

Appendix J

Lessons Learned from Recent HA Operations

This appendix is a compilation of lessons learned from four recent HA operations: Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, Provide Relief, the Mombasa Airlift for relief supplies to Somalia, Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, and the UN HA operation in Bosnia. This material was provided by OFDA and represents an overview of specific problem areas encountered in each case. Military commands should understand that this appendix is presented from the perspective of civilian agencies working with military forces.

PROVIDE COMFORT - NORTHERN IRAQ (APRIL 1991 - PRESENT)

| Objectives | Problems | Problems Addressed by | Planning Process | Constraints |
|--|---|--|--|--|
| INITIAL 1. Save lives (reduce death rates) 2. Provide post-war relief 3. Complete US intervention and withdrawal | 1.a. 400,000 Kurdish refugees fled to Turkish border; 800,000 refugees went to northern Iran 1.b. Turkish Govt refused entry, forcing refugees to survive in mountains | 2.a. Coalition forces began air-drops of excess Desert Storm supplies from Incirlik AFB 3.a. Deployment of US military civil affairs, US embassy liaison teams, and OFDA DART | 1.a. Deputies Committee 2.a. USAID formed posthostility contingency planning during war | 1.a. Iraqi Govt hostility to the Kurds <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Isolated area • Weakness of the UN • Returning home or permanent camps were not acceptable options |

PROVIDE COMFORT - NORTHERN IRAQ (APRIL 1991 - PRESENT)

| Objectives | Problems | Problems Addressed by | Planning Process | Constraints |
|---|---|---|--|--|
| <p>SUBSEQUENT (2 weeks)</p> <p>1. Establish secure zone in northern Iraq so that refugees would feel safe to return</p> <p>2. Set up camps in secure zone</p> <p>3. Begin repatriation of Kurds to secure zone</p> | <p>1.a. Presence, threats, and harassment by Iraqi military, police, and secret police</p> <p>3.a. Reluctance of Kurds to return to northern Iraq</p> <p>3.b. Kurds fearful of loss of protection</p> | <p>1.a. Deployment of coalition military to establish secure zone, set up camps</p> <p>1.b. Establish no-fly zone above 36th Parallel</p> <p>2.a. DART initiated grants to PVOs to manage camps and transit to UN</p> | <p>1.a. Deputies Committee</p> <p>1.b. EUCOM transition planning</p> <p>2.a. DART/JTF camp construction design</p> | <p>1.a. Initial secure zone did not include Dahuk, origin of most refugees</p> <p>1.b. Pace of UN mobilization</p> <p>1.c. PVO mandate in secure zone needed expansion</p> |
| <p>SUBSEQUENT (2 months)</p> <p>1. Withdrawal of coalition military forces</p> <p>2. UN management of relief operations</p> <p>3. Prepare long-term relief through winter and beyond</p> | <p>1.a. MOU with GOI permitted Iraqi interference</p> <p>1.b. Continued GOI harassment</p> <p>3.a. Wheat harvest sold outside area</p> <p>3.b. No effective economic management</p> | <p>1.a. Retained no-fly zone and "over-the-horizon" protection</p> <p>1.b. Coalition members developed cross-border, bilateral relief programs</p> <p>2.a. UN negotiation with GOI under terms of MOU</p> | <p>1.a. EUCOM relief and transition planning</p> <p>1.b. DART transition planning</p> <p>2.a. UN transition planning</p> | <p>1.a. PVO protection required</p> <p>2.a. UN facilitation of PVO relief efforts</p> <p>3.a. Sanctions prevent development of self-sufficiency</p> |

PROVIDE COMFORT - NORTHERN IRAQ (APRIL 1991 - PRESENT)

| Objectives | Problems | Problems Addressed by | Planning Process | Constraints |
|---|--|---|--|--|
| SUBSEQUENT (6 months and on) | | | | |
| 1. UN relief efforts maintained | 1.a. Reconstruction limited by sanction restrictions | 1.a. Effort in UNSC to reduce sanction constraints | 1.a. UN/DHA | 1.a. Sanctions limitations |
| 2. Coalition relief efforts maintained | 2.a. GOI embargo prohibiting trade between north and south Iraq 2.b. Turkey prohibits fuel commerce cross-border, reducing most normal commerce | 2.a. Local purchase program for wheat established, managed by WFP 2.b. Turkey engaged as participant in relief efforts | 2.a. IWG (DOS/NEA led) | 2.a. Continued GOI noncooperation |
| 3. Reduce relief requirements over time | | | 3.a. DOD/USAID (OFDA, OSD, JCS, EUCOM, CTF/DART) | |
| 4. Resettle refugees to self-sufficient locations | 4.a. Conflict also halts cross-border trucking, further isolating Kurds | | | 4.a. Limited protection of PVOs 4.b. Isolation of Kurds |
| 5. Expand sanctions to permit infrastructure rehabilitation | 5.a. Kurds not organized to manage economy effectively | 5.a. Funded road repair program to transport relief goods to south Kurd areas | | |
| 6. Develop agricultural self-sufficiency | | | | |
| 7. Develop internal wheat purchase program | 7.a. GOI currency manipulations | 7.a. Use of Turkish lira in Kurd areas found acceptable 7.b. Stockpiling of relief commodities | | |

MOMBASA AIRLIFT - SOMALIA (DECEMBER 1992 – MAY 1993)

| Objectives | Problems | Problems Addressed by | Planning Process | Constraints |
|--|---|--|---|---|
| <p>A. Airlift food and emergency relief supplies to Somalia/northern Kenya</p> | <p>1. Confusion of OFDA/DART and US military roles</p> <p>2. US military did not understand UN, NGO, ICRC mandates</p> <p>3. Military did not understand the food distribution system</p> | <p>1.a. Assignment of liaison officers</p> <p>1.b. Coordination on policy and operations between OFDA/DART and military commanders</p> <p>1.c. Regular communication between DART and military commanders</p> <p>1.d. Extending TDY time for DART personnel to ensure continuity</p> <p>2.a. OFDA/DART served as intermediary</p> <p>2.b. OFDA/DART briefings</p> <p>3.a. OFDA/DART validated food requests and requirements and coordinated delivery by the military to UN agencies, NGOs, ICRC</p> | <p>1.a. Create an "emergency action group" with the authority to convene an IWG of agencies to—</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Make planning recommendations • Delineate and assign agency responsibilities • Identify the lead agency <p>1.b. Develop SOPs and inter-agency agreements to formalize the planning process</p> <p>2.a. USAID should assist with training of military personnel. Recommend military include HA in senior officer training programs</p> <p>2.b. Recommend NGO input into training and mission simulations</p> <p>3.a. USAID should have lead responsibilities in a military-supported food distribution program</p> | <p>1.a. Lack of a formal mechanism/procedures for joint planning</p> <p>2.a. Military lacks formal training on civilian resources and organizational mandates</p> |

MOMBASA AIRLIFT - SOMALIA (DECEMBER 1992 – MAY 1993)

| Objectives | Problems | Problems Addressed by | Planning Process | Constraints |
|---|---|---|---|--|
| A. Airlift food and emergency relief supplies to Somalia/northern Kenya (continued) | 4. Classified material | 4.a. OFDA/DART security clearances provided to JTF 4.b. Using military liaison officers and embassy/consulate resources to transmit/receive classified materials | 4.a. Address security clearance procedures in inter-agency/ SOPs | 4.a. Classified material requiring different levels of security clearances |
| | 5. Personal security of civilians (e.g., travel on military aircraft) | 5.a. Command and policy clarifications 5.b. DART validated travel | 5.a. Address in initial planning process and refine in contingency planning | 5.a. Military/legal procedural requirements |
| | 6. Incompatibility in communication equipment | 6.a. Standardizing on possible radio frequencies and establishing HF radio communication times | 6.a. Disseminate radio frequency information | 6.a. Radios that can be programmed |
| | 7. Lack of clarity of overall roles | 7.a. Establishing working relationships between military and OFDA/DART | 7.a. Fully integrate planning process involving key agencies | 7.a. Insufficient planning |

RESTORE HOPE - SOMALIA (DECEMBER 1992 – MAY 1993)

| Objectives | Problems | Problems Addressed by | Planning Process | Constraints |
|--|---|--|---|--|
| <p>To ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance under UN resolution</p> | <p>1. Confusion over military and OFDA/DART roles</p> <p>2. Military priorities were determined without participation of humanitarian relief organizations</p> <p>3. Lack of information before intervention created security risk for relief workers</p> | <p>1.a. Assignment of a DART to Mogadishu</p> <p>1.b. Establishment of the civil-military operations center</p> <p>1.c. Appointment of Ambassador in Somalia to coordinate the HA/military/political strategies</p> <p>1.d. Working experience gained by military commanders who had earlier worked in the Mombasa airlift</p> <p>1.e. Assignment of liaison officers</p> <p>2.a. OFDA/DART became intermediary for input by relief organizations</p> <p>2.b. Civil-military operations center provided a forum for NGOs</p> <p>3.a. Not addressed</p> | <p>1. USAID should be an integral part of the military/political planning process</p> <p>2. USAID should be designated to represent the humanitarian relief community in key USG/UN agencies</p> <p>3.a. USAID representation in all phases of military/civilian planning</p> <p>3.b. Use of OFDA as a communication avenue to NGO consortium</p> | <p>1.a. Lack of familiarity by the military on the functions/responsibilities of OFDA and DART</p> <p>1.b. Restrictions or reluctance on the part of senior military commanders to use nonmilitary resources</p> <p>2.a. Assumption that HA can be planned and executed as a traditional political-military intervention</p> <p>3.a. Lack of knowledge on NGO operations and locations</p> |

RESTORE HOPE - SOMALIA (DECEMBER 1992 – MAY 1993)

| Objectives | Problems | Problems Addressed by | Planning Process | Constraints |
|---|---|--|--|--|
| To ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance under UN resolution (continued) | <p>4. Uncoordinated assessments</p> <p>5. Lack of military briefings for civilians</p> <p>6. US military presence raised local expectations of what might be achieved</p> | <p>4.a. Civil-military operations center</p> <p>5.a. Addressed by DART scheduling regular meetings and including military representatives</p> <p>5.b. Civil-military operations center held daily briefings in Mogadishu</p> <p>5.c. DART established regional networks in Somalia</p> <p>5.d. OFDA issued situation reports and USAID handled press and media inquiries</p> <p>6.a. DART and military commanders established communications with regional leaders</p> | <p>3.c. Establish as SOP a civil-military operations center prior to intervention</p> <p>3.d. Use UN communication networks</p> <p>4.a. Coordination by lead agency</p> <p>5.a. Schedule regular briefings as an SOP</p> <p>6.a. Communicate to NGOs and indigenous leadership the scope of activities planned</p> | <p>4.a. Tendency of different NGOs and organizations to do assessments without sharing information</p> <p>5.a. Need for a forum and coordination</p> <p>6.a. Define objectives and the need for inclusion of local leaders</p> |

Humanitarian Assistance

RESTORE HOPE - SOMALIA (DECEMBER 1992 – MAY 1993)

| Objectives | Problems | Problems Addressed by | Planning Process | Constraints |
|---|---|---|--|---|
| To ensure the delivery of humanitarian assistance under UN resolution (continued) | 7. Impact of intervention on local economy was not fully analyzed | 7.a. USAID provided economic and currency analysis 7.b. Payment in local currency 7.c. Use of food for work programs 7.d. Donor consensus on program interventions | | 7.a. No banking system 7.b. No UN policies established |
| | 8. Security problem was "pushed" from Mogadishu to other areas | 8.a. Coordination in multinational troop deployment strategy | 8.a. Contingency planning | 8.a. UN mandate |
| | 9. Different agendas for NGOs, UN, and military commanders | 9.a. Coordination by US ambassador 9.b. Civil-military operations center attempted to create consensus | 9.a. Appoint lead agency 9.b. Create training programs for US military 9.c. Second US personnel to UN agencies | 9.a. Different mandates and operational perspectives |
| | 10. Lack of NGO/UN field staff | 10.a. Not adequately addressed | 10.a. Contingency planning | 10.a. Security conditions 10.b. Lack of UN personnel system responsive to emergency operations |
| | 11. Civilians lacked an understanding of military ranks and units | 11.a. DART/CMOC briefings | 11.a. Training for NGOs | 11.a. Lack of familiarity and working relationships |
| | 12. Frequent military and civilian rotations | 12.a. Assignment of DART personnel for long-term TDYs | 12.a. Planning with assignment of personnel for 3-month rotations | |

UN HUMANITARIAN OPERATION - BOSNIA (JUNE 1992 - PRESENT)

| Objectives | Problems | Problems Addressed by | Planning Process | Constraints |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| A. Deliver food and relief supplies to Muslim enclaves to stem population movements (reinforce Vance-Owen plan) spring 1992 until spring 1993 | 1. Serbian Govt obstruction of UNHCR convoys from Belgrade | 1.a. UNHCR tries to reach agreements with Belgrade on access. 1.b. UN imposes stiffer sanctions on Serbia to get cooperation on access | 1.a. Creation of UN Sanctions Committee to monitor impact and enforcement of sanctions on Serbia | 1.a. Serbia tightens resolve against UN sanctions, elects hard-line government |
| | 2. Bosnian Serb military attacks on Muslim areas and ethnic cleansing of captured areas | 2.a. UNPROFOR peacekeeping forces deployed to escort UNHCR convoys 2.b. UN designates "safe havens" and pronounces "no-fly zone" | 2.a. Coordinated UNHCR Logistics Operation out of Geneva, Rhein-Main, Zagreb, Metkovic, Belgrade, Ancona 2.b. Designation of General Morillon as UNPROFOR commander 2.c. UN decrees "by any means necessary" policy and "no-fly zone" | 2.a. Coordination complicated by uncertain command structure, separated management points (Geneva, Belgrade, Zagreb, Washington) 2.b. Unclear authorities, mandate, and objectives given to UNPROFOR 2.c. Rules of Engagement not given or followed by UNPROFOR |
| | 3. Bosnian Serbs deny access of UNHCR convoys to Muslim areas | 3.a. UNHCR negotiates with Bosnian Serb militia to permit diversions (23%) of relief cargo, inspections of convoys, harassment of drivers, etc. 3.b. UNHCR commences airlifts into Sarajevo once road deliveries are disrupted (June 1992) | 3. OFDA consultants (Brennan, Stuebner, Maynard, Libby) conduct assessments in former Yugoslavia | |

UN HUMANITARIAN OPERATION - BOSNIA (JUNE 1992 - PRESENT)

| Objectives | Problems | Problems Addressed by | Planning Process | Constraints |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| <p>B. Prevent mass death from starvation, exposure, disease, during winter 1992-93</p> | <p>1. Winter obstructs access (blocked roads, blizzards)</p> <p>2. Food, heating fuel, supply shortages throughout Bosnia</p> | <p>1. OFDA dispatches Bailey bridge experts to plan, design, oversee construction of Bailey bridges near Mostar</p> <p>2. OFDA provides stoves, fuel, and plastic sheeting to UNHCR. Grants to UNHCR, IRC, and UNICEF for winterization programs</p> | <p>1. DOS Hamilton Working Group formed; interagency teleconferences started</p> <p>2. OFDA dispatches DART to Zagreb to coordinate USG relief assistance (Dec 92)</p> | <p>1. Transition in US administration led to unclear US-Bosnia policy</p> <p>2. European allies back Vance-Owen plan and limited UNPROFOR mandate</p> |
| <p>C. Provide assistance to remaining Muslim enclaves in eastern Bosnia, Muslims displaced in Tuzla, and Muslim pockets in south/central Bosnia (spring 1993)</p> | <p>1. Bosnian Serbian capture of Cerska, Zepa, and Srebrenica; mass exodus to Tuzla</p> | <p>1.a. Following fall of eastern Bosnian Muslim enclaves, regular UNHCR convoys to Tuzla and other safe havens were permitted through Serb-controlled areas</p> <p>1.b. OFDA-funded NGO programs (IRC, Solidarities, AICF, IMC, CRS, etc) address needs to Bosnian population</p> <p>1.c. US begins airdrops of MREs and medical supplies on eastern enclaves in March; Germany and France join airdrops</p> | <p>1. Hamilton Interagency Humanitarian Assessment Teams conduct (DOS, OFDA, USAID, DOD, CDC) assessments throughout Bosnia (Feb-Mar 1993); produce survey report 19 Apr 93</p> | <p>1. Mixed signals on US administration policy toward Bosnia</p> |

