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In the area of arming, the major difference between heavy and light forces is in the weapon systems in each division and the resultant consumption factors. FM 101-10-1 details the consumption factors for each type of force. Another difference is in the ground transportation assets available for emergency distribution of ammunition. The light division assets are much more austere, as discussed further in this appendix.

Until MOADS is fully implemented, there are other differences among divisions in ammunition resupply. First, the current heavy, airborne, and air assault DISCOMs operate an ATP in the DSA. However, the LID does not. LID elements in the division rear will typically have to pick up ammunition at the nearest ASP. In addition, even before MOADS is implemented, the LID will rely on loads configured for LID units by the nondivisional DS company.

The major fueling differences among divisions are also driven by the different types and quantities of equipment. Again, the factors in FM 101-10-1 reveal tremendous differences in consumption between the light and heavy divisions. As a result, huge differences exist among divisions in assets available for storage and distribution of bulk fuels. Though all divisions rely to some extent on throughput of fuel to BSA class III points, there are no assets in the LID to provide additional resupply of forward class III points from the main class III point in the DSA. Also planners supporting any elements of the air assault division must take into account large aviation fuel requirements.

Variations also exist in distribution techniques, though supply point distribution is the primary method used in most situations. In heavy divisions, FSBs will use their 5,000-gallon tankers to provide forward refueling as discussed in FM 63-20. LID FASTs, on the other hand, must deliver fuel to light infantry battalion trains since the battalions do not have sufficient organic capability to go back to the class III point and pick up fuel.

In the field of maintenance, the concept for the LID is unique. Minimal DS maintenance is performed in the brigade sector. The bulk of the DS maintenance capability in the LID DISCOM is in the DSA. Even there, however, assets are austere. Whereas the heavy DISCOMs have three maintenance companies (heavy, light, and missile) in the MSB and the airborne and air assault divisions have heavy and light companies in the DSA, the LID has only a main support company in the DSA. To compensate for the austerity of its DS maintenance capability, the LID relies on increased passback to EAD maintenance elements and use of replacement over repair.

Although all divisions require DS maintenance reinforcement from nondivisional units, the LID's reliance is greater than that of other divisions. Two teams have been designed to accommodate the increased passback load associated with the LID. The LID maintenance support team and missile maintenance team are modules assigned to the non-divisional maintenance company. These teams, which may be attached to the LID maintenance battalion, must deploy soon after the division does in order to provide required sustainment.

Another unique feature of the LID maintenance concept is that for maneuver elements unit maintenance is consolidated at brigade level. Planners must take that into account and ensure unit maintenance assets accompany light infantry forces less than brigade size when they are cross-attached to a heavy force.

Like ground and missile maintenance, aircraft maintenance in the LID differs from other divisions. The LID design includes the acceptable risk associated with an austere AVIM capability in the division and increased passback to EAD elements. An AVIM team has been designed to handle the additional passback in the LID. The other DISCOM with unique AVIM capabilities is the air assault DISCOM. Due to the number of helicopters in the air assault division, the DISCOM has an aircraft maintenance battalion with two AMCOS.

Fixing the heavy/light force is a significant challenge. Major differences in types and densities of equipment in the two types of forces results in problems in class IX and repair capabilities. Heavy/light mixes with LID elements are particularly difficult to support. The entire maintenance concept is unique, as discussed above. As a result, assets are extremely limited. In many cases, the relevant LID maintenance unit has only one or two repairers in a particular MOS. So repair capability cannot be split in thirds to provide support when a light infantry battalion is detached from its parent brigade or a light infantry brigade is attached or assigned to another division.

As noted above, the characteristic which distinguishes heavy forces from light forces is ground mobility. Dismounted infantry in all light divisions have extremely limited ground mobility. The air assault division is designed with significant air mobility, and the infantry division has some organic ground mobility in the form of its armored and mechanized infantry battalions. However, all infantry forces were designed to be employed in situations that do not require substantial ground mobility. The light element of a heavy/light mix is required to have significant ground mobility.

In the heavy and infantry divisions, the TMT company is organic to the MSB. In the other light divisions, it falls under the S&T battalion. In all divisions, the basic mission of the company is similar. Trucks are used to move general supplies from the DSA to the BSA, transport reserve supplies, and assist in displacing division units that are less than 100 percent mobile. However, the assets to perform the mission vary widely among divisions. The support concept for the LID is based on prepackaged loads being throughput to forward areas. Heavy forces having to support light elements will require COSCOM support in packaging loads (as discussed later) and moving them directly to forward areas. Light forces in general also rely more on aerial delivery. In addition, the LID maintenance concept of reliance on replacement forward depends on extensive back-haul of unserviceable components and end items.

Another important difference between heavy and light TMT companies is that heavy DISCOMs have HETs to move tanks and other pieces of heavy equipment around the battlefield and to evacuate them when required. Planners must ensure that HETs accompany any heavy force task-organized to a light unit.

Like fixing, moving the heavy/light force represents a considerable challenge. The two types of forces have very different mobility requirements and transportation assets. When a light force is task-organized to a heavy one, transportation for tactical and CSS movements must be provided by EAD assets. When a heavy force is task-organized to a light unit, it must bring with it its share of transportation assets, including HETs. The light force, if it must support a heavy element, will need significant augmentation to handle the large requirements for such items as bulk fuel and ammunition.

Other differences between heavy and LID support concepts include the lack of tracked ambulances in the LID, throughput of subsistence from EAD to organic the class I points in the LID BSAs, and delivery of water to the combat trains of the light infantry battalion. If a LID element is task-organized to a heavy force, assets to make such deliveries must be included. Light infantry battalions do not have assets to go to a water point to pick up water.

When a specific heavy/light mix is developed, the directing headquarters designates the command relationship. The differences in support concepts and organizations discussed above must be carefully considered. What follows here is a general discussion on several types of mixes the MSB may have to support. Command relationship recommendations are included. However, these are only recommendations. The commander must select the most appropriate relationship after considering at least the following factor:

• The size and mission of the force.

• The distance of the deploying force from the support base of its parent unit.

• The support capability of the receiving force. This capability is particularly important to consider in the case of light forces since the different types have significantly different support capabilities.

• The relationship between the deploying support elements and the receiving unit.

• The sources of support for each force.

• The self-sustaining capability of the deploying force.

In the case of light force elements being task-organized to heavy forces, planners in the MSB must understand that light fighters are exactly that--light. The more they have to carry, the slower they move and the smaller the advantage of their relative mobility in restricted terrain. Providing too much support forward involves considerable risk. Light forces do not have the assets to move large quantities of supplies and equipment. The lack of an ability to move significant amounts of reserve stocks means that planners must arrange for rapidly supplying packages of critical supplies to light units. These packages (which include class IV items such as wire, mines, and survivability items) should be carefully planned in advance. The heavy DISCOM support operations branch must be involved and coordinate for support from the COSCOM to configure unit loads (unless preconfigured unit loads configured at EAC are available) and be ready to transport them forward quickly. Coordination also must be made to meet the light force's reliance on aerial resupply.

The OPCON of a division heavy brigade to a light division is a viable option under the following conditions:

• The mission is relatively short (48 hours or less).

• The parent heavy DISCOM can continue to support the mission performed by the remaining heavy division elements.

• The line of communications from the heavy brigade to the parent DSA is secure and not so extended that the DISCOM cannot meet the movement requirements.

The heavy brigade must come with its full complement of support assets from the heavy DISCOM. These assets typically include:

• The FSB associated with the heavy brigade.

• Three HETs with drivers from the MSB TMT company.

• Three tankers with drivers from the MSB S&S company.

The support package may also include a water team from the MSB S&S company if the light division cannot support the brigade and a maintenance support team with essential ASL items from the MSB maintenance companies if the heavy division MSB cannot provide responsive support to this limited duration operation from its DSA location. The MSB resources accompanying the brigade colocate with the FSB.

Attachment of a heavy brigade to a light division is the least preferred option for this type of mix. The attachment relationship requires the light division to support the heavy brigade. The major differences in support doctrine and organizations outlined above make the light DISCOM incapable of providing support without significant augmentation. The FSB with some MSB assets would still accompany the brigade as discussed above with the OPCON brigade. However, the light DISCOM will require additional assets to sustain the brigade. The MSB must provide to the maintenance company or companies in the light DSA repairers, tools, parts, TMs, and any other assets required to reinforce the FSB maintenance company.

The light DISCOM will also require additional bulk fuel storage and distribution assets, class IV supply resources, ambulances to evacuate casualties from the BSA to the DSA, and other transportation assets. Even with these resources, throughput (especially of class I and III) from corps to the BSA should still be used whenever possible.

The preferred option for mixes at this level is also OPCON. In such cases, the heavy battalion task force (with a support slice from the parent heavy DISCOM) continues to receive support from the heavy DISCOM, which may require some MSB elements. The key factor influencing this situation is the distance from the battalion task force to the supporting FSB. If distances are great, sustainment of the task force over an extended period will be a substantial challenge, particularly in maintenance and class III and V supply.

MSB assets which may have to accompany the battalion task force might include-

• Tankers with drivers.

• HETs with operators.

• Tracked ambulances with drivers.

Attachment of a heavy task force to a light brigade is the least preferred option at this level. A light division forward area support team (or FSB in the case of the infantry division) is not capable of supporting a heavy battalion, even if accompanied by the package identified above. The FAST maintenance company lacks the capability to reinforce the repair capability of the MST deployed with the battalion in a number of commodity areas. It also does not have the ability to assist in the recovery of task force assets. The light division does not have HETs to evacuate heavy equipment or move it around the battlefield. Equipment incompatibilities will complicate class V and VII supply, and the EAST supply company does not have the capability to handle the large amounts of fuel required by the heavy task force. To cross-level assets from the FSB (and MSB) of the parent heavy DISCOM would likely jeopardize its ability to continue to support remaining elements of the heavy division.

Light forces must be employed in sufficient strength to create a reaction or tactical pause by the enemy. This typically requires light forces to be employed in division size. However, to capitalize on its advantages in close terrain, a light brigade may be employed with a heavy division.

If a division light brigade is task-organized to a heavy division, the preferred relationship is attachment. The reason for this is that the light DISCOM does not have the robustness, particularly in movement, to support a brigade over extended LOCs while continuing to support remaining light division elements. This is especially true for the LID.

The attached light brigade would be accompanied by assets from the light DISCOM. These assets would likely include the following:

• FASCO from the light DISCOM HHC.

• Forward supply company from the S&T battalion.

• DAO representative from the DISCOM HHC.

• Forward maintenance company from the maintenance battalion.

• Forward support medical company from the medical battalion.

• Assets (repairers, tools, parts) from the DSA maintenance company or companies of the maintenance battalion (or MSB in the infantry division) of the light DISCOM. These will provide required reinforcing support in several repair areas such as wheeled vehicles and power generation equipment. (However, as noted above, the lack of robustness in the light DISCOM makes it impossible to provide a repair slice for every type of equipment.)

• Ambulances from the DSA medical company of the light DISCOM.

• Water team (if the heavy DISCOM cannot provide water support).

• Trucks from the TMT company.

(NOTE: Instead of the FAST elements listed above, the FSB would accompany a brigade from the infantry division.)

Even with these assets, the MSB lacks the capability to provide sustainment to the light brigade without additional support from nondivisional elements. These would include additional trucks to provide required mobility and maintenance assets to handle increased passback. In particular, the MSB will not have the required class IX to support equipment that is unique to or in much higher densities in light forces, such as 105-mm towed howitzers and 60-mm and 81-mm mortars.

Assets from the maintenance company/companies normally located in the DSA and the TMT company (as well as the additional nondivisional trucks) would normally be attached to the appropriate company of the heavy division MSB.

The preferred relationship for such a mix is again attachment. Challenges will be similar to those discussed above. The supporting FSB (with reinforcement from its MSB) will be severely stressed if it has to provide the required mobility, repair capability (including class IX) for light force equipment, class V for light force weapon systems, and water distribution to the battalion if it is a light infantry battalion. Mobility is critical. To enable a light battalion to move rapidly over long distances as maybe required in heavy/light operations, the battalion will require additional vehicles or aviation assets. Additional maintenance and transportation assets should be provided to the MSB by the COSCOM to sustain the battalion.

OPCON of the battalion to the heavy brigade is the least preferred option due to the lack of movement assets to provide support over long distances.