects of enemy capabilities.

• As a final part of force interaction, JFCs must take action to protect or shield all elements of the joint force
from enemy symmetrical and asymmetrical action. This function of protection has particular relevance in joint warfare, as JFCs seek to reduce the vulnerability of their forces and enhance their own freedom of action.

- JFCs gain decisive advantage over the enemy through leverage. This leverage can be achieved in a variety of ways. Asymmetrical actions that pit joint force strengths against enemy weaknesses and maneuver in time and space can provide decisive advantage. Synergy from the concentration and integration of joint force actions also provides JFCs with decisive advantage. Leverage allows JFCs to impose their will on the enemy, increase the enemy’s dilemma, and maintain the initiative.

- Dimensional superiority, isolation of the enemy, and attack of enemy strategic centers of gravity can contribute to joint force leverage and are addressed in Chapter IV, “Joint Operations in War.”

f. Timing and Tempo

- The joint force should conduct operations at a tempo and point in time that best exploits friendly capabilities and inhibits the enemy. With proper timing, JFCs can dominate the action, remain unpredictable, and operate beyond the enemy’s ability to react. In its 1940 attack on France, for instance, Germany combined the speed, range, and flexibility of aircraft with the power and mobility of armor to conduct operations at a pace that surprised and overwhelmed French commanders, disrupting their forces and operations. France capitulated in little more than 1 month.

- The tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military requirements. While in many situations JFCs may elect to maintain an operational tempo that stretches the capabilities of both friendly and enemy forces, on other occasions JFCs may elect to conduct operations at a reduced pace. This reduced pace may be particularly appropriate when enemy forces enjoy a mobility advantage or when friendly forces are not yet able to conduct decisive operations.

- JFCs may vary the tempo of operations. During selected phases of a campaign, JFCs may elect to reduce the pace of operations, frustrating enemy commanders while buying time to build a decisive force or tend to other priorities in the operational area such as relief to displaced persons. During other phases, JFCs may conduct high-tempo operations designed specifically to exceed enemy capabilities.

- Just as JFCs carefully select which capabilities of the joint force to employ, so do they consider the timing of the application of those capabilities. Timing refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force. While JFCs may have substantial capabilities available, they selectively apply such capabilities in a manner that synchronizes their application in time, space, and purpose. Defining priorities assists in the timing of operations.

- Timing refers to the effects achieved as well as to the application of force. JFCs plan and conduct operations in a
manner that synchronizes the effects of operations so that the maximum benefit of their contributions are felt by the opponent at the desired time. Although some operations of the joint force can achieve near-immediate effects, JFCs may elect to delay their application until the contributions of other elements can be brought to bear in a synchronized manner. Additionally, commanders and planners strive to ensure that effects achieved through combat operations build toward decisive results but are not unduly or inappropriately felt by opponents long after their defeat.

g. Operational Reach and Approach

- On the first page of On War, Clausewitz likens war to a duel. In joint operational art, effective symmetrical attack (fully supported by all components of the joint force) and asymmetrical attack constitute the dueler’s sword; the actions of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces to protect each other is the dueler’s shield; and, in its broadest sense, basing is the dueler’s footing, affecting the reach of the sword and the strength and resiliency of the shield. Basing, whether from overseas locations, sea-based platforms, or CONUS, directly affects operational reach.

- Operational reach is the distance over which military power can be concentrated and employed decisively. Reach is influenced by the geography surrounding and separating the opponents. It is extended by locating forces, reserves, bases, and logistics forward, by increasing the range of weapon systems, and by improving transportation availability and the effectiveness of lines of communication and throughput. Nevertheless, for any given operation, there is a finite range beyond which the joint force cannot prudently operate or maintain effective operations.

- Thus, basing in the broadest sense is an indispensable foundation of joint operational art, directly affecting the combat power that the joint force is capable of generating by affecting such critical factors as sortie and resupply rates. In particular, the arrangement and successive positioning of advanced bases (often in austere, rapidly emplaced configurations) underwrites the progressive ability of the joint force to shield its components from enemy action and deliver symmetric and asymmetric blows with increasing power and ferocity. Basing is often directly affected by political and diplomatic considerations and as such can become a critical junction where strategic, operational, and tactical considerations interact. US force basing options span the spectrum from permanently basing forces in mature, strategically important theaters to temporary sea-basing during crisis response in littoral areas of instability. Bases (including the flexible and responsive capability of sea-basing) are typically selected to be within operational reach of the opponent, where sufficient infrastructure is in place or can be fabricated to support the operational and sustaining requirements of deployed forces, and where they can be assured of some degree of security from enemy attacks. Basing thus plays a vital role in determining the operational approach, which may be conceived of in terms of lines of operations.
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- **Lines of operations** define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives.

- A force operates on **interior lines** when its operations diverge from a central point and when it is therefore closer to separate enemy forces than the latter are to one another. Interior lines benefit a weaker force by allowing it to shift the main effort laterally more rapidly than the enemy. A force operates on **exterior lines** when its operations converge on the enemy. Successful operations on exterior lines require a stronger or more mobile force, but offer the opportunity to encircle and annihilate a weaker or less mobile opponent.

- In modern war, lines of operation attain a three-dimensional aspect and pertain to more than just maneuver. JFCs use them to focus combat power effects toward a desired end. JFCs apply **combat power** throughout the three dimensions of space and over time in a logical design that integrates the capabilities of the joint force to converge on and defeat enemy centers of gravity.

h. **Forces and Functions**

- **Commanders and planners can design campaigns and operations that focus on defeating either enemy forces or functions**, or a combination of both. Typically, JFCs **structure operations to attack both enemy forces and functions concurrently** in order to create the greatest possible contact area between friendly and enemy forces and capabilities. These types of operations are especially appropriate when friendly forces enjoy technological and/or numerical superiority over an opponent.

- JFCs **can focus on destroying and disrupting critical enemy functions** such as C2, resupply, and air defense. Attack of an enemy’s functions is normally intended to **destroy enemy balance**, thereby creating vulnerabilities to be exploited. Destruction or disruption of critical enemy functions can create uncertainty, confusion, and even panic in enemy leadership and forces and may contribute directly to the collapse of enemy capability and will. The **appropriateness of functional attack** as the principal design concept frequently is **based on time required and available** to cripple enemy critical functions as well as the enemy’s **current actions and likely response** to such attacks.

i. **Arranging Operations**

- **General**
  
  - JFCs **must determine the best arrangement of major operations**. This arrangement will often be a **combination of simultaneous and sequential operations** to achieve the desired end state conditions quickly and at the least cost in personnel and other resources. Commanders consider a variety of factors when determining this arrangement, including geography of the operational area, available strategic lift, changes in command structure, logistic buildup and consumption rates, enemy reinforcement capabilities, and public opinion. Thinking about the best arrangement helps determine tempo of activities in time and space.
• The dynamic nature of modern warfare that includes projection of forces complicates decisions concerning how to best arrange operations. During force projection operations, for example, a rapidly changing enemy situation may cause the commander to alter the planned arrangement of operations even as forces are deploying. The arrangement that the commander chooses should not foreclose future options.

• Phases

• The arrangement of major operations relates directly to the commander’s decision on phasing. A phase represents a period during which a large portion of the forces are involved in similar or mutually supporting activities (deployment, for example). A transition to another phase—such as a shift from deployment to defensive operations—indicates a shift in emphasis. World War II’s Operation OVERLORD contained six phases: buildup, rehearsals, embarkation, assault, buildup, and breakout.

• Phasing may be sequential or concurrent. Phases may overlap. The point where one phase stops and another begins is often difficult to define in absolute terms.

• During planning, commanders establish conditions for transitioning from one phase to another. The commander adjusts the phases to exploit opportunities presented by the enemy or to react to unforeseen situations.

• Phasing assists commanders to think through the entire operation and to define requirements in terms of forces, resources, and time. The primary benefit of phasing is that it assists commanders in achieving major objectives, which cannot be attained all at once, by planning manageable subordinate operations to gain progressive advantages, and so achieving the major objectives as quickly and affordably as possible. Campaign phasing should consider aspects such as prehostilities (including predeployment activities), lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow-through, and posthostilities (including redeployment).

• Actions during a prehostilities phase may be for deterrence or to seek to set the terms for battle and enhance friendly and limit enemy freedom of action. The friendly force should not seek battle until it has set the terms or established the conditions for battle in its favor and should avoid being rushed into battle before such conditions are established, if possible. During predeployment activities, JFCs tailor forces for deployment. The command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) and logistic requirements of the force must be developed during the predeployment phase in order to support JFC concepts of operations. When in-place forces are not sufficient and/or are not appropriate for the envisioned operation, early determination of the forces required and the order in which they are needed, based on the JFC’s concept of operations, assists in identifying the time required to deploy the force. Sealift and airlift capabilities are critical to JFC concepts.

• A lodgment phase allows the movement and buildup of a decisive combat force in the operational area. In operations during peacetime,
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deployment will normally include movements to host-nation air or sea ports. In operations conducted before and during combat, initial deployment may require forcible entry, followed by the occupation and expansion of lodgment areas.

- A **decisive combat and stabilization phase** initially focuses on the rapid buildup of joint force capabilities. The appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area can contribute greatly to the stabilization of the situation. Further, deployment of forces may serve as a deterrent to hostilities, but if deterrence fails, deployment will permit JFCs to build up full dimensional capabilities rapidly to conduct decisive action as early as possible. Such decisive action focuses on winning, that is, achieving the objectives defined by the NCA and JFC, and may include control of enemy territory and population and destruction of the enemy’s ability and will to continue.

- During a **follow-through phase**, JFCs synchronize joint force activities to bring the operation to a successful conclusion. Follow-through includes those actions that ensure the political objectives are achieved and sustained. Part of this phase may be to ensure the threat (military and/or political) is not able to resurrect itself. In essence, such a phase focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure. During this phase, joint forces may conduct operations in support of other governmental agencies. JFCs continuously assess the impact of current operations during hostilities on the termination objectives. The outcome of military operations should not conflict with the long-term solution to the crisis.

- During the **posthostilities and redeployment phase**, JFCs may retain responsibility for operations or they may transfer control of the situation to another authority and redeploy their forces. JFCs should identify posthostilities requirements as early as possible to best accomplish these missions and simultaneously redeploy assets no longer needed to resolve the crisis.
• Logistics is crucial to phasing. Joint force planners consider establishing logistic bases, opening and maintaining LOCs, establishing intermediate logistic bases to support new phases, and defining priorities for services and support. Logistics, then, is key to arranging the operations of campaigns and should be planned and executed as a joint responsibility.

• Changes in phases at any level can represent a period of vulnerability for the force. At this point, missions and task organizations often change. The careful planning of branches and sequels can reduce the risk associated with transition between phases.

• Branches and Sequels

• No plan of operations can be projected with confidence much beyond the initial stages of the operation. Commanders build flexibility into their plans to preserve freedom of action in rapidly changing conditions. Branches and sequels directly relate to the concept of phasing. Their proper use can add flexibility to a campaign or major operation plan.

• Branches. Branches are options built into the basic plan. Such branches may include shifting priorities, changing unit organization and command relationships, or changing the very nature of the joint operation itself. Branches add flexibility to plans by anticipating situations that could alter the basic plan. Such situations could be a result of enemy action, availability of friendly capabilities or resources, or even a change in the weather or season within the operational area.

• Sequels. Sequels are subsequent operations based on the possible outcomes of the current operation--victory, defeat, or stalemate. At the campaign level, phases can be viewed as the sequels to the basic plan.

j. Centers of Gravity

• Centers of gravity are the foundation of capability--what Clausewitz called “the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends . . . the point at which all our energies should be directed.” They are those characteristics, capabilities, or locations from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. At the strategic level, centers of gravity might include a military force, an alliance, national will or public support, a set of critical capabilities or functions, or national strategy itself.

• The centers of gravity concept is useful as an analytical tool, while designing campaigns and operations to assist commanders and staffs in analyzing friendly and enemy sources of strength as well as weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Analysis of centers of gravity, both enemy and friendly, is a continuous process throughout an operation.

• The essence of operational art lies in being able to mass effects against the enemy’s sources of power in order to destroy or neutralize them. In theory, destruction or neutralization of enemy centers of gravity is the most direct path to victory. However, centers of gravity can change during the course of an operation, and, at any given time, centers of gravity may not be apparent or readily discernible. For example, the center of gravity
might concern the mass of enemy units, but that mass might not yet be formed. In such cases, determining the absence of a center of gravity and keeping it from forming could be as important as defining it.

- **Identification of enemy centers of gravity requires detailed knowledge and understanding** of how opponents organize, fight, make decisions, and their physical and psychological strengths and weaknesses. JFCs and their subordinates should be alert to circumstances that may cause centers of gravity to change and adjust friendly operations accordingly.

- **Enemy centers of gravity will frequently be well protected**, making direct attack difficult and costly. This situation may require joint operations that result in indirect attacks until conditions are established that permit successful direct attacks.

- It is also important to identify friendly centers of gravity so that they can be protected. Long sea and air LOCs from CONUS or supporting theaters can represent a center of gravity. National will can also be a center of gravity, as it was for the United States during the Vietnam and Persian Gulf Wars.

  k. **Direct versus Indirect.** To the extent possible, JFCs attack enemy centers of gravity directly. Where direct attack means attacking into an opponent’s strength, JFCs should seek an indirect approach. For example, if the center of gravity is a large enemy force, the joint force may attack it indirectly by isolating it from its C2, severing its LOCs (including resupply), and defeating or degrading its air defense and indirect fire capability. When vulnerable, the enemy force can be attacked directly by appropriate elements of the joint force. In this way, JFCs will employ a synchronized combination of operations to expose and attack enemy centers of gravity through weak or vulnerable points--seams, flanks, specific forces or military capabilities, rear areas, and even military morale and public opinion and support.

  1. **Decisive Points**

  - By correctly identifying and controlling decisive points, a commander can gain a marked advantage over the enemy and greatly influence the outcome of an action. Decisive points are usually geographic in nature, such as a constricted sea lane, a hill, a town, or an air base. They could also include other elements such as command posts, critical boundaries, airspace, or a communications node. **Decisive points are not centers of gravity; they are the keys to attacking protected centers of gravity.**

  - There normally will be more decisive points in an operational area than JFCs can control, destroy, or neutralize with available resources. Accordingly, planners must analyze potential decisive points and determine which points enable eventual attack of the enemy’s centers of gravity. The commander designates the most important decisive points as objectives and allocates resources to control, destroy, or neutralize them.

  - Geographic decisive points that assist commanders to gain or maintain the initiative are crucial. Controlling these points in the attack assists commanders to gain freedom of operational maneuver. They thus maintain the momentum of the attack and sustain the
initiative. If a defender controls such a point, it can help exhaust the attacker’s momentum and facilitate the defender’s counterattack.

m. Culmination

- **Culmination has both offensive and defensive application.** In the offense, the culminating point is the point in time and space at which an attacker’s combat power no longer exceeds that of the defender. Here the attacker greatly risks counterattack and defeat and continues the attack only at great peril. Success in the attack at all levels is to secure the objective before reaching culmination. A **defender** reaches culmination when the defending force no longer has the capability to go on the counteroffensive or defend successfully. Success in the defense is to draw the attacker to culmination, then strike when the attacker has exhausted available resources and is ill-disposed to defend successfully.

- **Synchronization of logistics with combat operations can forestall culmination** and help commanders control the tempo of their operations. At both tactical and operational levels, theater logistic planners forecast the drain on resources associated with conducting operations over extended distance and time. They respond by generating enough military resources at the right times and places to enable their commanders to achieve strategic objectives before reaching their culminating points. If the commanders cannot do so, they should rethink their concept of operations.

n. Termination

- **Knowing when to terminate military operations and how to preserve achieved advantages** is a component of strategy and operational art. Before forces are committed, JFCs must know how the NCA intend to terminate the operation and ensure its outcomes endure, and then determine how to implement that strategic design at the operational level. In war, termination design is driven in part by the nature of the war itself. Wars over territorial disputes or economic advantage tend to be interest-based and lend themselves to negotiation, persuasion, and coercion. Wars fought in the name of ideology, ethnicity, or religious or cultural primacy tend to be value-based and reflect demands that are seldom negotiable. Often, wars are a result of both value and interest-based differences.

- **The underlying causes of a particular war--such as cultural, religious, territorial, or hegemonic--must influence the understanding of conditions necessary for termination of hostilities and resolution of conflict.** Ideally, national and allied or coalition decisionmakers will seek the advice of senior military leaders concerning how and when to end combat operations. Passing the lead from the military to other agencies to achieve final strategic aims following conflict usually requires the participation of JFCs.

- **Military operations typically conclude with attainment of the strategic ends for which the NCA committed forces.** In some cases,
these aims will be military strategic aims that, once achieved, allow transition to other instruments of national power and agencies as the means to achieve broader aims. World War II and the transition from the end of the war to other means to achieve a free and independent Europe is an example.

- **Commanders strive to end combat operations on terms favorable to the United States and its allies or coalition partners.** The basic element of this goal is gaining control over the enemy in the final stages of combat. When friendly forces can freely impose their will on the enemy, the opponent may have to accept defeat, terminate active hostilities, or revert to other types of conflict such as geopolitical actions or guerrilla warfare. Nonetheless, a hasty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict. There is a delicate balance between the desire for quick victory and termination on truly favorable terms.

- **JFCs and their subordinate commanders consider the conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end.** They translate political aims into strategy and operational design. They provide decisionmakers with critical information on enemy intent, objectives, strategy, and chances of success in obtaining desired goals. JFCs and subordinate commanders consider the nature and type of conflict, the objective of military force, the plans and operations that will most affect the enemy’s judgment of cost and risk and the impact on alliance and coalition warfare.

- **If the conditions have been properly set and met for ending the conflict, the necessary leverage should exist to prevent the enemy from renewing hostilities.** Moreover, the strategic aims for which the United States fought should be secured by the leverage that US and multinational forces gained and can maintain. Wars are fought for political aims. Wars are only successful when political aims are achieved and these aims endure.

- **A period of postconflict activities exists from the immediate end of the conflict to the redeployment of the last US Service member.** A variety of operations other than war occur during this period. These operations involve all instruments of national power and include those actions that ensure political objectives are achieved and sustained. Part of this effort may be to ensure the threat (military and/or political) does not resurrect itself. The effort focuses on ensuring that the results achieved endure and the conditions that resulted in the conflict do not recur.

- **Even as forces transition from combat operations to postconflict activities, requirements for humanitarian assistance will emerge.** Working with DOD and other US Government agencies, as well as nongovernmental organizations, JFCs prepare to meet the requirements of humanitarian support, including the provisioning of food and shelter and the protection of various groups against the depredations of opposing groups.

- **During postconflict operations, JFCs may transfer control to other authorities and redeploy forces.** JFCs should...
identify postconflict requirements as early as possible so as to facilitate transition and to permit the simultaneous redeployment of forces no longer required.

6. Key Planning Considerations

The elements of operational art discussed above form the basis for plans and orders and set the conditions for successful battle. As shown in Figure III-4, the initial plan establishes the commander’s intent, the concept of operations, and the initial tasks for subordinate units. It allows the greatest possible operational and tactical freedom for subordinate leaders. It is flexible enough to permit leaders to seize opportunities consistent with the commander’s intent, thus facilitating quick and accurate decisionmaking during operations. The initial plan not only affects the current operation but also sets the stage for future operations. As commanders prepare to conduct military operations, they should remember that all military operations have a psychological effect on all parties concerned—friendly, neutral, and hostile. Supporting psychological operations (PSYOP) designed to induce or reinforce favorable foreign attitudes and behavior must be integrated into all plans at the initial stages of planning to ensure maximum effect.

a. Mission. The mission statement is the impetus for the detailed planning that follows. It is the JFC’s expression of what the joint force must accomplish and why. Orders contain both specified and implied tasks. During mission analysis, commanders translate these tasks into missions for their subordinates. Commanders do so by analyzing the mission statement and concept of operations, understanding the intent of senior commanders, assessing the current situation, and organizing all resources available to achieve the desired end. Clarity of the mission statement and its understanding by subordinates, before and during the operation, is vital to success.

b. Commander’s Intent

• The commander’s intent describes the desired end state. It is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation, not a summary of the concept of operations. It may include how the posture of units at that end state facilitates transition to future operations. It may also include the commander’s assessment of the enemy commander’s intent.

• JFCs begin to form their intent as they analyze the mission assigned by a superior commander. Together, with the higher headquarters’ order, the JFC’s intent is the initial impetus for the entire planning process. JFCs initially provide their intent verbally to the staff with the restated mission and planning guidance. JFCs refine their intent as they consider staff estimates and complete the commander’s

![Figure III-4. The Initial Plan](image-url)
estimate. The intent statement may also contain an assessment of where and how the commander will accept risk during the operation.

- **The JFC’s intent helps subordinates pursue the desired end state** without further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned. Thus, the commander’s intent provides focus for all subordinate elements.

- **The intent statement is usually written**, but could be verbal when time is short. It should be concise and clear. The intent should be able to focus subordinate commanders on the purpose of the operation and describe how it relates to future operations. A JFC’s order should contain the intent statement of the next senior commander in the chain of command.

c. **Concept of Operations**

- **The concept of operations describes how the JFC visualizes the operation will unfold** based on the selected COA. This concept expresses what, where, and how the joint force will affect the enemy or the situation at hand. The commander provides sufficient detail for the staff and subordinate commanders to understand what they are to do without further instructions. In the concept of operations, JFCs describe the overall objectives of the joint force, the missions assigned to components of the force, and how the components will work together to accomplish the mission.

- To reinforce intent and priorities, commanders typically designate a main effort (for each phase, if the campaign has more than one phase). This designation is as true in the offense as it is in the defense and also applies in operations other than war. These designations provide focus to the operation, set priorities and determine risks, promote unity of effort, and facilitate an understanding of the commander’s intent.

d. **Targeting**

- **Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them** taking account of operational requirements and capabilities. As with all actions of the joint force, targeting and attack functions are accomplished in accordance with international law, the law of war, and international agreements and conventions, as well as ROE approved by the NCA for the particular operation. Military commanders, planners, and legal experts must consider the desired end state and political aims when making targeting decisions.

- **Targeting occurs at all levels of command** within a joint force and is performed at all levels by forces capable of delivering fires or attacking targets with both lethal and nonlethal disruptive and destructive means. **Targeting is complicated** by the requirement to deconflict duplicative targeting by different forces or different echelons within the same force and to synchronize the attack of those targets with other dimensions of the joint force.

- **Targeting and the Campaign Plan.** JFCs establish broad planning objectives and guidance for attack of enemy strategic and operational centers of gravity and interdiction of enemy forces as an integral part of joint campaigns and major operations. With the advice of subordinate commanders,
JFCs set priorities, provide targeting guidance, and determine the weight of effort to be provided to various operations. Subordinate commanders recommend to JFCs how to use their combat power more effectively to achieve the objective. Weight of effort for any aspect of joint targeting, for instance, may be expressed:

- In terms of percentage of total available resources.
- By assigning priorities for resources used with respect to the other aspects of the theater campaign or operation.
- As otherwise determined by the JFC.

**Targeting Process.** (See Joint Pub 2-01.1, “JTTP for Intelligence Support to Targeting.”)

- The targeting process is cyclic. It begins with guidance and priorities issued by the NCA, JFCs, or headquarters senior to JFCs and continues with identification of requirements by components, the prioritization of these requirements, the acquisition of targets or target sets, the attack of targets by components, the assessment of the effects of those missions by both components and JFCs, and continuing guidance from JFCs on future fires or attack of targets.

- Targeting mechanisms should exist at multiple levels. Joint force components identify requirements, nominate targets that are outside their boundaries or exceed the capabilities of organic and supporting assets (based on JFC’s apportionment and subapportionment decisions), and conduct execution planning. After the JFC makes the targeting and apportionment decisions, components plan and execute assigned missions.

- JFCs may establish and task an organization within their staffs to accomplish these broad targeting oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a subordinate commander. Typically, JFCs organize Joint Targeting Coordination Boards (JTCBs). If the JFC so designates, a JTCB may be an integrating center for this effort or a JFC-level review mechanism. In either case, it needs to be a joint activity comprised of representatives from the staff, all components, and, if required, their subordinate units. JFCs task commanders or staff officers with the JTCB function based on the JFC’s concept of operations and the individual’s experience, expertise, and situational awareness appropriate to the situation.

- In multinational operations, the JTCB may be subordinate to a multinational Targeting Coordination Board, with JFCs or their agents representing the joint force on the multinational board.

- JFCs will normally delegate the authority to conduct execution planning, coordination, and
deconfliction associated with targeting and will ensure that this process is also a joint effort involving applicable subordinate commands. Whoever is designated this responsibility must possess or have access to a sufficient C2 infrastructure, adequate facilities, and ready availability of joint planning expertise. Should such an agency be charged with joint functional command responsibilities, a joint targeting mechanism is also needed to facilitate this process at this level. All components are normally involved in targeting and should establish procedures and mechanisms to manage the targeting function.

e. Air Apportionment. Air apportionment is the determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time. The total expected effort made available to the JFACC is determined by the JFC in consultation with component commanders based on the assigned objectives and the concept of operations.

- Air apportionment assists JFCs to ensure the weight of the JFACC air effort is consistent with campaign phases and objectives.

- Given the many functions that airpower can perform, its theater-wide application, and its ability to rapidly shift from one function to another, JFCs pay particular attention to its apportionment. JFCs normally apportion by priority or percentage of effort into geographic areas, against assigned mission-type orders, and/or by categories significant for the campaign. These categories can include strategic attack, interdiction, counterair, maritime support, and close air support. After consulting with other component commanders, the JFACC makes the air apportionment recommendation.

- Following the JFC air apportionment decision, the JFACC allocates apportioned air sorties to the functions, areas, and/or missions they support.

f. Concept of Logistics

- The JFC’s concept of logistics is a key part of the synchronization of the joint effort. Through the logistic concept, JFCs enable the deployment, entry, buildup, application, and redeployment of joint forces. JFCs identify and reinforce priorities between combat and logistic requirements. Logistic considerations are key to the commander’s estimate process, will greatly impact on the development of COAs, and may dictate COA selection.

- COCOM gives combatant commanders authoritative direction over all aspects of logistics necessary to accomplish the mission. Within their commands, combatant commanders use this authority to ensure effectiveness and economy in operations and to prevent or eliminate the unnecessary duplication of facilities and the overlap of functions among Service components. In critical situations, combatant commanders may modify the normal logistic process within their commands. They may use all facilities and supplies of all assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission.
• Combatant commanders ensure that the concept of logistics supports the concept of operations. The logistic concept of the campaign plan does this by establishing a base of operations, opening and maintaining LOCs, providing intermediate bases of operations to support phasing, and establishing priorities for service and support for each phase of a campaign. The logistic concept also uses available host-nation support. Joint Pub 4-0, “Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations,” provides more information on the theater logistic system and logistic planning.

  ROE, which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces conduct operations other than war or begin or continue combat, are promulgated by the NCA. Many factors influence ROE, including national command policy, mission, operational environment, commander’s intent, and international agreements regulating conduct. ROE always recognize the inherent right of self-defense. Properly developed ROE are clear and tailored to the situation. ROE will typically vary from operation to operation and may change during an operation.

g. Other Considerations

• Disciplined Operations

  • Joint forces operate in accordance with applicable ROE, conduct warfare in compliance with international laws, and fight within restraints and constraints specified by superior commanders. Objectives are justified by military necessity and attained through appropriate and disciplined use of force.

  • Exercising discipline in operations includes limiting collateral damage—the inadvertent or secondary damage occurring as a result of actions initiated by friendly or enemy forces. JFCs apply the combat power necessary to ensure victory against combatants, but are careful to limit unnecessary injury and damage.

  • JFC use of forces includes the proper treatment of enemy prisoners of war, noncombatants, and civilians. Laws of war are intended to reduce casualties and enhance fair treatment of combatants and noncombatants alike.

• Risk

  • Risk is inherent in military operations. In peacetime operations, commanders consider a variety of risks—such as the implications of failure to national prestige or to joint force morale, or risk to the safety of individual joint force members.

  • In combat or potential combat situations, commanders carefully identify conditions that constitute success—both for the envisioned end state and for the major operations or stages that lead to that end state. To the extent that these conditions are met, commanders reduce the risk. When these conditions are not met, or only partially met, commanders identify the risk associated with continuing. To alleviate or reduce risk, commanders may apply additional force—by reallocating combat forces or by shifting supporting operations, for example. Or they may decide the risk is acceptable.

  • Commanders consider many factors as they identify risk in combat or potential combat situations. As in
peacetime operations, commanders consider the risk to joint force members. It is for this reason, in part, that an indirect approach to enemy centers of gravity, attacking enemy vulnerabilities rather than strengths, is important in the design of campaigns and major operations.

- **Rehearsals.** Rehearsal is the process of learning, understanding, and practicing a plan in the time available before actual execution. **Rehearsing key combat and logistic actions allows participants to become familiar with the operation and to visualize the plan.** This process assists them in orienting themselves to their surroundings and to other units during execution. Rehearsals also provide a forum for subordinate leaders to analyze the plan, but caution must be exercised in adjusting the plan in order to prevent errors in synchronization. While rehearsals with combat units usually occur at the tactical level, headquarters at the operational level can rehearse key aspects of a plan using command post exercises, typically supported by computer-aided simulations. While the joint force may not be able to rehearse an entire operation, JFCs should identify key elements for rehearsal.

- **Command and Control Warfare (C2W).** (For additional information, see Joint Pub 3-13, “Joint Doctrine for Information Warfare.”)

  - C2W seeks to deny the enemy the effective use of its C2 capabilities while at the same time protecting friendly C2 functions. C2W integrates the use of OPSEC, military deception, PSYOP, electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence. C2W accomplishes its objectives by denying the adversary the information it needs to make effective decisions (OPSEC), influencing the decisions that the adversary makes (deception and PSYOP), and degrading or destroying the adversary’s C2 systems (EW and physical destruction).

  - The synergistic effects of the coordinated use of the five elements of C2W provide the JFC with the potential to deliver a decisive blow against an adversary before the outbreak of armed conflict or during its initial period. It does so by allowing JFCs to think, plan, communicate, and act faster than their opponents. **C2W assists JFCs to seize the initiative and causes the enemy to react to the JFCs’ actions.**

### C2W in DESERT STORM, 1991

Before the beginning of the air operation, OPSEC and deception had already begun to affect the Iraqi leadership’s perception of what the coalition intended to do. The opening phase of the air operation focused on destroying or disrupting the Iraqi C2 system, limiting the leadership’s ability to gather accurate information and to transmit its decisions. During the air operation, OPSEC and deception continued to hide the preparations for the actual land operation while using maneuver forces and air strikes to portray a false intention to make the main attack into Kuwait. PSYOP, supported by B-52 strikes, targeted the front-line Iraqi soldier’s confidence in Iraqi leadership. The result of this integrated use of the elements of C2W was the decreased ability of the Iraqi leadership to respond effectively to the land operation when it began.
To be effective, C2W needs to be fully integrated into the commander’s concept of the operation and synchronized with other operations. The synchronization of these actions will require rapid and reliable intelligence support and communications. JFCs should ensure that the C2W objectives are part of the planning guidance and priorities.

C2W considerations will play an important role in the targeting process. Targets will be selected or protected to support C2W objectives. The timing of strikes against specific targets may be determined by the JFC’s C2W objectives. For example, an adversary’s signals intelligence site would not be targeted for destruction if the deception operation was using it as one of the means to insert false information into the adversary’s intelligence system.

Deception

Military deception, as executed by JFCs, targets enemy decisionmakers (opposing commanders) through the enemy intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination systems. This deception requires a thorough knowledge of opponents and their decisionmaking processes. Anticipation is key. During the formulation of the commander’s concept, particular attention is placed on defining how the JFC would like the enemy to act at critical points in the battle. Those desired enemy actions then become the goal of deception operations. Deception is focused on causing the opponents to act in a desired manner, not simply to be misled in their thinking. The purpose is to cause opposing commanders to form inaccurate impressions about friendly force capabilities or intentions, misappropriate their intelligence collection assets, or fail to employ combat or support units to their best advantage. Deception operates at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels as an integral and systematic component of C2W.

Deception operations are an integral element of joint operations. Planning for deception operations is top-down, in the sense that subordinate deception plans support the higher level plan.

Deception in the Yom Kippur War, 1973

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli Defense Force by attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces gained a significant foothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until a determined defense and counterattack drove them back.

To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted deception operations of strategic, operational, and tactical significance to exploit Israeli weaknesses. At the strategic level, they conveyed the notions that they would not attack without both a concerted Arab effort and an ability to neutralize the Israeli Air Force, and that tactical preparations were merely in response to feared Israeli retaliation for Arab terrorist activity. At the operational level, Egyptian forces portrayed their mobilization, force buildup, and maneuvers as part of their annual exercises. Egyptian exercises portraying an intent to cross the canal were repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them and therefore did
not react when the actual attack occurred. At the tactical level, Egyptian forces expertly camouflaged their equipment, denying information to Israeli observers and creating a false impression of the purpose of the increased activity.

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive at the operational and strategic levels. In spite of the deception, tactical observers reported with increasing urgency that the Egyptian buildup and activity were significant. Their reports caused concern, but no action. Egyptian forces exploited these vulnerabilities and timed the attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement, when they perceived the response of Israeli forces would be reduced.

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other operations of the force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively overwhelmed Israeli forces in the early stages of the Yom Kippur War.

• Commanders at all levels can plan deception operations. Strategic or operational plans may include the employment of lower-level units, although subordinate commanders may not know of the overall deception effort. It is therefore essential for commanders to coordinate their deception plans with their senior commander to ensure overall unity of effort.

• Deception operations depend on intelligence operations to identify appropriate deception targets, to assist in developing a credible story, to identify and orient on appropriate receivers (the readers of the story), and to assess the effectiveness of the deception effort.

• Deception operations are not without cost, but are a powerful tool in full dimensional operations. Forces and resources must be committed to the deception effort to make it believable, possibly to the short-term detriment of some aspects of the campaign. OPSEC for deception operations may dictate that only a select group of senior commanders and staff officers in the joint force know which actions are purely deceptive in nature. This situation can cause confusion within the force and must be closely monitored by JFCs and their staffs. Joint Pub 3-58, “Joint Doctrine for Military Deception,” provides additional detail.

• Psychological Operations

• PSYOP are actions to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences. They are designed to influence the emotions, motives, reasoning, and, ultimately, the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. PSYOP have strategic, operational, and tactical applications, including support to deception operations.

• At the strategic level, PSYOP may take the form of political or diplomatic positions, announcements, or communiqués. At the operational level, PSYOP can include the distribution of leaflets, loudspeaker broadcasts, and other means of transmitting information that encourage enemy forces to defect, desert, flee, or surrender. Persistent attacks can have a synergistic effect with PSYOP, accelerating the
degradation of morale and further encouraging desertion. At the tactical level, PSYOP include the use of loudspeakers to promote fear or dissension in enemy ranks.

- **PSYOP can contribute significantly to all aspects of joint operations.** Joint Pub 3-53, “Doctrine for Joint Psychological Operations,” provides additional detail.

- **Operations Security**
  
  - **OPSEC is a process of planning and action to gain and maintain essential secrecy** about the JFCs actual capabilities, activities, and intentions.
  
  - History has shown the value and need for reliable, adequate, and timely intelligence, and the harm that results from its inaccuracies and absence. It is therefore **vital and advantageous to deny the opposing force commanders the critical information they need** (essential secrecy) and cause them to derive inaccurate, timely appreciations that influence their actions (desired appreciations).

  - **OPSEC is applied to all military activities at all levels of command.** The JFC should provide OPSEC planning guidance to the staff at the time of the commander’s decision and, subsequently, to subordinate and supporting commanders in the chain of command. By maintaining liaison and coordinating the OPSEC planning guidance, the JFC will ensure unity of effort in gaining and maintaining the essential secrecy considered necessary for success. Joint Pub 3-54, “Joint Doctrine for Operations Security,” provides additional detail.

- **Electronic Warfare**
  
  - **EW is any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy.** Control of the electromagnetic spectrum ranges from protecting friendly systems to countering enemy systems. This control is not limited to radio or radar frequencies, but includes optical and infrared regions as well as those regions in which directed-energy weapons might function.

  - The three major subdivisions of EW are **electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support**, which may overlap. Some EW actions may be both offensive and protective in nature and may inherently use electronic surveillance in their execution.

  - **EW should be employed to attack the enemy according to established principles of warfare.** The decision to employ EW should be based not only on overall joint campaign objectives but also the risks of possible enemy responses and other effects on the campaign effort.

  - **The JFC should ensure maximum coordination among EW and other operations activities, and intelligence and communications (including frequency management) support activities for maximum effect.** This coordination is necessary to ensure effective exchange of information, eliminate undesirable duplication of effort, and provide for mutual support. See the glossary for definitions of electronic warfare terms and Joint Pub

• **Civil Affairs.** Civil affairs are those interrelated military activities that embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities and populations. Civil affairs missions include civil-military operations and civil administration. JFCs integrate civil affairs and synchronize their effects with combat operations to minimize civilian interference with military operations and safeguard noncombatants and their property. Joint Pub 3-57, “Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs,” describes civil affairs operations.

7. **Control and Coordinating Measures**

JFCs employ various maneuver and movement control and fire support coordinating measures to facilitate effective joint operations. These measures include boundaries, phase lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air operations, air defense areas, amphibious objective areas, submarine operating patrol areas, and minefields. Boundaries and fire support coordinating measures are discussed below.

a. **Boundaries**

• Boundaries define surface areas to facilitate coordination and deconfliction of operations. In land and sea warfare, a boundary is a line by which areas between adjacent units or formations are defined. A naval boundary may be designated for seas adjacent to the area of land conflict to enhance coordination and execution of naval operations.

• JFCs may use lateral, rear, and forward boundaries to define AOs for land and naval forces. Such areas are sized, shaped, and positioned to enable land or naval force commanders to accomplish their mission while protecting deployed forces.

• **Theater air sorties are not constrained by land boundaries, per se.** However, because the airspace above surface areas is used by all components of the joint force, JFCs promulgate airspace control measures to deconflict the multiple uses required of this space (see Joint Pub 3-52, “Doctrine for Joint Airspace Control in the Combat Zone”).

• Boundaries may require relatively frequent adjustment based on the actual and projected rate of maneuver and the operational environment.

b. **Fire Support Coordinating Measures**

• **Joint fire support coordinating measures** and the procedures associated with those measures assist in the C2 of joint forces. Within their AOs, land and amphibious commanders employ permissive and restrictive fire support coordinating measures to enhance the expeditious attack of targets; protect forces, populations, critical infrastructure, and sites of religious or cultural significance; and set the stage for future operations. Commanders position and adjust fire support coordinating measures consistent with the operational situation and in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected
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Commanders. Fire support coordinating measures are addressed in Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support.”

- Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL)
  - FSCLs are permissive fire support coordinating measures. They are established and adjusted by appropriate land or amphibious force commanders within their boundaries in consultation with superior, subordinate, supporting, and affected commanders. Forces attacking targets beyond an FSCL must inform all affected commanders in sufficient time to allow necessary reaction to avoid fratricide, both in the air and on the ground. FSCLs facilitate the expeditious attack of targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure. Supporting elements may attack targets beyond the FSCL, provided the attack will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. The FSCL is not a boundary—the synchronization of operations on either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land or amphibious force boundary.

- The decision on where to place or even whether to use an FSCL requires careful consideration. If used, its location is based on estimates of the situation and concept of operations. Location of enemy forces, anticipated rates of movement, weapons capabilities, and tempo of the operation are considered in the commander’s estimate, as well as other factors deemed appropriate. The FSCL is normally positioned closer to the forward line of own troops (FLOT) in the defense than in the offense; however, the exact positioning is situationally dependent.

- By establishing an FSCL at sufficient depth so as to not limit high-tempo maneuver, land or amphibious force commanders ease the coordination requirements for attack operations within their AOs by forces not under their control, such as naval gunfire or air interdiction. The FSCL applies to all fires of air, land, or sea weapon systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. (The FSCL is a term oriented to air-land operations; there is no similar term used at sea.)

- An associated benefit of employing an FSCL is the reduction in potential for fratricide. Short of an FSCL, all air-to-ground and surface-to-surface attack operations are controlled by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. Commanders employ restrictive measures to enhance the protection of friendly forces operating beyond an FSCL.

- Coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL is especially critical to commanders of air, land, and special operations forces. Their forces may now be operating beyond an FSCL or may plan to maneuver on that territory in the future. Such coordination is also important when attacking forces are employing wide-area munitions or munitions with delayed effects. Finally, this coordination assists in avoiding conflicting or redundant attack operations. In exceptional circumstances, the inability to conduct this coordination will not preclude the attack of targets beyond the FSCL.
However, failure to do so may **increase the risk of fratricide** and could **waste limited resources**.

- The land or amphibious force commander adjusts the location of the FSCL as required to keep pace with operations. In high-tempo maneuver operations, the FSCL may change **frequently**, such as every several hours. The establishing commander quickly transmits the change to higher, lower, adjacent, and supporting headquarters to ensure attack operations are appropriately coordinated by controlling agencies. **Anticipated adjustments** to the location of the FSCL are normally transmitted to other elements of the joint force sufficiently early to **reduce potential disruptions** in their current and near-term operations.
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CHAPTER IV
JOINT OPERATIONS IN WAR

“Everything is simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult”
Clausewitz: On War, 1812

1. Considerations Before Combat

Considerations before combat are shown in Figure IV-1.

b. Preparing the Theater

• Intelligence

  • At the advent of a crisis or other indication of potential military action, JFCs examine available intelligence estimates. As part of the IPB process, JFCs then focus intelligence efforts to refine estimates of enemy capabilities, dispositions, intentions, and probable actions within the context of the current situation. They look for specific indications and warning of imminent enemy activity that may require an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision cycles.

  • JFCs direct reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition operations by elements of the joint force to further develop the situation and gain information critical to decisionmaking. In some cases, such information can be gained by passive or unobtrusive means. In other cases, elements of the joint force may have to fight to gain the information desired. Armed reconnaissance operations...
conducted by manned systems have the potential to fight for information as well as process the information on site, providing commanders with real-time intelligence. SOF can be employed for special reconnaissance or other HUMINT operations.

• JFCs use a broad range of supporting capabilities to develop a current intelligence picture. These supporting capabilities include national intelligence and combat support agencies (for example, National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, Central Imagery Office, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Defense Mapping Agency), which are coordinated in support of the JFC by the National Military Joint Intelligence Center. J-2s should integrate these supporting capabilities with the efforts of the joint intelligence center. Liaison personnel from the various agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities resident in their agencies and can focus those capabilities on the JFC’s intelligence requirements. Intelligence operations serve to reduce uncertainty.

• The joint publications in the 2-0 series discuss intelligence support to joint operations.

• Organizing and Training Forces. Preparing the theater also includes organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the theater. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with CONUS-based forces with multiple taskings, maximum use should be made of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise opportunities. JTFs and components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint operations. JFCs and the composition of their staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. The training focus for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the combatant commander’s joint mission essential task list.

• Maintaining Theater Access. JFCs establish and maintain access (including exercises, basing, transit, and overflight rights) to operational areas in which they are likely to operate. In part, this effort is national or multinational, involving maintenance of intertheater (between theaters) air and sea LOCs. Supporting combatant commanders can greatly enhance this effort. Either at the outset or as operations progress, JFCs establish and secure intratheater (within the theater) LOCs through the application of appropriate intratheater LOCs.

c. Isolating the Enemy

• With NCA guidance and approval and with national support, JFCs strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary. The intent is to strip away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible, while limiting the enemy’s potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs may also be tasked to support diplomatic, economic, and informational actions as directed by the NCA.

• JFC seeks to isolate the main enemy force from its strategic leadership and its supporting infrastructure. This
isolation is accomplished by PSYOP and by interdicting critical C2 nodes, sources of sustaining resources, and transportation networks. This step serves to deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and may separate the enemy leadership and military from their public support.

d. Movement to Attain Operational Reach

• Forces, sometimes limited to forward-presence forces, can be positioned within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity to achieve decisive force at the appropriate location. At other times, mobilization and strategic deployment systems can be called up to begin the movement of reinforcing forces from CONUS or other theaters to redress any unfavorable balance of forces and to achieve decisive force at the appropriate location.

• JFCs carefully consider the movement of forces in such situations. At times, movement of forces can contribute to the escalation of tension, while at other times its deterrent effect can reduce those tensions.

e. Special Operations. During prehostilities, SOF can provide powerful operational leverage. Among their potential contributions, SOF can be employed to gather critical information, undermine a potential opponent’s will or capacity to wage war, or enhance the capabilities of multinational forces. SOF can gain access and influence in foreign nations where the presence of conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. They can also ameliorate the underlying conditions that are provoking a crisis in an effort to preclude open hostilities from occurring.

f. Protection. JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom of action. This protection dictates that JFCs be aware of and participate as appropriate in regional political and diplomatic activities. JFCs, in concert with US ambassadors, may spend as much time on regional political and diplomatic efforts as on direct preparation of their forces for combat.

g. Space. Throughout all prebattle operations, JFCs continue to exploit the advantages that control of space provides. Intelligence and communications systems are maneuvered or activated as necessary to provide JFCs with an accurate and timely appraisal of the current situation, as well as the ability to respond rapidly to events and directives from the CINC or from higher authority.

h. Physical Environment. Seasonal effects on terrain, weather, and sea conditions can significantly affect operations of the joint force and should be carefully assessed before and during operations. Mobility of the force, synchronization of operations, and ability to employ precision munitions can be affected by degraded conditions. Climatological and hydrographic studies and long-range forecasts help JFCs understand the most advantageous time and location for operations.
2. Considerations at the Outset of Combat

As combat operations commence, JFCs need to exploit full dimensional leverage to shock, demoralize, and disrupt opponents immediately. JFCs seek decisive advantage quickly, before close combat if possible.

a. Force Projection

• The NCA may direct combatant commanders to resolve a crisis quickly, employing immediately available forward-presence forces, and, at the lowest level possible, to preclude escalation of the crisis. When this response is not enough, the projection of forces from CONUS or another theater may be necessary. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and prepositioned forces. For example, the ability to generate high intensity combat power from the sea can provide for effective force projection operations in the absence of timely or unencumbered access.

• Force projection usually begins as a rapid response to a crisis. Alert may come with little or no notice, bringing with it tremendous stress on personnel and systems, accompanied by requests from the media for information. In any event, rapid, yet measured, response is critical.

• Joint forces participate in force projection operations in both war and operations other than war. These operations may be either unopposed or opposed by an adversary. JFCs sequence, enable, and protect the arrival of forces to achieve early decisive advantage. An example of enabling and protecting the arrival of forces when access is initially unavailable is the seizure and defense of lodgment areas by naval forces, which would then serve as initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow of additional forces and materiel into the theater. To accomplish this decisive advantage, forcible entry operations may be required at the onset. When opposed, force projection can be accomplished
rapidly by forcible entry coordinated with strategic airlift and sealift, and pre-positioned forces. Both types of operations demand a versatile mix of forces that are organized, trained, equipped, and poised to respond quickly.

- **Opposed operations** require a viable forcible entry capability with forces prepared to fight immediately upon entry. Forcible entry is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.

- **Unopposed operations** may afford an opportunity, following arrival in the operational area, to continue to build combat power, train, rehearse, acclimate, and otherwise establish the conditions for successful operations. In unopposed entry, JFCs control the flow of forces that best facilitates the buildup of forces necessary for the envisioned operations. Logistic capability may be a higher priority than combat capability, which could be initially limited to that needed for protection.

- The protection of forces will often be a friendly center of gravity during early entry operations. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with sufficient organic and supporting capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect personnel and equipment from potential or likely threats.

- JFCs introduce forces in a manner that enables rapid force buildup into the structure required for anticipated operations and simultaneous protection of the force. From a C2 perspective, echelonment is essential. Early entry forces should include the C2 capability to assess the situation, make decisions, and conduct initial operations.

- Operations with allies and coalition members often require a robust liaison and communications capability. Linguists must be capable of communicating warfighting concepts between military forces of diverse cultures. Also, additional sufficient communications equipment may be required for non-US forces to enable interoperable communications.

b. **Dimensional Superiority**

- JFCs will normally seek to secure air and maritime superiority early in the conduct of joint operations. Air and maritime superiority enable and enhance joint operations in all dimensions. Although air and maritime superiority are not ends in themselves, history shows that control of the sea and/or the air has been a pivotal wartime factor. World War II’s Operation POINT BLANK established air superiority, which was considered a prerequisite for Operation OVERLORD. The Navy component commander or JFMCC is normally the supported commander for sea control operations, and the JFACC is normally the supported commander for counterair operations.

- Superiority battles are not limited to the air and maritime environments. JFCs seek to achieve superiority immediately in command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)—space control is a necessary precursor to this superiority. They seek to lay open the enemy’s intentions, capabilities, and actions to observation and assessment, while simultaneously depriving the enemy of similar information about the friendly force and deceiving the enemy as to the veracity of the information obtained about the friendly force.
• As another example of seeking early superiority before close combat, land commanders may seek to first achieve counterbattery or indirect fire superiority, thereby enhancing protection of their forces. Additionally, JFCs can seek to achieve a mobility differential by selectively attacking key enemy forces and transportation networks to degrade enemy maneuver.

c. Direct Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity

• Also as part of achieving decisive advantages early, joint force operations may be directed immediately against enemy centers of gravity. Where possible, specific operations may be conducted to directly attack strategic centers of gravity by air, missile, special operations, and other deep-ranging capabilities. When air operations constitute the bulk of the capability needed to directly attack enemy strategic centers of gravity or to conduct air superiority operations, JFCs will normally task JFACCs, as supported commanders, to conduct such operations.

• There are several purposes to these attacks. They may in themselves be decisive. If they are not, they begin the offensive operation throughout the enemy’s depth that can cause paralysis and destroy cohesion.

d. Special Operations. Special operations enhance the power and scope of full dimensional operations and tend to be asymmetrical in their application. Innovative special operations can directly and indirectly attack enemy centers of gravity that may be difficult to reach by conventional action. SOF frequently require support from other forces, but can support other forces in operations such as intelligence gathering, target acquisition and designation, and interdiction. SOF capabilities are diverse, but they need to be employed judiciously so as not to negate their effectiveness. They are a complement to, not a substitute for, conventional forces.

e. Protection. JFCs strive to conserve the fighting potential of the joint force.

• Protection from the Enemy’s Firepower and Maneuver. JFCs counter the enemy’s firepower and maneuver by making personnel, systems, and units difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force from enemy maneuver and firepower, including the effects of weapons of mass destruction. Air and maritime superiority operations; air defense; and protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly force lodgment all contribute to force protection. OPSEC and military deception are key elements of protection.

• Health, Welfare, Morale, and Maintenance. JFCs keep personnel healthy and maintain their fighting spirit. This protection includes guarding equipment and supplies from loss or damage. JFCs ensure systems are in place for adequate medical care, quick return of minor casualties to duty, and preventive medicine. Joint Pub 4-02, “Doctrine for Health Service Support in Joint Operations,” discusses health support for joint operations.

• Safety. JFCs make safety an integral part of all joint training and operations. Sustained, high-tempo operations put personnel at risk. Command interest, discipline, and training lessen those risks. Safety in training, planning, and operations is
crucial to successful combat operations and the preservation of combat power.

- **Prevention of Fratricide.** JFCs make every effort to reduce the potential for fratricide—the unintentional killing or wounding of friendly personnel by friendly fire. The destructive power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high intensity and rapid tempo of modern combat, increase the potential for fratricide. Commanders must be aware of those situations that increase the risk of fratricide and institute appropriate preventative measures. The primary mechanisms for limiting fratricide are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination among component commands, rehearsals, and enhanced situational awareness. Commanders should seek to minimize the potential for fratricide while not limiting boldness and audacity in combat.

3. **Sustained Combat Operations**

JFCs seek to extend operations throughout the breadth and depth of the operational area. JFCs conduct sustained operations when a “coup de main” is not possible. During sustained operations, JFCs simultaneously employ air, land, sea, space, and SOF. During one major operation, one component or major category of operations, such as air operations, might be the main effort, with others in support. When conditions change, the main effort might shift to another component or function. Strategic attack and interdiction continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary or freedom of action. When prevented from concentrating, opponents can be attacked, isolated at tactical and operational levels, and defeated in detail. At other times, JFCs may cause their opponents to concentrate, facilitating their attack by friendly forces.

- **The Relationship Between Offense and Defense**

  - Although defense may be the stronger form of war, it is the offense that is normally decisive. In striving to achieve strategic objectives most quickly and at least cost, **JFCs will normally seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive offensive operations.**

  - **Joint operations will normally include elements of both offense and defense.** JFCs strive to apply the many dimensions of combat power simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the operational area. To conduct such operations, JFCs normally achieve concentration in some areas or in specific functions and require economy of force in others. During initial entry operations, entry forces may be required to defend while force buildup occurs. Even in sustained offensive operations, selected elements of the joint force may need to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces continue the attack. Further, force protection includes certain defensive measures throughout the campaign. Commanders at all levels must possess the mental agility to rapidly transition between offense and defense and vice versa.

  - The relationship between offense and defense, then, is an enabling one. **Defensive operations,** where required, enable JFCs to conduct or prepare for decisive offensive operations.
b. Linear and Nonlinear Operations

“The full dimensional joint campaign is in major respects ‘nonlinear.’ That is, the dominant effects of air, sea, space, and special operations may be felt more or less independently of the front line of ground troops. The impact of these operations on land battles, interacting with the modern dynamics of land combat itself, helps obtain the required fluidity, breadth, and depth of operations. In the same way, land operations can provide or protect critical bases for air, land, sea, and space operations and enable these operations to be supported and extended throughout the theater”

Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States”

• As technology and doctrines have expanded the lethality, tempo, and depth of operations, the potential for conventional forces to conduct nonlinear operations has increased. Linearity refers primarily to the conduct of operations along lines of operations with identified FLOTs. In linear operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of the land force in relation to other friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces, security is enhanced and massing of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations is the security of rear areas, especially LOCs between sustaining bases and fighting forces. World Wars I and II offer multiple examples of linear operations.

• In the land context, nonlinear operations tend to be conducted from selected bases of operations (ashore or afloat), but without clearly defined lines of operations. Because rear areas are likewise not clearly defined, their security as well as that of LOCs are not priority concerns. Operation JUST CAUSE is an excellent example of a nonlinear operation. In such an operation, land forces orient more on their assigned objectives (for example, destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical terrain or population centers) and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly forces. Maritime operations, special operations, and the operations of insurgent forces tend to be nonlinear. To protect themselves, individual forces conducting nonlinear operations rely more on situational awareness, mobility advantages, and freedom of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium on C4I, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.

c. Attack of Enemy Strategic Centers of Gravity. As described earlier in this chapter, JFCs seek to attack enemy strategic centers of gravity, employing the appropriate forces and capabilities of the joint force. Such operations typically continue throughout the overall joint operation. JFCs time their effects to coincide with effects of other operations of the joint force and vice versa. As with all operations of the joint force, attacks of enemy strategic centers of gravity should be designed to support the JFCs’ objectives and concept of operations, while limiting their potential negative effects on posthostilities efforts.

d. Maneuver

• The principal purpose of maneuver is to gain positional advantage relative to enemy centers of gravity in order to control or destroy those centers of gravity. The focus of both land and naval maneuver is to render opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and physical
cohesion (their ability to fight as an effective, coordinate whole) rather than to destroy them physically through attrition. This condition may be achieved by attacking enemy forces and controlling territory, populations, key waters, and LOCs (in all dimensions). Land and naval maneuver (which includes the action of air assets organic to the surface force) is required to control population, territory, and key waters.

- **There are multiple ways to attain positional advantage.** A naval expeditionary force with airpower, cruise missile firepower, and amphibious assault capability, within operational reach of enemy centers of gravity, has positional advantage. Land force attack aviation, if able to strike at the opponent’s centers of gravity, also has positional advantage. **Maintaining dimensional superiority contributes to positional advantage by facilitating freedom of action.**

- **Maneuver of forces** relative to enemy centers of gravity can be key to the JFC’s campaign or major operation. Maneuver is the means of concentrating forces at decisive points to achieve surprise, psychological shock, and physical momentum. Maneuver may also exploit the effects of massed and/or precision firepower or WMD.

- JFCs consider the contribution of special operations in attaining positional advantage. Through special reconnaissance, direct action, or support of insurgent forces, SOF may expose vulnerabilities and attack the enemy at tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

- At all levels of war, **successful maneuver** requires not only fire and movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans, operations, and organizations. It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main effort and applying the principles of mass and economy of force.

  - **At the strategic level,** deploying units to and positioning units within an operational area are forms of maneuver if such movement seeks to gain positional advantage. Strategic maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or major operations of a campaign.

  - **At the operational level,** maneuver is a means by which JFCs set the terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit existing situations. Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of operations to an area where they are in position to achieve operational objectives. As shown by USCINCENT’s concept of operations in Operation DESERT STORM, the ability to maneuver must be a trait not only of combat forces but also of the logistic resources that support them.

  - Once deployed into battle formations into the operational area, maneuver is typically considered tactical in nature.

- **The concept for maneuver,** both naval and land, needs to be articulated in the JFC’s concept of operations includes timing, sequencing, and method and location of entry into the operational area. **Types of joint force maneuvers** include forcible entry, sustained action at sea and from the sea, and sustained action on land.
• Forcible Entry

  • Forcible entry is seizing and holding a military lodgment in the face of armed opposition. In many situations, forcible entry is the only method for gaining access into the operational area or for introducing decisive forces into the region. Forcible entry capabilities give JFCs unique opportunities for altering the nature of the situation, such as the opportunity for gaining the initiative at the outset of combat operations. Forcible entry operations can strike directly at enemy centers of gravity and can open new avenues for military operations. Forcible entry operations can horizontally escalate the operation, exceeding the enemy’s capability to respond. For more information, see Joint Pubs 3-02, “Joint Doctrine for Amphibious Operations,” and 3-18, “Joint Doctrine for Forcible Entry Operations.”

  • Forcible entry operations are normally joint operations and may include airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations, or any combination thereof. Subordinate joint and Service publications provide details on these operations.

  • Forcible entry is normally complex and risky. These operations require detailed intelligence and unity of effort. Forces are tailored for the mission and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and employment. Forcible entry forces need to be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust C4I capabilities to move with forward elements.

  • OPSEC and deception are critical to successful forcible entry. Forcible entry relies on speed and surprise and is almost always employed in coordination with special operations. Forcible entry usually requires support from naval gunfire and/or aviation assets. Follow-on forces need to be prepared to expand the operation, sustain the effort, and accomplish the mission.

  • SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify, and modify conditions in the area of the lodgment. SOF may conduct the assaults to seize small, initial lodgments such as airfields or ports. They may provide fire support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible entry. They may conduct special reconnaissance and interdiction operations well beyond the lodgment.

  • The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible entry operations can be formidable, but must not be allowed to become such an overriding concern that the forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs carefully balance the introduction of logistic forces needed to support initial combat with combat forces required to establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment.

  • Forcible entry has been conducted throughout the history of the Armed Forces of the United States. Forcible entry is usually a complex operation and should therefore be kept as simple as possible in concept. Schemes of maneuver and coordination between forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. When airborne, amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of effort is vital. Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry.
Joint Operations in War

• JFCs and their staffs should be familiar with Service doctrine on land and naval maneuver.

e. Interdiction

• Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs. **Interdiction diverts, disrupts, delays, or destroys the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces.** Interdiction-capable forces include land- and sea-based fighter and attack aircraft and bombers; ships and submarines; conventional airborne, air assault, or other ground maneuver forces; SOF; amphibious raid forces; surface-to-surface, subsurface-to-surface, and air-to-surface missiles, rockets, munitions, and mines; artillery and naval gunfire; attack helicopters; EW systems; antisatellite weapons; and space-based satellite systems or sensors. The JFACC is the supported commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort.

• Interdiction-capable commanders require access to C2 systems able to take advantage of real and near real time intelligence. Such intelligence is particularly useful in dealing with targets of near or immediate effect on surface forces or whose location was not previously known with sufficient accuracy.

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Operation JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the Commander in Chief, US Southern Command, JTF Panama, conducted multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin OperationJUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized key lodgments at Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport and at the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF used these lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaults against the PDF.

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations with numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of the joint force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at staggered times from CONUS bases, some in C-141 Starlifters, others in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formation experienced delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield--its operations and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted for assault operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible compromise. SOF reconnaissance and direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely dispersed targets.

At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed forces, SOF, and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27 targets--most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal Zone. Illustrating that JFCs organize and apply force in a manner that fits the situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOFs to attack strategic targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-level targets.

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and follow-on attack against enemy C2 facilities and key units, seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decisionmaking. Most fighting was concluded within 24 hours. Casualties were minimized. It was a classic coup de main.
Chapter IV

- Interdiction operations can be conducted by many elements of the joint force and can have tactical, operational, and strategic effects. Air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces can conduct interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission. For example, naval expeditionary forces charged with seizing and securing a lodgment along a coast may include the interdiction of opposing air, land, and naval forces as part of the overall amphibious plan.

**BATTLE OF THE BISMARCK SEA**

2-4 March 1943

The Battle of the Bismarck Sea is an outstanding example of the application of firepower at the operational level—in this case, air interdiction.

During the first part of 1943, the Japanese high command attempted to establish a line of defense in the Southwest Pacific, to run from Northeast New Guinea, through New Britain to the northern Solomon Islands. After a defeat at Wau, New Guinea (the intended right flank of this line), the Japanese command at Rabaul decided to reinforce its garrison at Lae, in the Huon Gulf of New Guinea. Relying on inclement weather to cover its move, a convoy of 8 destroyers and 8 transports carrying over 8,700 personnel and extensive cargo departed Rabaul at midnight of 28 February.

General MacArthur’s Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) intelligence had identified the likelihood of this reinforcement. Lieutenant General George C. Kenney’s Allied Air Forces, SWPA, had stepped up long-range reconnaissance, forward positioning of air forces, and training in low-level strikes against shipping.

Late on 1 March the convoy was spotted moving westward off the northern coast of New Britain. Early on 2 March Lieutenant General Kenney’s air forces attacked as the convoy was moving into the Dampier Strait. Multiple formations of B-17s attacked throughout the day, sinking two transports and damaging several others. By the morning of 3 March the convoy was nearing the Huon Peninsula on New Guinea. It was now within range of all of Kenney’s Papuan-based aircraft. Clearing midmorning skies exposed the convoy. In a synchronized attack, 13 B-17 heavy bombers, 31 B-25 medium bombers, 12 A-20 light bombers, 28 P-38 fighters, and 13 Australian Beaufighters unleashed their firepower on the vulnerable Japanese ships. The attack continued throughout the day as more planes roared off the Moresby and Milne runways to join the fight. Before nightfall, over 330 allied aircraft had participated and, except for 4 destroyers that had fled to the north, all ships were sunk, sinking, or badly damaged. During the night and the next day, bombers and PT boats finished the job.

MacArthur was jubilant. His press release stated, in part, “Our decisive success cannot fail to have the most important results on the enemy’s strategic and tactical plans. His campaign, for the time being at least, is completely dislocated.” Looking back on SWPA operations, MacArthur, in 1945, still regarded the Battle of the Bismarck Sea as “the decisive aerial engagement” of the war in his theater. The Japanese high command was shocked and aborted its second projected offensive against Wau, New Guinea. By relying on Kenney’s aggressive airmen, MacArthur demonstrated the major impact of interdiction on a theater campaign.
• For more discussion of joint interdiction operations, refer to Joint Pub 3-03, “Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.”

f. Synchronizing Maneuver and Interdiction

• **Synchronizing interdiction and maneuver** (both land and sea) provides one of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force. Interdiction and maneuver should not be considered separate operations against a common enemy, but rather **complementary operations** designed to achieve the JFC’s campaign objectives. Moreover, maneuver by land or naval forces can be conducted to interdict enemy surface potential. Potential responses to synchronized maneuver and interdiction can create an agonizing dilemma for the enemy. If the enemy attempts to counter the maneuver, enemy forces can be exposed to unacceptable losses from interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such interdiction losses, enemy forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. **The synergy achieved by integrating and synchronizing interdiction and maneuver assists commanders in optimizing leverage** at the operational level.

• As a guiding principle, **JFCs should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver.** When maneuver is employed, **JFCs need to carefully balance doctrinal imperatives that may be in tension,** including the needs of the maneuver force and the undesirability of fragmenting theater/JOA air assets. The JFC’s objectives, intent, and priorities, reflected in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable subordinates to exploit fully the military potential of their forces while minimizing the friction generated by competing requirements. **Effective targeting procedures** in the joint force also alleviate such friction. As an example, interdiction requirements will often exceed interdiction means, requiring JFCs to prioritize requirements. **Land and naval force commanders responsible for synchronizing maneuver and interdiction** within their AOs should be knowledgeable of JFC priorities. Component commanders aggressively seek the best means to accomplish assigned missions. JFCs alleviate this friction through clear statements of intent for theater/JOA-level interdiction (that is, interdiction effort conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations). In doing this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of the joint force contribute to accomplishing strategic objectives. The campaign concept articulates that vision. JFCs then employ a flexible range of techniques to assist in identifying requirements and applying resources to meet them. JFCs define appropriate command relationships, establish effective joint targeting procedures, and make apportionment decisions.

• **Interdiction** is not limited to any particular region of the joint battle, but generally **is conducted forward of or at a distance from friendly forces. Interdiction may be planned to create advantages at any level** from tactical to strategic with corresponding impacts on the enemy and the speed
with which interdiction affects front-line enemy forces. Interdiction deep in the enemy’s rear area can have broad theater strategic or operational effects; however, deep interdiction normally has a delayed effect on land and naval combat which will be a direct concern to the JFC. Interdiction closer to land and naval combat will be of more immediate operational and tactical concern to maneuver forces. Thus, JFCs vary the emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers depending on the strategic and operational situation confronting them.

• JFCs may choose to employ interdiction as a principal means to achieve the intended objective (with other components supporting the component leading the interdiction effort).

• Where maneuver is part of the JFC’s concept, JFCs may synchronize that maneuver and interdiction. For the joint force campaign level, JFCs synchronize maneuver and interdiction to present the enemy with the dilemma previously discussed. Indeed, JFCs may employ a scheme of maneuver that enhances interdiction operations or vice versa. For instance, actual or threatened maneuver can force an enemy to respond by attempting rapid maneuver or resupply. These reactions can provide excellent and vulnerable targets for interdiction.

• All commanders should consider how their capabilities and operations can complement interdiction in achieving campaign objectives and vice versa. These operations may include actions such as deception operations, withdrawals, lateral repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause the enemy to reposition surface forces making them better targets for interdiction.

• Likewise, interdiction operations need to conform to and enhance the JFC’s scheme of maneuver during the campaign. JFCs need to properly integrate maneuver and interdiction operations to place the enemy in the operational dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or exposing forces to interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.

• JFCs are responsible for the conduct of theater/JOA operations. To facilitate these operations, JFCs may establish boundaries within the theater/JOA for the conduct of operations. Within the joint force theater of operations, all missions must contribute to the accomplishment of the overall objective. Synchronization of efforts within land or naval AOs is of particular importance.

• Land and naval commanders are directly concerned with those enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their near-term operations (current operations and those required to facilitate future operations). Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on land and naval maneuver normally supports that maneuver to enable the land or naval commander to achieve the JFC’s objectives. In fact, successful operations may depend on successful interdiction operations, for instance, to isolate the battle or weaken the enemy force before battle is fully joined.
The size, shape, and positioning of land or naval force AOs will be established by JFCs based on their concept of operations and the land or naval force commander’s requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and to fight at extended ranges. **Within these AOs, land and naval operational force commanders are designated the supported commander** and are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.

**The supported commander should articulate clearly the vision of maneuver operations** to those commanders that apply interdiction forces within the supported commander’s boundaries to attack the designated interdiction targets or objectives. The supported commanders should clearly state how they envision interdiction enabling or enhancing their maneuver operations and what they want to accomplish with interdiction (as well as those actions they want to avoid, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or the use of certain munitions in a specific area). However, supported commanders should provide supporting commanders as much latitude as possible in the planning and execution of their operations.

**Once they understand what the supported commanders want to accomplish and what they want to avoid, interdiction-capable commanders can normally plan and execute their operations** with only that coordination required with supported commanders.

**Joint force operations in maritime areas often require a higher degree of coordination among commanders** because of the highly specialized nature of some naval operations, such as submarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination requires that the interdiction-capable commander maintain communication with the naval commander. As in all operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in naval operating areas can result in fratricide and failed missions, especially in those areas adjacent to naval forces. The same principle applies concerning joint force air component mining operations in areas where land or naval forces may maneuver.

**Interdiction target priorities within the land or naval force boundaries are considered** along with theater/JOA-wide interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the apportionment decision. The JFACC will use these priorities to plan and execute the theater/JOA-wide interdiction effort.

**JFCs need to pay particular attention to, and give priority to, activities impinging on and supporting the maneuver of all forces.** In addition to normal target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures through which land or naval force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction targets they are unable to strike with organic assets within their boundaries that could affect planned or ongoing maneuver. These targets may be identified, individually or by category, specified
geographically, and/or tied to desired effects and time periods. The purpose of these procedures is to afford added visibility to, and allow JFCs to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned maneuver by land or naval forces.

g. **Joint Precision Interdiction.** JFCs have at their disposal a wide range of joint operational tactics, techniques, and procedures to influence the conduct of actions. As another example, JFCs may elect to use the technique of Joint Precision Interdiction (JPI), which **orients on establishing an advantageous mobility differential over a hostile force.** This advantage permits the judicious use of resources for decisive engagements at the time and place a JFC chooses. The major aspects of JPI (locating the enemy deep, blinding enemy sensors, adversely affecting enemy mobility, and preparing the enemy for closure and attack by friendly forces) seek to protect the JFC’s freedom of maneuver while attacking the hostile mobility-producing potential. Doctrinal principles for planning and executing interdiction operations and appropriate tactics, techniques, and procedures, including those associated with JPI, are provided in Joint Pub 3-03, “Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations.”

h. **Joint Fire Support.** Joint fire support includes those fires that assist land and amphibious forces to maneuver and control territory, populations, and key waters. Joint fire support can include the lethal or destructive operations of close air support (by both fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft), naval gunfire, artillery, mortars, rockets, and missiles, as well as nonlethal or disruptive operations such as EW. Joint Pub 3-09, “Doctrine for Joint Fire Support,” provides additional information and guidance.

i. **Combat Assessment**

- With the increasing complexity of modern warfare and its effects, the traditional bomb damage assessment has evolved through battle damage assessment (BDA) to combat assessment (CA). **CA is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations.** BDA is one of the principle subordinate elements of CA.

- At the JFC level, the CA effort should be a joint program, supported at all levels, designed to determine if the **required effects on the adversary envisioned in the campaign plan** are being achieved by the **joint force components** to meet the JFC’s overall concept. The intent is to **analyze with sound military judgment what is known about the damage inflicted on the enemy** to try to determine: what physical attrition the adversary has suffered; what effect the efforts have had on the adversary’s plans or capabilities; and what, if any, changes or additional efforts need to take place to meet the objectives of the current major operations or phase of the campaign. CA requires constant information flows from all sources and should support all sections of the JFC staff and components.

- **CA is done at all levels in the joint force.** JFCs should establish a dynamic system to support CA for all components. Normally, **the joint force J-3 will be responsible for coordinating CA,** assisted by the joint force J-2.
Joint Operations in War

- **JFCs apportion joint force** reconnaissance assets to support the CA intelligence effort that exceeds the organic capabilities of the component forces. The component commanders identify their requirements and coordinate them with the joint force J-3 or designated representative.

4. **Joint Operations in the Littoral or Maritime Environment**

   a. Depending on the situation, **JFCs may conduct operations in the littoral** to achieve or support joint force objectives. **The littoral area contains two parts. First is the seaward area from the open ocean to the shore**, which must be controlled to support operations ashore. **Second is the landward area inland from the shore** that can be supported and defended directly from the sea. **Control of the littoral area is often essential to dimensional superiority.** Naval operations in the littoral can provide for the seizure of an adversary’s port, naval base, or coastal air base to allow entry of other elements of the joint force.

   b. **Controlled littorals often offer the best positions from which to begin, sustain, and support joint operations**, especially in operational areas with poor infrastructure for supporting operations ashore. **Sea-based airpower and sea-launched land combat power are formidable tools that JFCs can use to gain and maintain initiative.** Naval forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas to mass forces rapidly and generate high intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by JFCs. Naval forces’ relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these capabilities where they can readily strike opponents. Naval forces’ very presence, if made known, can pose a threat that the enemy cannot ignore.

   c. Even when joint forces are firmly established ashore, **littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent opportunities to achieve leverage over the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea.** Such operations can introduce significant size forces over relatively great distances in short periods of time into the rear or flanks of the enemy. The **mobility**

   *Destroyers can provide a dominating presence, which joint force commanders can use in the littoral area to achieve objectives.*
of naval forces at sea, coupled with the ability to rapidly land operationally significant forces, can be key to achieving JFC objectives. These capabilities are further enhanced by operational flexibility and the ability to identify and take advantage of fleeting opportunities.

d. **JFCs can operate from a headquarters platform at sea.** Depending on the nature of the joint operations, a naval commander can serve as the JFC or function as a JFACC while the operation is primarily maritime, and **shift that command ashore** if the operation shifts landward in accordance with the JFC’s concept of operations. In other cases, a naval headquarters may serve as the base of the joint force headquarters, or an other-than-naval JFC may use C4I facilities aboard ship. Naval air and missile defense can project that coverage inland, during both entry operations and sustained operations ashore.

e. **Transferring C2 from sea to shore requires coordination throughout the joint force in order to maintain uninterrupted C2 for current operations.** Such a transition may involve a simple movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a complete change of joint force headquarters. The new joint force headquarters may use personnel and equipment, especially communications equipment, from the old headquarters, or it may require augmentation from different sources. **One technique is to transfer C2 in several stages.** Another technique is for the JFC to **satellite off the capabilities of one of the components ashore** until the new headquarters is fully prepared. Whichever way the transition is done, staffs should develop detailed checklists to address all of the C2 requirements and the timing of transfer of each. The value of joint training in this transition is evident.

5. **Operations When Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Employed**

a. As WMD proliferate, the likelihood of their use against friendly forces increases not only in war but also in operations other than war. An enemy’s use of such weapons can quickly change the nature of a campaign, perhaps even affecting the combatant commander’s strategic objectives. The **use or the threat of use of these weapons can cause large-scale shifts in strategic and operational objectives, phases, and COAs.** Thus, planning for the possibility of both friendly and enemy use is important to campaign design.

b. It may not be the sheer killing power of these weapons that represents the greatest effect. It is the **strategic, operational, psychological, and political impacts** of their use **that can affect strategic objectives and campaign design.**

c. The effective combination of conventional offensive and defensive operations can help reduce the **effectiveness or success of an enemy’s use of WMD.** Offensive measures include raids, strikes, and operations designed to locate and neutralize the threat of such weapons. JFCs implement defensive nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) measures and plan for effective air and theater missile defense with different systems. For more information, see Joint Pub 3-11, “Joint Doctrine for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical (NBC) Defense.”

d. **Multinational operations become more complicated with the threat of employment of these weapons.** An enemy may use WMD against other coalition members, especially those with no or little defense against these weapons, to disintegrate the coalition.
e. Intelligence systems and planners advise JFCs of an opponent’s capability to employ WMD and under what conditions that opponent is most likely to do so. This advice includes an assessment of the enemy’s willingness and intent to employ these weapons. It is important to ensure that friendly force dispositions do not provide lucrative targets for enemy WMD.

f. When directed by the NCA, JFCs plan for the employment of theater nuclear weapons by US forces in a manner consistent with national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such weapons signifies an escalation of the war and is an NCA decision. The Commander in Chief, US Strategic Command’s capabilities to assist in the planning of all nuclear missions are available to support nuclear weapon employment.

g. If directed to plan for the use of theater nuclear weapons, JFCs typically have two escalating objectives:

- **The first is to deter or prevent an enemy attack that employs WMD.** To make opponents understand that friendly forces possess and will use such weapons, JFCs may simply communicate that to the enemy, using PSYOP or other means. Regardless, JFCs implement measures to increase readiness and preserve the option to respond, including the alert and forward positioning, if required, of appropriate systems. Attempts at prevention or denial may include targeting and attacking enemy WMD capability by conventional and special operations forces.

- **If deterrence fails, JFCs respond appropriately,** consistent with national policy and strategic guidance, to enemy aggression while seeking to control the intensity and scope of conflict and destruction. That response could be conventional in nature, but may include the employment of WMD. More information can be found in the Joint Pub 3-12 series.

h. **Force protection is imperative in this environment.** The joint force can survive use of WMD by anticipating their employment. Commanders can protect their forces in a variety of ways, including training, PSYOP, OPSEC, dispersion of forces, use of protective clothing, inoculation, and proper use of terrain for shielding against effects. Enhancement of force protection by using all available measures reduces incentives for a first strike by an enemy with NBC weapons.

6. Considerations for Termination and Postconflict Operations

See the information provided in Chapter I, “The Strategic Concept,” and Chapter III, “Planning Joint Operations.”
Intentionally Blank
1. General

a. Military operations other than war encompass a wide range of activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war. Although these operations are often conducted outside the United States, they also include military support to US civil authorities. Military operations other than war usually involve a combination of air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces as well as the efforts of governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations, in a complementary fashion. This chapter addresses key operational-level concepts and types of operations.

b. For detailed guidance on specific military operations other than war, refer to the Joint Pub 3-07 series.

2. Role in the Strategic Security Environment

a. Combatant commanders support national objectives through combatant command strategies and military operations, which translate strategic intent into operational and tactical actions. Thus, joint operations other than war involve strategic, operational, and tactical considerations. Because the Department of State is a principal player in joint operations other than war outside the CONUS, JFCs should maintain a working relationship with the chiefs of the US diplomatic missions in their area.

b. Many US Government agencies, other than the Department of Defense, can be involved in operations other than war, including the Department of State; the Department of Agriculture; the Department of Commerce; the Department of Justice; the Department of Transportation; the Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) within the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA); and the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Both DART and OFDA are offices within AID. Nongovernmental organizations such as the American Red Cross and the Save the Children Fund are also frequently involved. Examples of international organizations that can be involved in such operations include the United Nations (UN), the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. These organizations may assume the lead to coordinate actions for other nongovernmental agencies. Military planners should therefore establish contact with lead nongovernmental agencies to ensure coordinated efforts.

c. The instruments of national power may be applied in any combination to achieve national strategic goals in operations other than war. The manner in which they are employed is determined by the nature of each situation. For operations other than war, the military instrument is typically tasked to support the diplomatic and work with the economic and informational instruments.
3. **Principles for Joint Operations Other Than War**

As shown in Figure V-1, there are six **principles** applicable for joint operations other than war.

![Figure V-1. Principles for Joint Operations Other Than War](image)

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>PRINCIPLES FOR JOINT OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR</th>
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<td>OBJECTIVE</td>
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<td>UNITY OF EFFORT</td>
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**a. Objective**

- **Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.**
- This principle of war applies also to operations other than war. A clearly defined and attainable objective--with a precise understanding of what constitutes success--is critical when the United States is involved in operations other than war. Military commanders should also understand what specific conditions could result in mission termination, as well as those that yield failure. JFCs must also understand the strategic aims, set appropriate objectives, and ensure that these aims and objectives contribute to unity of effort with other agencies.

**b. Unity of Effort**

- **Seek unity of effort in every operation.**
- The principle of unity of command in war also applies to operations other than war; but, in operations other than war, this principle may be more difficult to attain. In these operations, other government agencies may often have the lead. Commanders may answer to a civilian chief, such as an ambassador, or may themselves employ the resources of a civilian agency. Command arrangements may often be only loosely defined and many times will not involve command authority as understood within the military. This arrangement may cause commanders to seek an atmosphere of cooperation to achieve objectives by unity of effort. Military commanders need to consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also **diplomatic, economic, and informational in nature.** Because operations other than war will often be conducted at the small unit level, it is important that all levels understand the military-civilian relationship to avoid unnecessary and counter-productive friction.

**c. Security**

- **Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage.**
- In joint operations other than war, security deals principally with force protection against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to our interests. These could include a terrorist, a group opposed to the operation, and even looters after a natural disaster. JFCs also should be ready constantly to counter activity that
could bring significant harm to units or jeopardize mission accomplishment. Inherent in this responsibility is the need to be capable of rapid transition from a peaceful to a combat posture should the need arise. The inherent right of self-defense from the unit to the individual level applies to all operations.

d. **Restraint**

- **Apply appropriate military capability prudently.**

- The actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including specific ROE. In operations other than war, these ROE will often be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. Moreover, these rules may change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry, tactics, and levels of violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short- and long-term goals. This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment. The reasons for the restraint often need to be understood by the individual Service member because a single act could cause critical political consequences.

e. **Perseverance**

- **Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims.**

- Some operations other than war may be short, others protracted. Peacetime operations may require years to achieve the desired effects. Underlying causes of confrontation and conflict rarely have a clear beginning or a decisive resolution. It is important to assess crisis response options against their contribution to long-term strategic objectives. This assessment does not preclude decisive military action but does require careful, informed analysis to choose the right time and place for such action. Commanders balance their desire to attain objectives quickly with a sensitivity for the long-term strategic aims and the restraints placed on operations. Therefore, the patient, resolute, and persistent pursuit of national goals and objectives, for as
long as necessary to achieve them, is often the requirement for success.

f. **Legitimacy**

- **Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions.**

- This principle focuses on internationally sanctioned standards, as well as the perception that authority of a government to govern is genuine, effective, and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes. Joint force operations need to sustain the legitimacy of the operation and of the host government. During operations where a government does not exist, extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently legitimizing them. PSYOP can enhance both domestic and international perceptions of the legitimacy of an operation.

4. **Planning Considerations**

Planning considerations for military operations other than war are shown in Figure V-2.

a. **Interagency Coordination.** Inherent in operations other than war is the need for the military to work with other agencies of the US Government as well as other nations’ governments. **Consensus building** is a primary task and can be aided by understanding each agency’s capabilities and limitations as well as any constraints that may preclude the use of a capability. The goal—**to develop and promote the unity of effort needed to accomplish a specific mission**—can be achieved by establishing an atmosphere of trust and cooperation.

b. **Command and Control.** Each operation other than war can be unique. There is no single C2 option that works best for all such operations. JFCs and their subordinates should be **flexible in modifying standard arrangements to**

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**PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR**

Military operations other than war can involve threats that...

- May be subtle and indirect.
- Are normally regional in nature.
- May develop quickly.
- May or may not be long term.
- May or may not involve conflict.
- May have serious implications for safeguard of friendly interests.

Figure V-2. Planning Considerations for Military Operations Other Than War
meet the specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort.

c. Intelligence and Information Gathering. Force protection can be significantly improved with the proper mix of intelligence and information gathering. As soon as practical after an operation is declared, JFCs and planners determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the operation. Intelligence planners also consider the capability for a unit to receive external intelligence support, the capability to store intelligence data, the timeliness of collection systems, the availability of on-the-shelf intelligence publications, and the possibility of using other agencies and organizations as intelligence sources. In some military operations other than war (such as peacekeeping), the term “information gathering” is used rather than the term “intelligence” because of the sensitivity of the operation.

d. Constraints and Restraints. A commander tasked with conducting a joint operation other than war may face numerous restrictions in addition to the normal restrictions associated with ROE. For example, international acceptance of each operation may be extremely important not only because military forces may be used to support international sanctions but also because of the probability of involvement by international organizations. As a consequence, legal rights of individuals and organizations and funding of the operation should be addressed by the combatant commander’s staff. Also, constraints and restraints imposed on any agency or organization involved in the operation should be understood by other agencies and organizations to facilitate coordination.

e. Training and Education. The Armed Forces of the United States may be directed to conduct joint operations other than war with very little notice. Therefore, training and education programs focusing on joint, multinational, and interagency operations should be developed and implemented for individuals and units. Personnel from other US Government agencies and nongovernmental and international organizations should be invited to participate in these programs.

f. Postconflict Operations

• Planning for postconflict operations should begin as early as possible, and preferably before the conflict begins. As combat operations are nearing termination, military forces should prepare to transition to operations other than war. Refugee control, reestablishing civil order and public services, medical assistance, and other postconflict activities may be done best by military forces during this turbulent period. Postconflict activities typically begin with significant military involvement, then move increasingly toward civilian dominance as the threat wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished.

• The military’s presence and its ability to operate in crisis environments and under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in operations normally governed by other agencies. Military forces need to work competently in this environment while properly subordinating military forces to the agency in charge. To be effective, planning and conducting postconflict activities require a variety of perspectives and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of governmental agencies, other Services, and alliance or coalition partners. Typical postconflict activities include:
• **Transition to Civil Authorities.** This transaction could be to local governments or host nations after natural disasters, to a UN peacekeeping operation after peace-enforcement operations, or through the UN High Commissioner for Refugees to a nongovernmental agency in support of refugees.

• **Support to Truce Negotiations.** This support may include providing intelligence, security, transportation and other logistic support, and linguistics for all participants.

• **SOF Activities.** These activities include civil affairs support to reestablish a civil government, additional training for host-nation armed forces, PSYOP to foster continued peaceful relations, and intelligence gathering.

• **Public Affairs Operations.** These operations include command information programs, media support, and international information campaigns.

• **Redeployment.** Redeployment may include waste disposal, port operations, closing of financial obligations, clearing and marking of minefields and other explosive ordnance disposal activities, and ensuring appropriate units remain in place until their missions are complete. Redeployment must be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of redeploying forces and supplies to meet new missions or crises.

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**Operation PROVIDE COMFORT**

As the Gulf War’s fighting ended on 28 February 1991, a Kurdish rebellion erupted in northern Iraq. Iraqi forces attacked the Kurds. People fled from cities and towns. Worldwide television showed cold, wet Kurds suffering from hunger and disease and dying in the hills of northern Iraq and southern Turkey.

On 6 April 1991, Commander in Chief, US European Command (USCINCEUR) established JTF Provide Comfort. Initial objectives were to provide humanitarian relief by airdropping food and other necessities, establishing relief centers, supervising distribution of food and water, and improving sanitation and medical care. JTF Provide Comfort included USAF airlift, a special operations command, and an amphibious ready group (with an embarked Marine expeditionary unit). When it became apparent that operations would significantly increase in complexity and duration, USCINCEUR expanded the organization of the JTF, changed commanders to reflect the changed nature and increasing complexity of the operation, and established the JTF headquarters at Incirlik, Turkey.

The new JTF commander established two subordinate JTFs: JTF ALFA, a special operations task force, at Silopi, Turkey; and JTF BRAVO at Zakhu, Iraq. JTF BRAVO’s mission was to provide security in its operational area inside Iraq, build refugee camps, and move displaced persons into these camps. JTF BRAVO forces included the Marine expeditionary unit, a British Commando Brigade, a French Parachute Regiment, a Spanish Parachute Regiment, and US Army airborne infantry and attack helicopter battalions as well as PSYOP and civil affairs units. Ultimately, JTF BRAVO included combat and combat support units from US and coalition member nations, including
an Italian Composite Special Forces Airborne Brigade, a Dutch Marine Combat Battalion, and an Infantry Rifle Platoon from Luxembourg.

Air Force forces operated from Incirlik and established and maintained an air exclusion zone over the protected area and coordinated air delivery. Army and non-US cargo helicopters were OPCON to Commander, Air Force Forces (COMAFFOR). Army forces (less those in JTF BRAVO) were also based at Incirlik. COMARFOR was also designated commander of a multinational support command, with OPCON of Army, Air Force, and Marine logistic units to support its multinational force.

PROVIDE COMFORT was a coalition effort. The United Kingdom, Spain, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, Australia, Luxembourg, Canada, Germany, and the United States contributed forces. The operation also encompassed United Nations relief assistance. The JTF became Combined Task Force Provide Comfort.

Especially in its early weeks, PROVIDE COMFORT demonstrated the remarkable agility and flexibility of a team-oriented effort. The CJTF and subordinate commanders used Service capabilities where they were needed. They assigned clear (although not easy) missions; gave direct, simple guidance; and established command relationships that facilitated mission accomplishment. It was an outstanding example of the complexity of the end state and posthostilities operations.

5. Types of Operations Other Than War

As illustrated in Figure V-3, operations other than war include, but are not limited to, the following:

a. **Arms Control.** The main purpose of arms control is to enhance national security. Although it may be viewed as a diplomatic mission, the military can play a vital role. For example, US military personnel may be involved in verifying an arms control treaty; may seize WMD; may escort authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials (such as enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these assets; or may dismantle or destroy weapons with or without the consent of the host nation. All of these actions help reduce threats to regional stability.

b. **Combatting Terrorism.** These measures are both offensive (counter-terrorism) and defensive (antiterrorism) in nature. The former typically occurs outside the territory of the United States,
while the latter may occur anywhere in the world. The Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Federal Aviation Administration are actively involved in antiterrorism operations. See Joint Pub 3-07.2, “JTTP for Antiterrorism,” for more information.

c. DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations.

- The national drug control strategy (NDCS) is issued by the President pursuant to the Antidrug Abuse Act of 1988. The antidrug plans and programs of the Department of Defense are an integral part of the NDCS and include detection and monitoring; support to cooperative foreign governments; support for interdiction; support to drug law enforcement agencies; internal drug prevention and treatment programs; research and development; and C4I support. See Joint Pub 3-07.4, “Joint Counterdrug Operations,” for more information.

- The National Defense Authorization Act of 1989 assigned three major counterdrug responsibilities to the Department of Defense:

  - Acting as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.

  - Integrating the command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets of the United States that are dedicated to interdicting the movement of illegal drugs into the United States.

  - Approving and funding State governors’ plans for expanded use of the National Guard to support drug interdiction and enforcement operations of law enforcement agencies.

d. Nation Assistance. The main objective of nation assistance is to assist a host nation with internal programs to promote stability, develop sustainability, and establish institutions responsive to the needs of the people. Security assistance and foreign internal defense are the primary means of providing nation assistance.

- Security Assistance. Security assistance refers to a group of programs that provide defense articles and services, including training, to eligible foreign countries and international organizations that further US national security objectives. Public law prohibits personnel providing security assistance services (including mobile training assistance) from performing combatant duties.

- Foreign Internal Defense. Foreign internal defense (FID) supports a host-nation’s fight against lawlessness, subversion, and insurgency. US military support to foreign internal defense should focus on assisting host-nation personnel to anticipate, preclude, and counter these threats. Emphasis on internal defense and development programs when organizing, planning, and executing military support to FID programs is essential. Specific tools used in executing the DOD component of FID programs may include multinational exercises, exchange programs, civil-military operations, intelligence and communications sharing, logistic support of security assistance, and combat operations. See Joint Pub 3-07.1, “JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense,” for more information.
e. Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEOs). The purpose of NEOs is to safely and quickly remove civilian noncombatants from an area outside the United States where they are, or may be, threatened. Although NEOs are principally conducted for US citizens, Armed Forces of the United States may also evacuate citizens from host, allied, or friendly nations if the NCA determine it to be in the best interest of the United States. The Department of State has the lead in conducting NEOs. US ambassadors or chiefs of diplomatic missions are responsible for planning for NEOs by preparing emergency action plans to be implemented when NEOs are required. See Joint Pub 3-07.5, “JTTP for Noncombatant Evacuation Operations,” for more information.

Operation EASTERN EXIT

On 1 January 1991, the United States Ambassador to Somalia requested military assistance to evacuate the Embassy. Americans and other foreign nationals had sought shelter in the Embassy compound that day as the reign of Somali dictator Siad Barre disintegrated into a confused battle for control of Mogadishu.

The next day, Operation EASTERN EXIT was initiated. Despite the priorities of the Gulf War, SOF helicopters were put on alert, Air Force C-130 transport aircraft were deployed to Kenya, and two Navy amphibious ships with elements of a Marine expeditionary brigade embarked were sent south from the North Arabian Sea toward Somalia. Initial plans called for evacuation of the endangered Americans through Mogadishu’s international airport, utilizing Air Force aircraft staged in Kenya. The situation in Mogadishu rapidly worsened and aircraft, even those of the United States Air Force, could not land safely at the airport. It seemed unlikely in any case that those sheltered at the Embassy could travel safely through the embattled city to the airport.

By 4 January, it had become apparent that the Embassy’s only hope lay with the two ships still steaming south at flank speed. At 0247, two CH-53E helicopters with Marines and Navy SEALs departed the USS Guam for the 466-mile flight to Mogadishu. After two in-flight refuelings from KC-130 aircraft, the helicopters arrived over the Embassy at dawn. About 100 armed Somali stood with ladders by one wall. As the CH-53Es flew into the compound, the Somali scattered. Shortly after the helicopters touched down, a special operations AC-130 gunship arrived overhead to provide fire support, if needed. The CH-53Es unloaded the security force, embarked 61 evacuees, and took off for the 350-mile return flight.

The ships continued to steam at full speed toward Somalia throughout the day. The final evacuation of the Embassy started at midnight, after the ships had arrived off the coast. The remaining 220 evacuees and the security force were extracted during the night.

EASTERN EXIT, which resulted in the rescue of 281 people--from 30 different countries--from a bloody civil war, was the result of the synergistic employment of widely dispersed joint forces that rapidly planned and conducted a NEO in the midst of the Gulf War.
f. Other Civil Support Operations

- These operations encompass worldwide humanitarian assistance, military support to civil authorities, and military assistance for civil disturbances. Worldwide humanitarian assistance operations fall under the umbrella of civil-military operations. They include disaster relief, support to displaced persons as well as humanitarian and civic assistance. Included in support to civil authorities are US domestic actions applicable to disaster-related civil emergencies and civil defense for attacks directed against the territory of the United States. Included in assistance for civil disturbances are military support to US domestic law enforcement agencies, protection of life and federal property, and prevention of disruptions to federal functions.

- The Armed Forces of the United States can augment domestic governments of the United States. Such operations can include support to education systems, medical facilities, emergency response, and transportation systems in remote or depressed areas. Some of these operations directly contribute to military readiness; others do not.

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**JTF Andrew**

At 0500 on 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck south Florida and caused extensive damage. The Governor of Florida requested Federal assistance. The Secretary of the Army, as the President’s executive agent, directed initiation of disaster relief operations in support of the Federal response plan. As part of those operations, the Commander in Chief, Forces Command, directed the Second US Army to form JTF Andrew and begin humanitarian relief operations. Eventually composed of elements of all Services and both Active and Reserve forces, JTF Andrew began operations on 28 August 1992.

JTF Andrew's mission was to provide humanitarian support by establishing field feeding sites, storage and distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local and line haul transfer operations, and other logistic support to the populace in affected areas. Commander, JTF Andrew, defined success as getting life support systems in place and relieving immediate hardships until non-DOD Federal, state, and local agencies could reestablish normal operations. Operations were conducted in three phases. Immediate relief provided life support systems--food, water, shelter, medical supplies and services, information, sanitation, and transportation. A recovery phase ensured sustainment of services provided in Phase I while assisting Federal, state, and local authorities to reestablish public services. Finally, a reconstitution phase continued to reestablish services under Federal, state, and local control, while JTF forces redeployed.

During these operations, 1,014 sorties were flown, carrying over 19,000 tons of mission support materials. Almost 900,000 meals were served. Over 80,000 tons of humanitarian supplies were moved into the area by sea and over land. Almost 2,000 tons were moved by air. Over 67,000 patients received medical treatment, and over 1,000 tents were erected. A mobile radio station was established to provide emergency information to the local population and to provide route information to assist convoys as they arrive. Four life support centers were constructed, providing mass care for 2,400 people per day for
approximately 2 months. Over 6 million cubic yards of debris were removed, and 98 schools were repaired.

JTF Andrew coordinated with multiple Federal, state, and private agencies. These included the Federal Emergency Management Agency, the Civil Air Patrol, the American Red Cross, the General Services Administration, the Public Health Service, the Department of Agriculture, the Salvation Army, the Boy Scouts of America, and numerous religious relief organizations.

This disaster relief effort demonstrated the versatility of the Armed Forces of the United States. The training for war that developed and promoted initiative, ingenuity, and flexibility in leadership and conduct of operations, served the Nation well in a noncombat situation.

g. Peace Operations

- This term encompasses three general areas: diplomatic, traditional peacekeeping, and forceful military actions. Therefore, it may be helpful to view these types of operations with only three terms: **peacemaking** (diplomatic actions), **peacekeeping** (noncombat military operations), and **peace enforcement** (coercive use of military force). Peace operations are not typically conducted within the territory of the United States. For more information, see Joint Pub 3-07.3, “JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations.”

- The UN has been the most frequent sponsor of classical peacekeeping activities; however, regional organizations such as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Arab League have also acted in similar fashion to prevent, halt, or contain conflict in their respective regions.

- The objective of peace operations is to achieve a peaceful settlement among belligerent parties, primarily through diplomatic action. Military operations may be necessary if diplomatic actions are insufficient or inappropriate.
Operations PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE demonstrated the complexity of integrating peace support operations with other types of operations and provided a glimpse of a new style of post-Cold War military operations. By the middle of 1992, after years of civil war, drought, and famine, the situation in the southern half of Somalia had reached such a tragic state that humanitarian organizations launched a worldwide appeal for help. In response to this outcry, the President of the United States directed, in mid-August 1992, an airlift of food and supplies for starving Somalis (Operation PROVIDE RELIEF).

US forces immediately initiated the airlift of relief supplies from Mombassa, Kenya, but continued instability in Somalia prevented safe passage of the flights. Relief workers in Somalia operated in this unsafe environment under constant threat. Distribution of relief supplies was haphazard and subject to banditry and obstruction by local warlords. The people of Somalia continued to suffer.

Based on the continued suffering and the realization that the United States was the only nation capable of decisive action, the President directed USCINCENT to plan a larger scale humanitarian relief operation. On 3 December the President directed USCINCENT to execute Operation RESTORE HOPE. In broad terms, it was an effort to raise Somalia from the depths of famine, anarchy, and desperation in order to restore its national institutions and its hope for the future. Conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, Operation RESTORE HOPE was a multinational humanitarian assistance operation that ultimately involved more than 38,000 troops from 21 coalition nations, with an additional 9 nations providing funding, support, and facilities vital to the operation.

Unified Task Force (UNITAF) Somalia was formed with forces from France, Italy, Canada, Belgium, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States, as well as other nations. On 9 December 1992, under UN auspices, US SOF and amphibious forces assaulted and secured the airport at Mogadishu and the seaport soon thereafter. Arriving supplies could now be off-loaded safely.

The task force methodically expanded throughout the capital city of Mogadishu and into the countryside. As land forces were added to the task force, control was pushed inland. The airlift of supplies increased significantly as air bases were secured. Over the next 3 months, the coalition expanded into the southern half of Somalia, establishing and securing relief centers and escorting supply convoys.

The operation was made more complex by continued uncertainty and instability in the Somali political situation. The task force, working closely with the US Department of State and eventually more than 50 humanitarian relief organizations, assisted in establishing an environment in which relief operations could proceed. Because of the proliferation of weapons throughout the country during the many years of civil war, relief efforts included the identification of individuals and groups that posed immediate threats and the removal of visible weapons from circulation. A radio station and newspaper
were established to inform the public regarding the UN force objectives, as well as public service information to enhance security.

As the situation was brought under control by military forces, priority shifted to diplomatic efforts to establish and maintain a lasting truce between competing factions. UNITAF Somalia was amended to include relief-in-place by forces assigned to the United Nations Operation in Somalia, now designated UNOSOM II. The distribution of relief supplies continued while great care was taken to ensure a seamless transition between UNITAF and UNOSOM II forces.

h. Support to Insurgencies

- Insurgencies attempt to exploit actual or perceived governmental weaknesses, such as failure to maintain law and order; inability to respond adequately to disasters; overreaction to civil disturbances; or failure to meet economic, political, ethnic, or social expectations.

- Organizational structures for US support to insurgencies can be overt, low visibility, clandestine, or covert. Each support program is conducted as a special activity within the meaning of section 3.4(h) of Executive Order 12333, 4 December 1981, “US Intelligence Activities,” and is subject to approval by the US Congress.

- The US military principally trains and advises insurgent forces in unconventional warfare tactics, techniques, and procedures. These actions should be integrated with the programs of the other instruments of national power.
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CHAPTER VI
MULTINATIONAL OPERATIONS

“Almost every time military forces have deployed from the United States it has been as a member of -- most often to lead -- coalition operations.”

General Robert W. RisCassi, USA: "Principles for Coalition Warfare", Joint Force Quarterly: Summer 1993

1. General

a. US military operations are often conducted with the armed forces of other nations in pursuit of common objectives.

b. Multinational operations, both those that include combat and those that do not, are conducted within the structure of an alliance or coalition:

   • An alliance is a result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is one example. These alliance operations are technically combined operations, though in common usage combined is often used as synonym for all multinational operations.

   • A coalition is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action, for instance, the coalition that defeated Iraqi aggression against Kuwait in the Gulf War, 1990-1991.

   c. Joint operations as part of an alliance or coalition require close cooperation among all forces and can serve to mass strengths, reduce vulnerabilities, and provide legitimacy. Effectively planned and executed multinational operations should, in addition to achieving common objectives, facilitate unity of effort without diminishing freedom of action and preserve unit integrity and uninterrupted support.

d. Each multinational operation is unique, and key considerations involved in planning and conducting multinational operations vary with the international situation and perspectives, motives, and values of the organization’s members. Whereas alliance members typically have common national political and economic systems, coalitions often bring together nations of diverse cultures for a limited period of time. As long as the coalition members perceive their membership and participation as advancing their individual national interests, the coalition can remain intact. At the point that national objectives or priorities diverge, the coalition breaks down.

e. The Armed Forces of the United States should be prepared to operate within the framework of an alliance or coalition under other-than-US leadership. Following, contributing, and supporting are important roles in multinational operations--often as important as leading. However, US forces will often be the predominant and most capable force within an alliance or coalition and can be expected to play a central leadership role, albeit one founded on mutual respect. Stakes are high, requiring the military leaders of member nations to emphasize common objectives as well as mutual support and respect.
2. Considerations for Multinational Operations

Considerations are shown in Figure VI-1 and discussed below.

a. National Goals. No two nations share exactly the same reasons for entering a coalition or alliance. To some degree, participation within an alliance or coalition requires the subordination of national autonomy by member nations. The glue that binds the multinational force is agreement, however tenuous, on common goals and objectives. However, different national goals, often unstated, cause each nation to measure progress in its own way. Each nation, therefore, can produce differing perceptions of progress. JFCs should strive to understand each nation’s goals and how those goals can affect conflict termination and the desired end state.

b. Unity of Effort

- Motivations of member nations may differ, but multinational objectives should be attainable, clearly defined by the commander or leadership structure of the multinational force, and supported by each member nation. Commanders of multinational forces should carefully consider the types of missions assigned to member forces. Capabilities will often differ substantially between national forces, but sensitivity to and consideration of national honor, pride, and prestige will often be as important to final success as the contributions and capabilities of the national forces themselves. Small
decisions, such as which national forces are involved in the main effort or perhaps play the lead role at the start of an offensive, can have major consequences in multinational operations.

• **Coordinated policy**, particularly on such matters as alliance or coalition commanders’ authority over national logistics (including infrastructure) and theater intelligence, is **required**. Coordinated planning for rules of engagement, fratricide prevention, deception, EW, communications, special weapons, source and employment of reserves, and timing of operations is essential for unity of effort. **Actions to improve interoperability and the ability to share information need to be addressed early** (as early as the development of military systems for formal alliances). **Nations should exchange qualified liaison officers** at the earliest opportunity to ensure mutual understanding and unity of effort.

• Planning is often complicated by participation of all members. Multinational force commanders and staffs should seek to **involve all member nations in the decision-making process**, consistent with the terms established at the founding of the alliance or coalition. **Member recommendations should be sought continuously** by multinational force commanders, but especially during development of COAs and ROE, assignment of missions to national forces, and establishment of priorities of effort.

• **JFCs should establish a working rapport with leaders of other national forces.** A personal, direct relationship can often overcome many of the difficulties associated with multinational operations. **Respect, trust, and the ability to compromise** are essential to building and maintaining a strong team.

c. **Doctrine, Training, and Equipment**

• **Doctrines, operational competence** as a result of training and experience, and **types and quality of equipment can vary substantially** among the military forces of member nations.

• When the situation permits, **JFCs seek opportunities to improve the contributions of other national forces through training assistance and sharing of resources consistent with US and alliance or coalition terms of reference, such as the loan of American equipment (for example, radios, vehicles, or weapons).**

• JFCs implement measures to assess the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of member forces to facilitate **matching missions with capabilities**.

• Where member forces have **unique or special capabilities**, they should be appropriately exploited.

• **Joint and multinational exercises** are key components of joint training and doctrine refinement. Types of exercises include command post exercises and field training exercises. **Simulation** can complement most exercises. Distributed simulation is a means to enhance training between remotely separated forces.
d. Cultural Differences

- Each partner in multinational operations possesses a unique cultural identity—the result of language, values, religious systems, and economic and social outlooks. Even seemingly minor differences, such as dietary restrictions, can have great impact. Commanders should strive to accommodate religious holidays, prayer calls, and other unique cultural traditions important to allies and coalition members, consistent with the situation.

- Language differences often present the most immediate challenge. Specifying an official coalition language can be a sensitive issue. US forces cannot assume that the predominant language will automatically be English. Information loss during translation can be high, and misunderstandings and miscommunications can have disastrous effects.

- To assist with cultural and language challenges, JFCs employ linguists and area experts, often available within or through the Service components or from other US agencies. In some instances, members of Service forces may be especially familiar with the operational area, its cultures, and languages as a result of previous assignments or heritage.

e. Management of Resources. Forces of member nations must be supported either by national assets or through the coalition. Resource contributions will vary between members. Some may contribute logistically, while others contribute military forces. Some may be able to do both. Commanders of multinational forces should seek to ensure that member forces are appropriately supplied and that contributions of member nations are consistent with national capabilities and the terms established at the formation of the alliance and/or coalition. Frequently, JFCs will rely on national political leadership and representatives from such agencies as the Department of State to effect such coordination with the leadership of member nations.
f. National Communications

- JFCs should anticipate that some forces from alliance or coalition member nations will have **direct and near immediate communications capability** from the operational area to their respective national political leadership. This communications capability can facilitate coordination of issues, but it can also be a source of frustration as leaderships external to the operational area may be issuing guidance directly to their deployed national forces.

- JFCs should have a responsive and reliable link to appropriate US agencies and political leadership. Where senior JFCs are in the chain of command between the deployed JFC and the NCA, **provisions should be made for bypassing intermediate points in the chain of command for exceptional and emergency situations**. The conditions and supporting communications systems for such bypassing should be established by the appropriate military and political leadership early.

3. Considerations During the Planning and Execution of Multinational Operations

a. Rules of Engagement

- JFCs should give early attention to developing **ROE that are appropriate to the situation and can be employed by all member forces**. This task is often difficult, requiring the participation and cooperation of senior political and military representatives from member nations. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE may not be achievable because of individual national values and operational employment concepts. However, **JFCs should strive to develop and implement simple ROE** that can be tailored by member forces to their particular situation.

- In many cases, **commanders of deployed member forces may lack the authority to speak on behalf of their nation** in the ROE development process. This lack of authority may require considerable support from coalition political leadership both within and outside the operational area to coordinate and implement appropriate ROE.

b. The Media

- Though not directly related to the conduct of operations, **JFCs seek to facilitate the activities of national and international press organizations**, consistent with requirements for operational security.

- **This task is complicated in a multinational situation** where press corps from each member nation may have their own standards and requirements. JFCs cannot hope to impose control over such efforts and, instead, should seek to work closely with leaders of member forces and their national press elements to develop an open and collegial environment. **Simple ground rules should be established by the senior political and military representatives** of the alliance or coalition at the earliest possible moment to avoid incidents that could jeopardize the operation or detract from coalition cohesion.
c. Local Law Enforcement. US forces will often not have the authority or capability to enforce local laws in the operational area. JFCs should seek clear guidance from the alliance or coalition political leadership during the planning phase of multinational operations. Where local law enforcement organizations are present and capable, JFCs establish systems and procedures to optimize the contributions of indigent law enforcement personnel in facilitating operations and protecting lives and property in the operational area. Where local law enforcement systems and organizations are not available, JFCs should consider deploying appropriate US forces early in the deployment flow as well as exploiting the capabilities of other member nations.

d. Command and Control

- Successful multinational operations can center on achieving unity of effort from the outset. Participating nations need to provide the multinational force commander sufficient authority over their national forces to achieve this unity. In turn, multinational force commanders and staffs exercise their authority to unify the efforts of the multinational force toward common objectives. Such authority, however, is seldom absolute. Consensus and compromise are important aspects of decisionmaking in multinational organizations.

- Alliances typically have developed C2 structures, systems, and procedures. Alliance forces typically mirror their alliance composition, with the predominant nation providing the alliance force commander. Staffs are integrated, and subordinate commands are often led by senior representatives from member nations. Doctrine, standardization agreements, and a certain political harmony characterize alliances. Figure VI-2 provides an example of a command structure within an alliance.

- Coalitions are typically formed on short notice and can include forces not accustomed to working together. Establishing command relationships and operating procedures within the multinational force is often challenging. It involves complex issues that require a willingness to compromise in order to best achieve the common objectives. National pride and prestige can limit options for organization of the coalition command, as many nations prefer to not subordinate their forces to those of other nations. Though many C2 structures can be employed, coalitions are most often characterized by one of two basic structures: parallel command or lead nation command.

  - Parallel command exists when nations retain control of their deployed forces. If a nation within the coalition elects to exercise autonomous control of its force, a parallel command structure exists. Such structures can be organized with: (1) Nations aligned in a common effort, each retaining national control and (2) Nations aligned in a common effort, some retaining national control, with others permitting control of their forces by a central authority or another member force. Parallel command is the simplest to establish and often the organization of choice. Coalition forces control operations through existing national chains of command. Coalition decisions are made through a coordinated effort of the political and senior military leadership of member nations and forces. It is common for other command structures to emerge as
coalitions mature, but the parallel model is often the starting point. Figure VI-3 depicts the command relationships developed and employed by coalition forces for Operation DESERT STORM. These relationships represented a parallel command structure, with coordination facilitated by the Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center (C3IC). The C3IC was specifically established to facilitate exchange of intelligence and operational information, ensure coordination of operations among coalition forces, and provide a forum where routine issues could be resolved informally and collegially among staff officers.

- **Lead Nation Command.** In this arrangement, the nation providing the preponderance of forces and resources typically provides the commander of the coalition force. The lead nation can retain its organic C2 structure, employing other national forces as subordinate formations. More commonly, the lead nation command is characterized by some integration of staffs. The composition of staffs is determined by the coalition leadership.

- **Combination.** Lead nation and parallel command structures can exist simultaneously within a
coalition. This combination occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the command arrangement employed by the Gulf War coalition. Western national forces were aligned under US leadership, while Arabic national forces were aligned under Saudi leadership.

- **Coordination and Liaison**

  Regardless of the command structure, coalitions require significant coordination and liaison. Differences in language, equipment, capabilities, doctrine, and procedures are some of the interoperability challenges that mandate close cooperation. Coordination and liaison are important considerations in alliances as well.

  **Robust liaison is critical** to developing and maintaining unity of effort in coalition operations. Liaison exchange should occur between senior and subordinate commands and between lateral or like forces, such as between national SOF units or naval forces.
Multinational Operations

• Commanders and liaison teams require reliable communications, appropriate to the operational area and the coalition’s concept of operations. JFCs often deploy robust liaison teams with sufficient communications equipment to permit instantaneous communication between national force commanders. This communication is especially important during the early stages of coalition formation and planning. JFCs should appropriately prioritize their liaison requirements during deployment into the operational area to facilitate communications as soon as possible.

• Plans and Procedures

• Plans in multinational operations should be kept simple and focused on clearly defined objectives. The more complex the operation or the more players involved, the more time and effort it takes to plan and coordinate the operation. Plans should be issued far enough in advance to allow sufficient time for member forces to conduct their own planning and rehearsals. Some alliance or coalition member forces may not have the planning and execution dexterity and flexibility characteristic of US forces. Accordingly, JFCs should ensure that the tempo of planning and execution does not exceed the capabilities of national forces. Effective liaison and reliable communications can facilitate subordinate planning and execution.

• Liaison officers between multinational forces should be operationally proficient, innovative, and tenacious, but at the same time diplomatic and sensitive to the multinational forces with whom they are detailed. They should have the authority to speak for their JFCs or national force commanders.
• To the extent possible, **procedures should be standardized within the multinational force**, especially if mistakes can result in failed missions or fratricide. Procedures such as control of attacking aircraft, maneuver control and fire support coordinating measures, and requests for supporting fires should be standardized. Where this is not possible, liaison teams should be tasked to facilitate coordination and deconflict operations. JFCs should fully exploit all capabilities available to them to coordinate operations, including Marine air/naval gunfire liaison companies and/or teams and Air Force tactical air control parties.

• **Commanders may elect to organize the operational area** that supports the command’s organization. For example, when a parallel command structure is employed, there are advantages to assigning AOs to national forces. This assignment permits relative autonomy of operations and can significantly deconflict operations. This technique was successfully employed by JTF Bravo during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, where American, British, French, and Spanish forces operated in an area approximately 170 by 70 kilometers in size.

e. **Intelligence**

• **The collection, production, and dissemination of intelligence can be a major challenge.** Alliance or coalition members normally operate separate intelligence systems in support of their own policy and military forces. These national systems may vary widely in sophistication and focus. Members may not have capabilities similar to the United States to collect and process intelligence. Nonetheless, each nation’s contributions and capabilities should be appropriately incorporated and exploited. JFCs should rapidly establish a system that optimizes each nation’s contributions and provides member forces a common intelligence picture, tailored to their requirements and consistent with disclosure policies of member nations.

• **JFCs need to determine what intelligence may be shared** with the forces of other nations early in the planning process. The limits of intelligence sharing and the procedures for doing so need to be determined during initial coordination and negotiation between senior political and military representatives from member nations.

• **The National Disclosure Policy provides initial guidance.** It promulgates national policy and procedures in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definitions of terms, release arrangements, and other guidance. It also establishes interagency mechanisms and procedures for the effective implementation of the policy. In the absence of sufficient guidance, JFCs should share only that information that is mission essential, affects lower-level operations, and is perishable.

f. **Logistics**

• **Multinational logistics is a major challenge.** Potential problem areas, as shown in Figure VI-4, include differences in logistic doctrine; stockage levels; logistic mobility; interoperability; infrastructure; competition between Services and
Multinational Operations

### CONSIDERATIONS IN MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential Problem Areas Include...</th>
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<tr>
<td>• Difference in Logistic Doctrine.</td>
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<td>• Stockage Levels.</td>
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<td>• Logistic Mobility.</td>
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<td>• Interoperability.</td>
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<td>• Infrastructure.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Competition between Service, Alliances, and/or coalition members for common support.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• National Resource Limitations.</td>
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#### Figure VI-4. Considerations in Multinational Logistics

alliance and/or coalition members for common support; and national resource limitations. Nonetheless, JFCs need to coordinate the use of facilities such as highways, rail lines, ports, and airfields in a manner that supports mission accomplishment. The notion that logistics is primarily a national responsibility cannot supplant detailed logistic planning in the operational area. **JFCs typically form multinational logistic staff sections early** to facilitate logistic coordination and support multinational operations.

- **Standardization of logistic systems and procedures** can ease the logistic challenges. **Interoperability of equipment**, especially in adjacent or subordinate multinational units, is desirable and is considered by operational planners during concept development. Significant logistic operations include acquisition and distribution of food stuffs, fuels, ammunition, and spare parts; transportation; field services; and health service support.

- **Contracting.** Contracting for various types of support, especially labor, facilities, common supplies, and transportation, **is a significant aspect of many military operations.** Procurement of materiel and services in the joint force’s operational area is done either through contracting on the open market or when the host nation offers support through specific government agencies. The host nation may also restrict the joint force’s contracting ability as it manages essential services for the host population. Requirements for materiel and services should be consolidated and validated as operationally required by the JFC’s staff. A determination of appropriate source for meeting the requirements should then be conducted (for example, supply system, host-nation support, or contracting). If contracting is deemed appropriate, JFCs should ensure that sufficient, qualified contracting officers are available from the outset to leverage the capabilities available within the operational area. When required, contracting officers should be paired with linguists and should be prepared to operate in currencies or commodities other than US dollars.
• **Host-Nation Support.** Nations hosting US joint forces may offer logistic support or limit the ability of the joint force to contract support only through host-government agencies. JFCs can consider centralizing host-nation support functions so that requirements are both identified and supported, consistent with mission accomplishment. Nations might agree to have certain common supplies and support provided by member nations to other alliance or coalition forces. Nations might also agree on whether a multinational commander will have the authority to conclude host-nation support arrangements on behalf of participating nations.

• **Integration of Multinational Units.** If some level of force integration is necessary to conduct operations, planners should determine where the integration of units and headquarters needs to occur. Such decisions affect the deployment priorities and schedules for personnel and equipment. If integration is to occur at an intermediate staging base or port of debarkation, its impact on those bases or ports can be significant and needs to be addressed and accounted for by base and/or port commanders and staffs.

g. **Protection**

• **Protection measures** that apply to joint operations are appropriate also for multinational situations. JFCs consider, for example, air defense, defensive counterair, reconnaissance and surveillance, and security measures for the multinational force. These considerations extend to NBC warning and decontamination.

• **Avoidance of fratricide**, especially between member forces, is important because of its potential negative impact on alliance or coalition unity and trust between member forces. JFCs should carefully assess the risks of fratricide between member forces involved in COAs being considered and actively seek to minimize the fratricide potential through a combination of operational and technological solutions and expedients.
**APPENDIX A**

**PRINCIPLES OF WAR**

**Principles of War.** The principles of war guide warfighting at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are the enduring bedrock of US military doctrine.

a. **Objective**

- The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective.

- The objective of combat operations is the destruction of the enemy armed forces’ capabilities and will to fight. The objective of an operation other than war might be more difficult to define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. Objectives must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not contribute directly to achieving the objective.

b. **Offensive**

- The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative.

- Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across all levels of war.

- Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary expedient and must seek every opportunity to seize or reseize the initiative. An offensive spirit must therefore be inherent in the conduct of all defensive operations.

c. **Mass**

- The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time to achieve decisive results.

- To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities where they will have decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass must often be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

d. **Economy of Force**

- The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts.

- Economy of force is the judicious employment and distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as limited attacks, defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive point and time.
e. Maneuver

- The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power.

- Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—or threaten delivery of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver keeps the enemy off balance and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually posing new problems for the enemy.

f. Unity of Command

- The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander for every objective.

- Unity of command means that all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not necessarily part of the same command structure. In multinational and interagency operations, unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes paramount. Unity of effort—coordination through cooperation and common interests—is an essential complement to unity of command.

g. Security

- The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage.

- Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases friendly combat power and preserves freedom of action.

h. Surprise

- The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which it is unprepared.

- Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise include speed in decisionmaking, information sharing, and force movement; effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; OPSEC; and variations in tactics and methods of operation.

i. Simplicity

- The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.
• Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially critical to success in combined operations.
1. General

The estimate process is central to formulating and updating military action to meet the requirements of any situation. The estimate process should be used by commanders and staffs at all levels. Though its central framework for organizing inquiry and decision is essentially the same for any level of command, specific detailed questions within each part of this framework will vary depending on the level and type of operation. This framework is presented below. Specific material appropriate to joint force operations, especially for theaters of war and theaters of operations, has been added to flesh out the basic framework for readers of this publication.

2. Mission

a. Mission Analysis

• Determine the higher command’s purpose. Analyze national security and national military strategic direction as well as appropriate guidance in alliance and coalition directions, including long- and short-term objectives for conflict termination. Conflict termination objectives should include the military objectives that will provide the basis for realizing the political aim regardless of whether an imposed or negotiated termination is sought.

• Determine specified and implied tasks. If multiple, determine priorities.

b. Mission Statement

• Express in terms of who, what, when, where (task parameters), and why (purpose).

• Frame as a clear, concise statement of the essential tasks to be accomplished and the purpose to be achieved.

3. Situation and Courses of Action

a. Situation Analysis

• Geostrategic Context

  • Domestic and international context: political and/or diplomatic long- and short-term causes of conflict; domestic influences, including public will, competing demands for resources, and political, economic, legal, and moral constraints; international interests (reinforcing or conflicting with US interests, including positions of parties neutral to the conflict), international law, positions of international organizations, and other competing or distracting international situations.

  • Characteristics of the operational area, including: military geography (topography, hydrography, climate, and weather); transportation; telecommunications; economics (organization, industrial base, mobilization capacity); social conditions; science and technology factors affecting the operational area.
• Analysis of the Enemy. Enemy situation, including capabilities and vulnerabilities (at the theater level, commanders will normally have available a formal intelligence estimate):
  • Broad military COAs being taken and available in the future.
  • Political and military intentions and objectives (to extent known).
  • Military strategic and operational advantages and limitations.
  • Possible external military support.
  • Center(s) of gravity (strategic and operational).
  • Specific operational characteristics: strength, composition, location and disposition, reinforcements, logistics, time and space factors (including basing utilized and available), and combat efficiency (including proficiency in joint operations).

• Friendly Situation. Should follow the same pattern used for the analysis of the enemy. At the theater level, commanders will normally have available specific supporting estimates, including personnel, logistics, and C4 estimates; multinational operations require specific analysis of alliance or coalition partner objectives, capabilities, and vulnerabilities.

• Restrictions. Those limitations to the use or threat of use of force that are imposed or necessary to support other worldwide strategic requirements and associated diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts.

• Assumptions. Assumptions are intrinsically important factors on which the conduct of the operation is based and must be noted as such.

• Deductions. Deductions from above analysis should yield estimates of relative combat power, including enemy capabilities that can affect mission accomplishment.

b. Courses of Action Analysis. COAs development (based on the above analysis and a creative determination of how the mission will be accomplished). Each COA must be adequate, feasible, and acceptable. State all practical COAs open to the commander that, if successful, will accomplish the mission. Generally, at the theater level, each COA will constitute a theater strategic or operational concept and should outline:

  • Major strategic and operational tasks to be accomplished in the order in which they are to be accomplished.
  • Forces required.
  • Logistic concept.
  • Deployment concept.
  • Estimate of time required to reach termination objectives.
  • Concept for maintaining a theater reserve.

4. Analysis of Opposing Courses of Action

  a. Determine the probable effect of possible enemy COAs on the success of each friendly COA.
b. Conduct this analysis in an orderly manner: by time phasing, geographic location, and functional event. Consider the potential actions of subordinates two echelons down.

c. Consider conflict termination issues; think through own action, enemy reaction, counterreaction.

d. Conclude with revalidation of suitability, adequacy, and feasibility; determine additional requirements, if any; make required modifications; list advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

5. **Comparison of Own Courses of Action**

   a. Evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of each COA.

   b. Compare with respect to governing factors:

       • Fixed values for joint operations (the principles of war, the fundamentals of joint warfare, and the elements of operational art).

       • Other critical factors (for example, political constraints).

       • Mission accomplishment.

   c. If appropriate, merge elements of different COAs into one.

6. **Decision**

   Translate the selected COA into a concise statement of what the force, as a whole, is to do and explain, as may be appropriate, the following elements: when, where, how, and why.
Joint Pub 3-0 is based on the following primary references:


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APPENDIX D
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GLOSSARY
PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ADCON administrative control
AFFOR Air Force forces (a Service component of a joint force)
AI air interdiction
AID Agency for International Development
AO area of operations
AOR area of responsibility
ARCENT US Army component, US Central Command
ARFOR Army forces (a Service component of a joint force)
ATF amphibious task force

C2 command and control
C2W command and control warfare
C3IC Coalition Coordination, Communications, and Integration Center
C4I command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CA combat assessment
CENTAF US Air Force component, US Central Command (9th AF)
CINC commander in chief of a combatant command
CJTF commander of a joint task force
COA course of action
COCOM combatant command (command authority)
COMAFFOR commander, Air Force forces (a Service component commander)
COMMZ communications zone
CONUS continental United States
DART Disaster Assistance Response Team
DIRLAUTH direct liaison authorized

EW electronic warfare
FID foreign internal defense
FLOT forward line of own troops
FSCL fire support coordination line
IPB intelligence preparation of the battlespace
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operation Planning and Execution System</td>
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<td>JRA</td>
<td>joint rear area</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSCP</td>
<td>Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan</td>
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<td>JOA</td>
<td>joint special operations area</td>
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<td>JTCB</td>
<td>Joint Targeting Coordination Board</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>JTTP</td>
<td>joint tactics, techniques, and procedures</td>
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<td>LOC</td>
<td>lines of communications</td>
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<td>MARCENT</td>
<td>US Marine Corps component, US Central Command</td>
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<td>MARFOR</td>
<td>US Marine Corps forces (a Service component of a joint force)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVCENT</td>
<td>US Navy component, US Central Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>NAVFOR</td>
<td>US Navy forces (a Service component of a joint force)</td>
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<td>NBC</td>
<td>nuclear, biological, and chemical</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<td>NDCS</td>
<td>national drug control strategy</td>
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<td>NEO</td>
<td>noncombatant evacuation operation</td>
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<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
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<td>OFDA</td>
<td>Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
<td>operational control</td>
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<td>OPSEC</td>
<td>operations security</td>
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<td>PDF</td>
<td>Panamanian Defense Forces</td>
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<td>PSYOP</td>
<td>psychological operations</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>rules of engagement</td>
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<td>special operations component</td>
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<td>special operations forces</td>
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<td>SWPA</td>
<td>Southwest Pacific Area</td>
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<td>TACON</td>
<td>tactical control</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UNAAF</td>
<td>Unified Action Armed Forces</td>
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<td>unified task force</td>
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<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Somalia</td>
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<tr>
<td>USCINCENT</td>
<td>Commander in Chief, US Central Command</td>
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<td>USCINCEUR</td>
<td>US Commander in Chief, Europe</td>
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<td>USSOCOM</td>
<td>US Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
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PART II-TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

glossary

**air interdiction.** Air operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distance from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**apportionment.** In the general sense, distribution for planning of limited resources among competing requirements. Specific apportionments (e.g., air sorties and forces for planning) are described as apportionment of air sorties and forces for planning, etc. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**apportionment (air).** The determination and assignment of the total expected effort by percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the various air operations and/or geographic areas for a given period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area of operations.** An operational area defined by the joint force commander for land and naval forces. Areas of operation do not typically encompass the entire operational area of the joint force commander, but should be large enough for component commanders to accomplish their missions and protect their forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**area of responsibility.** 1. The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. 2. In naval usage, a predefined area of enemy terrain for which supporting ships are responsible for covering by fire on known targets or targets of opportunity and by observation. Also called AOR. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**battle damage assessment.** The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective. Battle damage assessment can be applied to the employment of all types of weapon systems (air, ground, naval, and special forces weapon systems) throughout the range of military operations. Battle damage assessment is primarily an intelligence responsibility with required inputs and coordination from the operators. Battle damage assessment is composed of physical damage assessment, functional damage assessment, and target system assessment. Also called BDA. See also combat assessment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**boundary.** A line which delineates surface areas for the purpose of facilitating coordination and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units, formations, or areas. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**campaign.** A series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**campaign plan.** A plan for a series of related military operations aimed to achieve strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**campaign planning.** The process whereby combatant commanders and subordinate joint force commanders translate national or theater strategy into operational concepts through the development of campaign plans. Campaign planning may begin during deliberate planning when the actual threat, national guidance, and available resources become evident, but
is normally not completed until after the National Command Authorities select the course of action during crisis action planning. Campaign planning is conducted when contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major joint operation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

centers of gravity. Those characteristics, capabilities, or localities from which a military force derives its freedom of action, physical strength, or will to fight. (Joint Pub 1-02.)
civil affairs. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)
close air support. Air action by fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft against hostile targets which are in close proximity to friendly forces and which require detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of those forces. Also called CAS. (Joint Pub 1-02)
coalition force. A force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose. (Joint Pub 1-02)
combat assessment. The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components, (a) battle damage assessment, (b) munitions effects assessment, and (c) reattack recommendations. The objective of combat assessment is to identify recommendations for the course of military operations. The J-3 is normally the single point of contact for combat assessment at the joint force level, assisted by the joint force J-2. Also called CA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 ("Armed Forces"), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force
commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COMC. See also combatant command; operational control; tactical control. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command and control warfare. The integrated use of operations security (OPSEC), military deception, psychological operations (PSYOP), electronic warfare (EW), and physical destruction, mutually supported by intelligence, to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy adversary command and control capabilities, while protecting friendly command and control capabilities against such actions. Command and control warfare applies across the operational continuum and all levels of conflict. Also called C2W. C2W is both offensive and defensive: a. counter-C2—To prevent effective C2 of adversary forces by denying information to, influencing, degrading, or destroying the adversary C2 system. b. C2-protection—To maintain effective command and control of own forces by turning to friendly advantage or negating adversary efforts to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy the friendly C2 system. See electronic warfare; military deception; operations security; psychological operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

commander’s estimate of the situation. A logical process of reasoning by which a commander considers all the circumstances affecting the military situation and arrives at a decision as to a course of action to be taken to accomplish the mission. A commander’s estimate which considers a military situation so far in the future as to require major assumptions, is called a commander’s long-range estimate of the situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the authority of commanders in the chain of command. (Joint Pub 1-02)

concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander’s concept. (Joint Pub 1-02)

contingency. An emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations, and equipment. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have
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the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

counterdrug. Those active measures taken to detect, monitor, and counter the production, trafficking, and use of illegal drugs. Also called CD. (Joint Pub 1-02)

coup de main. An offensive operation that capitalizes on surprise and simultaneous execution of supporting operations to achieve success in one swift stroke. (Joint Pub 1-02)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United States, its territories, citizens, military forces, possessions, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a condition of such diplomatic, economic, political, or military importance that commitment of US military forces and resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

economy of force theater. Theater in which risk is accepted to allow a concentration of sufficient force in the theater of focus. (Joint Pub 1-02)

electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack—That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection—That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP. c. electronic warfare support—That division of electronic warfare involving actions taskied by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), both communications intelligence (COMINT), and electronics intelligence (ELINT). (Joint Pub 1-02)

expedition. A military operation conducted by an armed force to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country. (Joint Pub 1-02.)

expeditionary force. An armed force organized to accomplish a specific
fire support coordination line. A line established by the appropriate land or amphibious force commander to ensure coordination of fire not under the commander’s control but which may affect current tactical operations. The fire support coordination line is used to coordinate fires of air, ground, or sea weapons systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The fire support coordination line should follow well-defined terrain features. The establishment of the fire support coordination line must be coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the fire support coordination line without prior coordination with the land or amphibious force commander provided the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on or to the rear of the line. Attacks against surface targets behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate land or amphibious force commander. Also called FSCL. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of Joint Pub 1-02.)

humanitarian assistance. Programs conducted to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions such as human pain, disease, hunger, or privation that might present a serious threat to life or that can result in great damage to or loss of property. Humanitarian assistance provided by US forces is limited in scope and duration. The assistance provided is designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation civil authorities or agencies that may have the primary responsibility for providing humanitarian assistance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

in extremis. A situation of such exceptional urgency that immediate action must be taken to minimize imminent loss of life or catastrophic degradation of the political or military situation. (Joint Pub 1-02)

interdiction. An action to divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s surface military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

fire support coordinating measure. A measure employed by land or amphibious commanders to facilitate the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide safeguards for friendly forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force. A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments, operating under a single joint force commander. (Joint Pub 1-02)

functional component command. A command normally, but not necessarily, composed of forces of two or more Military Departments which may be established across the range of military operations to perform particular operational missions that may be of short duration or may extend over a period of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

joint force commander. A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (Joint Pub 1-02)
**joint force air component commander.**

The joint force air component commander derives authority from the joint force commander who has the authority to exercise operational control, assign missions, direct coordination among subordinate commanders, redirect and organize forces to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall mission. The joint force commander will normally designate a joint force air component commander. The joint force air component commander’s responsibilities will be assigned by the joint force commander (normally these would include, but not be limited to, planning, coordination, allocation, and tasking based on the joint force commander’s apportionment decision). Using the joint force commander’s guidance and authority, and in coordination with other Service component commanders and other assigned or supporting commanders, the joint force air component commander will recommend to the joint force commander apportionment of air sorties to various missions or geographic areas. Also called JFACC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint force maritime component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of maritime forces and assets, planning and coordinating maritime operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force maritime component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force maritime component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of maritime forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFMCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint force special operations component commander.** The commander within a unified command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to the establishing commander for making recommendations on the proper employment of special operations forces and assets, planning and coordinating special operations, or accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned. The joint force special operations component commander is given the authority necessary to accomplish missions and tasks assigned by the establishing commander. The joint force special operations component commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control capabilities. Also called JFSOCC. (Joint Pub 1-02)
**joint operations.** A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not create joint forces. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint operations area.** An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Joint operations areas are particularly useful when operations are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are to be conducted on the boundaries between theaters. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**joint special operations area.** A restricted area of land, sea, and airspace assigned by a joint force commander to the commander of a joint special operations force to conduct special operations activities. The commander of joint special operations forces may further assign a specific area or sector within the joint special operations area to a subordinate commander for mission execution. The scope and duration of the special operations forces’ mission, friendly and hostile situation, and politico-military considerations all influence the number, composition, and sequencing of special operations forces deployed into a joint special operations area. It may be limited in size to accommodate a discrete direct action mission or may be extensive enough to allow a continuing broad range of unconventional warfare operations. Also called JSOA. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**lines of operations.** Lines which define the directional orientation of the force in time and space in relation to the enemy. They connect the force with its base of operations and its objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**military deception.** Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decisionmakers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission. The five categories of military deception are: a. strategic military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of senior military commanders to result in adversary military policies and actions that support the originator’s strategic military objectives, policies, and operations. b. operational military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of operational-level commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Operational military deception is planned and conducted in a theater of war to support campaigns and major operations. c. tactical military deception—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of tactical commanders to result in adversary actions that are favorable to the originator’s objectives and operations. Tactical military deception is planned and conducted to support battles and engagements. d. Service military deception—Military deception planned and executed by the Services that pertain to Service support to joint operations. Service military deception is designed to protect and enhance the combat capabilities of Service forces and systems. e. military deception in support of operations security (OPSEC)—Military deception planned and executed by and in support of all levels of command to support the prevention of the inadvertent compromise of sensitive or classified activities,
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**Glossary**

**capabilities, or intentions.** Deceptive OPSEC measures are designed to distract foreign intelligence away from, or provide cover for, military operations and activities. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**mission type order.** 1. Order issued to a lower unit that includes the accomplishment of the total mission assigned to the higher headquarters. 2. Order to a unit to perform a mission without specifying how it is to be accomplished. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**multinational operations.** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**national military strategy.** The art and science of distributing and applying military power to attain national objectives in peace and war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**national security strategy.** The art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security. Also called national strategy or grand strategy. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operational art.** The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design, and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities of all levels of war. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operational authority.** That authority exercised by a commander in the chain of command, defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or a support relationship. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operational control.** Transferable command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of combatant command. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Operational control may be delegated and is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. Operational control includes authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the command. Operational control should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Operational control normally provides full authority to organize commands and forces and to employ those forces as the commander in operational control considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control does not, in and of itself, include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. Also called OPCON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operational level of war.** The level of war at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to
accomplish strategic objectives within theaters or areas of operations. Activities at this level link tactics and strategy by establishing operational objectives needed to accomplish the strategic objectives, sequencing events to achieve the operational objectives, initiating actions, and applying resources to bring about and sustain these events. These activities imply a broader dimension of time or space than do tactics; they ensure the logistic and administrative support of tactical forces, and provide the means by which tactical successes are exploited to achieve strategic objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**operations security.** A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to:

a. Identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems.

b. Determine indicators adversary intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries.

c. Select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**peace operations.** The umbrella term encompassing peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and any other military, paramilitary, or nonmilitary action taken in support of a diplomatic peacemaking process. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**preventive diplomacy.** Diplomatic actions, taken in advance of a predictable crisis, aimed at resolving disputes before violence breaks out. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**reconnaissance.** A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**Service component command.** A command consisting of the Service component commander and all those Service forces, such as individuals, units, detachments, organizations and installations under the command including the support forces, that have been assigned to a combatant command, or further assigned to a subordinate unified command or joint task force. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**specified command.** A command that has a broad, continuing mission, normally functional, and is established and so designated by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It normally is composed of forces from a single Military Department. (Joint Pub 1-02)
**strategic estimate.** The estimate of the broad strategic factors that influence the determination of missions, objectives, and courses of action. The estimate is continuous and includes the strategic direction received from the National Command Authorities or the authoritative body of an alliance or coalition. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**strategic level of war.** The level of war at which a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic security objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to accomplish these objectives. Activities at this level establish national and multinational military objectives; sequence initiatives; define limits and assess risks for the use of military and other instruments of national power; develop global plans or theater war plans to achieve those objectives; and provide military forces and other capabilities in accordance with strategic plans. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**strike.** An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**support.** 1. The action of a force which aids, protects, complements, or sustains another force in accordance with a directive requiring such action. 2. A unit which helps another unit in battle. Aviation, artillery, or naval gunfire may be used as a support for infantry. 3. A part of any unit held back at the beginning of an attack as a reserve. 4. An element of a command which assists, protects, or supplies other forces in combat. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**supported commander.** The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**supporting commander.** A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**surveillance.** The systematic observation of aerospace, surface or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**tactical control.** Command authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned. Tactical control is inherent in operational control. Tactical control may be delegated to, and exercised at any level at or below the level of combatant command. Also called TACON. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**tactical level of war.** The level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. (Joint Pub 1-02)
**theater of focus.** A theater in which operations are most critical to national interests and are assigned the highest priority for allocation of resources. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**theater of operations.** A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**theater of war.** Defined by the National Command Authorities or the geographic combatant commander, the area of air, land, and water that is, or may become, directly involved in the conduct of the war. A theater of war does not normally encompass the geographic combatant commander’s entire area of responsibility and may contain more than one theater of operations. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**theater strategy.** The art and science of developing integrated strategic concepts and courses of action directed toward securing the objectives of national and alliance or coalition security policy and strategy by the use of force, threatened use of force, or operations not involving the use of force within a theater. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**unified action.** A broad generic term that describes the wide scope of actions (including the synchronization of activities with governmental and non-governmental agencies) taking place within unified commands, subordinate unified commands, or joint task forces under the overall direction of the commanders of those commands. (Joint Pub 1-02)

**unified command.** A command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander and composed of significant assigned components of two or more Military Departments, and which is established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Also called unified combatant command. (Joint Pub 1-02)
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All joint doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures are organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Pub 3-0 is the keystone joint operations publication. The diagram below illustrates an overview of the development process:

**STEP #1**
*Project Proposal*
- Submitted by Services, CINCS, or Joint Staff to fill extant operational void
- J-7 validates requirement with Services and CINCs
- J-7 initiates Program Directive

**STEP #2**
*Program Directive*
- J-7 formally staffs with Services and CINCS
- Includes scope of project, references, milestones, and who will develop drafts
- J-7 releases Program Directive to Lead Agent. Lead Agent can be Service, CINC, or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate

**STEP #3**
*Two Drafts*
- Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub
- PRA develops two draft pubs
- PRA staffs each draft with CINCS, Services, and Joint Staff

**STEP #4**
*CJCS Approval*
- Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff
- Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for coordination with Services and CINCS
- Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a Joint Publication

**STEP #5**
*Assessments/Revision*
- The CINCS receive the pub and begin to assess it during use
- 18 to 24 months following publication, the Director J-7 will solicit a written report from the combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of each pub and the need for any urgent changes or earlier-than-scheduled revisions
- No later than 5 years after development, each pub is revised