Stability

Contents

PREFACE .............................................................................................................. iii
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... iv

Chapter 1  STABILITY TASKS IN MILITARY OPERATIONS .............................. 1-1
  Primary Stability Tasks ................................................................................. 1-1
  Identification and Accomplishment of Stability Tasks .................................. 1-5
  Related Activities and Missions ...................................................................... 1-6

Chapter 2  STABILITY CONSIDERATIONS FOR TRANSITIONS ................. 2-1
  Stability Transition Levels............................................................................. 2-1
  Transition of Stability Tasks ......................................................................... 2-4
  Transitional Military Authority ..................................................................... 2-7
  Interim Civil Authority ................................................................................. 2-16

Chapter 3  CONSIDERATIONS TO ACHIEVE UNITY OF EffORT ............... 3-1
  Whole-of-Government Approach ................................................................ 3-1
  Comprehensive Approach ............................................................................ 3-19

Chapter 4  STABILITY ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS ................................. 4-1
  Importance of Assessing Stability Tasks ..................................................... 4-1
  District Stability Framework ......................................................................... 4-1
  Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework ............................................ 4-3

GLOSSARY .......................................................................................... Glossary-1
REFERENCES .................................................................................. References-1
INDEX .......................................................................................................... Index-1

Distribution Restriction: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*This publication supersedes FM 3-07, Stability Operations, 6 October 2008.
Contents

Figures

Introductory figure 1. Stability underlying logic ................................................................. v
Figure 1-1. Five guidelines for protection of civilians......................................................... 1-9
Figure 3-1. Levels of interaction ....................................................................................... 3-21
Figure 4-1. District Stability Framework process ............................................................ 4-2
Figure 4-2. Conflict diagnosis process of the interagency conflict assessment framework ........................................................................................................... 4-5

Tables

Introductory table 1. Terms modified by ADRP 3-07 ....................................................... vi
Table 1-1. Practical guidelines for supporting foreign humanitarian assistance .......... 1-25
Table 2-1. Phases of the stability framework and stability transition phases ............... 2-4
Table 2-2. Sample indicators for partners to transfer stability tasks ............................ 2-6
Table 3-1. The ACTion approach to social perspective taking ........................................ 3-7
Table 3-2. Global clusters and lead agencies ................................................................. 3-20
Table 3-3. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Nongovernmental Organization Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief .................. 3-28
Table 3-4. Interagency Standing Committee principles for civil-military relationships in complex emergencies ................................................................. 3-29
Table 4-1. Interagency conflict assessment framework transition into planning .......... 4-8
Preface

FM 3-07 contributes to the Army and joint community by providing tactical guidance on the conduct of operations focused on stability. FM 3-07 addresses employment of forces in the conduct of operations focused on stability. FM 3-07 expounds on the doctrinal fundamentals and concepts established in ADRP 3-0 and ADRP 3-07. Readers should be familiar with ADRP 3-07, which establishes the doctrinal fundamentals for the conduct of operations focused on stability.

The principal audience for FM 3-07 is leaders and planners at the battalion level and above. Commanders and staffs of Army headquarters serving as a joint task force or multinational headquarters should also refer to applicable joint or multinational doctrine concerning the range of military operations and joint or multinational forces. Trainers and educators throughout the Army will also use this publication.

FM 3-07 is a common reference for all Army professionals, in the field and in the Army school system. The stability considerations in this publication apply to units at all levels. Army techniques publications discuss techniques for applying this doctrine. This publication will serve as a resource for the other government agencies, intergovernmental organizations, international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities who seek to understand the role of the military in broader stability efforts.

Commanders, staffs, and subordinates ensure their decisions and actions comply with applicable U.S., international, and, in some cases, host-nation laws and regulations. Commanders at all levels ensure their Soldiers operate in accordance with the law of war and the rules of engagement. (See FM 27-10.)

FM 3-07 uses joint terms where applicable. Most terms with joint or Army definitions are in both the glossary and the text. The definition for which FM 3-07 is the proponent publication (the authority) is marked with an asterisk (*) in the glossary and boldfaced in the text. For other definitions shown in the text, the term is italicized and the number of the proponent publication follows the definition.

FM 3-07 applies to the Active Army, the Army National Guard/the Army National Guard of the United States, and the United States Army Reserve unless otherwise stated.

The proponent of ADRP 3-07 is the United States Army Combined Arms Center. The preparing agency is the United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, United States Army War College. Send written comments and recommendations on a DA Form 2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms) to Commander, U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and Fort Leavenworth, ATTN: ATZL-MCD (FM 3-07), 300 McPherson Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2337; by e-mail to usarmy.leavenworth.mccoe.mbx.cadd-org-mailbox@mail.mil; or submit an electronic DA Form 2028.
Introduction

Doctrine by definition is broad in scope and involves principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures applicable to Army operations worldwide. Thus, this publication does not focus on any region or country. Nor is it intended to be a standalone reference. Users should assess information from other sources to help them decide how to apply the doctrine in this publication to the specific circumstances facing them.

Throughout U.S. history, the Army has learned that military force alone cannot secure sustainable peace. A comprehensive approach is required, as well as in-depth understanding of an operational environment. Stability ultimately aims to establish conditions the local populace regards as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable. Stabilization is a process in which personnel identify and mitigate underlying sources of instability to establish the conditions for long-term stability. Therefore, stability tasks focus on identifying and targeting the root causes of instability and building the capacity of local institutions. Army forces accomplish stability missions and perform tasks across the range of military operations and in coordination with other instruments of national power. Stability missions and tasks are part of broader efforts to establish and maintain the conditions for stability in an unstable area before or during hostilities, or to reestablish enduring peace and stability after open hostilities cease. Army stability doctrine is based on lessons learned from previous and contemporary operations.

FM 3-07 expands upon stability tasks, their role in unified land operations, and considerations specific to stability. It contains four chapters.

Chapter 1 expands the discussion of stability tasks introduced in ADP 3-07 and ADRP 3-07. It introduces the reader to the stability tasks and places them in the context of Army operations.

Chapter 2 discusses transitions, including how to perform the tasks of changing the focus of the operation. Transitions are an essential part of stability.

Chapter 3 addresses the whole-of-government and comprehensive approaches to unity of effort. This chapter elaborates considerations that will assist commanders and staffs in focusing collaboration and cooperation with partners toward a common goal.

Chapter 4 looks at assessment. Identifying and prioritizing the local sources of instability is an essential first step toward understanding on how to apply military resources and how to determine what is working.

This publication completes the transition of Army stability doctrine to the Doctrine 2015 structure. ADP 3-07 and ADRP 3-07 introduced the basic concept behind stability including the stability principles: conflict transformation, unity of effort, legitimacy and host-nation ownership, and building partner capacity. ADP 3-07 and ADRP 3-07 also identified and described the primary stability tasks, how to consider stability in planning for operations, the place of stability in unified land operations, and unique considerations for stability across the range of military operations. Introductory figure 1 lays out the underlying logic for stability tasks in operations and lists stability tasks in both decisive action and the Army’s concept of unified land operations.
Introduction

**Introduction**

**Operations conducted outside the United States**

Conducted by the United States military in joint operations using...

![Diagram showing the operations conducted outside the United States](image)

**Unified Land Operations**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Before conflict</th>
<th>During conflict</th>
<th>After conflict</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Across the range of military operations</td>
<td>Guided by...</td>
<td>And executed by decisive action, simultaneously combining...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission Command</td>
<td>offensive tasks</td>
<td>defensive tasks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Stability tasks are tasks conducted as part of operations outside the United States in coordination with other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure environment, and provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

To do this the Army conducts the primary stability tasks integrated into the joint stability functions and the United States Government stability sectors to achieve the end state conditions...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Primary stability tasks</th>
<th>Joint stability functions</th>
<th>Stability sectors</th>
<th>End state conditions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish civil security</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Security</td>
<td>Safe and secure environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish civil control</td>
<td>Rule of law</td>
<td>Justice and reconciliation</td>
<td>Established rule of law</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore essential services</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance and social well-being</td>
<td>Social well-being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to governance</td>
<td>Governance and participation</td>
<td>Governance and participation</td>
<td>Stable governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to economic and infrastructure development</td>
<td>Economic stabilization and infrastructure</td>
<td>Economic stabilization and infrastructure</td>
<td>Sustainable economy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These operations must be founded in the stability principles of...

**Conflict transformation**  **Unity of effort**  **Legitimacy and host-nation ownership**  **Building partner capacity**
The information from the following chapters from the legacy FM 3-07 (2008, now obsolete) was updated and moved into ADP 3-07 and ADRP 3-07:

- Chapter 1: The Strategic Context.
- Chapter 4: Planning for Stability Operations.

To avoid confusion, rule of law was removed as a principle and the information consolidated into the discussion of end state conditions in chapter 1 of ADRP 3-07. Additionally, information retained from the appendixes of the obsolete field manual—regarding assessment—was updated, condensed to a discussion of principles, and moved into chapter 4 of this field manual. ATP 3-07.5 explains more fully the techniques for performing stability tasks, including measuring success.

Certain terms for which the legacy FM 3-07 (2008, now obsolete) had been proponent were modified by change 1 to ADRP 3-07 (2013). For the reader’s convenience, those terms are included in introductory table-1. FM 3-07 remains the proponent for one Army term: transitional authority.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>capacity building</td>
<td>Modified usage as building partner capacity in common English usage. No longer formally defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>comprehensive approach</td>
<td>Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conflict transformation</td>
<td>Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crisis state</td>
<td>Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disarmament</td>
<td>Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fragile state</td>
<td>Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governance</td>
<td>Adopts the joint definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reconstruction</td>
<td>Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>reintegration</td>
<td>Proponency moved to ADRP 3-07.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rule of law</td>
<td>Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security force assistance</td>
<td>Adopts the joint definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>security sector reform</td>
<td>Adopts the joint definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stabilization</td>
<td>Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>vulnerable state</td>
<td>Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>whole-of-government approach</td>
<td>Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 1

Stability Tasks in Military Operations

This chapter begins with a discussion of the five primary stability tasks. Then it provides guidance to help Army leaders identify and execute them effectively. Finally, it presents considerations for related activities and missions that apply to all aspects of stability tasks.

PRIMARY STABILITY TASKS

1-1. Stability tasks are part of every operation. However, the proportion of stability tasks, in relation to offensive and defensive tasks, may change. Whether an operation is a peace operation preventing conflict or a large-scale combat operation, forces will always integrate offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. For example, in a peace operation, forces may still perform offensive tasks such as raids to capture war criminals. Conversely, in large-scale combat operations, forces perform stability tasks to control captured areas or provide emergency essential services.

1-2. The primary stability tasks reflect myriad interrelated activities conducted across the five stability sectors. Tasks performed in one sector inevitably create related effects in another sector; planned and performed appropriately, carefully sequenced activities complement and reinforce these effects. Achieving a specific objective or setting certain conditions often requires performing a number of related tasks among different stability sectors. An example of this is the effort required to provide a safe, secure environment for the local populace. Rather than the outcome of a single task focused solely on the local populace, safety and security are broad effects. Military forces achieve them by ending hostilities, isolating belligerents and criminal elements, demobilizing armed groups, eliminating explosives and other hazards, and providing public order and safety. In other words, to ensure security will be sustained over time, forces perform numerous tasks across all the stability sectors.

1-3. Operations focused on stability aim to stabilize the environment enough so the host nation can begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure. These operations establish a safe, secure environment that facilitates reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Operations focused on stability aim to establish conditions that support the transition to legitimate host-nation governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market economy.

1-4. The size of the force and combination of tasks necessary to stabilize conditions depend on the situation in the operational area. When a functional, effective host-nation government exists, military forces work through and with local civil authorities. Together they restore stability and order and sometimes to reform the security institutions that foster long-term development. In this situation, the size of the force and the scope of the mission are more limited. However, in a worst-case scenario, the security environment would be in chaos and the state would be in crisis or failed altogether. In this situation, international law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and to address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. This requires a force capable of securing borders, protecting the population, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, regulating the behavior of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablishing essential civil services, and setting conditions in the operational area that enable the success of other partners.

1-5. Military forces provide support to facilitate the completion of tasks for which the host nation is normally responsible. Typically, these tasks have a security component ideally performed by military forces. However, military forces sometimes provide logistics, medical, or administrative support to enable the success of civilian agencies and organizations. These tasks generally fall into one of three categories, representing the collective effort associated with an operation focused on stability:
Tasks for which military forces retain primary responsibility.

Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations likely retain responsibility, but military forces are prepared to execute until transition can safely occur with those organizations.

Tasks for which civilian agencies or organizations retain primary responsibility.

1-6. The primary stability tasks are—

- Establish civil security.
- Establish civil control.
- Restore essential services.
- Support to governance.
- Support to economic and infrastructure development.

**Establish Civil Security (Including Security Force Assistance)**

1-7. Civil security is the provision of security for state entities and the population, including protection from internal and external threats. Establishing a safe, secure, and stable environment is key to obtaining local support for military operations. The primary task of establishing civil security may include security force assistance tasks depending on the missions assigned. As soon a host nation’s security forces can perform this task, Army forces transition civil security responsibilities to them. Within the security sector, transformation tasks focus on developing legitimate, sustainable, and stable security institutions. Civil security sets the conditions for enduring stability and peace.

1-8. Military forces set these conditions by performing subordinate tasks during all three phases of the stability framework—initial response, transformation, and fostering sustainability. During the initial response phase of the stability framework, Army units often perform the tasks on their own because the host nation lacks capability.

1-9. In the transformation phase of the stability framework, host-nation personnel and, potentially, interorganizational entities begin to contribute. Army units then focus more on security force assistance, particularly the systems required to professionalize a host nation’s security forces.

1-10. In the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, Army units transition to a steady-state posture focused on advisory duties and security cooperation. The host nation assumes responsibility for its civil security. Some societies have strong cultural resistance against foreign or domestic military involvement in civil security. On these occasions, United States (U.S.) forces explore other options or mitigate concerns about such involvement by synchronizing information-related capabilities and engagement.

1-11. Depending on the situation, establishing civil security can include seven subtasks:

- Enforce cessation of hostilities, peace agreements, and other arrangements.
- Determine disposition and composition of host-nation armed and intelligence services.
- Conduct disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
- Conduct border control, boundary security, and freedom of movement.
- Support identification programs.
- Protect key personnel and facilities.
- Clear explosives and other hazards.

(For a more detailed discussion of establish civil security subtasks, see chapter 2 of ATP 3-07.5.)

**Establish Civil Control**

1-12. Civil control fosters the rule of law. The rule of law means that all persons, institutions, and entities—public and private, including the state itself—are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights principles. To strengthen civil control and the rule of law, Army units seek to improve the capability, capacity, and legitimacy of host-nation judicial and corrections systems by providing training and support.
to law enforcement and judicial personnel. Army units focus on implementing temporary or interim capabilities to lay the foundation for host-nation or interorganizational development of this sector.

1-13. Civil control is based on a society ensuring individuals and groups adhere to the rule of law. A society that embraces the rule of law provides equal access to a legal system consistent with international human rights principles. Developing such a society is a long-term process guided by civilian entities.

1-14. Military forces perform subordinate tasks to facilitate civil control during all three phases of the stability framework. Initial response tasks focus on establishing civil control and fostering the rule of law. During the initial response phase of the stability framework, Army units may have to complete tasks on their own because the host nation has little or no capability or legitimacy. In other phases, host-nation security forces can maintain public order and require little Army unit involvement.

1-15. Transformation tasks develop justice, corrections systems, and other legal fields that meet international human rights standards and support viable processes for redress and reconciliation. In the transformation phase of the stability framework, host-nation police forces and interorganizational entities take the lead with Army units focusing on security force assistance, particularly the professionalization of host-nation security forces.

1-16. Fostering sustainability tasks emphasizes the transfer of the judicial and corrections systems to host-nation personnel. Army units facilitate this transfer, continue to monitor and report, and transition to a steady state posture focused on advisory duties and security cooperation.

1-17. Depending on the situation, nine subtasks may be performed:

- Establish public order and safety.
- Establish an interim criminal justice system.
- Support law enforcement and police reform.
- Support judicial reform.
- Support a civil property dispute resolution process.
- Support criminal justice system reform.
- Support corrections reform.
- Support war crimes courts and tribunals.
- Support public outreach and community rebuilding programs.

(For a more detailed discussion of establish civil control subtasks, see chapter 3 of ATP 3-07.5.)

**RESTORE ESSENTIAL SERVICES**

1-18. Restoring services essential to local expectations of normalcy allows people to return their daily activities and prevents further destabilization. Ideally, the host nation’s government and civilian relief agencies should restore and develop essential services. In most cases, local, international, and U.S. agencies have arrived in country long before U.S. forces. However, when partner organizations are not well established or lack capacity, Army units accomplish these tasks until the other organizations can.

1-19. Military forces perform subordinate tasks to facilitate restoring essential services during all three phases of the stability framework. During the initial response phase of the stability framework, Army units take the lead in providing for the population’s immediate critical needs, supporting and enabling other actors as they become operational. Army units provide minimal assistance if the other actors are already well-established. In any case, Army units assess essential services based on local norms. They determine the levels of functionality necessary to mitigate instability.

1-20. The transformation phase of the stability framework occurs once the immediate crisis is past and sufficient capacity begins to grow. This phase establishes the foundation for long-term development and resolves root causes of conflict that lead to famine, dislocated civilians, refugee flows, and human trafficking.

1-21. In the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, the host nation makes the efforts permanent by institutionalizing positive change in society and ensuring it has the means to sustain progress. If the situation in the host nation regresses, the host nation may resume stability tasks from earlier phases.
1-22. Restore essential services can include eight subtasks:

- Provide essential civil services.
- Perform tasks related to civilian dislocation.
- Support famine prevention and emergency food relief programs.
- Support nonfood relief programs.
- Support humanitarian demining.
- Support human rights initiatives.
- Support public health programs.
- Support education programs.

(For a more detailed discussion of restore essential services subtasks, see chapter 4 of ATP 3-07.5.)

SUPPORT TO GOVERNANCE

1-23. Governance is the set of activities conducted by a government or community organization to maintain societal order, define and enforce rights and obligations, and fairly allocate goods and services. Effective, legitimate governance ensures these activities are transparent, accountable, and involve public participation. Elections, while often an end state condition in planning, does not ensure these outcomes. In societies divided along ethnic, tribal, or religious lines, elections may further polarize factions. Generally, representative institutions based on universal suffrage offer the best means of fostering governance acceptable to most citizens. If a host nation’s government or community organizations cannot provide governance, some degree of military support may be necessary. In extreme cases where civil government or community organizations are dysfunctional or absent, international law requires military forces to provide basic civil administration.

1-24. Military forces perform subordinate tasks to facilitate support to governance during all three phases of the stability framework. During the initial response phase of the stability framework, the U.S. military may be directed to act as the transitional military authority to establish governance. In other cases, Army commanders can influence host-nation officials who have formal authority but little capacity. In either case, Army units develop host-nation partnerships and foster governance in their areas of operations. Even if U.S. forces have formal authority as a transitional military authority, they work closely with host-nation and interorganizational entities in order to prepare host-nation government and community organizations to assume responsibility for governance.

1-25. In the transformation phase of the stability framework, responsibility for governance is transferred to civilian authorities. This may be provisional under the control of an ambassador, a United Nations (UN) mission, or some other temporary entity. In some cases, authority will be transferred to host-nation representatives that may be from the same host-nation government prior to the operation. As Army units develop host-nation institutional capability and capacity, they continue to foster good governance by advising, assisting, supporting, and monitoring other actors.

1-26. In the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, host-nation authorities assume complete responsibility for governance. Army units and host-nation security partners focus on maintaining security, building capability and capacity, and facilitating appropriate security forces involvement in governance. Army units continue to monitor developments regarding governance and identify concerns to host-nation authorities and the U.S. Government.

1-27. Depending on the situation, support to governance has four primary subtasks:

- Support transitional administrations.
- Support development of local governance.
- Support anticorruption initiatives.
- Support elections.

(For a more detailed discussion of support to governance subtasks, see chapter 5 of ATP 3-07.5.)
SUPPORT TO ECONOMIC AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

1-28. Long-term peace and stability require sustainable host-nation economic and infrastructure development. The end state is the creation of a sustainable economy. In post-conflict and fragile states, host-nation actors, interagency partners, and interorganizational partners often have the most useful knowledge and skills regarding the restoration and facilitation of economic and infrastructure development. However, if security considerations or other factors restrict their ability to intervene, Army units should assist host-nation entities to foster sustainable economic and infrastructure development.

1-29. Military forces perform subordinate tasks to facilitate support to economic and infrastructure development during all three phases of the stability framework. In the initial response phase of the stability framework, Army units take the lead in assessing local economic conditions and prioritizing the obstacles to economic development. If other partners are unable to mitigate them, Army units work with host-nation and interorganizational partners to implement activities. Depending on the situation, Army units may provide security to foster commerce, create short-term livelihood opportunities, facilitate market access, secure key infrastructure or natural resources, or perform other tasks. It is crucial for Army commanders to implement only activities that support long-term sustainable development. For example, a project focused on creating jobs in the short term must ensure appropriate wages for local economic conditions. Inadequate wages for teachers or other professionals could eventually lead to their resignations. Such situations could disrupt progress and distort expectations of the host nation’s economy and government.

1-30. During the transformation phase of the stability framework, Army units establish the foundation for sustainable economic development and transition control of economic development to host-nation officials or interorganizational entities. Army units focus on establishing host-nation institutions that can provide sustainable economic growth. Once a civilian administration assumes control, Army units primarily advise and assist those officials. During this phase, Army forces continuously update the economic and infrastructure assessments. They transfer responsibility for maintaining the economy and infrastructure to host-nation officials or interorganizational entities. In general, the transformation phase builds on and reinforces successes of the initial response phase.

1-31. In the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, Army units facilitate the institutionalization of a long-term, sustainable economic infrastructure development program and transition economic control to host-nation officials and the civil society. The primarily task of Army units is to advise and assist host-nation civilian economic officials.

1-32. Depending on the situation, economic and infrastructure development has ten primary subtasks:
- Support economic generation and enterprise creation.
- Support monetary institutions and programs.
- Support national treasury operations.
- Support public sector investment programs.
- Support private sector development.
- Protect natural resources and environment.
- Support agricultural development programs.
- Restore transportation infrastructure.
- Restore telecommunications infrastructure.
- Support general infrastructure reconstruction programs.

1-33. Before implementing any activities, Army units must first assess the economic and infrastructure situation. This assessment should be based on local norms. It should identify and prioritize the sources of instability that threaten effective economic and infrastructure development. (For a more detailed discussion of support to economic and infrastructure development subtasks, see chapter 6 of ATP 3-07.5.)

IDENTIFICATION AND ACCOMPLISHMENT OF STABILITY TASKS

1-34. Ensuring a state’s long-term stability depends on applying combat power to those tasks that are, in fact, essential. For the commander and staff, operations focused on stability require a unique combination of knowledge and understanding, the ability to achieve unity of effort, and a thorough depth of cultural
astuteness. A finite amount of combat power is available to apply against the essential tasks associated with a given stability mission. Essential stability tasks lay the foundation for success. This foundation must sustain the burdens of governance, rule of law, and economic development that represent the future viability of a state. Establishing this foundation depends on applying combat power to the essential stability tasks identified during the initial assessment of the situation and the framing of the basic problem. Decisions about using combat power are more than a factor of the size of the force deployed, its relative composition, and the anticipated nature and duration of the mission.

**IDENTIFICATION OF TASKS**

1-35. Success in operations focused on stability often depends on the commander’s ability to identify the tasks essential to mission success. Success also depends on the commander’s ability to prioritize and sequence the accomplishment of those tasks with available combat power, the diverse array of actors participating, and the ability of the host nation to accept change. Even more so than in the offense and defense, operations focused on stability require commanders to demonstrate cultural understanding and a clear appreciation of the myriad stability tasks to determine which are fundamentally essential to mission success.

1-36. The commander and staff identify essential stability tasks after considering the relevant mission variables. Essential stability tasks are those that the force must successfully complete to accomplish the specific mission. These essential tasks may include specified and implied tasks required to establish end state conditions that define success. They include the primary stability tasks, informing and influencing of audiences, and protection of civilians. In addition, they include any essential offensive and defensive tasks associated with the defeat of an enemy force. Typically, military forces retain primary responsibility for these initial response tasks. Other tasks may be included that are not the primary responsibility of military forces. Some tasks are performed simultaneously and some sequentially.

**ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ALL ESSENTIAL TASKS**

1-37. In a complex operational environment—with unstable security conditions and a failed or nonfunctioning government—a military force may be the only substantial stabilizing presence. In these conditions, the force must be prepared to perform all the tasks essential to establishing and maintaining security and order while providing for the essential needs of the populace. In most situations, local and international aid organizations will be present in the operational area but may have limited access to the population. Military forces can significantly contribute to increasing the access of these aid organizations, allowing them to provide essential humanitarian assistance and conduct development activities for the civilian population. In turn, this reduces a substantial logistics burden on military forces, allowing them to focus on providing a safe, secure environment.

**RELATED ACTIVITIES AND MISSIONS**

1-38. Operations characterized by stability tasks often combine with certain activities and missions common to Army operations. These activities and missions cut across all stability missions regardless of the focus and require increased emphasis and attention by commander. Some activities—such as security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration—cut across the primary stability tasks and may be the centerpiece of an operation. Some operations feature a large component of stability tasks relative to offensive and defensive tasks. However, these operations, as with most decisive action, have elements of offense and defense as well. Some types of operations have a greater focus on stability tasks than others. Related activities and missions include—

- Information-related capabilities.
- Protection of civilians.
- Mass atrocity response operations.
- Security sector reform.
- Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.
- Destruction, monitoring, and redirection of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and mitigation of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards.
Stability Tasks in Military Operations

- Army support to security cooperation.
- Peace operations.
- Foreign humanitarian assistance.
- Counterinsurgency.
- Foreign internal defense.

INFORMATION-RELATED CAPABILITIES

1-39. Stability operations depend heavily on keeping audiences informed to minimize noncombatant interference, countering adversary and enemy information, and shaping their support of local transitional civil or military authorities. Information-related capabilities are integrated to directly influence the perceptions and increase support among key populations. An information-related capability is a tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions (JP 3-13). Synchronizing information-related capabilities—such as Soldier and leader engagement and military information support operations—can amplify positive actions, counter enemy information activities, and increase support. Commanders use received information and actions to shape analyzed information and operational environments to multiply the effects of friendly successes.

1-40. During operations, commanders and staffs synchronize information-related capabilities and tasks to produce complementary and reinforcing actions, themes, and messages. Army forces make every effort to reduce the potential for conflicting information that could interfere with achieving objectives. Commanders inform and influence audiences inside and outside their organizations. Commanders—

- Provide their commander’s intent, the mission narrative, and their vision of the desired end state.
- Establish and synchronize themes and messages to inform and influence audiences inside and outside their organization.
- Incorporate cultural awareness, relevant social and political factors, and informational considerations into the operations process.
- Guide the integration of information-related capabilities during the operations process.
- Assess how the staff and subordinate units use information-related capabilities to support operations.
- Understand their audiences, ranging from the audiences in the United States to indigenous civilians in the area of operations.

1-41. A critical information-related capability is Soldier and leader engaging with key leaders and the population. Soldier and leader engagement is interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with audiences in an area of operations (FM 3-13). Soldiers and leaders conduct engagement to provide information or to influence attitudes, perceptions, and behavior. Engagement is critical to understanding host-nation population concerns, explaining how Army units are pursuing stability along with other objectives, and gaining the cooperation with other actors. Engagements with adversaries may at times be appropriate to improve stability efforts. Soldier and leader engagement provides a venue for building relationships, solving conflicts, conveying information, calming fears, and refuting rumors, lies, or incorrect information.

1-42. Army leaders account for effective engagement that includes females in the population. Leaders consider how gender norms differ by culture. They plan and prepare to include female teams and interpreters, which are critical to effectiveness. In some situations, a trained female team can interact with the population, develop an understanding of gender and family issues, provide care to victims, and influence a significant but often inaccessible part of the population. Female teams require special training as these functions will likely differ from their normal responsibilities. Female teams have been known to experience difficulties with integration into military units; therefore, commanders emphasize their importance and integration to avoid problems.

1-43. Army units will have to engage actors who are in competition with each other. Soldiers must be careful to maintain their impartiality and avoid manipulation by actors with ulterior motives. Additionally, some actors may be perpetrators or otherwise have questionable legitimacy. Some actors will use
negotiation as an expedient tactic that is part of a larger campaign in opposition to the Army unit’s objectives. Units should be careful not to overlook or marginalize important groups such as women or minorities. Effective Soldiers strive to understand and address the concerns of each group. If possible, units coordinate engagements with activities of other partners to avoid contradictory messages. Finally, units take care that engagements do not generate unrealistic expectations. (See FM 3-13 for a more detailed discussion of Soldier and leader engagement and other information-related capabilities.)

**PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS**

1-44. Protection of civilians applies across the range of military operations. Regardless of the primary objective, protection of civilians is an important moral, political, legal, and military consideration. The protection of civilians refers, in general, to efforts that protect civilians from physical violence, secure their access to essential services and resources, and protect human rights. Military and nonmilitary stability partners perform tasks that support protection of civilians in the short term and long term. In addition to physical protection from imminent violence and provision of necessities, elements include setting broader enabling conditions.

1-45. A civilian is a person who is not a member of his or her country’s armed forces or other militia. The credibility and legitimacy of an Army operation, the success of the overarching mission, and the achievement of U.S. strategic goals depend on Army units being able and willing to protect civilians. Army units must ensure that civilians are not the object of attacks. They must ensure that civilians are spared and protected during conflict. The law of war (also known as international humanitarian law) requires belligerents to protect civilians from the effects of war and military occupation. Moreover, in many operations, the population’s support may be the center of gravity or indispensable for mission accomplishment. Political objectives often include security, stability, a sustainable peace, and other favorable conditions. Civilians living in a highly insecure environment, and observers around the world, expect that Soldiers will protect civilians.

1-46. Army units frequently work with, support, and enable other actors to establish an environment in which civilians are protected in the short term and long term. Army units will likely comprise one part of a larger multidimensional effort that includes other actors whose activities are, in fact, the most significant for ensuring protection of civilians in the long term. These actors include host-nation and international civilian, police, and military organizations that address security, governance, rule of law, humanitarian, and developmental needs. The various actors may have dissimilar objectives and use different methods, but they agree about the general desirability of protecting civilians.

1-47. Protection of civilians may be the primary purpose of a mission or a supporting task. Effective protection of civilians depends on adaptive units, a command climate that emphasizes its importance, and leaders who can make timely and appropriate decisions based on critical situations on the ground. Regardless of the operation, leaders will likely have to address protection of civilians.

1-48. Army units support protection of civilians by doing no harm and performing deliberate actions to protect civilians. First, Army units do no harm. These units act in accordance with the law of war and other relevant bodies of law in order to minimize civilian harm. Additionally, Army units avoid actions that undermine efforts by other actors that improve human security. Second, Army units perform deliberate actions to protect civilians. These units perform offensive, defensive, and stability tasks expressly intended to mitigate harm to civilians, including operations intended to create an environment conducive to protection of civilians.

**Risks to Civilians**

1-49. Civilians are potentially at risk from armed conflict and many other situations. Examples include widespread or systematic targeted violence including genocide and other mass atrocities, sexual violence, human trafficking, displacement, and impeded access to humanitarian assistance and essential services. To mitigate these risks, Army units must understand the relevant civilian vulnerabilities and the threats to civilians’ well-being.
Civilian Vulnerabilities

1-50. Civilian vulnerabilities come from many sources, including individual and community factors, environmental factors, and unavailability of services such as healthcare and emergency food distribution. For example, ethnic or sectarian violence may target certain groups within a population, rendering those more vulnerable than others. Civilians near military targets may be more vulnerable to collateral damage, and dislocated civilians who flee their homes may be more vulnerable to disease, starvation, and crime. Some groups may be vulnerable in certain contexts, including women, children, or the elderly, infirm, and disabled. Stability partners can mitigate vulnerabilities in many ways, including assistance and security.

Threats to Civilians

1-51. Threats consist of individuals or groups with the capability, intent, and opportunity to harm civilians. Specific threats vary in terms of their dimensions, type, and perpetrators’ objectives. The most important aspect of the threat is the perpetrators’ motivation or strategic logic behind the violence. If the violence is intrinsic to the goals or ideology of the perpetrator (such as cases of sectarian violence, ethnic cleansing, or genocide), the perpetrator may view the civilian population as a threat, and may prove difficult to deter. Similarly, when violence against civilians is intrinsic to a group’s existence, such as a group that survives from forced recruitment and pillage, it can be difficult to deter the perpetrators. When violence is instrumental to a group’s goals, such as some cases of terrorism or a brutal counterinsurgency campaign, perpetrators may attack civilians as a means to achieve some other objective. In such cases, perpetrators may be deterred or persuaded to use other methods. Their motivations may change over time and may overlap.

Five Guidelines for Protection of Civilians

1-52. Five overarching guidelines assist Army units with protection of civilians during operations. (See figure 1-1.) Leaders ensure Army forces do not neglect any of the guidelines as doing so increases the possibility that civilians will suffer unnecessary harm. These guidelines are not prioritized. However, their sequence suggests that Army units should understand the circumstances in which they will operate, establish their goals, conduct operations to achieve their goals, develop synergy with other actors, and shape the surrounding environment to enable success.

Figure 1-1. Five guidelines for protection of civilians
Continually Understand the Situation

1-53. Army leaders must constantly have situational understanding of an operational environment, relevant actors, and dynamics. The staff’s analysis of the operational variables (political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time, known collectively as PMESII-PT) contribute to understanding threats to civilians and ways to protect them.

1-54. Units have to influence (and, in many cases, should be influenced by) a wide range of other actors. These actors may be loosely categorized as adversaries, vulnerable civilians, bystanders, negative actors, and positive actors. These categories may overlap and could change over time. For example, a particular ethnic group could be both a perpetrator and victim of violence against civilians. In many situations, the military operates in support of other actors whose efforts are more important for achieving protection of civilians.

1-55. Additionally, effective Army leaders comprehend dynamics. These dynamics include evolving strategic guidance and mandates, the strategic logic of perpetrators, the impact of operations, changing vulnerabilities and threats that relate to protection of civilians, emerging opportunities to enhance protection of civilians, and changes in an operational environment or among the actors.

1-56. A situation often features a complex and evolving relationship among the operational variables and other dynamics, requiring good intelligence, efficient information management based on the commander’s critical information requirements, and effective current assessments. Different actors concerned with protecting civilians may be reluctant to exchange information—when this exchange could compromise their neutrality, confidentiality, or operations security. However, it may be possible to develop formal and informal information-sharing mechanisms that improve Army and partner efforts to protect civilians.

Pursue the Desired Outcomes

1-57. Effective protection of civilians ultimately depends on achieving five outcomes (or end states) essential to human security:

- Safe and secure environment.
- Good governance.
- Rule of law.
- Social well-being.
- Sustainable economy.

1-58. These outcomes are directly related to the Army’s primary stability tasks. They are often related to peace building and development and usually must be pursued as parallel, mutually supporting efforts. Failure to achieve these end states can result in civilian harm or inflame grievances that result in conflict and place civilians at increased risk. Tensions and tradeoffs often exist between short-term goals and long-term outcomes, as well as a potential tension between protection of civilians and other objectives. Army units are primarily involved with establishing a safe and secure environment. In addition to improving protection of civilians, security is necessary to enable a political settlement, permit a normal life for civilians, and support the end states for which other partners are responsible. However, to maintain security, units must be flexible. In varying degrees, units may need to enable, monitor, or support the objectives of other partners. In extreme cases of last resort, Army units may have to assume temporary responsibility for other tasks. Army units, at a minimum, will have to be aware of the status of other partners’ efforts, even if these partners do not have primary responsibility and authority for those tasks. This awareness enables units to comprehend the big picture, do no harm, and avoid undermining nonmilitary tasks that may be critical to mission accomplishment.

Design and Conduct Operations That Quickly Reduce Risks to Civilians

1-59. During operations, Army units may be required to protect civilians, neutralize threats to civilians, and mitigate civilian casualties or other forms of civilian harm. While conducting operations, units must routinely and proactively incorporate protection of civilians’ considerations, as failure to do so can convey the message that violence against civilians is acceptable. Some operations, such as patrols, checkpoints, support for humanitarian assistance, or evacuation of noncombatants, may be conducted to enhance
protection of civilians directly. In other cases, operations have a secondary effect of protecting civilians. Routine Army warfighting functions such as intelligence, mission command, sustainment, and protection may require some modification to account for protection of civilians.

Comprehensively Engage the Full Range of Actors

1-60. Protection of civilians usually requires contributions from a wide variety of military and nonmilitary actors (both local and international) who are not subordinate to a common authority and do not necessarily share the same objectives. A comprehensive approach to protecting civilians is, generally, the most effective. In a comprehensive approach, military and nonmilitary actors integrate military and nonmilitary means to achieve shared objectives while understanding that many of the nonmilitary considerations are most important in the long term. It is particularly important to understand protection of civilians from the local population’s perspective. Army units should integrate plans and operations with those of other partners. Examples of comprehensive engagement includes engaging with key leaders and the population, conducting multinational operations with international and host-nation police and military partners, building the capacity of (or enabling) other partners, developing effective civil-military operations centers, and enabling humanitarian assistance.

Shape the Protective Environment

1-61. In addition to understanding and operating within an operational environment, Army leaders must determine how to shape that environment in ways that enhance protection of civilians. These shaping efforts are achieved through effective risk mitigation, information-related capabilities, and programs including security sector reform; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and transitional justice. Additionally, Army leaders focus on eliminating conflict-related sexual violence and protecting children from threats—including recruitment as child soldiers. These problems are often overlooked but are critical to address. It is impossible to have a secure environment and adequate protection of civilians when atrocities of these types regularly occur. Local, community efforts are also critical for protection of civilians. Other partners (including domestic and international political, police, humanitarian, and developmental organizations) have primary responsibility, authority, and capability for many functions. Often, Army units are limited to a supporting and enabling role.

Challenges to Protection of Civilians

1-62. While conducting operations to achieve protection of civilians, military forces will confront tradeoffs, gaps, and challenges that require difficult choices by unit leaders. Most problems will be situational in nature and defy a blanket solution. Tradeoffs occur when conflicting considerations exist and leaders must attempt to strike a balance between them. For example, peace and stability are important objectives, but so is a just environment in which basic human rights are protected and violators are held accountable. Other tradeoffs include the role of host-nation and external actors, the pursuit of short-term and long-term goals, and the balanced protection of civilians with other objectives. Requirements for effective protection of civilians will likely exceed capacity. In addition, host-nation corruption, constraints with respect to civilian authorities and responsibilities, and difficulties in achieving unity of effort among the diverse actors will likely challenge Army units. (For additional resources, see the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute [PKSOI] Web site.)

Mass Atrocity Response Operations

1-63. Commanders should be prepared within their capabilities to monitor, prevent, and if necessary, respond to mass atrocity situations in all operations, not just in peace operations. Evidence of previously committed mass atrocities can also become known during the course of peace operations, potentially raising diplomatic, political, and social turmoil, the consequences of which can directly affect ongoing operations. Addressing the sources of instability may contribute to preventing mass atrocities. Military support and supporting efforts of other agencies and organizations in response to mass atrocities may be key to the success of stability missions. (JP 3-07.3 provides joint doctrine for mass atrocity response operations. For additional resources, see the PKSOI Web site.)
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

1-64. Security sector reform is a comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice (JP 3-07). Security sector reform aims to provide an effective and legitimate public service that is transparent, accountable to civil authority, and responsive to the needs of the public. It may include integrated activities to support defense and armed forces reform; civilian management and oversight; justice, police, corrections, and intelligence reform; national security planning and strategy support; border management; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; and concurrent reduction of armed violence.

1-65. Security sector reform involves reestablishing or reforming institutions and key ministerial positions that maintain and oversee the safety and security of a nation. Through the whole-of-government approach, ministerial officials and institutions can assume an effective, legitimate, and accountable role; they are responsible for security and should be subordinated under civil authorities. Effective security sector reform enables a nation to build its capacity to provide security and justice. Security sector reform promotes stability, fosters reform processes, and creates an environment for economic development. Security sector reform should result in effective and legitimate security sector firmly rooted within the rule of law.

Roles and Responsibilities of United States Government Partners

1-66. The departments and agencies of the U.S. Government, including the Department of Defense (DOD), pursue integrated security sector reform based on a whole-of-government approach. With the support of the host nation, military officials collaborate with interagency and interorganizational partners to design and implement security sector reform strategies and plans. The Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency for security sector reform, providing oversight for these efforts through its bureaus, offices, and overseas missions. DOD provides capabilities to support the establishment, reform, and restructuring of a host nation’s armed forces and defense sector. DOD also helps other U.S. agencies involved in security sector reform. Army forces participate in and support security sector reform as directed by the joint force commander. (Roles and responsibilities of interagency partners in security sector reform are discussed in the combined United States Agency for International Development [USAID], DOD, and DOS publication Security Sector Reform.)

1-67. The Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) can often serve as the primary effort for justice system reforms within a host nation. Effective commanders request assistance with identifying the critical tasks prior to deployment. If ICITAP personnel deploy, commanders involve ICITAP with all planning efforts. ICITAP can assist not only on police systems, but on both detention centers and prisons as well. ICITAP lends expertise in the following areas:

- Organizational development within the justice systems.
- Terrorism and transnational crime.
- Public integrity and anticorruption.
- Specialized and tactical skills.
- Marine and border security.
- Academy and instructor development (basic through advanced courses to include leadership and executive development).
- Criminal justice coordination (such as training and development for police, prosecutors, and judges).
- Criminal investigations.
- Forensics (basic to international standards).
- Basic police services.
- Community policing.
- Corrections.
- Information systems within the justice systems.
- Intelligence-led policing.
1-68. While the military may initially shape an operational environment, organizations and agencies such as ICITAP can provide long-term assistance from the tactical to the sustained institutional levels of development.

The Military Role in Security Sector Reform

1-69. Security sector reform can occur at any point across the range of military operations, in conditions ranging from peace to the aftermath of major combat operations. No matter the conditions, security sector reform focus on mitigating conditions that might foster crisis and conflict. Within unified land operations, security sector reform is often an aspect of operations focused on stability. Security sector reform includes tasks, functions, and activities from each of the primary task areas. It concentrates on generating the capacity of the state and societal institutions to support responsible governance and the rule of law. (The roles and responsibilities of the military in security sector reform are discussed further in ADRP 3-07 and JP 3-07.)

The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in Security Sector Reform

1-70. Since the end of the Cold War, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) have emerged as prominent partners in security sector reform efforts worldwide. The most prominently recognized among these actors is the UN. The UN brings high levels of legitimacy, special capabilities provided by a broad mix of member states, and a capacity for sustaining large missions over long periods. The UN deploys many agencies capable of supporting security sector reform across the security sector. Integrated missions mandated by a UN Security Council resolution and directed by a special representative to the UN Secretary General encourage cooperation in security sector reform by multiple partners from UN agencies.

Security Sector Reform and Host-Nation Autonomy

1-71. Operations focused on stability seek to enhance the legitimacy of host-nation governance while leveraging efforts to reform the security sector. A host nation’s constitution, institutions, laws, and processes, however developmental, should play a central role in security sector reform. External influences frequently shape security sector reform policy, especially when a host nation’s government functions poorly. Nonetheless, security sector reform planners carefully uphold the host nation’s sovereignty by integrating its government into reform planning and execution.

1-72. After hostilities cease, a comprehensive peace agreement must exist before security sector reform can begin. Once a peace agreement is established, partners can focus on helping the host nation create a national constitution. To create a suitable constitution, the partners ensure constitutional scholars work with host-nation officials to promote understanding of the political structure. National security strategies or policies and subordinate strategic documents, national defense acts, and national justice codes illustrate host-nation guidelines that can help to add structure to the security sector reform effort. Also important to the security sector reform effort are host-nation groups in charge of specific responsibilities, such as government reform agencies and national reconciliation commissions.

1-73. Each partner in security sector reform helps develop the programs using its own policy guidance and implementation mechanisms. For example, UN Security Council resolutions define the mandates of UN peacekeepers and missions led by the UN. Host-nation national policy guidance, national justice systems, and relevant national legislation, treaties, and agreements—bilateral and multilateral—provide a framework for the host nation and its military forces. U.S. security assistance must proceed within the framework of legislated provisions governing the delivery of foreign assistance by U.S. agencies. While security sector reform should integrate these activities, the reform programs should primarily reflect the host nation’s institutions, laws, and processes. (The roles and responsibilities of the U.S. Government and other partners in security sector reform are discussed in JP 3-07 and JP 3-08.)

Security Sector Reform Planning

1-74. Sustainable security sector reform depends on thorough planning, assessment, patience, and perseverance. Working within a collaborative environment, the various partners consider the unique capabilities and contributions of each participant. The ensuing plan aims for a practical pace of reform and
accounts for the political and cultural context of the environment. The plan accounts for available resources and capabilities while balancing the human capacity to deliver change against a realistic timeline. The security sector reform plan reflects the host nation’s cultures, sensitivities, and historical conceptions of security. It does not seek to implement a Western paradigm for the security sector, understanding that a Western model may not be appropriate. Yet, security sector reform planners cannot adopt a lax attitude toward security practices that contribute to conflict or instability. As with the broader campaign plan, the security sector reform plan seeks to resolve the underlying sources of conflict while preventing new security crises.

1-75. The level of host-nation development—especially as it pertains to poverty and economic opportunity—is an important consideration in security sector reform planning. High levels of poverty and extensive corruption significantly challenge security sector reform efforts. Poverty and corruption at the individual and institutional levels typically lead to poor economic growth, inadequate or excessive government revenues, and a chronically under-resourced public sector. Security sector reform should address these challenges. Programs should confront flagrant corruption in the public sector and accommodate limited host-nation public administration and public management capacities. External resourcing and external fiscal management for the host nation’s security sector, including its military institutions, may be necessary until the host nation can sustain security sector reform.

1-76. Ideally, the host nation’s security strategy and defense policy guide the security sector reform plan. However, in states without established, legitimate government institutions able to develop mature strategy and policy, interagency and interorganizational security sector reform planners must review international security strategy and defense policy before developing a plan. Any such review must account for the characteristics of the host nation’s cultures. It must help ensure the security sector reform plan reflects the genuine needs of the nation, not just the demands of its officials. It must ensure the final plan leads to a sustainable security apparatus appropriate for the needs of the host nation and its people.

**Principles of Security Sector Reform**

1-77. Effective security sector reform requires unity of effort and a shared vision among the agencies, organizations, institutions, and forces contributing to the reform process, both within and outside of the U.S. Government. This unity of effort and shared vision reflects a comprehensive approach. Security sector reform is a cooperative activity, conducted with the other agencies of the U.S. Government, IGOs, nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, and the host nation. Integrated programs that consider relationships among organizations, sectors, and actors increase the likelihood of success, minimize unforeseen developments, and ensure the most effective use of resources. Six principles guide security sector reform:

- Support host-nation ownership.
- Incorporate principles of good governance and respect for human rights.
- Balance operational support with institutional reform.
- Link security and justice.
- Foster transparency.
- Do no harm.

(The principles for security sector reform are discussed in ADRP 3-07 and JP 3-07.)

**Foundations of Security Sector Reform**

1-78. During security sector reform, participating military forces understand that the ultimate responsibility for reform rests with the host nation. Security sector reform planning is based on the recognition that successful efforts require an extended commitment of time and resources. The military judiciously selects and uses forces to create a secure environment so security sector reform proceeds smoothly. The military may provide temporary capability and expertise, but long-term success in reform depends on how quickly and effectively it transitions to appropriate civilian agencies and the host nation.

1-79. The foundations of security sector reform are—
A concept of security developed by the host nation and ingrained in its culture.

A framework that encompasses all security sector participants and challenges.

Cooperation with and among civil authorities.

Human rights.

Clear policies, accountability, and professionalism.

**A Concept of Security Developed by the Host Nation**

1-80. The host nation develops a concept of security; its culture then ingrains this concept. The core values of security sector reform should reflect the security needs of the people. Security sector reform should instill the principle of ownership.

**A Framework That Encompasses All Security Sector Participants**

1-81. Security sector reform should encompass all security sector participants and challenges. It provides a framework to structure thinking concerning the diverse security challenges facing host nations and their populations. An inclusive framework is essential to integrate security sector reform policies and to achieve civilian involvement and oversight. An inclusive framework is founded on understanding the security sector from the host nation’s perspective.

**Cooperation With and Among Civil Authorities**

1-82. Military forces develop security sector reform approaches in cooperation with civil authorities. Security sector reform approaches should be based on a broad assessment of the security and justice needs of the people and the state. Effective strategies reflect a comprehensive plan that encompasses all the numerous functions in the security sector.

**Human Rights**

1-83. Security sector reform must be based on democratic norms and supported by principles of international human rights. Effective security sector reform creates freedom from fear by measurably reducing armed violence and violent crime. Security sector reform should enhance the institutional and human capacity for security policy to function effectively and for justice to be delivered impartially.

**Clear Policies, Accountability, and Professionalism**

1-84. Security sector reform should include well-defined policies that strengthen the governance of security institutions. It should build professional host-nation security forces that are accountable to civil authorities and capable of executing their responsibilities. The security sector and supporting activities must adhere to basic principles of governance and broader public sector reform programs, including transparency and accountability. (Other considerations in security sector reform planning are discussed in ADRP 3-07 and JP 3-07.)

**Comprehensive Security Sector Reform**

1-85. Through unity of effort, execution of security sector reform unites all elements of the security sector. The activities of military forces may focus on reforming a host nation’s military forces, but those actions are only part of a broader, comprehensive effort to reform the entire security sector. Military forces may directly support related reform efforts or indirectly support the efforts as related, integrated activities.

1-86. Once the security sector is stabilized, other partners can safely begin operations in the operational area. Over time, military forces transfer appropriate responsibilities to other partners in the stability effort, whether from one military force to another or to a civilian group. Military forces complete the transfers of responsibilities and then focus their efforts on other stability tasks.
Civilian Oversight and Control

1-87. Establishing civilian oversight and control of the defense sector is critical to the success of any security sector reform. Oversight and control mechanisms as well as processes ensure civilian control of the military, a fundamental tenet of democratic governance. These processes and mechanisms also ensure that the various components of the defense sector are accountable to elected and appointed civilian leadership, in both the executive and legislative branches. That accountability is essential to establishing a sound foundation for defense budget planning and program implementation.

1-88. The ministry of defense acts as the primary agent of civilian oversight and control within the defense sector of many foreign nations. A key indicator of civilian oversight and control is the number of civilian positions in the ministry of defense. The ministry of defense operates within some form of interagency or cabinet framework that establishes political links and accountability between the ministry and the executive and legislative branches. Other agencies involved in the defense sector may share oversight and control responsibilities, such as the cabinet-level leadership of intelligence agencies, executive protection forces, and border forces. In transitioning or post-conflict states, these institutions are frequently weak, dysfunctional, or altogether absent. Security sector reform encompasses restructuring, rebuilding, and, in some cases, creating entirely new institutions. These programs coordinate with the host nation to provide oversight and control mechanisms for the defense sector.

1-89. The legislative branch plays an important role in oversight and control. The legislature typically determines the funding level of government activities while providing the statutory framework for planning and implementation. Constitutional frameworks may give the legislature a share in the appointment of senior government officials, or in the structuring, commissioning, and promoting of Soldiers. In this context, building an effective partnership between the executive and legislative branches becomes an important enabler of effective security sector reform.

1-90. Most transitioning and post-conflict host nations clearly define and delineate the roles and responsibilities of military forces and law enforcement agencies as they provide internal security. If the security apparatus of a host nation begins to fracture, the necessary distinctions between military and law enforcement roles and missions erode or disappear entirely. This situation frequently leads to inappropriate military involvement in political affairs. As a result, military forces may subsume justice and law enforcement functions although they lack professional training and appropriate equipment. Security sector reform must restore the distinction between military and law enforcement functions as well as provide robust mechanisms to sustain that distinction. This is particularly important with host nations embroiled in an insurgency, where the military seeks to assume the primary role while marginalizing the police.

1-91. The primary agent of civilian oversight and control over law enforcement agencies is likely a separate ministry, such as the ministry of interior or of justice. As host-nation capacity for law enforcement increases, inherent power struggles may develop as police leaders strive to control the management of social order. For this reason, security sector reform focuses on improving communication and coordination between disparate ministries that have overlapping responsibilities for maintaining civil security. Often, the threshold for transitioning law enforcement from military to police oversight depends on the level of violence. This threshold serves as a quantifiable measure of effectiveness for military or civilian security sector efforts. The goal is to reduce violence to levels that host-nation police can manage, not to eradicate violence completely.

Developing Security Forces

1-92. Security force assistance is the Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions (JP 3-22). The development of capability and capacity is integral to successful stability missions and extends to all security forces: military forces, police forces, border forces, and other paramilitary organizations. Development applies to all levels of government within the host nation as well as to other local and regional forces. DOD and other partners help the host nation develop forces that will be able to operate across the range of military operations. Such forces can combat internal threats such as insurgency, subversion, and lawlessness; defend against external threats; or serve as coalition partners in other geographic locations. Partners conducting security force assistance develop
programs that will facilitate the host nation to perform stability tasks and eventually sustain its own security. The host nation needs to sufficiently size, resource, organize, train, and equip its forces to meet its own standards (or internationally accepted standards) of security for its people. Successful security force assistance depends on thorough and continuous assessment. It includes the organizing, training, equipping, rebuilding, and advising of the forces involved. (Security force assistance is further discussed in FM 3-22 and JP 3-22.)

**Military Forces**

1-93. Military forces conducting security force assistance develop host-nation military forces for the primary purpose of countering external threats. The design of host-nation military forces develops from analyzing external threats to the host nation and determining the capabilities required to counter such threats. Other key military missions include providing humanitarian assistance, and in special cases, countering certain types of internal military threats. External organizations executing security sector reform and the individuals assigned to them are selected for their specific abilities to train and advise the developing force. For example, military police should help develop military police forces. This provides for appropriate development of expertise while facilitating the advising process.

**Justice and Law Enforcement Forces**

1-94. An effective and accountable justice system and supporting law enforcement (especially police) forces are central to a legitimate security framework. Although the military may be involved initially in developing the justice and law enforcement forces, other agencies should assume this task as soon as possible. Qualified, professional justice sector and police trainers support an improved advising process and ensure sustainable development with appropriate civilian oversight. Their expertise ensures an appropriate delineation of roles and responsibilities between military forces and law enforcement sectors. In policing, development of organizational substructure—supervision, process, policy, internal governance, planning, and budgeting—is vital to the long-term sustainability of reform efforts. (Further discussion on justice and law enforcement forces reform is found in JP 3-07.)

**Law Enforcement**

1-95. The Foreign Assistance Act specifically prohibits assistance to foreign police forces by DOD unless a Presidential directive provides specific exceptions. When providing assistance to training, the DOS’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs takes the lead in police assistance. The President, however, may delegate this role to other agencies. For example, in 2004, President George W. Bush signed a decision directive granting the Commander, United States Central Command authority to train and equip the Iraqi police.

1-96. When given the appropriate authority, Army military police support the criminal justice system reform through their law enforcement capabilities. Throughout the joint operational phases—shape, deter, seize the initiative, dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authority—professional military police units can support host-nation police organizations through partnership and mentorship programs. When criminal justice system reform, specifically the law enforcement activity, has broken down within a society, the military police may initially support efforts to assist in recruiting, training, and equipping host-nation police organizations to build force capability and capacity.

1-97. Following an intervention in a failed or fragile state, an effective police force may not exist. With the local security environment in disarray, international police trainers and advisors often cannot safely deploy into the area. Military forces may be required to take the lead in restoring and maintaining order—through clearing and holding operations—until enough civilian police partners arrive to initiate that component of security sector reform. When few military forces exist, counterinsurgency strategies require systematically creating secured zones before establishing local police in insurgent enclaves. While conventional military forces may be capable of providing immediate security from armed threats, they are not effective trainers of policing skills. Nor are they appropriate providers of police services to local communities unless they act as an occupying force under the provisions of the law of land warfare. Formed police units trained in stability policing skills are appropriate to perform these functions. Initial planning for failed state interventions should plan to incorporate such forces at the earliest opportunity. Typically, military police assist in
training and advising local police and establishing police stationing operations for local law enforcement forces. Military police forces may also assist in training and advising corrections officers as part of capacity-building activities. As the police program matures, formal police training centers and academies foster professional police forces.

1-98. Commanders and staffs at all levels during preplanning efforts must carefully analyze and assess the situation from a rule of law perspective. Either as the result of increased looting or an escalation of incidents caused by a simple disregard for the law, the military police may serve as the initial force to assist in stabilizing a situation. In the meantime, planning and coordination efforts must develop with the DOS to deploy civilian experts to the operational area. Specific law enforcement operations and activities that support stability tasks may include:

- Conducting police station operations.
- Conducting criminal investigations.
- Conducting traffic enforcement operations.
- Employing forensic capabilities.
- Conducting police engagement.
- Conducting temporary detention of personnel.
- Providing protective services for selected individuals and high-risk personnel security.
- Providing investigative support.
- Employing biometric capabilities.
- Conducting critical site security.
- Providing customs support.
- Restoring and maintaining order.
- Conducting border control, security, and freedom of movement operations.
- Restoring public safety, order, and confidence.
- Performing host-nation police training and support operations.
- Providing support to civil law enforcement.

**Legal System**

1-99. When criminal justice system reform, specifically the legal system, has broken down within a society, staff judge advocates and others may initially support efforts to assist in recruiting, training, and equipping the host nation’s legal system. Prior to deployment should coordinate and formulate basic, flexible rule of law plans that participants can tailor to the particular circumstances of the deployment. These participants can include judge advocates, civil affairs personnel, military police, and others who anticipate a rule of law activity that contemplates criminal justice system reform activities. Once deployed, information and time will likely be in short supply. Criminal justice system reform practices involving the practice of law include, but are not limited to—

- Evaluating and assisting in developing transitional decrees, codes, ordinances, courts, and other measures intended to bring immediate order to areas in which the host nation’s legal system is impaired or nonfunctioning.
- Evaluating host-nation law, legal traditions, and administrative procedures in light of international legal obligations and human rights standards and, when necessary, providing appropriate assistance to their reform.
- Evaluating the training given to host-nation judges, prosecutors, defense counsel, legal advisors, court administrators, and police and corrections officials in light of international legal obligations and human rights standards.
- Advising commanders and others on the application of international, U.S., and host-nation law considered in restoring and enhancing rule of law in the host nation.
- Advising commanders and U.S., international, and host-nation authorities on the legality, legitimacy, and effectiveness of the host nation’s legal system—including its government’s compliance with international legal obligations and host-nation law.
Stability Tasks in Military Operations

- When necessary, serving as legal advisors for transitional courts.
- Supporting the training of U.S. personnel in the host nation’s legal system and traditions.

1-100. Criminal justice system reform activities require continuity. Judge advocates deploying to replace judge advocates already in the operational area rely on their predecessors for information regarding an operational environment. This information can detail the host nation, its legal system, existing rule of law and criminal justice system reform activities, lessons learned, and opportunities identified for future activities.

Corrections

1-101. Commanders may have to conduct corrections operations should inadequacies exist within the host nation. Internment and resettlement planners can incorporate the number of companies required based on estimates of capture rates and dislocated civilians. A military police commander may serve as the commander of detainee operations, or a military police brigade commander may perform those functions in a smaller area of operations. Working through host nation’s corrections personnel and through authorized advisory efforts, U.S. corrections specialists can, through any phase of the stability framework, begin initial steps towards improving this crucial aspect of the criminal justice system. Of note, however, the military police houses detainees off the battlefield whereas prisons house inmates awaiting trial or convicted by the courts in the criminal justice system.

Other Security Forces

1-102. Requirements may arise for developing other forces within the security sector. These requirements may include specialized security forces; presidential guards; coast guard, border control, and customs services; or intelligence services. The host nation determines the specific requirements on which to develop these forces. Until such forces are developed and trained, other security forces assume responsibilities outside their intended domain. In such cases, commanders ensure forces conduct operations in compliance with relevant host-nation constitutional and statutory provisions and consistent with international law and humanitarian guidelines. Commanders consider civilians’ perceptions of operations and the legitimacy of the forces supporting operations. Units conducting security sector reform continuously assess operations. Commanders use those assessments to monitor the effect of operations on the local populace and broader security sector reform.

1-103. In general, capabilities of security forces reflect the roles for which they were designed and trained. There may be overlap, particularly in times of emergency or until all planned forces are developed and trained. Cooperation between military and police forces is emphasized from the outset, permitting both to maintain their appropriate and distinct constitutional roles in the security sector. Security sector reform educates host-nation forces, civilian oversight agencies, and political leadership on the appropriate roles for each part of the security forces. Security sector reform restricts military forces to their role as a force of last resort in the face of military threats. Using such forces may require several approaches within the constitutional rule of law when military support to civil authority is required.

1-104. Ultimately, force development clearly defines and institutionalizes the separation of roles and responsibilities between military forces and law enforcement agencies. Usually, their organization, training, and equipment reflect this distinction; their design clearly limits the amount and degree of force that law enforcement agencies can generate. For example, civilian police entities may adopt military command structures and systems but not their mobile organizational structure. Another separation of roles and responsibilities exists in that police forces provide services to a particular local area, neighborhood, or community. Since police lack organization for a large-scale maneuver, they seldom form like military forces. (Reform of these other security forces is discussed in JP 3-07.)

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION, AND REINTEGRATION PROGRAMS

1-105. The immediate goal of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs is to assess the security requirements of the host nation and bring the military and police forces into alignment with those requirements. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts are a critical component of stabilization activities and should be accounted for in initial planning. Often, the terms of these programs
are negotiated in ceasefire or peace accords. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs are designed to remediate sources of instability. These programs facilitate achieving long-term peace, security, and development. Efforts focus on immediately managing people previously associated with armed forces and belligerent groups.

1-106. Conceptually, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs transition from disarmament and demobilization to reintegration, but sequential progress is rare among all former warring factions. Disarmament is the voluntary collection and positive control of weapons, while demobilization is the formal disbanding of armed units and their support apparatus. Reintegration helps former combatants become productive members of society. Because of their significance to security sector reform, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts require a carefully crafted strategy that aligns funding, resources, organizations, and time available. This helps avoid stalled or haphazard programs that could lead former combatants to withdraw in frustration and distrust future efforts. Commanders implement programs as efficiently and effectively as possible. The success of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration depends on integrating strategies and planning across all the sectors. These programs can set the foundation for safeguarding and sustaining communities in which former combatants live as contributing, law-abiding citizens. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration will not be effective until all major actors to the conflict participate in the peace agreement. However, minor, irreconcilable factions should not factor into the decision to proceed with disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.

1-107. Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration officials must seek ways to defray costs and extend their programs as long as possible with the resources given. Leaders aim to conduct efficient operations that provide the maximum benefit to the host nation, keeping in mind that most programs end when funding stops.

1-108. Successful programs are rewarding for participants. Such programs provide certificates of completion along with certificates for education and vocational training. Many participants cherish this recognition. Additionally, forces host a graduation ceremony for successful completion of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. (For doctrine on disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, see ADRP 3-07 and JP 3-07. See the DOS’s Lessons-Learned: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) in Reconstruction and Stabilization Operations—A Guide for United States Government Planners for interagency perspectives.)

Disarmament

1-109. In the context of stability, disarmament is the collection, documentation, control, and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives, unexploded ordnance, and light and heavy weapons of former combatants. Disarmament does not extend to the citizenry, which possesses the inalienable right of self-defense. Because disarmament is a voluntary process, coercive techniques are counterproductive to the desired objectives of the disarmament programs. Accordingly, a comprehensive information campaign detailing collection points, dates for turning in weapons, ceremonies, and other pertinent information is essential. The host nation’s government must exploit every medium available to ensure the word spreads. However, it is counterproductive to offer money for weapons, since this can motivate individuals to turn in unserviceable and antiquated weapons. The military often provides security at collection points, but it should not participate directly in collection. For the irreconcilable factions, the host nation’s government should assume responsibility.

Demobilization

1-110. Demobilization is the process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality (JP 4-05). Because demobilization is complex, organization of infrastructure, administrative and medical personnel, and the structured program for processing is paramount. While the government security forces can use existing camps, rebel forces cannot. Consequently, these disparate groups need separate temporary camps for effective demobilization. The demobilization process typically takes several days to complete properly. Numerous challenges confront this process: a weapons turn-in and storage point; the ability to in-process and verify statuses of the combatants; medical screening; segregated barracks and latrines for males, females, child soldiers, and families; accommodations for disabled
individuals; and food and water. Fighters are not the only former combatants that process through disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration. Service support providers, most often women, must also be demobilized. For example, during in-processing, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration personnel must identify women who are victims of sex slavery and forced marriage and place them in secure barracks. (For additional resources on constructing and operating disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration cantonments, see the PKSOI Web site.)

Reintegration

1-111. Reintegration is the process through which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local populace (ADRP 3-07). It encompasses the reinsertion of individual former combatants and dislocated civilians into host-nation communities, villages, and social groups. Reintegration is a social and economic recovery process focused on the local community; it complements other community-based programs that spur job training, employment services, and economic recovery.

1-112. Reintegration includes programs to impart marketable skills to demobilized armed forces and groups, belligerents, and dislocated civilians; relocation assistance to support their resettlement in civilian communities; basic and vocational education; and assistance in finding employment in local economies. It accounts for the specific needs of women and children associated with armed forces and groups, as well as those of civilians forced to flee their homes after violent conflict or disaster. Consequently, temporary camps need facilities for education and vocational skills training. Recruiting local teachers and vocational instructors facilitates members of a society assisting in the reintegration process. Specialized assistance, such as psychiatric counseling for traumatized combatants and devices for disabled combatants, ensures victims of conflict receive necessary assistance.

1-113. Reintegration also addresses the willingness of civilian communities to accept former fighters into their midst. If reconciliation fails, programs include finding new communities for those who cannot be reintegrated. Amnesty and reconciliation are key components to successful reintegration. In this context, reintegration cannot be divorced from justice and reconciliation programs that are part of the broader transition process. Officials cannot promise or grant amnesty and must defer to the UN for such matters. If the host nation assumes this responsibility, it prosecutes alleged war criminals and conducts truth and reconciliation committees for lesser war crimes. In such cases, a temporary camp requires a facility for hearings. Successful reintegration programs tend to be long term and costly, requiring the participation of numerous external and host-nation security sector reform actors.

1-114. Reintegration inherently includes reinsertion, repatriation, and resettlement:

- Reinsertion is the assistance offered to former combatants, belligerents, and dislocated civilians prior to the long-term process of reintegration.
- Repatriation, in this context, is the return of individuals to their country of citizenship.
- Resettlement is the relocation of refugees to a third country that is not the country of citizenship nor the country into which the refugee has fled.

1-115. Reinsertion is a form of transitional assistance intended to provide for the basic needs of reintegrating individuals and their families. This assistance includes transitional safety allowances, food, clothes, shelter, medical services, short-term education, training, employment, and tools. While reintegration represents enduring social and economic development, reinsertion comprises short-term material and financial assistance programs intended to meet immediate needs. Resettlement to a third country is granted by accord of the country of resettlement. It is based on criteria that include legal and physical protection needs, lack of local integration opportunities, medical needs, family reunification needs, and threat of violence or torture.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and CBRN

1-116. A related mission may include the destruction, monitoring, and redirection of WMD as well as mitigating CBRN hazards. CBRN threats include WMD. CBRN hazards may result from deliberate attack or accidental release. During the performance of stability tasks, the presence of these CBRN hazards can be a major destabilizing force. Destruction activities include the dismantling, removal, transfer, disposal, and
consolidation of an adversary’s materials, equipment, personnel (intellectual capital), and infrastructure of WMD. Monitoring and redirection activities follow destruction activities. Monitoring and redirection aims to convert WMD programs, personnel, sites, and facilities to prevent the transfer, reconstitution, and misuse of residual dual-use capabilities. During monitoring and redirecting efforts, leaders need to understand the political and legal ramifications of U.S. military personnel handling WMD—all treaties, conventions, agreements, resolutions, and protocols should be considered.

1-117. The range of CBRN threats and hazards (beyond just WMD) can continue to pose a problem for both military forces and other partners supporting the stabilization efforts. Removing, decontaminating, or otherwise neutralizing these hazards ensures the safety, security, and well-being of the local populace and freedom of movement to U.S. forces.

1-118. The list of tasks related to CBRN activities may include an initial response in which military forces—

- RemEDIATE hazards remaining in the area.
- Provide decontamination support.

(For a discussion of destruction, monitoring, and redirection of WMD, see JP 3-40, and for mitigation of CBRN hazards, see JP 3-41.)

ARMY SUPPORT TO SECURITY COOPERATION

1-119. Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide United States forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (JP 3-22). Security cooperation includes all security assistance programs administered by DOD that build defense and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests. Security assistance programs include all international armaments cooperation activities and other security assistance activities. Security assistance and security force assistance may prove important to the primary stability task of establishing civil security either as part of peacetime activities or as assigned missions along the stability framework after conflict. (For a more detailed discussion of Army support to security cooperation, see FM 3-22.)

PEACE OPERATIONS

1-120. In joint doctrine, peace operations include crisis response and limited contingency operations. Peace operations normally include international efforts and military missions to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment for reconciling, rebuilding, and transitioning to legitimate governance. Peace operations usually have a high proportion of stability tasks compared to offensive and defensive tasks. Peace operations include—

- Peacekeeping operations.
- Peace building, which are post-conflict actions.
- Peacemaking.
- Conflict prevention efforts.
- Peace enforcement operations.

1-121. Peace operations may be conducted under the mandate of the UN, another IGO, within a coalition of agreeing nations, or unilaterally. As with other types of military operations, peace operations depend on the situation, reflecting the political, military, economic, social, information, and infrastructure characteristics of the environment. (Each type of peace operation is presented in more detail in JP 3-07.3.)

1-122. Peace operations overlap significantly with stability tasks and often contain a sizeable stabilization component. The military force focus initially on tasks relating to the establishment of civil security. A safe and secure environment is essential toward enabling the other nonmilitary aspects of the mission that promote the peace process and strive for resolution of the conflict. Protection of civilians has been key to most peace operations. As the situation stabilizes, the requirements for peace building increase and the military force need to prepare to support tasks dealing with establishment of civil control and governance.
1-123. The political objectives of a peace operation shape the development of key documents that provide legal authority and define its boundaries. These key documents assist commanders and their staffs in planning and accomplishing their missions in peace operations. Some key documents used in peace operations include—

- A mandate.
- A status-of-forces agreement or status-of-mission agreement.
- A term of reference.
- A memorandum of understanding.
- Rules of engagement.

1-124. Both the UN and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (known as NATO) have published doctrine on the conduct of peace operations. (See the UN Web site for UN publications. See the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Web site for North Atlantic Treaty Organization publications.)

FOREIGN HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

1-125. Foreign humanitarian assistance consists of DOD activities, during military operations or peacetime, to alleviate human suffering. (See JP 3-29 for joint doctrine on foreign humanitarian assistance.) Foreign disaster relief, one type of foreign humanitarian assistance, refers to prompt aid to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims. Army units and other security partners may be required to establish conditions conducive to humanitarian action. The administrator of USAID, the President’s Special Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance, promotes maximum effectiveness and coordination in responses by the U.S. Government to foreign disasters. Delivery of humanitarian assistance during the initial response phase of the stability framework may prove an important element of restoring essential services. (The minimum-essential stability tasks—provision of minimum levels of civil security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment to the civilian populace—are further discussed in ADRP 3-07. Chapter 4 of ATP 3-07.5 discusses tasks of foreign humanitarian assistance.)

1-126. Threats to civilians are often accompanied by acute needs for essential goods and services. Civilians may flee a threat, thus losing their access to livelihoods, services, and support networks. Perpetrators may destroy sources of food, water, and shelter or otherwise purposely restrict access to essential services. The situation may be a complex emergency, characterized by both conflict and natural disasters such as droughts or flooding. Lack of access to clean water, medical services, and other essentials can harm more civilians than physical violence. Moreover, lack of access to basic goods and services may undermine an individual or communities’ ability to protect or rebound from physical violence. Additionally, competition over scarce essential goods and services can be a root cause of or contribute to conflict and violence against civilians. It is therefore vital to foster an environment conducive to humanitarian assistance to protect civilians. This requirement could accompany other military operations and may at times be the military’s most important task to prevent widespread human suffering.

Army Role in Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

1-127. With the exception of immediate response to prevent loss of life, U.S. forces normally conduct foreign humanitarian assistance only upon the request of DOS and in coordination with the chief of mission and USAID. The U.S. military’s unmatched capabilities in logistics, mission command, communications, and mobility can provide rapid and robust response to dynamic and evolving situations among vastly different military, civilian, and government entities. Usually the military’s primary task in a humanitarian crisis is to ensure a secure environment in which humanitarian workers can operate.

1-128. Army forces, often as part of a joint task force, normally play a supporting role in foreign humanitarian assistance. Sometimes, the primary role for Army units is to help provide secure space so that humanitarian partners can focus on objective and apolitical human needs. Typical supporting roles include—

- Providing prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of foreign disaster victims.
- Making available, preparing, and transporting nonlethal excess property to foreign countries.
- Transferring on-hand DOD stocks to respond to unforeseen emergencies.
• Providing funded and space available transportation of humanitarian and relief supplies.
• Conducting some DOD humanitarian demining assistance activities.
• Conducting foreign consequence management.

1-129. Army units sometimes provide direct support to humanitarian operations. For example, in extreme situations and as a last resort, humanitarian actors may request direct assistance such as escorts from Army units for humanitarian teams delivering aid. In such cases, humanitarian use of military assets should seek to comply with international guidance designed to safeguard humanitarian actors and the people they seek to assist. Where humanitarian actors are not present or able to help people in need, Army units may be temporarily involved in the actual delivery of essential goods and services until other actors are able to assume the role. While Army units may become directly involved in humanitarian assistance as a last resort under extreme circumstances, normally these units contribute to an environment conducive to humanitarian action by—

• Establishing and maintaining general security, thus providing space in which humanitarian actors can operate.
• Providing situational awareness regarding such issues as the location, number, and condition of civilians in need.
• Providing information on potential threats.
• Providing communications support.
• Supporting planning efforts.
• Providing security at storage sites and during transload operations, transportation, and distribution.
• Improving or building infrastructure capability for transportation and delivery of humanitarian assistance.
• Providing transportation support (including helicopter transport and airfield operations).
• Providing equipment (such as materials handling equipment) and operators.
• Synchronizing information-related capabilities.
• Providing required technical expertise with selected Soldiers or units (such as medical, construction, water purification, graves registration, and interpreter expertise).

Types of Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Activities

1-130. Foreign humanitarian assistance activities conducted by U.S. forces span the range of military operations but are most often crisis response and limited contingency operations. A single foreign humanitarian assistance activity may well contain more than one of the following missions:

• Foreign disaster relief.
• Dislocated civilian support.
• Security missions.
• Technical assistance support functions.
• Foreign consequence management.

1-131. Foreign disaster relief missions include prompt aid that alleviates the suffering of disaster victims. Dislocated civilian support missions support assistance and protection for dislocated civilians. Dislocated civilian is a broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person (JP 3-29). Security missions may include establishing and maintaining conditions to support humanitarian efforts by organizations of the world relief community. Technical assistance and support functions may include short-term support tasks such as communications restoration, relief supply distribution management and delivery, port operations, base operating support, emergency medical care, search and rescue, and humanitarian demining assistance. (For further information regarding humanitarian demining assistance, see appendix B of JP 3-29.) Foreign consequence management is U.S. Government activity to help friends and allies mitigate the effects of a CBRN incident. (For further information regarding foreign consequence management, see JP 3-41.) Army leaders apply the practical guidelines summarized in table 1-1 for Army support to foreign humanitarian assistance.
Table 1-1. Practical guidelines for supporting foreign humanitarian assistance

| Army units supporting foreign humanitarian assistance— | • Consult with international humanitarian organizations for guidance.  
• Develop a plan of action for the distribution.  
• Adequately staff the distribution site, including translators to assist with communications.  
• Provide water, sanitation, and shelter at the distribution site.  
• Identify leaders from the population to assist with the operation.  
• Attempt to calm the population and create a sense of order prior to handing out supplies.  
• Use members of the community to assist with the distribution by informing people of what is being given to whom, including how and where the distribution will happen.  
• Divide large stockpiles of supplies into smaller parts to distribute to different locations or zones at the same time to minimize long lines and crowds.  
• Consider the special needs of women, children, the elderly, infirm, and handicapped who may have a difficult time accessing supplies.  
• Stop the distribution if disorder or violence occurs as a result. |

| Army units supporting foreign humanitarian assistance avoid— | • Distributing commodities without a site plan.  
• Sending a small team to execute a distribution.  
• Setting conditions that would lead to dehydration or an unsanitary environment.  
• Ignoring, marginalizing, or alienating local leaders during the distribution.  
• Using one major distribution point that will attract a large crowd.  
• Throwing commodities from vehicles or other modes of transport, creating a fight for the fittest to obtain the supplies.  
• Ignoring questions and concerns of the population.  
• Allowing long lines or waiting periods that can agitate populations and be harmful for vulnerable persons.  
• Distributing supplies to only one race, gender, religious group, or ethnic group that can aggravate social tensions resulting in violence.  
• Delivering commodities under unsafe conditions that put civilians at risk.  
• Assuming that distribution is an easy task; commodities are valuable items that can be monetized, which is why some people try to cheat the system to get as much as possible. |

COUNTERINSURGENCY

1-132. Counterinsurgency operations often focus on stability tasks. The combination of stability tasks with offensive and defensive tasks sets the tone for the operation. Although all tasks performed to establish conditions to achieve a desired end state are significant, an emphasis related to stability tasks is often critical in counterinsurgency operations. Changes in an operational environment occur rapidly and frequently, requiring adaptability when performing a combination of tasks. Army forces continuously assess the mix of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks so they can adjust operations to achieve the desired objectives. The tasks of establishing civil security and governance focus on legitimacy of the government when facing an insurgent threat. Complementary action to address insurgency is building up the capability of the host nation to resist the insurgency over time and to address the drivers of the conflict. The tasks of establishing civil control and support to economic and infrastructure development support this complementary action. (For more detail, see ATP 3-07.5.)

1-133. Countering an insurgency incorporates previous or continuing security cooperation efforts, U.S. and host-nation objectives, a whole-of-government effort, and a comprehensive approach to address root
Chapter 1

causes of the conflict. Insurgency is a struggle for legitimacy and influence, generally from a position of relative weakness. Insurgencies can exist apart from or before, during or after conventional conflicts. Throughout history, elements of a population have grown dissatisfied with the status quo. When they are willing to fight to change the conditions to their favor, using both violent and nonviolent means to affect a change in the prevailing authority, they have often initiated an insurgency.

1-134. Ideally, the host nation is the primary partner in responding to, isolating, and defeating an insurgency. Often, the host nation cannot effectively address sources of instability that provide an insurgent organization freedom of movement. A critical goal of a counterinsurgency is to address those sources of instability, erode the vulnerabilities of a population, and thus reduce active and passive support to an insurgent movement. Although U.S. forces may be directed to support to another nation in countering an insurgency, eventually the host nation will need to build its own capacity and capability to resolve its issues related to instability.

1-135. U.S forces must understand the strategic context within which counterinsurgencies are conducted so they can plan, prepare for, and execute counterinsurgency operations to achieve national objectives. Counterinsurgency efforts support U.S. policy. The U.S. approach to countering an insurgency incorporates agencies of the U.S. Government, and when possible, international agencies and partners, in supporting a host nation. (FM 3-24 provides doctrine on counterinsurgency and the importance of stability efforts in counterinsurgency.)

FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE

1-136. Foreign internal defense is participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security (JP 3-22). Foreign internal defense involves all instruments of national power. Primarily a series of programs, it supports friendly nations operating against or threatened by hostile elements. Foreign internal defense promotes regional stability by helping a host nation respond to its population’s needs while maintaining security.

1-137. Foreign internal defense requires an evolving combination of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. The military role in foreign internal defense often includes indirect support, direct support (not involving U.S. combat operations), and combat operations. Foreign internal defense is often conducted as military engagement in peacetime.

1-138. Army support to foreign internal defense often takes the form of security force assistance. Security force assistance activities support foreign internal defense activities where U.S. forces organize, train, equip, rebuild, build, and advise a host nation’s security forces. Participating Army forces normally advise and assist host-nation forces while refraining from combat operations. However, conduct of U.S. combat operations is possible. Security force assistance by all types of Army forces, both conventional forces and special operations forces, can support a foreign internal defense mission. (See JP 3-22 for more information.)

1-139. U.S. foreign internal defense supports the host-nation’s internal defense and development. The strategic aim of internal defense and development is to prevent subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to a host nation’s security, stability, and legitimacy. It focuses on building viable institutions—political, economic, military, and social—that respond to the needs of the society. Internal defense and development is not only a single master plan, it is a compilation of all internal defense and development plans at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels that a nation possesses. Tactical units may only see the local government strategy, economic development plan, or the long-range military plan of the host-nation security force unit, all of which inform internal defense and development strategy. Internal defense and development has multiple supporting objectives to include—

- Providing training and opportunities for host-nation security forces to improve and take the lead.
- Providing opportunity for the host-nation police and other governmental institutions to enforce and maintain the rule of law.
- Providing essential services and addressing the causes of instability to mitigate insurgent goals and access.
Training and employing local workers, providing materials to rebuild, and providing a sustainable economic and social system.

- Providing the conditions for political reforms.

1-140. Internal defense and development has four functional lines of effort:

- Balanced development.
- Mobilization.
- Neutralization.
- Security.

Balanced development consists of a variety of political, social, and economic reforms conducted in a balanced way. Balanced development avoids benefiting one group at the expense of others and builds viable political, economic, and social institutions that respond to the needs of the society. Mobilization is the widespread involvement of the local workforce and use of local material and resources. It organizes the population to participate in internal defense and development efforts and prevent the proliferation of insurgency. Neutralization renders the insurgents’ effort ineffective by preempting valid parts of their program, physically or psychologically separating insurgents from the people. Physically it focuses on disrupting their organization or capturing or killing their members. It uses information operations, media, and military information support operations to negate the effects of the insurgency and bolster the legitimacy of the host nation. Security protects the people from insurgent violence, separates them from insurgent control, and establishes conditions in which development can occur. Security addresses the prerequisites related to the safety of the people and the protection of critical infrastructure. (For more information regarding internal defense and development, see FM 3-22, FM 3-24, JP 3-05, JP 3-22, and JP 3-24.)
This page intentionally left blank.
Chapter 2

Stability Considerations for Transitions

This chapter starts by discussing levels of stability transitions that must be integrated. Then, it discusses the transition of stability tasks from U.S. forces to the host nation. Next, it explains transitional military authority. Finally, it discusses interim civil authority.

STABILITY TRANSITION LEVELS

2-1. Army leaders performing stability tasks at any level must be aware that their actions support goals at other levels. Stability transitions at the tactical level can influence operational or strategic stability goals and transitions. An operation may contain several types of transitions that may or may not occur simultaneously. Commanders and staffs consider how to facilitate smooth and coordinated transitions across all levels. Completing transitions successfully, safely, and seamlessly is vitally important to the success of stability efforts. The most critical and dangerous actions occur when forces shift from one type of operation to another. For example, shifting a unit from the offense to the defense or moving a support area from one locale to another is when loss of focus or missteps often occurs.

2-2. Understanding the levels of transitions, types of transitions, and their horizontally and vertically impacts helps planners achieve the desired end state. Coordination helps ensure military actions conducted across stability tasks are clear to all governmental agencies and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) responsible for the smooth transitions to a stable host nation. Transitions at the strategic level involve coordinated efforts across the civil-military domain. In addition, transition challenges differ at national, regional, and local levels. For example, national-level transitions involve sovereignty, legitimacy, and social and ministerial reform. Local-level transitions may consist of supporting the village leaders in reestablishment of their local customs. Each transition level and phase requires careful planning.

2-3. Returning to normalcy as quickly as possible is critical to success. All partners, including those from other nations, must understand what normalcy looks like so they can plan appropriately. The study of the host nation—as time permits—helps unified action partners understand how the host nation can transition. They should understand the host nation’s history, traditions, customs, and cultures. To facilitate understanding, planners identify host-nation personnel and NGOs already in place who can assist in quickly redeveloping structures and procedures. These people can provide a clear picture of normalcy to planners and practitioners.

IMPORTANCE OF INTEGRATION

2-4. Army leaders ensure the actions of Army forces are integrated within the joint force. Integration is the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole (JP 1). In the context of stability, the actions of United States (U.S.) forces support the integrated efforts of all unified action partners and the host nation. This supports the stability principle of unity of effort and purpose as described in ADRP 3-07—to achieve unity of effort and unity of purpose among all actors. To ensure the integration of transitions, planning must be collaborative and interactive between all partners. For the success of the host nation, all actions by all parties need to be nested and reinforcing. Actions performed at the local level must fit into national efforts while national efforts appropriately support local actions. Each action must be weighted appropriately to create equilibrium. Too much attention to actions at one level or too little to another level can lead to failure. Trying to correct the imbalance will become the focus and distract from the overall strategy. Partners must develop a robust cadre of civilians with the knowledge and training to collaborate effectively with locals and help them build host nation institutional capacity. To ensure long-term success, planners develop transition strategies as
early as possible. Military planners establish trust, shared objectives, and collaborative approaches to overcome difficulties that could impede successful unified action among partners.

2-5. Numerous partnerships are needed to ensure smooth transitions. Some are partnerships between the host nation and other nations, but partnerships among actors within the host nation are just as important. A coordinated, comprehensive approach depends on the combined support of external actors’ resources and internal actors’ commitment. Army leaders engage and establish links to all partners to facilitate successful transitions. Agencies and organizations operating within the region often understand the relationships between the new regime and the opposition. These agencies and organizations include U.S. agencies and those of other governments, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and other international organizations. The people within these agencies and organizations are not only familiar with the local culture and customs, they may have already developed a relationship of trust among the actors of both sides. This trust will help nurture these critical partnerships.

OVERALL TRANSITION PRINCIPLES

2-6. Army leaders at all levels keep in mind how their actions fit into a comprehensive approach. Leaders must avoid considering their missions in isolation from overall stability goals and principles. Principles of effective transition, within this comprehensive approach, include reconciliation, transparency, and patience. Applying these principles can support the development of trust among the various actors and, over time, provide an environment conducive to building partner capacity.

Reconciliation

2-7. The principle of reconciliation is to establish the end of conflict and renew a friendly relationship between disputing people or groups so the post-conflict government can represent them all. The transition principle of reconciliation builds on the stability principle of conflict transformation. Reconciliation must include more than an end to armed conflict. It also must involve renewing a friendly relationship between disputing people or groups. The disparate parties within the host nation must sufficiently resolve their differences and accept one another to allow for proper representation of each party in the host nation’s government. Reconciliation can be an end, a means, an outcome, or a process. For the purposes of this doctrine, reconciliation is a prerequisite to restoring governance. It must be achieved for the nation under new governance to move forward toward adequately serving its people. Including all groups and ensuring they all have representation from the beginning facilitate transparency, a key enabler for reconciliation.

2-8. Army units assist the host nation and other contributors in developing a means to facilitate reconciliation. Most likely, developing reconciliation will take time to build trust among the groups within the host nation. Initially units may carry messages among the groups. Eventually the host nation and other contributors discuss key issues that focus on their relationships. Discussing the collective fears and desires of the future will help drive the dialogue.

2-9. Effective stability efforts address underlying issues such as distrust and hatred passed from generation to generation. Planners develop a strategy to address and counter the underlying causes. Reconciliation needs to occur at personal and public levels.

2-10. Transitional justice refers to a society’s efforts to bring accountability, justice, and reconciliation to bear in addressing a legacy of major abuse of human rights and is a key component of reconciliation. Transitional justice mechanisms may include truth and reconciliation commissions, lustrations (banning members of the previous regime from holding public office), reparations, and judicial processes. The country team coordinates U.S. support to specific forms of transitional justice. Ongoing dialogue among host-nation groups includes the root causes of conflict. Root causes may be tribal, cultural, based in religion, or based on the disagreement of land ownership and land rights. Disputing people or groups can resolve less severe grievances through workshops, public apologies, or policy reform.

2-11. To facilitate reconciliation among individuals, transition planners should help the host nation develop a means for individuals to express their feelings through acceptable and peaceful cultural expression. Army units should take advantage of the expertise and contacts those IGOs and NGOs provide. Such organizations not only have direct contact with the many groups involved, but they most likely have tools and resources that can facilitate mutual respect among the host-nation groups. Despite apparent progress
toward reconciliation at the national level, Army leaders should remain aware that reconciliation requires the belief of the individuals. All past wrongs are not necessarily swept away with the end of conflict. Individuals who feel wronged and unfairly compensated often harbor resentment.

**Transparency**

2-12. The principle of transparency is to establish openness, integrity, and accountability in the post-conflict government so it will conduct itself responsibly. This transition principle of transparency builds on the stability principle of legitimacy and host-nation ownership. With reconciliation established, external contributors need to assist in ensuring the new government of the host nation is inclusive so that all host-nation actors can develop trust. A lack of transparency can easily become an issue among all groups if resources and programs prove inequitable. A society is likely to perceive, for example, that the political elite or military controls distribution to improve its own position. In some cases, a government can easily control contracting funds, food, and other humanitarian aid. Even with the best of intentions, it can lose credibility within the society if its activities are not transparent. Without proper processes, programs, and supervision to provide accountability, failure will occur. The magnitude of external support can easily overwhelm a fledgling nation that lacks structures and control procedures necessary to arrive in the proper quantity to the right people. Lax structures and control procedures can lead to corruption, particularly when for a culture accepts leaders at any level taking a portion of the payments for themselves.

2-13. Partners supporting a host nation must neither replace the government nor give the government carte blanche in operations until the host nation shows it can operate with transparency. External contributors should understand the difference between supporting the members of a society directly and giving the government resources it can use to provide for its people. Whether supporting the government or supporting the people directly, organizations help a fledgling government to operate effectively.

**Patience**

2-14. The principle of patience is to establish unity of effort with long-term interagency and interorganizational activities so the post-conflict government becomes successful. This principle of patience builds on the stability principle of unity of effort and purpose. All contributors must achieve unity of effort to build success over the long term. As in defense support of civil authorities, military forces will accomplish their missions, hand off tasks, and redeploy when other partners can continue remaining stability efforts without military support. Army leaders focus on the following to ensure successful transition:

- Knowledge: develop in-depth knowledge and situational understanding of host-nation actors and dynamics.
- Essential functions: focus assistance on essential functions, not all the problems in a particular organization.
- Realistic demands and expectations: set realistic demands and expectations for fragile states.
- Preeminence of civilian leadership: Civilian agencies should lead assistance to help build government effectiveness in the political, economic, and social spheres.

2-15. Military planners incorporate long-term planning with the U.S. Government, IGOs, and NGOs that remain in the country to assist in further development. Incorporating the United States Agency for International Development (known as USAID) is essential, as it assists in long-term development. Many times when the military is involved in reconstruction, the military looks to make as much impact as possible during its current tour of duty. Commanders ensure that military projects and programs do not interfere with long-range vision of the United States Agency for International Development. History shows that the length of involvement needed to support the transition of organizations exceeds the political will of most external actors. This may be due to financial strains or erroneous expectations about the time needed. In fact, effective transitions may take decades to complete. In most cases, a post-conflict transition continues long after military involvement. (See ADRP 3-07, chapter 4, for guidance on planning operations focused on stability using lines of effort and the desired end state. The discussion in ADRP 3-07 includes force tailoring and task-organizing the force. Refer also to *Senior Leader’s Guide to Transition Planning* for information on transitions between joint operational phases.)
TRANSITION OF STABILITY TASKS

2-16. In the context of stability tasks, transitions occur across each of the five primary stability tasks to achieve the end state. Comprehensive transition planning incorporates the transfer of responsibility, authority, power, and accountability incrementally, on several levels, and by numerous partners. The measures of performance (MOPs) or measures of effectiveness (MOEs) indicating the appropriate time to complete tactical transitions tend to be clear and specific. Strategic transitions are exponentially more complex due to the magnitude of systems affected. A rush to complete transitions may only result in a rush to failure if the host nation and supporting actors are not prepared. A well-structured transition plan helps minimize corruption and dependency of the provisional or interim government.

2-17. Army planners consider managing complex transitions in transition phases. Transition phases are consistent with the Army definition that describes a phase as a planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity (ADRP 3-0). Transitions include transferring authority and control to other military forces, civilian agencies and organizations, and the host nation. Forces should execute transitions phases gradually rather than abruptly. While gradual transitions are optimal, an unexpected change in conditions may require commanders to direct an abrupt transition. In such cases, the overall composition of the force remains unchanged despite sudden changes in mission, task organization, and rules of engagement.

2-18. U.S. government leaders have the lead for managing overall stability transitions. Civil organizations with more expertise in national development take the lead in stability transition. The host nation must have the political will and the resiliency to assume responsibility. The complexity of external actors and contributing nations’ international politics and policies may complicate the process. All short-term actions must nest and reinforce long-term end states. Numerous lines of effort crossing different transition phases potentially add complexity to all partner organizations. The numerous layers of tasks and actors compound the challenges with the finite number of people able to accomplish missions.

2-19. Unified action partners clearly plan and express the steps for their withdrawal so local actors have time to adapt to their responsibilities and structures. Extending a transition phase can provide an opportunity to test local readiness for sovereignty. Conversely, delaying completion of a transition phase might encourage others to create artificial disturbances to extend the delay.

2-20. In an operation, stability tasks transition within the stability framework (see ADRP 3-07). Military tasks are described in the stability framework as the initial response phase, transformation phase, or fostering sustainability phase. Forces accomplish stability tasks over time, carefully planning all levels of transitions throughout operations. Army leaders consider planning stability tasks in three transition phases:

- Phase 1—Repair and (re)establish systems.
- Phase 2—Normalize systems.
- Phase 3—Transfer and exit.

2-21. Initial response tasks generally occur in transition phase 1, transformation tasks in transition phase 2, and fostering sustainability tasks in transition phase 3. (See table 2-1.) However, there is overlap. In the fostering sustainability phase, military planners should keep in mind that the efforts of partners outside the Department of Defense are likely to continue after military forces depart. However, military tasks may continue with the emphasis on security cooperation activities, including security force assistance.

Table 2-1. Phases of the stability framework and stability transition phases

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phases of the stability framework:</th>
<th>Initial response</th>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>Fostering sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stability transition phases:</td>
<td>1—Repair and (re)establish systems</td>
<td>2—Normalize systems</td>
<td>3—Transfer and exit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2-22. The emphasis for commanders is on the transition of military tasks from U.S. forces to host-nation forces. Specific transitions will occur both as a change in focus of the tasks as described in the stability framework and as transfers of authorities to other partners or to the host nation. These transitions often do not occur all at once, but over time. At any given point, the lines of effort associated with the primary stability tasks may span different phases of the transition. For example, a line of effort associated with the primary stability task of establishing civil security is in transition phase 2, while another line of effort associated restore essential services is in transition phase 1. Additionally, transfers of authority may switch to other organizations or the host nation at a different pace. Finally, in the fostering sustainability phase of the stability framework, military planners consider that the efforts of partners outside the Department of Defense often continue after military forces depart. However, military tasks may continue with the emphasis moving to long-term security cooperation activities, including security force assistance.

2-23. Early integration of all supporting actors into a comprehensive approach toward a common end state is key to success. In addition, integrating host-nation personnel into the transition from the beginning is vital. Retaining and incorporating knowledge of past institutional procedures also streamlines the transition.

**TRANSITION PHASE 1—REPAIR AND (RE)ESTABLISH SYSTEMS**

2-24. Partners begin to repair or replace the systems that were once active or in control of the host nation. Typically, partners selectively support local actors based on the security situation. This means foreign actors often drive stabilization and reconstruction: they develop the strategies, priorities, and projects and manage implementation. Partners operate in those sectors in which they are proficient or chartered by their sponsors.

2-25. In transition phase 1, Army leaders begin a comprehensive approach toward mentoring and advising host-nation military leaders to ensure the host nation becomes willing to and capable of assuming its legitimate responsibilities. From the beginning, Army leaders organize a civil-military team for planning and executing subsequent transition phases. They coordinate horizontally and vertically to ensure that military efforts support host-nation agencies and organizations. The military must cooperate and coordinate with all partner agencies and organizations in a comprehensive approach. Military leaders recognize that military efforts are just one part of successfully building host-nation autonomy.

2-26. In some situations, a partner nation’s military must serve as the initial lead in repairing or reestablishing certain aspects of normalcy. This happens due to inadequate security within the host nation.

**TRANSITION PHASE 2—NORMALIZE SYSTEMS**

2-27. In this context, *systems* refers broadly to host-nation political, economic, social, and military structures that ensure—

- A safe and secure environment.
- The rule of law.
- Social well-being.
- Stable governance.
- A sustainable economy.

2-28. Transition phase 2 begins as the host-nation government becomes operational, and its management of civil security, civil control, essential services, governance, economic development, and infrastructure tasks becomes routine practice. This transition phase takes time. Host-nation personnel take the lead, while partners continue to mentor and coach. The host nation owns and operates the systems and processes. Mentors seek to understand the culture, norms, and customs of the host nation to help determine when to terminate education, training, mentoring, and coaching support.

2-29. Army leaders use MOEs and MOPs appropriate to the situation for measuring success. (See ADRP 3-07 for guidance on incorporating MOEs and MOPs in planning stability.) Determining criteria for normalized political, economic, social, and military systems is a challenge. Planners determine when to consider the actions in this transition phase complete based on achieving the end state conditions. Achieving the end state means that transition phase 2 should end and transition phase 3 should begin.
(Table 2-2 gives sample indicators that partners should transition stability tasks entirely to the host nation.)

### Table 2-2. Sample indicators for partners to transfer stability tasks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stability task</th>
<th>End state conditions</th>
<th>Sample transfer indicators</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Establish civil security</td>
<td>Safe and secure environment</td>
<td>Host-nation security forces able to provide security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Society has trust and confidence in host-nation forces to provide security.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establish civil control</td>
<td>Establish rule of law</td>
<td>Host-nation has fair laws, courts, police, and detention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Society accepts and trusts the established laws and procedures of the nation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore essential services</td>
<td>Social well-being</td>
<td>Essential food, water, shelter, and medical support sustain the needs of the population.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to governance</td>
<td>Stable governance</td>
<td>Legitimate host-nation political and administrative institutions serve citizens</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>through participative fair practice of rules, processes, and behavior.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support to economic and infrastructure development</td>
<td>Sustainable economy</td>
<td>Host-nation institutions and processes ensure the sustained viability of the state.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2-30. As transition phase 2 moves forward, stability planners ensure the host nation does not develop an over-dependence on partners. These partners provide the host nation the opportunity to become independent, even at the cost of mistakes. Learning from mistakes proves valuable in reinforcing planning and execution processes while correcting deficiencies and developing the opportunity to work in crisis management processes.

2-31. Army stability planners develop details of the transfer plan during transition phase 2. All actors must understand what roles and responsibilities require a formal transfer plan. Planners develop a clear delineation of which party takes the operational role and which party takes the monitoring role. Planners identify the timeline for the formal transfer. Ideally, transition timelines align with times that actors expect tasks to be completed.

2-32. At the tactical level during transition phase 2 of stability transitions, deploying and redeploying units may overlap so the new unit can learn the area of operations from the previous unit. This method of transition establishes clear roles and responsibilities for those releasing responsibility as well as those assuming responsibility. At the operational and strategic levels, relationships made during the coaching and mentoring of host-nation representatives may provide less structured lines for the time or conditions for transfer.

### Transition Phase 3—Transfer and Exit

2-33. As the systems normalize with the host nation, military and international partners begin to remove themselves from the national bureaucracy. With clear transfer plans developed in transition phase 2, the process of transferring responsibilities may begin to occur. Forces expect to transfer different aspects of an operation at different times based on setting conditions. Additionally, they consider that delays in one sector may delay the transfer in another. Plans should anticipate and account for potential delays.

2-34. The number of partners can easily overwhelm the very nation they are attempting to help. As a result, the pace of transition must be driven by the host nation’s priorities and its ability to incorporate the assistance provided. The speed to which transition occurs depends on the level at which the transition occurs. Local transitions normally occur quickly. A coordinated national transition should facilitate local transitions. Military forces should be the first partners to exit, as the long-term tasks of building institutions, strengthening the economy, and providing social services are inherently civilian.
MEASURING SUCCESS

2-35. MOPs and MOEs are the standard measures used to analyze progress when moving from one transition phase to another. As in any operation, leaders report on what is being done to achieve success and whether or not what is being done is successful in each transition phase. Army leaders use the assessment process described in ADRP 5-0: monitoring, evaluating, and recommending. Army leaders conducting operations focused on stability integrate assessments with partners. Designing the criteria for MOPs and MOEs is difficult. Equally challenging is determining what standard is being used by partners to reflect the host-nation norms.

2-36. Interagency and interorganizational stability practitioners use various tools to assist in measuring success. However, no single tool adequately provides all the information necessary to show success in all situations. Military planners developing MOEs and MOPs should work with partners in determining what standards to use, particularly with host-nation representatives. Coordinating the MOEs and MOPs helps ensure all partners work to the same purpose and the same goal. Available tools include the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework and the District Stability Framework (discussed in chapter 4). Additional interagency and interorganizational tools commonly used by stability partners for measuring success (see the references to access these tools) include—

- The U.S. Institute of Peace framework, Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments.
- The Department of State task matrix, Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks.
- The Sphere Handbook.
- UN transition strategies at the UN Web site.

2-37. Army leaders use assessment tools to determine what and how to measure in regards to individuals, relationships among the actors, and institutional and cultural actions and norms. Every operational environment will differ from the last. Understanding the current environment and the history helps inform leaders of the direction the transition should go and the look and feel of success.

2-38. Transition involves a complex set of processes further complicated by the diversity of partner cultures. Developing a plan and ensuring integration of the host-nation populace from the beginning is critical to success. Reconciliation, transparency, and patience are crucial in successful transition. Though much of the support and resources come from external partners, the driver of transition must remain the host nation. Without its acceptance and participation, failure is imminent. Partners develop a collective approach along with the host nation to ensure unity of purpose and achievable goals. When individual partners provide their selective resources to meet organizational goals that do not synchronize with stated interorganizational goals and objectives, then wasted resources—time, money, and energy—may result in failed objectives. Finally, forces ensure the MOEs and MOPs are clear and achievable to provide a true picture of progress.

TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY

2-39. A transitional military authority is a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. Under extreme circumstances, in which the host-nation government has failed completely or an enemy regime has been deposed, the intervening authority has a legal and moral responsibility to install a transitional authority on the behalf of the population. When military forces have invaded and are occupying enemy territory, a transitional military authority may be established. Under these circumstances, the military will take the lead in the stability sectors. However, a transitional military authority may draw assistance from experienced civilian agencies and organizations. These agencies and organizations have the expertise to establish a system of government that fosters the gradual transition to a legitimate host-nation authority. Sometimes, however, sufficient civilian expertise is not present or conditions of an operational environment do not support introducing such civilian expertise. Military forces may then be required to lead until they stabilize the security situation and can safely transition responsibility for the stability sectors to civil authority and civil control.


**COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY**

2-40. An occupying force establishes transitional military authority pursuant to international law, including The Hague and Geneva Conventions. Such authority is limited in scope by international law. In other circumstances, military forces establish a transitional military authority pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution or a similar international legal authority, which will also describe the limits of that authority. Furthermore, when occupying enemy territory, authority additional to that provided by traditional sources of international law, such as The Hague and Geneva Conventions, may be provided by UN Security Council resolutions or similar authority. Commanders should only take action with regard to transitional military authority after close and careful consultation with the legal advisor.

2-41. A transitional military authority acts on the behalf of the population and, in the case of occupation of enemy territory, to secure the occupying force. The UN Security Council resolution or similar authority may prescribe specific or additional roles of the transitional military authority. In cases other than the occupation of enemy territory, the international community generally will lead this effort through an IGO such as the UN. The occupation of enemy territory may result in one nation or a coalition of nations providing the transitional military authority.

2-42. Effective transitional military authority enhances security and facilitates ongoing operations while fulfilling the legal obligations of occupying forces under international law. This authority enhances stability by promoting the safety and security of both military forces and the local populace, reducing active or passive sabotage, and maintaining public order. It helps ongoing operations by building host-nation capability and capacity to perform government functions and relieving maneuver forces of the responsibility of civil administration. Until the military authority can safely transition to civil authority and control, activities of the transitional military authority are performed with civilian personnel assistance and participation. These civilians may come from the host nation, the U.S. Government, or other agencies or organizations. This cooperation facilitates the transition while ensuring that all activities complement and reinforce efforts to set conditions necessary to achieve success.

2-43. A transitional military authority exercises functions of civil administration. These functions include providing for the safety, security, and well-being of the populace; reestablishing and maintaining public order; and restoring essential services. Such functions—and the tasks that support them—evolve from the essential tasks described in the essential stability task matrix and are reflected in the five primary stability tasks. Establishing transitional military authority may require military forces to complete tasks typically performed by the host-nation government. These tasks may be provided for under international law—including applicable treaties such as The Hague and Geneva Conventions—and UN Security Council resolutions.

**Command Responsibility for Transitional Military Authority**

2-44. The exercise of transitional military authority is a command responsibility, exercised in accordance with international law. To ensure that situational understanding and cultural awareness inform planning and the conduct of transitional military authority, commanders at all levels maintain open, continuous dialogue. They also collaborate among the echelons of command and various agencies, organizations, and institutions that share in efforts to restore legitimate governance to the host nation.

2-45. The authority to implement transitional military authority resides with the President, exercised through the Secretary of Defense and the joint force commander. Broad policy formulation and initial planning for transitional military authority is conducted under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the joint force commander, key staff, subordinate Service components, and allied commanders also participate to a lesser degree.

**Establishment of Transitional Military Authority**

2-46. A transitional military authority restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety and security of the local populace, and provides essential civil services. Transitional military authority is not limited to the occupation of enemy territory. During operations outside the United States and its territories, necessity may also require establishing transitional military authority in various situations, including—
2-47. The time during which a transitional military authority exercises authority varies based on the requirements of both the military operation and international law. To establish transitional military authority, commanders may require from the host-nation population a level of obedience commensurate with military necessity. Such obedience provides security of military forces, maintenance of law and order, and proper administration of the operational area. Commanders can reward civil obedience by reducing infringement on the individual liberties of the local populace.

2-48. The degree of control exercised by a transitional military authority varies greatly due to several factors, including—

- The legal authorities of the military commander under international law.
- The relationship that previously existed between the U.S. Government and the host-nation government.
- Existing attitudes and the level of cooperation among the host nation’s national, regional, and local leaders and the local populace.
- Ongoing and projected military operations.
- The presence of hostile or enemy forces.
- The level of civil obedience.

As conditions in the territory subject to transitional military authority stabilize, the degree of control exercised by a military authority can decrease. Authority and control can transfer either to the legitimate sovereign or to another civil authority.

**Organization of Transitional Military Authority**

2-49. The joint force commander is responsible for the detailed planning and operations of the transitional military authority under the general guidelines received from the President, Secretary of Defense, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The structure and organization of the transitional military authority depend on—

- International law, including any applicable UN Security Council resolutions or similar authorities.
- The mission of the military force.
- The organization, capabilities, and capacities of deployed forces.
- The military and political conditions of the operational area.
- The nature, structure, and organization of the existing or former host-nation government.
- The physical, political, economic, and cultural geography of the host nation.

**Existing Laws, Customs, and Boundaries**

2-50. In general, the laws of the host nation subject to transitional military authority should not be changed, except to the extent permitted by The Hague and Geneva Conventions. Commanders must consult closely and carefully with their legal advisors before attempting to change any local laws.

2-51. In general, the military authority should not impose the customs of another nation on an occupied nation. Implementing changes or reforms inconsistent with local customs may foster active or passive resistance, adding friction to an already complex effort. Commanders and their legal advisors must recognize that laws and customs often vary between political divisions of a country, such as between provinces or municipalities. Commanders identify issues related to ethnic and minority groups so policies of the transitional military authority do not inadvertently oppress such groups.

2-52. Commanders avoid redrawing local boundaries and political divisions except to the extent permitted by international law. Unit boundaries should normally reflect these boundaries as closely as possible. Periodically, however, unit boundaries shift to avoid inadvertently creating sanctuaries for adversaries. Commanders examine existing police jurisdictional boundaries and lines to determine if their locations
contribute to setting the conditions for successful operations. Established precincts, zones, districts, regions, counties, parishes, or other mechanisms that delineate police authority facilitate commanders using decision making and employing military forces. Police jurisdictional boundaries may reflect dominant or sensitive cultural realities or fault lines that exist in a community. Some police boundaries may also exist to ensure that police capability is commensurate or appropriate to the criminal conditions of an area.

**Forms of Transitional Military Authority**

2-53. In general, transitional military authorities are either operational or territorial. An operational form of transitional military authority expands in authority as operations continue. In the territorial form of transitional military authority, the joint force commander establishes a separate organization under the direct command of the joint force commander or an authorized subordinate.

**Operational Form of Transitional Military Authority**

2-54. The responsibilities and geographic area over which a transitional military authority exercises civil administration may expand as operations continue. Commanders oversee civil functions of government in their respective operational areas. This includes ensuring the safety, security, and well-being of the local populace as well as providing humanitarian assistance. Under the operational form of transitional military authority, the chain of command retains the responsibility for authority and is supported by its staff structure.

2-55. Concentrating authority and responsibility in the commander helps ensure that activities related to civil administration are integrated consistently with ongoing operations. These activities include relationships between the military force and civilians. By ensuring the integrity of unity of command in an operational area, commanders mitigate much of the friction associated with operations in and among the local populace. As the situation permits, the responsibility for civil administration transfers to the host nation or other civil authority to help the host nation return to full self-governance. Using host-nation civilian advisory groups helps accelerate this transfer of authority.

2-56. The advantages of operational form of transitional military authority, however, are tempered by the rate of military activities. Generally, the higher the tempo within the operational area, the less the commander can address the requirements of transitional military authority. In areas where the tempo of operations and civil situation are consistently dynamic, civil administration policies may change frequently. Finally, operational headquarters are not always assigned operational areas corresponding to known political subdivisions. Even after hostilities, conformance of these areas to political boundaries may prove impossible, however desirable.

**Territorial Form of Transitional Military Authority**

2-57. In the territorial form of transitional military authority, commanders establish a separate organization to exercise the functions of civil administration. It may be under the direct command of the joint force commander or an authorized subordinate, or it may report directly to the Secretary of Defense or the President. The military governor may command subordinate military governors assigned to political subdivisions throughout the host nation. Generally, the territorial form of the transitional military authority follows a separate chain of command from operational forces.

2-58. A territorial form of transitional military authority typically uses military manpower and expertise more effectively and economically than an operational form of transitional military authority. Established after the operational area is stabilized, a territorial form of transitional military authority may ensure improved continuity of policy and administration. It should facilitate selecting and assigning specially trained military personnel. A territorial form of transitional military authority operates under the stability principle of unity of effort and purpose, to achieve unified action.

2-59. However, the existence of a separate chain of command within an operational area or a political subdivision presents unique challenges to the territorial form of transitional military authority. Activities of the territorial military authority must be carefully coordinated with those of operational military forces. These activities must not interfere with ongoing operations or expose the operational force to undue risk.
To ensure unity of effort, the territorial form of transitional military authority and the operational forces must maintain close communications, cooperation, and coordination.

2-60. In practice, the exact form of authority should be adapted to suit the political and military situation in the operational area. A territorial form of transitional military authority may draw certain features from an operational form, or vice versa. As operations progress, the character of the military authority may evolve according to the situation, mirroring the effort to build host-nation capacity. In certain cases, one type of military authority may dominate in one region of the host nation, while another type is better suited for another region.

Local Government Officials and Departments

2-61. Successfully implementing transitional military authority often depends on how the host-nation government and its civilians participate and contribute. The transitional military authority thoroughly assesses the capability of the remaining host-nation government officials. This assessment determines if those officials can support and contribute to transitional military authority. The long-term success of the operation may depend on this assessment. If permitted by international law, offices that are unnecessary or detrimental to the transitional military authority may close temporarily, and officials who refuse to serve the best interests of the transitional military authority may be suspended. However, such officials may be retained in an advisory capacity at the discretion of the military commander. In such cases, they should continue to receive compensation for their services.

2-62. Generally, if a transitional military authority needs to be established, high-ranking political officials of the former government will not continue to hold office. Such officials may include heads of the host-nation government, cabinet ministers, and other political elites. To the extent permitted by international law, the transitional military authority may be required to perform certain duties that would otherwise fall to individuals in these positions.

2-63. Typically, mere membership in unfriendly organizations or political groups is not by itself considered sufficient grounds for removal from office. However, officials who have served as active leaders of such organizations or political groups may need to leave office. Similarly, officials who prove unreliable or corrupt must leave office through legal action or through an open, transparent administrative process. The willful failure of retained officials to perform their duties satisfactorily is a serious offense against the transitional military authority.

2-64. The commander’s decisions about whether or not to retain leaders of the local government will likely vary. In some areas, full local participation may be the norm, while in other areas entire departments and bureaus of the local government may need to close. Where practical, the transitional military authority should retain subordinate officials and employees of the local government. These officials can continue to discharge their duties under the direction and supervision of appropriately trained military personnel. Under certain circumstances, military forces may protect officials who continue to serve in, or are appointed to, local public service. Hostile elements may pose a threat to these individuals.

2-65. In some areas, the local populace may have had very limited participation in government due to centralized power in an authoritarian regime or a dominating foreign power. Elitist groups may also have focused regional, provincial, or municipal power under their control, negating the participation of the local populace. In such cases, civilian officials of the former government may flee. Even if they remain, it may be impractical or unsafe for them to continue in office. For this reason, building new partner capability—training local nationals to assume certain government positions—must often precede long-term efforts in building partner capacity.

2-66. When military authority removes a local official or that official is unavailable, the transitional military authority seeks a fully qualified, trained, and experienced replacement. When selecting officials, the military authority considers their reliability, willingness to cooperate with the transitional military authority, and status in the community. The transitional military authority does not make permanent appointments, however. If a suitable candidate is not available, a representative of the transitional military authority performs the duties of the position until an appropriate replacement can assume the duties.
2-67. Commanders at all echelons must avoid any commitments to, or negotiations with, local political elements without the approval of higher authority. Military personnel should refrain from developing or maintaining unofficial relationships with local officials and host-nation personnel. Soldiers must refuse personal favors or gifts offered by government officials or the local populace unless authorized by higher authority.

GUIDELINES FOR TRANSITIONAL MILITARY AUTHORITY

2-68. For military forces, the successful accomplishment of the mission is paramount. As long as operations continue, the commander must exercise the necessary control. This may involve actions related to host-nation personnel and the local populace. The policies and practices adopted for transitional military authority should reduce the possibility that civilians interfere with ongoing operations.

2-69. To ensure operations continue unimpeded by civilians, transitional military authority focuses on ensuring the safety and security of civilians, restoring and maintaining law and order, building host-nation capability and capacity in key areas of government, and reestablishing living conditions to a normal, customary state. Thoroughly integrating civil affairs capabilities into the operations process helps facilitate unimpeded operations. Civil affairs integration supports maintaining positive interaction between military forces and the local people.

2-70. Commanders develop codes of behavior that avoid violation of, or insult to, local customs and practices. Foreign area officers, civil affairs and intelligence staff, and chaplains provide relevant information on the local populace, specific aspects of culture, and general customs and behaviors. Civil affairs personnel and chaplains provide host-nation religious information that may restrict military use or targeting of religiously consecrated buildings or locations. Commanders may direct trained personnel, in coordination with chaplain support, to act as negotiators or mediators between opposing groups within the local populace. (See FM 27-10 for doctrine on customary and treaty law during land operations.)

Treatment of the Population

2-71. Fair treatment of the local populace can help reduce the chance that the local populace will be hostile to U.S. forces and increase the chance for obtaining its cooperation. The proper and just treatment of civilians helps military forces establish and maintain security; prevent lawlessness; promote order; and secure local labor, services, and supplies. Such treatment promotes a positive impression of the military force; the United States; and other government agencies, organizations, and institutions engaged in unified action. Fair treatment strengthens the legitimacy of the operation and the transitional military authority in the eyes of the populace, bordering nations, and other members of the international community.

2-72. Nonetheless, a policy of proper and just treatment does not prevent the imposition of restrictive or punitive measures necessary to achieve objectives of the transitional military authority. Commanders consider imposing restrictive measures on the initial occupation or liberation of a host nation to establish control of the populace. Populace control measures addressing curfews, assembly, looting, reprisals, and so on require planning, and upon implementation, information dissemination to the populace. Furthermore, mission-specific rules of engagement addressing population control measures should be succinct and unambiguous. In particular, areas with active and aggressively hostile actors often need restrictive or punitive measures.

2-73. The military’s policies for treating any population vary depending on several factors. These factors first include characteristics of the population, such as their attitude toward the governing forces, the degree of technical-industrial development, socioeconomic conditions, the political system, and local history and culture. Another determining factor is the policies of the United States with respect to the host-nation government. The commander must become familiar with host-nation customs, institutions, and attitudes and implement transitional military authority accordingly.
2-74. When determining policies for treating the local populace, commanders consider other factors:

- Generally, measures that are less restrictive are appropriate for civilians of friendly or nonhostile states. Measures that are more restrictive may be needed with civilians of hostile states.
- Depending on the culture, the local populace may perceive certain actions as characteristic of an illegitimate or weak military government. On the other hand, certain actions, though permissible under international law, may aggravate an already complex civil situation or reduce the effectiveness of the force in imposing civil control.
- Force may be used to subdue those who resist the transitional military authority or to prevent the escape of prisoners or detainees suspected of crimes. Commanders limit force to what is necessary and is consistent with international law. Leaders consult legal advisors when forming standing rules for the use of force and the treatment of prisoners, detainees, and other persons.

2-75. Military commanders are inherently empowered to take all prudent and proportional measures necessary to protect their forces. However, during operations focused on stability, the nature of the threat can often inhibit the ability of friendly forces to differentiate between hostile acts, hostile intent, and normal daily activity among civilians. For this reason, military forces must retain the authority to detain civilians, using an acceptable framework under which to confine, intern, and eventually release them. This authority has the most legitimacy when sanctioned by international mandate or when bestowed or conveyed from the local or regional government power. The initial or baseline authority granted to military forces to use force to detain civilians will determine the status of the persons they detain. Based on that authority and the status of detained persons, forces will determine how to manage detainees, what due process is required, and whether to treat offenses as military or criminal offenses.

Economic Stabilization and Recovery

2-76. Transitional military authority generally focuses on security, the restoration and maintenance of law and order, and the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. In certain circumstances, military forces may need to act with regard to economic conditions that promote security and law and order. However, international law generally limits a transitional military authority in this area. Specific sources of international law directed at activities of the transitional military authority, such as UN Security Council resolutions, may provide additional authority. Commanders must routinely consult legal advisors in this complex area.

2-77. When international law and the governing mandate permits a transitional military authority to engage in economic stabilization and recovery activities, two immediate goals exist for the economic sector. The first goal is to use all available goods and services as efficiently as possible to meet the essential needs of the local populace. The second is to revive the economy at the local level to reduce dependence on external support. Achieving these goals depends on stimulating production capability and workforce capacity. The transitional military authority should quickly identify local sources of supply and services to support military operations. This infuses critical monetary resources into the local economy to stimulate growth, investment, and development.

2-78. Actions taken to stimulate economic recovery at the local level must closely work with efforts to stabilize the national economy. Therefore, the transitional military authority must immediately draw on the expertise and advice of civilian agencies (such as the Department of the Treasury) and organizations (such as the International Monetary Fund) to contend with macroeconomic challenges. Issues such as stabilizing monetary policy, controlling inflation, and reestablishing a national currency generally exceed expertise resident in the transitional military authority. This lack of expertise underscores the necessity of introducing appropriate civilian expertise as soon as practical or puts the success of broader economic recovery programs at risk from the outset of operations.

2-79. Stimulating the economy at the microeconomic level facilitates economic recovery, especially in areas suffering from market failure or collapse. The transitional military authority may apply microeconomics principles to influence local prices, supply and demand, or the availability of labor. For example, the transitional military authority can offer small-scale grants and low- or fixed-interest loans to encourage entrepreneurial investment and host-nation enterprise creation. These practices enable impoverished people to invest in projects that generate income, begin to build wealth, and eventually get
out of poverty. At the local level, this stimulation is essential to economic recovery; it sets the cornerstone for recovery and development on a national scale.

2-80. Economic assessments are critical to the success of recovery programs. The transitional military authority must understand economic conditions in the operational area, factors that affect stabilization and growth, and cultural nuances that influence market sector performance. Developing a shared situational understanding of the economic situation spurs market integration, helps to identify key needs and opportunities, increases private sector participation, and improves social and economic cohesion throughout the host nation.

2-81. An equitable distribution of necessities—such as food, water, shelter, and medicine—supports economic stability. To this end, commanders may need to establish and enforce temporary controls over certain aspects of the local economy. They may design these controls to affect the prices of goods and services, wage rates and labor practices, black market activity, hoarding of goods, banking practices, imports or exports, and production rates within industry. However, these controls may also have adverse effects that can lead to renewed violence. These adverse effects may consist of causing potential shortages of goods and services, impeding economic progress, and causing corruption, conflict over limited resources, and social tension. Commanders must weigh the decision to implement economic controls very carefully. In doing so, they should seek guidance from higher echelons and from personnel and organizations with appropriate expertise. They may discover alternatives available that achieve the same results with fewer negative consequences. They determine how well the private sector can identify profitable lines of investment and enterprise creation quickly, stimulate market-led economic recovery, and provide reasonably priced consumable goods and services to the population. (See FM 3-57 and ATP 3-57.10 for doctrine on populace and resources control.)

2-82. When permitted by international law, the transitional military authority may stimulate the economy to help the local industry develop, but it must do so with the end state of sustainable, private-sector activities. These may include agriculture, manufacturing, mining, forestry, and any number of service trades. The transitional military authority may support an activity in a specific operational area. Industries may require some form of initial subsidization to spur productivity as well as assistance with management. In potentially hostile areas, the transitional military authority may provide or train personnel for skilled positions (to replace people who have fled or are not cooperative or dependable). Detailed infrastructure assessments help to locate useable production facilities and identify damaged or inoperable facilities for reconstruction planning.

Public Health

2-83. The transitional military authority establishes a public health policy for security, public safety, and humanitarian reasons. This policy applies to the health of the military forces as well as the local populace. Sustained operations cannot exist without healthy military forces. Without a healthy, viable force, the military cannot provide for the health and well-being of the people adequately. To protect the health of the force, the transitional military authority sometimes takes measures to safeguard, and if necessary, improve, the health of the local populace. Generally, the force lacks the health service support and force health protection capacity to provide sustained medical care for civilians. However, with appropriate resources and security, the transitional military authority may open and secure humanitarian access to the local populace. It may also establish temporary clinics, train local health professionals, and augment existing medical facilities.

2-84. The transitional military authority reinforces the public health policy by securing the public health infrastructure. The transitional military authority may enable functioning hospitals and clinics to remain open so local medical personnel can continue to serve civilians. This authority may repair critical transportation infrastructure to ensure continued delivery of medical supplies and accessibility for emergency patient transport. Securing the public health infrastructure may involve ensuring the continued functioning of essential services infrastructure so that adequate power, water, and sanitation are available to support health care facilities. Public health policy focuses on disposing of sewage, garbage, and refuse properly; purifying local water supplies; inspecting food supplies; and controlling insects and disease. Additionally, the public health infrastructure addresses burying and cremating remains from a public health
Stability Considerations for Transitions

2-85. During operations focused on stability, Army leaders and Soldiers become governors in a much broader sense, influencing events and circumstances normally outside the bounds of the military. They become the executors of international and national policy. They are often required to reconcile long-standing disputes between opposing parties. These are responsibilities more suited to civilian expertise. Army forces are frequently called up to restore host-nation civil authority and institutions so national and international order can be restored. The burdens of governance on a transitional military authority require culturally astute leaders and Soldiers.

Respect for Religious Customs and Organizations

2-86. Religious and political factors often interact within a society, reflecting the motivations and perceptions of the local populace. The religious conventions and beliefs of a society may significantly influence the political dimension of conflict. The methods leaders use to manage religious factors can determine whether conflict and instability give way to peaceful outcomes. International law mandates that military forces respect the religious convictions and practices of members of the local populace. The military force should, consistent with security requirements, respect the religious celebrations and the legitimate activities of religious leaders. Places of religious worship should remain open unless they pose a specific security or health risk to the military force or the local populace.

Archives and Records

2-87. Military forces secure and preserve archives and records, current and historical, of all branches of the former government. These documents are of immediate and continuing use to the military force as a source of valuable intelligence and other information. They are even more important to the transitional military authority by providing invaluable information in running the government. Therefore, the military force must seize, secure, and protect archives and records.

Shrines and Art

2-88. Military forces protect shrines and art. Except in cases where military operations or military necessity prevents it, the force protects and preserves all historical and cultural monuments and works, religious shrines and objects of art, and any other national collections of artifacts or art.

Atrocities

2-89. Under certain circumstances, the transitional military authority may be required to contend with the aftermath of atrocities, including war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. To the greatest extent possible, the transitional military authority should assist in establishing commissions and with identifying, processing, and memorializing remains of victims. These are especially sensitive matters. The transitional military authority performs these tasks with appropriate sensitivity and respect for local culture and customs.

Corruption

2-90. Often, the transitional military authority contends with corruption in certain sectors of the host nation. Transparent, legitimate processes are fundamental to effective anticorruption programs. Therefore, the transitional military authority needs appropriate anticorruption measures to counter the influence of corrupt officials in host-nation institutions. However, the military authority should not dismiss corrupt officials before considering the effect of their prestige and influence.
Vetting

2-91. Successful building partner capacity relies on dependable vetting processes (such as biometric data collection devices for verifying identities) to screen potential civil servants from the host nation. These processes help commanders to select qualified, competent officials while reducing security risks. Vetting processes should include the participation of local inhabitants to ensure transparency, cultural sensitivity, and legitimacy. Commanders monitor these processes closely to prevent the exclusion of specific religious, ethnic, or tribal groups. (For additional information on security screening, see FM 2-22.2.)

Courts and Claims

2-92. The ordinary courts in areas under control of the transitional military authority generally continue to function during a military occupation. The transitional military authority may suspend ordinary courts if judges do not fulfill their duties, the courts are corrupt or unfairly constituted, or the administration of the local jurisdiction has collapsed. In such cases, the transitional military authority may establish its own courts.

2-93. The penal laws of the occupied territory remain in force during the occupation. However, the transitional military authority may suspend these laws during an occupation if they constitute a threat to security or an obstacle to the application of the Geneva Conventions.

2-94. During an occupation, the transitional military authority may enact special decrees and penal provisions essential for it to—

- Fulfill its obligations under The Hague and Geneva Conventions.
- Maintain orderly administration of the occupied territory.
- Ensure the security of the occupying forces.

2-95. Penal provisions enacted by the transitional military authority during an occupation may not be enforced until they are made public to the population of the occupied territory in the national language of that host nation. Such penal provisions may not be retroactive and the penalty must be proportionate to the offense. Courts may only apply those provisions of law that applied prior to the alleged offense and are in accordance with the general principles of law.

2-96. The transitional military authority may establish courts to hear cases on alleged violations of the special decrees and penal provisions enacted by the transitional military authority. It may also establish courts and administrative boards for other certain purposes. These purposes might include considering the cases of detainees and reconsidering the refusals of requests by aliens to leave the occupied host nation. (For further information on courts, commissions, and military tribunals, see the Manual for Military Commissions.)

2-97. During an occupation, the transitional military authority has certain requirements. It may not declare that the rights and actions of enemy nationals are extinguished, suspended, or unenforceable in a court of law. During an occupation, U.S. forces and the transitional military authority are not subject to local laws. Nor are they subject to the jurisdiction of the local civil or criminal courts of the occupied territory unless expressly agreed to by the transitional military authority or by the occupying power. Only U.S. military courts should try U.S. personnel subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (known as UCMJ). Promptly investigating, arbitrating, and settling local damage claims—to the extent permitted by U.S. law, regulation, and policy—can help to strengthen the credibility of the transitional military authority. (See AR 27-20 for regulatory guidance on claims.)

Interim Civil Authority

2-98. An interim civil authority is set up when the collapse of a government created a political void. An interim civil authority is also called a provisional or interim government. It can be formed by an outside nation or coalition of nations, local inhabitants or by an IGO, such as the United Nations.

2-99. Sometimes local unelected individuals organize to govern their town or region after a war, or sometimes a government may reform itself with provisional status under a coalition following a crisis. In
these cases, U.S. forces most often support the American ambassador through collaboration with the U.S. country team.

2-100. Occasionally the established government has ceased to carry its basic functions because of foreign or domestic conflict, and the situation poses a threat to international peace and stability. In such cases, the international community may decide to establish an interim civil authority instead of an interim military authority. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia, the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia, the UN Interim Administration in Kosovo (known as UNMIK), the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor, and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) in Iraq are examples. Although under the Department of Defense, the CPA was led by an ambassador and staffed primarily by civil administrators.

CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERIM CIVIL AUTHORITY

2-101. The interim civil authority exercises the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. It restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety and security of the local populace, and provides essential civil services. Because the interim civil authority is an external imposition on domestic affairs and affects the sovereignty of the state and the rights of the people, it can transition quickly to local governance. Therefore, the interim civil authority seeks an approach openly cooperative with the host nation and its population to facilitate transition to the host nation or international authority.

2-102. The timing of this transition varies across the sectors. Success depends on a viable political process that can establish local legitimate governance. The political process can include a range of activities such as—

- The negotiations towards an enduring, comprehensive peace agreement between the parties to a conflict.
- The holding of what is hoped to be peaceful and credible elections and the strengthening of democratic processes.
- The assistance to whatever local institutions exist in the extension of state authority.
- National reconciliation.
- Continual attention to the avoidance of a breakdown in the peace or political process.
- Supporting and facilitating an all-inclusive political process that can successfully move the country from a post-conflict state towards a sustainable peace.

2-103. The interim civil administration may organize itself in many ways that might include pillars and interim administrative structures, with combined international and local participation. In Kosovo, UN Interim Administration in Kosovo was divided into four sections:

- Pillar I: Police and justice (led by the UN).
- Pillar II: Civil administration (led by the UN).
- Pillar III: Democratization and institution building (led by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe).
- Pillar IV: Reconstruction and economic development (led by the European Union).

Additionally, a joint interim administrative structure was established with UN Interim Administration in Kosovo and North Atlantic Treaty Organization participation, along with local partners. This consisted of a Kosovo Transition Council and an Interim Administrative Council to smooth the way for a permanent legitimate structure. The interim civil administration put similar arrangements in place to establish the capacity and legitimacy of local partners. (See the cases listed in paragraph 2-100.)

MILITARY ROLE IN INTERIM CIVIL AUTHORITY

2-104. Military forces provide support to the interim civil authority. Stability tasks support the efforts of an interim civil authority when no legitimate government exists. Stability tasks leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; support the establishment of political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.
2-105. In a whole-of-government approach, commanders identify and prioritize critical objectives that need immediate attention. When other agencies, organizations, and the host nation lack a capability, commanders collaborate with them to provide military expertise. With an interim civil authority, that may mean that the military provides direct support to some of the offices and agencies of that authority while the overall direction remains with that authority. An example of this is the combined governance effort of the CPA in Iraq.

2-106. In the CPA, military participation consisted of a joint team (which included civil affairs, military information support operations [known as MISO], and public affairs) that provided initial security, communications, and transportation. Military information support operations and other information-related capabilities enabled integrated and tailored communications among the populace and key leaders, consistent with approved overarching themes, messages, and national objectives.

2-107. In the CPA, civilian representatives provided political and policy guidance on behalf of the administrator as well as identified needs and concerns in the political districts and offices. Civilian representation synchronized local programs and policies with regional and national structures. Local leaders emerged. These leaders linked interim administration initiatives with needs and requirements determined by local town and city councils and assisted in quicker transition to Iraqi control. Expatriates bridged cultural, linguistic, and tribal gaps. Contractors provided professional training and mentoring to interim local teams of public servants and administrators.

2-108. The military establishes physical liaison, communication, and data sharing between the interim civil authority and any task force headquarters. Generally, the responsibility for providing for the basic needs of the people rests with the host-nation government, designated civil authorities, or other organizations. When needed, military forces provide minimum levels of civil security and restore essential services until a civil authority or the host nation is able. These essential services provide for minimal levels of security, food, water, shelter, and medical treatment. Commanders at all levels assess resources available against the mission to determine how to complete these minimum-essential stability tasks and what risks they can accept.

2-109. Army forces coordinate the performance of their stability tasks with other partners. They perform tactical tasks subordinate to the primary stability tasks. The five primary Army stability tasks correspond to the five stability sectors used by the Department of State. Army stability tasks directly support broader efforts within the stability sectors. All partners complete tasks as part of unified action. Together, the primary Army stability tasks and the Department of State stability sectors can form a framework to help Army leaders understand the organization developed by interim civil authorities. Army leaders can use this framework to coordinate discreet tactical tasks with civil authorities.

2-110. Military forces perform none of the primary stability tasks in isolation. When integrated within their complementary stability sectors, the tasks represent a comprehensive effort to reestablish the institutions that provide for the civil participation, livelihood, and well-being of the citizens and state. At the operational level, the primary stability tasks serve as lines of effort or simply as a guide to action, ensuring broader unity of effort across the stability sectors.
Chapter 3
Considerations to Achieve Unity of Effort

This chapter discusses achieving unity of effort with two major groups of stability partners. It begins by discussing considerations for a whole-of-government approach among interagency partners. It concludes by discussing a comprehensive approach for unity of effort with interorganizational partners based outside the United States.

WHOLE-OF-GOVERNMENT APPROACH

3-1. Army doctrine describes operations focused on stability using both a whole-of-government approach and a comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort, depending on the nature of the partnerships. A whole-of-government approach encompasses coordination among all interagency partners. Such coordination is known as interagency coordination. Interagency coordination is defined as within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged United States Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 3-0). In the context of Army stability, partners can refer to organizations or their individual representatives who collaborate through structured teams or informal cooperation. Army forces perform stability tasks as partners in support of U.S. policy goals. In addition, this doctrine sometimes refers to U.S. and other partners as stability partners.

3-2. Coordination among United States (U.S.) and other partners is known as interorganizational coordination. Interorganizational coordination is defined as the interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; engaged United States Government agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). For the purposes of Army stability doctrine, the discussion of a comprehensive approach emphasizes coordination with civilian and military partners based outside the U.S. Government and any not considered of the United States. Many principles that apply to interagency coordination also apply to interorganizational coordination. (See JP 3-08 for joint doctrine on interorganizational coordination during joint operations.)

3-3. Security solutions are not likely to be determined by the military alone. U.S. military security efforts nest within a larger national security strategy that works with all the elements of good U.S. governance. As in the work of provincial reconstruction teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, engagements often include military forces working alongside governmental agencies in a whole-of-government approach. Working as stability partners, military forces can help build or restore the political, economic, and security institutions of weakened or failing states. Future engagements often include the coordinated action of civilian and military partners following natural disasters.

3-4. In stability, unity of effort results from successful synchronization, coordination, and integration of activities by governmental and nongovernmental entities. While military operations typically demand unity of command (a single commander directs the actions of all forces toward a common objective), operations focused on stability require coordination and cooperation toward common objectives by participants who belong to different commands or organizations. Moreover, achieving unity of effort can be challenging in an ambiguous operational context that is neither war nor peace. During operations focused on stability, extensive overlap among defense, diplomacy, and development activities is necessary to achieve mission objectives. Different stability partners simultaneously perform various tasks to create a secure environment, establish government control, and gain support from the populace.
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION

3-5. To foster effective interagency coordination, Army leaders need to understand and use the common characteristics of interagency groups. Army leaders should take advantage of the benefits of interagency partnerships, which have been proven by civil-military groups such as provincial reconstruction teams. Leaders and Soldiers should develop essential competencies such as cultural agility. The need for cultural agility applies to coordination among the different cultures of civil and military organizations as well as those of other nations. Army leaders should understand the capabilities of stability partners, including how partner organizations differ from the Army. They should consider relevant financial and legal factors. Above all, Army leaders should know how to improve communication and build relationships. No overarching interagency doctrine delineates or dictates the relationships and procedures governing all agencies, departments, and organizations in interagency operations.

Characteristics of Interagency Coordination

3-6. Interagency partnerships take many forms, such as formally structured teams with assigned tasks and members or informal collaboration among dissimilar groups with overlapping but independent goals. Stability involves networks of groups and organizations—including military groups—who work together toward at least one shared goal. This means Army leaders need to coordinate efforts within their own organization, between their organization and others when forming teams for specific tasks, and across numerous groups (including military units) whose individual efforts work more efficiently through partnerships.

3-7. Power, information, and expertise are widely distributed across civil and military stability partners. Because all the knowledge, skills, or abilities needed to achieve U.S. stability objectives does not reside in any one partner, stability partners establish teams with specialized skills sets. Each team or ad hoc partnership relies on others to provide capabilities it lacks, making all partners interdependent. This reliance results from the dangerous security situation that often characterizes operational environments. It also results from the complexity associated with operations focused on stability.

3-8. The temporary nature of interagency partnerships poses challenges to effective collaboration. Partners who collaborate in operations focused on stability often share a collective identity for a finite period. Interagency teams frequently are ad hoc; often members have little to no interaction before arriving in country. Short-term deployments for team members also make developing and maintaining relationships (and group identity) difficult. In circumstances such as these, leadership and personality factors influence success. Planners may need to factor in additional time to build trust and motivation to collaborate.

Benefits of Interagency Coordination

3-9. The integration of civilian and military efforts is crucial to mission success. For example, nation-building functions—such as implementing rule of law, developing human capital, providing social welfare, providing security, managing the use of the force, and establishing commercial markets—require coordinated and integrated actions from different U.S. agencies. By collaborating with other U.S. agencies, Soldiers gain access to individuals with extensive and specialized knowledge and skills. Collaboration with such individuals often leads to holistic solutions that consider factors normally outside the purview of military personnel.

3-10. Through successful interagency coordination, the U.S. Government conducts operations that achieve shared goals, build international support, achieve sustainability, and conserve resources. Interagency partners collaborate to determine when it is more efficient for partners outside the U.S. Government to perform certain tasks. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), for example, serve large numbers of people and have the capability to respond quickly and effectively to crises—their capabilities can effectively reduce the resources an Army commander would otherwise devote to an operation. Enabling partners to respond to security challenges may also reduce risk to U.S. forces and extend security to areas Army forces cannot reach alone.

3-11. Provincial reconstruction teams illustrate the effectiveness and challenges of interagency partnerships. These teams are interagency groups formed to improve stability in a region by integrating all instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic. While provincial
reconstruction teams have experienced success in Iraq and Afghanistan, their implementation also has highlighted significant challenges to interagency coordination. Overall, their levels of effectiveness, cohesion, and coherence have varied. Observers have suggested that provincial reconstruction team performance hinges almost solely on the ability of the military commander to work around obstacles to coordination.

**COMPETENCIES FOR INTERAGENCY COORDINATION**

3-12. At the national level, the Department of State has led efforts to build frameworks that enhance interagency coordination for stability efforts. However, leaders on the ground may only have general guidance and concepts and few formal arrangements. To improve collaboration in the field, commanders consider types of knowledge and skills along with best practices for working with interagency partners.

**Development of Cultural Agility**

3-13. Soldiers develop cultural agility—their ability to understand new cultures and adjust behavior to function effectively in them. In the context of stability, the idea of cultural differences normally refers to the cultures of a host nation. However, Army leaders also need to understand the organizational cultures of U.S. stability partners. Soldiers improve their sociocultural understanding of other groups by developing a greater awareness of norms, beliefs, practices, and perceptions. They try to understand how cultural factors will influence others’ behaviors, perceptions, and motivations. Sociocultural understanding helps commanders and staffs determine the effects of cultural norms and perceptions on mission objectives. Soldiers assess cultural factors so they can understand how individuals from other groups (societies or partner organizations) may view their behavior. They try to mitigate or avoid misunderstandings. Soldiers improve their ability to establish rapport and build relationships with individuals from different societal and organizational cultures.

**Understanding of the Context of Interagency Coordination**

3-14. The context of interagency coordination includes the interagency partners and an operational environment. A holistic understanding of an operational environment includes an awareness of civil considerations and sociocultural factors, such as beliefs and values, sources of power and authority, and social structures. These form a context for Army and interagency stability efforts. Whatever the mission objective, Army leaders study the environment’s historical, regional, and cultural context. To support situational understanding, Army leaders need to understand how a population perceives Army operations and interagency activities in which Army units participate.

3-15. Army leaders maintain a focused and persistent effort to understanding the culture, geography, politics, infrastructure, and economics of the country or region where forces are employed. This is challenging because such factors are dynamic and constantly evolving. Individuals working on interagency teams must find out where to obtain relevant information about the cultural context. Members must also be able to evaluate the accuracy and completeness of such information. (For more information on civil considerations and sociocultural factors, see FM 3-24.)

**Understanding of Capabilities of Interagency Partners and Systems for Coordination**

3-16. Understanding an operational environment includes understanding all interagency stability partners. Effective collaboration required understanding the policies, processes, and norms of interagency partners. Success in operations focused on stability also requires an awareness of trends that influence views of the actors and an understanding of factors that shape or constrain options and capabilities for partner organizations.

3-17. Army leaders develop the information needed to understand partner organizations, their component teams, and their place in overall U.S. stability activities and goals. This understanding forms the backdrop for assessing the effect of Army actions, plans, and decisions on partner organizations. A poor understanding of the partners must be avoided because it can hamper trust and impair integration of Army team members in interagency decisionmaking.
ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES

3-18. Military and civilian organizational cultures differ in significant ways. Organizational cultures comprise factors such as shared values, norms, expectations, and practices. An organizational culture influences how individuals approach work and what they regard as mission accomplishment. When team members with different organizational cultures interact with one another, differences become evident and can create tension in the group. Soldiers can minimize difficulties by improving their understanding of and attitudes toward partners.

3-19. Organizational differences—in mission objectives, size, and resource capabilities, and neutrality among others—and challenges in information sharing can create friction between military and civilian partners. Military personnel can improve interagency coordination by educating themselves on these differences. They should demonstrate a knowledge and appreciation of their partners’ capabilities and viewpoints.

3-20. Military personnel conducting interagency coordination consider organizational differences related to—

- Leadership.
- Mission objectives.
- Resources available.
- The nature of teamwork.
- The nature of humanitarian efforts.
- Time orientation.
- Measurement.

Leadership

3-21. Army leaders lack authority over the interagency partnerships in which they participate. Therefore, they need to develop other means of influence, as interagency decisionmaking processes tend to require building consensus. Soldiers also need to develop influence techniques that gain cooperation and preclude resistance to military objectives. Such techniques are uncommon within a traditional military setting.

Mission Objectives

3-22. Army leaders ensure various organizational priorities and mandates do not reduce the unity of effort for interagency teams or partnerships. They develop an understanding of the interrelatedness of objectives—how the objectives of Army forces and other partners align within U.S. security policy. With this perspective in mind, Army leaders strive to enhance unity of effort. The objectives of all partners are important and should be integrated into the whole rather than regarded as competing.

Resources Available

3-23. Army forces sometimes have more resources than their interagency stability partners have. While uncertain or hostile environments need resource overmatch, this imbalance may hinder success when conducting interagency coordination. Army leaders regularly monitor their attitudes and those of others in relation to volume of resources. They should avoid inadvertently creating a perception that they consider their mission more important simply because they have more resources. Army leaders should avoid inadvertently stifling contributions of smaller agencies or considering partner objectives unimportant in comparison with Army objectives. Such negative attitudes potentially impair collaborative decisionmaking and effective partnerships.

Nature of Teamwork

3-24. The take-charge, can-do attitude of Soldiers can come across as overbearing to interagency partners. In areas related to host-nation development, the Army may be seen as attempting to take over and manage all activities. Many partners join stability efforts intending to share the work, discuss the needs, and build consensus with an attitude of collaboration. Certain preferences of Army organizational culture, such as
getting right to the point in discussions and taking charge of meetings or missions, often fail to facilitate cooperation. Moreover, Army leaders must remember that the relatively strict hierarchical structure common to Army operations is less common among many partner organizations and possibly unwelcome on interagency teams.

**Nature of Humanitarian Efforts**

3-25. Some U.S. agencies are reluctant to be seen as having direct connections to U.S. forces. Reasons may be philosophical as well as practical. Members of many U.S. agencies providing aid intend to serve altruistic humanitarian purposes. They do not wish to be regarded as serving political objectives or advancing U.S. influence. They prefer their identity to be as civilian as possible in stabilization efforts. Moreover, the host-nation populace may not welcome humanitarian aid when U.S. forces are known or believed to be connected to humanitarian operations. Therefore, members of civilian agencies may feel that increased military involvement in stability efforts impairs their mission or image and compromises humanitarian values. Army leaders should expect such viewpoints. They can avoid friction by understanding that these attitudes may reflect the situation on the ground and most likely do not indicate that partners are criticizing Army operations. Army leaders and partners should determine collaboratively the most effective way Army forces can contribute to the whole-of-government approach.

**Time Orientation**

3-26. Army leaders need to consider how the tendency of Army operations to focus on relatively short-term objectives affects long-term goals of partners and U.S. policy. Some partners tend to emphasize future, long-term goals and the actions necessary to achieve them. For example, in Afghanistan, the Army’s short-term orientation has typically led to a focus on projects that achieve quick results. Some partners have considered projects such as building schools or clinics without adequate infrastructure or resources for their sustainment detrimental to Afghanistan’s long-term development. Overall stability efforts must achieve a balance of short- and long-term objectives; interagency coordination that includes military forces can be ideal for this purpose.

**Measurement**

3-27. Military and interagency partners also differ in how they measure success and when they consider the work of stability complete. Due in part to the military’s orientation on relatively short times and quick results, the military often measures tangible items such as the number of units trained or neighborhoods cleared. Conversely, civilian agencies often assess more intangible goals, such as the progress toward reconciliation. Not only are these intangible goals harder to measure, but they also require more time. Friction can result when Army leaders consider their mission accomplished while civilian leaders believe much work remains toward long-term, intangible goals not easily quantified. Army leaders can avoid discord by considering Army efforts within the context of long-term U.S. goals. They can collaborate with interagency partners to apply measurements that show the success of the whole-of-government approach. Army leaders participating in interagency groups—

- Learn about partners’ timelines and develop metrics supportive of all U.S. stability objectives.
- Establish metrics that measure outcomes (end results), not just activities (such as dollars spent, number of units trained).
- Clarify exactly how proposed actions support stability or developmental goals.
- Place immediate needs in the context of long-term strategic goals.

**STRATEGIES FOR IMPROVING COMMUNICATION**

3-28. Effective Soldiers learn how to facilitate communication and information sharing across partner agencies. Differences in organizational objectives and cultures present variations in informational needs, communication style, information-sharing processes, and priorities. Differences may include willingness or urgency to share information. Further, as teams are likely to be ad hoc, so are information arrangements. Therefore, every effort to enhance communication will support an effective whole-of-government approach.
3-29. Soldiers should ensure information is accessible to all interagency members. This requires an understanding of the available communication processes, technologies, and potential barriers that could impede communication (such as security concerns, system and program compatibility, and connectivity issues). Military organizations should avoid unnecessarily classifying information that could be helpful to partners, especially when the information originally belonged to other agencies.

3-30. Key strategies for improving communication include—

- Using a common lexicon of terms among interagency partners, since many terms can be misinterpreted or have slightly different meanings (such as *assessment* and *targeting*) across the different agencies.
- Avoiding the use of acronyms or terms that may not be familiar to all interagency members, since this may cause confusion or feelings of exclusion.
- Practicing suitable ways to share information based on the context and the intended audience. For example, it may be better to discuss certain subjects informally with a limited audience (outside a group meeting) or to bring up other subjects in front of all members of the group.
- Engaging in active listening.

**Active Listening**

3-31. No communications skill is more important than listening. Active listeners keep judgments in check while the other person is speaking. They listen to understand before they respond. Interagency group members take notes or write down points for clarification while another person is talking to ensure they capture important details of the message and are not distracted by counterarguments.

3-32. Active listeners restate and paraphrase the message they heard to help confirm they perceive it correctly. When working with interagency partners Soldiers ask open-ended questions to gain more information about the topic. This active listening gives the listener more insight into the speaker’s perspective and viewpoint on the discussion.

3-33. Active listeners pay attention to the verbal and nonverbal aspects of the message and the culture from which the speaker comes. For example, the manner and urgency in which a message is presented provides useful information. If the speaker leans forward and looks the listener in the eye, then the speaker probably tells the truth.

**Understanding the Perspectives of Others**

3-34. A key strategy to increase understanding of others is known as social perspective taking. In the discipline of social psychology, social perspective taking refers to methodically trying to understand what others are thinking and feeling and how their points of view differ from one’s own. Social perspective taking includes approaches individuals can use to improve understanding of others, including the motivations for their behaviors. Soldiers who successfully engage in social perspective taking (also called perspective taking) can see situations from another’s point of view and recognize the issues, challenges, and situations relevant to the actors involved. This understanding increases Army leaders’ ability to interpret, predict, and coordinate interagency behavior.

3-35. Perspective taking has several benefits for Soldiers working with interagency partners. Perspective taking can help Army leaders become aware of how their own organization and its cultural norms are perceived by individuals from partner agencies. Since many interpersonal friction points within an interagency stem from organizational and communication differences, being aware of one’s own cultural norms and potential biases, and how others perceive them, may help Soldiers anticipate and avoid unnecessary issues.

3-36. Soldiers who recognize that others may view a situation differently become more aware of and open-minded to differing or competing ideas. Perspective taking has also been shown to improve communication and facilitate negotiations and conflict resolution. Skilled perspective takers resort to stereotyping less often.

3-37. People are social beings. They naturally try to determine the reasons for others’ behavior. Often, people tend to use their experiences, beliefs, assumptions, and value systems as a frame of reference. This
can reduce the accuracy of their understanding of others. Perspective taking efforts may be challenging when Soldiers interact with someone from a different organizational culture. Soldiers may be unaware of the effects their own organizational culture has on their perspective. To increase perspective taking accuracy, Soldiers need to be self-critical when trying to understand the perspective of someone else. Perspective taking is an aptitude that can be increased with training and practice.

3-38. One method to increase social perspective taking is known as the ACTion approach to perspective taking (summarized in table 3-1). This approach illustrates a process Soldiers can use to improve perspective taking and to respond effectively to others. The ACTion approach involves three main steps:

- Assess yourself, others, and the situation while managing your emotions.
- Create guesses—based on information gathered—about the reasons for others’ behavior, and then test, refine, and prioritize the guesses.
- Take a course of action selected after testing, refining, and ranking guesses about others’ behavior and predicting the results.

Table 3-1. The ACTion approach to social perspective taking

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assess yourself, others, and the situation while managing your emotions.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self: assess your biases and manage your emotions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: assess a baseline and observe personal space, facial expressions, and signs of stress.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Situation: assess all relevant cultural and contextual information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Create guesses about the reasons for others’ behavior.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Testing: check your hypotheses against facts and an ongoing assessment of self, others, and the situation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refining: improve your understanding of others’ perspectives; adjust your hypotheses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prioritizing: rank your hypotheses according to probable correctness in terms of explaining the perspectives of others.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Take the course of action most likely to yield desired results.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Selecting: determine the course of action most likely to be effective—based on your understanding of others’ perspectives and your estimate of consequences or costs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accomplishing: carry out your course of action.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reassessing: continue gathering information.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3-39. The ability to understand accurately another person’s words and behavior, and their reasons for them, depends on biases. Biases, or distortions in thought and perception, are the main reasons one can be incorrect when trying to understand the behavior and motivation of others. Common biases include—

- The fundamental attribution error.
- Naive realism.
- Confirmation bias.
- The in-group/out-group bias.

3-40. The fundamental attribution error is the tendency to attribute a person’s behavior to personality rather than the situation. As a result, individuals tend to undervalue the importance of context to another person’s actions.

3-41. Naive realism refers to an assumption that the world is seen as it truly is and that others have this same perception of the world. However, if others do not share the same view, one may incorrectly assume it is because they have not been given the proper information or are illogical in their interpretation.

3-42. Confirmation bias refers to the tendency individuals have to gather evidence that supports their theories or ideas and to ignore information that may contradict their theories.

3-43. In-group/out-group bias refers to the preferential treatment people will give to individuals they perceive as members of their own group. Further, people often perceive more diversity within the characteristics of their in-group members and engage in discriminatory behaviors against out-group members.
3-44. Trying to manage complex situations with a diverse team of individuals with ambiguously defined roles and responsibilities—from different organizations with varying organizational goals and priorities—can be challenging and frustrating. Under these circumstances, regulating one’s emotions plays an important role in effective interagency interactions. This is because unchecked emotions may interfere with the formation of accurate impressions and hinder effective communication.

3-45. Key strategies for managing one’s emotions include—

- Reframing.
- Acting as if.
- Physiological regulation.

3-46. Reframing is the ability to deliberately change one’s understanding of the situation by stepping back and looking at it from another angle. A person can imagine watching a situation as a spectator, for example, and gain new insights.

3-47. Acting as if refers to determining what emotional response a situation calls for, considering the social norms, and regulating one’s emotions appropriately as if playing a role. For example, a person can imagine someone known to remain calm and cool under pressure, and behave as that person.

3-48. Physiological regulation involves deliberate physical actions that interrupt natural and immediate reactions to emotions. The brain produces predictable changes in the body (physiological changes) in reaction to certain stresses. Individuals may be able to regulate such changes by taking slow deep breaths, taking a drink of water, or taking one’s glasses off and putting them back on.

3-49. In addition to assessing themselves, Soldiers should also assess others by gathering information regarding the person with whom they are interacting. As part of assessing others, Soldiers establish the person’s normal baseline behavior in different situations. The Soldier then watches for fluctuations in that baseline behavior. Often the presence of change may indicate something important is triggering the behavior shift. For example, a Soldier would need to analyze a situation in which a normally reserved notional interagency partner suddenly becomes very vocal during discussions of security measures for an upcoming district election. Such a change in the partner’s behavior should trigger Soldiers to gather more information on the situation and to understand the motivations for the partner’s change in behavior.

3-50. When assessing others’ behavior, Soldiers should also examine the physical space between individuals. Culture, behaviors, and society affect the amount of space individuals permit. Two common uses of space include the use of closeness and space consumption. Generally, when people are physically closer to each other, it means that they like each other or feel positive about how the interaction is going. Further, when an individual takes up more space, this often signals comfort, dominance, or both. Therefore, the use of space is a simple clue to a person’s general feelings towards others, even if the verbal message seems unclear or even questionable.

3-51. Soldiers should also watch for other nonverbal behaviors, such as showing stress. Since stress often produces a physical reaction, many people try to block the stress they feel (perhaps by squinting their eyes or crossing their arms in front of their body). Other individuals manage feelings of stress by engaging in pacifying behavior (such as rubbing one’s neck, cracking knuckles, or playing with jewelry or ties). Lastly, Soldiers should try to observe people’s facial expressions (such as raised or furrowed eyebrows).

3-52. After Soldiers assess themselves and others, they need to assess the situation. Specifically, Soldiers determine what cultural and contextual information likely is influencing the person’s actions and motives. Soldiers use the information gained from assessing the speaker and the situation to create guesses about reasons for the person’s behavior. They develop and take a course of action based on the hypotheses generated.

3-53. Because accurate perspective taking is a continuous learning process, Soldiers continually gather more information to help refine and prioritize their hypotheses. By taking steps to increase perspective taking accuracy, Soldiers lay the foundation for successful interagency relationships.
STRATEGIES FOR BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS

3-54. Because successful partnerships depend on civil-military relationships, effective Soldiers take time to build relationships before engaging in shared planning for operations. Military personnel can facilitate effective interactions with partner agencies by understanding roles and responsibilities, developing alliances, fostering positive relationships, managing conflict, and building common ground and shared purpose. By engaging successfully with other partners, military leaders set the conditions for mission accomplishment.

Understanding Roles and Responsibilities

3-55. Army leaders allow time to understand roles and responsibilities, build relationships, and align missions with interagency goals. This time helps avoid unnecessary obstacles to collaboration, productivity, and cohesion. In situations where leaders have not received guidance on roles and responsibilities, they can minimize confusion and enhance effectiveness by building their understanding of roles and responsibilities.

3-56. During the conduct of operations focused on stability, Army leaders work collaboratively with other organizations to define the most appropriate and essential roles for civilian and military agencies. Collaboration begins during planning and continues through preparation, execution, and assessment. Where security issues do not prevent nonmilitary organizations from helping the local populace, Soldiers prepare to play a supporting role in operations focused on stability. Military participants also prepare to work in informal or formal, integrated civil-military groups led by representatives from other agencies. Civilian partners often serve as decisionmakers rather than advisors to military partners, and Soldiers may not have the authority to direct civilian partners toward a particular action.

3-57. Military members of interagency groups must remember that a military force alone cannot build long-term security and development. Within operations focused on stability, military leaders must act cooperatively rather than competitively, building strategic relationships to achieve coordinated goals. Organizations can increase collaboration by providing their representatives with a clear understanding of their organization’s functions and authority within the larger civil-military partnership. Regular interaction with interagency partners also contributes to an increased understanding of roles and mission requirements.

3-58. Key strategies for understanding roles and responsibilities include—

- Engaging civilian counterparts early to gain an understanding of their roles and mission requirements.
- Defining clear-cut responsibilities for civilian and military partners to ensure mission success.
- If possible, collaboratively determining roles and responsibilities for a particular task at the onset of consensus building. Each stakeholder participates in shaping his or her involvement.
- When possible, avoiding the provision of aid as a military responsibility. Attempts to define roles and responsibilities should seek creative ways for Army forces to enable provision of aid, rather than delivering aid directly.
- Considering military partners as enablers; working to help, inform, support, plan, and build capacity for others.
- For new members to interagency partnerships, identifying roles through research and communication with contacts experienced in civil-military partnerships.
- Conducting Army interactions with partners from other organizations collaboratively. This means Army commanders ensure they and their subordinates adopt a collaborative, whole-of-government approach.

Developing Alliances

3-59. To facilitate effective interagency collaboration, Soldiers develop networks and establish alliances with appropriate agencies. Sharing knowledge, skills, and learning opportunities is an effective strategy for building and maintaining alliances. Military team members can also facilitate effective partnerships by placing common goals above individual needs. As an example, military leaders demonstrate humility and a desire to work together by prioritizing mission goals over personal credit or professional achievement.
3-60. Early and frequent contact by key team members, or team leaders, helps reduce uncertainties and delays that characterize interagency collaboration and facilitates developing effective partnerships. If possible, senior military leaders and their staff locate near other partner agencies. Proximity has a beneficial effect on personal interaction and coordination. Specifically, being in the same space allows more agility and speed in managing rapidly developing crises. Co-location allows greater information sharing and regular participation by all partners in making critical decisions. Finally, regular informal interaction contributes to developing trust and, if needed, facilitates conflict resolution.

3-61. When organizations rely on one another to achieve shared objectives and create strong and potentially lasting bonds. To facilitate interagency alliances, leaders and Soldiers first develop an understanding of the mutual needs of all partner agencies. Once mutual needs have been determined, leaders and Soldiers should plan how best to support their interagency partners.

3-62. Leaders also should ensure that all organizations share the responsibility and the recognition for mission accomplishment. As much as possible, Army leaders ensure partners receive credit for the successes of their respective organizations and the successes of the interagency groups in which they participate. Praising and drawing attention to the success of others increases interagency support and strengthens bonds.

3-63. Key strategies for developing alliances are—

- Meeting with the partner on a regular basis and engaging in a variety of conversations.
- Taking the time to build a relationship with the partner and find out how to support him or her.
- Attending meetings of the partner’s agency and noting information shared.
- Taking advantage of opportunities to praise others and drawing attention to their successes.
- Introducing the partner to other key actors.
- When possible, co-locating Army partners close to agency or military partners.
- Valuing humility by focusing on shared outcomes rather than on getting credit.

3-64. Building relationships with appropriate organizations requires frequent positive interactions among group members. Military personnel should strive to interact with partners in a way that will result in successful shared experiences. Informal interaction is important to forming positive relationships and developing trust. When possible, Soldiers should also try to engage interagency partners prior to, and outside of the context of, operational planning.

3-65. Soldiers demonstrate a willingness to cultivate relationships with people from differing backgrounds and organizational cultures. They show respect and appreciation for these differences—and for partners’ roles and responsibilities—to develop positive relationships. Military group members demonstrate respect for others by acknowledging partners’ strengths and abilities and by welcoming input from all partners during the planning process.

3-66. Key strategies for fostering positive relationships are to—

- Welcome partners into existing civilian, military, or interagency planning functions.
- Form good relationships before taking major actions.
- Communicate respect to others through behavior.
- Highlight each partner’s strengths and abilities.
- Actively listen to input from interagency partners.
- Coordinate off the record during informal interactions (such as coffee breaks, meals, and convoys).

3-67. Successful cooperation depends on the belief that engagement in a collaborative process will produce a better result than working independently. For effective interaction, Soldiers must acknowledge that other agencies have resources, capabilities, and expertise essential for success in operations focused on stability.
3-68. Because coordinating with others is often a choice, military leaders should evaluate when and how collaboration makes sense. Before engaging with other agencies, Soldiers should reflect on their readiness to collaborate. This includes reflection on—

- How well one understands the issues at hand.
- What one believes can be achieved by working with others.
- What assumptions and expectations one has for interagency interactions.
- How open one is to alternative paths to mission accomplishment.

3-69. Identifying and fostering relationships with potential stakeholders is a critical first step in collaborative work. Stakeholders include individuals who participate in planning and implementing collaborative solutions, those who may be affected by them, and those who could block implementation. Military partners must be careful to establish relationships with stakeholders who are credible to the other collaborators, as well as to the group or organization that sent them. Representatives without credibility will lack the authority to commit their group or organization to a collaborative solution.

3-70. Soldiers must understand civilian partners’ operational strengths and limitations so they can ensure interagency relationships support mission objectives. By understanding and then building on identified core competencies and successful experiences of interagency partners, Soldiers can better use available resources, create lasting partnerships, and ensure mission success. When possible, Army leaders defer to the agency most competent by training, experience, and mandate to be the designated lead for interagency partnerships.

3-71. Key strategies for identifying and benefitting from key relationships are to—

- Approach assignments with an open mind and without assuming one knows all the answers.
- Show appreciation for different paths to success.
- Identify number, type (such as local, United States only, or international), and purpose of each group working in the theater of operations.
- Identify the key decisionmakers.
- Recognize that several entities within the same organization could be important for coordination.
- Identify agencies not yet represented and invite them to participate in collaboration.
- Build relationships with civilian partners to employ their capabilities when military forces are not allowed to work in an area.

**Managing Conflict**

3-72. Soldiers should understand the potential for conflicts among individuals with differing cultural backgrounds. For example, interagency conflict may arise because of perceived differences in organizational goals or attitudes about the appropriateness of military involvement. Anticipating counterproductive confrontations and taking steps to resolve individual and organizational conflicts constructively is paramount to successful collaboration.

3-73. To preserve working relationships, Soldiers should understand and apply compromise and mediation techniques where possible. Soldiers practice mediation by meeting one person to work out a solution or by grouping individuals who are in disagreement and allowing them to work out solutions separately. Mediation should occur quickly before positions become polarized and opinions are intractable. Mediation need not be a formal process; informal approaches conducted early are preferable.

3-74. Soldiers recognize the value of interagency coordination and demonstrate a commitment to preserving relationships with interagency partners. To prevent and manage conflict, Soldiers engage in regular interaction and ongoing, open communication with partners. These practices can prevent misunderstandings or rebuild lost confidence when disagreements result in bad feelings. Additional preemptive strategies for managing conflict include ensuring all stakeholders are identified and included in making decisions. Army leaders ensure that ground rules for interagency interaction are collaboratively set and that key players support the partnerships and proposed strategies for interagency mission accomplishment.

3-75. Key strategies for managing conflict are—
• Define and develop roles and responsibilities early.
• Bring hidden agendas (one’s own and those of others) and conflicts out into the open; address them with a win-win attitude.
• If a person seems difficult to work with, try a cooling-off time, a side conversation, a new person to speak with them, and empathy. If all else fails, work around that person altogether.

Building Common Ground and Shared Purpose

3-76. As part of fostering successful collaboration, Soldiers work with others. Together they develop ideas, obtain resources, gain commitment, and accomplish mutually important goals. This collaboration builds a common ground and shared purpose with interagency partners.

3-77. A common approach to interagency decisionmaking is consensus building. In consensus building, the decision-making authority resides with the collective group rather than a single individual. This process may feel alien to Soldiers accustomed to delegated orders from a chain of command. The consensus-building process may seem slow to Army leaders. Army leaders must understand the importance of ensuring that interagency partners explore various alternatives and all partners participate. Army leaders can adopt consensus-building leadership behaviors. Consensus-building behaviors include open discourse, friendly debate, and discussion with opinion sharing with and feedback from participants.

3-78. Key strategies for building common ground are to—
• Encourage joint civilian and military coordination at the planning stage.
• Clarify how proposed actions are in support of stability or developmental goals.
• Define clear-cut responsibilities for civilians and military forces to ensure mission success.
• Seek support of local community decision-making groups—it will be hard for others to disregard the voice of a locally organized entity.
• Use tact and work towards compromise.
• Engage in active listening.

3-79. During stability tasks, Soldiers will find themselves needing to rely on external organizations to maximize resources, reach difficult segments of the populations, and create sustainable solutions to problems. Therefore, success in stability tasks requires the coordination and cooperation of numerous civilian and military agencies. Understanding the context for partnerships, the capabilities and resources of different agencies, and the need to form positive, long-lasting relationships with interagency partners are fundamental to effective collaboration.

Types of Funding

3-80. Commanders normally have access to a variety of monetary instruments during operations focused on stability, so they can spend money how they determine it needs to be spent. For instance, they normally can spend appropriated funds for stipulated purposes that directly contribute to reconstruction and development. This means Army commanders should expect no caveats to funding that would restrict their ability to respond to the situation. This fiscal freedom does not mean that commanders can dispense funds without constraint. As for every other appropriation it makes, Congress sets criteria that specifically address how commanders can and cannot spend funds in operations focused on stability. Furthermore, funding strictly tied to the in-theater ground portion of operations focused on stability should flow through leaders to the suborganizations or units responsible for executing reconstruction and development, as this establishes fiscal accountability. Additionally Army commanders spend any stability funds in the context of a whole-of-government and comprehensive approach to achieve unity of effort toward an agreed goal.

Funding Guidance and Authorities

3-81. Resources are often limited and cannot be restricted to use by a single agency, Service, or entity. Army commanders and staff understand no other interagency stakeholders apply resources to achieve effects in the operational area. This list includes not only U.S. government agencies, but also intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, multinational partners, and private sector entities. The commander, together with key stability partners, completes detailed analyses of situations and operational
Considerations to Achieve Unity of Effort

environments. These analyses include understanding the sources of funding and resources and the methods of application. Each analysis helps ensure the various capabilities and activities focus on achieving stability objectives shared by all partners.

3-82. Funding for activities within any area of operations often comes from several sources with funding differing for each country and region. Funding examples include economic support funds (Department of State [DOS] or United States Agency for International Development [USAID]); overseas humanitarian, disaster, and civic aid (Department of Defense [DOD]); Quick Impact Funding—called the Commander’s Emergency Response Program funding in Afghanistan and Iraq (DOD); and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding (DOS).

3-83. In many cases, such as economic support funds and International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funds, the military may play an oversight or supporting role as it did in the provincial reconstruction teams. In Iraq and Afghanistan, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program provided military commanders with funds they could directly program and disburse. Even though the concept of quick-impact funds is firmly established, this practice may not continue in future reconstruction and stabilization missions.

3-84. Legal restrictions on the use of certain funds and the existing sanctions on the country in question require the separate management of these funds by the organization responsible for their expenditure. The separation of funding from different authorities is not always obvious and there is no blanket exception for deployment to the fiscal law framework. Commanders should use their resource and legal advisors to ensure the laws are not violated. In addition, constraints, including prohibitions on certain uses of the funds, must be taken into account in planning. Balancing so many considerations is an essential task for U.S. military and civilian leaders that ensures an effective, efficient, and sustainable work plan.

3-85. Commanders in a rapidly evolving stability environment sometimes react more effectively if they can access funds for a given response quickly and efficiently. In addition to civil affairs support to stability tasks, commanders and planners engage frequently with members of financial management, contracting, and staff judge advocate to ensure timely funding. (See FM 1-06 for more information about financial management.)

3-86. Two major areas of funding that the military commanders manage in operations focused on stability are quick impact funds and security cooperation activities.

Quick Impact Funds

3-87. A quick impact fund enables Army commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in their areas of operations by carrying out programs that immediately assist the population. The fund serves small tasks that benefit the local population directly. Commanders can use the money to fix problems in infrastructures quickly and increase the quality of life. Ideally, the immediacy of these actions prevents crises from developing. Commanders need not wait for the longer approval processes for other aid, which can allow the situation to deteriorate. This fund hastens a return to normalcy. Projects can bring some order and prevent deterioration of a situation that insurgents or other spoilers could exploit.

3-88. Army commanders have some considerations when using these funds. While these projects can reduce local unrest, some have had the opposite effect. They can lead to increased violence if targeted by insurgents. For example, insurgents frequently have targeted medical facilities and police stations funded by the United States. Their high visibility and connection with the United States makes striking at them generate a strong ideological message and frustrate the overall mission. Attacks are less likely if locals staff them and local contractors manage them, but the threat remains.

3-89. Another consideration is that quick impact funds, if not informed as part of a comprehensive approach, can adversely affect the building of host-nation capability and capacity and retard host-nation ownership. When U.S. partners complete essential tasks that should be under control of the host nation, the government has less motivation to take fiscal responsibility.

3-90. To avoid errors, commanders and staffs must be vigilant and seek advice from USAID and other interagency partners. Quick impact funding projects do not always succeed at building local capacity.
These funds sometimes have supported corrupt activities by local nationals. This happened because commanders received faulty recommendations and inadequate information. For example, Army forces might unknowingly build public structures on private land because a corrupt person influenced the project for personal gain.

3-91. The greatest danger occurs when commanders undertook projects with very broad scopes. When the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction inspected development in the Baghdad Economic Zone, some of the larger projects were deemed unsuccessful. They failed because the project managers followed the same management and oversight procedures for small development. Smaller projects, too, are not without dangers. Quick impact funding, if not well coordinated, promotes a patchwork solution to problems. Commanders in different areas may not know what others are doing. This lack of knowledge leads to duplication of projects or the creation of many little projects that impede large-scale reconstruction and development by other agencies.

3-92. Quick impact funding projects are most effective when used with longer-term reconstruction and development in a comprehensive approach. There is a window of opportunity at the beginning where these funds are particularly effective. Later, short-term solutions can be counterproductive. Instead of promoting growth, these projects might encourage locals to expect more, similar short-term projects. At this point, U.S. forces are beyond simply handing out money, and civilian agencies should move towards establishing sustainable long-term programs.

Security Cooperation Activities

3-93. Security cooperation activities are supported by a diverse range of resources. Many require the commitment of military units, some with special capabilities. Others require participation by individuals or small teams of Soldiers, and some use DOD facilities. Some resources are used to directly reimburse the participation of foreign personnel. Dozens of special sources are involved, including service operations and maintenance accounts and special funding sources outside DOD, most notably DOS. (For additional information, see The Management of Security Cooperation also known as The Green Book.)

Funding Sources in Public Law

3-94. Some funding sources are directly authorized by public law, with particular restrictions on use and individual reporting requirements. In several cases, applicability of a resource category to an activity does not mean the resource may be freely applied. Other restrictions, peculiar to the resource, may limit the applicability of the resource to particular expense categories (such as travel by U.S. personnel only) or may limit the countries whose expenses may be reimbursed through the funding source.

Title 10

3-95. Programs funded under Title 10 that build partner capacity include but are not limited to—

- Combatant Commander Initiative Fund: a means of handling unforeseen requirements not addressed in the normal budget process.
- Counterdrug support: support for training and equipping partners and host nations to combat illegal drugs and narcoterrorism in their territories.
- Defense Environmental International Cooperation: a program to support access to resources—including air, land, and sea—for training and readiness; minimizing encroachment; contributing to interoperability; and fostering a global military environmental ethic.
- Defense Threat Reduction Agency: various programs to reduce biological, chemical, and nuclear threats (programs include funding for counterproliferation).
- Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid: appropriation funds of DOD activities in humanitarian assistance (such as nonlethal excess property, medical visits, minor construction, and disaster preparedness), foreign disaster relief and emergency response (such as logistics, airlift, search and rescue, humanitarian daily rations, plastic sheeting, tents), and humanitarian mine action, formerly referred to as humanitarian demining operations.

3-96. Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic Aid includes explosive remnants of war and other issues involved in landmines and areas contaminated by explosive remnants of war, such as assistance to mine
victims, mine risk education, and program management in humanitarian mine action. Conventional forces conduct humanitarian mine action training with partner nations. Explosive ordnance disposal forces [designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the priority force], combat engineers, and infantry conduct train-the-trainer humanitarian mine action operations.

**Title 22**

3-97. Programs funded under Title 22 that build partner capacity include but are not limited to—

- Foreign military financing, foreign military sales, draw downs, excess defense articles, foreign military financing grants, and international military education and training.
- Economic Support Fund, which advances U.S. interests by helping countries meet short- and long-term political, economic, and security needs.
- Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining, and Related programs, which strengthen bio-security and help combat nuclear smuggling.
- Export Control and Related Border Security programs, which strengthen border security and help, states implement United Nations (UN) Security Council Resolution 1540, related to nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- Anti-Terrorism Assistance program and Counterterrorism Finance program that build law enforcement capacity to fight terrorism.
- Global Peace Operations Initiative designed to meet the world’s growing need for well-trained peace operations forces.
- International military education and training grants given to foreign governments to pay for the training or education of foreign military and a limited number of civilian personnel.
- International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement funding, which helps other countries with their law enforcement systems.

**Other Authorities**

3-98. Congress provides other funding sources and authorities found outside Title 10 and Title 22 that may be available for stability purposes. One example is the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS [human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome], Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of 2008 (Public Law 110-293). This law authorizes activities to reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS among foreign nation uniformed personnel. Often these funding authorities have restrictions, such as carrying particular reporting requirements, requiring oversight or control by another executive agency, or limiting their applicability to certain locations or expense categories.

**THE RULE OF LAW AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM**

3-99. The whole-of-government approach includes reform activities related to the rule of law and the criminal justice system of the host nation.

**Rule of Law Reform**

3-100. The execution of rule of law activities resides primarily within the interagency and possibly multinational organizations. Rule of law activities involve subordinate tasks that support the five primary Army stability tasks. These activities often entail a wide variety of issues inherently legal or framed by the practice of law. The rule of law dictates government conduct according to publicly recognized regulations while protecting the rights of all members of society. The rule of law also provides a way to resolve disputes nonviolently and an integral method to establish enduring peace and stability. Generally, rule of law exists when—

- The state monopolizes the use of force in resolving disputes.
- Individuals are secure in their persons and property.
- The state is bound by law and does not act arbitrarily.
- The law can be readily determined and is stable enough to allow individuals to plan their affairs.
• Individuals have meaningful and timely access to an effective and impartial legal system.
• The state protects human rights and fundamental freedoms.
• Individuals rely on existing legal institutions and the law during their daily lives.

3-101. The rule of law means that all persons, institutions, and entities, including the state itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced, independently adjudicated, and consistent with international human rights principles. The rule of law is more than a safe and secure environment. It requires the security of individuals and institutions and accountability for crimes.

3-102. Commanders executing stability tasks must decide how to address host-nation corruption they encounter. Corruption undermines the rule of law, tending to turn public service into a means to private, illegitimate gain. This weakens the value of merit within the government. Even so, many societies have developed forms of corruption that are entrenched and culturally acceptable. For example, public officials may be expected to supplement the incomes of low-wage workers illegitimately. Though not ideal, the rule of law can still develop in the presence of some level of corruption. Anticorruption efforts should address significant impediments to the rule of law while aiming for achievable results within the societal context.

3-103. An integrated effort across many partners (such as DOS, Department of Justice, DOD, and USAID) focusing on rule of law capabilities remains critical. Rule of law activities within the DOD and Army should be synchronized at all echelons of command. Uncoordinated rule of law activities may risk lives, often incur excessive costs due to waste and poor management, and may not actually promote the rule of law. Just as units need unity of command, the rule of law effort needs a clear mission, a designated leader, and a clear structure.

3-104. Building public confidence requires planning, preparing, and executing the transfer of responsibility for rule of law programs from the military to national or international civilian organizations or to the host-nation government. This transfer often proves to be a difficult and complex transition. Failure to ensure continuity of the rule of law effort throughout all transition phases threatens the safety and security of the local populace, erodes the legitimacy of the host nation, and impedes long-term development potential. Such failure renders achieving the desired end state highly improbable. Accordingly, a daunting obstacle is the extensive influence of illicit power structures in many ethnic or factional communities. Thus, establishing a secure environment with respect to the rule of law should proceed in tandem with other institution-building activities. Once progress is made in these areas, essential civilian-led measures to shape societal values and attitudes toward the rule of law and to build in safeguards against abuse have a much better chance to succeed in the long term.

3-105. In both permissive and nonpermissive environments, judge advocates prepare to take primary responsibility within the staff to coordinate with host-nation legal, ministry of defense, and security force personnel. In nonpermissive environments, judge advocates also prepare to take primary responsibility for supporting host-nation criminal and civil judicial systems and processes.

3-106. Rule of law activities are broad categories of actions designed to support host-nation institutional capacity, human capacity, functional effectiveness, and popular acceptance of a legal system and related government areas. This includes both civil and criminal law activities. Broad categories of rule of law activities include—

• The criminal justice system.
• Law enforcement.
• Judicial systems and processes.
• Corrections.
• The civil judicial system.
• Anticorruption.
• Elections.
• Detention.
• Transitional military authority and military governance.
• Transitional justice.
• Coordination with host-nation leaders.
Considerations to Achieve Unity of Effort

- Coordination with host-nation police forces.
- Coordination with host-nation legal personnel.
- Coordination with host-nation ministry of defense and security force legal personnel.

Criminal Justice System Reform

3-107. While the categories of activities supporting rule of law are broad, commanders should pay particular attention towards those activities involving criminal justice system reform. The three primary components of the criminal justice system include law enforcement (police), judicial systems and processes (laws and courts), and corrections (jails and prisons). Throughout all joint operational phases of a campaign or operation, interagency partners must empower the criminal justice system components through advising and equipping for a broader culture of rule of law to take hold in a society, either before or after a conflict.

3-108. Criminal justice system reform is crucial to establishment of the rule of law. As with other rule of law activities, the execution of criminal justice system reform tasks resides primarily with the lead interagency partner. Though the military may initially execute rule of law activities based on an operational environment and availability of civilian experts, the DOS is the lead for U.S. rule of law efforts. The primary interagency partners with the DOS for these efforts are the USAID and the Department of Justice. Whether military or civilian, partners coordinate any rule of law activities executed at the tactical or local level with the country team, if there is one. In a permissive environment, rule of law activities should be coordinated with DOS. The military contribution to criminal justice system reform may be limited to engagement with host-nation counterparts. However, in a nonpermissive environment, where the security situation does not permit easy access by interagency personnel, military forces may be required to coordinate criminal justice system reform activities on its own. Nonetheless, the military is neither tasked nor resourced to conduct long-term institutional reform on its own. When interagency partners are not participating in the field, the military contribution to criminal justice system reform may include operations at the tactical level, other support to the lead agency, and coordination with all criminal justice system reform partners—including host-nation and nongovernmental partners.

3-109. Establishing effective rule of law through criminal justice system reform typically requires an international review of the host-nation legal framework, a justice reform agenda, police and corrections institutional reviews, and general justice reform programs. Many societies emerging from conflict also require a new constitution or significant modification of an existing or previously instituted constitution. All efforts to establish and support the rule of law must account for the customs, culture, and ethnicity of the local populace.

3-110. Identifying the correct objectives for criminal justice system reform remains paramount during the planning stages. Divorcing planning efforts from critical interagency enablers who have a vital role in this reform effort is a dangerous proposition. Though not all inclusive, commanders consider the following key criminal justice system reform actions:

- Enforce law and order.
- Establish public security.
- Build effective police, customs, borders, and immigration organizations.
- Protect civilians and human rights.
- Establish an ethical legal framework.
- Promote accountability to the law.
- Establish effective courts and penal systems.
- Ensure access to judicial processes.
- Ensure access to justice systems.
- Promote civilian participation (public awareness).
- Promote a culture of lawfulness.

3-111. Commanders and planners analyzing the effect of rule of law on operations, as well as those leading the rule of law line of effort, should include experts within the specific fields of law enforcement, judicial, and corrections. Those experts should not necessarily be called to lead the rule of law line of effort, but they should be relied upon for their special area of expertise. For instance, military and civilian
police can give advice when dealing with correction or law enforcement. Attorneys can give advice on dealing with judicial and legal personnel.

3-112. In a permissive environment, military forces coordinate the criminal justice system reform effort with the country team. In a permissive environment, criminal justice system reform efforts may take the form of engagements with the host-nation military. In those cases, military police may work with host-nation military law enforcement personnel, but possibly not the civilian law enforcement personnel. Similarly, military judge advocates would work with host-nation military legal and judicial personnel in a permissive environment, but not their civilian counterparts, at least not without further coordination with the country team. A diverse and wide array of opinions across this crucial area of governance can only prove beneficial for the long-term sustainability of a nation.

3-113. Often, the personnel available for the military’s rule of law activities will be Soldiers, particularly in a nonpermissive environment. Similarly, in a nonpermissive environment the military may be unable to coordinate the criminal justice system reform effort with the country team. When only personnel are performing rule of law activities, military police should be the ones interacting with host-nation corrections and law enforcement personnel. Likewise, military judge advocates should interact with judicial and legal personnel. A purely military perspective on the rule of law may be unacceptable and can be damaging to the host nation. However, sometimes the military may be the only organization in the local area conducting rule of law activities due to the security situation.

3-114. U.S. forces have limited authority to provide assistance to foreign governments. The DOS is the lead for U.S. efforts to coordinate stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction activities. The Army conducts operations focused on stability in support of these activities. Such support promotes the broader U.S. interests in two ways. First, it assists an existing government with internal challenges or helping to establish a new social, economic, and political domestic order in the short term. Second, it assists in the long term by establishing conditions for a sustainable peace.

**USAID Principles for Reconstruction and Development**

3-115. Commanders involved in reconstruction during operations focused on stability need to understand and apply basic reconstruction and development principles. These nine principles are the key tenets of USAID’s work. The principles are not a checklist. They are a summary of the characteristics of successful assistance programs. They cannot be applied the same way in each situation but should serve as a reference for development practitioners as they design and implement programs. The USAID principles for reconstruction and development are—

- Ownership: Build on the leadership, participation, and commitment of a country and its people.
- Capacity building: Strengthen local institutions, transfer technical skills, and promote appropriate policies.
- Sustainability: Design programs to ensure their impact endures.
- Accountability: Design accountability and transparency into systems and build effective checks and balances to guard against corruption.
- Assessment: Conduct careful research, adapt best practices, and design for local conditions.
- Results: Allocate resources based on need, local commitment, and foreign policy interests.
- Partnership: Collaborate closely with all partners, including governments, communities, donors, NGOs, the private sector, international organizations, and universities.
- Flexibility: Adjust to changing conditions, take advantage of opportunities, and maximize efficiency.
- Selectivity: Allocate resources to countries and programs based on need, policy performance, and foreign policy interests.

3-116. U.S. leaders must engage failed states while understanding the potential correlation between fragile states and instability related to terrorism. Effective engagement requires the use of the tools of diplomacy, development, and defense in a collaborative fashion. The success of U.S. military strategy and development assistance policy in these countries have become mutually reinforcing. Development cannot effectively occur without the security that armed force provides, and security will not be sustained until the
local populace sees the promise of development as a viable alternative to violence to meet its needs. For example, while involved in reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military was called upon to manage substantially increased levels of U.S. bilateral foreign assistance. This assistance included official development assistance funding traditionally managed by USAID. To use these resources effectively, commanders involved in reconstruction in operations focused on stability need to understand and apply basic reconstruction and development principles. Such principles have evolved by the development community through years of experience.

3-117. USAID and the development community assist fragile states with finding solutions and resources to meet their requirements for sustained development and growth. To accomplish this, the development community relies on specific operating principles for stabilization, reconstruction, and development assistance. The principles have been tested through years of practical application and understanding the cultural and socioeconomic influences in the host nation. Understanding these generally accepted principles enables those involved in development, and in the development aspects of stabilization and reconstruction, to incorporate techniques and procedures effectively. Then those involved can help countries improve the economic and social conditions of the people.

3-118. Development officials improve the likelihood of success by applying the principles of reconstruction and development. Timely and adequate emphasis on these principles increases the opportunity for immediate success or, at a minimum, provides a means to adapt to the changing conditions. Development assistance officials assume risk in their programs when these principles are violated or ignored.

3-119. The nine principles of reconstruction and development formalize customary practices and operating procedures. The principles reflect key institutional principles that most aid agencies incorporate into the reconstruction framework. The principles are designed to ensure local ownership and sustainability of program results while building local capacity and thus eventual independence from outside assistance. They take advantage of the skills and resources others can bring to the effort by forging partnerships. Following these principles helps the host nation to adjust reconstruction and development activities to the dynamic political environment usually encountered in a violent conflict or post-conflict situation.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH

3-120. Stability efforts require contributions from a variety of partners outside the United States and the U.S. Government, including military and police forces, NGOs, international organizations, host-nation organizations, news media, and businesses. Many have no formal relationship with Army units but are, nevertheless, instrumental in achieving the desired outcomes. Army units must interact effectively with these partners to exchange information and strive for unified action. This requires interorganizational coordination, such as—

- Engaging with host-nation key leaders and the population.
- Conducting multinational operations.
- Building partner capacity.
- Establishing mechanisms such as civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) to facilitate coordination.
- Providing support to other partners, such as helping with the delivery of essential goods and services.

3-121. Some partners, such as many NGOs, prefer not to be known as partners of Army forces. NGOs that maintain neutrality perform an important role in stabilization and reconstruction, and Army units should not compromise their neutrality.

3-122. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (known as OCHA) coordinates activities among UN agencies, NGOs, and local partners. To facilitate this, fifteen global clusters have been created based on sectors of expertise. Global clusters and lead agencies are depicted in table 3-2 on page 3-20, and depending on the situation, a similar structure may exist at the country level.
### Table 3-2. Global clusters and lead agencies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Global clusters</th>
<th>Lead agencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food Security</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization (co-lead).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Food Programme (WFP) (co-lead).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Camp Coordination and Management</td>
<td>United Nations (UN) High Commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) (co-lead).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>International Organization for Migration (co-lead).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early Recovery</td>
<td>UN Development Programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Save the Children (co-lead).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) (co-lead).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Shelter</td>
<td>Disaster: International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Conflict: UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergency Telecommunications</td>
<td>Process: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Data and security communications: WFP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>World Health Organization.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logistics</td>
<td>WFP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>UNICEF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>UNHCR.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Sanitation and Hygiene</td>
<td>UNICEF.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Coordination With Other Partners

3-123. Army units interact with other partners to share information and, when possible, attain unity of effort to complete the primary stability tasks effectively. Stability is a multifaceted challenge with military and nonmilitary aspects. Different partners have important roles in achieving the desired outcomes; however, they will have dissimilar goals, priorities, and authorities. To the extent possible, Army units coordinate with these partners to achieve unified action, avoid gaps and redundancies, and resolve disagreements.

3-124. Army leaders determine what level of cooperation is possible and desirable with other actors. They consider guidance from the chain of command and the changing situation. Some actors may not desire a cooperative relationship even when their stabilization goals overlap with U.S. goals. The operational-level determination may differ from tactical levels in certain areas. For example, potential topics for coordination may include information regarding civilian risks and needs, humanitarian space considerations, planned operations, requests for assistance, transitions, and security concerns. Eventually, host-nation actors assume control over the stability tasks, maintain security, and achieve other desired outcomes. This can be problematic when host-nation actors who are to be entrusted with the future may be the same actors who contributed to state fragility in the past.

3-125. Different levels of interaction include coexistence, communication, information sharing, formal coordination, and collaboration. As shown in figure 3-1, higher levels of interaction may be possible when Army units share objectives with other actors and mutual trust exists. In some cases, it is only possible or necessary to understand each other’s objectives, requirements, capabilities, limitations, procedures, and terminology. However, some closer coordination is often critical; an important example is close integration with local police forces. In some cases, the Army units may conduct some level of interaction with potential adversaries.
Coexistence

3-126. Coexistence describes when multiple groups are present in an area but do not interact or communicate with each other. This may be the case with certain groups who do not want any affiliation with military forces at all.

Communication

3-127. Communication describes when parties have periodic contact, such as at routine meetings, but do not share substantive information on a regular basis, if at all. Parties can contact each other if necessary (for example, they may retain phone numbers for each other). When parties do not share any common interests, direct communication may not even be possible. In cases where no direct communication exists, they may sometimes relay messages through intermediaries such as civilian personnel associated with the mission or host-nation officials.

Information Sharing

3-128. Information sharing occurs when parties share substantive information periodically, but such activities are often circumspect and may not occur on a regular basis. Exchanged information is likely to be limited to matters of extremely high mutual concern. For example, a NGO may be willing to provide some information regarding a mass atrocity that has occurred but will be unwilling to share details about its planned operations.

Formal Coordination

3-129. Formal coordination occurs when parties regularly exchange information on a wide range of topics, to include some planned operations. This coordination includes generally answering most requests for information when parties can reasonably do so. The parties may find it beneficial to meet on a routine basis and may invite representatives to attend their own internal meetings.
Cooperation and Collaboration

3-130. The highest level of interaction entails cooperation or collaboration that can include jointly conducted operations, co-location of organizations, exchange of liaisons, and other measures to achieve more effective integration. In a loosely collaborative relationship, Army units may occasionally provide direct security for the other partners (such as a convoy escort). In a closer collaboration, the interaction is substantive and more permanent.

3-131. Other partners can beneficially contribute to Army units by providing independent, external assessments of relevant issues, to include the military’s activities and benchmarking. Army units should invite partners’ input and contribution to after action reviews, either by direct participation or through acceptable intermediaries such as civilian personnel associated with the operation.

3-132. Some general guidelines will help foster improved coordination with other partners:

- Take time to develop and maintain relationships.
- Identify and include stakeholders early. Coordination with host-nation security forces (especially police) is particularly important to create a secure environment, particularly since police forces will become responsible for civil security. Army units should seek input from vulnerable societal groups that lack power, as these may have long been without a voice.
- Consult; do not dictate.
- Be honest and reliable. Back up words with action.
- Be respectful. Avoid appearing arrogant or condescending. Show proper courtesy to older or higher-ranking counterparts.
- Conduct vertical efforts to supplement horizontal engagements. Direct engagements with counterparts may prove futile for a variety of reasons. It may be necessary to identify a problem to higher echelons in the chain of command that can in turn encourage higher counterparts to direct or take necessary actions.
- Consider the impact of and the effect on informing and influencing audiences.

Challenges

3-133. Many critical actors attempt to preserve their neutrality and avoid the appearance of collaborating with political and military entities such as Army units or the host-nation government. Because of different objectives, cultures, and chains of authority, disagreements and misunderstandings between the actors occur. Additionally, the competition for scarce resources such as infrastructure and a qualified host-nation work force can create tensions between Army units and other actors.

Considerations for Multinational Operations

3-134. Multinational operations are vital to achieve efficiency, unity of effort, and synergy to perform the primary stability tasks. Multinational operations integrate the wide variety of partners essential for stability and strengthen the population’s confidence in Army units and other security organizations. Multinational operations expand mutual situational understanding and can improve the effectiveness of the participants and enhance their relationships with each other. These operations enable host-nation involvement in and ownership of the primary stability tasks, since the host-nation retains its sovereign obligations and eventually must be capable of meeting them effectively. Multinational operations also capitalize on the host-nation security forces’ understanding of the terrain and population. By providing a method to monitor and mentor host-nation security forces, multinational operations can also support security sector reform.

3-135. While it is possible to integrate individuals at the lowest unit levels (for example, Soldiers and host-nation police operate a vehicle checkpoint together), it is often more appropriate to maintain unit integrity and assign tasks to Army units only. For example, a host-nation platoon might be tasked to establish a security cordon for a search operation conducted by an Army unit, or vice versa. Language differences and the availability of interpreters determine the possible level of integration. Staff integration can be extremely useful, depending on considerations such as language skills, security access requirements, and operations security precautions.
3-136. Multinational operations can be difficult to conduct effectively because of the potential attitudes and capabilities of the different participants. The various organizations will have dissimilar objectives, priorities, chains of authority, and cultures. They may also tend to disregard and mistrust outsiders, or otherwise cooperate reluctantly. Mistakes, misunderstandings, friction, and personality clashes can also undermine combined efforts. Army leaders, who desire effective multinational operations, may need to emphasize their importance, closely monitor their progress, and take corrective action when necessary. Patience and open-mindedness are critical to overcome inevitable obstructions. Multinational operations also have to account for logistics. Some participants may need significant support from Army units to contribute effectively, which could cause them to be perceived negatively. Interpreters are critical in many situations but often in short supply. Successful multinational operations require significant nurturing, which could divert leader focus from other pressing concerns.

BUILDING PARTNER CAPACITY

3-137. Building partner capacity addresses the potentially most important stability effort, which is to support and enable partners so they can perform their roles effectively. Building partner capacity results from comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and sustained military engagements. Over time, building partner capacity enhances the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. The Army integrates the capabilities of the operating and generating forces—to include special operations forces—to support capacity-building efforts, primarily through security cooperation activities. (See ADRP 3-0 and ADRP 3-07 for more information.)

3-138. Army units are concerned mainly with the capabilities of military and other security actors but should not ignore capacities unrelated to security sectors. In some cases, Army units can help build the capacity of other international partners who in turn are attempting to improve host-nation institutions. In other cases, Army units may directly assist in improving host-nation capacity and capability. One result of comprehensive engagement with other partners should be an increase in collective capacity to protect civilians.

3-139. Building partner capacity requires a different emphasis from many of the tasks Army units typically perform. Ultimately, the host nation must have the capability to ensure a safe and secure environment and must likewise develop the capacity to maintain acceptable conditions related to good governance, the rule-of-law, social well-being, and economic development. These efforts depend on capable host-nation and international partners from military, police, and civilian sectors.

3-140. Unified action partners (see ADRP 3-0) may have capabilities and a capacity that can contribute to stability; some partners such as the host-nation or coalition military forces operating under international mandates have formal legal obligations while others such as NGO’s contribute without formal obligations. Building partner capacity has short-, mid-, and long-term dimensions that require the determination of realistic objectives. Generally, Army units can help build partner capacity in many of the following ways, to include—

- Provide advisors and mentors. In addition to providing technical assistance on security affairs, advisors should emphasize such issues as respect for human rights, the proper treatment of civilians, and civil-military relations.
- Assist with development of administrative and logistics systems (such as pay, training, and maintenance).
- Monitor and if necessary restrain other partners regarding violence against civilians and human rights abuses.
- Assist with assessing, planning, and monitoring efforts to complete any of the primary stability tasks.
- Provide facilities and bases from which other partners may operate.
- Provide security to other partners.
- Provide transportation, communications, medical, or other logistics support to other partners (either on a routine or emergency basis).
• Provide personnel augmentation to other partners.
• Support and reinforce efforts of other partners by synchronizing information-related capabilities and engagements.

3-141. A major challenge is synchronizing efforts, both top-down and bottom-up, to improve host-nation capabilities. Local bottom-up efforts often begin earlier and are more critical for immediate impact on stability, but centralized top-down programs are necessary for long-term sustainability. Subsequent top-down efforts may conflict with or undermine multiple diverse bottom-up efforts that have already begun. Flexibility is required to integrate existing dissimilar local efforts with newly created centralized programs. The choice of partners must be made with care and with considerations that are more than just military. Potential partners may have questionable legitimacy because of past actions or current behavior. Additionally, Army units have limited authority, responsibility, and capability to influence other partners. Finally, other mission priorities such as daily operations limit an Army unit’s ability to focus on building the capacity of other partners.

THE ROLE OF CIVIL AFFAIRS IN OPERATIONS FOCUSED ON STABILITY

3-142. Civil affairs forces support unified land operations in every environment across the range of military operations. They are essential to the conduct of successful operations focused on stability. Civil affairs personnel provide unique area and linguistic orientation, cultural astuteness, advisory capabilities, and civilian professional skills that generally parallel those of host-nation governments. They provide the commander with specialized expertise on the civil component of operational environments. The commander draws on this expertise to analyze and influence the human dimension through specific processes and dedicated resources and personnel.

Civil Affairs Forces

3-143. Civil affairs forces mitigate or defeat threats to civil society and conduct responsibilities normally performed by civil governments. Civil affairs forces engage and influence the local civil populace by planning, executing, and transitioning civil affairs operations in unified action environment. Civil affairs forces support these operations by addressing civil considerations within the operational area before, during, or after a conflict or disaster. Civil affairs forces help to shape an operational environment by interacting with the local populace to facilitate military operations. A supportive local populace can provide valuable resources and critical information that supports friendly operations. A hostile local populace threatens the immediate success of military operations and may undermine domestic public support for those operations. When executed properly, civil affairs operations reduce the tensions between the local populace and the military force.

Civil Affairs Operations

3-144. Civil affairs forces conduct operations that support and are nested within the overall mission and commander’s intent. Civil affairs operations improve the relationship between military forces and host-nation authorities in areas in which the military force operates. They involve applying civil affairs skills to areas normally under the responsibility of a host-nation government. Civil affairs operations establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relationships between military forces and all levels of host-nation governments and officials. These operations are fundamental to completing stability tasks successfully.

3-145. Civil affairs organizations and personnel develop detailed assessments based on civil considerations. These include information about infrastructure, civilian institutions, and attitudes and activities of civilian leaders, the local populace, and host-nation organizations. These assessments may reveal that a viable host-nation government does not exist or cannot perform its basic civil functions. In such cases, military forces may support or implement transitional military authority until a legitimate host-nation government is established. (FM 3-57 and JP 3-57 provide doctrine on civil affairs.)

3-146. Civil affairs operations help ensure the sustained legitimacy of the mission and the transparency and credibility of military operations. Civil affairs operations minimize the effects of military operations on the local populace, limit how civilians affect military operations, and provide advice to commanders on the legal and moral obligations of the force.
3-147. Civil affairs personnel help the commander understand and visualize the civil component of the operational area. They provide detailed analysis based on careful consideration of operational and mission variables. This analysis helps determine the following within the supported unit’s operational area:

- The root causes of instability and civil strife.
- The requirement for CMOCs to facilitate communications and coordinate with civilian agencies and organizations.
- The need to use liaison teams to enhance communications and coordination with civilian agencies and organizations to facilitate operations at all echelons.
- What, when, where, and why civilians might be encountered; what ongoing or planned military operations might affect the activities of those civilians; what activities those civilians are engaged in that might affect military operations; and what actions the military force must take to mitigate the effects of those civilians.
- Measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for civil affairs operations to support the larger military operation.

Civil-Military Operations Center

3-148. Stability missions often require an established CMOC. A CMOC can facilitate information sharing and coordination between Army units and other partners, including the host-nation population and its institutions, such as police forces. Different echelons may establish their own CMOCs. A CMOC supports Army units as an agency to improve understanding and facilitate remedial action regarding civilian vulnerabilities and stability needs. All Army civil affairs units are organized and equipped to establish a CMOC. A CMOC is tailored to the specific tasks associated with the mission and normally augmented by assets such as engineers, medical, and transportation. It can be an accessible location for civilians to file reports or claims. It can serve as a coordination center for civilian and police organizations whose activities are vital for stability.

WORKING WITH NONGOVERNMENTAL HUMANITARIAN ORGANIZATIONS

3-149. Organizations that deliver humanitarian assistance are diverse. They include UN agencies and international and local NGOs, each with its own governing and accountability structure. Adherence to humanitarian principles, established codes of conduct, and civil-military guidelines vary. Moreover, many organizations can provide short-term humanitarian relief and long-term recovery and development assistance that often contributes to the sustainability of a host nation.

3-150. In addition to providing goods and services (for example, clean water, sanitation, food, and shelter), some humanitarian actors also provide protection programming such as human rights education, local conflict mediation and trust building, and monitoring, reporting and advocacy on the situation. Programming may be limited to ensuring that the provision of essential services does not create or exacerbate harm to civilians. Contributing to conditions that allow for the delivery of humanitarian assistance can support these humanitarian protection activities. In some contexts, political and armed actors may not accept humanitarian protection activities as neutral and impartial. Consequently, they may challenge or even target humanitarian workers. Commanders consider these variables when deciding how best to contribute to conditions enabling the provision of humanitarian assistance.

3-151. Some humanitarian actors have strong concerns about remaining neutral and independent to gain or retain access to communities in need. The ability of humanitarian organizations to operate according to their mandates, charters, and principles is sometimes known as humanitarian space. The common interests of humanitarian organizations include—

- Security of humanitarian workers.
- Mutual access between humanitarian workers and beneficiaries.
- The ability of humanitarian workers to interact with nonstate armed actors.
- Perceptions of humanitarian actors among beneficiaries and other actors.
- Humanitarian advocacy.
3-152. The neutrality and independence of humanitarian workers is especially important in politicized or conflict environments where political or armed actors are unwilling or unable to respect international humanitarian law and are targeting humanitarian workers, the assistance they provide, or the communities they are trying to assist. Humanitarian actors may also be concerned about situations where they can be confused with participants in an armed conflict. This can happen where military or other security forces provide goods and services directly to communities. Humanitarian actors may have other relationships to armed actors, such as receiving funds, even when the humanitarians are not part of the conflict. Therefore, each humanitarian agency has different interests and limitations regarding engagement with political and military actors, regardless of whether military units are tasked to facilitate humanitarian assistance or protect civilians. This diversity can create a confusing environment for Army units that may share common goals with humanitarian actors.

3-153. Humanitarians have developed guidelines to help clarify best practices for civil-military engagement and established sophisticated coordination mechanisms and offices tasked with engaging political and military actors at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. For example, as discussed earlier, humanitarian organizations often meet in clusters. Clusters are coordinating bodies organized by functions such as water and sanitation, protection, emergency shelter, and others. The cluster leads have responsibilities to liaise with external actors. Offices such as the UN Humanitarian Coordinator and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, if present, may also liaise with military and political actors.

3-154. Military support is more effective when Army units clearly understand the principles, codes of conduct, and policies that guide and sometimes limit humanitarian action and its interface with military actors.

3-155. Even in those situations where military forces are not directly involved, a focused and integrated humanitarian response is essential to alleviating suffering and reestablishing a stable environment that fosters a lasting peace to support broader national and international interests. Providing humanitarian aid and assistance is primarily the responsibility of specialized nonmilitary organizations and agencies, such as USAID. Nevertheless, military forces often support humanitarian response activities either as part of a broader campaign, such as Operation Iraqi Freedom, or a specific humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operation. These activities usually consist of stability tasks and generally fall under the primary stability task restore essential services. The discussion beginning with paragraph 3-156 outlines the guiding principles used by the international community to frame humanitarian response activities.

3-156. Generally, the host nation or affected country coordinates humanitarian response. However, if the host nation or affected country is unable to do so, the United Nations often leads the international community response on its behalf. The principles that guide the military contribution to that response are fundamental to success in unified land operations. These principles reflect the collective experience of a diverse group of actors in a wide range of interventions conducted over decades across the world. They help to shape the humanitarian component of operations focused on stability.

3-157. UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 governs the humanitarian response efforts of the international community. It articulates the principal tenets for providing humanitarian assistance—humanity, neutrality, and impartiality—while promulgating the guiding principles that frame all humanitarian response activities. These guiding principles are drawn from four primary, albeit separate, sources:

- InterAction and the DOD.
- International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
- Oslo Guidelines.
- The Inter agency Standing Committee.

InterAction and the Department of Defense

3-158. InterAction is the largest coalition of U.S.-based NGOs focused on the world’s poorest and most vulnerable people. Collectively, its members work in every developing country. Members meet people halfway in expanding opportunities. They support gender equality in education, health care, agriculture, small business, and other areas.
3-159. InterAction was a key participant in the development of the 2005 *Guidelines for Relations Between U.S. Armed Forces and Non-Governmental Humanitarian Organizations in Hostile or Potentially Hostile Environments* (reprinted in JP 3-08). The *Guidelines* were developed by a working group consisting of military and civilian participants from interagency partners, the United States Institute for Peace, a consortium of U.S. NGOs, and the Army’s Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. The *Guidelines* were endorsed by the director of the Joint Staff and disseminated to U.S. forces through the combatant commands. Although the endorsement was not directive in nature, the endorsement advised implementation of the Guidelines when possible.

*Note.* In 2012, the DOS’s Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction (formerly known as S/CRS) was replaced by the Bureau of Conflict and Stabilization Operations (known as CSO).

**International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement**

3-160. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement encompass two institutions and nearly 200 national societies. The institutions are the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The ICRC is an impartial, neutral, and independent organization. Established in 1863, its exclusively humanitarian mission aims to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in conflicts. It also endeavors to prevent suffering by promoting and strengthening laws pertaining to human rights and universal humanitarian principles.

**Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross**

3-161. Seven fundamental principles bond together the national Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, the ICRC, and the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. The principles ensure the continuity of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and its humanitarian work (see JP 3-08 for more information). These principles are—

- Humanity.
- Impartiality.
- Neutrality.
- Independence.
- Voluntary service.
- Unity.
- Universality.

**The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Nongovernmental Organization Code of Conduct**

3-162. In the summer of 1994, the code of conduct for the ICRC and NGOs in disaster relief was developed. (See table 3-3 on page 3-28.) Eight of the world’s largest disaster response agencies agreed on this code. It represents the body of international standards for disaster response. Before then, no accepted body of professional standards existed to guide their work. Today, the international community uses the code of conduct to monitor its own standards of relief delivery and to encourage other agencies to set similar standards.
Table 3-3. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Nongovernmental Organization Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief

- The humanitarian imperative comes first.
- Aid is given regardless of the race, creed, or nationality of the recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated based on need alone.
- Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.
- We shall endeavor not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.
- We shall respect culture and custom.
- We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.
- Ways shall be found to involve program beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.
- Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as meeting basic needs.
- We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from whom we accept resources.
- In our information, publicity, and advertising activities, we shall recognize disaster victims as dignified human beings, not hopeless objects.

3-163. Like most professional codes, the code of conduct is voluntary. It applies to any NGO, national or international, regardless of size. It provides ten principles that all NGOs should adhere to in their disaster response work. The code of conduct also describes the relationships that these groups should seek with donor organizations, host-nation governments, and the UN. The code is self-policing; no NGO is going to force another NGO to act in a certain way. At the time this manual was prepared, no international association for disaster response NGOs possessed any authority to sanction its members. (A more detailed discussion of The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Nongovernmental Organization Code of Conduct in Disaster Relief appears on the International Committee of the Red Cross Web site.)

Oslo Guidelines

3-164. The Oslo Guidelines were completed in 1994. They were the result of a collaborative effort by over 180 delegates from 45 nations and 25 organizations. These delegates drafted the Oslo Guidelines to establish a framework on the use of foreign military and civil defense assets in disaster relief. This framework aims to formalize and improve the effectiveness and efficiency when using United Nations military and civil defense assets for international disaster relief operations. The core principles of the Oslo Guidelines are—

- Humanity.
- Neutrality.
- Impartiality.

In addition to the core principles, key concepts include sovereignty and the complementing military and civil defense forces. (A more detailed discussion of the Oslo Guidelines, including additional key concepts, can be found on the UN Web site known as ReliefWeb.)

Interagency Standing Committee Principles and Concepts on Civil-Military Relationship in Complex Emergencies

3-165. The Interagency Standing Committee was established in June 1992, in response to UN General Assembly Resolution 46/182 on the strengthening of humanitarian assistance. It is the primary mechanism for interagency coordination of humanitarian assistance. It is a unique forum involving the key United Nations and other humanitarian partners. All humanitarian action, including civil-military coordination for humanitarian purposes in complex emergencies, must be conducted in accordance with the overarching principles (shown in table 3-4). This section outlines these principles and concepts to follow when planning or undertaking civil-military coordination. (A more detailed discussion of the IASC principles and concepts is in the Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies and on the UN Web site known as ReliefWeb.)
Table 3-4. Interagency Standing Committee principles for civil-military relationships in complex emergencies

- Humanity, neutrality, and impartiality
- Humanitarian access to vulnerable populations
- Perception of humanitarian action
- Needs-based assistance free of discrimination
- Civil-military distinction in humanitarian action
- Operational independence of humanitarian action
- Security of humanitarian personnel
- Do no harm
- Respect for international legal instruments
- Respect for culture and custom
- Consent of parties to the conflict
- Option of last resort
- Avoid reliance on the military
This page intentionally left blank.
Chapter 4

Stability Assessment Frameworks

This chapter begins by discussing the importance of assessing stability tasks. Then it presents two interagency frameworks that can support the activities of the operations process and enhance unity of effort.

IMPORTANCE OF ASSESSING STABILITY TASKS

4-1. Army commanders measure the effectiveness and performance of stability tasks in relation to accomplishing Army missions and achieving progress toward overall United States (U.S.) stability goals. Determining how completed stability tasks support overall goals, especially in post-conflict situations, is important but challenging because measuring effects may take months or years. Commanders need to establish accurate indicators and track them at repeated intervals, in coordination with interagency partners. Interagency assessment tools can facilitate coordination of measurement efforts. Measuring the success of stability tasks includes—

- Identifying and reducing the causes of instability.
- Reestablishing or building host-nation capability to reduce, manage, or prevent conflict.

4-2. Army forces use the operations process described in ADRP 5-0 to plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations. The assessment process described in ADRP 5-0 consists of, but is not limited to—

- Monitoring the current situation to collect relevant information.
- Evaluating progress toward attaining end state conditions, achieving objectives, and performing tasks.
- Recommending or directing action for improvement.

4-3. The assessment frameworks discussed in this chapter can support the activities of the operations process. These frameworks were developed collaboratively by the departments and agencies of the U.S. Government to identify the root causes of instability, develop activities to diminish or mitigate them, and evaluate the effectiveness of the activities in fostering stability. Unified action partners commonly use these frameworks. They are tools for interagency planning, and they can inform Army planning and enhance unity of effort. These frameworks are not intended to be prescriptive. In this context, terminology usage may differ from standard doctrinal terminology.

4-4. At each level of monitoring and evaluation, commanders identify lessons to improve future stabilization activities or sustain successful ones. For example, military forces may learn certain external factors prevented an activity from being successful. Subsequent efforts need to address those external factors or take a different approach to addressing the sources of instability.

DISTRICT STABILITY FRAMEWORK

4-5. To increase the effectiveness of stability missions, the United States Agency for International Development (known as USAID) developed the District Stability Framework. The District Stability Framework was designed to guide and support stabilization efforts by helping civilians and military organizations identify the causes of instability, develop activities to diminish or mitigate them, and evaluate the effectiveness of the activities in fostering stability at the tactical or operational level. The District Stability Framework can be used to create local stabilization plans and provide data for the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, which has a strategic (country or regional) focus. The District Stability Framework supports unity of effort by providing partners with a common framework to—

- Understand an operational environment from a stability-focused perspective.
- Maintain focus on the local population and its perceptions.
- Identify the sources of instability in a specific local area.
- Design activities that specifically address the identified sources of instability.
- Monitor and evaluate activity outputs and impacts, as well as changes in overall stability.

(See ATP 3-07.5 for a more detailed description of the District Stability Framework.)

4-6. The District Stability Framework helps overcome many of the challenges to successful operations focused on stability. It can help—

- Keep military formations focused on the center of gravity for operations focused on stability—the population and its perceptions.
- Provide a common operational picture for all interagency teams in an area of operations. By focusing on sources of instability, partner organizations can focus their varied resources and expertise on shared priorities.
- Prioritize activities based on their importance to the local populace and their relevance to the overarching mission of stabilizing the area.
- Enhance continuity between military formations. Units can easily pass District Stability Framework data along from one unit to the next, establishing a clear baseline that identifies sources of instability and the steps taken to mitigate them.
- Empower tactical-level formations by giving them hard data useful for decisionmaking at their level and for influencing decisions at higher levels.
- Identify measures of performance and measures of effectiveness for unit activities rather than simply tracking measures of performance.
- Track indicators of overall stability by assessing whether an area is becoming more stable.
- Identify issues that matter most to the population; the District Stability Framework helps identify information themes that resonate with the population.

4-7. The District Stability Framework has four steps. Ideally, all interagency partners in the area participate in the process, organized through the creation of an interagency stability working group. Figure 4-1 illustrates the four basic steps.

**Figure 4-1. District Stability Framework process**

**Situational Awareness**

4-8. The District Stability Framework uses four lenses to achieve a population-centric, stability oriented, situational awareness of an area of operations. The stability working group by examines the area of operations from four perspectives: an operational environment; cultural aspects; stability and instability dynamics; and local perceptions. The District Stability Framework examines the area of operations and helps leaders achieve a situational awareness of stability conditions and underlying factors.

**Analysis**

4-9. After gaining situational awareness in step 1, the District Stability Framework provides tools to analyze and identify potential sources of instability, their causes, the desired objectives, and the indicators
that measure progress in addressing each source of instability. The second step of the District Stability Framework, analysis, consists of four tasks: identify potential sources of instability, vet each source against instability criteria, determine if the source meets two of the three instability criteria, and prioritize the sources of instability. The instability criteria are—

- Decreased support for the government or legitimate governance institution.
- Increased support for adversaries or enemies.
- Undermining of the normal functioning of society.

After identifying and prioritizing the sources of instability, practitioners fill out a tactical stability matrix for each source of instability.

**DESIGN**

4-10. In the third step of the District Stability Framework, practitioners design, prioritize, and synchronize stabilization activities. The stability working group develops activities to diminish the sources of instability identified during the analysis step. The process begins by brainstorming potential stabilization activities. It continues by filtering and refining the proposed activities against a set of stability criteria, design principles, and resource availability. This step is similar to the Army design methodology’s activities *develop an operational approach* and *develop the plan*, described in ADRP 5-0.

**MONITORING AND EVALUATION**

4-11. The final step in the District Stability Framework takes place during and after the implementation of stability activities. Monitoring and evaluation are conducted in three ways:

- Measures of performance: track implementation of an activity.
- Measures of effectiveness: measure the effect that an activity achieved.
- Overall stability: assess the overall stabilizing effect of all the activities conducted over a longer period, as well as the influence of external factors.

4-12. As practitioners conduct this monitoring and evaluation, they identify lessons about what worked, what did not work, and what partners can do to improve their stability efforts as they repeat the District Stability Framework process in the future.

4-13. The District Stability Framework can support effective monitoring, evaluating, and decisionmaking. It focuses on the perceptions of the population and informs a common operational picture for Army units and their interagency partners. Furthermore, it helps inform and influence audiences by identifying themes that resonate with the population.

**INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK**

4-14. Interagency partners begin helping host nations prevent, mitigate, and recover from violent conflict by developing shared understanding about the sources of violent conflict or civil strife. To assess conflict situations systemically and collaboratively, interagency teams use a tool known as the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF), published by the Department of State in 2008. The ICAF supports interagency planning for conflict prevention, mitigation, and stabilization.

4-15. Army forces conducting stability operations often are involved in interagency processes. To be effective, Army forces should be familiar with the ICAF. Army forces frequently participate in interagency conflict assessment activities. Using the ICAF for interagency activities also informs Army operational assessments.

**PURPOSE OF THE INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK**

4-16. The ICAF provides interagency partners a framework for developing a common perspective about the dynamics driving and mitigating violent conflict in a country. Partners use the ICAF to create shared understanding that informs national policy and planning decisions. The ICAF may also be used to inform strategic-level decisionmaking.
4-17. The ICAF outlines key concepts, processes, and products essential to conflict assessment. Interagency partners develop supplementary documents, appropriate tools, and data collection procedures as needed. Partners set the composition and functions of each interagency conflict assessment team.

4-18. The ICAF draws on conflict assessment tools used by interagency and interorganizational partners. It is not intended to duplicate or replace independent analytical processes, such as those conducted within the intelligence community. Rather, the ICAF builds upon those and other analytical efforts to provide a common framework. It facilitates shared knowledge and understanding.

4-19. The ICAF is distinct from other forecasting tools that identify countries at risk of instability or collapse and that describe relevant conditions. The ICAF builds on other forecasts and social science expertise. It helps interagency teams understand the reasons conditions exist and identify effective ways to engage and transform those conditions. The ICAF provides a shared, strategic perspective of the conflict against which future progress can be measured. (See ADRP 3-07 for a discussion of conflict transformation in the performance of stability tasks.)

**APPLICATION OF THE INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK**

4-20. The ICAF guides the determination of which partners initiate and participate, when and where the process occurs, the type and application of products needed, and the appropriate level of classification. When interagency partners use the ICAF, they need to complete all of its analytical steps. The nature and scope of the assessment vary according to the situation.

4-21. The ICAF is a flexible, scalable interagency tool suitable for use in—

- Steady-state engagement and conflict prevention planning.
- U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization contingency planning.
- U.S. Government reconstruction and stabilization crisis response planning.

**Steady-State Engagement and Conflict Prevention Planning**

4-22. Steady-state or conflict prevention planning efforts normally provide interagency partners with sufficient time for a thorough assessment and a permissive operational environment. Steady-state engagement and conflict prevention planning efforts may include—

- Answering requests by an embassy or combatant command for interagency assistance in understanding and planning for leveraging U.S. interests in fragile or at-risk countries.
- Assisting with the development of combatant command theater campaign plans, including security cooperation planning.
- Developing country assistance strategies or mission strategic plans.
- Designing interagency prevention efforts for countries listed on state failure watch lists and early warning systems.

**United States Government Reconstruction and Stabilization Contingency Planning**

4-23. Reconstruction and stabilization contingency planning are based on a hypothetical future. The ICAF provides concrete background information about existing dynamics that could trigger, exacerbate, or mitigate violent conflict. The ICAF is a robust element of planning, providing critical information for situational analysis, regardless of where the assessment and planning occur.

**United States Government Reconstruction and Stabilization Crisis Response Planning**

4-24. The ICAF provides detailed situational analysis that can contribute critical information for initial interagency planning. Interagency partners update the ICAF analysis as they have more information available and better access to inform the policy formulation, strategy development, and interagency implementation. When used for crisis response, the ICAF might be a tabletop assessment completed in as little as one and one-half days by an interagency team based in Washington. Conversely, it could occur
over several weeks, with conversations back and forth between Washington and interagency partners in the field.

Roles and Responsibilities in the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework

4-25. Planners determine which partners serve on an ICAF team and in what capacities. The agency or individual responsible for managing the overall planning process proposes the tools and requests participation of partners. An established country team may use the ICAF to inform country assistance strategy development while a geographic combatant command uses the ICAF to bring an interagency perspective to theater security cooperation planning. In crisis response, the ICAF normally is part of the strategic planning led by a group focused on reconstruction and stabilization of the country in crisis. The ICAF may also be used among partners as part of collaborative planning.

4-26. As a rule, participants using an ICAF include the broadest possible representation of partners with expertise or a stake in a given situation. An ideal interagency team represents diverse skill sets and brings together the collective knowledge and experience of various U.S. departments and agencies. Participants might include relevant regional bureaus, sector experts, intelligence analysts, and social science or conflict specialists. When interagency partners use the ICAF to support planning, the interagency field team includes members of the strategic planning team. The interagency field team expands as needed to include local stakeholders and international partner representatives.

4-27. To ensure the most comprehensive analysis, members of the interagency team must provide all relevant information retained by each department or agency, including the results of past assessments and related analyses. Members of the interagency team must retain reachback capability with their agencies to obtain further information to fill critical information gaps identified through the ICAF process.

4-28. The ICAF includes two major tasks: conflict diagnosis and transition into planning.

STEPS OF CONFLICT DIAGNOSIS IN THE INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

4-29. ICAF’s first major task is conflict diagnosis. Conflict diagnosis allows the interagency team to deliver a product that describes the context, core grievances and resiliencies, drivers of conflict and mitigating factors, and opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict. Figure 4-2 illustrates the steps of conflict diagnosis:

- Evaluate the context of the conflict.
- Understand core grievances and social and institutional resilience.
- Identify drivers of conflict and mitigating factors.
- Describe opportunities for increasing or decreasing conflict.

Figure 4-2. Conflict-diagnosis process of the interagency conflict-assessment framework
Step 1—Evaluate the Context of the Conflict

4-30. During the first step of conflict diagnosis, the team evaluates and outlines key contextual issues in an operational environment. Context does not cause conflict but describes the often long-standing conditions that resist change. Issues may include environmental conditions, poverty, youth bulge, or recent or long-term conflict in a region. Contextual conditions can reinforce divisions between communities or contribute to pressures making violence appear attractive for advancing individual interests. Contextual conditions can shape perceptions of identity groups. Key actors can use the conditions to manipulate and mobilize constituencies.

4-31. Each ICAF step begins with identifying the contextual conditions and issues from which the conflict evolved. This process, depicted in figure 4-2, reflects the complex interaction between the context and the other elements of the ICAF.

Step 2—Understand Core Grievances and Sources of Social and Institutional Resilience

4-32. The team should understand, agree upon, and communicate the concepts of core grievances and sources of social and institutional resilience. They should describe them within the specific situation. Under the ICAF, a core grievance is any societal group’s perception that other groups or social institutions threaten its physical security, livelihood, interests, or values. A source of social and institutional resilience is any group’s perception that social relationships, structures, or processes are in place that can resolve disputes and meet basic needs through nonviolent means.

4-33. During the second step of conflict diagnosis, the team must—

- Describe identity groups who perceive threats to their identity, security, or livelihood.
- Articulate how societal patterns reinforce perceived deprivation, blame, and intergroup cleavages; articulate how those societal patterns promote harmony and peaceful resolution of disputes.
- Explain how positive or negative institutional performance contributes to or aggravates the resolution of conflict.

4-34. Identity groups are groups of people that identify with one another, often because of characteristics used by outsiders to describe them. These characteristics can include ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, political affiliation, age, gender, economic activity, or socioeconomic status. Identity groups are inclined to conflict when they perceive that other groups’ interests, needs, and aspirations compete with and jeopardize their identity, security, or other fundamental interests.

4-35. Societal patterns associated with conflict reinforce divisions between groups. These patterns can include elitism, exclusion, corruption, chronic state capacity deficits, and unmet expectations. Capacity deficits consist of systemic economic stagnation, scarcity of necessary resources, and ungoverned spaces. Unmet expectations may be a lack of a peace dividend, land tenure issues, disillusionment, and disenfranchisement. Impacts of societal patterns often include negative economic consequences for disadvantaged groups.

4-36. Institutional performance considers formal and informal social structures to determine the groups’ performance level and if they contribute to or mitigate conflict and instability. Formal social structures consist of governments, legal systems, religious organizations, public schools, security forces, and economic institutions. Informal social structures include traditional dispute resolution bodies; families, clans or tribes; and armed groups. Assessing institutional performance involves distinguishing between outcomes and perceptions. Institutional outcomes are results that can be measured objectively; perceptions are the evaluative assessment of those outcomes. To diagnosis the conflict, teams must understand how various groups within a society perceive outcomes, especially in terms of effectiveness and legitimacy.

Step 3—Identify Drivers of Conflict and Mitigating Factors

4-37. The team should understand and outline the drivers and mitigating factors of conflict and enumerate them within the situation being assessed. Drivers of conflict represent the active energy moving the conflict—the dynamic situation resulting from key actors’ mobilization of social groups around core grievances. While core grievances can be understood as the potential energy of conflict, key actors translate
Stability Assessment Frameworks

that energy into drivers of conflict. Mitigating factors represent the dynamic situation resulting from key actors’ mobilization of social groups around sources of social and institutional resilience. Mitigating factors can be understood as the energy produced when key actors mobilize the potential energy of social and institutional resilience.

4-38. During the third step of conflict diagnosis, the team identifies the key actors central to producing, perpetuating, or profoundly changing the societal patterns or issues of institutional performance identified previously. The team determines whether key actors are motivated to mobilize constituencies toward inflaming or mitigating violent conflict and the means they have at their disposal. To perform the analysis required in this step, the team—

- Identifies the key actors.
- Identifies key actors’ constituencies.

Identify the Key Actors

4-39. The team identifies the people, organizations, or groups who have leadership abilities or power—such as political position, moral authority, charisma, wealth, and weapons. These key actors can affect societal patterns and institutional performance, shape perceptions and actions, and mobilize people around core grievances or social and institutional resilience.

4-40. The team identifies the locations of key actors in leadership positions in governing, social, or professional organizations or networks (either within or external to a state or territory). They include private businesses, religious organizations, government positions, informal and illicit power structures, media, and academic institutions.

4-41. The team identifies what motivates key actors to exert influence on each of the political, economic, social, and security systems within the host nation—such as commitment to a cause or a people, greed (money or notoriety), and religious beliefs. The team identifies the methods key actors use to exert their influence (leadership capability, moral authority, personal charisma, access to resources or weapons, or networks).

Identify Key Actors’ Constituencies

4-42. The team first identifies key actors’ supporting and opposing constituencies. Then the team identifies their core grievances or social or institutional resilience around which they are being mobilized. The team identifies the key actors’ critical motivations, means, and resources.

4-43. Using this information, the team drafts brief narrative statements describing the methods and reasons that key actors mobilize specific constituencies around core grievances and sources of social and institutional resilience. Each statement relating to core grievances becomes an entry in the list of drivers of conflict. Each relating to sources of social and institutional resilience becomes an entry in the list of mitigating factors.

Step 4—Describe Windows of Vulnerability and Windows of Opportunity

4-44. In the final step of conflict diagnosis, the team—

- Identifies potential situations that could contribute to an increase in violent conflict.
- Identifies potential situations that might offer opportunities for mitigating violent conflict and promoting stability.

4-45. The team should specify situations for increasing and decreasing conflict and describe those expected within the specific situation being assessed. These situations are described as windows of vulnerability and windows of opportunity. Windows of vulnerability are potential situations that may trigger conflict escalation. They often result from large-scale responses such as an increase of uncertainty during elections or following an assassination. They also result from an exclusion of parties from important events (such as negotiations or elections) or attempts to marginalize disenfranchised followers. Windows of vulnerability are moments when events threaten to rapidly and fundamentally alter the balance of political or economic power. Elections, devolution of power, and legislative changes illustrate possible windows of vulnerability. Key actors may seize, retain, and exploit the initiative during these moments to amplify the drivers of
conflict. Windows of opportunity describe potential situations that may enable significant progress toward achieving stable peace. These windows may include situations where overarching identities assume prominence among disputing groups, natural disasters affect multiple identity groups, the situation requires a unified response, or a key leader driving the conflict is killed. These windows are moments when overarching identities become more important than subgroup identities. These occasions may present opportunities to provide additional support for factors that mitigate conflict.

4-46. The team completes conflict diagnosis by considering windows of vulnerability and windows of opportunity and prioritizing drivers of conflict and mitigating factors identified previously. The team uses the list of prioritized drivers and mitigating factors as the basis for its findings.

**STEPS OF TRANSITION INTO PLANNING IN THE INTERAGENCY CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK**

4-47. ICAF’s second major task is transition into planning. When the ICAF is used to support crisis response or deliberate planning, the findings of the conflict diagnosis feed into the situational analysis and policy formulation steps of interagency, whole-of-government planning. When the ICAF is used to support steady-state engagement or conflict prevention planning, the team begins preplanning activities after completing conflict diagnosis. During the transition into these types of planning, the team maps existing diplomatic and program activities against the prioritized lists of drivers of conflict and mitigating factors. This mapping identifies gaps in current efforts as they relate to conflict dynamics. However, this is not intended as an evaluation of the overall impact or utility of any specific program or initiative. The team uses these findings as a basis for making recommendations to planners on potential entry points for interagency activities.

4-48. When the ICAF is used to support steady-state engagement or conflict prevention planning, six steps are used to facilitate the transition into planning (summarized in table 4-1).

**Table 4-1. Interagency conflict assessment framework transition into planning**

| Step 1       | Specify current U.S. activities (identify U.S. departments and agencies present in the country and the nature and scope of their efforts) by—  
|              | • Identifying the impact of these efforts on drivers of conflict and mitigating factors.  
|              | • Identifying efforts that target similar outcomes and coordination mechanisms in place. |
| Step 2       | Specify current efforts of partners not part of the United States Government, including bilateral agencies, multilateral agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector and local entities by—  
|              | • Identifying the impact of the efforts on the drivers of conflict and mitigating factors.  
|              | • Identifying efforts that target similar outcomes (including efforts of interagency partners) and coordinating mechanisms in place. |
| Step 3       | Identify drivers of conflict and mitigating factors not sufficiently addressed by existing efforts (gaps). |
| Step 4       | Specify challenges to addressing these gaps. |
| Step 5       | Describe risks associated with failing to address gaps (relate directly to windows of vulnerability). |
| Step 6       | Describe opportunities to address gaps (relate directly to windows of opportunity). |

4-49. The team draws on the information generated from the transition into planning to determine potential entry points for U.S. efforts. The description of these entry points explain how the dynamics outlined during conflict diagnosis may be susceptible to outside influence.
Glossary

The glossary lists acronyms and terms with Army or joint definitions. Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. Terms for which FM 3-07 is the proponent (authority) manual are marked with an asterisk (*). The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

SECTION I – ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADP</td>
<td>Army doctrine publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADRP</td>
<td>Army doctrine reference publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AR</td>
<td>Army regulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ATP</td>
<td>Army techniques publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CBRN</td>
<td>chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>civil-military operations center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DA</td>
<td>Department of the Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>field manual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HIV/AIDS</td>
<td>human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAF</td>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICRC</td>
<td>International Committee of the Red Cross</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICITAP</td>
<td>International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IGO</td>
<td>intergovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JP</td>
<td>joint publication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>measure of effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOP</td>
<td>measure of performance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>nongovernmental organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKSOI</td>
<td>Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>weapons of mass destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION II – TERMS

demobilization

The process of transitioning a conflict or wartime military establishment and defense-based civilian economy to a peacetime configuration while maintaining national security and economic vitality. (JP 4-05)

dislocated civilian

A broad term primarily used by the Department of Defense that includes a displaced person, an evacuee, an internally displaced person, a migrant, a refugee, or a stateless person. (JP 3-29)
foreign internal defense
Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security. (JP 3-22)

information-related capability
A tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions. (JP 3-13)

integration
The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. (JP 1)

interagency coordination
Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective. (JP 3-0)

interorganizational coordination
The interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; engaged United States Government agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector. (JP 3-08)

phase
(Army) A planning and execution tool used to divide an operation in duration or activity. (ADRP 3-0)

reintegration
The process through which former combatants, belligerents, and displaced civilians receive amnesty, reenter civil society, gain sustainable employment, and become contributing members of the local populace. (ADRP 3-07)

security cooperation
All Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation. (JP 3-22)

security force assistance
The Department of Defense activities that contribute to unified action by the US Government to support the development of the capacity and capability of foreign security forces and their supporting institutions. (JP 3-22)

security sector reform
A comprehensive set of programs and activities undertaken to improve the way a host nation provides safety, security, and justice. (JP 3-07)

Soldier and leader engagement
Interpersonal interactions by Soldiers and leaders with audiences in an area of operations. (FM 3-13)

*transitional military authority
A temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority.
References

All URLS accessed on 15 May 2014.

REQUIRED PUBLICATIONS
These documents must be available to intended users of this publication.
ADP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.
ADRP 3-07. Stability. 31 August 2012.

RELATED PUBLICATIONS
These documents contain relevant supplemental information.

JOINT AND DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PUBLICATIONS
Most joint publications are available online: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jointpub.htm.
JP 3-0. Joint Operations. 11 August 2011.
JP 3-07.3. Peace Operations. 01 August 2012.
JP 3-08. Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations. 24 June 2011.
JP 3-41. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management. 21 June 2012.

ARMY PUBLICATIONS
Most Army publications are available online: http://www.apd.army.mil/.
ADRP 3-0. Unified Land Operations. 16 May 2012.
ADRP 5-0. The Operations Process. 17 May 2012.
ATP 3-07.5. Stability Techniques. 31 August 2012.
ATP 3-57.10. Civil Affairs Support to Populace and Resources Control. 06 August 2013.
FM 3-57. Civil Affairs Operations. 31 October 2011.

OTHER PUBLICATIONS


Geneva Conventions. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/lawwar.asp.


The Hague Conventions. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/lawwar.asp.


UNITED STATES LAW

Most acts and public laws are available http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php.


Title 10, United States Code. Armed Forces.
Title 22, United States Code. Foreign Relations and Intercourse.
Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act.

WEB SITES
ReliefWeb (a service of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs). Available at http://www.reliefweb.int.

PRESCRIBED FORMS
None.

REFERENCED FORMS
DA Form 2028. Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms.
This page intentionally left blank.
# Index

Entries are by paragraph number.

## A
acting as if, managing emotions, 3-47

**ACTion** approach, steps, 3-38
active listening, communication and, 3-31–3-33
actors, comprehensive approach, 2-23
coopration with, 3-124
generate, 1-60
humanitarian, 3-150
identifying key, 4-39–4-41
influence by, 1-54
neutrality, 3-151–3-152
Soldiers and, 1-46

## B
behaviors, assessment of, 3-51
bias, common types, 3-39–3-43
boundaries, transitional military authority and, 2-50–2-52
building partner capacity, 3-137–3-141
esday by, 3-139

## C
CBRN, 1-117–1-118
challenges, coordination, 3-133
| Entries are by paragraph number.                                                                 |
|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| corrections, security sector reform, 1-101                                     | sector goals of, 2-77                                                          |
| corruption, rule of law and, 3-102                                             | stability necessities of, 2-81                                                 |
| transitional military authority and, 2-90                                       | stimulants, 2-82                                                              |
| costs, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, 1-107                    | emotions, management of, 3-44–3-48                                           |
| planning, 1-135                                                                 | engagement, steady state, 4-22                                                |
| courts, transitional military authority and, 2-92–2-97                          | environment, shape, 1-61                                                     |
| criminal justice system, components of, 3-107 rule of law and, 3-108           | stabilize, 1-3                                                                |
| criminal justice system reform, actions for, 3-110 whole-of-government approach, 3-107–3-114 | essential services, phases of stability framework, 1-19–1-21                  |
| crisis response, planning, 4-24 support to, 4-47                               | restore, 1-18–1-22                                                           |
| cultural agility, 3-13                                                          | establish civil control, 1-12–1-17                                          |
| cultures, organizational, 3-18                                                  | subtasks, 1-17                                                               |
| customs, transitional military authority and, 2-50–2-52                         | establish civil security, 1-7–1-11                                            |
| D                                                                                | subtasks, 1-11                                                               |
| demobilization, definition, 1-110                                               | evaluate, step 1 of conflict diagnosis, 4-30–4-31                            |
| Department of Defense, InterAction and, 3-158–3-159                           | evaluation, District Stability Framework, 4-11–4-13                           |
| Department of State, interagency coordination and, 3-12                        | F                                                                                |
| design, District Stability Framework, 4-10                                       | factors, identify mitigating, 4-37–4-43                                       |
| development, USAID principles for, 3-115–3-119                                  | females, in engagement, 1-42                                                  |
| disarmament, 1-109                                                              | forces, actions of, 1-48                                                      |
| disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, 1-105–1-115                    | assistance from, 3-114                                                        |
| costs, 1-107 goals of, 1-105 success of, 1-108                                  | focus by, 3-138                                                              |
| displaced civilian, definition, 1-131                                            | partners and, 3-123                                                          |
| District Stability Framework, 4-5–4-13 assistance from, 4-6 steps of, 4-7–4-13 | foreign disaster relief, 1-125                                               |
| drivers of conflict, identify, 4-37–4-43                                       | foreign humanitarian assistance, 1-130                                        |
| dynamics, understanding, 1-55                                                  | foreign humanitarian assistance, 1-125–1-131                                  |
| economy, recovery stimulants for, 2-78–2-79                                    | Army support to, 1-127–1-129 types, 1-130–1-131                              |
| F                                                                                | foreign internal defense, 1-136–1-140 definition, 1-136 tasks, 1-137           |
| funding risks, 3-91                                                             | foreign police forces, assistance to, 1-95                                    |
| governance and authorities on, 3-81–3-93                                       | fostering sustainability phase, civil control, 1-16                           |
| legal restrictions, 3-84                                                        | civil security, 1-10                                                         |
| management, 3-84                                                                | essential services, 1-21                                                      |
| other authorities, 3-98                                                          | support to economic and infrastructure development, 1-31                     |
| oversight, 3-83                                                                 | support to governance, 1-26                                                   |
| sources, 3-82, 3-94–3-98                                                        | foundations, security sector reform, 1-78–1-84                               |
| Title 10, 3-95                                                                 | fragile states, assistance to, 3-117 engagement with, 3-116                  |
| Title 22, 3-97                                                                  | fundamental attribution error, 3-40                                            |
| types, 3-80–3-98                                                                | funding, activities, 3-82                                                      |
| funds, quick impact, 3-87–3-92                                                  | areas of, 3-86–3-93                                                          |
| G                                                                                |                                                                                     |
| government, host nation, 2-61–2-67 officials, 2-62                             |                                                                                     |
| host nation, assistance to, 1-5                                                |                                                                                     |
| challenges of, 1-75                                                             |                                                                                     |
| counterinsurgency, 1-134                                                        |                                                                                     |
| development of, 1-75                                                            |                                                                                     |
| government, 2-61–2-67                                                           |                                                                                     |
| government actions, 2-28                                                        |                                                                                     |
| laws, customs, boundaries, 2-50–2-52                                           |                                                                                     |
| responsibilities of, 1-78                                                        |                                                                                     |
| security concept, 1-80                                                           |                                                                                     |
| security sector reform and, 1-71–1-73 support to, 2-8                           |                                                                                     |
| human rights, 1-83                                                              |                                                                                     |
| humanitarian action, military support to, 3-154                                 |                                                                                     |
| humanitarian actors, interests of, 3-151–3-152                                 |                                                                                     |
| support from, 3-150                                                             |                                                                                     |
| humanitarian assistance, interagency standing committee and, 3-165             |                                                                                     |
| nongovernmental organizations and, 3-149–3-165                                  |                                                                                     |
| humanitarian efforts, organizational differences, 3-25                         |                                                                                     |
| humanitarian operations, See also foreign humanitarian assistance actors in, 1-129 |                                                                                     |
| humanitarian response, principles, 3-155–3-165 sources, 3-157                  |                                                                                     |
| I                                                                                |                                                                                     |
| identity groups, 4-34                                                           |                                                                                     |
| influence, development, 3-21                                                    |                                                                                     |
Entries are by paragraph number.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Entries</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-29</td>
<td>information, accessibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-123</td>
<td>sharing, accessibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-39</td>
<td>information-related capability, definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-128</td>
<td>sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-39</td>
<td>information-related capability, definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-40</td>
<td>synchronized</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-43</td>
<td>in-group/out-group bias</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-14</td>
<td>initial response phase, civil control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-8</td>
<td>civil security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-19</td>
<td>essential services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-29</td>
<td>support to economic and infrastructure development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-24</td>
<td>support to governance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-9</td>
<td>instability, criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-19</td>
<td>forecasting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-23</td>
<td>integration, comprehensive approach, definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-4</td>
<td>multinational operations, transition and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-135</td>
<td>InterAgency, Department of Defense and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-158</td>
<td>InterAgency, Department of Defense and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-159</td>
<td>InterAgency, Department of Defense and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-125</td>
<td>interaction, levels of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>interagency coordination, facilitating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-59</td>
<td>InterAgency Conflict Assessment Framework, application of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-14</td>
<td>InterAgency Conflict Assessment Framework, application of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-20</td>
<td>InterAgency Conflict Assessment Framework, application of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-28</td>
<td>InterAgency Conflict Assessment Framework, application of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-29</td>
<td>InterAgency Conflict Assessment Framework, application of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-43</td>
<td>InterAgency Conflict Assessment Framework, application of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-19</td>
<td>InterAgency Conflict Assessment Framework, purpose of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-25</td>
<td>InterAgency Conflict Assessment Framework, responsibilities of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-28</td>
<td>InterAgency Conflict Assessment Framework, tasks of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-49</td>
<td>InterAgency Conflict Assessment Framework, transition into planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-18</td>
<td>interagency coordination, benefits of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-11</td>
<td>interagency coordination, benefits of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-6</td>
<td>interagency coordination, characteristics of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-8</td>
<td>interagency coordination, characteristics of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-12</td>
<td>interagency coordination, competencies for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-18</td>
<td>interagency coordination, competencies for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-20</td>
<td>interagency coordination, definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-1</td>
<td>interagency coordination, definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>fostering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-74</td>
<td>relations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-14</td>
<td>interagency coordination, understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-15</td>
<td>interagency coordination, understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-57</td>
<td>interagency group, considerations by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-14</td>
<td>interagency group, considerations by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-14</td>
<td>interagency partners, coordination from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-17</td>
<td>interagency partners, coordination from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-10</td>
<td>interagency partners, coordination from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-108</td>
<td>interagency partners, coordination from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-8</td>
<td>interagency partnerships, challenges</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-165</td>
<td>interagency standing committee, humanitarian assistance and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-30</td>
<td>interagency team, evaluation by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-31</td>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-25</td>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-33</td>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-37</td>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-38</td>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-44</td>
<td>Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-140</td>
<td>internal defense and development, lines of effort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-140</td>
<td>internal defense and development, objectives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-139</td>
<td>international law, transition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-40</td>
<td>International Red Cross, code of conduct</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-162</td>
<td>Red Crescent Movement and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-163</td>
<td>Red Crescent Movement and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-160</td>
<td>interorganizational coordination, definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-2</td>
<td>interorganizational coordination, definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-120</td>
<td>stability efforts and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-49</td>
<td>joint force commander, responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-105</td>
<td>judge advocates, coordination by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-10</td>
<td>justice, transitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-94</td>
<td>justice system, See also criminal justice system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-194</td>
<td>justice system, See also criminal justice system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-99</td>
<td>justice system reform, U.S. Government partners and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-67</td>
<td>justice system reform, U.S. Government partners and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-43</td>
<td>key actors, constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-41</td>
<td>key actors, constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-39</td>
<td>key actors, constituencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-95</td>
<td>law enforcement, development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-98</td>
<td>law enforcement, development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-104</td>
<td>law enforcement, development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-91</td>
<td>oversight of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-45</td>
<td>laws, penal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-93</td>
<td>laws, penal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-50</td>
<td>transitional military authority and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-52</td>
<td>leaders, See also commanders and officials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-37</td>
<td>evaluation by</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-56</td>
<td>collaboration with</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-6</td>
<td>considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-29</td>
<td>considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-17</td>
<td>considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-22</td>
<td>considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-26</td>
<td>considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-55</td>
<td>considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-124</td>
<td>considerations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-55</td>
<td>dynamics and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-56</td>
<td>dynamics and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-116</td>
<td>engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-14</td>
<td>focus of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-15</td>
<td>focus of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-27</td>
<td>interagency groups and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-62</td>
<td>responsibilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-68</td>
<td>situational understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-53</td>
<td>situational understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-56</td>
<td>situational understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-25</td>
<td>support from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-21</td>
<td>leadership, organizational differences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-84</td>
<td>legal restrictions, funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-99</td>
<td>legal system, security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-100</td>
<td>legislative branch, security sector reform</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-89</td>
<td>legitimacy, civil affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-146</td>
<td>establishment of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-71</td>
<td>justice system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-94</td>
<td>law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-95</td>
<td>law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-98</td>
<td>law enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-12</td>
<td>transparency and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-140</td>
<td>lines of effort, internal defense and development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-60</td>
<td>location, interagencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-63</td>
<td>mass atrocity, response</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-36</td>
<td>measurement, tools</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-73</td>
<td>mediation, relationships and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>military forces, combination of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-108</td>
<td>development of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-93</td>
<td>foreign humanitarian assistance and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-127</td>
<td>interim civil authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-110</td>
<td>interim civil authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-97</td>
<td>responsibility of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-178</td>
<td>security sector reform and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-4</td>
<td>size needed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-15</td>
<td>stability operations and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-58</td>
<td>strategies for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-69</td>
<td>support from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-96</td>
<td>military police, support from</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-154</td>
<td>military support, humanitarian action</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ministry of defense, responsibilities of, 1-88
mission objectives, organizational differences, 3-22
support to, 3-70
MOEs, transition phases, 2-35
monitoring, District Stability Framework, 4-11–4-13
MOPs, transition phases, 2-35
multinational operations, 3-134–3-136
participants, 3-136

N
naïve realism, 3-41
neutrality, humanitarian actors and, 3-151
nongovernmental organizations, code of conduct, 3-162–3-163
humanitarian, 3-149–3-165
nonpermissive environment, criminal justice system reform, 3-113

O
officials, criteria for, 2-63
selecting, 2-66
operational environment, understanding, 3-16
operational form, transitional military authority, 2-54–2-56
operational level, transition, 2-1
opportunity, describe, 4-44–4-46
organizational culture, 3-18
organizational differences, 3-18–3-23
organizations, differences, 3-18–3-23
Oslo Guidelines, 3-164
outcomes, desired, 1-57–1-58
oversight, civilian, 1-87–1-91
funding, 3-83
legislative branch and, 1-89
responsibilities, 1-88

P
participants, See also actors, civilians, military forces, partners, populace, stakeholders
inclusion of, 1-81
multinational operations, 3-136
partner capacity, building, 3-137–3-141
building, 3-140
partners, assistance from, 3-120
benefits from, 3-131
capabilities of, 4-26
challenges of, 2-34
coordination of, 3-122, 3-123–3-133
differences in, 3-19
forces and, 3-123
integration, 3-103
Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework and, 4-20
neutrality of, 3-121
planning, 2-3
responsibilities, 1-73
security sector reform, 1-73
strengths, 3-70
support from, 2-24
transfer from, 2-33
transitions, 2-5, 2-38
transparency and, 2-13
U.S. Government, 1-66–1-68
partnerships, building, 3-54
interagency, 3-6
patience, transition and, 2-14–2-15
patterns, institutional, 4-36
peace building, civilian protection, 1-58
peace development, civilian protection, 1-58
peace operations, 1-120–1-124
political objectives and, 1-123
types, 1-120
perceptions, focus on, 4-13
interagency partners, 3-24
transparency and, 2-12
permissive environment, criminal justice system reform, 3-112
perspective taking, 3-53
ACTion approach, 3-38
benefits, 3-35
challenges, 3-37
social, 3-34
perspectives, understanding, 3-34–3-53
phase, definition, 2-17
phases of stability framework, civil control, 1-14–1-16
civil security, 1-8–1-10
essential services, 1-19–1-21
stability transition phases, 2-21
support to economic and infrastructure development, 1-29–1-31
support to governance, 1-24–1-26
physiological regulation, managing emotions, 3-48
planners, Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework, 4-25
partners, 2-15
transition phases, 2-17
transitions, 2-2, 2-30
planning, conflict prevention, 4-22
counterinsurgency, 1-135
partners, 2-3
reconstruction and stabilization contingency, 4-23, 4-24
rule of law and, 1-98
security sector reform, 1-74–1-76
transition, 2-11, 4-47–4-49
policies, security sector reform, 1-84
policy, strategy and defense, 1-76
populace, assessment of, 3-49
attitudes, 3-136
expression, 2-11
participation by, 2-65
treatment of, 2-71–2-75
principles, security sector reform, 1-77
transitions, 2-6–2-15
protection, challenges, 1-62
civilians, 1-44–1-62
guidelines for, 1-52–1-61
positive outcomes for, 1-57
transitional military authority, 2-75
provincial reconstruction teams, 3-11
public health, infrastructure, 2-84
transitional military authority and, 2-83–2-84
public law, sources for funding, 3-94–3-98
purpose, building shared, 3-76–3-79

Q
quick impact funds, 3-87–3-92

R
reconciliation, conflict transformation, 2-7
developing, 2-8
transition, 2-7–2-11
reconstruction, USAID principles for, 3-115–3-119
reconstruction and stabilization, contingency planning, 4-23
crisis response planning, 4-24
Entries are by paragraph number.

recovery, economic stabilization and, 2-76–2-82
Red Crescent Movement, code of conduct, 3-162–3-163
International Red Cross and, 3-160–3-163
Red Cross, principles of, 3-161
reframing, managing emotions, 3-46
reintegration, 1-111–1-115
definition, 1-111
goals, 1-112
related missions, stability, 1-38–1-140
relationship building, strategies for, 3-54–3-79
relationships, fostering, 3-64–3-66
leveraging, 3-73
preserving, 3-73
strategies for identifying, 3-71
strategies for positive, 3-66
religious, customs and organizations, 2-86
resilience, understand, 4-32–4-36
resources, availability, 3-23, 3-81
organizational differences, 3-23
responsibilities, understanding, 3-55–3-58
restore essential services, 1-18–1-22
subtasks, 1-22
risks, civilians, 1-49
funding and, 3-91
reducing, 1-59
roles, understanding, 3-55–3-58
rule of law, adherence to, 1-13
civil control and, 1-12
criminal justice system and, 3-108
criteria, 3-100
establishment of, 3-109
planning, 1-98
rule of law activities, categories of, 3-106
execution of, 3-100
rule of law programs, transfer of, 3-104
rule of law reform, whole-of-government approach, 3-99–3-106
S
security, assessment, 1-105
coordination, 3-3
host nation concept, 1-80
law enforcement agencies and, 1-91
transition and, 1-90
transitional military authority, 2-42
security cooperation, funding, 3-93
support to, 1-119
security force assistance, definition, 1-92–1-104
foreign internal defense and, 1-138
security forces, capabilities, 1-103
development of, 1-92–1-104
other, 1-102–1-104
security sector reform, 1-64–1-104
civilian oversight established, 1-87
comprehensive, 1-85–1-86
definition, 1-64
desired outcome, 1-65
establishment of, 1-72
foundations of, 1-78–1-84
host nation, 1-71–1-73
IGO and, 1-70
military support to, 1-69
planning, 1-74–1-76
principles of, 1-77
security requirements, 1-102
sustainment of, 1-74
U.S. government partners, 1-66–1-68
unity of effort, 1-85
whole-of-government approach, 1-66
situation, assessment of, 3-52
understand, 1-53–1-56
situational awareness, District Stability Framework, 4-8
social perspective taking, 3-34
societal patterns, 4-35
Soldier and leader engagement, definition of, 1-41
information-related capabilities and, 1-41
Soldiers, actions, 3-49, 3-54
behaviors, 3-65
collaboration with, 3-79
considerations of, 1-43, 3-72
development by, 3-59
interactions with, 3-64
protection of civilians and, 1-46
responsibilities, 3-28
stability, civil affairs in, 3-142–3-148
humanitarian response, 3-155
related activities, 1-38–1-140
unity of effort and, 3-4
stability efforts, challenges, 2-9
support to, 3-120
stability framework, phases, 1-8–1-10, 1-14–1-16, 1-19–1-21, 1-24–1-26, 1-29–1-31
stability framework, transition and, 2-20
stability sectors, stability tasks in, 1-2
stability tasks, accomplishment of, 1-34
assessment of, 4-1–4-4
categories of, 1-5
coordination, 2-109
counterinsurgency, 1-132
executing, 3-102
identification of, 1-34–1-37
multinational operations and, 3-134
peace operations and, 1-122
primary, See also individual primary tasks
primary, 1-1–1-33
primary list, 1-6
proportion of, 1-1
stability sectors, 1-2
support to, 1-98
transition of, 2-16–2-38
transition phases, 2-20
stability transition phases, phases of the stability framework, 2-21
stabilization, economic recovery and, 2-76–2-82
planning, 4-23–4-24
stakeholders, interagency, 3-81
relationships with, 3-69
strategic level, transition, 2-1
strategy and defense policy, security sector reform and, 1-76
success, measurement, 2-35–2-38, 3-27, 4-1
support, from Army, 1-129
support to economic and infrastructure development, 1-28–1-33
phases of stability framework, 1-29–1-31
subtasks, 1-32
support to governance, 1-23–1-27
phases of stability framework, 1-24–1-26
subtasks, 1-27
synchronization, challenges of, 3-141
systems, support from, 2-27
### Entries are by paragraph number.

| T | stability tasks, 2-16–2-38  
understanding, 2-2  
transition into planning,  
Intergency Conflict  
Assessment Framework, 4-47–4-49  
steps for, 4-48  
transition phase 1, 2-24–2-26  
transition phase 2, 2-27–2-32  
transition phase 3, 2-33–2-34  
transition phases, planners, 2-17  
transitional military authority,  
2-39–2-97  
authority, 2-40–2-48  
command responsibility and,  
2-40–2-48  
considerations, 2-85–2-91  
courts and claims, 2-92–2-97  
criteria, 2-49  
definition, 2-39  
degree of control, 2-48  
establishment of, 2-46–2-48  
focus of, 2-76  
forms of, 2-53–2-60  
guidelines for, 2-68–2-91  
operational form, 2-54–2-56  
organization, 2-49–2-67  
public health and, 2-83–2-84  
religious considerations, 2-86  
requirements of, 2-97  
roles of, 2-41  
success of, 2-61  
territorial form, 2-57–2-60  
transparency, civil affairs, 3-146  
transition and, 2-12–2-13  
treatment, factors for, 2-73–2-74 |
| U | U.S. Government partners,  
responsibilities, 1-66–1-68  
understand, conflict diagnosis  
step 2, 4-32–4-36  
unified action partners, stability,  
3-140  
transition, 2-19  
units, influence of, 1-54  
unity of effort, establishment, 2-14  
security sector reform, 1-85  
stability and, 3-4  
support to, 4-5  
USAID, District Stability  
Framework, 4-5  
principles, 3-115–3-119 |
| V | vetting, transitional military  
authority and, 2-91  
vulnerability, describe, 4-44–4-46 |
| W | weapons of mass destruction,  
1-116  
whole-of-government approach,  
3-1–3-119  
criminal justice system reform,  
3-107–3-114  
interim civil authority, 2-105  
rule of law reform, 3-99–3-106  
security sector reform, 1-66  
windows of opportunity and  
vulnerability, assessment of,  
4-45–4-46 |
By order of the Secretary of the Army:

RAYMOND T. ODIERNO  
General, United States Army  
Chief of Staff

Official:

GERALD B. O’KEEFE  
Administrative Assistant to the  
Secretary of the Army  
1414201

DISTRIBUTION:  
Active Army, Army National Guard, and United States Army Reserve: Distributed in accordance with the initial distribution number (IDN) 115882, requirements for FM 3-07.
This page intentionally left blank.