IRREGULAR WARFARE: COUNTERING IRREGULAR THREATS

JOINT OPERATING CONCEPT

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Distribution Statement A
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This concept reflects the continued evolution in Department of Defense thinking about future security challenges and outlines the Department's approach to improving its capabilities and increasing its capacity for countering irregular threats. As part of this effort, the concept probes more deeply into the nature of these threats and the approach required to address them, to include striking the appropriate balance between population-focused and enemy-focused action. This concept envisions a collaborative process by which all agencies synchronize and integrate their activities and commit to a multinational, multidisciplinary effort to counter irregular threats posed by state and non-state adversaries.

The Department of Defense leads for the Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats Joint Operating Concept (JOC) v. 2.0, U.S. Joint Forces Command and U.S. Special Operations Command, co-authored this concept. They developed it jointly with the Joint Staff, Services, Combatant Commands, and Agencies through the use of joint and service operational lessons learned, joint wargames, seminars, workshops and other concept development venues.

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IRREGULAR WARFARE: COUNTERING IRREGULAR THREATS
JOINT OPERATING CONCEPT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Joint operating concepts describe how the joint force is expected to conduct joint operations within a military campaign in the future. They identify the broad military capabilities necessary to achieve the ends envisioned by the concept.\(^1\) Since the original version of the *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept* was approved in September 2007, the understanding of irregular warfare has continued to evolve. Battlefield experience, further reflection, and official guidance led to the decision to update the concept in advance of the normal revision cycle. Events such as joint and Service wargames, workshops, seminars, and joint experimentation have all contributed to the development of thinking about irregular warfare.

Official guidance has directed a continuing quest for better ways to prepare for and address irregular threats. The *Quadrennial Roles and Missions Report*, released in January 2009, cites irregular warfare as one of six core mission areas for the entire joint force.\(^2\) The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, also published in January 2009, states that we must “build a balanced and versatile force” to accomplish a variety of missions, especially to improve combat capabilities with respect to irregular enemies.\(^3\) The *Department of Defense Directive 3000.07* “recognizes that irregular warfare is as strategically important as traditional warfare.”\(^4\) In addition, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated in a January 2009 *Foreign Affairs* article: “As secretary of defense, I have repeatedly made the argument in favor of institutionalizing counterinsurgency skills and the ability to conduct stability and support operations.”\(^5\)

This joint operating concept (JOC) is part of the effort to identify and institutionalize these skills and abilities. The twofold purpose of this document is to articulate how the joint force must operate to counter irregular threats and to guide force development, materiel and non-materiel capability development, and experimentation. To that end, this

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\(^1\) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3010.02B, 27 January 2006. See also Mattis, James N., *Vision for Joint Concept Development*, 28 May 2009 (see page 3, paragraph 1 for a description of how concepts differ from doctrine).


JOC describes how the future joint force will conduct operations, when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, to prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat non-state actors, as well as state actors who pose irregular threats. The joint force must be prepared to address them without compromising its ability to address conventional threats.

This document assumes that “whole-of-government” efforts are critical to the joint force’s success in countering most irregular threats. While this JOC does not presume to tell other agencies how to conduct their activities to counter irregular threats, it does identify what the joint force must do to support a whole-of-government effort. Since irregular threats are not purely military problems, many of the responses required are not purely military either. Moreover, due to the complex and amorphous nature of these threats, many of these contests will not end with decisive military victory. They are more likely to require long-term involvement to remedy, reduce, manage, or mitigate the causes of violent conflict. For those threats deemed to require a U.S. response, the joint force must find multidimensional approaches in tandem with other partners.

The irregular warfare problem is defined in this joint operating concept as follows: Adaptive adversaries such as terrorists, insurgents, and criminal networks as well as states will increasingly resort to irregular forms of warfare as effective ways to challenge conventional military powers. Advances in technology and other trends in the environment will render such irregular threats ever more lethal, capable of producing widespread chaos, and otherwise difficult to counter. These threats are enmeshed in the population and increasingly empowered by astute use of communications, cyberspace, and technology, such that their impact extends regionally and globally. Many of these conflicts are essentially contests for influence and legitimacy over relevant populations.

The joint force approach as identified in this joint operating concept is as follows: To prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular threats, the joint force must seek to work in concert with other governmental agencies and multinational partners, and, where appropriate, the host nation to understand the situation in depth, plan and act in concert, and continually assess and adapt their approach in response to the dynamic and complex nature of the problem. This will be achieved through a sustained and balanced approach aimed at both the threats themselves as well as the population and the causes and

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6 A whole of government approach is an approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal. Army Field Manual FM 3-07, Stability Operations, October 2008, 1-17.
conditions that give rise to the threats. The goal is to enhance a local partner’s legitimacy and influence over a population by addressing the causes of conflict and building the partner’s capacity to provide security, good governance, and economic development.

**The approach in detail:** The approach to the problem is to prevent, deter, disrupt, or defeat irregular threats. Prevention is the primary focus of effort, since it is preferable to deal with incipient threats and the conditions that give rise to them. Once a threat is manifest the joint force will aim to deter, disrupt, or defeat it.

There are principally five activities or operations that are undertaken in sequence, in parallel, or in blended form in a coherent campaign to address irregular threats: counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (SO). In addition to these five core activities, there are a host of key related activities including strategic communications, information operations of all kinds, psychological operations, civil-military operations, and support to law enforcement, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations in which the joint force may engage to counter irregular threats.

In order to maximize the prospect of success, the joint force must understand the population and operating environment, including the complex historical, political, socio-cultural, religious, economic and other causes of violent conflict. The joint force must adopt collaborative frameworks to understand, plan, act, assess, and adapt in concert with U.S. Government (USG) interagency and multinational partners and the host nation. Adequate frameworks for such collaboration do not currently exist in any codified or institutionalized form, although a variety of ad hoc mechanisms have been used and various studies have proposed such frameworks.

In planning and executing these collaborative operations, the joint force must be prepared to give priority to the battle of the narrative; undertake persistent engagement and sustained effort; build partner capability; employ a calibrated approach to the use of force that weighs its potential negative consequences; counter irregular threats’ leveraging of cyberspace; overcome institutional seams to address the regional and global linkages of many irregular threats; and enable scalable,

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7 Security force assistance (SFA), a term that overlaps with foreign internal defense, is defined as: activities that directly support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions. (DoD Draft Instruction)

8 These five activities and operations are not listed in an effort to suggest sequence or a linear phasing model. This concept advocates the execution of these five activities in concert with one another to achieve the desired ends.
integrated, distributed operations by general purpose and special operations forces.\textsuperscript{9} Maximizing the prospect of success will likely require additional or improved capabilities as well as potential doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facility, and policy changes.

\textsuperscript{9} According to the USJFCOM Draft Concept, \textit{A Concept for Joint Distributed Operations v.0.6.1, dated 28 October 2009}, distributed operations are those characterized by forces widely dispersed in multiple domains throughout an operational area, often beyond mutually supporting range and operating independently of one another because of distance or differing missions or capabilities, but supported by a variety of nonorganic capabilities. The critical distinction between distributed operations and joint distributed operations is the level and responsiveness of external support to the distributed units.
The Irregular Warfare Problem: Adaptive adversaries such as terrorists, insurgents, and transnational criminal networks as well as states present irregular threats that are not readily countered by military means alone. These threats:

- Are enmeshed in the population
- Extend their reach and impact regionally and globally through use of communications, cyberspace and technology
- Compete with host nation for legitimacy and influence over relevant populations
- Require long-term effort to address the causes of violent conflict

The Approach: To prevent, deter, disrupt and defeat irregular threats, the Joint Force must:

- Understand in depth
- Plan and execute in concert with partners
- Assess and adapt in response to the dynamic and complex nature of the problem

This approach requires balance between defeating the threats and enhancing a local partner’s legitimacy and influence over a population by addressing the causes of conflict and building the partner’s ability to provide security, good governance and economic development.

Required Capabilities:

- The ability to:
  - Gather, assess, and share a holistic understanding of the environment
  - Integrate joint force IW planning with interagency (IA) partners
  - Synchronize joint force IW activities with IA partners
  - Provide support to host nation, multinational (MN), IA, and nongovernmental partners
  - Draw support from host nation, MN, IA, and nongovernmental partners
  - Develop within the host nation an enduring capability to establish and maintain security, provide legitimate governance, and foster development programs that address root causes of conflict and grievance
  - Influence relevant populations by planning and executing coordinated communications strategies and by matching actions to messages
  - Enable partners to plan and execute communications strategies and match activities and messages
  - Conduct cyber operations to influence, disrupt, deny, and defeat adversaries’ activities
  - Conduct local and regional assessments of operational effectiveness
  - Evaluate and understand the potential effects from both population-focused action and enemy-focused action
  - Project or modify IW-related actions and activities with flexible force and operational constructs

Guiding Principles to Counter Irregular Threats:

- Understand complex political, economic, cultural, religious, and historical factors
- Use collaborative frameworks to plan, act, assess and adapt
- Persistent engagement and sustained effort given long-term nature of conflict
- Build partner capability to increase legitimacy of host nation
- Balanced approach to the use of force
- Prioritize the battle of the narrative
- Counter use of cyberspace as a safe-haven and means of attack
- Overcome institutional seams to address complex factors of conflict
- Enable scalable, integrated and distributed operations

IW Operations & Activities:

- Counterterrorism
- Unconventional Warfare
- Foreign Internal Defense
- Counterinsurgency
- Stability Operations

Ends:

A joint force with an improved ability to prevent, and when necessary, counter irregular threats through a balanced approach aimed at both the threats themselves, as well as elements of the operating environment, including the population and the causes and conditions that give rise to the threats.
1. Introduction

Irregular threats of growing reach and power will frequently confront the United States and its strategic partners.\(^{10}\) This joint operating concept describes how the future joint force will conduct activities and operations when directed to prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat non-state actors as well as state actors who pose irregular threats.\(^{11}\) The concept also identifies military capabilities to be applied as part of a “whole-of-government” effort.

Given the prevalence of irregular threats in the current and expected future operating environment, the U.S. military must become as proficient in addressing irregular threats as it is in confronting conventional or regular threats.\(^{12}\) Historically, the joint force has focused its efforts on defeating a state adversary’s conventional military forces. Current and future adversaries are more likely to pose irregular threats, however, and the United States must be able to respond to them. Once considered largely the province of special operations forces (SOF), irregular threats are now understood to fall within the purview of the entire joint force.

The purpose of this document is to guide force development, capability development, and experimentation by:
- Further developing the framework for military professionals to think about irregular warfare (IW)
- Describing how the joint force will conduct future operations to counter irregular threats and provide military support to interagency and international efforts to counter irregular threats
- Identifying the joint force military capabilities required to successfully conduct the IW core mission area
- Identifying potential doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facility, and policy changes
- Informing Federal government agencies and partner nations of joint force capabilities and support to whole-of-government efforts.

\(^{10}\) The use of the term “partner” in this concept may refer to one or more of the following, depending on context: interagency, host nation, allied nations, coalition partners, other partner nations, sub-state partners, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, or private voluntary organizations.

\(^{11}\) Non-state actors include individuals, violent extremist groups, and state-like adversaries, who may use conventional as well as irregular methods. State-like adversaries refer to non-traditional adversaries that have evolved to the point of attaining state-like power, authority, and influence over a population. These are elements that have taken root in a population group and have grown to become the de facto governing authority but are not formally recognized by the United States or the international community.

\(^{12}\) The Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 (DoDD 3000.07): Irregular Warfare establishes policy and assigns responsibility for DoD conduct of IW and development of capabilities to address irregular challenges to national security. The Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report (QRM) and other documents also identify the need for increased proficiency in irregular warfare as a priority.
Understanding and appreciation of the challenges of irregular warfare have matured since the publication of the *Irregular Warfare Joint Operating Concept v. 1.0* in 2007. This concept uses the official definition adopted in *Joint Publication 1-02*, which describes irregular warfare as: “a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will.”

Discussion and debate continues regarding the use of the terms “irregular” and “irregular warfare” to describe campaigns, equipment, and training of personnel. In addition, some allies and other partners object to the use of the term “irregular warfare” to characterize their actions, or the actions of the joint force in non-hostile environments. This concept also acknowledges that compartmentalized distinctions of warfare rarely exist in practice and that forces may very well employ some combination of conventional and irregular methods.

For clarity this concept follows the original usage from the 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* in applying the term “irregular” to describe the nature of the threat (i.e., the methods and actions of the adversary). Irregular threats include actors who employ methods such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, criminal activities, and insurgency.

While violent extremist organizations and other non-state adversaries have turned to irregular forms of warfare as effective ways to counter traditional military powers, such methods are not limited to use by non-state actors. Therefore, for the purpose of this concept, irregular threats are those posed by a) non-state actors and b) state actors who

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13 United States Department of Defense, *Joint Publication 1-02: Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JP 1-02).*
14 The *QRM* and the *CCJO* note this blending tendency of categories of warfare. One characterization uses the term hybrid warfare to describe a blend of conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal aspects, namely: “a full range of different modes of warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and coercion, and criminal disorder. Hybrid Wars can be conducted by both states and a variety of non-state actors. These multi-modal activities can be conducted by separate units, or even by the same unit, but are generally operationally and tactically directed and coordinated within the main battlespace to achieve synergistic effects in the physical and psychological dimensions of conflict.” In *Conflict in the 21st Century: the Rise of Hybrid Wars*, by Frank G. Hoffman.
15 The 2006 *Quadrennial Defense Review* introduced the term irregular as one of four types of threats faced by the United States: irregular, traditional, disruptive, and catastrophic.
16 The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations v.3.0* observes that combatants “may employ methods ranging from combined-arms tactics to guerrilla warfare, terrorism, sabotage, subversion, unconventional warfare, or other methods usually considered ‘irregular.’ This full range of methods will be available to both state and non-state adversaries, who are likely to adopt some combination.” Colin Gray, in *Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare*, also includes insurgency as one of the “familiar branches on the tree of irregular warfare,” 225-226. He also notes that methods used by irregular forces may be adopted by regular forces.
adopt irregular methods. This concept recognizes that irregular methods may also be used against state actors who present more or less conventional threats, though this is not a focus of this JOC. The concept recognizes that irregular warfare activities and operations are a component of the military instrument of national power and may be employed to address a variety of challenges as national policy directs.\textsuperscript{17}

Thus, the scope of this concept addresses activities and operations involving irregular threats that are either present or nascent, as well as the enablers of such threats including financiers, recruiters, and logistical support. While such operations will occur in both steady-state and surge conditions, they do not include conventional military operations or normal peacetime military engagement where no threat is present.\textsuperscript{18} These operations occur in environments where there is actual or incipient violence emanating from irregular threats.

The \textit{Capstone Concept for Joint Operations} (CCJO), which is the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s vision for how the joint force will operate, informs this concept.\textsuperscript{19} The central thesis of the CCJO proposes that future joint force commanders will take the following three steps to respond to a wide variety of security challenges. First, commanders will address each situation in its own unique political and strategic context. Second, they will then conduct integrated action according to a concept of operations designed for that unique situation. Third, they will continuously assess the results of operations and modify their understanding and operations accordingly.

The integrated action that the CCJO envisions future joint force commanders employing is a blend of four military activities – combat, security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction – which will be applied in accordance with the unique requirements of each operational situation. Combat aims to defeat armed enemies; security activities seek to protect and control civil populations and territory; engagement seeks to improve the capabilities of or cooperation with partners; and relief and reconstruction seek to restore or maintain essential civil services.\textsuperscript{20} The CCJO offers them as the four basic building blocks from which joint operations are designed. The joint force commander will develop a concept of operations that integrates these four activities. Most joint

\textsuperscript{17} Since not all actions undertaken to address these challenges are necessarily named military operations, this concept uses “operations and activities” or “activities” to refer to those undertaken by the joint force or any of its partner entities.

\textsuperscript{18} Steady-state is defined as cumulative day-to-day activities that are outside of major surge operations. Surge is defined as a condition, which requires forces to be provided to support Combatant Commander operations beyond routinely scheduled activities and results in exceeding Secretary of Defense and Military Department rotation planning goals or Reserve Component access policies in order to meet that demand. The definition of steady-state and surge are drawn from the Guidance for the Development of the Force.


\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Ibid.} 15-20.
operations require some combination of these activities arranged and
weighted to accomplish the missions described in the subordinate joint
integrating concepts.

In response to the changing character of warfare and irregular
threats in particular, this concept first provides a description of the
future environment, followed by an operational problem set and those
aspects which pose the greatest challenge for the joint force. The concept
then proposes an operational approach that describes how the joint force
will operate in response to those problems in the environment we
anticipate. This in turn leads to a set of capabilities and implications that
will allow the joint force to operate in the described manner. The concept
then describes the risks and mitigations of adopting the approach. The
joint force and the Services will use this concept to identify and address
capability gaps and ultimately drive change in how the force will operate.

2. The Future Operating Environment

The 2008 Joint Operating Environment (JOE) serves as one of the primary
source documents to aid the joint force in identifying the potential
challenges of the future security environment. The JOE describes
major trends in demographics, globalization, economics, resources,
climate, and other areas that affect security, as well as challenges arising
from intra-state competition, weak and failing states, unconventional
threats, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, advances in
technology, and increasing urbanization. The complex interplay of these
trends and challenges, together with the varied nature of cultures,
historical experience, leaders' idiosyncrasies, and the occurrence of
events foreseen by no one, suggest that the operating environment will be
even more complex and ambiguous in the future. Taking the JOE as the
starting point, this section discusses three aspects that have particular
relevance for irregular warfare: the fluidity of the environment, the
adaptive nature of adversaries, and the centrality of the population.

The future operating environment will be one of constant and
accelerating change. Economic, demographic, resource, climate, and
other trends will engender competition locally, regionally, and globally.
Global integration, intense nationalism, and religious movements will
likely exacerbate the tensions created by each of these trends. Frequent
conflicts will erupt among sub-state ethnic, tribal, religious, and political
groups. State fragmentation, transnational crime, the globalized
movement of capital, competition for resources, and migration and

urbanization will all contribute to the likelihood of conflict in this complex and fluid environment. Of particular concern are failed and failing states, which could lead to more “ungoverned spaces,” which become safe havens for terrorists, criminals, and groups engaged in other illicit activities. These “spaces” could be rural, urban, maritime, air, or “virtual.” Also of increasing concern are rogue states that use proxies, which allow the state to distance itself from actions and achieve strategic aims simultaneously.

Thinking, highly adaptive actors will take advantage of the trends outlined above and employ a combination of methods to include criminality. Non-state actors will be a significant component of the future operating environment, and irregular wars will be more common than major regular or nuclear wars. Non-state actors will become increasingly powerful as they extend their reach and capabilities through globalization and advancing technology, including cyber-warfare; chemical, radiological, biological, or nuclear weapons; and sophisticated information campaigns.

Often motivated by extremist ideologies or the desire to overturn or challenge the established order, or simply exploit the larger state and international system for their own gain, these adaptive actors may possess some of the power of states and adopt state-like structures; others will take the form of popular movements or distributed networks. Regardless, these actors are less constrained, or even unconstrained, by international laws and conventions observed by most states. These actors present a unique challenge, as they do not employ the same calculus as the states they oppose and will exploit the norms observed by states.

State and non-state actors will find new and more deadly means of conducting operations in all domains, to include land, air, maritime, and cyberspace to further their aims. This may include piracy and smuggling on the high seas; interruption of the flow of people, goods and services; fostering illicit commerce and activities; and otherwise leveraging land, air and maritime areas to ensure their freedom of movement and deny it to others.

These actors will use cyberspace for a host of activities that transcend state and regional boundaries. Cyberspace provides a worldwide virtual safe haven to recruit, train, finance, plan, and conduct operations, as well as to magnify the impact of messages and actions

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23 Cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the interdependent network of information technology infrastructures, including the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers (JP 1-02).
through graphic, rapid information operations (IO). Any group or individual armed with the necessary knowledge and technology may wage stealthy cyber attacks to disrupt state or global information systems and networks, or obtain information that confers insight and advantage. Effective countermeasures are difficult to develop and employ with equal rapidity. The JOE states it succinctly: “the introduction and employment of new technologies and the adaptation and creativity of our adversaries will alter the character of joint operations a great deal.”

Since irregular warfare is a contest for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations, the populations carry particular weight as both the battleground and object of the conflict. Stealthy adversaries hide among the population, using it as a shield and willing or unwilling helper. These adversaries often play on legitimate aspirations and grievances against unpopular, abusive, or corrupt governments to gain popular support and legitimacy, such as in an insurgency. At other times, the “relevant” population these adversaries are trying to influence could be very particular government or security apparatus officials, commercial activities and businesses, or even groups outside of the host nation and not the general public, as seen with irregular adversaries who have infrastructure links to diasporas and criminal enterprises. These adversaries target civilians to intimidate and coerce them, and expose the inability of the state to provide protection.

Given the psychological and political dimensions of the contest, perceptions are as important as any physical reality of the battlefield. Adept adversaries plan their actions around sophisticated communications strategies enabled by the globalization of information and technology. In this age of instant communication, actors have become proficient at crafting their accounts of events into a compelling story or narrative. The intent of this narrative is to influence not only the local population but the global community as well. The battle of the narrative, as this struggle for influence has been called, is waged primarily through critical elements of the population who have formal or informal power or standing to sway the sentiments or induce the compliance of the general population.

24 Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations defines IO as: “The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.”
26 Ibid. 39.
27 The “battle of the narrative,” an idea further developed in section 4.c. of this document, is an informal term meant to denote efforts by the joint force and its interagency and other partners to counter the message/narrative that the adversary socializes to win favor with the population. An effective counter-narrative is based on real grievances that resonate with the relevant population.
3. The Irregular Warfare Problem

In the 21st century’s complex operating environment, adaptive adversaries present irregular threats that seriously challenge military-only responses in what are essentially contests for influence and legitimacy. Irregular threats including terrorists, insurgents, and criminal networks are enmeshed in the population and are increasingly empowered by astute use of communications, cyberspace, and technology to extend their reach regionally and globally. Subversion and terrorism are not readily countered by military means alone, just as legitimacy and influence cannot be achieved solely by rapid, decisive application of military power.

Since the problem is not purely a military one, the approach is also not purely military. Due to the nature of these complex and amorphous threats, these contests are unlikely to end with decisive military victory. Success will more often be defined by long-term involvement to remedy, reduce, manage, or mitigate the conflict and its causes. The joint force thus must find multidimensional approaches in tandem with other partners to solve them, when directed by the President to do so.

3.a. The Joint Force Problem

How should the joint force operate to prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular threats in conjunction with other governmental agencies and multinational partners, and support efforts to address the underlying causes of conflict and win the contest for legitimacy and influence?

3.b. Factors that Compound the Joint Force Problem

Irregular threats present the following challenges for the joint force:

- The complex political, cultural, religious, and historical factors and diverse populations involved in each conflict are difficult to understand in sufficient depth
- The non-military nature of many aspects of the conflict fall outside the sole competence of the joint force
- Many irregular threats are proficient in waging the battle of the narrative
- The protracted nature of the conflict tests U.S. staying power; adversaries aim to survive and outlast rather than defeat the joint force outright
- The host-nation government or local partner often possess limited ability to meet their populations’ security, governance, and economic needs, and otherwise address causes of conflict, which in turn affects political legitimacy
- Non-state actors leverage cyberspace as an operational safe haven and as a means to attack
The application of military force, while often necessary, can be used by adversaries to rally opposition, and excessive use of force can outweigh any gains derived from military power.

Irregular threats operate as networks with regional and global linkages that enable more rapid, sustained and stealthy action, and transcend governments’ institutional boundaries.

The varied and decentralized nature and organizational structure of irregular threats demand versatile and agile joint forces and organizations that are able to adapt to the complexity of the threat.

4. The Approach

The approach describes how the joint force and its partners prevent, and when directed, counter irregular threats through a variety of methods aimed at changing the character of the operating environment, including the critical segments of the relevant populations, the threats themselves, and the causes and conditions that give rise to these threats. The approach outlined here consists of ends, ways, and means to counter irregular threats. For the purposes of this JOC, ends are the objectives or desired outcomes; ways are specific actions that the joint force will undertake to reach those outcomes; and means are the methods and capabilities required to execute the ways.

28 Networks include internal and external support mechanisms and agencies.
The **ends** are to prevent, deter, disrupt, or defeat irregular threats. Prevention is a primary focus of effort, since it is preferable to deal with incipient threats and the conditions that give rise to them. Once a threat is manifest the joint force will aim to deter, disrupt, or defeat it. Deterring irregular threats requires new approaches that take into account the nature of non-state groups’ leadership, motivations, and means of communicating. In some cases, disruption, mitigation, or suppression may be the most that can be accomplished to degrade or limit the adversary’s ability to cause harm. In other cases irregular threats may be defeated by swift and precise military action, but most often a long-term focus on the causes and conditions will be required for eventual success. The strategic measures of success are the degree to which a) the influence and control of the relevant populations have been wrested from the adversary and b) the legitimacy and credibility conferred on the political authorities opposing the adversary have been increased.

The **ways** are principally five activities or operations that are undertaken in sequence, in parallel, or in blended form in a coherent campaign to address irregular threats: counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign internal defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations (SO).

The **means** are collaborative frameworks for the joint force to act with its partners to understand the problem in depth, plan and execute activities and operations, and assess and adapt continuously to achieve the desired outcomes, as well as key elements that characterize effective joint force operations against irregular threats, and their corresponding capabilities.

### 4.a. Central Idea

To prevent, deter, disrupt, and defeat irregular threats, the U.S. military will apply some blend of counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. To carry out these activities successfully, the joint force must collaborate with other governmental agencies, multinational partners, and, where appropriate, the host nation to understand the situation in depth, act in concert, and continually assess and adapt their approach in response to the dynamic and complex nature of the problem. The contest for legitimacy and influence over a population will be won primarily through

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29 Amorphous leadership, nihilistic or millennial motivations or stealthy communications all pose challenges for deterring irregular threats. It is difficult, for example, to design measures that will deter adversaries bent on self-destruction or willing to absorb mass casualties.
persistent effort to enable a legitimate and capable local partner to address the conflict's causes and provide security, good governance, and economic development. Success requires an appropriate balance of population-focused and threat-focused action, special emphasis on a strategy of continuous communication, offensive and defensive cyberspace measures, regional and global coordination across institutional seams, and tailored combinations of capable forces to conduct these varied missions.

4.b. The Ways: Irregular Warfare Activities and Operations
The principal way that the joint force will counter irregular threats in both steady-state and surge conditions is by some combination of counterterrorism, unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, counterinsurgency, and stability operations. These are the preferred activities for addressing irregular threats because they are typically sustained activities that focus on the population and are conducted with other partners. Rather than treating them as five separate activities or operations, however, the joint force will blend these complementary activities into a coherent campaign tailored to the specific circumstances. The five activities may be undertaken in sequence, in parallel, in partial or blended form as needed to address the specific circumstances. This holistic application of the five activities characterizes the approach to irregular threats, which have often proven impervious to the singular application of any one of the five. Counterterrorism operations, for example, do not normally eradicate the threat or engender lasting stability without complementary efforts to address drivers of conflict and build host-nation capacity.

This concept recognizes that these five IW activities may also be applied outside the arena of irregular threats, as reflected in their doctrinal definitions. There is also significant overlap among these five activities. Finally, these activities are not an exclusive listing of how the joint force counters irregular threats. Key related activities are strategic communication, information operations of all kinds, psychological operations, civil-military operations, and support to law enforcement, intelligence, and counterintelligence operations.

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30 An imperfect analogy may aid understanding of this fundamental point: the adoption of a combined arms approach provided greater synergistic effect than infantry, cavalry/tanks, and artillery operating separately.
31 There is also significant overlap among the five activities, in particular between foreign internal defense, stability operations, and counterinsurgency. The former term came into being as a replacement for counterinsurgency in the decade after Vietnam, but it is now used more broadly to characterize support to another country facing insurgency or other forms of lawlessness and subversion. When foreign internal defense is conducted in low-threat environments, it shares many common features with stability operations. Finally, counterterrorism and unconventional warfare are evolving to include broader features than their core notions of defeating terrorists and using indigenous partners to overthrow state or state-like adversaries.
32 For the purposes of this concept, and in accordance with Joint Publication 3-13, Information Operations, psychological operations is considered a subset of information operations.
This section describes how these five IW activities will be conducted. Most of them will require the general purpose forces (GPF) to play a large and varied role. In addition, USG agencies and multinational and host-nation forces will often be partners as well. Conducting many of these activities and operations effectively will require innovations in the roles, skills, and relationships of the joint force in regard to its interagency, host nation and other partners, general purpose forces, and special operations forces components, as well as in the footprint, size, scale, basing, sustainment, visibility, and distribution of its forces.

In particular, because these activities may be undertaken on a small or large scale, depending on the level of the threat and the capacity of the host nation, the joint force must be able to provide scalable, flexible force packages to support distributed operations, including logistics support for small unit operations, transportation, lift/mobility, air support, human and technical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), force protection, engineering, communications, medical assistance, and other enablers. In many cases this entails employing existing capabilities in new ways rather than developing new capabilities. Advisory personnel with the requisite language and cultural skills are needed. The footprint should be the minimum essential to accomplish the mission at an acceptable level of risk, since a large foreign presence tends to provoke opposition and undermine the legitimacy of the host nation. Various sustainment and basing options can be employed to include joint forces based at sea.

Land, air, and maritime forces will all be used in new ways to counter irregular threats, address root causes, and build partner-nation capability and capacity so they may provide ongoing security. For example, the Africa Partnership Station builds maritime safety and security capabilities in the Gulf of Guinea with partner nations using an at-sea platform that provides persistent regional presence with a minimal footprint ashore. Similarly, building partner air forces will be an important component of the overall security mission. The Combined Air Power Transition Force 438 AEW in Afghanistan and the Iraq Training and Advisory Mission-Air Force 321 AEW are examples of long-duration aviation capacity-building missions. Interdicting irregular threats and related operations will require continued, increased, and innovative use of precision strike capability, unmanned aerial systems, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms, and other space-based assets including weather and navigational capabilities. Distributed

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33 The Africa Partnership Station serves as a “maritime university” that makes repeat visits on a schedule tailored to meet the partner nations’ need for sustained support. It is an interagency effort, coordinated with the country teams, as well as nongovernmental organizations.
operations will place a premium on expanded use of low-profile and other forms of airlift for mobility, resupply, and medical evacuation.

Aspects of these activities and operations that are critical to an irregular warfare context, including their focus, partners, and key requirements, are described below.

**Stability operations in IW.** This section addresses how the joint force will conduct stability operations to establish or re-establish order in a fragile state where the threat of violence exists. The focus of joint force activities will be to provide a safe and secure environment to support other government agency programs to build host nation capacity. When conditions require, the joint force will conduct activities to provide essential services, enable good governance, and foster economic development.

The Department of State (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) will be the lead U.S. agencies to support a host-nation’s efforts to establish or improve key aspects of governance to include rule of law and a variety of services. Other agencies and departments, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and partner nations are also likely to be involved. An interagency protocol would provide a concept of operations, structure for civilian-military command authority, and an essential task list identifying functions to be performed by each component of the interagency team. In a large-scale effort, a shortage of personnel from non-Department of Defense (DoD) agencies may require the use of DoD personnel, including civilians and Reservists, who possess critical non-military skills in governance, rule of law, and development.

In stability operations, general purpose forces will likely conduct multiple civil-military operations across several lines of operation. These efforts, particularly large-scale projects, must be coordinated with USAID and may be conducted by Service-specific engineering units and others. Civil affairs personnel will also be required for these efforts, as may expeditionary medical personnel. In low-profile stability operations, SOF units will also conduct civil-military operations. Stability operations often include building host-nation security forces as outlined in following sections on FID and building partner capability.

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34 The joint force doctrinal definition of stability operations is “an overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.” ([Joint Publication 1-02](https://www.dtic.mil/whs/dilithium/1-02/index.html)) Other definitions for Stability Operations exist, for example, in the [National Defense Authorization Act of FY 2009](https://www.congress.gov/110/bILLS/575/). The [Reconstruction and Stabilization Civilian Management Act of 2008](https://www.congress.gov/110/bILLS/575/) codified the existence and functions of the Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and authorized new interagency capabilities under the lead of the Department of State.
**Foreign internal defense in IW.**

The joint force will conduct FID to enable and assist a host nation to prevent, deter, and defeat a variety of irregular threats, including criminal activity, insurgency, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents. The Department of State will generally lead efforts that support the sovereign host-nation government’s defense and development plan. The joint force will often focus on the military element of FID to build the host-nation’s security capacity, from the ministerial to tactical level. It may, if requested, also support civilian-led efforts to improve the host-nation’s governance and development capacity, for example by providing advisory assistance outside of the security sector in support of interagency requirements.

Security force assistance (SFA) is an overlapping term that is defined as: activities that directly support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions. SFA encompasses DoD’s efforts to strengthen the security forces and their sustaining institutions of partner nations as well as international and regional security organizations. SFA can occur across the range of military operations, during all phases of military operations, and across the spectrum of conflict. FID occurs in the context of an internal threat, whereas SFA may be provided or conducted as part of peacetime engagement activities or in response to an external threat.

FID is a long-term effort that requires persistent rather than episodic engagement. A comprehensive strategy must be developed for providing training and assistance to host nation security forces. Civilian and military efforts to build partner capacity to perform security functions should be a multi-year program of synchronized civilian and military activities and engagements. GPF, SOF, and other interagency partners may conduct missions focused on assessing, training, advising, and assisting host-nation security forces to include ground, air, and maritime military forces as well as police, border forces, and other relevant divisions of the host-nation’s security apparatus.

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35 Foreign internal defense is defined as “participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.” (Joint Publication 1-02)

36 The Foreign Internal Defense Joint Integrating Concept, v. 0.5, March 2009 describes these operations in greater detail.

37 This definition of SFA is in draft form and not based in doctrine. See section 4.c. on “Build partner capability” for a discussion of related issues.

38 DoD shall conduct SFA activities in support of U.S. policy in coordination with U.S. Government departments or agencies and wherever possible, with foreign governments and security forces, to enhance partners’ capacity and capability to deter, and, when necessary, defeat state and non-state adversaries as well as expand the capacity and capability of partners to contribute to multilateral operations. SFA comprises an important component of the activities conducted through Security Cooperation (SC) initiatives undertaken by DoD. While SC encompasses all of DoD’s efforts to encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States in order to achieve strategic objectives (e.g., ranging from civil affairs activities to modeling and simulation exchanges to senior leader bilateral meetings), SFA focuses exclusively on enhancing the capacity and capabilities of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions. (DoD Draft Instruction).
The development of non-military security forces is an important component of FID, and an effective model with appropriate authorities and mechanisms to integrate interagency, training, advice, and assistance is essential to achieve unity of effort. For small-scale efforts, police training and advising may be primarily a civilian mission. If required and appropriately authorized, military police and other units may be trained and deployed to train, advise, and assist non-military security forces. SOF’s primary role is to assess, train, advise, and assist host-nation military and paramilitary forces in the tasks that require their unique capabilities.39

**Counterinsurgency.**40 The joint force, in conjunction with civilian agencies, will conduct military, political, economic, and information-related actions as well as civic actions to defeat an insurgency. The joint force may lead COIN operations or it may support the host-nation’s COIN operations. The primary focus of effort for the joint force is to establish security, counter subversion and disrupt the insurgency, and its external support network. As it establishes security, the joint force will also help build the host-nation’s ability to provide security and support development and governance to gain or maintain its legitimacy. As the host-nation’s capabilities improve, the joint force will move into a supporting FID role to enable the host nation to continue the counterinsurgency effort.

The joint force may conduct counterinsurgency under either a civilian or military lead. The ideal model for successful counterinsurgency is a thoroughly integrated civilian-military command structure in support of the host nation government. The greater emphasis in COIN on combat and securing the population notwithstanding, the political nature of the struggle requires a concerted effort to address the root causes fueling the insurgency as an acceptable level of security is being established.

The scale, footprint, and capabilities required for COIN will vary. Counterinsurgency is manpower intensive because of the need to provide population security. If host-nation forces are insufficient, COIN operations may require a large initial commitment of GPF, including enablers, support, and sustainment capabilities. In some cases, the joint force may need to operate in a low-profile (i.e., not readily identifiable)

39 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-05, Joint Special Operations, II-7.
40 JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations defines counterinsurgency as “comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances” and insurgency as the following two definitions will be included if finalized: The final draft of JP 3-24 defines insurgency as “the organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself.” These definitions are approved for inclusion in JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms.
manner, which would also require low-profile means of air, land, and maritime transport and sustainment. Rapid air mobility, airlift, and target acquisition are also crucial to success and can limit the footprint required and/or the duration of the operations.\textsuperscript{41} In addition, certain specialized capabilities may be required according to the circumstances, including, but not limited to, manned and unmanned aviation, armed reconnaissance, IO, riverine and littoral capabilities, explosive ordnance disposal, or other personnel or units that must be rapidly deployable.\textsuperscript{42}

\textbf{Counterterrorism.}\textsuperscript{43} The joint force will conduct lethal and non-lethal operations against terrorists and their networks to deter, disrupt, and defeat terrorists and their enablers, such as recruiters, financiers, facilitators, and propagandists. The focus of the joint force effort in CT is to capture or kill terrorists in order to permanently remove them from a position of damaging influence in the populace.\textsuperscript{44} To do so, the joint force will operate in a network-versus-network approach that focuses on dispersed, protracted, and persistent actions. This focus of joint force operations will be to first identify and understand the terrorist networks’ leadership, affiliate groups, local organizations, radicalized individuals, and supporters and enablers, and then undertake continuous action as part of a global counterterrorist network that utilizes a broad set of interagency and multinational partner capabilities. Counterterrorism activities may be undertaken either before, or concurrently with, FID and COIN activities, and long-term success will normally require sustained follow-on efforts to build partner-nation capacity to address residual threats and prevent their resurgence.

Critical attributes of successful counterterrorism operations include rapid, distributed transnational, regional, and global activities by interagency, coalition, and host-nation partners as well as other international or multinational entities. Counterterrorism operations are often performed in conjunction with the host nation where terrorists and their networks reside or transit as well as with U.S. and partner nation intelligence services. The joint force must leverage foreign partners’ capabilities and streamline information-sharing procedures to ensure rapid, successful, continuous action against terrorists and their resources. The joint force will also support host-nation capacity to conduct counterterrorism operations at the regional level, and thereby

\textsuperscript{41} Pre-deployment training of joint air attack team personnel has increased air-ground coordination and effectiveness. Such innovations and the importance of adaptability are discussed in Air Force Doctrine Document 2-3: \textit{Irregular Warfare}, 1 August 2007.
\textsuperscript{42} The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command is one example of a command designed to provide adaptive force packages of rapidly deployable forces of active duty and reserve specialists.
\textsuperscript{43} Operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. \textit{(Joint Publication 1-02)}
\textsuperscript{44} The \textit{Defeating Terrorist Networks Joint Integrating Concept}, v.1.0 further explores the lethal and non-lethal actions against terrorists and their support networks.
expand the CT network with new non-USG forces that have greater cultural knowledge and a lower profile. SOF additionally will train host nation CT forces, which can include constabulary, police, and other Ministry of Interior security forces. Host nations will require appropriate, sustainable material solutions to support their counterterrorism operations.

Specially organized, trained, and equipped forces execute many of the joint force missions for counterterrorism, but are dependent on the same range of support capabilities that reside within the GPF that other distributed operations such as counterinsurgency require. They must be transnational and possess the standoff capabilities needed for “look and listen” operations, which provide a means of information gathering in denied and contested areas from a distance.

**Unconventional warfare in IW.** The joint force may employ unconventional warfare to counter irregular threats, such as states that wage irregular or proxy warfare. When direct U.S. military power projection or intervention against state sponsors of irregular threats is militarily or politically undesirable or infeasible, unconventional warfare provides decision makers with an alternative to direct U.S. military intervention in order to counter irregular threats. Pursuant to a national policy decision, the joint force may conduct unconventional warfare to induce change in a foreign government’s behavior that is contrary to U.S. national interests. It may also be conducted to isolate, destabilize, or undermine a hostile foreign government. Finally, it may be used to enable the overthrow of a hostile regime or a shadow government or force the withdrawal of an occupying power by supporting or fomenting an insurgency. Additionally, unconventional warfare may be executed independently or in conjunction with other operations executed by the joint force. In the latter case, unconventional warfare would support the main effort. For example, the joint force might conduct UW against a revolutionary movement while at the same time conducting FID with the host nation.

While primarily considered a SOF activity, the conduct of unconventional warfare requires the full capabilities of the joint force to provide enablers. Unconventional warfare requires significant assistance from partner nations providing the following support: basing for joint forces, overflight rights, sanctuary, and external support for

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**Footnotes:**

45 Unconventional warfare consists of activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerrilla force in a denied area. Pending JP 1-02 definition.

46 One example of a successful UW operation was the ouster of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan after the 9/11 attacks on the United States.

47 The *Unconventional Warfare Joint Integrating Concept v. 0.9* discusses the actions and activities associated with unconventional warfare in greater detail.
resistance forces. Additionally, allied nations may provide SOF units to work with resistance forces in conjunction with U.S. forces.

Unconventional warfare requires significant interagency participation because the activity includes support to both the military and political aspects of internal opposition. Various forms of diplomatic, information, economic, or military pressure may be used to increase the effects of an insurgency or resistance movement. Unconventional warfare operations will require a highly capable joint force that conducts collaborative planning, resourcing, and execution of unconventional warfare related activities with key USG agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State. Each of these agencies provides essential capabilities and expertise to support unconventional warfare operations.

Joint force strategists and planners should be capable of recognizing and assessing the conditions that are appropriate for successful unconventional warfare operations. This includes the preparation of center of gravity analyses, vulnerability assessments of unfriendly and potentially adversarial regimes, and the identification and assessment of existing or potential insurgent or resistance movements. As in counterterrorism operations, unconventional warfare entails non-traditional military approaches that often necessitate low-profile or clandestine operations including support.48

4.c. Means to Counter Irregular Threats

The joint force will use fully integrated combinations of general purpose forces and special operations forces, and DoD combat support agencies (CSAs), usually in combination with interagency and multinational partners, to capitalize on the individual competencies of each component. These fully integrated components will employ the capabilities identified later in this document under the guiding principles described in this section to maximize the prospect of success.

**A collaborative process to understand the operating environment and the problem.** The first and fundamental means required are detailed processes to arrive at a holistic understanding of all facets of the problem, including the relevant root causes of the conflict. The varied, adaptive, networked nature of adversaries who operate stealthily and hide among the population creates a daunting challenge for the joint force to develop an in-depth understanding of the threat(s)

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48 Joint elements conducting and supporting unconventional warfare generally operate in a highly distributed manner. Small elements of SOF will work with the underground and guerrillas, and small support bases will be located in neighboring countries or sanctuaries. When the resistance movement matures, it may move into more lethal and visible operations, which will concurrently increase the profile of joint unconventional warfare forces.
and the environment, including the relevant population. The joint force must develop a thorough appreciation of the specific socio-cultural, political, religious, economic, and military factors involved and a detailed portrait of key segments of the population, including those who wield most influence in the society. Joint force commanders will provide an assessment to policymakers to inform their decision of the costs, benefits and implications of undertaking action. Commanders must make realistic assessments to inform decision makers as to the prospects for success.

To accomplish this essential and fundamental task of understanding, the joint force will marshal all available resources in a collaborative knowledge enterprise. Within its own ranks, it will identify, utilize, maintain, and incentivize the accumulation of linguistic and cultural expertise, since language proficiency and in-depth knowledge of regions, sub-regions, and subgroups takes years to acquire. The joint force will also simultaneously cast a wide net to tap sources of information, intelligence, and knowledge throughout the U.S. Government, its partners, and the local society to leverage expertise, methods, and technology available in academia, the private sector, and other organizations. A multinational, multidisciplinary effort will provide greater expertise than is available in the joint force or the U.S. Government. The joint force will incorporate these insights into campaign plans. The joint force will collaborate with interagency partners to form fusion cells to bring multiple sources of expertise and resources to bear on specific areas of concern such as narcotics or threat financing.

This process of understanding includes, but is not limited to, improved and expanded joint intelligence preparation of the operational environment. The joint force and its interagency partners will initiate intelligence collection, production, and dissemination in a timely and synchronized manner across the U.S. Government and other partners, employing a variety of low-profile, multidisciplinary means. The aperture of intelligence collection and analysis must broaden from a threat focus to one that includes the population and other aspects of the operating environment, since a narrow focus limits understanding of a situation. A variety of tools such as social network analysis, biometrics, and electronic mapping should be applied systematically to create integrated

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49 For example, certain components of the population may be more influential or relevant than others, and this determination will vary from case to case. The relevant population may not be every villager but rather particular tribes, traditional leaders, or other influential groups or individuals.

50 The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) is a tool that enables an interagency team to assess conflict situations systematically and collaboratively. It is described in Appendix G. Operational design offers an additional approach. For a description, see TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500: Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design v1.0, 1-5 and 1-6.

51 Possible models for emulation, further development, or codification are the MNF-I Joint Strategic Assessment Team and the USCENTCOM Assessment Team, groups of experts tasked by a commander to conduct an independent, intensive study of the situation.
databases as part of an ongoing effort to gain a comprehensive understanding that will in turn inform planning and operations.52

**Adopt collaborative frameworks to plan, act, assess, and adapt.** DoD should seek to establish processes and structures that will go beyond current USG department and agency approaches, with the goal of institutionalizing frameworks capable of directing civilian-military action on a regional and global scale. This may be done through wholesale creation of a new framework, or in a more evolutionary manner, drawing on real-world opportunities for innovation. It will institutionalize frameworks capable of directing integrated civilian-military action on a regional and global scale. Such efforts to improve our whole-of-government approach will lay a strong foundation for a broader comprehensive approach, which integrates the USG effort with multinational, nongovernmental, intergovernmental, and private sector partners who share common goals.53 The U.S. Government cannot achieve consistent unity of effort without these collaborative frameworks, but their adoption requires a decision of the U.S. Government, not DoD alone.54

**Plan and Act in Concert.** Collaborative frameworks will be sought to enable the joint force to act in concert with other USG agencies and other partners. The country team performs such a function within the boundaries of a single country, but its planning and operational capacity may need to be augmented by more robust military groups and greater interagency capacity to deal with irregular threats. Moreover, since many irregular threats transcend the boundaries of any single country, the U.S. Government will create new mechanisms to conduct integrated civilian-military planning and implementation above the country-team level.55

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52 For example, the understanding of the drivers of the conflict and the population will inform the approach to strategic communication, e.g., identification of themes that resonate with the population and which local messengers wield the most influence.

53 A comprehensive approach refers to efforts at cooperation among a broad variety of government and nongovernment actors. For descriptions of and distinctions between a whole-of-government approach and a comprehensive approach, see *Army Field Manual 3-07: Stability Operations*, 1-17 through 1-22. The former seeks collaboration while the latter relies on cooperation, because the broader array of actors are not compelled to work toward a common goal as are agencies of the same government.

54 As acknowledged in the Risks and Mitigations section of this JOC, the adoption of collaborative frameworks is contingent upon a U.S. Government decision to do so. Absent such a decision, the joint force must continue to seek ad hoc means of coordination and collaboration.

55 The Regional Security Initiative was one effort to coordinate counterterrorism planning and execution among embassies in a given region and with the geographic combatant command. To maximize the impact of U.S. Government counterterrorism efforts, the State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism created the Regional Security Initiative, a series of regionally-based, interagency strategy planning activities, hosted by U.S. Embassies, to form a flexible network of coordinated country teams to deny terrorists safe haven. (United States Department of State Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, *The Terrorist Enemy*)
A number of civilian-military planning and implementation mechanisms have been implemented or proposed. One such mechanism, the Interagency Management System, currently exists, but its use is limited to reconstruction and stabilization contingencies.56 A previous mechanism for use in contingencies and steady-state operations was established by Presidential Decision Directive 56, which mandated the creation of political-military implementation plans. During the Vietnam War, an integrated civilian-military team led by civilians, the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), was employed to conduct counterinsurgency operations. Similarly, in Iraq and Afghanistan, integrated planning cells and interagency fusion cells were created at the country team and joint task force level to bring multiple skills and authorities to bear on a given problem, although these entities did not have directive authority. Another example is the National Counterterrorism Center, which was established by Executive Order 13354 as the primary USG agency responsible for strategic operational planning and synchronizing interagency operations, activities, and actions to counter terrorism.57 The Project on National Security Reform and the Center for Strategic and International Studies both published studies that proposed a standing procedure to form civilian-military entities or permanent interagency task forces to enable interagency collaboration.58

Under a civilian-military framework, the U.S. Government will adapt the specific characteristics of the task force or command entity to the situation. Most activities to counter irregular threats will not be primarily combat operations led by joint task forces but rather non-lethal activities conducted with other partners. In these cases the joint force will most often operate as the supporting element, with the Department of State, a coalition, or other interagency or host nation partner in the lead. The joint force will enable unified action, anticipate the potential need to support numerous extended operations and be prepared to fulfill them. The combined civilian-military entity will ideally form its plans and programs in a single process but in any case they will be synchronized to achieve maximum synergy. The joint force may serve as lead for major mission elements or sub-objectives, and it will likely be required to support the transition of mission responsibilities to the host nation when conditions permit.

When acting as the supported entity, the joint force will incorporate civilian USG agencies into its extensive planning process

56. The Interagency Management System is described in Appendix G.
57 NCTC can assign operational responsibilities to lead agencies for CT activities that are consistent with applicable law and support strategic plans to counter terrorism.
58 The Project on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, November 2008, and Center for Strategic and International Studies, Beyond Goldwater-Nichols Series.
from the start and draw on civilian expertise in all relevant areas of those plans. Collaboration between the joint force and the interagency partners will avoid unintended effects. Even if the joint force has funding and authority to carry out stabilization and reconstruction projects, it should enlist the expertise of other partners to ensure that the right projects are selected and executed with the right sensitivity. For example, the joint force may have funds and authority to build a school and do so, only to find that the local tribal chief was dishonored when he did not get credit. The host nation or USAID, for example, may have had the requisite knowledge to ensure that the project was executed in a way that honored the chief. USAID’s Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework gathers and analyzes the information required to understand and achieve the desired impact on a given local population.  

Government-wide planning will occur simultaneously with military planning, and coordination mechanisms will ensure transparency and compatibility. If required to perform non-military tasks, the joint force will partner with the relevant U.S. Government civilian agencies in their planning and execution and transition to Department of State lead when conditions permit. Geographic combatant commands will adopt additional mechanisms to integrate civilian-military operations. Two combatant commands have both a military deputy and civilian deputy (a senior foreign service officer). Interagency representatives at geographic combatant commands are a welcome advance, but these representatives do not have authority to decide or act on behalf of their parent agency. One further evolution might be interagency unified commands.  

Local commanders have the best understanding of their area of responsibility. These commanders should have access to the resources needed to produce timely intelligence, conduct effective tactical operations, and manage IO and civil-military operations. To enable subordinate commands to conduct effective, decentralized operations, the designated operational commanders will task organize their assets at the lowest practical level to push appropriate capabilities and authorities down to the local commander’s level to encourage the initiative of the subordinate commanders. These lowest echelons are closest to the population and the irregular threats, and must have access to or control of the resources to adapt and react as quickly as the threat. To enable subordinate commands to conduct effective, decentralized operations, operational commander theater capabilities will be allocated, based on  

59 Collaboration between the joint force and the interagency partners will avoid unintended effects. Even if the joint force has funding and authority to carry out stabilization and reconstruction projects, it should enlist the expertise of other partners to ensure that the right projects are selected and executed with the right sensitivity. For example, the joint force may have funds and authority to build a school and do so, only to find that the local tribal chief was dishonored when he did not get credit. The host nation or USAID, for example, may have had the requisite knowledge to ensure that the project was executed in a way that honored the chief. USAID’s Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework gathers and analyzes the information required to understand and achieve the desired impact on a given local population.  

60 The joint force has provided security for civilian entities, such as the Embedded Provincial Reconstruction Teams, in order to enable them to operate in hostile environments. Responsibility for securing U.S. civilian department and agency personnel under chief of mission authority falls to the regional security officer of the Embassy. Responsibilities will be decided on a case by case basis in a memorandum of agreement between the joint force and chief of mission. The joint force’s desire for civilian expertise in planning and operations to promote governance and development may lead it to provide security for such personnel in order to obtain the needed integrated civil-military action.  

61 The U.S. Southern Command’s Command Strategy 2018: Partnership for the Americas, December 2008, states that “USSOUTHCOM seeks to evolve into an interagency-oriented organization seeking to support security and stability in the Americas.” The document specifically recommends that such a command be able to: 1) Improve synchronization of operations and activities between Combatant Command (COCOM) and other U.S. Government organizations operating in this part of the world to create a collaborative, effective, and efficient command, 2) Integrate personnel from interagency partners into the COCOM staff and provide similar liaisons to partner agency staff, 3) Ensure interagency participation at all COCOM exercises and conferences, 4) Support interagency-oriented security command concept in future Unified Command Plans and 5) Ensure COCOM has a 21st century facility to enable discussions at all levels of classification.
prioritization of available resources, in order to satisfy needs and achieve desired end states.

Assess and Adapt. The joint force will also use these collaborative frameworks to conduct continuous assessment and adaptation, which are essential given the dynamic and adaptive nature of irregular threats. The problem itself will continuously evolve, as will the joint force’s understanding of it. Since any actions will alter the operational environment and the problem, the joint force must also factor the effects into the assessment. These insights are captured in operational design, which provides a sophisticated method for understanding and clearly defining an approach to complex problems. The joint force commander or interagency task force leader and his staff initially frame the problem after an in-depth study of it, then proceed to formulate his design and operational approach. This approach is dynamic in that it recognizes that the original framing is a starting hypothesis and basis for learning as operations proceed. Along the way, strategic guidance may be refined, the operational environment will change, and situational understanding may increase. Through a process of ongoing assessment, the commander continually refines his design and reframes the problem to take account of new insights as well as the evolving situation. Leaders will assess progress against measurements of effectiveness and the desired ends. The assessment process requires a sophisticated methodology that relies on meaningful and apt quantitative measurements as well as other means to determine the value of new information, to include the commander’s growing intuitive grasp of the problem. Leaders will then use the assessment to determine what adaptations may be needed in the framing of the problem or the campaign design in an ongoing, iterative process.

Give priority to the battle of the narrative. In irregular warfare, the primary effects are created by influencing perceptions of disparate populations. Adversaries understand this and design their operations to achieve the desired effect on the perception of populations at the local, regional, and international level. Their efforts are made easier when they operate in domains that the United States and its allies generally consider “free” (e.g., cyberspace, the press, and religious institutions). Adversaries use their knowledge of local history, culture, and religion to

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62 See TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5-500: Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design v1.0, 1-5 and 1-6.
63 There is a growing appreciation that many input or output metrics that simply tally actions taken (e.g., number of wells dug) do not capture what if any impact the actions have had on the crucial issues of influence and legitimacy. Some quantitative metrics are powerful indicators; for example, based on his experience in Southeast Asia, Sir Robert Thompson identified two metrics, the amount of intelligence supplied by the population and the rate of insurgent recruitment, as significant measures of a counterinsurgency campaign’s effectiveness.
64 For a more detailed explanation on influencing the behaviors of selected populations, governments or other decision-making groups, see the Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept, v1.0.
frame their actions positively and those of the joint force negatively. The joint force and its partners must grasp the central importance of this “battle of the narrative” and adopt a meaningful approach to communications that enables the host nation and other local partners.

The first principle is to recognize that perception is shaped by both actions and words, and that both must convey the same message. Actions taken that are contrary to words undermine credibility and negate the latter’s effect. The joint force must craft a strategy of continuous communication that guides its own plans and operations, conveys its intent, and explains its actions. To do so effectively requires strategic listening, ongoing dialogue, and understanding of the local culture. It must also rapidly and proactively provide truthful information and evidence, since altering perceptions once created is difficult.

The second principle is to work with the host nation or local partner to bolster the local partner’s legitimacy and assist it in crafting alternative narratives that are culturally authentic and at least as compelling as the adversary’s. Bolstering the local partner’s legitimacy and de-legitimizing the adversary are the critical objectives, more so than creating a favorable image for the United States. Building indigenous communications serves long-term objectives, and indigenous messages and messengers are usually far more resonant with the local population. Moreover, messages delivered unilaterally by the joint force tend to undermine the legitimacy of the local partner and the primacy of civilian rule.

The third principle is to delegitimize the adversary by highlighting how his actions contradict his stated aims and the needs, interests, and values of the local population. The joint force should facilitate and amplify local voices that effectively counter the adversary to the extent this is possible without the appearance of sponsorship. The joint force and its partners should also disrupt the adversary’s messaging capability and exploit his barbarous acts. In some cases, the potential for success may be modest: eroding an adversary’s influence may be the only achievable goal in some cases where that influence is longstanding or deeply rooted. To execute this approach, the joint force must organize more effectively at all levels to conduct information operations and strategic communication, and ensure it has appropriate authorities, policy, and doctrine to implement a proactive strategy. Commanders should push approval authority for rapid release of information products down to the tactical level to increase timeliness and effectiveness. They

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should form interagency fusion cells to ensure all perspectives are integrated.66

**Undertake persistent engagement and sustained effort.** In many cases, success will require persistent engagement and sustained effort to counter irregular threats in both steady-state and surge scenarios, since the threats are not susceptible to rapid or surgical solutions and sporadic and uncoordinated actions have little positive and often negative effect. The great majority of these efforts will be very small-scale and non-combat in nature, but longer-term assignments, deployments, and/or repeat tours will be required for maximum effectiveness to sustain relationships and develop the in-depth cultural knowledge required for effective IW activities. These efforts will occur as directed by the President, in permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments, in situations where a standing government needs to be buttressed as well as those where no semblance of functioning government exists. Given the proliferation and global reach of some irregular threats, numerous protracted operations may be conducted simultaneously. The joint force will therefore need the resources, authorities, rotational constructs, and area expertise to conduct activities and operations that may range from several months to many years. Low-profile operations will also have unique requirements, including long-range clandestine infiltration methods and heavy reliance on ISR and precision strike capabilities.

**Build partner capability.** The contest for legitimacy ultimately rests on the local government’s own ability to provide security, good governance, and economic development and otherwise address the population’s needs. Activities that enhance the local government’s capability will go a long way toward the prevention of many irregular threats. A capable and professional local security force is vital to securing the population and achieving political legitimacy. Thus, in many cases the joint force will be required to assist in building host nation security force capability and capacity. Building partner capability will allow the joint force to limit the scope of its efforts and thus allow the joint force to maintain persistent engagement. Building partner security force capacity is one means of enhancing preventive security and a primary focus of effort for the joint force during steady-state operations. The joint force will work with other USG and multinational partners to enhance the capability of indigenous foreign security forces, including land, air, and maritime forces. DoD will train, advise, assist and where appropriate equip and combat-advise counterpart units from the tactical to the ministerial level, including defense ministries, Service secretariats

66 For a more detailed discussion on this topic, to include required joint force capabilities, see the Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept, v.1.0.
and staffs, and other military institutions. These efforts will require land, air, and maritime advisors to provide training and expertise in Service-specific areas, as well as approaches that are transferrable, affordable, modular, and interoperable. Security also requires building viable and integrated criminal justice systems capable of implementing the rule of law. This includes policing, detention, judicial, and other criminal justice functions grounded in a local conception of law and legitimacy. As such, when required and if the appropriate authorities are in place, DoD may also provide such support to non-military security, law enforcement, and intelligence organizations at the invitation of the host nation with full coordination and support of the chief of mission and geographic combatant commander. This may include, in accordance with authorities and policy guidance, constabulary, national and regional police, border security forces, port security forces, and authorized local defense forces. The joint force efforts should be coordinated, paced, and scaled to complement other training, education, assistance, and material support to a partner’s forces from other USG agencies, countries, or private entities. For example, the joint force should make use of coalition partners’ experience in building national police forces, since the U.S. Government does not have such forces. In addition, security sector reform requires an interagency approach to strengthen basic governmental functions such as management, oversight, finance, and the entire judicial/criminal justice system, to include police, detention/corrections, and prosecutorial/defense functions.67 Such integrated rule-of-law programs should be the norm if host nation capability is lacking. In certain circumstances, the joint force must be prepared to execute basic governance and development tasks at the local, provincial, and national levels.

Employ a balanced approach. The joint force commander must determine and strike the appropriate balance between population-focused and enemy-focused action, recognizing that the latter can cause civilian casualties and other negative impacts on the population and the battle of the narrative. This balancing act is one of the commander’s most difficult and important tasks. The joint force may be required to engage in combat actions against irregular threats, but the inappropriate use of military force can undermine the entire undertaking. In some cases, it may be necessary to limit use of force, or refrain from the use of force altogether.68 Bearing in mind the overarching objectives of legitimacy and influence, the joint force must be precise and discriminate in attacking and defeating the threat while also shaping and influencing the operating environment itself. The joint force must disrupt violent

67 United States Agency for International Development, United States Department of Defense, and United States Department of State, “Security Sector Reform,” February 2009 defines as “reform efforts directed at the institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and promote rule of law.”
68 This does not preclude the appropriate use of force in accordance with commanders’ rules of engagement.
extremist organizations, their infrastructure, their resources, and access to, and use of, weapons of mass destruction. This includes actions to kill, capture, and interdict adversaries. The joint force must calibrate and integrate these short-term actions with the much broader and sustained set of activities to shape and influence the environment, secure the population, and address the underlying drivers of the conflict. Ultimately these latter efforts, if successful, will have the most lasting and potentially decisive effect, because they erode the enemy’s ability to survive and regenerate.69

**Counter irregular threats’ leveraging of cyberspace.** One of the chief ways in which irregular threats increase their reach and impact is through cyberspace, which provides a virtual safe haven to recruit, train, finance, and plan operations by using sophisticated concealment techniques. Countermeasures are complicated by the ubiquity of cyberspace and the ease and ubiquity of establishing or reestablishing a presence there. Adversaries also execute denial of service attacks to inhibit, counter, control, or infiltrate opponents. In addition to defending against attacks, the joint force may take offensive measures to disrupt adversaries’ expanding and more sophisticated use of cyberspace. To do so the joint force must possess advanced access and technological expertise in computer network operations to exploit, attack, and defend websites, mobile technologies, various messaging systems, and social network environments, and achieve synergy among the various computer network operations and media. Barriers in law, policy, and culture must be overcome to achieve the agility needed to detect threats and conduct proactive cyberspace operations to deny, disrupt, and defeat adversaries.70

**Overcome institutional seams to address the regional and global linkages of many irregular threats.** In irregular warfare, adversaries frequently operate without regard to state, regional, or other institutional or jurisdictional boundaries. The joint force must work with its partners to overcome these seams that complicate their ability to respond to these regional and cross-border threats. One important interagency seam is the Department of State’s bilateral orientation, which vests authorities at the ambassadorial level, while the geographic combatant commands are focused regionally. One of the primary planning and coordination seams occurs because mission strategic plans and country assistance strategies of the civilian USG agencies are formulated on a country-by-country basis while the geographic combatant commands’ theater campaign plans are regionally focused.

70 The Cyber Joint Operating Concept, currently in development, addresses the full range of cyberspace issues. For more on the use of cyberspace in irregular warfare, see the Foreign Internal Defense Joint Integrating Concept Appendix F: Cyberspace Operations: Domestic and International Legal Implications.
Another seam is with USAID, which takes a much more long-term approach in planning its development assistance and other programs in most situations. Deconflicting the differing time horizons and methodologies between DoD and USAID is important. This can be accomplished in part through DoD participation in USAID/country team planning and project design activities.

There are also seams between geographic combatant commands. Geographic combatant commands meet semiannually to synchronize their theater plans for combating terrorism and determine roles, missions, and priorities for the participating organizations. Additionally, while GCCs conduct informal cross-boundary coordination on a daily basis, these efforts can be expanded to incorporate interagency partners as well. The joint force has instituted synchronization efforts for global training and assistance planning and threat finance coordination. These means can be extended to address the full range of irregular threats. Revisions in law and policy are also needed to address the jurisdictional issues involving advances in technology and remove the barriers that impede agile responses by the joint force.

**Devise force generation and allocation systems and policies that enable scalable, integrated, distributed operations by general purpose and special operations forces.** The operational environment and national objectives will determine the specific organization of the military response. In some circumstances SOF will support and enable GPF, and in others GPF will be required to support and enable SOF. At times they may be mutually supporting. New organizing and deploying constructs may be required to employ the desired skill sets and achieve the desired effects in protracted operations.71 The objectives and the nature of the operation should drive the decisions about the type of military units needed and their roles rather than the conventional hierarchical planning of unit size and rank structure.72 For example, large-scale operations in training and partner capacity building will likely fall to appropriate GPF units with SOF in direct support. Special operations elements will require enabling combat support as they work in more remote locations or politically sensitive missions. In general, countering irregular threats will require distributed, small-unit operations and scalable, tailorable, integrated military-civilian teams with a mix of mutually supporting SOF and GPF. Distributed operations

71 The Department of Defense Directive 3000.07, Enclosure, Responsibilities, 12 (3) instructs the U.S. Joint Forces Command commander in coordination with USSOCOM and the Secretaries of the Military Departments to “recommend mechanisms and capabilities for increasing interoperability and integration of SOF and GPF in IW-related activities.”

72 GEN (Ret) Gary Luck and COL (Ret) Mike Findlay, Insights and Best Practices: Special Operations and Conventional Force Integration, Focus Paper #5, for the Joint Warfighting Center, United States Joint Forces Command. See also United States Special Operations Command, Publication 3-33: Handbook on Conventional and SOF Integration and Interoperability.
on a global scale place great stress on enablers’ capacity for providing mobility, aerial sensors, field medics, remote logistics, engineering planners, construction, intelligence, regional specialists, human terrain teams, interpreters/translators, communications, dog teams, close air support specialists, security forces, and base operating support.

5. Key Required Capabilities

5.a. Methodology
The capability requirements for the IW JOC v. 2.0 were derived from over 24 months of strategy-to-task analysis based on the IW JOC v. 1.0 capabilities based assessment, IW Development Series, development of three joint integrating concepts (Defeating Terrorist Networks, Foreign Internal Defense, Unconventional Warfare), the Guidance for Development of the Force study, the Joint Urban Warrior 2009 wargame, and two IW JOC v. 2.0 workshops.

Most recently, a draft of these capabilities was examined in June 2009 as part of the IW JOC v. 2.0 limited objective experiment and subsequently refined or revised. Additionally, some implications of the activities and operations required to support irregular warfare were identified and catalogued.

5.b. Requirements
This capabilities list captures those joint requirements at the operational level deemed new, critical, or different for IW JOC v. 2.0, and groups them according to the three elements highlighted in the central idea of this concept. The capabilities listed in the IW JOC v. 1.0 remain valid and are still being considered and assessed in other venues.

**Element 1: Create in-depth understanding of the operational environment**

- IW 2.0-001C. The ability to gather, assess, and share a holistic understanding of the operational environment that includes the drivers of instability, the root causes of conflict, and the history behind them; the threats to security locally, nationally, and regionally; as well as the capability and actions of the host nation to respond to these factors
**Element 2: Plan and execute in concert with partners**

- IW 2.0-002C. The ability to integrate joint force IW planning with other USG agencies to facilitate regional and global operations across USG agency and department boundaries.

- IW 2.0-003C. The ability to synchronize joint force execution of IW activities with other USG agencies to facilitate regional and global operations across USG agency and department boundaries.

- IW 2.0-004C. The ability to provide support to host nation, multinational, other USG agencies, and nongovernmental organizations (NGO).

- IW 2.0-005C. The ability to draw support from host nation, multinational, other USG agencies, and nongovernmental organizations.

- IW 2.0-006C. The ability to assist efforts to develop within the host nation an enduring capability to establish and maintain security, provide legitimate governance, and foster development programs that address root grievances.

- IW 2.0-007C. The ability to **influence** relevant populations by planning and executing coordinated communications strategies, to include crafting narratives that match actions to messages so that the population
  - Perceives the legitimacy of local and host nation authorities
  - Denies moral and physical support to adversaries and competing actors.

- IW 2.0-008C. The ability to **enable** partners to plan and execute communications strategies, to include crafting narratives that match activities and messages so that the relevant population
  - Perceives the legitimacy of local and host nation authorities
  - Denies moral and physical support to adversaries and competing actors.
• IW 2.0-009C. The ability to conduct offensive cyberspace operations to influence, disrupt, deny, and defeat adversaries’ activities

• IW 2.0-010C. The ability to conduct defensive cyberspace operations and computer network defense to influence, disrupt, deny, and defeat adversaries’ activities

**Element 3: Assess and adapt in response to the dynamic and complex nature of the problem**

• IW 2.0-011C. The ability to conduct local and regional assessments of operational effectiveness

• IW 2.0-012C. The ability to evaluate and understand the potential effects from both population-focused action and enemy-focused action

• IW 2.0-013C. The ability to project or modify IW-related actions and activities with flexible force and operational constructs

6. Implications

Listed below is a set of initial implications, based on elements of the central idea and the enabling capabilities. These implications will need to be explored, validated, and refined through further experimentation, capability analysis, and subsequent operational experience.

**Element 1: Create understanding in depth**

1. The joint force should establish semi-annual regional forums as a mechanism that brings together academia, business and industry, diplomats, interagency partners, the military, multinational partners, and nongovernmental organizations to discuss development, governance, humanitarian conditions and the security of priority countries within their regions. This forum would allow all key stakeholders to provide input towards developing an adequate, holistic appreciation of the environment.

2. The Service and joint force professional military education (PME) institutions should include education on a range of topics related to irregular warfare including: balanced approach, crafting the narrative, civil affairs, building partner capability, funding sources for building partner capability, civil-military teams, best and worst practices, and expectation management.
3. The Service and joint force PME institutions should stress the importance of cultural norms and that enhanced understanding of culture and other environmental factors may require changes in the application of existing doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and standards.

4. The joint force should develop "senior mentor" type programs with retirees from other USG agencies and nongovernmental organizations in order to train and advise the DoD in developmental and governance activities.

5. Leaders at all levels should make a mental shift from winning decisive engagements to embracing the idea that “winning the battle of the narrative” should be what drives many joint force operations in an IW environment – rather than conducting operations and attempting to tell a favorable U.S. story in the aftermath.

6. The joint force should adopt a layered/tiered approach to cultural awareness and language skills. Some personnel get all the requisite training and education, some personnel receive additional specialized training, and a third smaller tier receives the most highly specialized skills. These skills will provide an appreciation of the environment, as well as linguistic, social, and societal aspects of specified regions.

7. The Services should continue to refine personnel tracking systems that identify IW-unique skill sets (e.g., in security force assistance activities, regional expertise, intelligence and/or interagency experience) to support the joint force. The intent is to develop and sustain those skill sets, expertise and personal relationships/contacts throughout the course of an individual’s career.

8. Leaders should understand that the mere presence of the joint force can radically alter and skew local, traditional power brokers and structures.

9. The joint force should leverage multinational partners when developing cultural awareness of a country, region, people, society or tribe. Many of our partner nations have extensive experiences and previous relationships within a region that provide cultural knowledge of areas, people, and environments that the joint force may lack.

10. Service and joint force manpower models should support IW requirements. Irregular warfare requires a force of more experienced and mature personnel who have experience in country, links to host nation personnel, are able to understand the causes of conflict, and work with other partners (e.g., interagency, multinational, and nongovernmental).
11. The Services should incentivize and track personnel, both active duty and reserve, with critical IW skills and experience (e.g., trainer advisor billets; interagency assignments; foreign area officers; or civil affairs related specialties such as agricultural planning, water treatment, and public administration experience). Incentives could include career-level or re-enlistment bonuses, precepts to PME education, promotion, and command selection boards, as well as other career enhancing assignments.

12. The joint force should expand its ability to conduct foreign media analysis; leveraging the capabilities and capacities of other USG agencies when and where applicable. This ability will allow the joint force to identify the local media, their audiences, and how information is spread and transferred within the cultural context of the relevant population.

13. Service and joint force lessons learned repositories should become more integrated, more easily searchable, more user-friendly, and accessible to all USG agencies and relevant partners.

14. The joint force should recruit local formations and incorporate local personnel (e.g., regional scouts, KATUSAs) when and where acceptable.

**Element 2: Plan and execute in concert with partners**

1. As joint force actions take place within the political context of decisions made by the U.S. Government, DoD should continue to work with interagency partners to further develop national level mechanisms to determine the prioritization and resourcing of activities to be performed by the joint force and those expected to be performed by other USG agencies.

2. The joint force should pursue permanent, flexible, multi-agency funding authorities with multi-year funding streams. Single-year funding makes it difficult to establish persistent engagement plans for training host nation security forces.

3. The joint force should expand and place greater emphasis on its knowledge and expertise in stability programming in order to identify and synchronize development, governance and security activities; the

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73 Sections 1206, 1207 and 1208 of the National Defense Authorization Act respectively provide the Department of Defense with the authority to train and equip foreign military and maritime security forces; transfer funds to the Department or State for reconstruction, stabilization and security activities in foreign countries; and reimburse foreign forces, groups or individuals supporting or facilitating ongoing counterterrorism military operations by U/S. special operations forces.
relevant authorities; as well as the actors and transition points among them.

4. The joint force should increase and enhance MILGP structures to oversee military support to host nation partners in order to reflect IW requirements and priorities.

5. The joint force should work with interagency partners to refine doctrine that articulates supported and supporting roles when working together.

6. The joint force should identify the appropriate civil-military integration points throughout the structure of the joint force, its multinational partners, and the host nation. When appropriate, this could include other USG agency billets embedded in the joint force structure and joint force billets embedded in our partner’s structure from the tactical to the ministerial level.

7. The joint force should institutionalize nongovernmental organization and civil-military team training as part of military exercises, pre-deployment training, and other events.

8. The joint force should emphasize the importance of joint information operations in mission planning and ensure coordination between public affairs, military support to public diplomacy and IO functions to increase the potential for synergy.

9. The joint force should develop enhanced working relationships with media outlets, in particular multinational and local outlets, and provide access to appropriate information.

10. The joint force should use appropriate and timely messaging devices and methods in order to engage in sophisticated, interactive strategic communication at the local, regional, national, and global levels.

11. The joint force should establish mechanisms to streamline the current review and approval process for computer network attacks.

12. The joint force should place greater emphasis on cyberspace in the planning process when developing courses of action.

13. The joint force should establish a collaborative system that allows cyberspace operations to coordinate real-time with partner nations, host nation, and interagency partners.

14. The joint force should develop the capabilities to support global distributed operations that would place small units (below the battalion level) of GPF in civil-military teams and situations where they will have to rely on host nation enablers and medical care.
15. The Services should review the training, leadership, and rank structure needed by the GPF to conduct global distributed operations.

16. The joint force should establish appropriate enablers, sustainment, and support relationships and processes in support of global distributed operations.

**Element 3: Assess and adapt in response to the dynamic and complex nature of the problem**

1. An existing, high-level coordination body with appropriate seniority should establish a regular, integrated security assessment process for prioritized countries, inclusive of interagency partners (e.g., DoD, DoS, USAID), which develops an appreciation of the environment in those countries; identifies potential threats to governance, development and security; articulates the resources needed to deal with the various types of threats; and assesses the range of ability of the country to deal with these threats.

2. The joint force should develop frameworks and mechanisms with academia, business and industry, NGOs and other USG agencies to enable the identification and analysis of the appropriate leading indicators that measure the effectiveness of developmental, governance, and security activities in an IW environment.

3. The joint force and Services should make the Global Force Management process and Service Force Generation models flexible enough to meet the demand signals for IW activities; ensuring that deploying organization and constructs are paired with appropriate and sufficient enabler, support, and sustainment capabilities.

4. The joint force should establish processes to ensure there is continuity and consistency of message and deeds, particularly when units rotate in and out of the host nation.

5. The joint force should institutionalize the capabilities, currently being provided by ad-hoc and in-lieu-of organizations employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom (OIF/OEF), that are proven through experimentation to retain relevance in a post-war threat environment where there is the continued need to conduct counter-insurgency and population-centric missions.

6. The joint force should consider how readiness reporting is conducted – readiness models should be flexible enough to account for units participating in IW activities and operations as well as major combat operations.
7. The Services and USSOCOM should ensure that weapons systems and other material designs are transferable, affordable, modular, and interoperable to facilitate building partner capability.

7. Risks and Mitigation

Risks are hypothetical events that could render this concept invalid. They help frame the context in which this JOC applies. Mitigations are potential means to address the risks.

**Risk #1: Adjusting joint force capabilities and capacities to provide greater emphasis on countering irregular threats risks reducing capabilities and capacities to address regular threats, which may be less likely but potentially more dangerous.**

**Mitigation:** This risk can be mitigated to the degree that capabilities and organizations can be designed for maximum versatility. In addition, a balanced approach is needed to develop and maintain those specialized capabilities and capacities that are required to address irregular and regular threats. New training techniques and technologies can enhance the ability of the joint force to develop, increase, and maintain the proficiency required to address both irregular and regular threats. Previously, training and education in irregular warfare activities was allowed to atrophy post-conflict. The joint force should not allow our education in conventional or traditional skills to atrophy. U.S. military personnel should be provided a balanced education that instills in them an understanding of both conventional and irregular warfare and the ability to adapt quickly to the challenges of either, or both, in combination. Modularization of enabling capabilities can also facilitate rapid mission transition. In the final analysis, the President and Secretary of Defense will decide where to take risk if such a decision is necessary due to resource or other constraints.

**Risk #2: Participating in protracted irregular warfare activities in multiple locations may strain the capacity and reduce the readiness of the joint force to conduct major conventional combat operations and sustain its other long-term global commitments.**

**Mitigation:** Identifying the likely range of irregular warfare activities and other contingencies should lead to an assessment of capacity and capabilities that will most likely be needed. Conduct assessments of GPF capabilities to determine capability gaps, and prepare a plan with a timeline to address them. This risk can be mitigated to the degree that capabilities and organizations can be designed for maximum versatility. In addition, a balanced approach is needed to develop and maintain those specialized and general purpose capabilities and capacities that are...
required to address irregular and regular threats. Mitigation strategies include increasing JPME to develop leaders that are more capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict; pursuing technological advances to increase our asymmetric advantages; and dedicating force structure to establish a persistent presence that may be useful to avoid violent conflict altogether and/or to shape the environment. This could include establishing permanent MILGPs within U.S. missions in select countries, and/or otherwise reconsidering the composition and/or training of DoD presence in U.S. missions. In addition, contingency plans and hedging strategies should be considered to provide surge capabilities and capacities to address irregular threats, either through utilizing capacity in the reserve component, rapid retraining of other specialties not in high demand, and identification of additional capacity in the DoD civilian workforce.

Risk #3: Assuming that civilian capacity and capability will be created to conduct development and governance activities to address irregular threats risks a lack of military preparedness to undertake these tasks if the civilian USG agencies cannot perform them.

Mitigation: Mitigating this risk requires acknowledgement in doctrine and training that the joint force may be called upon in certain circumstances to perform or assist in the performance of such tasks and to conduct these activities if necessary in the absence of other agencies.

Risk #4: The U.S. Government does not develop collaborative whole-of-government approaches to conducting irregular warfare activities.

Mitigation: The Department of Defense should conduct analyses to identify lessons learned and best practices from recent studies and past irregular warfare efforts and share these findings with other agencies. DoD and partners should collaborate in an effort to lead development of a unified approach with the requisite authorities and mechanisms for planning and operations, as well as roles and responsibilities for specific interagency partners in countering irregular threats. Whole-of-government exercises should be established to test and rehearse whole-of-government collaborative approaches. Furthermore, given the political nature of IW, the joint force commander should carefully consider his command and control (C2) structures and review them with key civilian counterparts to identify required USG civilian-military integration points. For legal reasons related to Title 10 and Title 22, which will likely continue to exist for the foreseeable future, establishing a unified civilian-military command will probably be impossible. That said, the aforementioned C2 review may contribute to improved processes for cooperation and collaboration that will be important to enable unified
action. In the absence of clear, formal processes, joint force commanders should familiarize themselves with successful experiences and seek to get USG agreement to apply them as appropriate.

**Risk #5: Lack of success in building coalitions with partner nations to counter irregular threats reduces the prospects for achieving overall success.**

**Mitigation:** The Defense Department should strengthen current alliances, partnerships, and informal associations while the Department of State and other USG agencies develop new relationships to expand the range of potential partners around the world. The United States can explore new ways to cooperate with existing international, multinational, regional, nongovernmental, private voluntary organizations and other non-state entities with which it shares common aims.

**Risk #6: This concept’s emphasis on the indirect methods of countering irregular threats could lead to the misconception that IW can be conducted successfully with limited casualties and little physical destruction.**

**Mitigation:** The requirement to strike the appropriate balance between population-focused and enemy-focused action does not diminish the need for the joint force to be able to kill, capture, and interdict adversaries with speed, precision, and discrimination. The imperative to refrain from or de-escalate the use of force in certain circumstances does not imply that use of force will never be necessary. These are tasks that the military and no other agency of the U.S. Government is uniquely designed to accomplish.
Appendix A – References


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Appendix B – Glossary and Acronyms

**Capability.** The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) (Joint Publication [JP] 1-02) It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of an initial capabilities document or a DOTMLPF change recommendation. In the case of materiel proposals, the definition will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the capability development document and the capabilities production document. (CJCSI 3170.01) See also military capability.

**Combat support agency.** A Department of Defense agency or activity that provides combat support or combat service support functions to joint operating forces across the range of military operations and in support of combatant commanders executing military operations. Also called CSA.

**Computer network operations.** Includes three sub-categories: computer network attack (CNA), computer network defense (CND), and computer network exploitation (CNE). CNA consists of actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. CND involves actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DoD information systems and computer networks. CND actions not only protect DoD systems from an external adversary but also from exploitation from within, and are now a necessary function in all military operations. CNE is enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks.

**Conventional forces.** 1. Those forces capable of conducting operations using non-nuclear weapons. 2. Those forces other than designated special operations forces. (JP 1-02)

**Counterinsurgency.** Comprehensive civilian and military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any core grievances. Also called COIN. (JP 3-24)

**Counterterrorism.** Actions taken directly against terrorist networks and indirectly to influence and render regional and global environments inhospitable to terrorist networks. Also called CT. (JP 3-26 RFC)
**Distributed Operations.** Operations characterized by forces widely dispersed in multiple domains throughout an operational area, often beyond mutually supporting range and operating independently of one another because of distance or differing missions or capabilities, but supported by a variety of nonorganic capabilities. The critical distinction between distributed operations and joint distributed operations is the level and responsiveness of external support to the distributed units. (US Joint Forces Command Draft Concept, A Concept for Joint Distributed Operations, v.0.6.1, 28 Oct 2009.)

**Foreign internal defense.** Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID. (JP 1-02)

**Hostile environment.** Operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 1-02)

**Insurgency.** The organized use of subversion and violence by a group or movement that seeks to overthrow or force change of a governing authority. Insurgency can also refer to the group itself. (JP 3-24)

**Irregular warfare.** A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations. Irregular warfare favors indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capabilities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, influence, and will. Also called IW. (JP 1-02)

**Joint force.** A general term applied to a force composed of significant elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under a single joint force commander. See also joint force commander. (JP 1-02)

**Joint operations.** A general term to describe military actions conducted by joint forces, or by Service forces in relationships (e.g., support, coordinating authority), which, of themselves, do not establish joint forces. (JP 1-02)

**Operational environment.** A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the commander. (JP 1-02)

**Permissive environment.** Operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as
the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. (JP 3-0)

**Psychological operations.** Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)

**Security assistance.** A group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services by grant, loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and objectives. Also called SA. See also security assistance organization; security cooperation. (JP 3-57)

**Security cooperation.** All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. See also security assistance; security assistance organization. (JP 1-02)

**Security cooperation activity.** Military activity that involves other nations and is intended to shape the operational environment in peacetime. Activities include programs and exercises that the U.S. military conducts with other nations to improve mutual understanding and improve interoperability with treaty partners or potential coalition partners. They are designed to support a combatant commander’s theater strategy as articulated in the theater security cooperation plan. (JP 1-02)

**Security cooperation planning.** The subset of joint strategic planning conducted to support the Defense Department’s security cooperation program. This planning supports a combatant commander’s theater strategy. See also security cooperation. (JP 5-0)

**Security force assistance.** Activities that directly support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their sustaining institutions. Also called SFA. (Draft DoD Instruction)
Security forces. Duly constituted military, paramilitary, police, and constabulary forces of a state. (DoDI 3000.07)

**Security sector reform.** Efforts directed at the institutions, processes, and forces that provide security and promote rule of law. (United States Agency for International Development, United States Department of Defense, and United States Department of State. *Security Sector Reform*)

**Special operations.** Operations and activities conducted in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive environments to achieve military, diplomatic, informational, and/or economic objectives employing military capabilities for which there is no broad conventional force requirement. These activities often require covert, clandestine, or low profile capabilities. Special operations are applicable across the range of military operations. They can be conducted independently or in conjunction with operations of conventional forces or other government agencies and may include operations through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. (JP 1-02)

**Stability operations.** An overarching term encompassing various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. (DoDI 3000.05)

**Strategic communication.** Focused U.S. Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of U.S. Government interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. (Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept, v.0.9, 26 August 2008, B-10)

**Terrorism.** The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 1-02)

**Traditional warfare.** A form of warfare between the regulated militaries of states, or alliances of states, in which the objective is to defeat an adversary’s armed forces, destroy an adversary’s war-making capacity, or
seize or retain territory in order to force a change in an adversary’s government or policies. (DoDD 3000.07)

**Unconventional warfare.** Activities conducted to enable a resistance movement or insurgency to coerce, disrupt or overthrow a government or occupying power by operating through or with an underground, auxiliary and guerilla force in a denied area. Also called UW. (UW Joint Integrating Concept [JIC], USSOCOM-approved definition)

**Unified action.** The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. (JP 1-02)
Acronyms

C2 – Command and control
CABP – Comprehensive Approach to Building Partnership
CCJO – Capstone Concept for Joint Operations
CJCSI – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
CJIAFTF – Combined joint interagency task force
CNA – Computer network attack
CND – Computer network defense
CNE – Computer network exploitation
COCOM – Combatant command
COIN – Counterinsurgency
CORDS – Civil operations and revolutionary development support
CSA – Combat support agency
CT – Counterterrorism
DoD – Department of Defense
DoS – Department of State
DOTMLPF-P – Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy
FID – Foreign internal defense
GPF – General purpose forces
ICAF – Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
IGO – Intergovernmental organization
IMS – Interagency Management System
IO – Information operations
ISR – Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW – Irregular warfare
JIATF – Joint interagency task force
JIC – Joint integrating concept
JOC – Joint operating concept
JOE – Joint operating environment
JP – Joint publication
JTF – Joint task force
JWAC – Joint Warfare Analysis Center
MILGP – Military group
NGO – Nongovernmental organization
NSC – National Security Council
OEF – Operation Enduring Freedom
OIF – Operation Iraqi Freedom
PME – Professional military education
PSYOP – Psychological operations
PVO – Private voluntary organization
SA – Security assistance
SFA – Security force assistance
SO – Stability operations
SOF – Special operations forces
U.S. – United States
USAID – United States Agency for International Development
USG – U.S. Government
UW – Unconventional warfare
Appendix C – IW JOC Relationship to Other Joint Operating Concepts

The *Irregular Warfare JOC v. 2.0* is consistent with the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations v. 3.0*. The CCJO states that U.S. forces require the same level of expertise in irregular warfare that they developed for conventional warfare. The institutional implications of adopting the CCJO include improving knowledge of and capabilities for waging irregular warfare. The relationship of the IW JOC to the other extant JOCs is described below.

The *Military Contribution to Cooperative Security (CS) JOC v. 1.0* supports irregular warfare by setting conditions for future operations. Countering irregular threats is dependent on complementary and foundational elements of the CS JOC by helping gain knowledge of the operational environment, enabling operational access, and preparing the operational environment for potential irregular warfare activities and operations. CS activities provide pre-crisis situational awareness, set the foundation for operational access and develop the relationships and organizational precursors that enable effective partnerships in times of crisis. The CS JOC also makes clear that a commander’s primary objective during cooperative security is to create a less permissive environment for extremists by helping alleviate the underlying conditions, motivators, and enablers of violent extremism and destabilizing militancy. The CS JOC addresses primarily overt activities, acknowledging that other more irregular methods may be used in countries that are neither partners nor adversaries. Additionally, cooperative security and IW activities such as FID can both include security force assistance.

The *Deterrence Operations (DO) JOC v. 2.0* describes operations that aim to decisively influence the adversary’s decision-making calculus in order to prevent hostile actions against U.S. vital interests by both state and non-state actors. The DO JOC identifies five key factors relevant to irregular warfare. First, it is far more difficult to determine who the important non-state actor decision makers are. Second, there is generally greater uncertainty regarding how non-state actor decision makers perceive the benefits, costs, and consequences of restraint regarding actions we seek to counter. Third, state and non-state actors often differ in their susceptibility to our efforts to credibly threaten cost imposition. The fourth key factor that differentiates non-state actors involves the manner in which they value things: they have different goals/objectives, and they employ different means to achieve them. Finally, in contrast to non-state actors, countering state actors is facilitated by well-established means of communications between states.
In summary, success in these efforts will greatly reduce enemy capabilities and discredit the enemy’s reputation for effectiveness, while at the same time enhancing the reputation and effectiveness of the Joint and coalition forces and the host-nation government.

The Military Support to Stabilization, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations JOC v. 2.0 addresses a broad range of military support to assist a state or region that is under severe stress or has collapsed due to a natural or manmade disaster. This joint operating concept overlaps in some respects with the IW JOC in recognizing that hostile forces will likely opt to attack the joint force, U.S. allies, elements of the existing or new host government, and even the local population through various irregular means, e.g., terrorism and insurgency. The SSTR JOC states the most critical determinant of success when conducting SSTR operations in a conflict environment will be convincing the local populace to recognize the legitimacy of the existing or new government. If these operations are conducted in the presence of armed insurgent forces that are actively opposing the efforts of the existing or new host government, then operations against the insurgent force are a counterinsurgency operation where stability and reconstruction activities are part of the larger COIN operation. Pursuant to DoDD 3000.07, the IW JOC includes a subset of stability operations. Those SSTR operations carried out in the wake of natural disasters or other situations that require humanitarian assistance, stabilization and reconstruction, but which do not occur where irregular threats are present or incipient, are not considered in the IW JOC. The forthcoming JP 3-07 contains further discussion of stability operations.

The Major Combat Operations (MCO) JOC v. 2.0 addresses conflicts that involve primarily conventional, large-scale, violent military operations against state adversaries. It overlaps with the IW JOC in that state adversaries with capable militaries will use their capabilities in new and creative ways including access denial, information operations, advanced conventional, WMD and irregular warfare methods to coerce or attack friends or allies, threaten regional stability, or take other actions that pose an unacceptable threat to the United States. The U.S. military must be capable of defeating such adversaries while minimizing the prospects for unintended escalation and considering the burdens of post-war transition and reconstruction. More importantly, joint force planners must anticipate continued, protracted resistance in the form of irregular warfare to occur by some enemy elements as major combat operations begin to subside.

The DOD Homeland Defense and Civil Support (CS) Joint Operating Concept (DOD HD and CS JOC) v. 2.0 states that threats to the homeland
will continue to be diverse, adaptive, and in many cases difficult to predict. Potential adversaries will attempt to surprise the United States as they adopt an array of persistent and emerging traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive methods and capabilities to threaten the homeland. DoD intends to fulfill its responsibilities associated with securing the homeland by: 1) detecting, deterring, preventing, or, if necessary, defeating external threats to the homeland, 2) responding to catastrophic incidents, and 3) integrating and operating with U.S. and international partners to achieve unity of effort for HD and CS. There are also three circumstances that govern DoD involvement in HD and CS operations and Emergency Planning activities within the homeland that are categorized as extraordinary circumstances, emergency circumstances, and limited scope missions. The central idea of this concept is for DoD to contribute to a national system that is active and layered. There are two key supporting ideas. First, HD and CS, including Emergency Preparedness, are national missions to which DoD contributes. Second, these integrated national HD and CS activities are conducted via an active, layered defense comprised of a number of overlapping systems. This JOC proposes a multi-faceted solution with an active, layered defense, unified action to achieve unity of effort, methods to reduce uncertainty (including the proposal for a National Homeland Security Plan), and the desired ends, effects, and capabilities that the Joint Force Commander will need in the 2012-2025 timeframe.
Appendix D – Consolidated Table of Capabilities

This appendix provides a table of broad IW capabilities. These capabilities represent the incremental development of capabilities identified during IW JOC v. 1.0 development as well as those capabilities defined during the development of the Defeating Terrorist Networks, Foreign Internal Defense, and Unconventional Warfare Joint Integrating Concepts (and the execution of follow-on capabilities based assessments).

The tables are organized by the operations cycle of plan, prepare, execute, and assess. Within each table, the original source document of the capability is reflected by parenthetical notation in the left hand column. Following columns decompose the capabilities into the relevant Joint Capability Areas. The appendix does not include all tasks required to conduct IW in the future – it highlights capabilities and tasks that are new or have resurfaced and should be considered in a Capabilities-Based Assessment.

1. Design the Campaign.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IW Broad Capability</th>
<th>Most Relevant JCA(s)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW-001C (IW 2.0-001C)</td>
<td>Ability to gather, assess, and share a holistic understanding of the environment that includes the drivers of instability, the root causes of conflict and the history behind them, the threats to security locally, nationally, and regionally, as well as the capabilities and actions of the host nation to respond to these factors</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Net-Centric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW-002C (IW 2.0-012C)</td>
<td>Ability to evaluate and understand the potential effects from both population-focused action and enemy-focused action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW-003C (IW)</td>
<td>Ability to project or modify campaigns with flexible force</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Planning</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IW Broad Capability</th>
<th>Most Relevant JCA(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IW-0041C (IW-007T)</strong></td>
<td>Ability to conduct operational preparation of the environment</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Logistics Services</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building Partnerships</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Battlespace Awareness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. Integrate Activities with Interagency and Multi-National Partners.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IW Broad Capability</th>
<th>Most Relevant JCA(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tier 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IW-006C (IW-013T)</strong></td>
<td>Ability to share information with other government agencies, multi-national and nongovernmental partners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IW-007C (IW-002C)</strong></td>
<td>Ability to integrate joint force IW planning with other USG agencies to facilitate regional and global operations across Federal</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW Broad Capability</td>
<td>Most Relevant JCA(s)</td>
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<td>---------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IW-008C</strong> (IW 2.0-003C)</td>
<td>The ability to synchronize joint force execution of IW activities with other USG agencies to facilitate regional and global operations across Federal Agency and Department boundaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IW-009C</strong> (IW 1.0-031C)</td>
<td>Provide Security Force Assistance (formerly provide military training and advisory assistance)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IW-010C</strong> (IW 2.0-008C)</td>
<td>The ability to enable partners to plan and execute communications strategies and match activities and messages so that the relevant population</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Perceives the legitimacy of local and host nation authorities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Denies moral and physical support to adversaries and competing actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IW-011C</strong> (IW 2.0-0-0)</td>
<td>Ability to provide support to host nation, multinational,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Develop Within the Host Nation an Enduring Capability to Establish and Maintain Security, Provide Legitimate Governance, and Foster Development Programs that Address Root Grievances.  

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74 This capability was originally identified in IW JOC v. 2.0 as IW 2.0-006C; during capability consolidation, it became a Tier 1 IW capability.
5. Conduct Operations to Disrupt and Defeat Adversaries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IW Broad Capability</th>
<th>Most Relevant JCA(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IW-012C</strong></td>
<td>Force Application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IW 1.0-036C)</td>
<td>Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IW-013C</strong></td>
<td>Force Application</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IW 1.0-042C)</td>
<td>Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IW-014C</strong></td>
<td>Net-Centric</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IW 2.0-010C)</td>
<td>Information Assurance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prevent</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

6. Control and Influence Populations and Resources.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IW Broad Capability</th>
<th>Most Relevant JCA(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>IW-015C</strong></td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IW 2.0-009C)</td>
<td>Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Building</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Communicate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inform Domestic and Foreign</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D-4
Planning and executing coordinated communications strategies and by matching actions to messages so that the population
- Perceives the legitimacy of local and host nation authorities
- Denies moral and physical support to adversaries and competing actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Most Relevant JCA(s)</th>
<th>Audiences</th>
<th>Partnerships</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Persuade Partner Audiences</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Influence Adversary and Competitor Audiences</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shape</td>
<td>Partner with Governments and Institutions</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7. **Sustain the Campaign.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IW Broad Capability</th>
<th>Most Relevant JCA(s)</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IW-019C (FID-008C)</td>
<td>Ability to establish sustainment support</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IW-020C (FID-025T)</td>
<td>Ability to provide movement services</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>IW-</td>
<td>Ability to draw</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Logistics</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tier 1</th>
<th>Tier 2</th>
<th>Tier 3</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Deployment and Distribution</td>
<td>Sustain the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Deployment and Distribution</td>
<td>Move the Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>Supply</td>
<td>Manage Supplier Networks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
8. **Assess Plans and Operations.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IW Broad Capability</th>
<th>Most Relevant JCA(s)</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>Tier 1</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IW Consol-023C</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>(IW 2.0-011C)</td>
<td>Ability to conduct local and regional assessments of operational effectiveness</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>IW Consol-024C</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>(IW 024T)</td>
<td>Ability to modify the campaign</td>
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</table>
Appendix E – IW Vignette: Countering Irregular Threats

Introduction
This is a notional vignette based on a regional scenario that describes future U.S. conduct to counter irregular threats. It details the integration of the five primary IW activities and operations and the employment of IW JOC-derived capabilities. While grounded in real challenges, it should not be interpreted to be current events or situations in any country.

The vignette begins by briefly outlining current notional theater campaign plan activities. It then describes a series of actions that show how the joint force may confront the complex challenges presented and the results that are achieved. This vignette focuses on a single regional campaign, and it does not address the global capacity requirements to conduct multiple regional campaigns simultaneously.

Situation and Background
Sharkia, a state in the Central Gulf region, and Jaiysh al Safrani (JAS), a violent extremist group, are waging an irregular campaign against countries in the region and the United States.

Figure 1. Overview of Regional Actors
Table 1. Regional Threats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Threat</th>
<th>End: Increase influence and control of resources in the Gulf while undermining U.S. influence in the region.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sharkia</td>
<td>Ways:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Operates through proxies to maintain deniability.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Supports Jaiysh al Safrani through Shimal.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Supports organized criminal networks in Harbia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Employs propaganda to portray itself as the victim of Western hostility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conducts terrorist and cyber attacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Manipulates images of attacks to portray the United States and its allies as the perpetrators of hostility.</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Leverages digital media and social networks to cultivate worldwide network of support.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Sponsors criminal and hacker organizations to conduct cyber attacks against Jisria.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaiysh al Safrani (JAS)</td>
<td>End: Eliminate U.S. presence in the region</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ways:</td>
<td>• Conducts limited terrorist attacks against U.S. interest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Minimizes operational ties to Sharkia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maintains broad network of support from extra-regional states and ideologically-based charities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The United States has been providing diplomatic and security assistance to both Janubia and the island nation of Jisria. In accordance with the theater campaign plan of EASTCOM and the strategic plans of the respective U.S. missions, the joint force is conducting a modestly funded program to help develop these nations’ security forces and to target JAS and other emerging challenges. WESTCOM has granted a low priority to addressing the relevant countries in its area of responsibility, Harbia and Shimal. It has conducted sporadic engagement activities primarily aimed at maintaining bilateral military relations with Harbia and monitoring threats from the military regime in Shimal.

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75 The effective use of a global media campaign and global network of supporters is similar to the rise of the Zapatistas of southern Mexico in 1994.
76 This reflects the growing disruptive use of cyber in conflicts such as the pre-emptive cyber attacks by Russia prior to the invasion of Georgia following the Georgia incursion into South Ossetia.
77 The recent use of Twitter, Facebook, and proxy servers by Iranian protestors demonstrates the global effect of on-line social networking to rapidly and widely broadcast messages and influence world opinion – despite a state’s efforts to control the information domain (e.g., jam broadcasts and block message traffic on the Internet).
78 “Diasporas have played an important role in helping Tamil rebels in Sri Lanka, Kurdish guerrillas in Turkey, and the PLO, among other movements.” Daniel Byman, et al. Trends in Outside Support for Insurgent Movements.
2011: Request for Assistance and Understanding the Operational Environment

In 2011, the government of Janubia makes a formal request to the United States to increase its level of assistance and counter the growing unrest and violence. Acknowledging the threat posed by JAS, the U.S. Government, and partner nations agree to the request and begin to develop a campaign plan for persistent engagement in the region.

In order to accomplish overarching U.S. objectives, the National Security Council (NSC) establishes the Janubia Regional Support Group (JRSG) – an interagency task force. The JRSG first seeks to develop an in-depth understanding of Janubia and the region. This team quickly recognizes that they have limited information due to a lack of access in the region. In response, the U.S. ambassador to Janubia establishes an information fusion cell within the U.S. mission to overcome access issues and gain new information. WESTCOM engagement includes a HUMINT Foreign Military Intelligence Collection Activity capability able to conduct strategically overt debriefing of U.S. personnel in contact with foreign counterparts, other sources in the regional AOR. The government of Janubia grants permission to embed combined host nation, interagency, and civilian teams with local authorities executing defense and development programs in order to build partner capability. These teams survey the population to understand their grievances and identify and assess sub-national powerbrokers and stakeholders. The Secretary of Defense directs EASTCOM to deploy small advisory teams composed of GPF military police elements and SOF advisors and embed them with host nation security forces. At the same time the ambassador and the EASTCOM commander draw together a broader group of high-level experts to assess the current operating environment and gain a deeper understanding of the root causes of the current conflict. This effort includes representatives from host nation ministries, USG agencies, academic, nongovernmental and other nations who are supporting Janubia and the region-wide support effort. Virtual forums are instituted

79 See Forging a New Shield, Project on National Security Reform, for detailed discussion of such a mechanism for integrated civilian-military policy implementation. The JRSG is led by the Ambassador to Janubia with the Deputy Commander of EASTCOM as the second in command, and includes the Ambassadors from Janubia, Harbia, and Jisria. The JRSG coordinates operational planning in support of Janubia counterinsurgency efforts. The JRSG includes planning elements from interagency and partner nation organizations. Planning and execution is coordinated through respective Embassies. To support operational unity of effort and provide integrated tactical control of deployed forces, EASTCOM and WESTCOM establish a military group within each Embassy. WESTCOM forces operating in the AOR are shifted to the operational control of the deputy commander EASTCOM for unity of command.

80 The Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework and Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework were used to enable an interagency team to assess the situation systematically and collaboratively. For more information see Appendix G.

81 To tap expertise from outside the joint force, in 2003 DoD developed the Human Terrain Teams and subsequently the Human Terrain System to embed social scientists with military units for the purpose of improving their understanding of the socio-cultural elements of the operating environment.
to connect continuously with an even broader network of subject matter experts in social, economic, political, military, religious, and cultural domains.

This intensive initial assessment reveals how the ethnic allegiances, which cross state and geographic combatant command boundaries, facilitate the supply of money, arms, recruits, and propaganda emanating from Sharkia to the JAS insurgency movement in Janubia, the dictatorship of Shimal, and sympathetic segments of the population in Jisria. It also reveals the mutually supportive ties between Harbia, Janubia, and Jisria (Janubia and Jisria contain ethnic enclaves of Harbian expats) as well as ethnic cross-border ties between tribal elements of Harbia and Shimal. The assessment concludes that a campaign of influence and support can counter these trends.

The NSC is briefed on this assessment by the ambassador to Janubia. Based on this assessment, the President directs attainment of the following objectives within the region:

1) Counter the growing insurgency threat in Janubia;
2) Disrupt the subversive support to criminal and insurgent networks emanating from Shimal;
3) Defeat the terrorist network JAS;
4) Enhance the internal defense and development programs of Harbia to strengthen its role as a regional stabilizing force;
5) Subvert the destabilizing influence of Sharkia in the region;
6) Be prepared to conduct stability operations if required.

The NSC designates this region as a Tier 1 priority and directs the JRSG to accomplish these objectives.

2012: Initial Actions
The JRSG provides guidance to conduct a coordinated campaign aimed at:

- Promoting stability (legitimacy, good governance, trust, rule of law, and tolerance) in Janubia, Harbia, and Jisria
- Undermining the disruptive influence of Sharkia
- Eroding the legitimacy of the military regime in Shimal
- Eliminating the threat posed by JAS
- Build the capacity of regional ally security forces to eradicate JAS networks.

The JRSG undertakes five simultaneous lines of operation, each weighted based on priorities and available capabilities, and undertaken
with the approval and participation of the governments of Janubia, Harbia, and Jisria.

1) Enable Janubia to counter the JAS insurgency, secure the population and promote stability. The U.S. MILGP in Janubia is tasked with embedding military advisors with Janubia security forces to improve their capability to conduct direct action raids against JAS strongholds. While these actions disrupt current JAS activities, a broader indirect campaign is conducted to isolate JAS from its sources of external support and from the population as well as its sources of external support. Civil-military teams repair and upgrade infrastructure, facilitate economic development, and demonstrate support to the local population by the government of Janubia.

2) Undermine Sharkia’s influence by improving the professionalism and effectiveness of Janubia security forces, eliminating corruption, and addressing rule-of-law initiatives to enhance policing, judicial, detention, and administration of law enforcement and justice. Small SOF and GPF teams operating under the direction of the MILGP are deployed in select, often remote, parts of Janubia, ensuring a minimal U.S. footprint and helping to legitimize the host nation security forces by providing security services to the population. The JRSG also establishes an interagency coordination group (ICG) to support the U.S. mission staff in Janubia and Harbia to assist in their mission of building development and governance capacity in their respective countries. The ICG coordinates a broad range of civil development programs ranging from foreign investments to direct support where critical host nation capacity shortfalls exist.

3) Erode Shimal’s legitimacy by training and equipping subversive elements within Shimal with ethnic ties to Harbia. This enables cross border support to reduce the level of support Shimal is able to provide to JAS in Janubia without requiring incursions into Shimal. This action is conducted in partnership with forces from Gyamarti who have maintained relationships with sub-national leaders in northwest Shimal. In this manner, money and arms are able to be supplied without direct implication of the nation of Harbia.

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82 In El Salvador, a multibillion-dollar FID effort over a decade supported the Salvadoran government’s national plan, Unidos Para Reconstruir, which included economic development, governance programs and security force assistance. A small U.S. MILGP oversaw the military element of FID in support of an army with very limited combat experience and a history of corruption and human rights violations. The war was concluded through a UN-mediated peace accord signed in 1991.
4) Establish a regional maritime security initiative combining the maritime security development programs in Harbia, Janubia, and Jisria. This international task force is chartered to counter the Shimal-sponsored piracy disrupting shipping in the Shimal Straits, improve the flow of goods and bolster the import/export economies of Harbia, Janubia, and Jisria. Of particular importance are U.S. diplomatic negotiations with Sebaya to support the maritime security initiative, reduce its level of support to Shimal, and increase its support for Jisria. Command for the maritime security initiative is rotated between Jisria, Janubia, and Harbia – strengthening the legitimacy of the task force to provide security to the shipping lanes in international waters.

5) Isolate JAS and Sharkia from the population and counter their broad global support by establishing a strategic communication cell in order to assist Janubia, Harbia, and Jisria in their strategic communication efforts. This includes the central government crafting a message of support to the populations at risk, backing it up with development and governance programs that implement actions directly supporting the message and obtaining feedback through units in the field that interact with local populations, assessing their views towards the central government and the impact and reach of the information campaign. Additionally, the strategic communication cell makes continuous efforts to broadcast acts of violence and disruption committed by JAS and to clearly articulate linkages between JAS, Shimal, and Sharkia as they are uncovered.

Because of the strong, vocal, global support for Sharkia, no operations are conducted that directly target Sharkia – denying any opportunities for fueling Sharkia propaganda efforts.

2014: Assessment of Campaign Effects
The initial phase of the campaign succeeds in reducing the presence of JAS inside Janubia, de-escalates the conflict, and isolates the military regimes in Shimal and Sharkia. As a result of operations conducted by host nation security forces and security sector reforms implemented in all three countries, the legitimacy of the governments of Janubia, Harbia, and Jisria are strengthened. Janubia, Harbia, and Jisria are increasingly able to support and execute their own national plans.

83 The United States launched an international naval force targeting Somali pirates, over 20 countries contributed to the force including Russia. This collaboration with a current peer competitor is an example of partnering with third party nations to directly support stability in a critical region while building stronger constructive ties and indirectly reducing tensions between the two nations – turning a potential adversary into a partner with mutually supportive motivations.
Figure 2. Reduced effectiveness of Sharkia/JAS

2015: Changes in Janubia Regional Support Group objectives
The assessment of the campaign’s progress produces an understanding of the shift in adversary objectives as well as an understanding of evolving operating environment. This results in a review of theater campaign plans with updated leadership intent and planning guidance:

- Continued support to enhance the stability of Harbia, Janubia, and Jisria
- Re-establish the legitimately elected former government of Shimal by leading diplomatic efforts to remove the current military regime, contain violence resulting from the transition of power and conduct stability operations to minimize the disruption of services
- Defeat JAS terrorist network elements operating in Shimal
- Contain the influence of Sharkia in the region
- Counter the disruptive cyber capabilities of Sharkia.

The United States commits to long-term defense and development support for Harbia, Janubia, and Jisria and strengthens its military relationship through permanently established MILGPs in each nation, staffed with a rotating group of personnel with expertise and long experience in the region as well as habitual training relationships with
host nation forces. The MILGPs provide command and control of U.S. forces, training and advisory services to security forces, foreign military sales programs that ensure proper equipping of indigenous forces, and ensure unity of effort with civilian agencies.

The United States also leads a diplomatic effort to gather support for a UN mandate to re-establish the former legitimately elected government of Shimal. Supporting indigenous forces under the UN mandate, coalition forces (led by Harbia with key enablers provided by the United States) succeed in deposing the regime. At the same time that diplomatic negotiations are underway, the JRSG begins planning for post-conflict stability operations. This enables a quick transition from military to civilian lead with minimal disruption of essential services.

The United States and regional partners develop a long-term strategy during a Regional Synchronization Conference to deter any resurgence of influence by Sharkia, as supporters in multiple countries are actively working to rebuild the insurgency. To prevent a resurgence in support for Sharkia, the countries represented at this conference agree to provide continued support to partner governments in countries in which Sharkia and JAS supporters maintain a continued presence. Meanwhile, the JRSG is expanded with national-level representation and given directive authority to bridge the seams in the operating models of various USG departments and agencies. The enduring effect is a national effort that draws upon the appropriate strengths of multiple USG agencies and multinational support in a coordinated manner in support of national policy.
Appendix F – Joint Assessment and Experimentation Plan

1. **Purpose.** The purpose of this appendix is to describe the primary activities that informed the development of the *IW JOC v. 2.0* and present an outline for joint assessment and experimentation to further refine the elements of this concept and validate it for possible inclusion in joint doctrine.

2. **Insights and Results Gained From Joint Assessment and Experimentation.** Multiple activities since the publication of the *IW JOC v. 1.0* in September 2007 have contributed to the development of the ideas contained in this concept. These events include:

   - The *IW JOC v. 1.0* Capability Based Assessment (CBA)
   - Review of insights from the 2008 IW Development Series and other IW related experiments
   - An *IW JOC v. 2.0* limited objective experiment (LOE)
   - Review of current strategic guidance and IW-related literature including outcomes of the Guidance for the Development of the Force-directed IW study
   - Unified Quest 2008 Building Partnership Capacity wargame
   - Unified Quest 2009 Full Spectrum Operations wargame
   - Joint Urban Warrior 2009 wargame
   - Senior level military leader and IW subject matter expert dialog to help frame the problem.

Below are specific insights from some of the key activities referenced above.

**IW JOC LOE (15-17 June 2009).** An LOE was conducted during the *IW JOC v.2.0* development process. The purpose of the LOE was to accept, refine, revise, or identify an initial set of capabilities required of the joint force to execute IW activities as stated in the JOC and to determine the DOTMLPF-P implications of these capabilities. To examine the required capabilities, participants were asked to explore how the joint force will understand, act, assess, and adapt coordinated activities in multiple operating environments.

**Key insights from IW JOC LOE.**

   - Understanding the operational environment as well as the cause of competition for the popular support are essential elements of planning and strategy development. Additionally, since information will not be perfect, establish an acceptable level of understanding of the operating environment and host-nation culture.
• Although the U.S. Government conducts numerous, international, pre-crisis operations, there is a lack of synchronization. Local actions have regional and international effects; therefore require a system of harmonization.
• Too often generalizations are made of a pending crisis due to ambiguity of information where in reality a deep appreciation of complex, adaptive systems is essential to formulate an appropriate solution.
• Doctrine does not identify who plays the lead and supporting roles. The joint force should understand that due to the nature of IW, it is supporting a greater whole-of-government approach.
• A mechanism is required to cross-walk geographic combatant command plans and actions to assess impact in other areas or responsibility and subsequently develop mitigation strategies.
• When addressing IW dynamics, a combined joint interagency task force is preferred over a joint task force due to the inherent combined and interagency construct for planning and execution.
• Confusion exists when using the terms direct or indirect approach.
• There needs to be agreement on the accepted definition of IW.
• Inadequate emphasis is placed on the battle of the narrative, an area where irregular adversaries have a distinct advantage.

**IW Development Series (May-December 2008).** The 2008 USJFCOM/USSOCOM Irregular Warfare Development Series was a set of six workshops and an LOE that focused on the challenges facing the Department of Defense and other elements of the U.S. Government to understand and resolve the most difficult issues and capability gaps for conducting the type of irregular activities described in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the *Irregular Warfare JOC, v. 2.0*, and related documents.

**Key Topics Discussed during the IWDS.**

• **The term “irregular warfare”** is misunderstood through the different agencies including USG agencies, combatant commands, academia, industry, NGOs, and sovereign partners. This discussion among the JOC’s stakeholders continued, with the result that the JOC revision was re-titled: *Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats*.
• **Refining the Indirect Approach.** The Irregular Warfare Development Series explored how to develop capabilities, which enable achievement of indirect approaches using traditional and non-traditional partners. Debate over the meaning of direct and indirect approaches dominated early stakeholder discussions during development of *IW JOC v. 2.0*. It was agreed that *IW JOC v.*
2.0 would focus on a balanced approach that describes direct and indirect approaches without titling them as such. Aspects of the indirect approach are emphasized in *IW JOC v. 2.0*, particularly in the sub-section titled *Employ a balanced approach.*

- **Interagency Collaboration.** Multiple issues concerning interagency partnering in IW were addressed during the Irregular Warfare Development Series, including lack of sufficient resources and the need for improved planning and execution frameworks. These are other related issues are addressed in *IW JOC v. 2.0*, particularly in the sections titled *Adopt collaborative frameworks to plan, act, assess, and adapt* and *Overcome institutional seams.*

- **Countering Violent Extremism.** “By, with and through” and the perceived lack of effectiveness of our strategic communications efforts were addressed during the IWDS. Both topics are directly addressed in the *IW JOC v. 2.0* sections titled *Building partner capability* and *Give priority to the battle of the narrative.*

- **Assessing the Effectiveness of IW Operations.** The Irregular Warfare Development Series found that there is no capability to effectively assess IW operations in a steady state. This issue is addressed in the *IW JOC v. 2.0* section titled *Assess and Adapt.*

- **Sovereign Partner Collaboration.** The Irregular Warfare Development Series explored how to build trust, enable sovereignty, and connect countries with complementary U.S. capabilities. The need to develop an enhanced shared situational awareness among sovereign partners in the security, political, social, economic, and information domains was identified. Both the whole-of-government and the broader comprehensive approach are used to frame this discussion in the *IW JOC v. 2.0* section titled *Adopt collaborative frameworks to act, assess, and adapt.*

- **SOF-GPF Synchronization.** Irregular Warfare Development Series identified a need to codify the relationships for support between SOF-GPF and to develop a coherent IW planning construct. *IW JOC v. 2.0* addresses these issues in the section titled *Enable scalable, integrated, distributed operations by general purpose and special operations forces.*

**Unified Quest 08 Building Partnership Capacity Seminar Wargame.**

This venue provided several key insights that were addressed in *IW JOC v. 2.0:*

- Regional assessment, a critical step in the regional engagement process, requires a whole-of-government approach to address the full spectrum of conditions.
- BPC will need a mix of short-term initiatives tied to and consistent with long-term objectives to be successful.
A complementary mix of civilian interagency personnel assigned to the geographic combatant commands will improve the commands’ responses and decisions across the range of country and regional issues.

As more emphasis is placed on building partner capability as a method of creating stability, prioritization of military capability will become a challenge.

**Unified Quest 09 Full Spectrum Operations Seminar Wargame.** This venue included identified the following insights related to IW:

- SOF and GPF enabler, support, and sustainment requirements and considerations are a subset of the larger issue of enabling, supporting, and sustaining distributed DoD and USG agencies.
- Establishing a U.S. structure that the host nation cannot adapt to or will not adopt may cause a lack of command and control capability in the host nation when U.S. forces depart.
- Army designers and planners must consider joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational, and not solely military factors.
- Determining the structures and practices to enable sharing of information and intelligence is a key requirement for the [operational] design and planning process between the joint task force and country team.

**Joint Urban Warrior 2009.** Reflecting a growing interest in IW, JUW 09 shifted its focus and objectives from combat in urbanized environments to the military’s contributions to a more holistic approach to conflict prevention – involving the U.S. Government interagency community, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational partners. Key insights related to the IW JOC include:

- Existing crisis response and military planning constructs are inappropriate for steady-state conflict prevention.
- Whole-of-government is limiting, as it focuses attention on USG actors – excluding multinationals, NGOs, and international governmental organizations (IGO). A comprehensive approach is a preferable and more descriptive term, capable of including multinational partners, regional powers, host nations, NGOs, IGOs, and others.
- A multi-faceted, comprehensive approach to assessing a conflict is critical; this may be the interagency conflict assessment as articulated in the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework.
- Civilian USG agencies are the executive agents in steady-state efforts, but they generally lack the capacity, expeditionary
experience and, in some cases, statutory authority to lead large-scale multi-institutional, multinational efforts abroad.

- JUW-09 recommendations included the establishment of a formal training and education institution (styled after U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command), to train and educate government civilians, military, NGO, IGO, and multinational partner professionals.
- Embed the Department of State’s regional bureau desks with the headquarters of their corresponding geographic combatant commands to create greater unity in strategic vision.
- A system of elevated “super ambassadors” at the regional levels that operate much like current diplomatic special envoys would bridge the gap between DoD regional focus and the Department of State’s country focus.
- There are less than optimal information sharing arrangements between USG and multinational partners. Information is not always shared, even with close allies. The need to incorporate multinational opinions is critical to producing a balanced, accurate portrayal of the affected region.
- There is a growing understanding of the importance of conflict prevention vice post-conflict reaction and the importance of a comprehensive approach integrating all aspects of the U.S. Government, as well as multinational partners, IGO, and NGOs.

3. Areas for Future Joint Assessment and Experimentation. Based on the prevalence of irregular threats in the current and expected future operating environment, the IW JOC v. 2.0 identifies operational capability gaps in IW. Based on the work summarized above, this concept proposes an approach that describes how the joint force will operate in response to the problems anticipated in this environment. While these approaches are actionable, each should be refined through a more detailed examination.

Assessments. Current and programmed assessment activities as part of existing IW-related CBAs are well-suited to further examine some of the approaches proposed in this JOC. As such, IW JOC v. 2.0 related assessment activities will be integrated into the ongoing USSOCOM “IW CBA Campaign.”

Current work in the IW CBA Campaign consists of capability assessments from the IW JOC v. 1.0 and one of three subordinate joint integrating concepts (Defeating Terrorist Networks). The IW JOC v. 1.0 CBA was divided into three subordinate CBAs: preparation of the environment (complete), security force assistance (ongoing), and control and influence (not started). The control and influence CBA from IW JOC v. 1.0, originally sponsored by the U.S. Army, must be completed or
incorporated into other CBA activities that are part of the overall IW CBA Campaign. Several activities being considered as candidates to cover the control and influence CBA are three related studies: the psychological operations CBA, the civil affairs CBA, and the Strategic Communication Joint Integrating Concept CBA.

The programmed work yet to be completed in the IW CBA Campaign consists of two additional JIC CBAs, foreign internal defense, and unconventional warfare.

**Experimentation.** Future Experimentation efforts include, but are not limited to, Joint Irregular Warrior 2010. This wargame has made advancing IW concepts and proposed approaches the focus of the venue. It proposes to provide ample opportunity to experiment with the proposed approaches contained in this JOC in an interagency and international setting. Additionally, multiple other experimentation venues, as listed below, may offer opportunities to test this concept.

**Other Possible Joint Experimentation and Assessment Venues.**

- Expeditionary Warrior 2010 (22-26 February 2010)
- Unified Quest 2010 (3-7 May 2010)
- USSOCOM Global Scout 2010 (September 2010)
- Unified Engagement 2010 (October 2010)
- Comprehensive Approach to Building Partnership (CABP)/USJFCOM
- Socio-Cultural Analysis/USEUCOM
- Metrics Assessment/USJFCOM Joint Warfare Analysis Center (JWAC) (focused at country and provincial levels)
- Influence CBA/USSTRATCOM
- Digital Warfighter/US Army
- Cyberspace Operations JOC/USSTRATCOM
- Assured Air Access/USJFCOM
- Other joint and Service training venues

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84 Lessons learned at the operational and tactical levels can be immediately folded into joint training venues. For example, the U.S. Air Force Green Flag West Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) and U.S. Joint Forces Command’s Joint Fires Integration and Interoperability Team closely collaborated at the Army’s National Training Center JAAT personnel, to include Army Brigade Combat Teams and Air Force fighter squadrons, prepared for combat missions in support of irregular warfare.
Appendix G – IW Planning Between the Military and the Rest of Government

Assessment and planning tools that may be employed are the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), the Tactical Conflict Assessment and Planning Framework (TCAPF), and the Country Assistance Strategy. The ICAF is a tool that enables an interagency team to assess conflict situations systematically and collaboratively. It draws on existing conflict assessment procedures used by USG departments and agencies as well as some international and nongovernmental organizations and builds upon them to provide a common framework. It also draws on social science expertise to describe a process that an interagency team uses to identify societal and situational dynamics shown to increase or decrease violent conflict, and to provide a shared perspective against which future progress can be measured.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) uses the TCAPF to help commanders and their staffs identify the causes of conflict, develop activities to diminish or mitigate them, and evaluate the effectiveness of the activities at the tactical (provincial or local) level. It should be used to provide data for the ICAF, which has a strategic and operational (country or regional) level focus. Country Assistance Strategies and Mission Strategic Plans are the USAID and Department of State official planning constructs. They are long-term plans focused on single countries, in contrast to the theater campaign plans of geographic combatant commands, which are regional in scope. USAID representatives provide input on theater campaign plans.

The Interagency Management System (IMS) is an approved and maturing response mechanism to organize USG planning and operations in the event of a reconstruction and stabilization crisis critical to U.S. national interests. Because its official use is limited to reconstruction and stabilization contingencies and must be activated by high-level decision, the IMS has only been tested in part, and has not been routinely employed to date. It consists of a system of processes, structures, and authorities that provide key leadership (Deputies Committee/Interagency Policy Committee, GCC, chief of mission) with the capacity to integrate the instruments of national power and leverage the capabilities of all participants to achieve national strategic objectives. Key structures include a Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) in D.C., an Integration Planning Cell (IPC) located at the relevant combatant command, an Advance Civilian Team (ACT) located at the U.S. mission, and any number of Field ACTs (FACTs) located throughout the effected nation. The system must be activated by a decision of the Secretary of State.