THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

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Preface

Doctrine provides a military organization with unity of effort and a common philosophy, language, and purpose. This FMI provides doctrine for the exercise of command and control throughout the conduct (planning, preparing, execution, and assessment) of full spectrum operations.

PURPOSE

This FMI reinforces fundamental principles in FMs 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0. It clarifies, emphasizes, or expands upon those fundamentals based on changes in Army structure and lessons learned from ongoing operations. It provides commanders with doctrinal considerations for organizing their individual command and control (C2) systems and putting them into action to accomplish missions. It also replaces the battlefield operating systems described in FM 3-0 with the six warfighting functions.

This FMI establishes the Army’s position on how the joint effects-based approach to joint operations affects Army forces and Army C2 doctrine. This FMI also is a guide for further refining battalion through corps headquarters design and developing branch and echelon manuals concerning C2 in operations.

SCOPE

FMI 5-0.1 has an introduction and five chapters. It augments but does not replace the planning doctrine in FM 5-0 and the C2 doctrine in FM 6-0. It expands C2 doctrine regarding decision making, assessment, and exercising C2 during execution.

- The introduction expands upon the manual’s purpose and summarizes the doctrinal changes it contains.
- Chapter 1 discusses the Army’s operational concept and describes several keystone doctrine changes. It provides a doctrinal position on how the effects-based approach to joint operations affects the conduct of operations by Army forces.
- Chapter 2 provides doctrine for organizing C2 systems for operations. It provides a taxonomy for command post (CP) structure and general guides for the role and functions of CPs and cells within CPs.
- Chapter 3 expands the operations process. It discusses how several processes integrate during the planning, preparing, executing, and assessment activities of an operation. It reinforces the commander’s role in exercising C2 and the staff’s role in supporting the commander and subordinate commanders.
- Chapter 4 broadens the doctrine for exercising C2 during execution established in FM 6-0. It introduces the rapid decision making and synchronization process.
- Chapter 5 provides doctrine for assessment, including tactics, techniques, and procedures for assessing operations.
- Appendix A expands doctrine on full spectrum operations, to include planning considerations for stability and reconstruction operations and civil support operations.
- Appendix B provides doctrine for crafting mission and task statements that clearly describe the commander’s intended effects.

APPLICABILITY

FMI 5-0.1 applies to Army headquarters from battalion through corps. It applies to all Army leaders, especially trainers, educators, force designers, and doctrine developers.
Army headquarters serving as a headquarters for a joint force land component or joint task force should refer to appropriate joint doctrine, policies, and regulations.

This publication applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

DESCRIPTION OF FIELD MANUALS–INTERIM

An FMI is a Department of the Army publication that provides expedited delivery of urgently needed doctrine the proponent has approved for use without placing it through the standard development process. Unless an FMI is rescinded, information it disseminates is incorporated into a new or revised field manual. FMIs expire after two years unless superseded or rescinded.

ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

Terms that have joint or Army definitions are identified in both the glossary and the text. The glossary lists most terms used in FMI 5-0.1 that have joint or Army definitions. Terms for which FMI 5-0.1 establishes definitions are indicated with an asterisk in the glossary and printed in boldface in the text. For other definitions in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent field manual follows the definition.

Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, is the proponent for this publication. The preparing agency is the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center. Send written comments and recommendations on DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-CD (FMI 5-0.1), 201 Reynolds Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to webcadd@leavenworth.army.mil; or submit on an electronic DA Form 2028.
Introduction

THE ROLE OF DOCTRINE

Doctrine is the concise expression of how Army forces contribute to campaigns, major operations, battles, and engagements. It provides a common frame of reference across the Army. Rather than establishing a set of hard-and-fast rules, the objective of doctrine is to foster initiative and creative thinking. Doctrine provides a menu of practical options based on experience from which Army leaders can create solutions to tactical problems.

Doctrine facilitates unity of effort by providing a common philosophy and language. This common understanding of how Army forces fight and the doctrinal terms used to describe this understanding facilitate rapid team-building, tailoring, and task-organizing among units and Soldiers. It helps standardize operations and aids readiness by establishing common ways of accomplishing military tasks. Well-established terms and graphics and commonly accepted practices allow for shorter orders. They also facilitate their rapid production, dissemination, and understanding.

The Army is a learning organization. Its doctrine is not static. It continuously revises doctrine based on the ever-changing security environment and lessons from operations. FM 1 and FM 3-0 are the Army’s two capstone field manuals. They provide the fundamental principles for employing landpower. Among many things, these manuals provide overarching doctrinal direction for the conduct of full spectrum operations.

The revision of Army capstone and several keystone doctrinal manuals has begun with the publication of the June 2005 edition of FM 1. FM 1 establishes the Army’s operational concept and refines the principle of full spectrum operations. Additionally, the Army is currently revising FMs 3-0 and its two keystone command and control (C2) manuals, FMs 5-0 and 6-0. This is a parallel effort with the revisions of JPs 3-0 and 5-0.

EMERGING DOCTRINAL REQUIREMENTS

Since the publication of the 2001 edition of FM 3-0, there have been significant changes in the security environment (for example, the War on Terrorism) and organizational changes in the operational Army (transformation to the modular force). Lessons from ongoing operations and transformation initiatives have revealed several doctrinal, training, and leader development requirements. Doctrinal needs include—

- Expanding full spectrum operations doctrine to better describe how to plan, prepare, execute, and assess stability and reconstruction operations simultaneously with offensive and defensive operations.
- Better describing how to integrate several integrating processes (the military decision making process [MDMP], targeting, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, intelligence synchronization, and risk management) with each other and throughout the operations process.
- Better describing the roles and functions of command posts, cells within command posts, and the duties and responsibilities of key staff officers.
- Describing the applicability of the effects-based operations/effects-based approach concept to Army operations.

The deliberate process of incorporating these needs into doctrine is underway with the revisions of FMs 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0. This effort, however, will take up to two years to complete. It involves ensuring that Army doctrine nests with joint doctrine and is coordinated with organizational design, training, and leader development initiatives. It also requires acceptance by the Army—especially the operational force. It requires staffing, coordination, and resolution of differences. Ongoing operations and continuing work in Army transformation, however, requires immediate implementation of the doctrinal changes this FMI contains.
FMI 5-0.1 establishes interim doctrine to clarify, expand, or adjust current doctrine related to the exercise of C2 during operations. Feedback from this doctrine will inform the further development of FMs 3-0, 5-0, and 6-0 and guide branch and echelon manual development.

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

The following paragraphs summarize the doctrinal changes made by this FMI.

NEW, MODIFIED, AND RESCINDED TERMS

Introductory tables 1 and 2 (below) list changes to Army terms made by this FMI.

Introductory table 1. New Army terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This FMI adds the following terms to Army doctrine:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Army positive control</td>
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<td>• Army procedural control</td>
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<tr>
<td>• battle rhythm</td>
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<td>• board</td>
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<td>• command post cell</td>
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<td>• center</td>
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<td>• command and control warfighting function</td>
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<td>• early-entry command post</td>
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<td>• effect</td>
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<td>• fire support warfighting function</td>
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<td>• graphic control measure</td>
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<td>• intelligence warfighting function</td>
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<td>• measure of effectiveness</td>
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<td>• measure of performance</td>
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<td>• movement and maneuver warfighting function</td>
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<td>• protection warfighting function</td>
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<td>• situational awareness</td>
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<td>• staff element</td>
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<td>• staff section</td>
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<td>• sustainment warfighting function</td>
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<td>• warfighting function</td>
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<td>• working group</td>
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Introductory table 2. Modified and rescinded Army terms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>This FMI modifies the following Army terms:</th>
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<tr>
<td>• assessment</td>
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<td>• command</td>
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<td>• commander’s intent</td>
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<td>• commander’s visualization</td>
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<td>• command group</td>
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<td>• control</td>
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<td>• control measure</td>
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<tr>
<td>• evaluate</td>
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<td>• line of operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>• main command post</td>
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<tr>
<td>• military decision making process</td>
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<td>• monitoring</td>
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<td>• operations process</td>
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<td>• planning</td>
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<td>• running estimate</td>
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<td>• tactical command post</td>
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<th>This FMI rescinds the following Army terms:</th>
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<td>• air defense battlefield operating system</td>
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<td>• battlefield operating system</td>
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<tr>
<td>• combat service support battlefield operating system</td>
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<tr>
<td>• command and control battlefield operating system</td>
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<tr>
<td>• criteria of success</td>
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<tr>
<td>• fire support battlefield operating system</td>
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<tr>
<td>• intelligence battlefield operating system</td>
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<tr>
<td>• maneuver battlefield operating system</td>
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<tr>
<td>• mobility, countermobility, survivability battlefield operating system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• positive control*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• procedural control*</td>
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<tr>
<td>• staff estimate</td>
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*The joint terms and definitions for positive control and procedural control remain in effect.
Introduction

CHANGES BY CHAPTER
The following paragraphs summarize the doctrinal changes by chapter.

Chapter 1 – Command and Control
Chapter 1 makes the following changes:

- Describes how the Army’s operational concept expressed in FM 1 affects current C2 doctrine.
- Replaces the battlefield operating systems with the warfighting functions (intelligence, movement and maneuver, fire support, protection, sustainment, and command and control).
- Retains the fundamental of combat power but changes the elements of combat power to the six warfighting functions tied together by leadership.
- Summarizes how joint forces use an effects-based approach in the conduct of joint operations. Provides guidance on how this joint methodology impacts on Army forces, to include defining the term effect for Army use.
- Reinforces Army doctrine on mission command and mission orders, to include emphasizing the use of the Army’s who, what (task), where, when, and why (purpose) construct when issuing instructions to subordinates to accomplish objectives and missions.
- Modifies the definition of military decision making process prescribed in FM 5-0 to account for the interaction among the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders during planning.
- Modifies the definition of the operations process prescribed in FM 6-0 to provide a more complete definition of the term.
- Modifies the definition of assessment prescribed in FM 3-0 to provide a clearer definition of the term.
- Combines the terms staff estimate (FM 5-0) and running estimate (FM 6-0) into a single term, running estimate. It also revises the definition of running estimate. The change emphasizes that there is only one type of continuous estimate.
- Rescinds the term criteria of success and adds the terms measure of effectiveness and measure of performance to enhance doctrine on assessment.
- Modifies the definition of control measure and adds the term graphic control measure to account for the various forms of Army positive and Army procedural controls.
- Modifies the definition of commander’s visualization prescribed in FM 6-0 to provide a more clear definition of the term.
- Adds the term situational awareness to account in doctrine for a term commonly used throughout the Army. Within the cognitive hierarchy, situational awareness is at the knowledge level. Commanders, leaders, and staff members apply judgment to situational awareness to achieve situational understanding.
- Modifies the definition of command for the Army. The definition now includes leadership.
- Modifies the definition of commander’s intent prescribed in FM 3-0 to account for civil considerations that may be a part of the commander’s envisioned end state.
- Adds the word “Army” in front of the terms positive control and procedural control to prevent confusion between the Army’s command and control terms and the joint terms that refer to means of controlling airspace. Changes the definition of Army procedural control to reflect that doctrine includes tactics, techniques, and procedures.
Chapter 2 – Command Posts and Staff Operations

Chapter 2 makes the following changes:

- Provides a common doctrinal taxonomy for CP organization by establishing and defining the terms **staff section, center, command post cell,** and **staff element.** A center is a C2 node similar to a CP but with a narrower focus. The cells within a CP are **functional cells** (intelligence; movement and maneuver; fire support; protection; sustainment; and command, control, communications, and computer operations) and **integrating cells** (current operations, future operations, and plans). Provides doctrine for the overall function of each functional and integrating cell.

- Retitles the staff section **G-5/S-5,** civil-military operations, to G-5/S-5, plans, to better align Army and joint staff structures. The civil-military operations staff section is now the **G-9/S-9.** Establishes a **G-8,** financial management, staff section. The financial management section is lead by the financial management officer, formerly called the resource management officer/comptroller.

- Purposely does not retitle the **fire support coordinator** the “effects coordinator” or title the **fire support cell** the “fire and effects cell.” Using these terms has added to confusion in the duties and responsibilities of staff officers and cells, and implied that Army doctrine includes the effects-based operations concept.

- Shortens the definition of **command group** prescribed in FM 1-02.

- Establish common functions for tactical CPs and main CPs.

- Modifies the definition of **tactical command post** prescribed in FM 1-02 by deleting the CP’s location (well forward on the battlefield).

- Modifies the definition of **main command post** prescribed in FM 1-02 to provide a more accurate definition of the term.

- Defines an **early-entry command post,** providing a definition for the term used in the transformed division and corps headquarters.

- Establishes and defines the terms **working group** and **board.** Provides doctrine on typical working groups used by commanders to exercise C2.

- Provides planning considerations (effectiveness factors and survivability factors) for organizing CPs for operations.

- Establishes and defines the term **battle rhythm** to account in doctrine for a term commonly used throughout the Army.

- Modifies the format of **paragraph 5 of the operation order** prescribed in FM 5-0 to better account for CP employment.

Chapter 3 – Exercising Command and Control

Chapter 3 makes the following changes:

- Expands the discussion of the exercise of C2 during all operations process activities. Describes how several **integrating processes** (the MDMP, targeting, intelligence preparation of the battlefield, intelligence synchronization, and risk management) and **continuing activities** (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations; security operations; protection; liaison and coordination; terrain management; information operations; and Army airspace command and control) are synchronized throughout operations.

- Establishes more precisely the **synchronization requirements for planning and current operations** by CP and CP cells.

- Provides doctrine on **time horizons** (short-, mid-, and long-range) as a construct for assigning responsibilities to CPs and CP cells.
Chapter 4 – Execution

Chapter 4 makes the following changes:

- Expands upon the Army’s operational concept established in FM 1. Provides considerations for commanders on how to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative during execution by continuously exploiting opportunities and countering threats to achieve the operation’s end state.
- Expands the doctrine on decision making during execution described in FM 6-0. It introduces the rapid decision making and synchronization process (RDSP)—a tool available to leaders when time is short or it is inappropriate to conduct a full MDMP.
- Provides guidelines for collaborative synchronization during execution.

Chapter 5 – Assessment

Chapter 5 makes the following changes:

- Expands doctrine on assessment described in FM 6-0.
- Modifies the definition of monitoring prescribed in FM 6-0. Expands the definition to include more than the common operational picture.
- Provides techniques for crafting measures of performance and measures of effectiveness.

Appendix A – Considerations for Stability and Reconstruction Operations and Civil Support Operations

Appendix A makes the following changes:

- Expands the discussion of stability and reconstruction operations and civil support operations within the context of full spectrum operations. Provides an increased emphasis on the simultaneous nature of operations and the complementary effects of each on the types of operations (offense, defense, stability and reconstruction, and civil support).
- Expands the doctrinal discussion of transitions between operations and phases of operations. Links operational art and the execution of transitions.
- Modifies the definition of lines of operations prescribed in FM 3-0 to account for logical lines of operations within the definition.
- Provides an expanded discussion of the use of logical lines of operations during operational design to support planning considerations for stability and reconstruction and civil support operations.

Appendix B – Mission Statements and Tasks to Subordinate Units

Appendix B reinforces doctrine on developing mission statements and tasks to subordinate units. It discusses using the who, what (task), when, where, and why (purpose) construct to clearly articulate desired effects or results.
Chapter 1
Command and Control

The exercise of command and control (C2) during the conduct (planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment) of operations is based on the fundamentals of full spectrum operations and mission command. This chapter modifies these fundamentals based on doctrinal revisions in FM 1 (2005), lessons learned from recent operations, and Army transformation. In some instances, it expands upon current doctrine; in others, it changes it. This chapter is divided into three sections. Section I discusses the Army’s operational concept (established by FM 1) and its supporting fundamentals. Section II introduces the warfighting functions, modifies the elements of combat power, and discusses the relationship of emerging effects-based concepts used by joint forces with Army C2 doctrine. Section III summarizes changes to C2 fundamentals established in FM 6-0. This chapter revises the definitions of several terms related to C2 and the conduct of operations.

SECTION I – HOW ARMY FORCES FIGHT

1-1. The Army is a critical component of the joint team. Army forces provide prompt, sustained, and decisive land power in concert with air and naval power. This ensures a synergy that gives joint forces capabilities well beyond the sum of their parts. The Army provides joint force commanders (JFCs) with distinct and complementary capabilities across the spectrum of conflict. These include the following:

- Supporting civil authorities at home and abroad.
- Providing expeditionary forces.
- Reassuring multinational partners.
- Dissuading and deterring adversaries.
- Decisively defeating enemies should deterrence fail.
- Winning the peace as part of an integrated, interagency, postconflict effort aimed at achieving enduring victory.

1-2. FM 1 established the Army’s operational concept as seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative with speed, shock, surprise, depth, simultaneity, and endurance. Four fundamentals—combined arms, joint interdependence, mission command, and full spectrum operations—underlie the operation concept. These fundamentals define the way Army forces conduct full spectrum operations. The operational concept represents the core statement of Army doctrine. It guides the way Army forces conduct engagements, battles, and major operations within a joint, interagency, and multinational environment.

COMBINED ARMS AND COMBINED ARMS ORGANIZATIONS

1-3. Combined arms is the synchronized or simultaneous application of several arms—such as infantry, armor, field artillery, engineers, air defense, and aviation—to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm were used against the enemy separately or in sequence (FM 3-0). It is a function of both organizational design and temporary associations for particular missions. Commanders achieve it by task-organizing elements of different branches into highly integrated tactical organizations. The strengths of each branch complement and reinforce those of the others, making combined arms teams stronger than the sum of their parts.
1-4. The Army is transitioning from a division-based to a brigade-based force to improve its ability to conduct combined arms operations. In the past, brigade task forces were built by attaching supporting arms (such as artillery, engineer, and signal) from divisional units to infantry and armored brigades. Doctrine stressed flexibility in brigade organization. However, establishing habitual relationships between maneuver brigades and their supporting units led to de facto fixed organizations. Army leaders recognized the value of stable relationships at brigade level. Many of these relationships are permanent in the new brigade combat team (BCT) design.

1-5. BCTs are now the Army’s primary tactical organizations. They have three standard designs: heavy BCT, infantry BCT, and Stryker BCT. BCTs include battalion-sized, combined arms maneuver, fires, reconnaissance, and sustainment units. Cross-attaching companies between battalions is not the exception, but rather the rule. This practice increases battalion cohesiveness. Commanders augment BCTs and combined arms battalions with additional units, capabilities, and resources, based on the situation.

1-6. The BCT staff is also significantly enhanced. Army of Excellence brigades relied heavily on their higher headquarters’ planning and coordination capabilities. Many of these capabilities are organic to the BCT headquarters. This change facilitates mission command and the use of mission orders by division and corps commanders.

**JOINT INTERDEPENDENCE**

1-7. Joint interdependence describes the complementary use of Army forces with those of other Services as part of the joint force. It is the purposeful reliance on other Service capabilities to maximize their total complementary and reinforcing effects while minimizing their relative vulnerabilities. Joint interdependence reinforces and complements the effects of Army combined arms operations. It makes Army forces more effective than they would be otherwise.

1-8. JFCs reinforce land or Army forces with additional capabilities. These include intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); maneuver; fires; protection; sustainment; and command and control (C2). Army forces also provide a range of capabilities to JFCs and other Services, including inland sustainment and control or protection of areas and resources. Effective joint integration requires an understanding of joint interdependence at all echelons. Throughout an operation, commanders and staffs constantly consider and request joint capabilities to help them accomplish missions.

**MISSION COMMAND**

1-9. Mission command is the Army’s preferred C2 method. (See FM 6-0, paragraphs 1-67–1-87.) It emphasizes the following:

- Timely decision making.
- Subordinates’ understanding of the commander’s intent.
- Subordinates’ clear responsibility to exercise initiative within that intent.

Mission command is well suited, if not essential, to achieving success in uncertain and fluid environments.

1-10. Military operations are complex endeavors. They involve struggles between opposing human wills. Land combat adds to the complexity of operations. It involves destroying or defeating an enemy force or taking objectives that reduce the enemy’s will to fight. Land operations occur among populations. This requires commanders to conduct stability and reconstruction operations simultaneously with offensive and defensive operations.

1-11. Within the land environment, commanders face thinking and adaptive enemies. They cannot accurately predict how enemies or populations will act and react, or how events will develop. Friction makes even friendly actions difficult to predict.

**Mission command** is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding.

*FM 6-0*
1-12. Time is a critical factor in all operations. It adds to the complex and uncertain nature of operations. Both sides attempt to exploit it. Friendly forces seek to conduct operations fast enough to stay ahead of enemies or changing conditions. Commanders address problems related to civil considerations before situations deteriorate or inaction affects the population’s perceptions. Commanders who understand how time and uncertainty affect enemies, friendly forces, and populations develop better plans and accomplish missions more effectively.

1-13. Mission command accepts that land operations are inherently uncertain. It requires commanders to act based on available information rather than waiting for desired information. When practicing mission command, commanders allow subordinates freedom of action and require initiative on their part. Higher commanders make fewer decisions, allowing them to focus on the most important ones. Mission command tends to be decentralized and flexible. Orders and plans are as brief, clear, and simple as possible. They provide only the instructions essential to synchronize forces and warfighting functions (WFFs). (Paragraphs 1-23–1-30 discuss the WFFs.) Commanders rely on subordinates’ ability to coordinate and understand with minimal verbal exchange. The elements of mission command are—

- Commander’s intent.
- Subordinates’ initiative.
- Mission orders.
- Resource allocation.

1-14. Mission orders is a technique for completing combat orders that allows subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action in accomplishing missions and leaves the “how” of mission accomplishment to subordinates (FM 6-0). Mission orders follow the five-paragraph operation order format. (See FM 5-0, page G-18.) They include the following:

- Task organization.
- Commander’s intent.
- Unit mission.
- Concept of operations.
- Subordinates’ missions and tasks.
- Essential coordinating instructions.

Missions and tasks assigned to subordinates include all normal elements (who, what, when, where, and why). However, commanders and staffs emphasize the purpose (why) of tasks (what) to facilitate understanding the desired results. (See appendix B.) Along with the commander’s intent and concept of operations, the emphasis on purpose guides subordinates’ initiative.

FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

1-15. Full spectrum operations involve the conduct of simultaneous combinations of the four types of Army operations across the spectrum of conflict. FM 1 modified the types of Army operations described in FM 3-0. It replaced the term stability operations with stability and reconstruction operations, and support operations with civil support operations. Below is a summary of the types of operations and a discussion of how these operations are combined in full spectrum operations.

1-16. Offensive operations carry the fight to the enemy by closing with and destroying enemy forces, seizing territory and vital resources, and imposing the commander’s will on the enemy. They focus on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative.

1-17. Defensive operations counter enemy offensive operations. They defeat attacks, destroying as many attackers as necessary. Defensive operations preserve control over land, resources, and populations. They retain terrain, guard populations, and protect key resources.

1-18. Stability and reconstruction operations sustain and or establish civil security and control over areas, populations, and resources. They employ military capabilities to reconstruct or restore essential services

*Stability and reconstruction operations will be redesignated stability operations when FM 3-0 is republished to comply with DOD Directive 3000.05.
and governance, and provide support to civilian agencies. Stability and reconstruction operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They may occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operations; however, they also occur separately, usually at the low end of the spectrum of conflict. Stability and reconstruction operations lead to an environment in which, in cooperation with a legitimate government, the other instruments of national power can predominate.

1-19. Civil support operations address the consequences of manmade or natural accidents and incidents beyond the capabilities of civilian authorities within the United States and its territories. Army forces conduct civil support operations to support homeland security. Homeland security provides the Nation strategic flexibility by protecting its citizens and infrastructure from conventional and unconventional threats. It has two components. The first is homeland defense. If the United States comes under direct attack or is threatened by hostile armed forces, Army forces under joint command conduct offensive and defensive operations to defend the homeland. The other is civil support, which constitutes the fourth type of Army operations. Civil support operations take the following forms:

- Support to civil authorities.
- Support to civil law enforcement.
- Protection of military and civilian critical assets.
- Response and recovery.

1-20. Commanders combine and sequence the types of operations to form their overall operational design for major operations. Army forces conduct full spectrum operations abroad by executing offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction operations as part of integrated joint, interagency, and multinational teams. Army forces within the United States and its territories conduct full spectrum operations by combining civil support, offensive, and defensive operations to support homeland security. Operations at home and abroad occur concurrently at the strategic level. (See figure 1-1, below.)

![Figure 1-1. Full spectrum operations](image)

1-21. Understanding the Army’s operational concept and its four fundamentals is important in exercising C2 during operations. It provides a framework commanders use when visualizing, describing, directing, and leading. This framework helps commanders design operations, especially in developing their commander’s intent and structuring the concept of operations. It also helps frame commanders’ thinking when adjusting their design throughout execution.
SECTION II – MAJOR KEYSTONE DOCTRINE CHANGES

1-22. Lessons from recent operations and Army transformation have identified three doctrinal requirements:

- A better construct for grouping related activities Army forces perform during operations and training.
- An explanation of how Army C2 doctrine relates to emerging effects-based concepts.
- Enhanced tactics, techniques, and procedures for military decision making and the operations process.

This section establishes doctrine for these three requirements.

WARFIGHTING FUNCTIONS AND ELEMENTS OF COMBAT POWER

1-23. This FMI replaces the battlefield operating systems found in FM 3-0 with the warfighting functions: intelligence, movement and maneuver, fire support, protection, sustainment, and command and control. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. Commanders visualize, describe, direct, and lead operations in terms of the WFFs. Decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations combine all the WFFs to generate combat power. No WFF is exclusively decisive, shaping, or sustaining.

1-24. This FMI also modifies the elements of combat power described in FM 3-0. The principle of combat power and its use are retained. However, the individual elements have changed. They are now the WFFs tied together by leadership. (See figure 1-2, page 1-6, below.)

1-25. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. It includes tasks associated with ISR. It is a flexible, adjustable architecture of procedures, personnel, organizations, and equipment. These provide relevant information and products relating to the threat, civil populace, and environment to commanders. The intelligence WFF focuses on four primary tasks:

- Support to situational understanding.
- Support to strategic responsiveness.
- Conduct ISR.
- Provide intelligence support to targeting.

1-26. The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. It includes those tasks associated with employing forces in combination with direct fire or fire potential (move), force projection (movement), mobility, and countermobility. Movement and maneuver are the means by which commanders mass the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance.

1-27. The fire support warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, joint fires, and offensive information operations. It includes tasks associated with integrating and synchronizing the effects of these types of fires with the other WFFs to accomplish operational and tactical objectives. Lethal and nonlethal fires, including offensive information operations, are integrated into the concept of operations during planning and targeting based on the targeting guidance. The three components of the fire support WFF are—

- Fire support command and control.
- Target acquisition systems and assets.
- Fire support assets and resources.
1-28. The *protection* warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power. Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatant and noncombatant), physical assets, and information of the United States and multinational partners. It includes the following task areas:

- Safety.
- Fratricide avoidance.
- Survivability.
- Air and missile defense.
- Antiterrorism.
- Counterproliferation and consequence management actions associated with chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) weapons.
- Defensive information operations.
- Force health protection.

1-29. The *sustainment* warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. It includes those tasks associated with—

- Maintenance.
- Transportation.
- Supply.
- Field services.
- Explosive ordnance disposal.
- Human resources support.
- Financial management.
- Health service support.
Command and Control

- Religious support.
- Band support.
- Related general engineering.

Sustainment facilitates uninterrupted operations through means of adequate logistic support. It is accomplished through supply systems, maintenance, and other services that ensure continuous support throughout an operation.

1-30. The command and control warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that support commanders in exercising authority and direction. It includes those tasks associated with acquiring friendly information, managing all relevant information, and directing and leading subordinates. Command and control has two components: the commander and the C2 system. Information systems—including communications systems, intelligence-support systems, and computer networks—form the backbone of each commander’s C2 system. They allow commanders to lead from anywhere in their area of operations. The C2 system supports the commander’s ability to make informed decisions, delegate authority, and synchronize the WFFs. Moreover, the C2 system supports the commander’s ability to adjust plans for future operations, even while focusing on the current fight. Staffs work within the commander’s intent to direct units and control resource allocations. They also are alert for enemy or friendly situations that require command decisions and advise commanders concerning them. Through C2, commanders initiate and integrate all systems and WFFs toward mission accomplishment.

EFFECTS AND EFFECTS-RELATED CONCEPTS

1-31. This discussion provides background on the effects-based operations (EBO) concept, provides a summary of how JP 3-0 (revised final coordination [RFC]) has incorporated aspects of EBO, and clarifies several doctrinal questions associated with Army force use of EBO.

BACKGROUND

1-32. For several years, the joint community has experimented with using effects to better link higher-level objectives to tactical actions. These efforts produced the EBO concept. The proponent for EBO is the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM). EBO is designed to improve the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment activities of joint forces at the strategic and operational levels of war. However, EBO is not part of joint or Army doctrine. As defined by USJFCOM, it is not designed for use by Army tactical forces.

1-33. One difficulty with understanding EBO is the lack of consensus as to what it is and how to use it. There are numerous joint, Service, and Army nondoctrinal publications that describe different versions of EBO. Some are consistent with each other; others are not. Although EBO is designed for joint force headquarters use, some Army tactical commanders, including some at brigade and below, have incorporated versions of EBO into their C2 practices. In some cases, this has aided mission accomplishment. In others, it has caused confusion between the commander and staff, among echelons, and between Services and multinational forces.

1-34. How to incorporate EBO into joint doctrine is a major issue of the ongoing revision of JP 3-0. Expected for release in mid-2006, the revised JP 3-0 will provide joint capstone doctrine for using effects in conducting joint operations. Until then, the following description of an effects-based approach to joint planning and assessment is provided for background information. It is based on JP 3-0 (RFC). It is neither joint nor Army doctrine. When published, JP 3-0 will supersede the material in paragraphs 1-35 to 1-51.

INCORPORATING EFFECTS INTO JOINT DOCTRINE

1-35. Before describing how Army forces incorporate aspects of the EBO concept into operations, an understanding of how effects-related concepts are being incorporated into joint doctrine is required. This discussion summarizes JP 3-0 (RFC)’s discussion of how joint forces use effects in conducting operations. Army force headquarters serving as a component of a joint force participate in joint planning and assessment. Additionally, Army divisions and corps routinely serve as the base for joint task forces. Such situations require Army headquarters to understand how joint forces use effects during joint operations.
1-36. JP 3-0 (RFC) discusses effects in the context of operational art and design. JFCs use operational art to visualize employment of military forces, their sustainment, and arranging their efforts in time, space, and purpose. This includes fundamental methods associated with synchronizing and integrating military forces and capabilities. Operational art governs the deployment of forces, their commitment to or withdrawal from a joint operation, and the arrangement of battles and major operations to achieve operational and strategic objectives. Among many considerations, operational art requires JFCs to answer the following questions:

- What objectives, when achieved, attain the desired national strategic end state (ends)?
- What effects, when created, support achievement of objectives (conditions)?
- What sequence of actions is most likely to create those effects (ways)?
- What joint force resources are required to accomplish that sequence of actions (means)?
- What is the likely cost to the joint force in performing that sequence of actions (risk)?

**Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment**

1-37. In designing operations, JFCs and staffs use a systems perspective to understand the operational environment. A systems view considers more than just an enemy’s military capabilities, order of battle, and tactics. It strives to provide a perspective of the interrelated systems that make up the operational environment. A system is a functionally related group of elements forming a complex whole. Major systems that JFCs and staffs commonly consider and analyze are political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII). Understanding these systems, their interaction with each other, and how system relationships change over time helps JFCs understand how actions on one system element can affect others. (See figure 1-3, below.)

1-38. The joint force intelligence directorate is responsible for managing the analysis and development of products that provide a systems understanding of the operational environment. Using an effects-based approach, this analysis identifies a number of nodes—specific physical, functional, or behavioral entities of each system. Nodes can include people, facilities, individual systems, forces, information, and other system components. It then tries to identify links—behavioral, physical, or functional relationships among nodes. This analysis requires collaborative relationships with various intelligence organizations, other governmental agencies, and nongovernmental groups and organizations.

1-39. A systems perspective helps staffs identify potential sources on which to focus indications and warning activities. Identifying nodes in each system, the links among them, and potential decisive points also helps with center of gravity analysis and operational design. It lets JFCs and staffs consider a broader set of options and identify desired and undesired effects to achieve objectives.

![Figure 1-3. Systems perspective of the operational environment](image)

**Designing Joint Operations**

1-40. Mission analysis helps JFCs develop and understand strategic objectives, the joint force’s mission, and the operational environment in systems terms. From this understanding, JFCs and staffs continue planning, including course of action (COA) development. They use the elements of operational design to help them visualize the arrangement of joint capabilities in time, space, and purpose to accomplish their mission.
1-41. To help JFCs connect strategic and operational objectives to tactical tasks, JP 3-0 (RFC) introduces “effects” as a new element of operational design. It defines an effect as the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect. A desired effect represents a condition for achieving a strategic or operational objective. Undesired effects are those that may adversely impact achieving strategic or operational objectives.

1-42. JP 3-0 (RFC) states that identifying desired and undesired effects within the operational environment provides a method of connecting strategic and operational objectives with tactical tasks. For example, a strategic objective may be, “A secure and stable government is established in country X.” The JFC may identify several strategic and operational effects needed to achieve this strategic objective. Possible effects include the following:

- Country X security forces maintain internal and border security.
- Country X’s population votes in nationwide elections.

1-43. These examples are statements about the behavior of systems in country X necessary for country X to have a secure and stable government. Creating only these effects would likely not be enough to achieve the strategic objective. The JFC would establish other desired effects and identify undesired effects. The full set of desired effects represents the conditions for achieving the strategic objective of a secure and stable government of country X.

1-44. An understanding of systems and their behavior in the operational environment supports an effects-based approach to planning. JFCs help guide the initial systems analysis by describing desired strategic and operational objectives and desired/undesired effects. This, along with the JFC’s intent and planning guidance, helps the staff identify potential tasks for the joint force components. For example, a possible task for a subordinate joint task force or joint force component could be, “Train and equip country X security forces capable of conducting independent internal and border security operations at the brigade level.”

1-45. JP 3-0 (RFC) states that thinking in terms of desired and undesired effects helps JFCs and staffs do the following:

- Amplify strategic and operational objectives.
- Understand the conditions necessary for success.
- Determine the best sequence of actions to create these conditions.
- Develop more precise assessment measures of the progress of operations.

Staffs continue to develop and refine desired effects throughout planning. Monitoring progress toward attaining effects is part of assessment. It begins during planning and continues throughout preparation and execution.

Assessing Joint Operations and Effects Assessment

1-46. JP 3-0 (RFC) would expand joint doctrine on assessing the progress of joint operations. Assessment is used to measure joint force progress toward mission accomplishment. Commanders continuously assess the operational environment and the progress of operations, and compare them to their initial vision and commander’s intent. JFCs adjust operations based on their assessment to ensure objectives are met and the desired end state is achieved. The joint assessment process is continuous and directly tied to the commander’s decisions throughout the conduct of operations. Staffs help JFCs by monitoring the numerous factors that can influence the outcome of operations and provide them timely information needed for decisions. The commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) are linked to the assessment process by the JFC’s need for timely information to make decisions.

1-47. JFCs and staffs consider assessment during planning, preparation, and execution. They focus their assessment on identified effects and specified tasks issued to subordinates. Generally, the level at which a specific operation, task, or action is directed should be the level at which it is assessed. This reduces redundancy and enhances the efficiency of the overall assessment process.
1-48. Assessment at the strategic and operational levels focuses on effects assessment. Effects assessment measures effects that support strategic and operational objectives. Strategic- and operation-level assessment concentrates on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and progress toward the desired military end state of the campaign or major operation. The joint force operations directorate, assisted by the intelligence directorate, coordinates assessment activities for the JFC.

1-49. The joint assessment process uses measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs) to determine progress toward achieving objectives and the desired military end state. MOEs are generally associated with measuring changes in the operational environment (assessing effects). They help answer such questions as the following: Is the force doing the right things? Are its actions producing the desired effects? Are alternative actions required? MOPs are closely associated with task accomplishment (assessing tasks). MOPs help answer questions like these: Was the action taken? Were the tasks completed to standard? How much effort was involved? Well-devised measures can help JFCs and staffs understand the causal relationship between specific tasks and desired effects.

1-50. JFCs and staffs derive assessment measures during planning. They consider assessment measures during mission analysis and refine them in the initial planning guidance and estimates. They war-game the measures during COA development. MOEs and MOPs are included in the approved plan or order and re-evaluated continuously throughout preparation and execution.

1-51. JFCs use MOEs and MOPs as assessment tools throughout an operation. Well-devised MOEs and MOPs, supported by effective management of available information, help JFCs and staffs understand links between tasks, desired effects, and the JFC’s objectives and end state. They help to determine progress toward creating desired effects, achieving objectives, and attaining the military end state. They also contribute to identifying needed adjustments the plan.

**Effects and Army Doctrine**

1-52. Army forces conduct operations according to Army capstone and keystone doctrine. The methods joint force headquarters use to analyze the environment, develop plans, or assess operations does not change this. During operations, joint force headquarters send senior Army headquarters a campaign plan, operation plan, or operation order. Army headquarters then perform the military decision making process (MDMP) to develop their own plan or order. (See FM 5-0, chapter 3.)

1-53. While portions of the joint plan or order may be articulated in terms of effects to achieve or assessment tasks with specified MOEs and MOPs, this does not change or require a new planning method for Army forces. Upon receipt of a joint order, Army forces begin mission analysis to understand the relationship of the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). Among many planning requirements, Army force commanders and their staffs identify specified and implied tasks, discern the restated mission, and develop a concept of operations. From the concept of operations, commanders and staffs develop tasks to subordinate units and essential coordinating instructions that synchronize forces and WFFs to accomplish missions.

1-54. Army forces will not adopt the joint systems analysis of the operational environment, an effects-based approach to planning, or effects assessment as described in JP 3-0 (RFC). These planning and assessment methods are designed for the strategic and operational levels of war and for use by a properly resourced joint staff. However, joint interdependence requires Army headquarters to understand joint doctrine that addresses these methods when participating in joint operation planning or assessment. When published, JPs 3-0 and 5-0 will establish this doctrine.

**Defining Effects**

1-55. JP 3-0 (RFC) defines *effect* in two ways:

- An effect is the physical or behavioral state of a system that results from an action, a set of actions, or another effect.
- An effect is a result, outcome, or consequence of an action.
1-56. The first definition relates to a systems perspective of the operational environment, an effects-based approach to planning, and effects assessment—C2 methods used by joint forces. Army doctrine generally uses the word effect within the context of the second definition. For example, FM 3-0 states, “In land operations, commanders combine and apply the elements of combat power to produce overwhelming effects.” FM 3-90 categorizes certain tactical mission tasks as having an “effect on the enemy” (for example, contain, delay, or destroy). Thus, this FMI establishes the second definition as the Army definition of effect.

All actions create effects—some desired, others undesired. Desired effects are results that support accomplishment of an objective or the mission. Undesired effects could adversely impact accomplishment of an objective or the mission.

Doctrinal Implications

1-57. Incorporating the term effect and describing and assessing operations in terms of effects does not fundamentally change Army doctrine. The Army’s fundamentals of full spectrum operations and mission command include the idea of focusing all efforts toward achieving the operation’s end state. They also require commanders to focus on results. Proper task performance alone does not accomplish missions. Rather, the results of executing a task or combinations of tasks for a specific purpose lead to it.

1-58. All WFFs generate effects. For example, the movement and maneuver WFF creates the effects of destruction, delay, seizure of terrain, and defeat of enemy forces. The protection WFF creates effects that include defeat of enemy air attacks and protection of critical assets. Since all WFFs create effects, no single staff officer is designated as the “effects coordinator” and no single staff section or command post (CP) cell is assigned responsibility for “effects.” The names and responsibilities of staff sections remain as designated in FM 6-0 except as changed in this FMI.

MILITARY DECISION MAKING

1-59. While there are many aspects of C2, decision making is at the forefront. Decision making is selecting a course of action as the one most favorable to accomplish the mission (FM 6-0). All military decisions result from a combination of intuitive and analytic decision making techniques. Factors affecting the combination of the two techniques include the leader’s experience and the amount and quality of available information. However, the most important factor is usually the time available to make the decision. FM 6-0 provides overarching doctrine on decision making. FM 5-0, chapter 1, provides doctrine on decision making and planning.

INTUITIVE AND ANALYTIC DECISION MAKING

1-60. Intuitive decision making is the act of reaching a conclusion that emphasizes pattern recognition based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character. This approach focuses on assessment of the situation vice comparison of multiple options (FM 6-0). Intuitive decision making is neither “flying by the seat of the pants” nor decision making by guesswork. Often, experienced commanders can rapidly and almost unconsciously assess a situation, fit it into a pattern they recognize, and produce a very good solution without comparing options. A decision based on such reasoning is not a guess but a reasoned action based on experience.

1-61. Analytic decision making approaches a problem methodically. Leaders analyze a problem, generate several possible solutions, analyze and compare them to a set of criteria, and select a solution. Analytic decision making aims to select the best solution from those identified. This approach is systematic and allows the breakdown of tasks into recognizable elements. It serves well for decision making in complex or unfamiliar situations. It ensures that commanders and staffs consider, analyze, and evaluate all relevant factors. It may help inexperienced leaders by giving them a methodology to compensate for their lack of experience.

1-62. Military decision making combines intuitive and analytic techniques. Intuitive techniques predominate when time is short or speed of decision is important. They emphasize assessing the situation rather than comparing multiple COAs. The result is a faster decision but requires accepting some risk. Intuitive decision making relies on a leader’s ability to do three things:
Recognize the key elements and implications of a particular problem or situation.
Reject impractical COAs.
Select an adequate (rather than the optimal) COA.

This ability is a factor of experience.

1-63. However, “intuitive” decisions have an analytic component, and “analytic” decisions rely to an extent on intuitive factors. For any decision, leaders evaluate the quality of available information and compare the decision with the commander’s intent. The preponderance of analytical factors increases with echelon. At higher echelons, most major decisions are based on the military decision making process (MDMP), an analytic process that requires applying intuitive factors throughout.

**THE MILITARY DECISION MAKING PROCESS**

1-64. The Army has two planning processes: the MDMP and troop leading procedures. Troop leading procedures are used by leaders at company and below. (See FM 5-0, chapter 4.) The MDMP applies to all Army units with a staff and during all operations. Following it helps commanders and staffs organize their thinking. It helps them apply thoroughness, clarity, sound judgment, logic, and professional knowledge to reaching decisions and developing plans.

1-65. The military decision making process is a process that integrates the activities of the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders in developing an operation plan or order. It establishes procedures for analyzing a mission; developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action; selecting the best course of action; and producing an operation plan or order. (This definition replaces the definition in FM 5-0.) The MDMP is much more than simply selecting a particular COA. It results in a series of products, including updated running estimates, intelligence products, and the control measures needed to execute the operation. (This FMI changes the definition and use of control measure. See paragraphs 1-103–1-105.)

1-66. Every decision does not require the full MDMP. In fact, the MDMP is often inappropriate for making decisions during execution. The MDMP produces a plan or order that establishes numerous instructions to help control a specific operation. These instructions and control measures are based on coordination done during the MDMP. Many control measures remain unchanged throughout an operation. However, commanders change them when necessary to keep an operation directed toward the end state. When the situation requires a major adjustment to the order, the staff often performs the MDMP in time-constrained environment to change the plan and resynchronize the operation. (See FM 5-0, paragraphs 3-203–3-240.) In other instances, commanders and staffs may not have enough time to perform the MDMP. In these instances commanders, supported by the staff, make a decision and develop a quick plan of action. (See chapter 4.)

**DECISIONS DURING PREPARATION AND EXECUTION**

1-67. Commanders make two basic types of decisions during preparation and execution: execution decisions and adjustment decisions.

**Execution Decisions**

1-68. An execution decision is the selection, during preparation and execution, of a course of action anticipated by the order (FM 6-0). The most basic form of an execution decision is applying resources or activities as outlined in the plan or within minor deviations from the plan. Commanders often delegate many execution decisions to subordinates.

**Adjustment Decisions**

1-69. An adjustment decision is, during preparation and execution, the selection of a course of action that modifies the order to respond to unanticipated opportunities or threats (FM 6-0). These decisions are rarely delegated to subordinates. When commanders adjust the order, it normally requires resynchronizing operations across the WFFs. Commanders may have to describe their visualization of the adjustment and provide
guidance on affected control measures. Staff members take necessary actions within their areas of expertise to implement the decision.

**OPERATIONS PROCESS ACTIVITIES**

1-70. The operations process consists of the major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment. These activities occur continuously throughout an operation, overlapping and recurring as required. (See figure 1-4, below. This definition replaces the definition in FM 6-0.) The operations process serves two important functions for commanders:

- It provides a framework that describes the exercise of C2.
- It provides a framework for organizing the C2 system and using it to conduct operations.

Chapter 3 describes new fundamentals for using the operations process to exercise C2. The reminder of this discussion revises several definitions related to the operations process.

1-71. For organizational purposes, doctrine describes the exercise of C2 by each operations process activity. However, planning, preparing, executing, and assessing occur continuously and concurrently throughout operations. Units train to perform all four activities simultaneously. For example, while executing one operation, units always plan or prepare to execute a branch, sequel, or subsequent operation. Subordinate units of a command may be performing different activities simultaneously. For example, during a mobile defense, the striking force prepares to counterattack while the fixing force executes a defense.

1-72. The operations process provides an organizing construct that shows how commanders synchronize WFFs, integrating processes, ongoing activities, and control measures to accomplish missions. (Chapters 3 and 4 discuss how commanders do this.) It helps commanders determine when and where to perform such leadership actions as making decisions, issuing guidance, and providing command presence.

1-73. The operations process also helps commanders organize their individual C2 systems. (Section III discusses C2 systems.) Each commander organizes his or her C2 system to meet the C2 requirements of an operation. Commanders organize their personnel and equipment into facilities called CPs. (Chapter 2 discusses how to do this.)

1-74. Commanders set information management priorities that ensure they get the relevant information they need to make timely decisions. They establish procedures and control measures for synchronizing units and WFFs. In short, they allocate resources (time and staff) to accomplish the mission. They adjust the resources allocated to each activity based on the situation. The operations process provides a framework that helps commanders think through how to do this. The following paragraphs discuss each operations process activity.

**PLANNING**

1-75. Planning is the process by which commanders (and staff if available) translate the commander’s visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results. (This definition replaces the definition prescribed in FM 3-0.) It distinguishes planning (discussed in FM 5-0) from commander’s visualization (discussed in FM 6-0).

1-76. Planning involves envisioning a desired end state and describing effective methods to achieve it. It includes formulating one or more COAs to accomplish the mission. Planners consider the consequences and implications of each COA. Once commanders select a COA, planning continues to complete the plan...
or order. Planning does not stop, however, with the order’s publication. Planning is continuous. It includes modifying the original order and branch and sequel development.

1-77. Planning is the art and science of envisioning a desired future and laying out effective ways of bringing it about. It includes thinking through consequences to estimate whether certain actions will bring the force closer to the end state. While planning is a form of decision making, it involves much more than making decisions. Once the commander decides on a COA, planning continues to develop a fully synchronized plan or order.

**PREPARATION**

1-78. *Preparation* consists of activities by the unit before execution to improve its ability to conduct the operation including, but not limited to, the following: plan refinement, rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and movement (FM 3-0). (Chapter 3 discusses preparation activities.)

1-79. Preparation creates conditions that improve friendly forces’ chances for success. It facilitates and sustains transitions, including those to branches and sequels. Several preparation activities—especially reconnaissance operations, security operations, and force protection—begin in planning and occur throughout the operation.

1-80. Preparation continues during execution. Staffs continue to prepare for branches and sequels. Uncommitted forces prepare for identified contingencies and look to the operation’s next phase or branch. Committed units revert to preparation when they reach their objectives, occupy defensive positions, or pass into reserve.

**EXECUTION**

1-81. *Execution* is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions (FM 6-0). (Chapter 4 expands on execution doctrine prescribed in FM 6-0, chapter 6.)

1-82. Operations are dynamic. Therefore, commanders must make and implement decisions during execution. As an operation unfolds, its dynamics initiate an action-reaction-counteraction series of responses between friendly and enemy commanders. As one gains an advantage, the other acts to counter it. The first commander then decides what to do to address the new situation and directs the required actions. Even a successful action or reaction may require issuing an order to exploit it.

1-83. Similar dynamics occur in stability and reconstruction and civil support operations. Instead of an action-reaction-counteraction between opposing commanders, this dynamic usually occurs between commanders and changing environmental conditions. Commanders continuously assess these changes and direct the actions needed to control the situation.

**ASSESSMENT**

1-84. *Assessment* is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation. (This definition replaces the one prescribed in FM 3-0.) Assessment involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes to actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. Commanders and staffs continuously assess an operation’s progress. They monitor the situation and evaluate the operation’s progress to determine if the current order is still valid or if there are better ways to achieve the end state. Assessments by staff sections form the foundation of running estimates. Assessments by commanders allow them to keep an accurate situational understanding and revise their visualization based on it.

**Types of Criteria**

1-85. Critical to effective assessment is developing criteria for evaluating the degree of success in accomplishing the mission. Criteria can be expressed as measures of effectiveness or measures of performance.
• A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect.

• A measure of performance is a criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment.

1-86. MOEs and MOPs generate information requirements that, when met, support the overall assessment of an operation. They replace the term criteria of success, which will no longer be used.

Running Estimates

1-87. A running estimate is a staff section’s continuous assessment of current and future operations to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if future operations are supportable. (This definition replaces the definition in FM 6-0. The term staff running estimate in FM 5-0 will no longer be used.) In their running estimates, staff sections continuously consider the effect of new information and update the following:

• Facts.
• Assumptions.
• Friendly force status.
• Enemy activities and capabilities.
• Civil considerations.
• Conclusions and recommendations.

A section’s running estimate assesses the following:

• Friendly force capabilities with respect to ongoing and planned operations.
• Enemy capabilities as they affect the staff section’s area of expertise for current operations and future plans.
• Civil considerations as they affect the staff section’s area of expertise for current operations and future plans.
• Environment’s effect on current and future operations from the staff section’s perspective.

1-88. Running estimates provide the basis for action. When an estimate reveals a variance that requires correction, staff representatives act within their authority to correct it. (Paragraph 4-12 discusses variances.) When the decision required is outside their authority, they present the situation to the staff officer delegated the authority to act or to the commander. When the estimate reveals information that answers an information requirement, especially a CCIR, staff representatives send that information to the section requiring it. Staff representatives do more than collect and store information; they process it into knowledge and apply judgment to get that knowledge to those requiring it. The section’s running estimate is one product of this effort.

1-89. Staff sections maintain their running estimates to identify when decisions are needed and to help the commander make them. When the commander is considering a decision, an estimate’s presentation always ends with a recommendation. Sometimes the recommendation is implied. For example, when the estimate is presented as part of a situation update, the implicit recommendation is to continue operations according to the present order unless the presenter recommends otherwise. Each staff section maintains only one estimate. That section’s representatives to the CP’s cells and working groups base their assessments and recommendations on that single running estimate. (See chapter 2 for how commanders organize CPs into cells.)

1-90. Staff sections maintain their running estimates between operations, even when not deployed. At minimum, they maintain situational awareness of friendly force capabilities within their areas of expertise. (Situational awareness is defined in paragraph 1-112.) Some running estimates, such as the intelligence estimate, also monitor the capabilities of enemies or adversaries. Assignment of a mission focuses staff assessments. Staff sections build the running estimates that result on the foundation of preparations made beforehand.
1-91. Commanders are rarely briefed on the contents of every staff section’s running estimate. Staff representatives brief the part of the estimate that applies to the situation and the issue or decision being addressed. The focus of an estimate presented by a representative in the plans cell is different from one presented by a representative in current operations. However, both representatives base their presentation on the single running estimate maintained by their parent staff section.

1-92. During operations, running estimates are usually presented orally, especially during preparation and execution. Written estimates may be prepared to support contingency planning during peacetime. Even then, they are normally prepared only at higher-level headquarters. Written estimates follow the format in FM 5-0, figure E-1.

SECTION III – THE COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEM

1-93. Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders exercise command and control through a command and control system (FM 6-0). Each commander establishes a single C2 system to support his or her requirements.

1-94. A command and control system is the arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures, and equipment and facilities essential for the commander to conduct operations (FM 6-0). Commanders organize their personnel and equipment into facilities called CPs linked by communications. CPs use procedures to help commanders control operations. (Chapter 2 discusses CPs. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 discuss basic C2 procedures.) An effective C2 system allows commanders to—

- Exercise C2 anywhere within the area of operations (AO).
- Delegate authority to subordinate commanders and staff to allow decentralized execution of operations.
- Synchronize actions throughout the AO.
- Focus on critical actions instead of details.

1-95. Their individual C2 systems help commanders exercise C2 in three primary ways. First the C2 system helps the commander achieve and maintain situational awareness and facilitates situational understanding. It does this by using information management to create the common operational picture (COP) and disseminate it throughout the force. Commanders apply judgment to their situational awareness to achieve situational understanding. Second, it helps the commander regulate forces and WFFs. It does this by supporting the commander’s decision making during planning, preparation, and execution. Third, it allows the force to adapt to change. It does this by providing commanders access to the information needed for continuous assessment throughout the operation and by disseminating the orders required to regulate the force.

1-96. C2 is unique among the WFFs in that it integrates the activities of the other WFFs. Given the nature of operations, effective C2 is characterized by the ability to—

- Forecast or identify changes in the situation and react to them.
- Provide continuous reciprocal interaction and influence among the commander, staff, and forces.
- Reduce chaos, lessen uncertainty, and operate effectively despite the remaining uncertainty.

1-97. Command and control are interrelated. Command resides with commanders. It consists of authority, decision making, and leadership. Control is how commanders execute command. It resides with both commanders and staffs. Commanders cannot exercise command effectively without control. Conversely, control has no purpose without command to focus it.

COMMAND

1-98. Command is the authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the leadership, authority, responsibility, and accountability for effectively using available resources and planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces to accomplish assigned missions.
It includes responsibility for unit readiness, health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel. (This definition replaces the definition of command in JP 1-02 for the Army.)

1-99. Commanders are the key to effective C2. They exercise it by combining the art of command, including leadership, with the science of control. They create a positive command climate, which includes fostering trust and mutual understanding. They train their subordinates in C2 and use their individual C2 systems to direct operations. Commanders are the focal point for penetrating or coping with the fog and friction of operations. Commanders’ knowledge, experience, and personality determine how they interact with their commands. They decide what to do and the best method to achieve the end state. Then they instill in Soldiers the will to win and lead their commands to mission accomplishment.

CONTROL

1-100. Control is the regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. (This definition replaces the one prescribed in FM 6-0.) Control includes information management—the provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decision making. It uses procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information (FM 3-0).

1-101. Aided by staffs, commanders exercise control over all forces in their AO. Staffs provide their greatest support in providing control and keeping commanders informed. However, effective control requires commanders to actively participate in its exercise.

FORMS OF CONTROL

1-102. FM 6-0 describes two basic forms of control used by Army forces—procedural and positive. Military operations require both forms to offset the weaknesses of each. They complement each other and enhance executing operations. Commanders balance the two based on the people and circumstances of each situation. (The terms procedural control and positive control in FM 6-0 are redesignated Army procedural control and Army positive control to prevent confusion with the joint terms used to control airspace).

- **Army procedural control** is a technique of regulating forces that relies on a combination of orders, regulations, policies, and doctrine (including tactics, techniques, and procedures). Army procedural control requires no intervention by the higher headquarters once it is established.

- **Army positive control** is a technique of regulating forces that involves commanders and leaders actively assessing, deciding, and directing them. Army positive control is more restrictive in that subordinates require permission to act once it is established.

Commanders, assisted by their staffs, exercise both Army procedural and Army positive control through control measures.

CONTROL MEASURES

1-103. A control measure is a means of regulating forces or warfighting functions. (This definition replaces the definition prescribed in FM 5-0.) Control measures are established under the authority of a commander. However, staff officers and subordinate leaders can establish them within the authority commanders delegate. Control measures assign responsibilities, coordinate actions between forces, or impose restrictions. They can be permissive or restrictive. Permissive control measures allow something to happen. Restrictive control measures limit how something is done.

1-104. Control measures may be used to exercise either Army procedural or Army positive control. They may be complex (such as a corps operation order) or simple (such as a checkpoint). This FMI discusses control measures most important to the exercise of C2 by commanders of units with a staff. Control measures include but are not limited to the following:

- Laws and regulations.
- Commander’s intent.
- Planning guidance.
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- CCIRs.
- Delegation of authority.
- Assignment of missions and tasks to subordinates.
- Plans and orders, including—
  - Unit mission.
  - Task organization.
  - Concept of operations.
  - Target lists.
  - Rules of engagement.
  - Intelligence synchronization matrix.
  - Service support plans.
- Graphic control measures (including fire support coordinating measures and airspace control measures).
- Unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) to include reports and returns.
- Information requirements.

Certain control measures belong to the commander alone and may not be delegated. These include the commander’s intent, unit mission statement, planning guidance, and CCIRs.

1-105. Unit SOPs specify many control measures. An operation plan or order modifies them and adds additional ones for a specific operation. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, modify them to adapt to changing situations throughout all operations.

**Graphic Control Measures**

1-106. Some control measures may be graphical. A graphic control measure is a symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions. Examples include boundaries, coordinating altitudes, air defense areas, and minefields. Commanders establish them to regulate maneuver, movement, airspace, fire support, and other aspects of operations. In general, all graphic control measures should be easily identifiable on the ground.

1-107. Graphic control measures are a form of shorthand. Each has a specific meaning. Properly used, they portray a lot of information very simply. Well-thought-out control measures established in advance facilitate subordinates’ freedom of action and reduce the need to ask higher headquarters for guidance during operations. Joint interoperability and the use of digital information systems make using standard graphic control measures essential. They contribute to massing combat power most effectively while preventing fratricide.

1-108. Effectively using graphic control measures requires commanders and staffs to understand the purpose and ramifications of each. FM 1-02, chapters 7 and 9, shows each graphic control measure and discusses the rules for drawing them.

**Role of the Commander**

1-109. The commander’s role in exercising C2 involves the following:
- Visualizing the environment.
- Describing their commander’s visualization to subordinates.
- Directing actions to achieve results.
- Leading the command to accomplish the mission.

The commander’s role of visualizing, describing, directing, and leading is continuous and drives the operations process. (See figure 1-5, below.)
VISUALIZE

1-110. Commander’s visualization is the mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning how the force will achieve that end state. (This definition replaces the one prescribed in FM 6-0.) Many activities are required of commanders. However, visualizing an operation from start to finish and describing that visualization to the staff and subordinate commanders is the means commanders use to establish their will for the conduct of an operation.

Figure 1-5. Commander’s role in command and control

1-111. Visualizing the desired outcome requires commanders to clearly understand the situation. What is the mission? What are the enemy’s capabilities and likely actions? What are the characteristics of the AO? How much time is available? What sustainment factors are important? What role do civil considerations play? This framing of the situation in terms of relationships among the factors of METT-TC begins during mission analysis. Staff sections analyze the situation within their areas of expertise in terms of the factors of METT-TC to maintain their running estimates. Running estimates provide the relevant information commanders need to understand the situation.

1-112. Commanders normally begin their visualization with situational awareness. Situational awareness is knowledge of the immediate present environment, including knowledge of the factors of METT-TC. More simply, it is knowing what is happening around you now. In the context of the cognitive hierarchy, situational awareness is at the knowledge level. (See figure 1-6, page 1-20, below. FM 6-0, appendix B, discusses the cognitive hierarchy and details each factor of METT-TC.) Situational awareness occurs in
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Soldiers’ minds. It is not a display or the COP but the interpretation of displays or the actual observation of a situation.

1-113. Upon receipt of a mission (either directed or derived from an ongoing operation), commanders form a clear situational awareness. They base it on information and such knowledge products as the COP and running estimates. Staffs support them in this. During mission analysis, commanders apply judgment to their situational awareness to arrive at situational understanding. **Situational understanding** is the product of applying analysis and judgment to the common operational picture to determine the relationships among the factors of METT-TC (FM 3-0). It enables commanders to determine the implications of what is happening and forecast what may happen.

1-114. There is a difference between situational awareness and situational understanding. Situational understanding is more than knowledge of the factors of METT-TC. It includes understanding the present relationships among them and forecasting them into the future. Such forecasts allow staff representatives to see how actions in their area of expertise might affect other areas. Acting on this knowledge is part of subordinates’ initiative. Ideally, the commander’s situational understanding increases as the operation proceeds. Information management, including priorities commanders set by establishing and continuously updating their CCIRs, support commanders’ achieving and maintaining an accurate situational understanding.

**Figure 1-6. Cognitive hierarchy**

1-115. Commanders describe their commander’s visualization through the commander’s intent, planning guidance, and CCIRs. These three control measures belong to the commander. They are used to guide the conduct of operations.

1-116. Commanders describe an operation in terms suited to their experience and nature of the mission. They use an operational framework and the elements of operational design to describe the relationship of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to time and space. (See FM 3-0, paragraphs 4-69–4-99 and 5-23–5-56.) They emphasize how this combination relates to achieving the end state. They outline how to combine or sequence offense, defense, and stability and reconstruction or civil support operations to accomplish the mission. Commanders continue to describe throughout operations. This includes issuing planning guidance for branches and sequels and providing targeting guidance.

**Commander’s Intent**

1-117. Commanders express their visualization in their commander’s intent. **The commander’s intent** is a clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the operation’s desired end state. (This definition replaces the definition prescribed in FM 3-0.) It defines success as achieving the end state. It also establishes conditions commanders consider when describing it. In this context, a condition is a specific situation with respect to circumstances that, when achieved, describes one aspect of the desired end state.

1-118. There is no format for a commander’s intent. However, its components are purpose, key tasks, and end state. (See FM 5-0, paragraphs 3-16–3-20.) Commanders develop their intent personally. The commander’s intent is short and concise. Soldiers must be able to understand and remember it two levels down. During planning, the commander’s intent drives the MDMP. The staff uses it to develop COAs that conform to how the commander wants to achieve the end state. During execution, the commander’s intent en-
ables subordinates’ initiative. (See FM 6-0, paragraphs 2-83–2-92.) It links the unit’s mission, concept of operations, and tasks to subordinate units by establishing the overall conditions that represent mission accomplishment. Subordinates use the commander’s intent to decide what to do when facing unforeseen opportunities and threats, and in situations where the concept of operations no longer applies.

Planning Guidance

1-119. Commanders develop planning guidance for the staff from their visualization. Planning guidance may be as broad or detailed as circumstances require. However, it must convey the essence of the commander’s visualization. Commanders use their experience and judgment to add depth and clarity to the planning guidance. They ensure their staffs understand the broad outline of their visualization while still permitting the necessary latitude to explore different options.

1-120. FM 5-0, appendix D, provides guidelines for planning guidance. Planning guidance ranges from the type of order to issue to COAs not to consider. It states in broad terms when, where, and how the commander intends to employ the WFFs in the decisive operation to accomplish the mission within the higher commander’s intent. Planning guidance contains priorities for the WFFs. It includes how the commander visualizes shaping and sustaining operations contributing to the concept of operations. This guidance provides the basis for the concept of operations without dictating the plan’s details.

Commander’s Critical Information Requirements

1-121. One aspect of the commander’s visualization is the information commanders do not know but deem critical for decision making. Commander’s critical information requirements are elements of information required by commanders that directly affect decision making and dictate the successful execution of military operations (FM 3-0). CCIRs serve as control measures for information management by establishing collecting, processing, and disseminating priorities. They help screen the type and amount of information reported directly to commanders. CCIRs may include a latest time information of value (LTIOV) to indicate time sensitivity. CCIRs are—

- Specified by commanders for each operation.
- Applicable only to the commander who specifies them.
- Situation-dependent—directly linked to current and future missions.
- Focused on predictable events or activities.
- Time-sensitive—answers to CCIRs must be immediately reported to the commander by any means available.
- Always promulgated by an order or plan.

1-122. Commanders decide what information requirements to designate as CCIRs based on their—

- Anticipated decisions.
- Individual cognitive abilities.
- Commander’s visualization.

During planning, staffs recommend information requirements for commanders to designate as CCIRs based on mission analysis. During preparation and execution, they recommend changes to CCIRs based on assessment.

1-123. Commanders limit CCIRs to a useable number (usually 10 or fewer). Designating a small number of CCIRs highlights the information the commander needs to make near-term decisions. It helps staffs and subordinates to quickly identify information the commander needs immediately. CCIRs may support one or more decisions. In all cases, the fewer the CCIRs, the better the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resources.

1-124. CCIRs are not static. Commanders add, delete, adjust, and update them throughout an operation based on the information they need to make specific decisions. When commanders make a decision, they do the following:

- Review their CCIRs.
• Remove those no longer needed.
• Designate new ones to support the next anticipated decision.

During planning, CCIRs often focus on information needed to determine which COA to choose. During preparation and execution, CCIRs focus on information needed to validate the selected COA or determine when to initiate critical events, such as a branch or sequel.

1-125. Commanders determine their own CCIRs or select them from staff nominations in the form of recommended priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) or recommended friendly force information requirements (FFIRs). Once approved, CCIRs consist of two components: PIRs and FFIRs.

**Priority Intelligence Requirements**

1-126. *Priority intelligence requirements* are those intelligence requirements for which the commander has an anticipated and stated priority in planning and decision making (JP 1-02). PIRs identify the information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations that the staff considers most important to the commander for decision making. PIRs concern both the enemy (including the time available to the enemy) and the environment (terrain, weather, and civil considerations). All staff sections submit PIRs. The G-2/S-2 manages PIRs for the commander.

1-127. PIRs are most often considered information requirements concerning enemy forces, the weather, and terrain. However, lessons from recent operations show that civil considerations are often critical to decisions during operations. Thus, staff sections should recommend information about civil considerations as PIRs.

**Friendly Forces Information Requirements**

1-128. *Friendly forces information requirements* are information the commander and staff need about the forces available for the operation (FM 6-0). They consist of information on the mission, troops and support available, and time available for friendly forces. In coordination with the staff, the unit’s G-3/S-3 manages them for the commander.

**DIRECT**

1-129. Commanders direct during all operations process activities. Their directions take different forms during planning, preparation, and execution. Commanders make decisions and direct actions based on their situational understanding. They keep their situational understanding current by continuously assessing the situation. Chapters 3 and 4 discuss how commanders direct in planning, preparation, and execution.
Chapter 2
Command Posts and Staff Operations

The staff’s primary function is to help the commander and subordinate commanders exercise control. Commanders organize their individual command and control (C2) systems into command posts (CPs). By doing this, commanders disperse their staff and C2 capabilities. This enhances the commander’s ability to exercise C2 and makes the C2 system more survivable. This chapter begins by identifying coordinating, special, and personal staff sections. Next it describes how commanders organize their C2 system into CPs. This chapter provides a common taxonomy for CP organization. It describes the key functions of each type of CP and CP cell for the transforming Army. Next, this chapter provides organizational principles and guidelines. The chapter concludes with several tactics, techniques, and procedures for CP operations, including battle rhythm and CP administration. This chapter applies at battalion through corps level. CPs, however, vary widely among types of units and echelons. Refer to echelon manuals for specifics of CP design. This chapter supplements material in FM 6-0, paragraphs 5-111–5-115.

BACKGROUND

2-1. Headquarters have existed throughout military history as the organizational structure through which commanders exercise command and control (C2). In the nineteenth century, Napoleon recognized that a headquarters providing the planning and analytic capability for a campaign was too large to use in battle. He exercised C2 through a smaller grouping brought from the larger headquarters but with communications to it for coordinating and planning. By World War II, Army doctrine divided headquarters into forward and rear elements. Under the Army of Excellence design, maneuver battalions through corps are structured to command and control operations through a command group and three primary command posts (CPs):

- Tactical CP (TAC CP).
- Main CP.
- Rear CP.

2-2. While some headquarters are still under the Army of Excellence design, Army transformation initiatives have changed the headquarters CP construct. Brigade combat teams through modular corps headquarters are no longer resourced for a rear CP. Many of the rear CP functions have been moved to subordinate units or incorporated into the main CP. Additionally, the roles, functions, and relationships among CPs have changed. This chapter focuses on the modular force and describes these changes. Units that have not transformed should continue to refer to their appropriate current echelon field manual.

STAFF ORGANIZATION

2-3. Commanders cannot exercise control alone except in the simplest and smallest of units. The staff’s primary function is to help the commander and subordinate commanders exercise control. Control allows commanders to direct the execution of operations. Unlike command functions, which remain relatively similar among echelons of command, control functions increase in complexity at each higher echelon.

2-4. Staffs at every echelon are structured differently; however, all staffs are similar. A staff includes a chief of staff (COS) or executive officer (XO), and various staff sections.
2-5. A staff section is a grouping of staff members by area of expertise under a coordinating, special, or personal staff officer. (See figure 2-1, below.) The number of coordinating, special, and personal staff officers and their corresponding staff sections varies with different command levels. FM 6-0, appendices C and D, details the duties and responsibilities of staff officers. Unless specifically stated in this FMI, FM 6-0 remains the doctrinal source for staff officers’ duties and responsibilities. Staffs are organized based on three considerations:

- Mission.
- Areas of expertise.
- Regulations and laws.

MISSION

2-6. The mission determines which tasks and activities to accomplish. These activities determine how commanders organize, tailor, or adapt their staffs to accomplish the mission. The mission also determines a staff’s size and composition. For example, a division headquarters may serve as the base for a joint task force headquarters. Based on the factors of METT-T, the division staff would be augmented with additional staff members and C2 capabilities to accomplish the mission.

AREAS OF EXPERTISE

2-7. Regardless of mission, every commander divides staff duties and responsibilities along common areas of expertise. Grouping related activities this way gives commanders an effective span of control. It also facilitates unified effort by the staff. Areas of expertise may vary slightly, depending on the command echelon, mission, and environment. For example, there is normally no financial management officer at battalion level and certain logistic units combine the intelligence and operations areas.

2-8. Army modular organizations have added staff sections and changed some staff sections’ areas of expertise. Staffs now include a separate sections for plans (the G-5/S-5) and financial management (the G-8/S-8). The civil-military operations section is redesignated the G-9/S-9. The G-5/S-5 performs duties related to planning listed in FM 6-0, paragraph D-59. The G-8/S-8 performs duties listed in FM 6-0, paragraphs D-91 and D-96. The G-9/S-9 performs duties listed in paragraphs D-71–D-73. Some staffs also include a personnel recovery section. See FM 3-50.1, paragraphs 2-22–2-30, for this section’s responsibilities.

REGULATIONS AND LAWS

2-9. Army regulations and laws establish special relationships between certain staff officers and the commander. For example, ARs 20-1, 27-1, 165-1, and 360-1 require the inspector general, staff judge advocate, chaplain, and public affairs officer to be members of the commander’s personal staff.

2-10. Each military unit has an authorization document that states a unit’s approved structure and resources. It is the basis and authority for personnel assignments and equipment requisitions. This document is the modification table of organization and equipment (MTOE).

2-11. Doctrine and a unit’s MTOE provide commanders a starting point for organizing their staff into CPs. Each operation is different, depending on the factors of METT-T. As commanders organize their force for an operation, they organize their individual C2 systems for effective C2.

COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION

2-12. A command post is a unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities (FM 6-0). CPs are the principal facilities commanders use to control operations. Each facility is a CP, regardless of whether the commander is present. When necessary, commanders personally control the battle from other locations. In all cases, the commander alone exercises command, whether in the CP or elsewhere.
Command Posts and Staff Operations

Figure 2-1. Basic staff structure and coordinating authorities

Note 1: The chaplain, inspector general, public affairs officer, and staff judge advocate are personal staff officers to the commander. When necessary, they coordinate actions through the appropriate coordinating staff officer.

Note 2: Dashed lines indicate coordinating authority.

ACOS Assistant Chief of Staff  G-4  Logistics  G-7  Information Operations
AG Adjutant General  G-5  Plans  G-8  Financial Management
G-1 Personnel  G-6  Command, Control,  G-9  Civil-Military Operations
G-2 Intelligence  Communications, and
G-3 Operations  Computer Operations
2-13. Commanders organize CPs to meet changing situations and the requirements of different operations. CPs help commanders control operations by coordinating and synchronizing the warfighting functions (WFFs). Activities common to all CPs include—

- Maintaining running estimates and the common operational picture.
- Information management. (See FM 3-0, paragraphs 11-28–11-48; FM 6-0, appendix B.)
- Developing and disseminating orders. (See FM 5-0.)
- Controlling operations. (See chapter 4.)
- Assessing operations. (See chapter 5.)
- Coordinating with higher, lower, and adjacent units.
- CP administration.
- Displacing.
- Providing security.
- Organizing for operations.
- Maintaining continuity of operations.

**Types of Command Posts**

2-14. The number and types of CPs of a given headquarters vary by echelon. (See table 1-1, below.) This section provides a definition of each CP type and describes its primary purpose. Not depicted in table 2-1 is an early-entry command post (EECP). Division and corps may form an ad hoc, temporary EECP based on the factors of METT-TC. (See paragraphs 2-23–2-24.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Combined Arms Battalion</th>
<th>Brigade Combat Team</th>
<th>Division</th>
<th>Corps</th>
<th>Army Service Component Command</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command Group</td>
<td>Command Group</td>
<td>Mobile Command Group</td>
<td>Mobile Command Group</td>
<td>Mobile Command Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAC CP</td>
<td>TAC CP</td>
<td>TAC CP (2 per division)</td>
<td>TAC CP</td>
<td>Operational Command Post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main CP</td>
<td>Main CP</td>
<td>Main CP</td>
<td>Main CP</td>
<td>Main CP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Trains CP</td>
<td>Field Trains CP or Support Area CP</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Command Group**

2-15. The command group consists of the commander and selected staff members who accompany commanders and enable them to exercise command and control away from a command post. The command group is organized and equipped to suit the commander’s decision making and leadership requirements while ensuring he or she can accomplish critical C2 functions anywhere in the area of operations (AO). The command group consists of critical staff officers the commander needs to directly influence the operation. It normally includes the capability to provide local security and personal assistance for the commander.

2-16. Divisions and corps headquarters have a mobile command group (MCG). MCGs allow commanders to exercise battle command on the move. They include ground and air components. The ground component contains vehicles configured with Army Battle Command System multifunctional displays and communications equipment. The air component includes UH-60A/L helicopters equipped with Army Airborne
Command and Control System information systems. The commander selects MCG members based on METT-TC.

2-17. Whether ground or air based, the MCG is highly mobile. It allows commanders to move to the point of decision. Commanders normally position their MCG where they can observe the decisive operation while communicating with the entire force.

Tactical Command Post

2-18. The tactical command post is a command and control facility containing a tailored portion of a unit headquarters designed to control current operations. (This definition replaces the definition in FM 1-02.) The TAC CP includes representatives of all the WFFs. Depending on the echelon, commanders employ one or two TAC CPs. (When published, FMI 3-91 will discuss the two-TAC-CP design and employment.) Commanders can use the TAC CP to control execution of discrete tasks, like river crossings. A TAC CP can also control a special task force.

2-19. The TAC CP is fully mobile. As a rule, it includes only the Soldiers and equipment essential to control current operations. The TAC CP relies on the main CP for planning, detailed analysis, and coordination. A deputy commander or the G-3/S-3 leads the TAC CP. They are assisted by a chief of operations or assistant S-3 (depending on the echelon) and a senior noncommissioned officer.

2-20. Normal TAC CP functions include the following:
- Control current operations, to include resynchronizing forces and WFFs.
- Provide information to the common operational picture.
- Monitor and assess the progress of operations.
- Monitor and assess the progress of higher and adjacent units.
- Perform targeting for current operations.
- Perform short-range planning.
- Provide input to future operations planning.
- Provide a facility for the commander to control operations, issue orders, and conduct rehearsals.

Main Command Post

2-21. The main command post is a command and control facility that contains the portion of the unit headquarters in which the majority of planning, analysis, and coordination occurs. (This definition replaces the definition in FM 1-02.) The main CP includes representatives of all staff sections. It is larger in size and personnel and less mobile than the TAC CP. The main CP controls current operations when the TAC CP cannot or is not employed. The COS/XO leads and provides staff supervision of the main CP. He or she is assisted by the chief of operations/assistant S-3 and a senior noncommissioned officer.

2-22. Normal functions of the main CP include the following:
- Planning future operations.
- Performing detailed analysis.
- Developing intelligence.
- Performing mid- to long-range assessment of the overall conduct of an operation.
- Conducting detailed coordination.
- Assessing the progress of operations.
- Assessing the progress of higher and adjacent units.
- Controlling current operations for short periods, based on METT-TC.
- Providing a facility for the commander to control operations, issue orders, and conduct rehearsals.

Early-Entry Command Post

2-23. An early-entry command post is a command and control facility containing tailored portions of the unit’s headquarters for a specific mission over a specific period. It normally includes members of
the tactical command post and additional planners, intelligence analysts, liaison officers, and others as required. The EECP is a temporary arrangement of personnel and equipment to help the commander command and control a deployment and initial operations. It is not included in unit tables of organization and equipment and not intended to be a permanent part of a unit’s CP structure.

2-24. Commanders configure an EECP to deploy rapidly. Normally, they form an EECP around a TAC CP. Liaison officers, planners, intelligence analysts, and others from the main CP are added, based on METT-TC. The EECP performs the main and TAC CPs’ functions until the headquarters is operational. A deputy commander, G-3/S-3, chief of operations/assistant S-3, and senior noncommissioned officer lead and provide staff supervision of an EECP.

CENTERS

2-25. A center is a command and control facility established for a specific purpose. Centers are similar to command posts in that they are facilities with staff members, equipment, and a leadership component. However, centers have a more narrow focus (for example, movement control) and are normally formed around a subordinate unit headquarters.

2-26. Centers are more common at operational echelons. (Examples include the joint interrogation and de-briefing center of a joint task force, and the theater materiel management center of an Army service component command.) But centers are also formed by Army tactical commanders. For example, a civil affairs battalion under the operational control of a division normally establishes a civil-military operations center. The civil-military operations center may not locate with a division CP.

STAFF SECTIONS, COMMAND POST CELLS, AND STAFF ELEMENTS

2-27. Staffs are organized into staff sections by areas of expertise. (See figure 2-1, page 2-3, above.) Commanders organize CPs into functional and integrating cells. These cells contain elements from staff sections.

Staff Sections

2-28. Doctrine and tables of organization and equipment assign portions of each staff section (coordinating, special, and personal) to CPs and to cells and elements within CPs. For example, in a modular division, G-2 elements are assigned to the main and TAC CPs. Within each CP, G-2 elements are allocated among several cells.

2-29. Some staff sections do not normally provide elements to CP cells. The inspector general section is an example. Others—for example the G-7 and G-9 sections—operate primarily as staff sections, sending elements to CP cells as required.

Command Post Cells

2-30. A command post cell is a grouping of personnel and equipment by warfighting function or purpose to facilitate command and control during operations. There are two types of CP cells, functional and integrating. (See figure 2-2, below.) Functional cells group personnel and equipment by WFF. Integrating cells group personnel and equipment to integrate functional cell activities. Integrating cells normally focus on different time horizons. For example, the plans cell focuses on the long-range time horizon, while the current operations cell focuses on the short-range time horizons. (Paragraphs 3-11–3-25 discuss time horizons.)

2-31. This is not to say that the functional cells do not integrate. The sustainment cell integrates numerous logistic areas and services. The fire support cell integrates Army indirect fires and joint fires. It also integrates the contributions of all WFFs to targeting through the targeting working group. (Working groups are discussed in paragraphs 2-38–2-42, below.) This integration, however, generally focuses on maximizing the effects of a single WFF. Integrating cells focus the efforts of functional cells on planning, preparing for, or executing the overall operation within a time horizon.
2-32. Functional cells and integrating cells are not single staff sections. In a sense, they are combined arms staff components. For example, in a corps main CP, G-2 section personnel often form elements of the intelligence, fires, current operations, and plans cells.

2-33. Not all cells depicted in figure 2-2 are in every CP. A battalion or brigade TAC CP, for example, is usually not divided into cells: the entire TAC CP is the current operations cell. It comprises representatives from various staff sections. A corps TAC CP, in contrast, normally has all cells listed in figure 2-2 except for plans.

![Figure 2-2. Command post organization](image)

**Staff Elements**

2-34. A staff element is a component of either a staff section or a command post cell. Tables of organization and equipment normally specify element composition. However, commanders may alter these based on METT-TC.

2-35. CP cells include elements from staff sections whose areas of expertise affect the cell’s work. Using the example from paragraph 2-28, the portion of the G-2 assigned to the division TAC CP current operations cell is called the “G-2 current operations element.” The current operations cell contains numerous elements. These may include fire support, Army airspace command and control, civil-military operations, and provost marshal elements.

**Meetings, Working Groups, and Boards**

2-36. Periodically or as required, ad hoc groupings form to solve problems and coordinate actions. These groups include representatives from within or outside a CP. Their composition depends on the issue. These groups are called meetings, working groups, and boards. Each is a control measure for regulating a specific action, process, or function. (See JP 5-00.2 for joint force headquarters design options. It addresses the boards, bureaus, and centers used by joint force commanders.)

**Meetings**

2-37. Meetings (sometimes called huddles) are informal gatherings used to present and exchange information. CP cell chiefs and staff section representatives hold meetings as needed to synchronize their activities.
Working Groups

2-38. A working group is a temporary grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to coordinate and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function. Some working groups may be thought of as ad hoc CP cells. Others are forums used to synchronize contributions of multiple cells to a process. For example, the targeting working group brings together representatives of all staff sections concerned with targeting. It synchronizes the contributions of the entire staff to the work of the fire support cell. It also synchronizes fires with current and future operations. Working groups may be held at a central location, by teleconference, by video teleconference, or by a combination of these. They are formed as needed or when the commander directs.

2-39. Typical working groups and the lead cell or staff section at division and corps headquarters include—
- Operations synchronization (current operations cell).
- Plans (plans cell).
- Targeting (fire support cell).
- Information operations (G-7 staff section).
- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) (current operations cell).
- Intelligence synchronization (intelligence cell).
- Protection (protection cell).
- Logistics synchronization (sustainment cell).
- Movements (sustainment cell).
- Civil-military operations (G-9 staff section).
- Information management (C4OPS cell).

2-40. The number of and subjects working groups address depend on the situation and echelon. For example, a corps CP may form working groups to address enemy improvised explosive device tactics or refugee return and resettlement. Battalion and brigade headquarters normally have fewer working groups than higher echelons. Working groups there are often less formal. Groups may gather daily, weekly, or monthly, depending on the subject, situation, and echelon.

2-41. Working groups form a major part of a CP’s battle rhythm. (Battle rhythm is discussed in paragraphs 2-89–2-92, below.) The COS/XO oversees the battle rhythm and working group scheduling. Each meeting or working group should be logically sequenced so that one group’s outputs are available as another’s inputs when needed. COSs/XOs balance the time required to plan, prepare for, and hold working groups with other staff duties and responsibilities. They also critically examine attendance requirements. Some staff sections and CP cells may not have enough personnel to attend all working groups. COSs and cell leaders constantly look for ways to combine working groups and eliminate unproductive ones. Figure 2-3 (below) shows a sample standing operating procedure (SOP) for a working group.

2-42. Unit SOPs should address the following for each working group:
- Purpose.
- Frequency.
- Composition (chair and attendees).
- Inputs and expected outputs.
- Agenda.

Boards

2-43. A board is a temporary grouping of selected staff representatives delegated decision authority for a particular purpose or function. Boards are similar to working groups. When the process or activity being synchronized requires command approval, a board is the appropriate forum. Typical boards address targeting, planning, sustainment, and movement. Commanders determine the subjects boards address and those delegated to working groups. Unit SOPs establish the following for each board:
Command Posts and Staff Operations

- Purpose.
- Frequency.
- Required inputs.
- Expected outputs.
- Attendees.
- Agenda.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose/Frequency</th>
<th>Purpose:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish policies, procedures, priorities, and overall direction for all civil-military operations (CMO) projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide update on ongoing CMO projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify needs within the area of operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Present suggested future projects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency:</td>
<td>Weekly.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose/Composition</th>
<th>Chair: G-9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Attendees:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil affairs battalion representative.</td>
<td>Psychological operations company representative.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3 operations representative.</td>
<td>Special operations forces liaison officer.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-5 planner.</td>
<td>Surgeon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-7 representative.</td>
<td>Chaplain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff judge advocate representative.</td>
<td>Project manager and contractor representatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological operations planner.</td>
<td>Brigade combat team and Marine force liaison officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Host-nation liaison officers.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer planner.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inputs/Outputs</th>
<th>Inputs:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Intelligence synchronization working group.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Project management status.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Information operations working group (last week’s).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Targeting board.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Higher headquarters operation order.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outputs:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Updated project status matrix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Proposed project matrix.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Long-range CMO plan adjustment.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agenda</th>
<th>G-2 update/assessment.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Operations update.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public perception update.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Civil affairs project update.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Engineer project update.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                        | Outputs: |
| Staff judge advocate concerns. |
| Discussion/issues. |
| Approval of information operations working group inputs. |

Figure 2-3. Sample SOP for a division civil-military operations working group
COMMAND POST CELL DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2-44. Doctrine provides overarching duties and responsibilities of CP members and cells. Commanders further define them to meet their particular needs in their SOPs. The following discussion addresses each CP cell type’s duties and responsibilities. It includes considerations for assigning leadership and supervisory responsibilities.

FUNCTIONAL CELLS

2-45. Functional cells are organized by WFF except for the command, control, communications, and computer operations (C4OPS) cell. (See figure 2-2, page 2-7, above.) The C4OPS cell is different from the C2 WFF. The C2 WFF is broader, including the commander and the C2 system.

Intelligence

2-46. The intelligence cell coordinates activities and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. This includes tasks associated with intelligence preparation of the battlefield and ISR. The unit’s G-2/S-2 leads this cell.

Movement and Maneuver

2-47. The movement and maneuver cell coordinates activities and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy. This includes tasks associated with employing forces in combination with direct fire or fire potential (maneuver), force projection (movement), mobility, and countermobility. The movement and maneuver cell may also form the base of the current operations cell. The unit’s G-3/S-3 or a deputy G-3/S-3 leads this cell.

Fire Support

2-48. The fire support cell coordinates activities and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires and joint fires. This includes tasks associated with targeting and the targeting process. The fire support cell integrates lethal and nonlethal fires, including offensive information operations, through the targeting process. The unit’s fire support coordinator leads this cell.

Protection

2-49. The protection cell coordinates the activities and systems that preserve the force. This includes protecting personnel, physical assets, and information of the United States and multinational partners. It also performs the tasks listed in paragraph 1-28. Commanders normally select this cell’s leader from among the air and missile defense coordinator, chemical officer, engineer coordinator, and provost marshal.

Sustainment

2-50. The sustainment cell coordinates activities and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance. It includes the tasks listed in paragraph 1-29. The commander normally selects this cell’s leader from among the G-1/S-1, G-4/S-4, and G-8.

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Operations

2-51. The C4OPS cell coordinates activities and systems that provide support to continuous and assured communications. This includes tasks associated with C4 operations, network operations, and information systems support to information management. The unit’s G-6/S-6 leads this cell.
INTEGRATING CELLS

2-52. Integrating cells group personnel and equipment to integrate functional cell activities. CPs normally include current operations, future operations (FUOPS), and plans cells. The plans cell is normally located in the main CP. The current operations and FUOPS cells are normally located in the TAC CP.

Current Operations

2-53. The current operations cell is responsible for assessing the current situation while regulating forces and WFFs in accordance with the commander’s intent. Normally, all staff sections are represented in the current operations cell. The unit’s G-3/S-3, supported by the chief of operations or an assistant S-3, leads this cell. Members of the movement and maneuver cell are normally also members of the current operations cell.

2-54. Staff representatives in the current operations cell actively assist subordinate units. They provide them information, synchronize their activities, and coordinate their support requests. The current operations cell solves problems and acts within the authority delegated by the commander. It also performs short-range planning using the military decision making process (MDMP) in a time-constrained environment or makes decisions and resynchronizes operations as described in chapter 4.

Future Operations

2-55. The FUOPS cell is responsible for planning and assessing operations for the mid-range time horizon. This includes preparing branches. Corps and Army service component commands have a FUOPS cell. Battalion through division headquarters are not resourced for one; the plans and current operations cells share its responsibility. The FUOPS cell uses the MDMP or the MDMP in a time-constrained environment to develop plans and orders. The cell consists of a core group of planners led by the deputy G-3 (chief of future operations). All staff sections assist as required.

Plans

2-56. The plans cell is responsible for planning operations for the mid- to long-range time horizons. It develops plans, orders, branches, and sequels. This cell is also responsible for long-range assessment of an operation’s progress. It consists of a core group of planners and analysts led by the G-5/S-5. All staff sections assist as required.

COMMAND POST ORGANIZATION CONSIDERATIONS

2-57. Planning considerations for CP organization can be categorized as—

- Those contributing to effectiveness.
- Those contributing to survivability.

In many cases these factors work against each other; therefore, neither can be optimized. Trade-offs are made to acceptably balance survivability and effectiveness.

EFFECTIVENESS FACTORS

2-58. CP staff and equipment are arranged to facilitate coordination, smooth exchange of information, and rapid decision making. CPs must be able to effectively communicate with all subordinate units. They are organized to quickly deploy throughout the unit’s AO. Five factors contribute to CP effectiveness: design, standardization, continuity, deployability, and capacity and range.
Command Post Design and Fusion of Command and Staff Efforts

2-59. Many design considerations affect CP effectiveness. At minimum, CP cells and staff elements should be positioned to facilitate communication and coordination. Other design considerations include—

- Ease of information flow.
- User interface with communications systems.
- Positioning information displays for ease of use.
- Integrating complementary information on maps and displays.
- Adequate workspace for the staff and commander.
- Ease of displacement (setup, tear-down, and mobility).

2-60. Well-designed CPs integrate command and staff efforts. Meeting this requirement requires matching the CP’s manning, equipment, information systems, and procedures against its internal layout and utilities. Organizing the CP into functional and integrating cells promotes efficiency and coordination.

Standardization

2-61. Standardization increases efficiency and eases CP personnel training. Commanders develop detailed SOPs for all aspects of CP operations during all operations process activities. Standardizing CP layouts, battle drills, and reporting procedures increases efficiency. These SOPs must be followed and revised throughout training. Using the standardized procedures must be reinforced constantly. Doing this makes many C2 processes routine. Staffs then effectively execute them in demanding, stressful times.

Continuity

2-62. CPs exercise C2 continuously for long periods. They must be manned, equipped, and organized to control operations without interruptions by enemies, environmental conditions, or actions.

2-63. The CP’s personnel, information systems, and equipment must be able to support 24-hour operations. However, duplicating every staff member within a CP is unnecessary. Commanders carefully consider the primary role and functions assigned to each CP and resource it accordingly. Internal CP SOPs should address shifts, rest plans, and other CP activities important to operating continuously. Leaders should enforce these provisions.

2-64. SOPs should address providing C2 continuity when communications are lost with the commander, subordinates, and or a particular CP. Maintaining C2 continuity during displacement or catastrophic loss requires designating alternate CPs and procedures for passing control between them. Continuity of command requires commanders to designate seconds in command and inform them of all critical decisions. Primary staff officers should also designate alternates.

Deployability

2-65. CPs must deploy efficiently and move within the AO as the situation requires. Determining the capabilities, size, and the sequence of CPs in the deployment flow requires careful consideration. Modular CP elements can be configured as an EECP based on the situation. Commanders can add or subtract elements to the EECP as the situation requires. CP size directly affects deployment and employment.

Capacity and Range

2-66. CPs should be organized to manage the information needed to operate effectively. The capacity to conduct (plan, prepare, execute, and continuously assess) operations concerns both staffing and information systems. So does the ability to manage relevant information. CP personnel must have the necessary tactical and technical proficiency. CPs must be able to communicate with all higher and lower headquarters, including those outside the force’s AO.
SURVIVABILITY FACTORS

2-67. CP survivability is vital to mission success. Survivability is often obtained at the price of effectiveness. CPs need to remain small and highly mobile. They should be able to operate on the move or disperse into cells. These capabilities enhance CPs’ survivability. Most CPs are easily acquired and targeted when concentrated. However, it is difficult to maintain a coordinated staff effort when CPs are dispersed.

2-68. The details of a commander’s C2 system depend on the command’s level and nature. However, the following survivability considerations are useful when developing C2 SOPs and organizing headquarters into CPs for operations.

Dispersion

2-69. Dispersing CPs enhances survivability. Commanders place minimum resources forward and keep more elaborate facilities back. This makes it harder for enemies to find and attack them. It also decreases support and security requirements forward. Most of the staff resides in the main CP; the TAC CP contains only the staff and equipment essential to controlling current operations. Commanders disperse and harden CP components as well.

Size

2-70. A CP’s size affects its deployability, mobility, and survivability. Large CPs ease face-to-face coordination. However, they are vulnerable to multiple acquisition and attack means. Smaller CPs may be easier to hide but unable to control all force elements. The key is striking the right balance to provide a responsive yet agile organization. For example, commanders require information for decisions; they do not need every subject matter expert located with them. Commanders identify necessary elements and eliminate unnecessary ones.

Redundancy

2-71. Reducing CP size reduces signature and enhances deployability and mobility. However, some personnel and equipment redundancy is required for continuous operations. Inevitably, in combat some C2 assets are lost or fail under stress. Redundancy allows CPs to continue operating when that happens.

Mobility

2-72. CP mobility is important, especially at lower echelons. Lower-echelon CPs and those employed forward in the combat zone may need to move quickly and often. Small size and careful transportation planning allow CPs to displace rapidly.

COMMAND POST OPERATIONS

2-73. The operations process is dynamic and all its activities occur continuously. However, commanders must establish a consistent pattern to this process throughout a command. They use the following control measures to do this: SOPs, plans and orders, and battle rhythm.

COMMAND AND CONTROL SOPs

2-74. Command and control SOPs increase C2 effectiveness. These SOPs serve two purposes. First, internal SOPs standardize each CP’s internal operations. Second, external SOPs developed for the entire force standardize interactions among CPs and between subordinate units and CPs. For SOPs to be effective, all must know their provisions and train to their standards.
Internal SOP Requirements

2-75. Each CP should have SOPs that address the following:
   
   - Organization and setup.
   - Staffing and shifts.
   - Continuous operations, including eating and sleeping plans.
   - Physical security and defense.
   - Priorities of work.
   - Loading plans and equipment checklists.
   - Orders production and dissemination procedures.
   - Journals and log maintenance.
   - Equipment and vehicle maintenance.

Shift-change Briefings

2-76. During continuous operations, CPs normally operate in shifts. To ensure uninterrupted operations, staffs execute a briefing when shifts change. Depending on the situation, it may be formal or informal and include the entire staff or selected members. Normally it is done face-to-face among key CP leaders. The COS/XO oversees the briefing, with participants briefing their areas of expertise. The briefing’s purpose is to inform the incoming shift of—

   - Current unit status.
   - Significant activities that occurred during the previous shift.
   - Significant decisions and events anticipated during the next shift.

The commander may attend. This may change the focus of the briefing. If the commander issues guidance or makes a decision, issuing a fragmentary order may be necessary.

2-77. The shift-change briefing format and emphasis change based on the situation. For example, the format for a force supporting civil authorities in a disaster area differs from one for a force conducting offensive operations abroad. To facilitate a quick but effective shift-change briefing, unit SOPs should contain its format and sequence. (See figure 2-4, below.)
Current mission and commander’s intent (COS/XO).

Enemy situation (G-2/S-2).
- Significant enemy actions during the last shift.
- Current enemy situation and changes in the most likely enemy courses of actions.
- Changes in priority intelligence requirements (PIRs).
- Limited visibility and weather update.
- Changes to collection priorities and updates to the intelligence synchronization plan.
- Disposition and status of selected intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) units and capabilities.

Civil situation (G-9/S-9).
- Significant actions by the population during the last shift.
- Current civil situation.
- Disposition and status of civil affairs units and capabilities.
- Significant activities involving the population anticipated during the next shift.

Friendly situation (G-3/S-3).
- Significant friendly actions during the last shift.
- Subordinate units’ disposition and status.
- Higher and adjacent units’ disposition and status.
- Major changes to the task organization and tasks to subordinate units that occurred during the last shift.
- Answers to commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) and changes in CCIRs.
- Changes to the ISR plan.
- Disposition and status of selected ISR units and capabilities.
- Answers to friendly forces information requirements (FFIRs) and changes in FFIRs.
- Significant activities and decisions scheduled for next shift (review of the decision support matrix).
- Anticipated planning requirements.

Running estimate summaries by warfighting function and staff section.

Briefers include—
- Fire support coordinator.
- Air liaison officer.
- Aviation coordinator.
- Air and missile defense coordinator.
- Engineer coordinator.
- Chemical officer.
- Provost marshal.
- G-1/S-1.
- Surgeon.
- G-6/S-6.

Briefings include—
- Any significant activities that occurred during the last shift.
- Disposition and status of units within their area of expertise.
- Any changes that have staffwide implications (for example, “higher headquarters changed the controlled supply rate for 120mm HE, so that means…”).
- Upcoming activities and anticipated changes during the next shift.

CP operations and administration (headquarters commandant or senior operations noncommissioned officer).
- CP logistic issues.
- CP security.
- CP displacement plan and proposed new locations.
- Priority of work.

COS/XO guidance to the next shift, including staff priorities and changes to the battle rhythm.

Figure 2-4. Example shift-change briefing

2-78. The shift-change briefing provides a mechanism to formally exchange information periodically among CP members. However, CP members share information throughout the shift. They coordinate activities and inform each other continuously. Information that answers a CCIR and exceptional information is given to the commander immediately. (See FM 6-0, paragraphs B-60–B-62, for a discussion of exceptional information.) Information that answers a PIR or FFIR is routed to the appropriate coordinating staff officer. Information that can potentially affect the entire force is disseminated to the commander, higher
headquarters, and subordinate units as the situation dictates. Situational understanding for CP members includes knowing who needs what relevant information and why they need it. CP members exercise subordinates’ initiative when they ensure relevant information gets to people who need it.

Command Post Battle Drills

2-79. Each CP requires procedures to react to a variety of situations. Specific actions taken by a CP should be defined in its SOPs and rehearsed during training and operations. Typical CP battle drills include—

- React to an air attack.
- React to a ground attack.
- React to a chemical attack.
- React to indirect fire.
- React to jamming or suspected communications compromise.
- Execute time-sensitive targets.
- Execute a close air support or joint fires mission.
- React to a mass casualty incident.
- React to a civil riot or incident.
- React to significant collateral damage.
- React to a misinformation incident.

External SOP Requirements

2-80. Procedures for how CPs interact with each other and how subordinate units interact with CPs are also required. Key areas include—

- Standardized reports and returns.
- Operation update and assessment briefing.
- Procedures for transferring control of operations between CPs.

Reports and Returns

2-81. A unit’s reporting system facilitates timely and effective information exchange among CPs and higher, lower, and adjacent headquarters. An established SOP for reports and returns is key to effective information management. These SOPs include—

- Who is required to submit each report.
- The frequency and time reports are due.
- The recipient of each report.

Changes to the unit SOP involving reports are normally reflected in the command information management plan. This is normally a stand alone plan and not part of an operation order.

Operation Update and Assessment Briefing

2-82. An operation update and assessment briefing may occur daily or anytime the commander calls for one. It is similar in content to the shift-change briefing but has a different audience. The staff presents it to the commander and subordinate commanders. Its purpose is to provide all key personnel a common situational awareness. Often commanders require this briefing shortly before an operation begins to summarize changes made during preparation, including changes resulting from ISR efforts.

2-83. During the briefing, staff sections present their running estimates. Subordinate commanders brief their current situation and planned activities. This briefing is rarely conducted face-to-face. Various communications means are used; among them, FM-voice, joint network node conference call, and video teleconference. All CPs and subordinate commanders participate. The briefing follows a sequence and format specified by SOP. That keeps transmissions short, ensures completeness, and eases note-taking. This briefing normally has a format similar to a shift-change briefing. However, it omits CP administrative information and includes presentations by subordinate commanders in an established sequence.
**Transferring Control of Operations between Command Posts**

2-84. The employment and use of CPs are important decisions reflected in the operation order. Often, a particular CP may control part of the operation or control the operation for a specific time. Effectively transferring control between CPs requires a well-understood SOP.

2-85. While all CPs have some ability to perform C2 on the move, they lose many capabilities they have when stationary. Therefore, CPs normally control operations from a static location. During moves, control responsibilities are transferred to another CP. Transfer of control requires notifying subordinates and many network operations changes to route information to the new controlling CP. SOPs establish these requirements to minimize interruptions when transferring control.

**Establishing Command Post Locations and Responsibilities**

2-86. When planning operations, staffs develop a C2 plan that addresses each CP’s initial and subsequent position. The plan also includes the command group’s composition and how the commander plans to employ it. The C2 plan establishes which CP controls specific parts of the operation. This is especially important for modular divisions, which have two TAC CPs.

2-87. The C2 plan is published in paragraph 5 of the operation order. Areas of that have not changed from the unit’s SOP are not addressed.

2-88. This FMI modifies paragraph 5 of the operation order to better account for the above requirements. Figure 2-5, page 2-18 (below), shows the revised format for paragraph 5.

**Battle Rhythm**

2-89. A key control measure commanders use to establish a CP operations pattern is a unit’s battle rhythm. **Battle rhythm** is the sequencing of standardized command and control activities within a headquarters and throughout the force to facilitate effective command and control. The COS usually controls the battle rhythm.

2-90. Battle rhythm establishes the time, frequency, and type of meetings, working groups, boards, and other events, and who attends them. Reports, briefings, meetings, and working groups all require input and preparation. Additionally, the outputs of certain working groups are inputs for other working groups. The battle rhythm accounts for such requirements. Staff officers and subordinate units require a schedule to prepare for each C2 event.

2-91. The battle rhythm changes as operations progress. For example, early in the operation a commander may require a plans update briefing each morning. As the situation changes, the commander may only require this update every three days. Many factors help determine a unit’s battle rhythm. Some of these factors are the staff’s proficiency, higher headquarters’ battle rhythm, and current mission.
5. Command and Control.
   a. Command.
      (1) Location of the commander. (State where the commander plans to be, including the mobile command group’s location. If the operation is phased, state the location of the commander by phase.)
      (2) Succession of command. (State the succession of command, if not covered in unit’s SOP.)
      (3) Special instructions for deputy commanders. (Specify responsibilities of deputy commanders and associated CPs, by phase if necessary.)
   b. Control.
      (1) Scheme of CP employment. (State each CP’s location and how each CP will be used. State which CP is the primary controlling CP for the operation. If the operation is phased, state this scheme by phase.)
      (2) Special instructions for CPs. (State special tasks or additional instructions for each CP not detailed elsewhere. These might include movement of key staff officers between CPs and movement of functional cells. List these by phase if necessary).
      (3) Liaison requirements. (Provide instruction for liaison to higher, lower, and adjacent commands.)
   c. C4 Operations (See Annex H.)
      (1) Network operations. (Include network control procedures for network administration and management.)
      (2) Signal Operating Instructions. (Current SOI in effect.)
      (3) Information management procedures. (Special requirements under the command information management plan.)
      (4) Recognition and identification instructions. (Special instructions not included in the SOP, friendly recognition signals, vehicle markings, and so forth.)

Figure 2-5. Format for operation order paragraph 5

2-92. Battle rhythm must remain flexible. Some missions require more time and effort to plan and prepare, than others. Additionally, battle rhythm must not keep commanders from exploiting opportunities. In a protracted stability operation, a division’s battle rhythm may look something like figure 2-6 (below). In fast-paced offensive or defensive operation, the division battle rhythm would be quite different.

Figure 2-6. Battle rhythm example for a stability operation

0700–Shift-change briefing (chief of staff/CP members).
0800–Operation update and assessment briefing (commander, staff, subordinate commanders).
0900–G-5 plans update (chief of staff and plans cell).
1000–Logistic synchronization conference call.
1100–Movement synchronization meeting.
1300–Operation synchronization meeting (G-3, chief of operations, and section and cell chiefs).
1700–Corps operation update and assessment briefing.
1900–Shift-change briefing (chief of staff/CP members).
2000–Working groups.
- Interagency working group (Monday).
- Targeting working group (Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday).
- Information operations working group (Wednesday).
- Civil-military operations working group (Friday).
- Assessment working group (Sunday).
Chapter 3
Exercising Command and Control

This chapter expands the scope of the operations process established in the current FM 3-0. It describes enhancements to the operations process to make it more comprehensive. It expands the operations process to incorporate several existing integrating processes, continuing activities, and control measures. It introduces patterns of operations. It expands doctrine on time horizons and operations process activities distribution. The integration responsibilities of the plans and current operations cells are more precisely established. All refinements emphasize the commander’s central role in visualizing, describing, directing, and leading operations. They reinforce mission command. At the same time, they contribute to better describing the staff’s role in helping commanders exercise command and control. Since these processes require a staff, this discussion applies only to battalion and above.

ENHANCING THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

3-1. As specialization within command posts (CPs) has grown, doctrine has not provided guidance for synchronizing integrating processes with each other and the overall operation. This chapter fills that void.

3-2. The operations process does not consist of distinct, sequential tasks, but of four continuous, overlapping activities (plan, prepare, execute, and assess) performed throughout an operation in varying proportions. There is also a requirement to coordinate integrating processes and continuing activities to synchronize the warfighting functions (WFFs) throughout an operation. Commanders and staffs develop and use control measures to do this. For doctrine to portray the integrated effort required in combined arms operations, the operations process now incorporates four existing integrating processes and several continuing activities. (See figure 3-1, page 3-2, below.)

INTEGRATING PROCESSES

3-3. The following integrating processes occur during all operations process activities. They must be synchronized with each other as well as integrated into the overall operation:

- Intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB).
- Targeting.
- Intelligence synchronization.
- Risk management.

In addition, commanders use the military decision making process (MDMP) and troop leading procedures to integrate activities during planning and, when required, during preparation and execution. They use the rapid decision making and synchronization process (RDSP; see chapter 4) to integrate activities during execution when circumstances do not require the MDMP or troop leading procedures. The unit’s battle rhythm is a key control measure for managing integration efforts.
CONTINUING ACTIVITIES

3-4. The following continuing activities occur during all operations process activities. They must be synchronized with each other as well as integrated into the overall operation:

- Intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations.
- Security operations.
- Protection.
- Liaison and coordination.
- Terrain management.
- Information operations.
- Army airspace command and control.

3-5. The integrating processes and continuing activities are related within the operations process as shown in figure 3-1 (below). Figure 3-1 also includes the control measures identified in chapter 1.

3-6. This chapter provides doctrine for synchronizing these aspects of operations during all operations process activities. While they appear to be sequential in figure 3-1, they actually occur continuously throughout all operations. Command and control includes identifying and employing the control measures the situation or operation requires. Much synchronization under mission command will be collaborative. (See chapter 4.) Synchronization involves more than arranging military actions; it requires an all-pervading unity of effort throughout the force.
PATTERNS OF OPERATIONS

3-7. No two operations are ever the same; nevertheless, some patterns may be discerned. The operations process applies to all of them. Figure 3-2 (below) shows how an operation might take place. Although it depicts the operation in a linear fashion, the actual conduct of full spectrum operations resembles multiple iterations of varying combinations of the types of operations.

![Figure 3-2. Example of two operations with a transition](image)

3-8. Figure 3-2 shows an operation beginning as an offensive one, with a specific line of departure and objective as well as a finite end state. Even with its focus on offense and defense, the operation includes some stability and reconstruction operations; considerations of stability and reconstruction operations are included from the beginning of planning and continue through preparation and execution. As the initial operation concludes successfully, the higher headquarters directs a sequel with stability and reconstruction operations predominating. The sequel cannot be executed successfully unless stability and reconstruction operations to set conditions for it were executed during the previous operation.

3-9. During long-term operations, a higher headquarters may require a force to conduct a short-term operation that supports the higher headquarters’ end state but diverts the force from its original mission. Usually this situation occurs during operations where stability and reconstruction operations predominate. These short-term operations have distinct starting and ending points. An example is an offensive operation to clear an insurgent cell from a geographic objective. These operations may or may not be anticipated during predeployment planning. They normally require a separate order.

3-10. In addition, unanticipated events that require an immediate solution also occur. Commanders address these contingencies as they would any emergency. As with planned operations, conducting them may or may not contribute to achieving the unit’s short-range objectives or end state. Commanders keep their intent in mind while resolving them. That helps them posture their force to resume the original mission.

TIME HORIZONS

3-11. Commanders also face the tension of how far ahead to plan without planning becoming irrelevant to preparation and execution. Planning too far in advance may overwhelm staff capabilities, especially at lower echelons. However, not planning far enough ahead may result in losing the initiative and being unprepared.

3-12. Time horizons can help commanders organize and resource their planning efforts. A time horizon is a point in time commanders use to focus the organization’s planning efforts to shape future events. Time horizons are situation dependent; they can range from weeks and months to hours and days. As a rule, the higher the echelon, the more distant the time horizon it is concerned with. Because planning occurs continuously, commanders consider time horizons during preparation and execution.

3-13. Commanders assign planning responsibilities by specific periods based on METT-TC and tempo. For example, a division plans cell may focus on operations 96 hours out during conventional operations. In
contrast, brigades and divisions conducting long-term stability and reconstruction operations routinely plan operations months in advance.

3-14. A useful way to use time horizons is to associate general periods (based on the situation) with the planning effort’s purpose. The planning efforts are long-range, mid-range, and short-range. (See figure 3-3, page 3-4, below.)

![Time Horizons Diagram](image)

**Figure 3-3. Time horizons and planning responsibilities**

**Long-range**

3-15. Operations begin with an overarching design that guides forces from their current state to the end state. Long-range planning may consider contingencies weeks to months out. As such, it may produce both plans and orders. At the start of a campaign or major operation, long-range planning normally addresses shaping operations to set conditions for success. It might involve selecting and prioritizing targets with the joint target coordination board. Plans and orders describe the following:

- Operation’s end state.
- Conditions necessary to achieve it.
- Force objectives.
- Broad schemes for achieving them.

They provide the starting point for an operation, including the initial task organization, resource allocation plan, and other control measures.

3-16. During campaigns that include multiple deployments, long-range planning at lower levels may focus on an end-of-tour end state that represents success for the tour. Setting end-of-tour end states is more common in campaigns involving large-scale stability and reconstruction operations than in those involving major combat operations.

3-17. When operations are phased, the design for initial phases is normally more developed than that for later ones. After an order is issued, planning continues. Planners refine later phases, refine or develop branches, and develop sequels.

3-18. Long-range planning occurs in the plans cell using the military decision making process (MDMP). The plans cell develops solutions to problems and passes them to the current operations cell if a fragmentary order (FRAGO) is needed. If a full operation order is required, the plans cell performs the MDMP as
time allows and prepares the order. The G-3 authenticates all orders, including FRAGOs. The plans cell conducts a plans-to-current-operations handover briefing when responsibility for integrating the order passes to the current operations cell. Normally, this occurs after the rehearsal. However, the situation and unit standing operating procedures (SOPs) determine when integration responsibility is transferred. The plans cell may perform mid- and short-range planning by exception.

**Short-range**

3-19. During execution, commanders and staffs perform short-range planning to modify the current order based on the commander’s assessment of changes in the situation. Short-range planning focuses on the immediate future. This may be hours or days but is normally 24 hours out. Short-range planning addresses the same time horizon the targeting working group uses for current operations targeting.

3-20. Short-range planning produces a FRAGO. It may involve representatives from all WFFs or include only selected staff members and the commander. Who participates depends on the problem’s complexity and available time. The current operations cell normally performs short-range planning. Other functional and integrating cells contribute. The plans cell may perform short-range planning in exceptional situations; however, this detracts from the organization’s long-range planning capability.

3-21. Short-range planning is normally done in a time-constrained environment. The staff may use the MDMP modified for time-constrained conditions. (See FM 5-0, paragraph 3-203–3-240.) Or it may use a less formal process like those described in chapter 4. Short-range planning addresses situations arising outside the normal decision or assessment cycles that demand immediate action. These include opportunities and threats that commanders must exploit or counter. Failure to recognize such situations and act may result in lost opportunities or destruction of the force.

3-22. These situations are a particular challenge to commanders and staffs. First, they must recognize that a situation outside the normal decision or assessment cycle exists. Forecasts in running estimates aid such recognition. Then they must swiftly organize CP resources to perform planning and implement the decision for resolving it. Often, the current operations cell leads this team, although plans support it.

3-23. For short-range requirements requiring more than a FRAGO, commanders of units authorized a future operations (FUOPS) cell can task it. If a FUOPS cell is not authorized, a standby FUOPS working group may be established. Members of the plans, current operations, and other cells may be part of it.

**Mid-range**

3-24. Distinguishing between long-range and short-range time horizons and assigning staff responsibilities for them is relatively straightforward. The time horizon between them poses a greater challenge. Mid-range planning addresses contingencies within the current phase. Its time horizon may range out days, weeks, or months, depending on the type of operation. Mid-range planning includes branch planning and refinement of long-range planning products, such as branches in concept form.

3-25. Corps and Army service component commands have a FUOPS cell responsible for mid-range planning. Battalion through division headquarters are not allocated a FUOPS cell. Their commanders decide where to assign responsibility for mid-range planning based on METT-TC. Different commanders address this issue differently. Some make the plans cell be responsible for mid-range decision making and planning. Others assign this responsibility to a team formed from the current operations and plans cells. The G-3/S-3 is responsible for deciding what horizon the situation represents and recommending solutions to the commander.

**OPERATIONS PROCESS ACTIVITIES DISTRIBUTION**

3-26. Planning, preparing, executing, and assessing occur simultaneously throughout an operation. (See figure 3-4, page 3-6, below.) They may occur sequentially during part of an operation, especially when a new mission starts. However, planning, preparing, and executing always overlap somewhat. An example is when a unit receives an on-order, short-range mission while executing a long-range mission.
3-27. The activities may also overlap when planning for a branch, sequel, or new mission is required during preparation or execution. Assessment is continuous; it overlaps all other activities. In addition, subordinate units may perform different activities simultaneously. For example, one may be executing while another is preparing. Finally, the activities overlap during execution if the organization has received a mission for a sequel or a new mission that it must plan for while executing the current operation.

3-28. In operations where stability and reconstruction operations predominate, the operations process activities overlap more than when other types of operations predominate. Coordinating responsibility for synchronizing integrating processes between the plans and current operations cells (and the FUOPS cell, if it exists) becomes even more difficult. The patterns depicted in figure 3-4 (above) become less regular than shown, as there may be several operations in progress simultaneously, based on how many of the various decision thresholds have occurred.

INTEGRATING IN THE OPERATIONS PROCESS

3-29. Integrating processes and continuing activities both contribute to the overall operations process. Their number and the complexity of their interaction make it necessary to discuss integration within each activity separately. Assessing is discussed first because it provides input to all other processes and activities. The discussion of each activity addresses how assessing contributes to it.

3-30. Commanders direct during all operations process activities. Their directions take different forms during planning, preparation, and execution. Commanders make decisions and direct actions based on their situational understanding. They keep their situational understanding current by continuously assessing the situation.

ASSESS

3-31. Commanders and staffs collect relevant information for the common operational picture (COP) as they monitor the situation. They evaluate data and information by comparing them to criteria—either measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs). Assessing leads to achieving situational understanding. During planning, assessing focuses on understanding the situation; it also con-
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siders progress in achieving planning goals. During preparation and execution, it emphasizes evaluating the operation’s progress, identifying variances, and determining the significance of those variances. (A variance is a difference between the actual situation during an operation and what the plan forecasted the situation would be at that time or event. [FM 6-0].)

3-32. The primary tools for assessing are the commander’s visualization and running estimates. The visualization serves as part of the commander’s personal decision making methodology. Commanders use it to evaluate the nature of the situation or the operation’s progress. Each staff section maintains a running estimate. These provide information, conclusions, and recommendations from the section, based on the COP. Its running estimate represents a staff section’s situational understanding.

Running Estimates

3-33. In their running estimates, staff sections continuously consider the effect of new information. They update assumptions, friendly force status, effects of enemy activity and effects of civil considerations based on it. They analyze this information to produce conclusions and recommendations. A running estimate assesses the following for current and future operations:

- Friendly force capabilities.
- Enemy capabilities and intentions.
- Effects of terrain and weather.
- Effects of civil considerations.
- Effect of time available.

3-34. The staff provides updated conclusions and recommendations to the commander as the situation or the commander require. Updated conclusions proceed from determining the significance of variances detected using MOEs and MOPs. (See chapters 4 and 5.) Updated recommendations are based on conclusions about the significance of these variances—whether they indicate an opportunity, a threat, or are within accepted tolerances. Identifying significant variances may well be intuitive and instantaneous, especially with respect to timeliness for seizing an opportunity or blunting an enemy threat. Running estimates also contain forecasts of possible or probable future events and their implications for decision making and planning.

Integrating Processes’ Contributions to Assessment

3-35. Assessing develops the knowledge to which commanders apply judgment to obtain situational understanding and make decisions. It also determines achievement of any effects commanders specify in their planning guidance. All staff sections route relevant information to the section responsible for managing it. The plans or current operations cell—whichever is responsible for integration—integrates the results into a whole for the commander and staff.

3-36. Of the integrating processes, IPB and intelligence synchronization—with their focus on the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations—are most directly related to assessing three of the six factors of METT-TC. The intelligence cell oversees these functions. The other functional cells assess the other METT-TC factors. Assessing involves active reconnaissance and surveillance missions as part of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations. Reachback capabilities to obtain information from higher-echelon resources also support assessing throughout the operations process.

3-37. Intelligence synchronization supports assessing by managing assets collecting against intelligence requirements. In addition, it supports assessment through the intelligence synchronization plan.

3-38. Friendly forces information is easier to collect than enemy and civil information. Normally, information about the mission, troops and support available, and time is acquired through normal reports and returns. However, other means may be needed to supplement them.

3-39. Targeting requires assessment during all operations process activities. Assessing contributes to accomplishing the initial decide function during planning and its update throughout the operation. The decide function also requires assessing to determine the results of fires and to support reattack recommendations.
3-40. Before receiving a mission, all staff members continually assess the situation from the perspective of their area of expertise based on possible contingencies. For example, intelligence staff members use contingency plans to focus assessment on possible areas of commitment. Likewise, logistic staff members assess logistic readiness and actions needed to achieve it by contingency plan. These assessments support overall unit planning. Receipt or development of a mission focuses assessing on a purpose; staff members then assess the situation with respect to the new mission. For some areas of expertise, relevant information is already largely available, but the operation against which it is assessed has changed. In such circumstances, staff members refine their assessment as needed to meet the new mission requirements.

PLAN

3-41. The MDMP guides planning at echelons with a staff. The integrating processes begin during planning or, if ongoing, are revised when the MDMP begins for a new order. The plans cell uses the MDMP to synchronize the integrating processes during planning. (See FM 5-0, chapter 3.)

3-42. Planning is more than choosing a course of action (COA). The result of planning is a plan or order that provides the instructions and control measures needed to synchronize forces and resources in time, space, and purpose. A few of the products that result from planning include—

- Intelligence synchronization plans.
- Movement plans.
- Frequency management instructions.
- Medical evacuation plans.
- Execution matrices.
- Decision support matrices.
- Commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs).
- Tasks to subordinate units.
- Operation overlays.

3-43. Moving a division from the United States, positioning it in an area of operations, and conducting an operation against an enemy as part of a joint force requires hundreds of decisions and detailed coordination. These decisions take place during the MDMP to produce a plan or order that is the basis for making decisions during execution. Depending on the complexity of the problem and time available, commanders devote a significant amount of time and staff to planning.

3-44. Commanders issue planning guidance, make decisions, and establish control measures during planning. While the MDMP requires these actions at set points, commanders are not limited to acting only at those times. The MDMP belongs to commanders; commanders act whenever necessary to keep it on track.

3-45. The MDMP produces the control measures needed to prepare for and execute the operation as well as assess progress toward the end state. Under mission command, the MDMP results in a base order that is relatively brief. It contains a short commander’s intent, a concept of operations that allows subordinates as much latitude as circumstances permit, and ten or fewer CCIRs. The control measures needed to regulate the operation are contained in annexes when the unit SOPs do not address them.

Assessment During Planning

3-46. Assessment during planning focuses on three tasks:

- Developing situational understanding.
- Establishing assessment criteria for the mission, normally—but not exclusively—MOEs and MOPs.
- Evaluating COAs for the commander’s decision.

It describes the situation and its implications for the mission. It also assesses the progress of planning itself to ensure it meets established time lines and quality.

3-47. Mission analysis, the second MDMP step, is an assessment tool for understanding the situation. The commander’s visualization drives the staff. However, mission analysis provides commanders with the tools
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to begin their visualization. IPB, along with other running estimates, provides commanders with the context through which to begin their visualization and begin to express their planning guidance. Planning guidance usually drives the staff to clarify information further.

3-48. During planning, commanders formulate their visualization, and staff sections update their running estimates. Commanders never have perfect a visualization of the operation; they need to continually refine it.

3-49. The staff assesses COAs during COA analysis and evaluation. During the COA analysis, MOEs and MOPs—as well as other criteria for evaluation during the operation—are developed. During COA evaluation, the staff applies these criteria to recommend a COA to the commander for approval.

3-50. MOEs and MOPs provide the framework for an assessment plan. Higher echelons may prepare a formal assessment plan because they have the resources to employ one. Lower echelons develop an informal assessment plan. This involves tasking staff members to monitor certain MOEs, MOPs, or other criteria.

Integrating Processes During Planning

3-51. IPB, targeting, and intelligence synchronization are prominent during planning.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

3-52. IPB is a systematic, continuous process of analyzing the threat and environment, which includes terrain, weather, and civil considerations. It supports the commander’s visualization, running estimates, and the MDMP. IPB—

- Defines the operational environment.
- Describes the environment’s effects.
- Produces an evaluation of the threat.
- Develops possible enemy COAs.

IPB is critical to the success of planning. It takes a well-trained staff to perform it successfully.

3-53. Although the G-2/S-2 leads IPB, it involves the entire staff and incorporates information from each section’s area of expertise. The G-9/S-9 contributes to developing information on civil considerations, especially those that do not concern enemies. These contributions are especially important after the force is employed. Information provided by each staff section allows the commander and staff to develop a better understanding of the enemy and environment. It also develops products that benefit planning and enable decision making.

3-54. IPB remains the same for all types of military operations; however, its focus may change depending on the predominant type of operation or the unit’s primary focus. Products required to portray the information may also change based on the type of operation. Doctrinal and situation templates used to portray conventional threats differ from those used to portray asymmetric threats. In addition, civil considerations have assumed an importance on a par with the enemy and environment for all types of operations. IPB products must provide enough detail for commanders and staffs to make informed decisions.

Targeting

3-55. While targeting, like the other integrating processes, occurs continuously throughout an operation, it begins during planning. Its steps mirror planning, preparing, executing, and assessing. During planning for a new operation, however, it is primarily the decide function that is performed.

3-56. From the targeting standpoint, the fire support, intelligence, and operations estimates are interrelated and must be closely coordinated. Key staff products influencing targeting include IPB and target value analysis. The G-3/S-3, G-2/S-2, and fire support coordinator participate in COA analysis and collaboratively develop the following decide function products:

- **High-payoff target list.** The high-payoff target list is a prioritized list of targets by target set whose loss to an enemy will contribute to the success of the mission.
- **Targeting input to the intelligence synchronization plan.** The *intelligence synchronization plan* is the plan the intelligence officer uses, with staff input, to synchronize the entire collection
effort, to include all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units, and higher echelon units and organizations, and intelligence reach to answer the commander’s critical information requirements (FM 2-0).

- **Target selection standards.** Target selection standards establish criteria for deciding when targets are located accurately enough to act upon.
- **Attack guidance matrix.** The attack guidance matrix lists which targets or target sets to act on, how and when to act on them, and the desired effects.
- **Target synchronization matrix.** The target synchronization matrix combines data from the high-payoff target list, intelligence synchronization plan, and the attack guidance matrix. It lists high-payoff targets by category and the agencies responsible for detecting them, attacking them, and assessing the effects of the attacks.

3-57. The decide function gives a clear picture of which targets will produce the greatest payoff (maximum effect) and then applies priorities to the following:

- Tasking target acquisition assets.
- Information processing about targets.
- Selection of attack means for identified types of targets.

3-58. The fire support coordinator chairs the targeting working group. The targeting working group includes members from across the staff, (such as the G-7/S-7, Air Force, and staff judge advocate).

**Intelligence Synchronization**

3-59. The integrating processes—especially targeting and IPB—produce information requirements related to the environment and threat. Making the most effective use of available information and collection assets requires managing these requirements. In most cases, the number of requirements exceeds the unit’s processing and collection capability. The collection manager tracks and manages all intelligence requirements until they are answered or become irrelevant. The intelligence synchronization process ensures that the appropriate staff section or collection asset is tasked to collect the required information. It also ensures the optimal collector is tasked and the highest priorities satisfied first. Moreover, to preclude wasting limited resources, tasking multiple collection assets against a requirement or target should be a conscious decision.

3-60. To integrate intelligence synchronization into the MDMP, the collection manager participates in mission and COA analysis. Doing this helps the collection manager obtain a thorough understanding of the commander’s intent and concept of operations, and develop a better collection strategy. The commander and staff prioritize information requirements as CCIRs, priority intelligence requirements, and remaining intelligence requirements. The collection manager analyzes each requirement and develops specific information requirements. Some of these requirements can be answered from existing information and requests for information. Those that cannot are converted into reconnaissance tasks and surveillance tasks, and assigned for collection. Based on reconnaissance tasks and surveillance tasks, the collection manager evaluates resources and prepares the intelligence synchronization plan. This plan provides a collection methodology to synchronize requirements with resources.

3-61. The G-3/S-3, in coordination with the G-2/S-2, uses the intelligence synchronization plan to prepare the reconnaissance and surveillance plan. The G-3/S-3 orders execution of reconnaissance and surveillance operations, often during planning and preparation. The information collected contributes to integrating processes as well as the overall plan.

3-62. Integrating friendly, civil, and enemy information into a useable COP occurs initially in the plans cell as part of the MDMP. However, it includes the current operations cell, which assumes integration responsibility during preparation. When collection occurs during planning, the current operations cell supervises the mission. The intelligence cell analyzes the collected information, fuses it with other information to produce intelligence, and returns the results to the plans cell for integration.
**PREPARE**

3-63. Preparation includes the following:

- Revising and refining the order or plan.
- Rehearsals.
- Task-organizing.
- Training.
- Troop movements.
- Preoperations checks and inspections.
- Logistic preparations. (During execution, this includes recovery and rearming.)
- Integrating new Soldiers and units.
- Subordinate confirmation briefs and backbriefs.

3-64. Preparation creates conditions within which friendly forces improve their chances for success. It facilitates and sustains transitions, including those to branches and sequels. Several preparation activities—especially reconnaissance operations, security operations, and force protection—begin in planning and continue throughout the operation.

3-65. Preparation continues during execution. Uncommitted forces prepare for identified contingencies and look to the operation’s next phase or branch. Committed units revert to preparation when they reach their objectives, occupy defensive positions, or pass into reserve.

3-66. During preparation, commanders continue to use the visualize-describe-direct-lead methodology to exercise command and control. They update and validate their visualization as they receive relevant information and assessments from running estimates. Commanders’ situational awareness changes as they receive new information. Assumptions may prove true or false. Intelligence may confirm or deny enemy actions and conditions in the environment. The status of friendly forces may change. As their situational awareness changes, commanders apply judgment to determine the significance of the changes and their possible effects on the operation. This produces a new situational understanding that either validates their commander’s visualization or prompts them to change it. Significant new information requires commanders to make one of three assessments with respect to the order:

- The new information validates the order with no further changes.
- The new information requires adjusting the order.
- The new information invalidates the order.

3-67. The earlier the commander identifies the need for modifications, the easier it is to incorporate them into the order and resynchronize it. Commanders use their updated commander’s visualization to balance the loss of synchronization and coordination caused by a change against the consequences of continuing a course that no longer fits the situation. When they decide a change is required, they describe their view of its implications and direct the changes to control measures needed to effect the necessary adjustments.

**Continuing Activities and Preparation Activities**

3-68. The continuing activities and preparation activities listed in figure 3-1 (page 3-2, above) occur during preparation. However, four require special mention.

**Reconnaissance and Surveillance Operations**

3-69. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations often begin during planning to fill information gaps identified during mission analysis and support the integrating processes. Such operations are evaluated against operations security considerations so friendly operations are not compromised.
Revising and Refining the Order or Plan

3-70. Plan refinement consists primarily of revising the plan based on changes in the situation and command and staff visits to subordinate elements.

Coordination and Liaison

3-71. Coordination of the integrating processes, as well as internal and external coordination, continues after planning to synchronize them. Battle rhythm is a control measure that assists with synchronizing the continuing activities and integrating processes during preparation. It establishes a schedule for commanders and staffs that synchronizes routine meetings, working groups, and reports.

Rehearsals

3-72. Rehearsals are the commander’s tool for ensuring staffs and subordinates understand the commander’s intent and concept of operations. (See FM 6-0, appendix F.) They focus on synchronization and coordination. Rehearsals help commanders accomplish the following:

- Synchronize and integrate integrating processes.
- Identify key points and times requiring coordination.
- Update synchronization matrices.
- Solve previously unidentified coordination problems.

However, the commander or chief of staff may direct accomplishment of these tasks during another event.

3-73. Uncommitted units rehearse during execution if time allows. Reserves practice their movements to attack or defensive positions. Units defending in depth rehearse their movements and engagements.

Assessment During Preparation

3-74. Assessing during preparation has two focuses:

- Determining the friendly force readiness to execute the operation.
- Determining changes in the threat and civil considerations from those developed for planning.

3-75. Commanders continue to receive information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. Staffs integrate this information so commanders understand these factors in relation to each other rather than in isolation. Assessing during preparation includes confirming or disproving assumptions made during planning. Its results may influence revisions and refinements to the order.

Integrating Processes During Preparation

3-76. IPB, targeting, and intelligence synchronization remain prominent during preparation. Integration responsibility is passed from the plans cell to the current operations cell at a point set by the unit SOP.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

3-77. During preparation staffs continue to update and refine products produced during planning. IPB focuses on providing an updated picture of the environment and threat based on new information gathered through collection and friendly reporting. Staffs also ensure the products are available and disseminated to subordinate units, which often do not have the resources available to higher headquarters.

Targeting

3-78. Targeting continues but emphasizes the detect function. The collection manager supervises collecting information to answer targeting requirements. Target priorities from planning determine the targeting requirements that collection assets focus on. Suspected targets are tracked until they are validated and attacked. The detect function continues through execution.

3-79. Target acquisition assets gather information and report their findings to their controlling headquarters, which passes pertinent information to the tasking agency. Some collection assets provide actual
Exercising Command and Control

targets; others must have their information processed to produce them. Not all reported information benefits targeting; however, it may contribute to developing the overall situation. Target priorities are used to expedite target processing. Situations arise where the attack of a target upon location and identification is either impossible (for example, out of range) or undesirable (moving toward a better location for the attack). Critical targets that are not attacked are tracked to ensure they are not lost.

3-80. Tracking suspected targets keeps them in view while they are validated. Assets used for target tracking may be unavailable for target acquisition. As targets are developed, appropriate attack systems are tasked per the attack guidance and the system’s location requirements.

**Intelligence Synchronization**

3-81. Intelligence synchronization continues to coordinate collection of prioritized requirements and dissemination of information to those needing it. As requirements are satisfied, the collection manager re-evaluates intelligence requirements and available assets. The collection manager then coordinates with the G-2/S-2 and G-3/S-3 and recommends retaskings. The G-3/S-3 ensures new requirements are integrated into the current order and tasks units to fill them (usually with a FRAGO). Based on previous guidance, the collection manager may retask collection assets, provided the new requirement does not require extensive planning.

3-82. Reconnaissance and surveillance operations continue to help confirm or deny enemy COAs and estimates of enemy capabilities and combat effectiveness. Reconnaissance and surveillance also confirm or deny assumptions about the environment and threat made during planning. Depending on the requirement’s nature, collected information is either immediately disseminated or exploited before dissemination. The broadcast or point-to-point dissemination method is used, depending on the information type.

**Transition of Responsibility for Integration**

3-83. During preparation, responsibility for process integration for the plan being developed remains with the plans cell until the plans-to-current-operations handover occurs. It may be before or after the rehearsal, depending on the situation and unit SOPs. If there is an ongoing operation, the current operations cell integrates the processes for it. The current operations cell also integrates processes for operations executed to support planning, such as reconnaissance missions. Normally, the plans cell conducts the rehearsal in coordination with the current operations cell. The plans cell revises synchronization and integration to correct shortcomings identified during the rehearsal and prepares any FRAGOs needed to modify the order to comply with rehearsal decisions. The plans cell also executes the plans-to-current-operations handover briefing when integration responsibility is transferred to the current operations cell. After this point, the current operations cell becomes responsible for the order’s integration, synchronization, and execution.

**EXECUTE**

3-84. This discussion addresses principles for process integration during execution. It addresses the following:

- Assessing during execution.
- Activities specific to execution.
- Integrating processes during execution.
- Decision making during execution.

Chapter 4 provides more detail on execution.

3-85. Execution is more than putting a decision into action. It involves monitoring the situation, assessing the operation, and adjusting the order as needed. Throughout execution, commanders continuously assess the operation’s progress based on information from the COP and running estimates. Assessment keeps their situational awareness current and allows commanders to continuously update their situational understanding and validate their visualization. When the situation varies from the assumptions the order was based on, commanders direct adjustments to exploit opportunities and counter threats.
3-86. Commanders do not restrict their visualization to the current operation. As their situational understanding evolves, they incorporate considerations for the operation’s next phase or a sequel into their visualization. They begin to visualize how to transition from the current operation to the next one. Based on this visualization, commanders direct actions to posture the force for the transition. As they visualize the implications of events and their solutions, commanders describe their conclusions to staff and subordinates through updated CCIRs and planning guidance. This guidance may be to develop a branch or change the main effort to exploit success. Commanders direct adjustments when necessary, primarily through FRAGOs but verbally when needed.

3-87. As commanders assess an operation, they determine when decisions are required. Orders usually identify some decision points; however, unanticipated enemy actions or conditions often present situations that require unanticipated decisions. Commanders act when these decisions are required; they do not wait for a set time in the battle rhythm.

3-88. A commander’s visualization based on an accurate, current situational understanding allows commanders to rapidly and effectively adjust control measures to adapt to changing situations—whether precipitated by the enemy, changes in friendly force status, or civil considerations. Commanders do not hesitate to modify the order or scrap it altogether if they think it necessary to accomplish the mission, better achieve the higher commander’s intent, or save the force. Adhering to a plan when the situation changes significantly wastes resources and opportunities. It may risk defeat.

3-89. Sustaining the operation is important during execution. Without it, other decisions become irrelevant. During execution, sustainment tasks depend on a high level of anticipation. Logisticians project when and where support will be required to ensure constant pressure on enemy forces and continuous operations by friendly ones. Finally, sustainment must anticipate support required for follow-on operations.

Assessing During Execution

3-90. Assessing during execution focuses on identifying variances and their nature and magnitude. Variances prompt decision making. During execution, running estimates continue to assess the friendly and enemy situations against current and future operations.

3-91. During execution, commanders continually assess the operation’s progress. They act to ensure subordinate units execute actions appropriate to the actual situation. They adjust the disposition of forces, tasks assigned to subordinates, and priorities of support to achieve the greatest effect at minimum cost. They modify some tasks, even if the operation unfolds as expected. A major part of the art of command is knowing when to change the order and determining which control measures to change to assure success. Critical to command is determining which MOEs or MOPs indicate needed changes and deciding which changes will obtain the maximum contribution to achieving the higher commander’s intent.

3-92. Just as commanders dedicate resources to planning, they also commit resources to current operations activities. These include assessing the current situation while directing and regulating forces and WFFs in accordance with the commander’s intent.

Execution Activities

3-93. To execute an operation, commanders synchronize the integrating processes and continuing activities. This integration is complex, but necessary. In addition, they perform the following activities specific to execution:

- Focus assets on the decisive operation.
- Adjust CCIRs based on the situation.
- Adjust control measures.
- Manage movement and positioning of supporting units.
- Adjust unit missions and tasks as necessary.
- Modify the concept of operations as required.
- Position or relocate committed, supporting, and reserve units.
Integrating Processes During Execution

3-94. IBP, targeting, and intelligence synchronization continue during execution.

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield

3-95. During execution, staffs continue to collect and evaluate information received from collection requirements and friendly reports. They use this information to update IPB products, which contribute to the commander’s and staff’s situational understanding. IPB produces an integrated picture of the environment and terrain. It supports production of predictive intelligence. The intelligence cell evaluates the ongoing operation against the current picture produced by IPB. It forecasts what, when, where, and how changes in the operational environment will occur based on this evaluation. The current operations cell integrates the IPB products, including forecasts of changes and implications for future operations, with other relevant information into the operations running estimate. Commanders use it and other running estimates to refine their visualization, assess the situation, and direct adjustments. Significant or forecast changes in the environment or threat may result in changes to the order (adjustments).

3-96. Updated IPB products and their associated reports also feed targeting. As enemy forces adapt to friendly operations, they may pursue new COAs, and current friendly tactics may not have the desired effects. Changes to environmental factors also affect how friendly and enemy forces operate. These changes are evaluated during targeting to determine the best way to defeat them.

Targeting

3-97. The deliver function of targeting begins in earnest with execution. However, the full targeting process—decide, detect, deliver, assess—continues throughout execution. The targeting process provides speed and efficiency in the delivery of fires on targets. Within the deliver function, the attack system or combination of systems selected during planning is employed. During stability and reconstruction operations, offensive information operations, particularly psychological operations, may be the predominant type of fires. The executing agency (for example, a fires brigade) develops the technical solution for the targets. Technical solutions include—

- Identifying attack units.
- Determining the ordnance type or other influence means.
- Setting the attack time.
- Coordinating instructions.

3-98. After delivery, effects are assessed using combat assessment. Combat assessment is the determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment in military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: battle damage assessment, munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack recommendation (JP 1-02). Intelligence normally provides battle damage assessments. Fire support specialists provide munitions effects assessments. However, combat assessment, especially reattack recommendations, involves not only the targeting working group but also the current operations cell. The reattack recommendation is developed from the attack guidance matrix as updated by the most recent targeting working group. The reattack recommendation provides guidance to the fire support cell for the decide function, thus continuing the targeting process.

3-99. If combat assessment reveals that attacks have not achieved the effects the commander’s guidance calls for, the detect and deliver functions continue to focus on the targets involved. This feedback may result in changing original decisions made during planning. These changes are provided to subordinate units because they affect continued execution of the order. If combat assessment reveals the commander’s guidance has been met, assets to attack high-priority targets not originally scheduled due to limited resources become available. This is an iterative process. After each attack, the fire support cell evaluates its effects. It then recommends reattack or retasks assets against the next priority target for which they are appropriate.
Chapter 3

Intelligence Synchronization

3-100. During execution, intelligence synchronization continues the following tasks:

- Oversee collection requirements.
- Evaluate the information.
- Update priorities.
- Retask collection.

Collection tasks linked to decision points play a critical part in the operation. The reconnaissance and surveillance plan must ensure that information tied to decision points reaches the commander and staff in time to support the decision.

3-101. The intelligence synchronization plan is continually updated during execution. Changes to the friendly or enemy situation may require changes in collection priorities and the reconnaissance and surveillance plan. Also failure to answer a priority requirement may require tasking additional or different resources against the requirement or reassessing the situation. The collection manager maintains a current status of all collection assets. This supports timely recommendations that allow the staff to make informed collection decisions.

3-102. The reconnaissance and surveillance plan also ties directly into the targeting process. Collection assets often detect targets. The collector’s information triggers the deliver function. After delivery, the same collector may provide information to assess the attack. If not, a different asset is tasked to do this.

3-103. Throughout execution, intelligence synchronization supports both decision making and targeting. While the collection manager directly oversees it, staff integration of this process is essential to synchronize collection and maneuver.

Decision Making During Execution

3-104. Decision making continues throughout execution, but its form changes. Commanders rely more on intuitive or naturalistic forms of decision making than on analytic decision making processes. The MDMP is not designed to address the time-sensitive decisions required to execute operations. Operations never unfold the way planners envision them. Many factors (the fog and friction of operations) disrupt the operation and synchronization of force elements. These include enemy actions, friendly mistakes, and unforeseen environmental conditions.

3-105. Decision making during execution occurs continuously. It is not tied to a cycle or battle rhythm, although some parts of it may be. Being able to act when events occur, not at a predetermined point, is key to its effectiveness. Only in this way can commanders operate within the enemy’s decision cycle at a tempo the enemy cannot match. Effective decision making during execution meets certain criteria:

- It is a comprehensive, integrated combined arms process, not a series of stovepiped processes.
- It relates all actions to the commander’s intent and concept of operations to ensure they support the decisive operation.
- It relies heavily on intuitive decision making by commanders and staffs to make rapid adjustments.
- It is continuous and can react immediately to any opportunity or threat.
- It accommodates cyclical process requirements but is not tied to them.

3-106. An important aspect of decision making during execution is determining the type of decision required. Execution decisions involve COAs anticipated in the order. Adjustment decisions modify the order. The decision type establishes the decision authority. It may also determine the extent of participation by the current operations cell. Tactics, techniques, and procedures for execution are discussed in chapter 4.

Execution Decisions

3-107. Execution decisions include normal decisions needed to keep the operation within the parameters of the order. These normally occur as part of the battle rhythm. Events such as operation update and
assessment briefings, shift-change briefings, and resynchronizations provide opportunities to make these decisions. These decisions are important but less urgent than most others.

3-108. The current operations cell makes execution decisions within the authority the commander delegates. It oversees the synchronization of integrating processes needed to implement them. In this context, operation update briefings and assessments are useful to inform the staff of the action and allow the commander to address everyone together.

Adjustment Decisions

3-109. Often, the most difficult aspect of decision making during execution is recognizing the need for a decision. Recognizing the more subtle requirements for adjustment decisions is particularly difficult. Threats that require changing the plan may not appear until they are serious and require immediate action. Recognizing adjustment decisions needed to respond to opportunities may be even harder. In both cases, forecasting or anticipation may be required for an effective decision.

3-110. The current operations cell recommends adjustment decisions to the commander based on its ongoing assessment and running estimate. It also oversees synchronization of the integrating processes needed to implement them. When adjustments fall within the mid- to long-term time horizon, planning for adjustment decisions is passed to the FUOPS or plans cell. When time does not allow this, the current operations cell performs the planning.
Chapter 4

Execution

FM 6-0 provides principles and a framework for exercising command and control during execution. This chapter expands on that doctrine. It discusses how commanders seize, retain, and exploit the initiative during execution by continuously exploiting opportunities and countering threats to better achieve the operation’s end state. It discusses the nature of decision making in execution and introduces the rapid decision making and synchronization process. The rapid decision making and synchronization process is a tool commanders, other leaders, and staffs use to make decisions and rapidly resynchronize forces and warfighting functions during execution.

INTRODUCTION

4-1. Execution is putting a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions (FM 6-0). This definition applies to any combination of offensive, defensive, stability and reconstruction, and civil support operations throughout an operation. Doctrine for execution also supports the Army’s operational concept of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative with speed, shock, surprise, depth, simultaneity, and endurance. (See FM 1, chapter 3.)

SEIZE, RETAIN, AND EXPLOIT THE INITIATIVE

4-2. Operation plans and orders incorporate the Army’s operational concept by establishing how initiative will be seized and retained. They do this by providing instructions on synchronizing the warfighting functions (WFFs) and assigning tasks to subordinate units. An order alone, however, does not seize and retain the initiative, let alone exploit it. Fully seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative depends on commanders doing the following:
- Taking action.
- Creating and exploiting opportunities.
- Continuously assessing the situation and taking calculated risks.
- Applying sound tactics.
- Employing joint capabilities.

Opportunities are events or conditions that offer better ways to achieve success. However, every opportunity for greater success carries some elements of risk, if only that of temporarily desynchronizing the operation. Thus, execution requires adjusting and resynchronizing operations to meet changing conditions. Doing this enables commanders to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. (FM 6-0, paragraph 2-94, addresses calculated risks.)

4-3. Execution also requires commanders to build and maintain momentum. Commanders and staffs do this by continuously assessing and synchronizing operations. Commanders build and maintain momentum by constantly pressuring the enemy. They control tempo to present enemies with new problems before they can solve current ones. Forecasting and anticipation helps keep up pressure. Perceived requirements for synchronizing can slow momentum; however, the enemy force’s condition dictates the level of synchronization required.

4-4. To fully achieve the end state, commanders must exploit success. This requires making refinements during execution to take advantage of success when it occurs. Exploitation also depends on assessing and
understanding the impact of sustainment. Ultimately, however, only initiative that contributes to achieving the end state counts.

SYNCHRONIZATION AND COMBINED ARMS

4-5. Executing synchronized combined arms operations requires extensive planning, preparation, and training. Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive time and place (JP 1-02). In full spectrum operations, it also includes achieving a balance among offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction or civil support operations to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent. It requires mastery of the tactical art. (See FM 3-90, paragraphs 1-12–1-19.) Control by higher headquarters reduces risk and ensures various units remain closely linked by schedule, position, and action. However, excessively centralized control, while contributing to a highly synchronized operation, stifles subordinates’ initiative. It may result in missed opportunities. Commanders balance control and flexibility. Careful task-organizing reduces the span of control and permits greater tactical flexibility. (See FM 6-0, paragraphs 5-100–5-105.)

4-6. Effective synchronization is collaborative as well as directive. Modern technological tools help achieve this collaborative synchronization; however, synchronization starts with Soldiers exercising subordinates’ initiative. Situational understanding for staff members entails knowing how factors in their area of expertise affect other areas. It underlies the collaborative synchronization needed to effectively exploit opportunities commanders discern. Staff work at brigade, division, and corps entails sustaining synchronization over time as movement, casualties, and enemy actions affect original arrangements. It also entails achieving unity of effort with larger joint, interagency, and multinational operations. This requires understanding other agencies’ capabilities and agendas as well as establishing measures for coordination and de-confliction.

TRANSITION TO EXECUTION

4-7. The Army has a time-proven process for planning: the military decision making process (MDMP). The MDMP produces a plan or order that provides the initial guide for actions during execution and control measures for regulating them. These measures include schemes of maneuver and fires; an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) plan; tasks to subordinate units; and various schemes of support. The most important control measures provide guidelines for exercising subordinates’ initiative. These are the commander’s intent, mission, and concept of operations.

4-8. Operations never unfold the way the planners envision them. Enemy actions, friendly mistakes, unforeseen environmental conditions, and many other factors conspire to disrupt the synchronized application of combat power envisioned in the order. The MDMP is not designed to address the many decisions necessary during execution. To fight as intended in the operational concept, Army forces require execution doctrine that facilitates flexibility. The rest of this chapter addresses this requirement.

CONCEPT OF EXECUTION

4-9. The Army’s operational concept envisions executing operations at a tempo enemies cannot match by acting or reacting faster than they can adapt. To achieve this type of flexibility, commanders use mission command to focus subordinate commanders’ initiative. Subordinates exercising initiative within the commander’s intent can significantly increase tempo; however they also may desynchronize the unit’s WFFs. This may reduce commanders’ ability to mass the effects of combat power. Even relatively minor, planned actions by command post (CP) cells affect other cells’ areas of expertise, affecting the operation’s overall synchronization.

4-10. Under mission command, commanders accept some risk in synchronization as the price of seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative. The commander’s intent and mission orders focus every level of the organization on executing the concept of operations. Collaborative synchronization—enabled and expected by mission command—uses subordinates’ initiative to achieve resynchronization continuously. Subordinates’ successes may offer opportunities within the concept or develop advantages that make a new concept practical. In either case, the commander’s intent keeps the force acceptably focused and synchro-
nized. Subordinates need not wait for top-down synchronization. Mission command is especially appropri-
ate for operations in which stability and reconstruction operations predominate. It allows subordinates to
exploit information about enemies, adversaries, events, and trends without direction from higher echelons.

4-11. During execution, the current operations cell strives to keep the WFFs synchronized and balanced
between subordinates’ initiative and synchronized activities as the situation changes. The current opera-
tions cell follows and provides its own level of collaborative synchronization. It considers the following
outcomes when making synchronization decisions or allowing others’ collaborative synchronization to
proceed:

- Combined arms integration.
- Responsiveness—both proactive and reactive.
- Timeliness.

This lets commanders mass the effects of combat power at decisive times and places.

VARIANCES

4-12. A variance is a difference between the actual situation during an operation and what the plan fore-
casted the situation would be at that time or event (FM 6-0). Staffs ensure information systems display
relevant information that allows them to identify variances. When a variance emerges, the commander and
staff evaluate it. If necessary, the staff updates its running estimates and recommends a course of action
(COA) to the commander, who directs the necessary action. There are two forms of variances: opportuni-
ties and threats.

Opportunities

4-13. The first form of variance is an opportunity to accomplish the mission more effectively. Opportuni-
ties result from forecasted or unexpected successes. When they recognize an opportunity, commanders al-
eter the order to exploit it if the change achieves the end state without incurring unacceptable risk. Exploit-
ing a forecasted opportunity usually involves executing a branch or sequel. When exploiting an
opportunity, the concept of operations may change, but the commander’s intent usually remains the same.

Threats

4-14. The second form of variance is a threat to mission accomplishment or survival of the force. When a
threat is recognized, the commander adjusts the order to eliminate the enemy advantage, restore the
friendly advantage, and regain the initiative. Not all threats to the force or mission involve hostile or neu-
tral persons. Disease, toxic hazards, and natural disasters are examples of other threats that may arise.

4-15. Victory in battle requires commanders to recognize and evaluate opportunities and threats—current
and projected—in time to direct effective actions that exploit or counter them. Commanders use their visu-
alization based on the common operational picture as their primary evaluation method. Staffs use their run-
ning estimates, derived from their understanding of the common operational picture, to evaluate the situa-
tion and provide recommendations.

TYPES OF DECISIONS

4-16. Current doctrine designates decisions made during execution as either execution decisions or ad-
justment decisions. Execution decisions involve COAs anticipated in the order. Adjustment decisions mod-
ify the order. (See figure 4-1, page 4-4, below.) The decision type establishes the decision authority. It may
also determine how the current operations cell participates.

Execution Decisions

4-17. Execution decisions implement a planned action under circumstances anticipated in the order. Staff
members or the chief of staff/executive officer make most execution decisions. In their most basic form,
exection decisions apply resources or implement activities as outlined in the order or within minor toler-
ances. For example, transitioning between phases and executing a branch or sequel are execution decisions. Commanders normally make decisions concerning branches and sequels.

**Figure 4-1. Decisions in execution**

4-18. Decisions made to support the plan within the execution activities are also execution decisions. Other execution decisions are made to maintain tactical coherence and synchronization, often through collaborative synchronization. Execution activities are routine occurrences designed to limit variances and prevent them from becoming a threat to success. These functions include those identified in chapter 3:

- Focus assets on the decisive operation.
- Adjust commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) based on the situation.
- Adjust control measures.
- Manage movement and positioning of supporting units.
- Adjust unit missions and tasks as necessary.
- Modify the concept of operations as required.
- Position or relocate committed, supporting, and reserve units.

**Adjustment Decisions**

4-19. Adjustment decisions modify the plan to respond to opportunities and threats. They often require completely resynchronizing the WFFs. Commanders make these decisions unless they explicitly delegate them. Adjustment decisions generally take one of three forms:

- Unanticipated resource or priority reallocation.
- Changing the concept of operations.
- Changing the mission.
4-20. After adjustment decisions have been made, commanders and staffs make execution decisions to re-
synchronize operations. They employ collaborative synchronization as much as possible. Perfect synchro-
nization in these situations cannot be attained; commanders do not expect it. Major combat operations and
operations in which stability and reconstruction operations predominate require collaborative synchroniza-
tion by subordinates—commanders and staffs—to maintain the synchronization necessary to accomplish
the mission.

RAPID DECISION MAKING AND SYNCHRONIZATION PROCESS

4-21. This section introduces the rapid decision making and synchronization process (RDSP). The RDSP
is a decision making and synchronization technique for commanders and staffs to use during execution.
While identified here with a specific name and methodology, the basic process is not new; it has always
been used by successful commanders.

4-22. The RDSP applies to both execution and adjustment decisions. Leaders can use it to complement the
focused COA and recognition decision techniques. (See FM 6-0, paragraphs 6-116–6-121.) The RDSP is
based on research in intuitive decision making. It helps leaders focus on executing rather than planning.
The RDSP facilitates continuously integrating and synchronizing the WFFs to address ever-changing situa-
tions. It meets the following criteria for making effective decisions during execution:

- It is comprehensive, integrating all WFFs. It is not stovepiped by WFF.
- It ensures all actions support the decisive operation by relating them to the commander’s intent
  and concept of operations.
- It allows rapid changes to the order.
- It is continuous, allowing commanders to react immediately to opportunities and threats.
- It accommodates but is not tied to cyclical processes, such as targeting.

4-23. The RDSP focuses on synchronizing actions and understanding relationships within staffs as well as
among commanders. It applies to all leaders. Although this discussion describes staff duties within the
RDSP, leaders can use it with or without a staff. It also applies in multinational and interagency environ-
ments.

4-24. One significant difference between the RDSP and the MDMP is that the RDSP is based on an exist-
ing order. Control measures in the order identify the commander’s priorities. The most important of these
control measures are the commander’s intent, concept of operations, and CCIRs. Leaders use these priori-
ties as criteria for making decisions.

4-25. A second difference between the RDSP and the MDMP is that the RDSP seeks an acceptable solu-
tion, while the MDMP seeks the optimal (most desirable) one. Using the RDSP lets leaders avoid the time-
consuming requirements of developing decision criteria and comparing COAs. METT-TC factors continu-
ously change during execution. This often makes COAs and decision criteria obsolete before leaders can
make a decision. Under the RDSP, leaders combine their experience and intuition with situational aware-
ness to quickly reach situational understanding. Based on this, they develop and refine workable COAs.
While these decisions may not have included explicit consideration of multiple COAs, they can be consid-
ered optimal. They may even improve the original concept of operations. In any event, the RDSP supports
timely decisions. Timeliness is essential to obtaining the speed of action needed to seize fleeting opportuni-
ties.

4-26. Implementing the RDSP requires three skills. First, leaders must be able to recognize when a vari-
ance requires an adjustment. Second, they must be able to visualize several possible COAs and quickly se-
lect an acceptable one. Third, they must know what actions are feasible in the time available. Developing
these leader skills requires training and experience.

4-27. The RDSP includes five steps. (See figure 4-2, page 4-6, below.) The first two may be performed in
any order, including concurrently. The last three are performed interactively until an acceptable COA is
identified.
Chapter 4

Figure 4-2. Rapid decision making and synchronization process

**COMPARE THE CURRENT SITUATION TO THE ORDER**

4-28. Leaders monitor the situation to identify variances. Staff members look for indicators of variances that affect their areas of expertise. (See table 4-1, below, for examples of indicators organized by WFF.) The commander, chief of staff, and CP cell chiefs look for indicators of variances that affect the overall operation. While these indicators may come from any source, they will often come from ISR efforts or reports from units executing the operation.

4-29. Staff members are particularly alert for answers to CCIRs; commanders need them to make execution decisions. They also watch for exceptional information. *Exceptional information* is information that would have answered one of the commander’s critical information requirements if the requirement for it had been foreseen and stated as one of the commander’s critical information requirements (FM 6-0). Exceptional information usually reveals a need for an adjustment decision.

**DETERMINE THAT A DECISION, AND WHAT TYPE, IS REQUIRED**

4-30. When a variance is identified, leaders quickly compare the current situation to the expected situation. This assessment accomplishes the following:

- Describes the variance.
- Determines if the variance provides a significant opportunity or threat.
- Determines if an adjustment decision is needed by identifying if the variance—
  - Directly threatens the decisive operation’s success.
  - Indicates an opportunity that can be exploited to accomplish the mission faster or with fewer resources.
  - Threatens a shaping operation such that it may threaten the decisive operation directly or in the near future.
  - Can be addressed within the commander’s intent and concept of operations. (If so, determine what execution decision is needed.)

4-31. For minor variances, leaders determine whether changes to control measures are needed. If so, they determine how those changes affect other WFFs. They direct changes within their authority (execution decisions) after coordinating with staff elements the changes affect.

4-32. If a decision exceeding their authority is required, staff members notify the decision authority according to the appropriate procedure. That leader determines how much of the staff should be involved. If it does not require more than one or two CP cells, the action is directed to the appropriate cell chief. Otherwise, the leader assembles the appropriate cell chiefs and proceeds to the next step. When an adjustment decision is necessary, the leader contacts the commander for guidance.
Table 4-1. Examples of decision indicators by warfighting function

| **Intelligence** | • Identification of enemy main effort. |
|                 | • Identification of enemy reserves or counterattack. |
|                 | • Indications of unexpected enemy action or preparation. |
|                 | • Identification of an IR. |
|                 | • Insertion of manned surveillance teams. |
|                 | • UAS launch. |
|                 | • Identification of HPT/HVT. |
|                 | • Answer to a PIR. |
|                 | • Enemy electronic attack use. |
|                 | • Enemy rotary-wing or UAS use. |
|                 | • Identification of threats from within civilian population. |
| **Movement and Maneuver** | • Success or failure of a subordinate unit task. |
|                  | • Success or failure in breaching operations. |
|                  | • Capture of significant numbers of EPWs, enemy CPs, supply points, or artillery units. |
|                  | • Modification of an ACM. |
|                  | • Answer to an FFIR. |
|                  | • Numbers of refugees sufficient to affect friendly operations. |
|                  | • Damages to civilian infrastructure affecting friendly mobility. |
| **Fires** | • Receipt of an air tasking order. |
|             | • Battle damage assessment results. |
|             | • Unplanned repositioning of firing units. |
|             | • Success or lack thereof in offensive information operations. |
|             | • Identification of an IR. |
|             | • Execution of planned fires. |
|             | • Modification of a FSCM. |
|             | • Effective enemy counterfire. |
|             | • Identification of HPT/HVT. |
| **Sustainment** | • Significant loss of capability in any class of supply. |
|                | • Identification of significant incidences of disease and nonbattle injury casualties. |
|                | • Mass casualties. |
|                | • Receipt of significant resupply. |
|                | • Contact on a supply route. |
|                | • Civilian mass casualty event beyond capability of HN resources. |
|                | • Identification of significant shortage in any class of supply. |
|                | • Aeromedical evacuation launch. |
|                | • Answer to an FFIR. |
|                | • Changes in availability of HN support. |
| **Protection** | • NBC 1 report or other indicators of enemy CBRNE use. |
|                | • Report or other indicators of enemy improvised explosive device use. |
|                | • Indicators of coordinated enemy actions against friendly forces. |
|                | • Identification of threat to base or sustainment facilities. |
|                | • Identification of threats to communications or computer systems. |
|                | • Reports of enemy targeting critical HN infrastructure. |
|                | • Increased criminal activity in a given sector. |
| **Command and Control** | • Answer to a CCIR. |
|                  | • Identification of an IR. |
|                  | • Loss of contact with a CP or commander. |
|                  | • Jamming. |
|                  | • Receipt of a fragmentary order or warning order from higher headquarters. |

4-33. Staff members constantly compare the current situation to their expectations to identify variances. Likewise, as the time for an anticipated execution decision approaches, staff members assess the situation in their area of expertise. Doing this allows them to confirm that the decision will produce the planned effects. It “jump-starts” the RSDP, essentially bypassing recognition and allowing the staff to discover small changes in conditions that might otherwise go unnoticed.
**DEVELOP A RESPONSE**

4-34. If the variance requires an adjustment, the leader and affected CP cell chiefs begin developing COAs. They use the following control measures from the order to screen possible COAs:

- Mission.
- Commander’s intent.
- Concept of operations, especially the decisive operation.
- CCIRs.

4-35. The COAs must not violate the commander’s intent. They may alter the concept of operations and CCIRs if the change remains within the intent. However, the commander must approve CCIR changes.

4-36. Functional cell chiefs and other staff section leaders identify areas that may be affected within their area of expertise by proposed changes to the order. Considerations include but are not limited to those shown in table 4-2 (below).

4-37. Commanders have two options for an adjustment decision: make the decision personally or delegate it. In general, commanders should focus on decisions only they must or can make and delegate the rest.

4-38. If time is available, commanders normally direct the plans or future operations cells to develop a new COA, using the MDMP. They may also direct the current operations cell to issue a fragmentary order setting conditions for executing the new COA. When time is not sufficient to perform the MDMP, commanders make an immediate adjustment decision—using intuitive decision making—in the form of a focused COA. (See FM 6-0, paragraph 6-118.) Developing the focused COA often proceeds from mental wargaming commanders perform until they reach an acceptable COA.

**REFINE AND VALIDATE THE COA**

4-39. Once the commander has described the COA, the current operations cell analyzes it. It validates the COA for suitability, feasibility, and acceptability. If it finds something rendering the COA unacceptable, the G-3/S-3 informs the commander. If the COA is acceptable, it is refined to resynchronize the WFFs enough to generate the needed combat power.

4-40. The validation and refinement is done very quickly. In many cases, the G-3/S-3 conducts a mental simulation. The G-3/S-3 considers potential enemy reactions, the unit’s counteractions, and secondary effects that might affect the force’s synchronization. When time allows, the G-3/S-3 assembles CP cell chiefs and performs this refinement and validation in an open forum. Staff members consider the following:

- Does this action affect my area of expertise?
  - Does it require changing my information requirements?
  - Are any of my information requirements CCIRs?
  - What actions within my area of expertise does this change require?
  - Will it require changing objectives or targets nominated by the staff section?
- What other CP cells and elements does this action affect?
- What are potential enemy reactions?
- What are the possible friendly counteractions?
  - Does this counteraction affect my area of expertise?
  - Will it require changing my information requirements?
  - Are any of my information requirements CCIRs?
  - What actions within my area of expertise does this counteraction require?
  - Will it require changing objectives or targets nominated by the staff section?
  - What other CP cells and elements does this counteraction affect?
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<td>• Assigning new tasks to subordinate units.</td>
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<td>• Adjusting terrain management.</td>
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<td>• Modifying the intelligence synchronization plan.</td>
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<td>• Modifying the high-payoff target list and attack guidance matrix.</td>
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<td>• Delivering fires against targets or target sets.</td>
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<td>• Modifying radar zones.</td>
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<td>• Modifying priorities.</td>
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<td>• Synchronizing and adjusting information operations (IO) to support the new decision.</td>
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<td>• Modifying IO priorities.</td>
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<td>• Modifying and submitting IO target recommendations to the targeting process.</td>
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<td><strong>G-9/S-9</strong></td>
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<td>• Revising advice to commanders on military effects of operations on civilians to reflect new operations decisions.</td>
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<td>• Recommending modifications of civil-military operations (CMO), including employment of civil affairs and other units to perform CMO tasks.</td>
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<td>• Revising recommended protected targets to fire support coordinator.</td>
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<td>• Identifying and adjusting use of host nation and other resources available from civil authorities.</td>
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4-41. The validation and refinement show if the COA will acceptably resolve the situation. If it does not, the G-3/S-3 modifies it through additional analysis or develops a new COA. The G-3/S-3 informs the commander of any changes made to develop an acceptable solution.

**Implement**

4-42. When the COA is acceptable, the G-3/S-3 implements it if delegated that authority (most execution decisions) or recommends approval to the commander (for all other decisions). The staff then implements the decision. The most important staff actions are resynchronizing the WFFs and disseminating changes to control measures.

**Collaborative Synchronization**

4-43. After the analysis is complete, CP cell chiefs update decision support templates and synchronization matrices. When time is available, the G-3/S-3 continues this analysis through to the end of the operation to complete combat power integration. Staff members begin synchronization needed to implement the decision. This synchronization involves collaboration with other CP cells and subordinate staffs. Staff members determine how actions in their areas of expertise affect others. They coordinate those actions to eliminate undesired effects that might cause friction. This collaborative synchronization requires staff members to exercise subordinates’ initiative. Situational understanding for staff members includes being able to visualize how actions in their area of expertise affect other areas and what is required to synchronize them.

4-44. Collaborative synchronization also occurs among commanders. Commanders establish relations with higher, adjacent, and subordinate commanders. These relationships and networked information systems lead to collaboration. They enhance the effectiveness of eavesdropping and cross-talk over command channels during execution.

4-45. The commander’s intent, planning guidance, and CCIRs guide subordinates—staff and subordinate commanders—in synchronizing operations. They are also essential to achieving collaborative synchronization. Collaborative synchronization occurs without direction from higher headquarters or commanders. It requires subordinates to inform other affected staff sections or commanders of their decisions and actions. It also requires monitoring their counterparts’ decisions for implications that affect their areas of expertise. Doing this allows subordinates to resynchronize their activities with their counterparts’. This exercise of subordinates’ initiative results in collaborative synchronization of the force.

4-46. Leaders aim to achieve the minimum synchronization needed to generate enough combat power to implement the decision while preserving flexibility. Spending too much time synchronizing results in too slow a response, less flexibility in execution, and lost opportunities. Deciding how much synchronization is enough requires an accurate situational understanding by commanders and subordinates. It requires applying experience gained through training to situational awareness and the courage to act amid uncertainty.

**Control Measures**

4-47. Once the commander decides on a COA, the current operations cell issues a fragmentary order directing implementing actions. It may be written or verbal. Common revisions to control measures needed to effect adjustments include the following:

- Updated enemy situation, including the situational template.
- Revised CCIRs.
- Updated ISR execution (retask assets).
- Updated scheme of maneuver and tasks to maneuver units, including an execution matrix and decision support matrix/template.
- Updated scheme of fires, including the fire support execution matrix, high-payoff target list, and attack guidance matrix.
- Updated civil-military operations tasks.
4-48. If the decision does not affect the overall operation, this directive may be released by a CP cell chief as an update (after coordination). Updates address such areas as—

- Delivery on of fires targets or target sets.
- Modification of radar zones.
- Updates to information requirements.
- Modifications of air defense weapons control status.

4-49. If time permits, leaders verify that subordinates understand critical tasks. Methods for doing this include the confirmation brief and backbrief. (See FM 6-0, paragraphs F-7 and F-8.) This is done both between commanders and within staff elements to ensure mutual understanding.

Cautions

4-50. Leaders consider the following when using the RDSP.

4-51. Validating and refining actions is normally not a formal process but an intuitive one. (When available, automated decision support tools can help refine the decision). It should be done quickly and not drawn out. The focus is on speed to maintain the tempo and minimum necessary synchronization. The RDSP is not designed to mass maximum combat power but to make the minimum coordination needed to generate enough combat power to prevail.

4-52. Most decisions during execution are made at a relatively low level by CP cell chiefs. They refine execution of the order; they do not change it significantly. However, even small changes can affect other staff sections. Given time, any changes should be coordinated in open forum. When time does not allow this, the staff element making the change advises all affected elements immediately.

4-53. Maximizing combat power requires avoiding unneeded actions. During execution, it is essential to keep decision support tools current. Delete targets from target lists and CCIRs and priority intelligence requirements from the ISR plan when they no longer affect the operation. This frees assets for other priorities. All staff members continually monitor targets they nominated and information requirements they submitted. When these no longer are needed, requesters act to delete them.

4-54. Follow the principle of economy of force in all cases. When reallocating resources or priorities, assign only minimum essential assets to shaping operations. Use all other assets weight the decisive operation. This principle applies when allocating resources for the overall operation or within a WFF. It pertains to ISR assets, combat power, and sustainment.

4-55. Execution is multilayered. The answer to a CCIR or priority intelligence requirement may result in a new target or objective. If so, the current operations cell evaluates the target or objective to determine its relative importance. A priority needs to be assigned to it and resources allocated based on that priority. Base the priority on the contributions of the target or objective to the concept of operations, especially the decisive operation. If it is a higher priority than existing targets or objectives, reallocate assets to attack it. This may require reallocating ISR assets to develop the information needed for the attack.

4-56. Conversely, attack of a newly identified target may require diverting assets from other targets. If an attack is unsuccessful, it may require reallocation of combat power for reattack. It may also require tasking ISR assets to determine the extent of failure and develop the information for a successful reattack. If an attack is successful, it may render collection against or attack of other targets unnecessary. For example, enemy counterfire radars may be rendered useless if the firing units they support are destroyed. This might change the requirement to attack such radars or collect against them.

4-57. For the RDSP to work, it must be done continuously, not tied to cyclical events or the battle rhythm. Cyclical events (such as targeting working groups) can be used to review an entire process or evaluate the entire ISR or targeting plan; however, the RDSP cannot be tied to them or it loses its effectiveness. The key is to be able to act and react in real time as events occur, not at predetermined points. Only in this way can Army forces operate within the enemies’ decision cycles at a tempo they cannot match.
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Chapter 5
Assessment

Assessment is integral to the operations process. It enables commanders and staffs to effectively plan, prepare, and execute operations. This chapter expands on assessment doctrine in FM 6-0. It describes the use and role of assessment during each operations process activity. It discusses assessment tools and techniques, including how to develop and use measures of effectiveness and performance to evaluate progress.

CONCEPT OF ASSESSMENT

5-1. Assessment is the continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation. (This definition replaces the one prescribed in FM 3-0.) It involves deliberately comparing forecasted outcomes to actual events to determine the overall effectiveness of force employment. Commanders and staffs base assessment on their situational understanding. They achieve and maintain situational understanding to identify opportunities for more effective mission accomplishment, threats to the force, and gaps in information.

5-2. Many aspects of military operations are quantifiable. Examples include movement rates, fuel consumption, and weapons effects. While not easy, assessing physical aspects of operations can be straightforward. However, the dynamic interactions among friendly forces, adaptable enemies, and populations make assessing many aspects of operations difficult. This is especially true of operations in which stability and reconstruction operations predominate. For example, assessing the results of planned actions to change human behavior is very challenging. In these instances, assessment relies on understanding trends and indicators over time to make judgments concerning the success of given actions.

5-3. Assessment is conducted at all echelons and levels of war. It is essential to the successful conduct of operations. It is continuous throughout planning, preparation, and execution. Assessment precedes, accompanies, and follows all operations. It helps commanders determine whether executed missions and tasks are creating the desired results (effects) envisioned by the commander and expressed in the order. Put simply, assessment helps commanders determine what is and is not working. It provides insight into how to do things better.

5-4. Commanders drive assessment at all echelons. Some commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs) support assessment. Commanders establish CCIRs that help them determine whether specific decisions are succeeding or if they must adjust the operation. Sources of information for assessment include liaison personnel, reconnaissance units, intelligence analysts, and other staff specialists. The G-2/S-2 and G-9/S-9 are especially important in assessing civil-military operations and stability and reconstruction operations.

5-5. As a rule, the higher the echelon, the more formal the assessment process. For example, a joint task force headquarters may have a dedicated assessment command post cell, formalized assessment plan, and structured assessment progress, including assessment working groups and boards. Assessment at battalion level is usually less formal, often relying on the judgment of commanders and staff officers. (FM 6-0, paragraphs 2-13–2-18 and 2-76–2-106, discusses judgment and intuition.)

5-6. Understanding the contributions and effects of other elements of the joint force is essential to assessment. This is true today at lower levels than previously because of greater mobility, longer weapons and sensor ranges, and larger areas of operations. Many nonmilitary agencies—governmental and nongovernmental—prepare their own assessments, especially in stability and reconstruction operations. Some of these assessments can contribute to the commander’s assessment of the operation’s success. The U.S.
Agency for International Development and the country team can help commanders understand issues concerning the various agency assessments.

5-7. Situational understanding during planning forms the basis for the initial commander’s visualization. Commanders understand the general situation before planning begins; receiving a mission focuses their attention on a specific purpose. During preparation and execution, an accurate situational understanding allows commanders to assess the operation’s progress, continuously update their visualization, and make rational decisions. Keeping CCIRs current focuses efforts to gather information commanders need to make expected decisions. Throughout an operation, intelligence provides products that contribute to the situational awareness and situational understanding needed for assessment and decision making.

5-8. Assessing consists of two tasks:

- Monitoring the current situation and operation’s progress.
- Evaluating operations against measures of effectiveness and measures of performance.

Based on their assessment, commanders adjust the order to accomplish the mission more effectively. Subordinate commanders assess their unit’s progress by comparing it with their mission and higher commander’s intent (one and two levels up). They adjust their actions as required.

**MONITORING**

5-9. *Monitoring* is continuous observation of the current situation to identify opportunities for the force, threats to the force, gaps in information, and progress according to the plan or order. (This definition replaces the one prescribed in FM 3-0.) Monitoring is the foundation of situational awareness, which leads to situational understanding. During planning, commanders and staffs focus their monitoring on the facts and assumptions that underlie the plan. They monitor these to ensure they remain valid and to identify new ones that will affect the plan. During preparation and execution, commanders and staffs continue to validate facts and assumptions but focus their monitoring on the current situation, identifying variances and gaps in relevant information.

5-10. At lower levels, reports required by standing operating procedures are often adequate for monitoring. Sometimes simple reports or communications through liaison teams are enough. However, the complexities of operations at higher echelons require a monitoring plan. The monitoring plan assigns responsibility for monitoring specific actions.

**EVALUATION**

5-11. *Evaluate* is to compare relevant information on the situation or operation against criteria to judge success or progress. (This definition replaces the one prescribed in FM 6-0.) Evaluation allows commanders to identify variances, confirm or invalidate assumptions, and forecast trends. It uses the common operational picture (COP) to measure, analyze, and report the performance of forces against criteria commanders establish. Staff sections and command post cells incorporate assessments based on evaluations into their running estimates. They use these to make adjustments within their delegated authority or present recommendations to the commander. Commanders consider these recommendations, make a decision, and direct actions.

5-12. Commanders and staffs continuously evaluate the current and projected situations to identify decisions needed to accomplish the mission or better achieve the commander’s intent. One aid to evaluation is the following list of questions. These questions may also serve as a basis for designating or revising the CCIRs or identifying relevant information for running estimates. However, they must be converted to address the specific situation before they suffice for CCIRs. Many answers to these questions can serve as a way to assess an operation’s success:

- Can the force achieve the commander’s intent?
- Where is the enemy? Doing what? How?
- Where are friendly forces? Doing what? How?
- What is the enemy force’s posture now? What will it be at the time being considered (for example, an anticipated decision time)?
Assessment

- Where will the friendly force be at the time being considered?
- What are the enemy force’s problems? How can the force exploit them?
- What are friendly force’s problems? How can they be corrected?
- What are the enemy force’s opportunities? How can the force deny them?
- What are friendly force opportunities? How can they be exploited?
- Are any changes needed to the concept of operations? Task organization? Mission?
- What is the disposition of the local populace? What impact do they have on the operation? What impact does the operation have on them?

By evaluating the answers to questions such as these, commanders and staffs can determine variances and their significance.

Assessment in Planning

5-13. During planning, staffs achieve situational understanding based on the mission analysis and the COP. From this, they develop and evaluate courses of action (COAs), and identify opportunities, threats, and information gaps. Assessing includes establishing initial measures of effectiveness and performance to evaluate COAs. (See paragraphs 5-23–5-36.) Commanders and staff develop these criteria during the COA analysis and use them for COA comparison. They then use these criteria for evaluating during preparation and execution. Intelligence preparation of the battlefield is a key tool for assessing the enemy situation, environment, and civil considerations. It begins during planning and continues during all operations process activities. Running estimates also begin during planning and are key tools for all staff sections.

5-14. Operation orders include provisions for assessment. At minimum, paragraph 5 should include where the commander, deputy commanders, and key staff officers will be positioned during the operation. (See figure 2-5, page 2-17, above.) One useful assessment technique is the “directed telescope.” (See FM 6-0, paragraphs 3-102–3-105.)

5-15. The plan for assessment is particularly important during early deployment stages and initial operations. An expeditionary force—with its fast arrival, early employment, and varying task organization—requires particularly accurate means of assessing its own and the enemy’s situations. That means assessment measures and collection means have to be understood early and in place when deployment starts.

5-16. A formal assessment plan may be included in the coordinating instructions of the basic order. If it is complex, a full annex may be needed. Operations complex enough to require a formal, written assessment plan usually occur at higher echelons. However, in longer-term operations, lower echelons may require a formal assessment plan. Synchronization matrices and decision support templates provide starting points for developing assessment plans. They show key events and outcomes to assess. The end state in the commander’s intent and the conditions defining success in it also contain aspects of the operation to assess.

Assessment in Preparation

5-17. Assessing during preparation focuses on determining changes in the friendly force’s readiness to execute the operation. It also considers changes to the situation that the plan or order was based on. Commanders continue to receive information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations. Staff sections integrate new information into their running estimates and assess its effects against the order. This allows them to understand the factors of METT-TC in relation to each other (and not in isolation) and their impact on achieving the end state. They compare the actual information against expectations to determine variances and their significance. Assessing during preparation includes confirming or invalidating assumptions made during planning and any threats or opportunities that might require the commander to adjust the order. Continuously updating running estimates facilitates an accurate situational understanding and predictive analysis. These estimates contribute to revising and refining the plan and issuing new orders to modify subordinates’ tasks if necessary.
Chapter 5

ASSESSMENT IN EXECUTION

5-18. During execution, assessment involves a deliberate comparison of forecasted outcomes to the current situation using criteria to judge progress toward the end state. Assessing during execution focuses on identifying variances and their nature and magnitude. Significant variances prompt adjustments. During execution, running estimates continue to assess the current situation against possible future operations and the end state.

5-19. Commanders use their situational understanding to assess the operation. The most important question when assessing during execution is whether the order is still valid and the force will achieve the end state. Assessment in execution emphasizes identifying opportunities and threats. Once identified, commanders exploit the opportunities and solve or mitigate the problems that the threats create. Commanders make execution decisions if the plan is still valid. They make adjustment decisions if the situation requires altering the plan. Altering the plan requires enough resynchronization to effectively apply combat power while affording maximum flexibility to subordinates. As commanders develop an assessment, they describe their conclusions to their staffs and subordinates. After commanders make a decision, staffs transmit the necessary orders. When necessary, it adjusts the order—to include adjusting the measures of effectiveness and performance if required. The focus then returns to executing and assessing.

ASSESSMENT CONSIDERATIONS

5-20. Assessing may be formal or less formal based on the situation. Quarterly training briefings and unit status reports, for example, are formal assessments. In fast-paced operations, however, a formal assessment process may not be possible. Commanders may rely on the COP, personal observations, and periodic operational and assessment briefings from the staff and subordinate commanders as their assessment mechanisms.

5-21. Commanders balance time and staff resources allocated for assessing against other requirements just as they do for other operations process activities. To help balance the time and staff resources devoted to assessment, commanders and staffs address the following questions:

- What will be assessed and to what detail?
- How will a particular task, activity, or effect be assessed? What criteria will be used?
- Who in the staff has primarily responsibility for assessing a particular area?
- What information requirements are needed to support a particular assessment?

Example. In stability and reconstruction operations, a brigade combat team may have an area of operations with several large towns damaged by combat operations. The commander tasks subordinate commanders to restore essential services to those towns and provides them the needed resources. This task may take months and require the higher commander to continuously assess its progress.

In this example, a common construct describing “essential services” must be developed and understood throughout the command. This construct would focus the efforts of subordinate commanders and the assessment efforts. A report providing the information necessary to assess progress in restoring essential services should be developed. In addition, a principal staff officer should be designated to collect this information and provide a comprehensive assessment to the commander.

5-22. Commanders must be careful, however, not to overassess. Staffs can easily become bogged down developing formal assessment procedures for numerous tasks and effects. They might smother subordinate commanders and staffs with requirements for numerous reports, questions, and information requirements. Often, standard reports, returns, and updates by commanders are sufficient. The chief of staff/executive officer helps the commander achieve the right balance.
MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS AND MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE

5-23. To support assessment, commanders and staff develop measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs). Not all criteria can be reduced to MOEs or MOPs. Commanders should not use MOEs or MOPs when they are inappropriate. In those exceptional cases, commanders should develop criteria that fit the situation.

5-24. A measure of effectiveness is a criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. MOEs focus on the results or consequences of friendly actions taken. They answer the question, Is the force doing the right things, or are additional or alternative actions required? Often an effect cannot be measured directly. If direct measurement is not possible, then indicators of achieving the effect are measured. Staffs then apply analysis and judgment to develop conclusions about achieving the effect. Measuring indirectly requires great care in selecting and measuring indicators.

5-25. A measure of performance is a criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. MOPs answer the question, Was the task or action performed as the commander intended? MOPs confirm or deny that the task has been correctly performed.

5-26. MOEs and MOPs give commanders and staffs a basis to evaluate the contributions military efforts make toward achieving the end state. They are indicators used collectively to identify trends that can affect future actions, influence decisions, identify transitions, and determine termination points. MOEs and MOPs help commanders determine when all or part of the mission has been accomplished, permitting reallocation of resources. The criteria used depend on the situation. They often require readjustment as the situation changes and objectives evolve.

5-27. At lower levels, it may be impractical to use of a large number of MOEs and MOPs. The level of detail depends on the operation’s nature and headquarters’ staffing level. In stability and reconstruction operations, limited use of MOEs and MOPs may be possible down to battalion level. In general, units without a staff cannot perform assessments to such a level of detail. Consequently, higher echelon staffs ensure that their numerous MOEs and MOPs do not overly burden lower echelons—especially battalion and below.

5-28. When crafting MOEs and MOPs ensure they have the following characteristics:

- Measurable.
- Discrete.
- Relevant.
- Responsive.

MEASURABLE

5-29. MOEs and MOPs require quantitative or qualitative standards that can be used to measure them. Quantitative measures are generally preferable, as they are usually more objective than qualitative measures. When qualitative measures are required, clear measurement criteria must be established and disseminated to prevent misinterpretation and useless information.

DISCRETE

5-30. Although forces can measure any given task or desired impact with multiple MOEs and MOPs, care is required to ensure that each criterion measures a distinct aspect of the operation. This eliminates redundant efforts. Excessive numbers of MOEs and MOPs become unmanageable. At that point, the cost of collection efforts outweighs the value of assessing.
RELEVANT

5-31. MOEs and MOPs must be relevant to measured task’s outcome. Developing relevant MOPs is usually fairly simple. Relevant MOEs are more difficult. The key is visualizing the desired result or outcome and identifying the most accurate and simplest indicator of it.

RESPONSIVE

5-32. MOEs and MOPs must detect situation changes quickly enough for commanders to respond immediately and effectively.

5-33. A measure is a data point that depicts the degree to which an entity possesses an attribute. This degree is expressed by a unit of measure. Although measures are informative, commanders and staffs are most interested in patterns and trends. Once two or more measures are taken, they can be plotted to determine patterns and trends. These reveal whether an attribute is more or less prevalent at different times. Commanders and staffs also develop a standard or baseline against which they compare measures and trends. Once established, this baseline remains a fixed reference point. From this information and analysis of why a trend is up or down, staffs can identify trouble spots and plan operations to reverse negative trends. They can also capitalize on positive trends by determining what is causing the positive increase and apply those tactics, techniques, and procedures more broadly.

5-34. The following examples illustrate the difference between MOEs and MOPs.

Example 1. Assume a unit supporting disaster relief is tasked to establish a refugee camp (task) in order to provide shelter to displaced civilians (purpose).

An example of an MOP for this refugee camp would be the number of tents erected. This measures the level of task accomplishment.

An example of an MOE for this refugee camp would be the number of people within supporting distance of the refugee camp without shelter. This measures the desired result of establishing the refugee camp. The baseline for this MOE would be the number of people without shelter before the disaster. This provides a natural-state standard against which the unit can measure their results. Tracked over time, these measures produce trends that the unit can focus their efforts around until they reach the baseline.

Notice that MOPs generally measure performance of the task while MOEs generally measure accomplishment of the purpose.

Example 2. Assume a fire brigade is given the task, Neutralize enemy force 1 vicinity Objective Alpha (task) to enable 1st Brigade Combat Team’s unimpeded movement along Route X (purpose).

MOPs for this task would include the number and type of rounds fired, when they were fired, and where they hit.

An MOE for this task would be, Is enemy force 1 able to impede 1st Brigade Combat Team’s movement along Route X?

Again, the MOPs generally relate to accomplishing the task and MOEs generally relate to accomplishing the purpose.

5-35. Commanders and staffs should exercise caution and judgment when using numerical and statistical indicators. These indicators may vary widely in interpretation. They may be valid only for a specific time, place, or group of people. They may not have a direct correlation to effectiveness. MOEs and quantitative MOPs may not capture qualitative changes.

5-36. MOEs and MOPs may be placed in the coordinating instructions subparagraph of operation order paragraph 3. If the discussion is too long, they may be placed in an annex. Usually, this annex includes the assessment plan. In stability and reconstruction operations, assessing focuses on the state of civil security and civil control (including governance) and the state of essential services for the civilian population.
Appendix A

Considerations for Stability and Reconstruction Operations and Civil Support Operations

This appendix addresses considerations for stability and reconstruction and civil support operations within the context of full spectrum operations. It discusses the nature of simultaneity and the complementary effects of each of the major types of operations. The appendix expands the doctrinal discussion of transitions and links operational art and executing transitions. Finally, this appendix discusses using lines of operations to support planning considerations for stability and reconstruction and civil support operations during operational design.

INTRODUCTION

A-1. Contemporary operations require a force able to simultaneously conduct purposeful combinations of the types of operations, shifting the emphasis of the predominant type as necessary. In an unpredictable environment where the level of violence is subject to sudden, unexpected change, Army forces must retain the capability to maneuver against and destroy enemies in close combat, seize and hold terrain, and control populations. Physical destruction of enemy forces is but a means to an end.

A-2. Breaking the will of the enemy does not necessarily end a campaign. Ultimately, Americans fight for a better peace. Security must be established, services restored, and the foundation for a lasting peace established. After major combat operations, Army forces continue to conduct full spectrum operations, with stability and reconstruction operations predominating. Forces with the inherent ability to rapidly transition between types of operations are ideally suited to conduct operations in today’s operational environment.

FULL SPECTRUM OPERATIONS

A-3. Full spectrum operations are characterized by the conduct of simultaneous combinations of the types of Army operations (offense, defense, and stability and reconstruction or civil support) across the spectrum of conflict (peace, crisis, and war). Stability and reconstruction operations are executed only outside the homeland, while civil support operations are conducted domestically. (See figure A-1, page A-2, below.)

A-4. Army forces employ landpower across the range of military operations. Effective employment of landpower relies upon the purposeful combination of the types of operations, integrated and synchronized through operational art and design, to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Simultaneity is a vital component to the joint effort to disrupt, dislocate, and destroy an enemy force. It is fundamental to Army operational doctrine. Campaigns normally consist of several overlapping major operations, each with a different emphasis and different weight of effort applied to each type of operation. Army forces plan, prepare, execute, and assess simultaneous and sequential combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction or civil support operations as part of an integrated joint force. Typically, one category of operations predominates and gives the operation or phase its overall character.

SIMULTANEITY IN OPERATIONS

A-5. Simultaneity is a key attribute of full spectrum operations. Full spectrum operations shatter the enemy’s coherence by seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative with speed, shock, surprise, depth, simultaneity, and endurance. Simultaneous operations distributed throughout the area of operations (AO) generate the swift and violent engagements that disrupt the enemy’s coherence and capitalize on Army
forces’ leadership, cohesion, and superior training. Continuous exploitation accelerates enemies’ deterioration and ultimately collapses their will. Major combat operations are characterized by Army forces executing dynamic combinations of offensive and defensive operations while simultaneously conducting stability and reconstruction operations. Full spectrum operations and their inherent simultaneity are vital to creating conditions for a lasting peace, preventing the civilian population from becoming disaffected, and providing for their essential needs.

**Figure A-1. Full spectrum operations**

A-6. Throughout operations, commanders constantly adapt. Combat operations entail simultaneous and continuous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction operations. Commanders adjust their individual command and control systems, change force composition, and balance the emphasis placed on offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction or civil support tasks.

A-7. Simultaneity within full spectrum operations also creates complementary operational effects. For example, the ability of Army forces to attack and destroy enemy forces supports the efforts of forces engaged in stability and reconstruction operations by deterring potential threats. Conversely, effective stability and reconstruction operations influence civilians in the AO not to join or support enemy efforts, reducing defensive and offensive requirements. Ultimately, the same capabilities that enhance the ability of forces to conduct simultaneous full spectrum operations enable those same forces to dominate in an environment characterized by the ambiguities and complexities present in stability and reconstruction or civil support operations.

A-8. The ability to conduct simultaneous combinations of offense, defense, and stability and reconstruction operations in campaigns outside the United States while supporting homeland security domestically is central to full spectrum operations. Based on the mission, commander’s intent, and planning guidance, one of the three types of operations predominates, but the potential to transition between them is never absent. Commanders shift the predominant type of operation based on the current situation, phase, and their assessments as they shape the environment and set the conditions to achieve the end state. The ability of commanders to simultaneously conduct different types of operations to accomplish the mission is fundamental to full spectrum operations.

**TYPES OF OPERATIONS**

A-9. Army forces conduct four types of operations: offense, defense, stability and reconstruction, and civil support. Full spectrum operations focus on seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative, a fundamental principle of the operational concept. Army forces conduct full spectrum operations outside the homeland by executing offensive, defensive, and stability and reconstruction operations as part of inte-
Considerations for Stability and Reconstruction Operations and Civil Support Operations

Incorporated joint, interagency, and multinational teams. Army forces within the United States and its territories conduct full spectrum operations by combining civil support, offensive, and defensive operations to support homeland security. These operations, whether executed domestically or abroad, occur concurrently. The types of operations are different, each with its own purpose and considerations. (See figure A-2, below.)

![Figure A-2. Purposes and considerations for the types of operations](image)

**Offensive and Defensive Operations**

A-10. *Offensive operations* carry the fight to enemies by closing with and destroying their forces, seizing territory and vital resources, and imposing the commander’s will on them. This active imposition of land-power makes the offense the decisive type of military operation, whether undertaken against irregular forces or the armed forces of a nation state. Additionally, the physical presence of land forces enhances stability and reconstruction operations through threat of offensive action in areas they occupy.

A-11. *Defensive operations* counter enemy offensive operations. They defeat attacks, destroying as many attackers as necessary. The defense preserves physical dominance over land, resources, and populations. Defensive operations retain terrain and protect populations and key resources. The defense buys time and economizes forces to allow the conduct of offensive operations elsewhere. Defensive operations alone normally cannot achieve a decision. Their purpose is to create conditions for counteroffensive operations that regain the initiative or establish the conditions for unimpeded stability and reconstruction operations.
Stability and Reconstruction Operations

A-12. Stability and reconstruction operations establish, retain, and exploit security and control over areas, populations, and resources in order to employ military capabilities to restore essential services and facilitate the reestablishment of civil order and authority. Stability and reconstruction operations involve both coercive and cooperative actions. They occur before, during, and after offensive and defensive operations. Stability and reconstruction operations are conducted in situations in which a legitimate civil authority is unable to provide the necessary security and control for the local population. This situation usually results from—

- Offensive and defensive actions within an AO.
- Regime change through U.S. military action.
- Support to one or more states in which the legitimate civil authority has been rendered ineffective through war or natural disaster.
- An international request to assist a failed state.

A-13. By providing security and control to stabilize the environment, stability and reconstruction operations provide an effective foundation for gradually transitioning control to the other instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, and economic. Once this transition is successfully completed, operational focus for each of the instruments of national power is on transferring regional control to a legitimate civil authority in accordance with the desired national end state.

A-14. As an integral component of full spectrum operations, stability and reconstruction operations may complement offensive and defensive operations, or they may be the decisive operation within a phase of a campaign or major combat operation. During hostilities, stability and reconstruction operations help prevent armed conflict from spreading while securing the support of local populations in unstable areas. Forces engaged in an operation where stability and reconstruction predominates may have to conduct offensive and defensive operations to defend themselves or destroy forces seeking to undermine the effectiveness or credibility of the stability and reconstruction mission. Following hostilities, forces may conduct stability and reconstruction operations to provide a secure environment for civil authorities as they work to achieve reconciliation, rebuild lost infrastructure, and resume vital services.

A-15. Stability and reconstruction operations promote and protect U.S. national interests by influencing the diplomatic, informational, military, and, economic dimensions of the operational environment through a combination of peacetime developmental, cooperative activities and coercive actions in response to crisis. Regional security is supported by a balanced approach that enhances regional stability and economic prosperity.

A-16. As populated areas are cleared of hostile forces during offensive operations, a portion of the force secures urban areas and critical infrastructure, defeats bypassed force remnants and unconventional elements, and eventually returns territory to the control of civil authorities. Above all else, effective stability and reconstruction operations focus on the essential needs of the populace. This produces an essential secondary effect of preventing the populace from becoming disillusioned and offering support and sanctuary to enemy forces. Properly focused and effective stability and reconstruction operations prevent urban population centers from evolving into fertile recruiting areas for insurgencies, opposition movements, and civil unrest.

A-17. During the conduct of stability and reconstruction operations, Army forces retain the ability to resume offensive or defensive operations. Future campaigns may place greater emphasis on the dynamic interaction among the types of operations, particularly as rapid, decisive offensive operations create the conditions for protracted stability and reconstruction operations.

Civil Support Operations

A-18. Army forces support homeland security within the United States and its territories. Homeland security provides the Nation strategic flexibility by protecting its citizens and infrastructure from conventional and unconventional threats. It has two components. The first is homeland defense. If the United States comes under direct attack or is threatened by hostile armed forces, Army forces under joint command con-
duct offensive and defensive missions to defend the homeland. The other is civil support, which constitutes
the fourth type of Army operation.

A-19. Civil support operations address the consequences of manmade or natural accidents and incidents
beyond the capabilities of civil authorities. Fundamental to employing military forces in civil support opera-
tions is recognizing that civil authorities have the primary authority and responsibility for domestic opera-
tions. Within the United States, military operations are limited by law. When authorized, Army forces
conduct civil support operations, providing Army resources, expertise, and capabilities in support of the
lead agency. This expertise and capability is limited to supporting civil authorities and law enforcement
agencies, and preventing civil disturbance.

A-20. Defensive capabilities are employed in such homeland security missions as protecting key infra-
structure during a crisis. The ability to conduct offensive operations, though largely maintained only as a po-
tential capability, is present nonetheless. That potential, simultaneously employed with defensive and civil
support operations, complements the execution of domestic support tasks. Similarly, effective and efficient
civil support operations reduce the need to conduct offensive or defensive operations to quell civil unrest
or protect infrastructure. Discipline, endurance, and unit cohesion developed during training prepare Sol-
diers and units to deal effectively with the ambiguities and complexities of executing stability and recon-
struction or civil support operations.

A-21. The guiding principle of full spectrum operations is a recognition that the ultimate purpose of mili-
tary operations is to create an environment where peaceful processes dominate. However, the complex na-
ture of the operational environment requires commanders to conduct operations across the spectrum of
conflict. To meet this requirement, the Army provides forces with balanced capabilities and capacities, yet
retains the ability to conduct major combat operations while simultaneously executing day-to-day smaller-
scale contingencies.

**TRANSITIONS**

A-22. Transitions mark the intervals between ongoing operations and execution of branches and sequels.
Transitions also mark the change in predominance between types of operations, such as from offensive to
stability and reconstruction. Transitions are significant sources of operational tension, as forces must adapt
to changes in mission, situation, and the environment. Transitions between types of operations may be the
most difficult to anticipate, plan, prepare for, and execute.

A-23. Addressed early in planning, transitions represent a major consideration during course of action de-
velopment. During execution, transitions may create unexpected opportunities for Army forces, enemies,
or adversaries. Such opportunities must be recognized quickly and acted upon immediately. Typically, the
command structure evolves to meet changing situations, but transition planning must also account for
changes in mission focus and staff organization. Commanders must remain flexible to changes in the situa-
tion and environment, adjusting the composition and mission focus of deployed forces as necessary.

A-24. When the predominant type of operation changes from offense to stability and reconstruction, the
types of units initially deployed may not be ideally suited for the associated tasks. These forces have been
tailored for combat operations. As emphasis shifts from offensive to stability and reconstruction operations,
commanders task-organize existing forces to meet the requirements and constraints of the environment. At
the conclusion of a campaign, the deployed force—tailored for stability and reconstruction operations—
may only superficially resemble the force that initiated operations.

A-25. Figure A-3 (page A-6, below) illustrates this common dilemma. During the course of a campaign, a
force optimized for operations must transition from major combat operations to operations predominated
by stability and reconstruction tasks. While the force is flexible enough to adapt to the evolving nature of
the tasks involved in the transition, it remains one designed primarily for combat operations. During this
transition, some forces optimized for offensive operations must shift missions and execute stability and re-
construction operations, although they are neither designed nor optimized for them. Drawing on experi-
ence, judgment, and intuition, commanders must task-organize their forces appropriately to transition be-
tween phases of the campaign, yet retain the capability to conduct full spectrum operations. Mastery of the
operational art is required to accomplish this.
Appendix A

A-26. Similar to this type of transition is the transfer of authority between a force conducting a stability and reconstruction operation and another instrument of national power or a legitimate civil authority. As with the transition from major combat operations to stability and reconstruction operations, the force may not be ideally suited to the tasks associated with the evolving mission requirements. An increased emphasis on governance, economic development, or social action may characterize this transition. Commanders must be prepared to tailor forces optimized for stability-and-reconstruction-related tasks to assume the changing requirements of the mission.

A-27. Historically, considerable planning and changes to task organization were necessary to transition between types of operations. Force tailoring anticipates likely changes to the task organization needed to execute transitions. Division and corps commanders practice military art in the continuous tailoring and task-organizing of forces and timing of operations. Commanders cycle forces and orchestrate capabilities to maintain pressure. The goal is to effect the change in emphasis without incurring an operational pause.

A-28. Army forces do not transition abruptly between phases. Nevertheless, a phase change may occur abruptly with a significant change in task organization, mission, or rules of engagement. The overall composition of the force, however, might not change. This requires commanders to continuously adapt the organization, basing, and distribution of forces to conditions in the AO.

**LINES OF OPERATIONS**

A-29. As commanders perform operational design, they may use lines of operations to describe how various decisive points are linked to operational and tactical objectives. A *line of operations* is a line that *defines the orientation of the force in time and space, or purpose in relation to an enemy or objective*. Commanders define the military conditions and end state that need to be achieved within their AOs. Subordinate commanders then develop lines of operations intended to create complementary conditions that support achieving the desired end state. Subordinate commanders adjust the level of effort and missions within their AOs along each line of operations.

A-30. Commanders may describe an operation along lines of operations that are tangible, conceptual, or a combination of both. *Physical lines of operations* define the directional orientation of the force in time and
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space in relation to the enemy. They connect a series of decisive points that, over time, lead to control of a geographic objective or enemy force. Physical lines of operations link the force with its base of operations and objectives. (See figure A-4, below.) Operations designed using physical lines of operations generally consist of a series of cyclic, short-range events conducted across a well-defined, finite time line.

A-31. Major combat operations are typically designed using physical lines of operations. These tie offensive and defensive operations to the geographic and positional references of the AO. Multiple and complementary lines of operations work through a series of objectives. Commanders synchronize activities along multiple lines of operations to attain the end state. Physical lines of operations are formulated during course of action development and refined through continual assessment.

A-32. Logical lines of operations define the operational design when positional reference to an adversary has little relevance (See figure A-5, page A-8, below.) Operations designed using logical lines of operations typically consist of an extended, event-driven time line. This time line combines the complementary, long-range effects of civil-military operations as well as the cyclic, short-range events characteristic of combat operations.

A-33. Logical lines of operations are formulated and coordinated with related processes of the operations process during course of action development. Beginning with the broadly defined end state and supporting conditions, staffs analyze the situation and environment to determine the objectives necessary to set those conditions. These objectives are organized using a geographic or purpose-based methodology to ensure unity of effort. Decisive points offering significant leverage against the objectives are identified, ensuring a greater degree of success. Finally, objectives and related decisive points are graphically represented along a line of operations that links these design elements with the conditions and desired end state. Under the G-3’s/S-3’s direction, the operational design, including the lines of operations, is translated into objectives, missions, and tasks. These, in turn, are assigned to subordinate commanders.
Figure A-5. Logical lines of operations

A-34. In stability and reconstruction or civil support operations, when positional reference to an enemy often has little relevance, commanders typically visualize operations along logical lines of operations. Commanders link multiple objectives and actions with the logic of purpose—cause and effect. Logical lines of operations also help commanders visualize how military means can support nonmilitary instruments of national power.

A-35. During a campaign or major operation, the operational design may comprise primarily physical lines of operations or a combination of physical and logical lines of operations. The use of physical lines of operations reflects the more traditional linkage among decisive points, objectives, and the end state. This practice is more tangible but does not project the operational design beyond the defeat of the enemy force at the operational level. By combining physical and logical lines of operations, commanders project operational design into subsequent phases of a campaign. This approach considers the less tangible aspects of civil security, civil control, and civil action. In doing so, commanders use operational art to visualize, describe, and direct operations from a more conceptual perspective. The resulting operational design reflects the thorough integration of full spectrum operations into the overall campaign.

A-36. An operational design composed of both physical and logical lines of operations reflects the characteristics of each as well. Certain aspects of the operation are executed along a finite time line, while other elements are executed with a focus on the long-range stability of the region. With this approach, it is vital for commanders to nest the lines of operations, both geographically and with respect to the desired effects. This ensures that the lines of operations converge on a well-defined, commonly understood end state that comprises the conditions outlined in the commander’s intent.

A-37. Figure A-6 (below)—an operational design tool used by coalition forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom—illustrates the use of parallel logical lines of operations to unify and focus the actions of forces and agencies toward a common end state. In this example, operational-level logical lines of operations are used to link the effects and objectives of coalition forces, military police, and the Iraqi police. These actions, which contribute toward territorial and civil control, ensure the conditions that support the desired strategic end state are established.

A-38. Using logical lines of operations, tactical commanders develop missions, allocate resources, and assess the effectiveness of the operation. Commanders may specify which logical line of operations is the decisive operation and which are shaping operations. Commanders synchronize activities along multiple logical lines of operations to achieve the desired military condition or an end state within an AO.

A-39. Logical lines of operations are mutually supportive among echelons as well as adjacent organizations. For example, similar logical lines of operations between brigade combat teams produce complemen-
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...tary effects, while their collective set of conditions reinforce the conditions and end state at the division level. Logical lines of operations are normally used at brigade and higher levels, where the staff is sufficiently robust enough to manage multiple lines of operations. Below brigade level, logical lines of operations have less utility, since organizations are less likely to conduct different types of operations simultaneously.

Figure A-6. Example logical lines of operations (operational)

A-40. Within a civil support operation, logical lines of operations normally focus on support to civil authorities, support of law enforcement, critical asset protection, and restoration of essential services. Each operation, however, is different, and logical lines of operations are developed and modified according to the situation.
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Appendix B

Mission Statements and Tasks to Subordinate Units

An important aspect of command and control is communicating instructions to subordinates. Clearly communicated instructions help subordinates understand what to do and why. Army doctrine for planning, command and control, and tactics describes how to develop mission statements and tasks to subordinate units. The introduction of effects and effects-based planning in joint doctrine does not change Army doctrine. This appendix elaborates on existing techniques for developing mission statements and tasks to subordinate units. It is framed around the military decision making process; however, these techniques apply to targeting and general problem solving as well.

RECEIPT OF MISSION AND MISSION ANALYSIS

B-1. Upon receipt of a mission, commanders and staffs take the steps necessary to begin planning. These include gathering tools, updating running estimates, and performing an initial assessment. This assessment includes determining the available planning time.

B-2. In mission analysis, commanders and staffs analyze the relationships among the factors of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). They seek to understand—

- The operational environment, including enemies, adversaries, terrain, and civil considerations.
- The desired end state of their higher and next higher headquarters.
- Their mission and how it is nested within those of their higher and next higher headquarters.
- The forces, capabilities, and resources available.

B-3. In determining their unit’s mission, commanders and staffs identify their specified and implied tasks. Staffs analyze the higher headquarters order and the higher commander’s guidance to determine these. A task is a clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations. Tasks are specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of encompassing missions or other requirements (FM 7-0). A specified task is a task specifically assigned to a unit by its higher headquarters (FM 5-0). While specified tasks can be assigned anywhere in an operation order or plan, most are stated in paragraph 3, execution.

B-4. An implied task is a task that must be performed to accomplish a specified task or mission but is not stated in the higher headquarters order (FM 5-0). Implied tasks are derived from a detailed analysis of the higher headquarters order and the factors of METT-TC. Instructions in joint orders may be written as effects to achieve; for example, “Population X in area of operations B participates in the national election.” In this case, commanders and staffs would consider the many implied tasks needed to achieve this effect. These could range from informing the population on the election process to providing polling station security.

B-5. Once staff members have identified specified and implied tasks, they ensure they understand each task’s requirements and purpose. Then they determine the essential tasks. An essential task is a specified or implied task that must be executed to accomplish the mission. Essential tasks are always included in the unit’s mission statement (FM 5-0). The staff presents the essential tasks to the commander for approval during the mission analysis briefing.
DEVELOPING A RESTATED MISSION

B-6. An essential step in mission analysis is developing a restated mission based on analysis of the unit’s specified, implied, and essential tasks. The chief of staff/executive officer or operations officer prepares a recommended mission statement based on the mission analysis. The unit’s mission statement is presented to the commander for approval, normally during the mission analysis brief. A mission statement is a short sentence or paragraph describing the unit’s essential task (or tasks) and purpose that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. It contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, and the reasons thereof, but seldom specifies how (FM 5-0). The five elements of a mission statement answer the following questions:

- Who will execute the operation (unit/organization)?
- What is the unit’s essential task or tasks (stated as an intended effect [such as, fix, neutralize, influence] or an action by a friendly force [such as, link up, consolidate, or disengage])?
- When will the operation begin (by time or event), or what is the duration of the operation?
- Where will the operation occur (area of operations [AO], objective, or grid coordinates)?
- Why will the force conduct the operation (for what purpose or reason)?

B-7. The unit mission statement along with the commander’s intent and concept of operations, provide the primary focus for subordinate actions throughout the operation. The following are two examples of a mission statement.

**Example 1.** Not later than 220400Z August 2005 (when), 1st (U.S.) Armored Division (who) fixes elements of the 22d Division Tactical Group (what/task) in AO New York (where) to enable 3d (U.S.) Infantry Division’s unimpeded attack west to seize Objective Carol (why/purpose).

**Example 2.** 1-505th Parachute Infantry Regiment (who) seizes (what/task) Jackson International Airport (where) not later than D-day, H+3 (when) to allow follow-on forces to air-land into AO Slammer (why/purpose).

B-8. The mission statement may have more than one essential task. The following example shows a mission statement for a phased operation with a different essential task for each phase.

**Example.** 1/509th Parachute Infantry Regiment (who) seizes (what/task) Jackson International Airport (where) not later than D-day, H+3 (when) to allow follow-on forces to air-land into AO Slammer (why/purpose). On order (when), secure (what/task) Objective Gold (where) to prevent the 2d Pandor Guards Brigade from crossing the Blue River and disrupting operations in Airhead Slammer (why/purpose).

B-9. Additionally, commanders may include the type or form of the operation in the mission statement. While mission statements seldom contain how, including the type or form of the operation provides an overarching doctrinal description of how the commander wants the task accomplished. In the example below, the commander includes “infiltrates” for emphasis and to synchronize the force. This directive limits subordinates to a specific form of maneuver (infiltration) that the entire force will use to seize Objective Bravo.

**Example.** At 021100Z August 2004 (when) 1st Brigade, 25th (U.S.) Infantry Division (Light) (who) infiltrates (form of maneuver) to seize (what/task) Objective Bravo (where) to prevent enemy forces from interfering with the rapid crossing of 3d (U.S.) Infantry Division over the Blue River (why).
B-10. The *who*, *where*, and *when* of a mission statement are straightforward. The *what* and *why* are more challenging to write and can confuse subordinates if not stated clearly. The *what* is a task and is expressed in terms of action verbs (for example, contain, destroy, or isolate). These tasks are measurable and can be grouped as “actions by friendly forces” or “effects on enemy forces.” The *why* puts the task into context by describing the reason for performing it.

B-11. The *what* in a mission statement is a task to be accomplished. It is expressed in terms of an intended effect or an action by a friendly force. Commanders should use tactical mission tasks or other doctrinally approved tasks contained in combined arms field manuals or mission training plans in mission statements. These tasks have specific military definitions that are different from dictionary definitions. They are measurable and often describe results or effects in relationship to the enemy, terrain, and friendly forces. Using them simplifies orders. A tactical mission task is the specific activity performed by a unit while executing a form of tactical operation or form of maneuver. It may be expressed in terms of either actions by a friendly force or effects on an enemy force (FM 3-90). Table B-1 (below) lists the tactical mission tasks. FM 3-90, appendix B, describes each one. Commanders and planners should carefully choose the task that best describes the commander’s intent and guidance.

**Table B-1. Tactical mission tasks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Effects on Enemy Forces</th>
<th>Actions by Friendly Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Block</td>
<td>• Assault</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Canalize</td>
<td>• Attack-by-fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contain</td>
<td>• Breach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Defeat</td>
<td>• Bypass</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Destroy</td>
<td>• Clear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disrupt</td>
<td>• Conduct personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fix</td>
<td>• Consolidate and reorganize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Interdict</td>
<td>• Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Isolate</td>
<td>• Counterreconnaissance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Neutralize</td>
<td>• Disengage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Penetrate</td>
<td>• Exfiltrate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Turn</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Conduct personnel recovery replaces combat search and rescue. See FM 3-50.1*

B-12. Table B-2 (below) lists selected additional tasks available to commanders and the field manuals that discuss them. These tasks are stated in terms of the effects they produce.

**Table B-2. Other tactical tasks**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offensive Information Operations (See FM 3-13)</th>
<th>Defensive Information Operations (See FM 3-13)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Destroy</td>
<td>• Deceive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disrupt</td>
<td>• Exploit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Degrade</td>
<td>• Influence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Deny</td>
<td>• Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Fix</td>
<td>• Detect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Turn</td>
<td>• Restore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Block</td>
<td>• Respond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Contain</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Disrupt</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B-13. The *why* of a mission statement provides the mission’s purpose—the reason the unit is to perform the task. It is extremely important to mission command and mission orders. The purpose is usually stated as a descriptive phrase and is often more important than the task. Normally, the staff completes a task statement
by adding the phrase “in order to” and stating the task’s purpose. Table B-3 (below) shows sample purpose verbs for “in order to” phrases.

### Table B-3. Sample purpose verbs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Purpose Verb</th>
<th>Purpose Verb</th>
<th>Purpose Verb</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Allow</td>
<td>Divert</td>
<td>Prevent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cause</td>
<td>Enable</td>
<td>Protect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Create</td>
<td>Envelop</td>
<td>Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deceive</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Surprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny</td>
<td>Open</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B-14. Including the purpose in the mission statement clarifies the tasks it contains and supports the exercise of subordinates’ initiative. The following example shows a mission statement that includes a purpose.

**Example.** Not later than 031100Z July 2003 (when) 1st Brigade Combat Team (who) secures (what/task) Objective Bravo (where) to prevent enemy forces from crossing the Blue River (why/purpose).

B-15. In the above example, if the enemy chooses to cross the Blue River at a fording site two kilometers west of Objective Bravo, subordinates would know to notify higher headquarters and quickly reposition to prevent the enemy from establishing a fording site. If they did not know their mission’s purpose, they would have to ask their higher headquarters for instructions. The delay involved would cede the initiative to the enemy. Here is an example of a mission statement without a purpose.

**Example.** At H-hour, D-day, 3-75 Ranger Regiment seizes Jackson International Airport (vicinity grid GL900231).

B-16. The purpose for seizing the airport in this example is unclear. Subordinates cannot determine if this mission’s purpose is to prevent enemy use of the airfield or to gain control of the airfield for friendly use. The mission’s purpose affects the approach subordinates may take to accomplish this mission. It should be included in mission statements.

### PLANNING GUIDANCE AND COURSE OF ACTION DEVELOPMENT

B-17. Following mission analysis, commanders approve the unit’s mission statement, and issue their initial commander’s intent and planning guidance. These are based on their commander’s visualization. They describe how the commander envisions the operation’s end state and conditions necessary to achieve it. The initial commander’s intent focuses the rest of the planning process.

B-18. Thinking in terms of desired and undesired effects helps commanders develop and issue planning guidance. It also helps staff members develop courses of action (COAs). The Army defines an effect as a result, outcome, or consequence of an action. All actions create effects—some desired, others undesired. Desired effects are results that support accomplishment of an objective or the mission. Undesired effects could adversely impact accomplishment of an objective or the mission.

B-19. For example, a commander may state, “Key to stability in the unit’s AO is that a certain community in city B no longer supports the insurgency.” A COA to create this effect may include two activities: psychological operations messages to discourage insurgent support, and infrastructure development projects as rewards for shifting support. In addition, this COA may call for a limited military presence in the city to avoid the perception of occupation. Staff analysis should identify possible undesired effects associated with each COA. For example, the limited military presence might produce increased insurgent activity and support due to a perception of friendly force weakness. Thinking this way helps commanders and staffs thoroughly examine ways to best achieve desired effects while mitigating undesired effects.
DEVELOPING TASK STATEMENTS

B-20. The staff translates the commander’s planning guidance and approved COA into tasks to subordinate units. For example, a commander states in the planning guidance and part of a COA that the “enemy reserve does not interfere with the seizure of Objective Dog by 1st Brigade Combat Team.” The staff then plans a series of actions or tasks to subordinate units to achieve the effects stated in the commander’s guidance. In this example, actions may include any of the following or a combination of them:

- Nominating the enemy reserve for destruction by air attack.
- Assigning the aviation and fires brigades to neutralize the enemy reserve with fires.
- Deceiving the enemy reserve with a feint.
- Blocking the enemy reserve with a force or obstacle.

B-21. When developing tasks to subordinate units, staffs use the same task/purpose (what/why) construct as they did to develop the unit’s restated mission. Staffs develop tasks to subordinate units the same way they developed the unit’s restated mission. Each task statement follows the mission statement format and contains the same five elements. (See paragraph B-6.)

B-22. As with mission statements, task statements normally do not specify how. However, there may be occasions when commanders want to specify an activity (for example, raid, ambush, infiltrate) that provides an overarching doctrinal description of how to accomplish a task.
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**Glossary**

The glossary lists terms with Army and joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions are different, *(Army)* follows the term. Terms for which this FMI is the proponent manual (the authority) are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition. Terms for which the Army and Marine Corps have agreed on a common definition are followed by *(Army-Marine Corps)*.

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<th>Definition</th>
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<td>area of operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BCT</td>
<td>brigade combat team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C2</td>
<td>command and control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C4OPS</td>
<td>command, control, communications, and computer operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCIR</td>
<td>commander’s critical information requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COA</td>
<td>course of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COP</td>
<td>common operational picture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COS</td>
<td>chief of staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CP</td>
<td>command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBO</td>
<td>effects-based operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EECP</td>
<td>early-entry command post</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FFIR</td>
<td>friendly forces information requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual; frequency modulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FMI</td>
<td>field manual-interim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAGO</td>
<td>fragmentary order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUOPS</td>
<td>future operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-1</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, personnel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-2</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-3</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-4</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-5</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, plans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-6</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, command, control, communications, and computer operations (C4OPS)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-7</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, information operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-8</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, financial management</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G-9</td>
<td>assistant chief of staff, civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPB</td>
<td>intelligence preparation of the battlefield</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**ISR**
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance

**JFC**
joint force commander

**JP**
joint publication

**MCG**
mobile command group

**MDMP**
military decision making process

**METT-TC**
mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations

**MOE**
measure of effectiveness

**MOP**
measure of performance

**MTOE**
modification table of organization and equipment

**PIR**
priority intelligence requirement

**RFC**
revised final coordination

**RDSP**
rapid decision making and synchronization process

**S-1**
personnel staff officer

**S-2**
intelligence staff officer

**S-3**
operations staff officer

**S-4**
logistics staff officer

**S-5**
plans staff officer

**S-6**
command, control, communications and computer operations (C4OPS) officer

**S-7**
information operations officer

**S-8**
financial management officer

**S-9**
civil-military operations officer

**SOP**
standing operating procedure

**TAC CP**
tactical command post

**U.S.**
United States

**USJFCOM**
United States Joint Forces Command

**WFF**
warfighting function

**XO**
executive officer

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**SECTION II – TERMS**

**adjustment decision**
During preparation and execution, the selection of a course of action that modifies the order to respond to unanticipated opportunities or threats. (FM 6-0)

**Army positive control**
A technique of regulating forces that involves commanders and leaders actively assessing, deciding, and directing them.

**Army procedural control**
A technique of regulating forces that relies on a combination of orders, regulations, policies, and doctrine (including tactics, techniques, and procedures).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Glossary Term</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>*assessment</td>
<td>(Army) The continuous monitoring and evaluation of the current situation and progress of an operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*battle rhythm</td>
<td>The sequencing of command and control activities within a headquarters and throughout the force to facilitate effective command and control.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*board</td>
<td>A temporary grouping of selected staff representatives delegated decision authority for a particular purpose or function.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>calculated risk</td>
<td>An exposure to chance of injury or loss when the commander can visualize the outcome in terms of mission accomplishment or damage to the force, and judges the outcome as worth the cost. (FM 6-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*center</td>
<td>A command and control facility established for a specific purpose.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cell</td>
<td>See command post cell.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>civil considerations</td>
<td>The influence of manmade infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of the civilian leaders, populations, and organizations within an area of operations on the conduct of military operations. (FM 6-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combat assessment</td>
<td>(joint) The determination of the overall effectiveness of force employment during military operations. Combat assessment is composed of three major components: (a) battle damage assessment; (b) munitions effectiveness assessment; and (c) reattack recommendation. (JP 1-02)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>combined arms</td>
<td>The synchronized or simultaneous application of several arms—such as infantry, armor, field artillery, engineers, air defense, and aviation—to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm were used against the enemy separately or in sequence. (FM 3-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*command</td>
<td>(Army) The authority that a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the leadership, authority, responsibility, and accountability for effectively using available resources and planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces to accomplish assigned missions. It includes responsibility for unit readiness, health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>command and control</td>
<td>(Army) The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of a mission. Commanders exercise command and control through a command and control system. (FM 6-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>command and control system</td>
<td>(Army) The arrangement of personnel, information management, procedures, and equipment and facilities essential for the commander to conduct operations. (FM 6-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*command and control</td>
<td>The related tasks and systems that support the commander in exercising authority and direction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>warfighting function</td>
<td>(Army) Elements of information required by commanders that directly affect decision making and dictate the successful execution of military operations. (FM 3-0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>commander’s critical</td>
<td>(Army) A clear, concise statement of what the force must do and the conditions the force must meet to succeed with respect to the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations that represent the operation’s desired end state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>information requirements</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*commander’s intent</td>
<td>The mental process of developing situational understanding, determining a desired end state, and envisioning how the force will achieve that end state.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>*commander’s visualization</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**command group**
The commander and selected staff members who accompany commanders and enable them to exercise command and control away from a command post.

**command post**
(Army) A unit headquarters where the commander and staff perform their activities. (FM 6-0)

**command post cell**
A grouping of personnel and equipment by warfighting function or purpose to facilitate command and control during operations.

**control**
(Army) The regulation of forces and warfighting functions to accomplish the mission in accordance with the commander’s intent.

**control measure**
A means of regulating forces or warfighting functions.

**decision making**
Selecting a course of action as the one most favorable to accomplish the mission. (FM 6-0)

**early-entry command post**
A command and control facility containing tailored portions of the unit’s headquarters for a specific mission over a specific period. It normally includes members of the tactical command post and additional planners, intelligence analysts, liaison officers, and others as required.

**effect**
(Army) A result, outcome, or consequence of an action.

**element**
See staff element.

**essential elements of friendly information**
(Army) Critical aspects of a friendly operation that, if known by the enemy, would subsequently compromise, lead to failure, or limit success of the operation, and therefore must be protected from enemy detection. (FM 3-13)

**essential task**
A specified or implied task that must be executed to accomplish the mission. Essential tasks are always included in the unit’s mission statement. (FM 5-0)

**evaluate**
To compare relevant information on the situation or operation against criteria to judge success or progress.

**exceptional information**
Information that would have answered one of the commander’s critical information requirements if the requirement for it had been foreseen and stated as one of the commander’s critical information requirements. (FM 6-0)

**execute**
To put a plan into action by applying combat power to accomplish the mission and using situational understanding to assess progress and make execution and adjustment decisions. (FM 6-0)

**execution decision**
The selection, during preparation and execution, of a course of action anticipated by the order. (FM 6-0)

**fire support warfighting function**
The related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, joint fires, and offensive information operations.

**friendly forces information requirements**
Information the commander and staff need about the forces available for the operation. (FM 6-0)

**graphic control measure**
A symbol used on maps and displays to regulate forces and warfighting functions.

**information management**
The provision of relevant information to the right person at the right time in a usable form to facilitate situational understanding and decision making. It uses procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. (FM 3-0)
information systems  (Army) The equipment and facilities that collect, process, store, display, and disseminate information. This includes computers—hardware and software—and communications, as well as policies and procedures for their use. (FM 3-0)

intelligence synchronization plan  The plan the intelligence officer uses, with staff input, to synchronize the entire collection effort, to include all assets the commander controls, assets of lateral units and higher echelon units and organizations, and intelligence reach to answer the commander’s critical information requirements. (FM 2-0)

*intelligence warfighting function  The related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the enemy, terrain, weather, and civil considerations.

intuitive decision making  (Army-Marine Corps) The act of reaching a conclusion that emphasizes pattern recognition based on knowledge, judgment, experience, education, intelligence, boldness, perception, and character. This approach focuses on assessment of the situation vice comparison of multiple options. (FM 6-0)

*line of operations  (Army) A line that defines the orientation of the force in time and space, or purpose in relation to an enemy or objective.

*main command post  A command and control facility that contains the portion of the unit headquarters in which the majority of planning, analysis, and coordination occurs.

*measure of effectiveness  (Army) A criterion used to assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an effect. (This is the Army definition until the revised JP 3-0 is approved. The Army will use the joint definition in JP 3-0 when JP 3-0 is approved.)

*measure of performance  A criterion to assess friendly actions that is tied to measuring task accomplishment. (This is the Army definition until the revised JP 3-0 is approved. The Army will use the joint definition in JP 3-0 when JP 3-0 is approved.)

*military decision making process  A process that integrates the activities of the commander, staff, and subordinate commanders in developing an operation plan or order. It establishes procedures for analyzing a mission; developing, analyzing, and comparing courses of action; selecting the best course of action; and producing an operation plan or order.

mission  (joint) The task, together with the purpose, that clearly indicates the action to be taken and the reason therefore. (JP 1-02)

mission command  The conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission orders for effective mission accomplishment. Successful mission command results from subordinate leaders at all echelons exercising disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to accomplish missions. It requires an environment of trust and mutual understanding. (FM 6-0)

mission orders  A technique for completing combat orders that allows subordinates maximum freedom of planning and action in accomplishing missions and leaves the “how” of mission accomplishment to subordinates. (FM 6-0)

mission statement  A short sentence or paragraph describing the unit’s essential task (or tasks) and purpose that clearly indicate the action to be taken and the reason for doing so. It contains the elements of who, what, when, where, and why, and the reasons thereof, but seldom specifies how. (FM 5-0)
*monitoring (Army) Continuous observation of the current situation to identify opportunities for the force, threats to the force, gaps in information, and progress according to the plan or order.

*movement and maneuver warfighting function The related tasks and systems that move forces to achieve a position of advantage in relation to the enemy.

*operations process The major command and control activities performed during operations: planning, preparation, execution, and continuous assessment. These activities occur continuously throughout an operation, overlapping and recurring as required.

*planning The process by which commanders (and staff if available) translate the commander’s visualization into a specific course of action for preparation and execution, focusing on the expected results.

preparation Activities by the unit before execution to improve its ability to conduct the operation including, but not limited to, the following: plan refinement, rehearsals, reconnaissance, coordination, inspections, and movement. (FM 3-0)

priority intelligence requirements (joint) Those intelligence requirements for which the commander has an anticipated and stated priority in planning and decision making. (JP 1-02)

*protection warfighting function The related tasks and systems that preserve the force so the commander can apply maximum combat power.

relevant information All information of importance to commanders and staffs in the exercise of command and control. (FM 3-0)

*running estimate A staff section’s continuous assessment of current and future operations to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if future operations are supportable.

*situational awareness Knowledge of the immediate present environment, to including knowledge of the factors of METT-TC.

situational understanding The product of applying analysis and judgment to the common operational picture to determine the relationships among the factors of METT-TC. (FM 3-0)

*staff element A component of a staff section or command post cell.

staff estimate See running estimate.

*staff section A grouping of staff members by area of expertise under a coordinating, special, or personal staff officer.

subordinates’ initiative The assumption of responsibility for deciding and initiating independent actions when the concept of operations or order no longer applies or when an unanticipated opportunity leading to the accomplishment of the commander’s intent presents itself. (FM 6-0)

*sustainment warfighting function The related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance.

synchronization (joint) The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive time and place. (JP 1-02)

*tactical command post A command and control facility containing a tailored portion of a unit headquarters designed to control current operations.
**task**  (Army) A clearly defined and measurable activity accomplished by individuals and organizations. Tasks are specific activities that contribute to the accomplishment of encompassing missions or other requirements. (FM 7-0)

**tempo**  (Army) The rate of military action. (FM 3-0)

**variance**  A difference between the actual situation during an operation and what the plan forecasted the situation would be at that time or event. (FM 6-0)

**warfighting function**  A group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives.

**working group**  A temporary grouping of predetermined staff representatives who meet to coordinate and provide recommendations for a particular purpose or function.
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FM 5-0 (101-5). Army Planning and Orders Production. 20 Jan 2005.

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PREScribed FORMs

None.

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