“Mobility, both strategic and tactical, is the partner of flexible organization. We must be able to shift combat strength rapidly to any threatened point in the world. Strategic airlift of troops by the Air Force is the answer to the requirement of speed. . . . While airlift adds to our strategic mobility, it does not supplant Navy transport for maintaining the lines of heavy supply and reinforcement to overseas theaters. The Navy has provided this support for the Army throughout our history; we cannot foresee the day when it will not be needed.”

(General Barksdale Hamlett)

Strategic deployment is the strategic relocation and concentration of forces and their support base (manpower and logistics) from CONUS into a theater, from CONUS to CONUS, from OCONUS to OCONUS, or from OCONUS to CONUS in response to a military need or crisis. Deployments may take the form of a forcible entry for crisis response or unopposed entry for natural disasters or humanitarian assistance.

DEPLOYMENT PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

The particular procedures used in planning depend on the time available to accomplish them. When time is not a critical factor, deliberate planning is used. When the time available for planning is short and the near-term result is expected to be an actual deployment or employment of armed forces, the planner uses crisis-action procedures. The overall procedures are the same for both deliberate and crisis-action planning. For more information refer to Appendix A.

As the national security strategy states, the ability to project our power will underpin our strategy more than ever. We must, through strategic mobility, be able to deploy substantial forces and sustain them in parts of the world where pre-positioning of equipment will not always be feasible, where adequate bases may not be available, or where a poorly developed industrial base and infrastructure exists. Our mobility strategy demands that we be able to move personnel and materiel to the scene of a crisis at a pace and in numbers sufficient to achieve quick, decisive mission success. See Figure 4-1.

Deployment from one overseas theater to another was a monumental and previously uncharted undertaking for VII Corps. In support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, VII Corps, assembling on the move, expanded from a European base of 42,000 soldiers to 145,000 soldiers in Southwest Asia. This expansion was accomplished concurrent with initial combat training activities and operational missions. The deployment, from alert to closure in the tactical assembly areas in Southwest Asia, of more than 109,000 VII Corp personnel and 48,600 vehicles was completed in only 97 days.
STRATEGIC MOBILITY OPTIONS

Planners will be continuously challenged to quickly project the proper balance of combat, CS, and CSS forces during the critical time periods. A lack of strategic mobility options may also increase our vulnerability to the enemy and jeopardize operations.

Mobility options to meet regional scenario requirements are dependent on a balance of US Government assets, requisitioned US commercial ships, the stages of the civil reserve aircraft fleet (CRAF), and the varying degrees of allied transport reliance. Several variables quantify the size of the strategic mobility assets necessary to deploy and sustain the force. Certain variables affect the concept of operation. The concept of operations integrates these variables, which include—

- Forces employed (may include reserve forces and sustainment).
- Forces to counter (size and training level of enemy).
- Delivery schedules and distances (includes strategic assets and pre-positioned materiel).
- Warning time (pre-C-Day to C-Day).
- Mobilization level to C-Day or D-Day.
- Options for host nation support, assistance, or relief.
- Combined operations.
- National will and political risk.

In a theater where CINCs and MTMC have operational agreements, MTMC arranges for the operation or use of commercial ocean terminals to support worldwide DOD requirements. MTMC establishes such terminal units as necessary to administer pent operations. MTMC and the shippers/consignees (OCONUS) follow the same basic concepts as the ocean cargo clearance authority (OCCA) relationship in CONUS; theater inland traffic management remains with the theater commander.

![Figure 4-1. Strategic Mobility Objectives for the Army](image-url)
MTMC selects SPOEs, in conjunction with unified commands, as appropriate. MTMC provides port call to deploying units, operates SPOEs, places sealift requirements on MSC, and conducts continuing analyses of port capabilities and land transportation assets. MTMC depends on a port support activity provided by the deploying service to perform critical functions such as maintenance, assembly of equipment security, and other activities beyond the capabilities of the MTMC terminals. See Figure 4-2.

**Strategic Lift**

Force projection and sustainment success is based on the *strategic mobility triad* (airlift, sealift, and pre-positioning). Regardless of the abilities of the force and its training, the following determines the success of our force projection capability: the balance of pre-positioning sealift and airlift, coupled with those interconnecting LOCs. Annex J of the JSCP provides planning guidance and apportions transportation assets for CINC movement planning. Deploying forces can improve the impact of airlift and sealift capabilities by preparing unitized loads of ammunition, supplies, and equipment.

![Figure 4-2. Strategic Mobility Options Anticipated Activation Sequence](image-url)
The JOPES time-phased force and deployment data lists movement priorities for air and sea moves. Upon execution, commanders adjust TC ACCIS information to reflect the unit’s actual cargo weights and configuration. MTMC uses TC ACCIS information to plan and load ships.

**Sealift**

The US strategic sealift capability is made up of a combination of ships from various sources and is managed by the Navy’s MSC. Sealift assets currently available to the deploying forces include fast sealift ships (FSS), ready reserve force (RRF) ships, afloat pre-positioning force ships (APF), and chartered ships which divide into two categories:

- Existing US flag cargo ships under long-term charter to the Navy.
- Augmenting sealift assets available through US flag and foreign flag commercial sources.

These assets are expected to move unit equipment (UE) from day 1 and throughout the contingency.

These surge sealift capabilities are the most difficult to maintain because of the decreasing number of roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships available in the commercial sector. Military use of containership assets during the surge period is constrained by the fact that in many cases U/E is not compatible with containers. Standardized containers permit rapid distribution and minimal handling.

**Airlift**

The US strategic airlift capability includes organic aircraft primarily in the Air Force’s Air Mobility Command and selected commercial aircraft with military useful compartments. Air Mobility Command assets may be augmented by commercial charter contracts or CRAF aircraft. The CRAF program is administered by CINC USTRANSCOM in coordination with the Department of Transportation. Types and quantities of CRAF aircraft change monthly based on service, maintenance, and ownership.

Deploying forces can improve the impact of airlift and sealift capabilities by preparing unitized loads of ammunition, supplies, and equipment to the maximum extent possible.

One of the major findings during Operation Just Cause was that the Container Delivery System (CDS), which rapidly drops multiple bundles from C-130 or C-141 aircraft, is a viable means for resupply when convoys and Army aviation are limited.

Airflow and seaflow need to be coordinated to ensure effective reception of units into the theater, that is, arrival of soldiers must match the arrival of equipment. The transition to an emphasis on regional contingency response has placed a premium on earlier availability of CRAF. Equipment pre-positioning places additional demands on CRAF to deliver the associated personnel.

CRAF has limiting factors such as loading/unloading times and requirements for specialized equipment. Because of increased ground time for unloading CRAF aircraft and their unique materials handling equipment requirement, CRAF cargo assets may reduce organic airlift effectiveness and constrain cargo delivery and off-load. Of special note is that planning currently indicates that CRAF will normally not be used in the LRC scenarios.

**Ground Movement**

Rail is the preferred method for moving all wheeled vehicles (over one day’s driving distance from the port) and all tracked vehicles. The commercial railroad industry normally requires up to seven days to position rail cars at installations to support deployments. To overcome this time lag, the commercial railroad industry coordinates with FORSCOM and MTMC to position military-owned and military-managed strategic port rail cars. To support rail movements and staging requirements, installations will maintain rail tracks, adequate loading ramps, facilities, and staging areas for their deployment missions. Installation and deploying commanders must precoordinate the procurement, use, control, and return or recycling of blocking, bracing, and tie-down equipment throughout the deployment.
Other Methods

Military convoy is the preferred method of moving wheeled vehicles to ports and other facilities that are within one day’s driving distance. The accepted deployment method for rotary wing aircraft is by self-deployment to the POE. In most cases, rotary wing aircraft are transported from the POE to the theater by strategic airlift and/or sealift. Fixed wing aircraft are normally self deployable to the theater.

SEAPORTS OF EMBARKATION

MTMC, at commercial port terminals—

- Provides liaison to civil port authorities at strategic seaports.
- Operates port staging area.
- Coordinates activities of deploying unit personnel within port areas.
- Utilizes contractual support to load equipment with unit assistance, if required.
- Documents cargo.
- Prepares ship manifests.
- Coordinates support with PSA personnel.

UNIT MOVEMENTS

Planning for strategic deployment or unit movement by air and/or sea is influenced by existing AUELs, OPORDs, the commander’s intent, pre-positioned equipment, available lift, and mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time available (METT-T). Units that are moving in response to an OPORD are programmed for movement via the JOPES, as modified by the supported commander’s updated plan of operations.

Units responding to short-notice contingencies without pre-existing plans must be prepared to quickly assess their unit status/movement requirements. They must provide the necessary Status of Resources and Training System (SORTS) transactions (unit status report and mobilization or change report). They must use TC ACCIS to update their unit movement data. These actions assist USTRANSCOM in computing lift requirements and times of embarkation.

DEPLOYMENT CONCEPT

Our forward-presence forces speed our ability to respond to MRC threats in areas such as the Pacific or Southwest Asia, where the US military responds to conventional contingency situations requiring a mix of air and sea assets for force deployment.

There are other regions or LRCs where the US military responds to less formidable, though no less urgent, contingency situations that require immediate response. The combatant commander’s pretreated OPLANs, based upon detailed analysis, permits the determinations of possible responses and mobility requirements. See Figure 4-3.

The Army’s ability to project a mix of armored, light, and SOF, with the proper mix of CS and CSS is central to the Army’s role as the nation’s strategic land force with missions ranging from peacetime competition, to conflict, to war. As a prelude to counterattack responses, the Army must execute its deploy-to-fight response with the focus of building up a credible combat capability to deter any threat.

Responding to the request of the Kuwaiti government-in-exile to the President, DOD tasked the Army to provide elements of the 352d Civil Affairs Command (USAR) from Maryland to advise and assist Kuwaiti government counterparts in planning for the emergency recovery and rebuilding phases following Operation Desert Storm and the liberation of Kuwait. A planning cell was created and a majority of the unit was deployed to Saudi Arabia by early January 1991. The Army provided elements of the 353d Civil Affairs Command (USAR) from New York to coordinate civil affairs actions supporting humanitarian relief assistance to Kurdish refugees during Operation Provide Comfort.

The Army’s contribution to a joint and/or combined force commander may be as small as a civil affairs element or a maneuver brigade task force, as large as an entire corps, or even an EAC organization capable of larger operations. Depending on the size of the required force, the duration, and the mission, RC forces may be called up to participate. Whatever the force size or category, Army units must be prepared for rapid task-organizing, echeloning, and tailoring for deployment.
TASK-ORGANIZING PROCESS

For deployment purposes, task-organizing is the process of forming combined arms task forces with limited self-sustainment capabilities for rapid deployment. Task-organizing, centered primarily around maneuver brigades, is a predeployment activity. Task-organized units will develop close training relationships during normal training activities to facilitate deployment and tactical employment. Training at maneuver-brigade level and above should include preparation for a variety of employment environments.

ECHELONING

Echeloning is organizing units for movement. Like task-organizing, echeloning is a predeployment standard operation procedure that establishes a priority for movement within the task force to accommodate available lift. Echelons may be divided, for example, into advance parties, main body, and trail force.

Within each echelon, there must be appropriate combat, CS, and CSS elements. Planning for each echelon must include numbers of vehicles and personnel, consumable supply requirements, and updated UMD/AUEL. Essential, habitual support relationships between combat and CSS units be established during the planning stages. In principle, CSS units must be adaptable, flexible, and capable of supporting a wide variety of equipment and units.

TAILORING

Tailoring occurs after initial strategic lift, pre-positioned assets, and host nation/contract services or assets have been identified. Whereas task-organizing and echeloning are preplanned, tailoring is situationally dependent. Units and UMD may be added to or subtracted from a planned task organization, based on the mission and available lift. Additionally, availability of pre-positioned equipment near the AO, host nation/contract services, or other infrastructure assets are combat multipliers that allow for multiple requirements to move simultaneously to the operational area.
TIME-PHASED FORCE AND DEPLOYMENT DATA

The TPFDD is the supported CINC’s statement of his requirements by unit type, time period, and priority for arrival. Further, TPFDD defines the support CINC’s nonunit-related cargo and personnel requirements to include Army civilians to sustain his forces. The validation and sourcing of below-the-line units (CS and CSS) for TPFDD is the responsibility of the supporting CINCs.

Supporting CINCs are also responsible for assigning the subsequent capstone alignments derived from the OPLAN TPFDDs. The priorities for unit sourcing are derived from each theater commander’s concept of operations: the broad narrative statement of how the supported CINC expects to allocate, deploy, employ, and support his forces. See Figure 4-4.

The TPFDD is both a force requirements document and a prioritized transportation movement document. The supported commander and the designated supporting commanders identify force shortfalls to JCS. The ultimate objective of deployment is the arrival of the force at the right place and at the right time. The supported commander and the supporting combatant commander routinely validate TPFDD.

TPFDD is a dynamic document that the supported combatant commander refines. He also ensures that its objectives are achieved. Some of the factors that may require TPFDD adjustments include—

- Nonvalidated forces/sustainment added to the flow.
- Validated forces that have a new latest arrival date (LAD).
- UMD adjustments to deployment equipment lists (DEL) necessitating changes in strategic lift type/quantity.
- Available-to-load date (ALD)/ready-to-load date (RLD) adjustments to deploying forces.
- Delayed POE/POD arrivals and departures that affect subsequent strategic lift.
- Strategic lift reroutings and delays resulting from natural or man-made disasters.
- Emergency needs for forces or sustainment in the theater.

The supported commander’s required date (CRD) to have forces at their destinations is the end goal from which all common-user transportation must be planned. The supporting combatant commander establishes milestones for loading and transporting units and their accompanying supplies to the POE, embarking them aboard strategic lift, and transiting them to the POD.

The following must be resolved by the supported combatant commander as early as possible the sequence in which Army units deploy in relation to the movement of forces of the other services and alliance and/or coalition forces. Efficient and timely use of limited amounts of available strategic lift is the key to successful deployment operations.

Following their evaluation of the supported combatant commander’s plan, ASCCs and others must clearly and quickly articulate their lift requirements. Early resolution of the sequencing of forces into the theater will solidify the TPFDD, determine the time required to deploy the forces, and provide the basis to initiate the theater distribution plan. The supported CINC performs the ultimate phasing, prioritization, and validation of all requirements. See Figure 4-5.

Proper sequencing of forces, to include participating alliance and/or coalition forces, into the AO will contribute significantly to the stabilization of the situation. It will also allow for rapid buildup of capabilities that permit the supported combatant commander to seize the initiative and conduct successful decisive operations as early as possible.

Simultaneous deployment of tactical and operational level headquarters early in the operation is essential for conducting current operations, facilitating future planning, and coordinating with host nation or allied forces. Additionally, simultaneous deployment allows for the
THE PROCESS

NCA
PROVIDE STRATEGY/POLICY GUIDANCE

JCS
APPROVE CONCEPT ARMED FORCES

JCS
PLAN REQUIREMENT ESTABLISH MISSION APPORTION FORCES

SUPPORTED CINC
CONCEPT FORCE LIST PRIORITIES

ARMY COMPONENTS
CS/CSS REQUIREMENTS DEPLOYMENT PHASING DRAFT TPFDD

SUPPORTED COMMANDS
MERGE COMPONENT TPFDD REVIEW/APPROVAL

ARMY COMPONENT
REVIEW TPFDD

SUPPORTING CINC
VALIDATE REQUIREMENTS PROVIDE UNITS BY FLAG CAPSTONE ALIGN UNITS MOB STATIONING

USTRANSCOM
HOST/FACILITATE REFINEMENT OF TPFDD

Figure 4-4. Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development

1 Dependent upon plan/scenario, mobilization, authorization, and forces apportioned.
rapid employment of follow-on reinforcing units. Appropriate CS/CSS headquarters must deploy with the initial force. Throughout the deployment, Army forces must maintain the flexibility to reconfigure units and adjust deployments should the supported commander’s needs change while the deployment is in progress.

The needs of the joint force commander and the requirement for rapid deployment will initially take priority over maximizing the efficiency of lift. Even if the strategic intent is to attempt to deter an opponent, the operational focus must be on seizing the initiative and creating an offensive capability to fight and win should deterrence fail.

DEPLOYMENT PHASES

The five deployment phases include predeployment activities, movement to the POE, strategic lift, theater reception, and theater onward movement. Concurrent with, and resulting from, the deployment of the forces and logistics, the combatant commander conducts lodgement, stabilization, and restoration of conditions amicable to US interest.

PHASE I - PREDEPLOYMENT ACTIVITIES

During normal peacetime operations the Army prepares its units for crisis-action and force-projection missions. Based on the operational requirements of the supported CINC, Army organizations are designated, equipped, trained, and led with force projection capabilities in mind. Commanders must adhere to Armywide standards for task-organizing, echeloning, and tailoring units. Units must conduct routine collective deployment training to ensure the Army deploys the balance of forces, individual manpower, and materiel to meet the combatant commander’s missions. See Figure 4-6.

Forces

Commanders of individual units revise their unit movement plans to reflect the exact equipment being deployed and perform the following predeployment activities:

- Active Army units conduct necessary deployment and individual and collective training to attain the desired mission capability in the shortest possible time consistent with the planned deployment. In addition, they conduct soldier readiness checks and prepare for overseas movement, to include proper documentation of containerized unit equipment.

Numerous military intelligence units were mobilized and deployed in support of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The 446th and 480th Military Intelligence Detachments (MID) (Army Reserve, Bloomington, IN), and the 484th MID (Boston, MA) augmented the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Installations assigned a mobilization mission (CRC, regional marshalling area, PSA, and A/DACG responsibilities) must identity nondeploying units and/or individual manpower and units to conduct Phase I (Redeployment Activities) and Phase II (Movement to POE) requirements.

Units required to support mobilization and deployment activities must be identified early in the expansion of the force.

The 3397th US Army Garrison (Army Reserve, Chattanooga, TN) filled the installation support gap at Fort Campbell, KY. The 3397th was reorganized into a deployment support organization to assist the deployment of the 101st Airborne Division. This initiative proved so successful that the unit was locally redesignated as the 3397th Deployment Command and used in this capacity for deployment and redeployment operations at Fort Campbell.
Individual Manpower

The theater PERSCOM G1, in coordination with PERSCOM, conducts nonunit-related personnel (NRP) (individual fillers and casualty replacements deploying to the theater) deployment planning functions and determines requirements.

This planning is based on unit filler and casualty replacement shelf requirements. These requirements are integrated into transportation and reception plans and incorporated into the TPFDD by the Army commander. These requirements are also used to determine the number and locations of CONUS CRCs and APOEs required to support the OPLAN. The DCSPER has final approval on the CRCs required to support the OPLAN, based on input from PERSCOM, TRADOC, and ODCSLOG. PERSCOM coordinates with USTRANSCOM on the APOEs required to support the CRCs.

Upon receipt of the OPLAN warning order, PERSCOM conducts an analysis of fill capability. PERSCOM analyzes the capability by comparing available personnel against the supported CINC’s pre-positioned shelf requirements to adjust the NRP flow in the TPFDD. Additional critical filler requirements identified by the theater ASCC, not in the pre-position shelf, are included in this analysis.

Casualty replacement normally remains the same unless the planned threat changes significantly. CRCs and theater area replacement operations (TAROs) initiate procedures to start up or expand current capabilities in preparation for processing fillers and casualty replacements. (Figure 4-7)

All NRP deploying to a combatant theater, whether military or civilian, process through a designated CRC. Installations designated as CRCs verify the readiness of soldiers and civilians to deploy OCONUS to theaters. The verification of soldier readiness includes personal affairs, medical and dental, and finance readiness. In addition, CRCs coordinate with their respective installation support activity for issuance of—

- Organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE).
- Individual weapon.
- Chemical defense equipment for deploying soldiers.

CRCs perform very limited training, focused mainly on weapons zero/qualification, protective mask fitting, and cultural awareness. The use of a CRC does not absolve the losing installation of ensuring that departing soldiers and civilians meet all deployability prerequisites.¹

TRADOC identifies CRC replacement battalions and replacement companies for early order to active duty in each call-up list of units developed to support execution of specific CICS-approved OPLANs. These units must be called up early in the process in order to process OCONUS individual replacements. For planning purposes, activation of a CRC requires approximately 30 days. This includes calling forward equipment stocks and their preparation for issue.

Expansion of the CRC operation may require the early assignment of additional assets.

The 360th Personnel Replacement Battalion (CRC) (Army Reserve, Myrtle Beach, SC) was called to active duty in December 1990 to support the execution of the CRC operation at Fort Jackson, SC. The 360th executed the CRC operation and established a CONUS demobilization center after cessation of hostilities.

Logistics

DLA and AMC receive and fill high-priority requisitions from both forward-presence and planned deploying forces. Forward-presence and early deploying force requisitions receive priority of support. Deployable nondivisional units designated for a crisis response force may have a wartime support mission that differs

¹With supported CINC approval, DLA and AMC technicians/civilians may process for movement with a deploying force as part of its tailored force package.
from their peacetime support mission. These units will ensure adequate repair parts, based on projected equipment density or type, are on hand to support their wartime mission. A predeployment baseline of ASL stockage requirements is the key to providing the proper support to the deployed units.

All supply support activities (divisions, separate brigades, nondivisional direct support units) should track and retain predeployment, deployment, and postdeployment inventory data (on-hand inventory dollar value, excess dollar value, dollar value of excess turn-ins during a quarter) in order to provide a funding baseline to aid in tracking funds expended on ASL during a crisis. To aid and assist in the total accounting effort, requests and identification of project codes for wartime requisitions must be initiated early and according to current procedures.

DLA and AMC review anticipated supply requirements and initiate actions (increase production lines, obtain additional vendors, begin industrial base expansion) to overcome forecasted shortages. Deploying units must preplan and properly document containerized sustainment. Phase I ends when the MS validates the unit for deployment and/or employment according to specified deployability criteria.

**PHASE II - MOVEMENT TO THE PORT OF EMBARKATION**

Based on the mobilization process and/or [Redeployment Activities], units have completed POM and have been validated. Units update AUELs to deployment equipment lists (DELs) and submit them to the appropriate authority. Whether deploying for training or in response to a crisis, unit loads are configured for combat contingencies. This configuration provides the capability of redeployment while en route to training or other activities.
Resupply and follow-on logistics may be configured for administrative loading. For NRP, upon verification of deployability and issue of equipment, the CRC will coordinate the movement to designated APOEs under direction of the PERSCOM commander. See Figure 4-8.

**All forces must be capable of redeploying for contingency operations from any location.**

The 20th Special Forces Group (Alabama National Guard) was alerted for Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm and moved to Fort Bragg, NC. Ultimately, members of the units were redeployed to support Operation Provide Comfort as a part of the 10th Special Forces Group.

When required, all ports must immediately receive necessary direction to permit the rapid movement and loading of live ammunition onto aircraft and ships.

During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, elements of the 101st Air Assault Division arrived in Jacksonville, FL, with their ammunition basic load. No prior plan had been established for moving ammunition through a commercial port. As a result, there was a strategic deployment pause since waivers had to be obtained before the ammunition could be processed for loading.

Installations must have in place individual manpower and forces (A/DACG, PSA, and so on) to deploy and sustain units designated by the OPORD to the AO.

**Volunteers from the 650th Transportation Company (Army Reserve, Wilmington, NC) operated the XVIII Airborne Corps Arrival/Departure Airfield Control Group. Prior to the 650th’s mobilization and deployment to Southwest Asia, the volunteers had processed almost 30,000 personnel, over 5,000 pieces of equipment, and over 20,000 short tons of cargo.**

Based on information provided to JOPES on the readiness of units and individual manpower for movement (RLD), USTRANSCOM provides movement guidance for movement to the POE.

**Units must be configured and positioned for prompt deployment. Advances in strategic lift capability—new fast sealift ships; large, medium-speed RO/RO (LMSR) ships; and C-17 aircraft—will make this even more critical.**

In support of Operation Just Cause, the 7th Infantry Division (Light) faced significant constraints on its deployment. The local Monterey Airport (California) could not handle the size and amount of aircraft required. Accordingly, soldiers were bussed to Travis Air Force Base, and supplies went out of the Monterey Airport. This change in plans, combined with the constricted local road net and civilian traffic, slowed the deployment.
**Forces**

Units receive movement instructions from the transportation component commands (TCCs). MTMC specifies, by movement directive, when unit equipment is required to be at the POE for loading aboard strategic lift (ALD). Based on the movement directive, units backward-plan their installation departure and POE processing to meet ALD. During the deliberate planning process, planners should identify strategic seaports for berthing of sealift assets to facilitate rapid deployment of forces.

The Air Mobility Command specifies, through an air tasking order, using the Airlift Deployment Analysis System (ADANS), when unit equipment is required to be at the APOE for loading aboard aircraft. Based on the ADANS directive, units backward-plan their installation departure.

At the POE, forces are inspected for compliance with strategic lift requirements. With acceptance by the A/DACG or PSA, responsibility for forces, if not directed by the OPORD, is automatically transferred from the unit to the transportation community.

The A/DACG (air) and PSA (sea), in conjunction with USAMC and MTMC, respectively, process the forces and aid in loading them aboard strategic lift for departure. Proper logistics marking system (LOGMARS) labels and container documentation are critical to accounting for cargo and making proper manifests to be used at the POD. Establishment of an effective PSA, to expedite actions at ports, is key to rapid deployment and integrity/accountability of forces and readiness. Deployment control units (DCUs) have teams available to assist ITOs and units in completing the proper documentation for deployment. These assets should be used to the maximum.

**Individuals**

Nonunit-related personnel (NRP) are normally moved via commercial transportation from the losing installations to the designated CRC. The PERSCOM commander coordinates strategic lift requirements with USTRANSCOM for movement of the NRP from the APOE to the theater. The PERSCOM commander coordinates all NRP personnel actions at the APOE through the personnel assistance point (PAP).

**Logistics**

Supply items that require containerization are sent to the designated container consolidation point (CCP) for processing and shipment. The US Army Logistics Control Activity (LCA) prescribes the priority for shipment out of the CCP. The ASCC of the supported CINC provides the appropriate priority guidance. The vendor sends other items directly to the theater via regular commercial carriers. In all cases, the deploying materiel is properly documented with requisite packing lists, placarding, and LOGMARS labeling attached at the origin to facilitate POE throughput and subsequent theater processing.

Phase II concludes with the departure of the strategic lift at the POE:

- Wheels up for aircraft.
- Passage of the last buoy marking the channel to the SPOE for vessels.

If not specified by the OPORD, command of the departing forces and NRP is automatically transferred from the supporting combatant commander to the supported combatant commander.

**PHASE III - STRATEGIC LIFT**

This phase begins with strategic lift departure from the POE. It ends with arrival in the theater. The appropriate TCCs are responsible for strategic transportation of forces and their support. USTRANSCOM will ensure intransit visibility (ITV) of forces, to include NRP, and supplies. ITV data, coupled with unit movement coordinators, can combine to provide force tracking details required by the supported combatant commander. See Figure 4-9.

**PHASE IV - THEATER BASE RECEPTION**

This phase begins with the arrival of forces and sustainment at the POD in the theater and ends with the departure of the forces/sustainment from the POD. Therefore, port clearance is a theater responsibility. The supported combatant commander is responsible for developing a theater reception and onward movement plan for arriving forces and sustainment. Except in the case of forcible entry, CS and CSS forces may either precede or arrive concurrently with combat forces to process them through the POD and establish theater distribution infrastructure.
The replacement battalion receives NRP and coordinates onward assignments, transportation, and life support. To facilitate management of NRP and unit flow into the theater, the supported ASCC must ensure that communications support and ADP connectivity are provided to theater replacement battalions. The theater replacement battalion is under command of the theater PERSCOM.

A/DACG (air) and military or military-contracted port commands (sea), augmented with PSA organizations, must be established to process forces and sustainment equipment and supplies through the POD. Commands send advance parties to coordinate the orderly processing of deploying forces. Additionally, advance ship manifests are used for POD planning for ship off-loading.

Logistics-over-the-shore (LOTS) operations provide a unique capability for offloading transport/supply ships in areas having limited or no adequate port facilities or augment limited capacity in damaged ports. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps have LOTS capability.

One of the primary requirements during this phase is coordinating the onward movement of deploying forces to their destination. This requires personnel who are knowledgeable about the unit, its movement configuration, the receipt of PWRS, and the ultimate destination. These personnel work with the combatant commander’s designated representatives for sustainment (support command) and movement (movement control agency) in completing the required documents for moving and sustaining the forces. ITV and force tracking

Figure 4-6. Predeployment Activities - Forces
(FT) are verified at reception to ensure continuous identification of force projection efforts.

**PHASE V - THEATER ONWARD MOVEMENT**

This phase begins with the personnel and equipment linkup, the reconfiguration of forces, sustainment, and receipt of PWRS at designated marshaling areas. This phase concludes with arrival at the gaining command’s staging areas where combat preparation occurs. In this phase, ITV and FT are the responsibility of the supported commander.

The supported combatant commander is responsible for the health, welfare, and support of forces and assisting with their onward movement. In this capacity, the supported combatant commander sustains the NRP of the forces until the NRP arrive at their prescribed theater. Through the theater army movement control agency (TAMCA), units obtain assistance for intratheater movement. In joint and/or combined operations, the OPLAN must delineate the reception and onward movement responsibilities of participating nations.

**LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS**

All sustainment requirements are shipped to theaters based on the priorities of the supported combatant commander. The Army is responsible for providing people and materiel.

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The 318th Transportation Agency (TAMCA) (Army Reserve, Jamaica, NY) managed all intratheater movements in the CENTCOM theater from October 1990 until its redeployment in June 1991. Never before had a single movement control unit managed the movement of a theater army, while at the same time controlling the movement of thousands of trucks, tracks, and trains to sustain a force of over a half-a-million personnel.

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![Diagram of CONUS Replacement Centers](image)
CONTAINERIZATION POLICY FOR STRATEGIC SEAPORTS

Major combat units and their early deploying support elements routinely use RO/RO shipping to the maximum extent possible. Containers used to carry a given unit's equipment are transported aboard the same ships if possible. Follow-on units and sustainment equipment and supplies may use containers and container shipping.

Increased containerization of unit equipment parallels the commercial transportation industry's use of container shipping. However, this use is tempered by the command's need for ITV and a sufficient theater capability to readily move to the tactical assembly area (TAA), unload, and return to the transportation system for further use. A tendency of receiving units and the services to retain containers causes exorbitant costs. To avoid such costs, commanders at all levels must vigorously enforce the container return policy.

SUPPLIES AND MATERIEL

Supplies must flow prior to or concurrently with the arrival of units. Increased forces result in increased supply requirements. Supporting commanders, in coordination with the supported commander's senior logistics

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1 Mobilization, deployment, and employment
2 Cross-level personnel/equipment, order logistics, train, POM, and validate.

Figure 4-8. Deployment Process for Phases I through III
command, must estimate supply requirements and initiate shipments of supplies to the theater. This is known as a push system.

As time allows, the supported commander submits demand-based requisitions to initiate a pull system for resupply. A potential problem is that nondemand-shipped supplies may exceed theater reception, onward movement, and storage capabilities at PODs, POEs, and supply bases. If a shipment arrives at an APOE and waits for several days until diverted to surface movement, valuable time is lost and effective support is jeopardized. Therefore, compliance with air clearance authority approval, based on ASCC priorities, is critical.

Sustainment supplies do not always follow the prescribed LOCs. Some supplies (POL and ammunition) require special facilities and cannot be off-loaded at some ports without significant disruption of port activities.

The supply and support requirements of deploying forces consist of two major categories: unit-related supplies and equipment and nonunit-related supplies and equipment. Unit-related supplies and equipment include a unit’s organic equipment, basic load, and accompanying supplies.

Nonunit-related supplies and equipment include all supply sustainment support requirements that are not

![Diagram of Deployment Process for Phases III through V](image-url)
identified for a specific unit. Nonunit-related supplies and equipment support the force until air, land, and sea LOCs are open. These include PWRS, sustaining supplies, and resupply.

SECURITY

In coordination with other DOD activities, services develop and administer a DOD transportation security program to provide standardized transportation security measures and procedures, overall monitorship, and central direction. Commanders plan security for their units and equipment to the POE in CONUS, while MTMC coordinates security within the port.

Commanders plan and use operation security for movement of organizational equipment and personnel and assist in providing security. The transportation community assists and coordinates physical security enroute and within OCONUS port/terminal areas.

AMMUNITION

MTMC provides routing instructions for movement of all classes of ammunition entering the Defense Transportation System. In a contingency operation, select units will be designated to deploy through commercial ports with their ammunition basic load.

Supporting commanders, via TPFDD, provide unit names and other pertinent data to MTMC; MTMC coordinates with the USCG to obtain permits to allow ammunition to be loaded at the ports required. MTMC provides copies of the permits to the Coast Guard and supporting commander for file and provides units with packing and configuration instructions that meet the Coast Guard safety requirements for sea movements. At execution, MTMC area commands notify the Coast Guard and the captain of the port of the unit’s deployment and request activation of the permits for ammunition basic load. As required, USTRANSCOM will coordinate exceptions to airlift of unit ammunition.

RECEPTION

The supported combatant commander designates responsibility for port operations according to Joint Publication 4-01.5. In all theaters, reinforcing units must be received and prepared for further deployment and employment. This is particularly true in those areas in which forward-presence forces are stationed during peacetime. The ASCC is responsible for receiving, equipping, and assisting deploying units and NRP.

Normally, crisis-response and reinforcing units deploy personnel by air and equipment by sea. Planners must synchronize these arrivals to accommodate the supported commander’s intent. Once unit personnel and equipment arrive, they must be consolidated and prepared for onward movement to their parent organizations. Typically, though not always, arrival sites are located in the COMMZ. Thus, the CSS requirements for supporting these operations normally are assigned to the ASCC.

The ASCC, through the senior logistics element, directs forces and sustainment movements. Individual logistics units are responsible for the full range of logistics support to arriving units. They coordinate life support and provide essential supplies, recovery, and evacuation services.

Based on supported command movement directives—
- TAMCA elements coordinate port clearance and inland theater movements.
- Theater TRANSCOM elements assist with port clearance and transportation from the POD or PWRS to marshaling sites.
- Medical elements that provide area support assist with medical problems and may provide most medical support to the arriving units.
- PERSCOM elements assist with personnel service support, including filler and casualty personnel flowing through the PRB, and personnel accountability.

CONTRACTING

Contracting can provide the same type of support during the deployment phase by filling the gap until LOGCAP and HNS become fully integrated into the support plan. Once deployed, units will receive contracting support from the theater army contracting activity.

Units should plan to fill low-dollar-value requirements (less than $2500) through the use of ordering officers appointed from within the unit. The selection and training of these ordering officers must be accomplished prior to deployment. Installation directorates of contracting can provide the necessary training and appointments.

SUMMARY

Deployment is the planning, preparation, and movement of forces and their support base from any location to an area of operations in response to a military need or crisis. Deployments may take the form of a forcible (tactical) or peaceful (nontactical) entry. Deployments are conducted in five phases. Concurrent with, and resulting from, the deployment of the forces and logistics, the combatant commander conducts the major operations of lodgement, stabilization, and restoration of conditions amicable to US interests.