PART TWO

Army Operational-Level
Combat Service Support

The requirement to deploy anywhere in the world with a force that may range from a small specialized element to a corps or larger force is a complex process. The CSS challenge of providing the right support with the properly sized force at the right time and place is equally as complex. Planners and commanders must decide the proper support requirements to meet the CSS needs of the deploying force. The LSE, HNS, and the use of deployed civilians and contractors are important factors in this equation.

Operational CSS is the linkage between the strategic and the tactical levels and the product is sustainment. This linkage overlaps both levels, resulting in a seamless system that virtually eliminates distinct boundaries. Therefore, both the supported and the supporting operational-level commanders manage some strategic and tactical CSS functions in support of the CINC’s missions. Operational logisticians place requirements and strategic logisticians fill them according to the CINC’s strategic CSS priorities.

Army CSS functions are to be performed in as routine a manner as possible throughout the range of military operations. Included are the design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and reconstitution of materiel; the acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; the acquisition, preparation, maintenance, equipment, movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; the acquisition or furnishing of services; and the acquisition of food services and field feeding. Logistics also involves the integration of the strategic, operational, and tactical sustainment efforts within the theater and planning and effecting the development, mobilization, deployment, demobilization, and sustainment of national and/or multinational military resources to support National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy.

Chapter 3
Responsibilities, Planning, and Support

On the modern battlefield, operations and CSS are more interdependent than ever before. Modern and future weapons systems with their increased sophistication, mobility, and firepower require not only highly skilled and motivated soldiers to operate and maintain them, but a highly flexible and responsive integrated military and civilian logistical support system. CSS provides the tactical commander staying power by providing the required people, materiel, health services support (HSS), facilities, transportation, and services. The mission of the Army logistics system is to support soldiers and their systems with what is needed, when it is needed, and where it is needed. The system’s effectiveness is measured by how it enhances and supports the CINC’s strategic, operational, and tactical plans. Operational-level CSS focuses primarily on the sustainment of the force, while tactical-level CSS focuses primarily on the readiness of the force.
RESPONSIBILITIES

Arranging for and providing CSS are national responsibilities. Unless otherwise directed by the NCA or the CINC during war, the implementation and execution of CSS functions remain the responsibility of the services and the service component commander. Normally, each service is responsible for the support of its own forces except when that support is provided for by agreements with other services, national agencies, or allies. However, when deployed for major operations, the services may become interdependent. CINCs may designate a service, usually the dominant user, to provide common CSS functions for the entire theater. During Operation Desert Shield, when common-item support responsibilities exceeded the providing service’s capabilities, the CINC directed that it be totally or partially provided by another service or by contracting for, or obtaining, HNS. Host nations provided assistance in Class I (Subsistence) and Class III (POL).

Operational-level commanders must determine the proper balance between centralized planning and decentralized execution of CSS functions and responsibilities. Too much centralization often results in rigidity and sluggish response, while too little causes waste and inefficient use of critical resources. Centralizing functions to avoid unnecessary duplication is not always justified. Limited duplication can be beneficial and it may be necessary for adequate flexibility and mobility.

The operational-level commander must decide which elements of a force to deploy first. He must ensure the proper mix of combat, CS, and CSS forces based on the assigned mission and other METT-T considerations. Generally, initial deployments are in the form of self-sustained and balanced task forces appropriately tailored to accomplish assigned missions. As the theater matures, other forces are deployed to provide required support capabilities. Deploying forces must be sequenced to arrive in the area of operations in order to support the CINC’s concept and support forces during all phases of operations. The ASCC’s staff helps leaders focus on the mission by providing broad policy direction and by coordinating functions both internally within the component and externally with joint, multinational, interagency, and HN agencies.

PLANNING

CSS is vital to the successful execution of an operations plan. Planning involves critical decisions concerning the interface of combat, CS, and CSS at all levels. CSS planning and operations must be versatile; they must complement combat plans and operations, thus enhancing the ability of the supported unit to accomplish its mission. Commanders must anticipate their units’ mission requirements and provide the required support. They must assess what resources and capabilities are available in the theater and tailor follow-on forces accordingly. Deploying units should be self-sustaining in the theater of operations until LOC are established.

Too much centralization often results in rigidity and sluggish response, while too little causes waste and inefficient use of critical resources. Centralizing functions to avoid unnecessary duplication is not always justified. Limited duplication can be beneficial and it may be necessary for adequate flexibility and mobility.

The CINC’s logistics support plan is normally based on a campaign plan. As the CINCs of the unified commands develop their strategic concept of operation, they concurrently develop, in coordination with their ASCC, a concept of support. They and their staffs consider a myriad of support factors that affect the ability of forces to conduct operations. At the campaign and major operation planning level, support can be a dominant factor in determining the nature and tempo of operations. Sound support planning, anticipation, and analysis are three factors that allow for rapid changes to operations plans.

CSS planning should be centralized, comprehensive, tailorable, flexible, and continuous. Its purpose is to identify the mobility, sustainability, and infrastructure necessary for strategic, operational, and tactical operations. Planners also consider the use of army war reserve (AWR) stock in the theater, at port of embarkation (POE), or afloat.

Logistics comprises the means and arrangements which work out the plans of strategy and tactics. Strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to the point.

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thereby reducing requirements in theater and providing earlier force closure for stabilization operations. If appropriate, planners must also consider HNS. CSS planning will—

- Identify significant time-phased materiel requirements, facilities, and other resources necessary to support the OPLAN.
- Identify the capabilities, vulnerabilities and limitations of the aerial ports of debarkation (APODs), aerial ports of embarkation (AF’OEs), sea ports of debarkation (SPODs), sea ports of embarkation (SPOEs), and their reception and clearance capabilities.
- Identify support methods and procedures required to meet the needs of air, sea, and land LOC.
- Identify vulnerabilities of certain types of systems and forces and to weapons of mass destruction.
- Provide for coordinating and controlling onward movement of arriving forces and materiel.
- Plan on reasonably assured HN and third nation resources.
- Identify sustainment capabilities by—measuring US ability to fill material requirements.

PEACETIME PLANNING

Using planning guidelines and established doctrine, logisticians will determine the quantities of supplies and services needed to support a major regional contingency (MRC) or a lesser regional contingency (LRC). Before strategic deployment begins, planners must identify LOG capable of accommodating the types of aircraft and ships that will be used. Some commodities, for example POL and ammunition, require special facilities and cannot be off-loaded everywhere without significant disruption of port activities. Peacetime planning should consider AWR stock, HNS agreements, containerization, and weapons of mass destruction.

Army War Reserve Stock

AWR stock is materiel amassed in peacetime to meet the increase in military requirements at the outbreak of war. AWR stock remains set at the minimum level needed to sustain and equip the approved forces as outlined in the defense planning guidance. AWR consists of—

- AWR sustainment (AWRS) stock. AWRS stock is acquired in peacetime to meet increased wartime requirements. It is intended to provide support essential to combat operations and postmobilization training beyond the capabilities of the peacetime stocks, industry, and FIN.
- AWR operational project (AWROP) stock. AWROP stock is materiel above normal TOE, TDA, and common table of allowance (CTA) authorizations tailored to key strategic capabilities essential to the army’s ability to execute its power projection strategy. Examples of these projects are inland petroleum distribution system, Force Provider, aircraft matting, aerial delivery, and CONUS replacement centers (CRC). They are positioned in CONUS with tailored portions or packages pre-positioned overseas.
- AWR pre-positioned sets (AWRPS). AWRPS are AWR pre-positioned materiel—end items, supplies, and secondary items—stored in unit sets to reduce force deployment response time and designed to support multiple contingencies.

HNS Agreements

Potential HNS agreements should address labor support arrangements for port and terminal operations, use of available transportation assets in country, use of bulk petroleum distribution and storage facilities, possible supply of some Class III (Bulk) and Class IV, and development and use of other field services. Agreements with allies should be initiated, continually evaluated for improvement, or specifically spelled out to enable CSS planners to adjust for specified requirements.

Containerization

Containerization significantly improves the delivery times of resupply and other selected cargo to the theater of operation by reducing handling, shipload, and discharge time. However, effective use of the system requires advance planning to ensure that
necessary material handling equipment (MHE) and container handling equipment (CHE) are available. Planners must consider the use of existing technologies to enhance visibility of location and content of containers.

Pre-positioning of stocks provides the capability to rapidly resupply forces until sea lines of communication (SLOC) can be established. Locating pre-positioned stocks in potential theaters of operations is desirable. Alternatives are pre-positioned stocks afloat or in intermediate support bases and/or AWR stocks assembled in tailored packages for deployment with projected forces. In areas of potential operations where port facilities are limited and requirements for SLOC exist, pre-positioning of port construction equipment and materiel is highly desirable.

**Weapons of Mass Destruction**

The use of weapons of mass destruction can have an enormous impact on the planning and conduct of CSS operations. Not only do the sheer killing and destructive power of these weapons create a battlefield effect, but the strategic, operational, psychological, and political impacts of their use affect logistical plans and operations. Further, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction dramatically alters the nature of regional conflict. As these weapons proliferate, the likelihood of their being used against friendly forces or in response to an enemy’s first use increases. The effects of these weapons on an operation—either through use or the threat of use-can cause large-scale shifts in logistical objectives, APODs/SPODs, and equipment storage sites/site selection. Thus, planning for the possibility of their use against friendly forces is critical to campaign design. See FM 3-4-1 for guidance on fixed-site protection in NBC environments.

Planners must consider the implementation of defensive NBC principles of avoidance, protection, and decontamination when planning CSS operations. See FM 3-100 for discussion of NBC principles. They must plan for effective air and ballistic missile defense with different systems for all CSS bases. Planners must assess an enemy’s willingness to employ these weapons and the conditions that would prompt him to do so. However, commanders should never assume that the enemy is rational. A virtually defeated enemy may resort to unrestricted warfare by any means at hand.

**PLANNING FOR JOINT AND MULTINATIONAL LOGISTICS**

Many Army CSS units will likely have joint and possibly multinational logistics responsibilities. Command, control, and composition of operational-level CSS units are tailored for the situation. Commanders and planners at the operational level must take maximum advantage of available HN infrastructure and contracted logistics support.

CSS planners must identify joint, multinational, or coalition logistics requirements and support that may have to be given to the host or coalition nations as quickly as possible so that scarce resources can be distributed throughout the force. The Army must be prepared to go beyond the accepted principle that logistics is a national responsibility. It must endeavor to streamline multinational efforts toward focused combat power. Complementary arrangements work best when each partner contributes national assets as they are able. The coalition or alliance coordinates these efforts. The supported CINC can establish an executive agency for specific classes of supply to meet the demands of joint and combined operations. The CSS structure, and service component logistics headquarters are essential for operational and tactical planning and execution.

Theater logistics planners must consider a theater distribution plan (Appendix C) as soon as possible. This plan shows the flow of sustainment support in the theater. The development of the distribution plan is guided by the commander’s concept of operations, the number, types, and location of in-place and incoming units to be supported, and their time-phased arrival in theater. Establishing priorities is essential. Clearly articulated priorities provide guidance at all levels and aid in ensuring that critical transportation is provided for the highest priority requirements. Planners must include Army operational- and strategic-level logistics units in early deployment flow either to provide CSS support not available to the tactical level or to support joint or multinational operations. This enables
the tactical commander to focus on his tactical mission.

**PLANNING FOR CIVILIAN PERSONNEL**

Civilian personnel have deployed in support of the military throughout history, but never to the degree that is occurring today. Civilian personnel provide essential CSS support for military operations in peacetime as well as in conflict or war.

*As we have seen throughout our history and has been dramatically underscored by Desert Shield, our civilians fulfill a vital role in our trained ready Army*

General Carl Vuono, Army Chief of Staff
November 1990

Identifying requirements to be filled by civilian personnel—government or nongovernment agency civilians and contractors—and identifying qualified personnel to fill those requirements are essential when planning for operations. Appropriate proponents must ensure that civilians are incorporated into the deliberate planning so that they are trained and ready in a timely manner. As part of his campaign plan, the CINC must plan for civilians on the battlefield and establish guidelines for how far forward civilians will be on the battlefield as conditions go from peacetime to conflict or war. Three reasons for employing civilians are that they—

- Augment military capabilities, thus freeing soldiers for other duties or duty forward.
- May be employed without a mobilization, while much of the military’s CSS is in the reserve components.
- Have technical skills that are not available in the military.

Civilian personnel, who provide essential CS and CSS roles in a theater, are a key component of the Total Army. For example, civilian members of the LSE provide national-level supply, maintenance, and technical assistance; contractors under the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) provide a wide range of field services, such as laundry and showers; and the Army/Air Force Exchange Service (AAFES) deploys civilians to run an exchange system for everyday necessities. This civilian workforce includes CONUS expansion and OCONUS requirements in support of military operations. Planners must consider designation of key civilian jobs as emergency essential to ensure critical skills are available in a crisis. Sources that can assist in providing combat support and CSS roles in a theater of operations, include—

- Department of State.
- Department of Defense (DOD).
- International nongovernment agencies (INGOs), that is, United Nations agencies and the International Red Cross.
- Private volunteer organizations,
- The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program.
- Vendors and contractors, including those of host and third nations.

**Support**

Military operations conducted within the three levels of war include the unified operations of the CINC’s theater campaign plan, joint operations of subordinates’ campaign plans, the senior Army commanders’ major operations, and battles composed of a series of engagements between opposing forces conducted at the corps level and below. In order to accomplish the mission, sustainment through the three levels of logistics applies to crisis situations across the range of military operations. The logisticians must have a clear view of this continuum as he plans, builds, tailors, and modifies the organizations that will carry the force to the conclusion of the crisis through redeployment.

**THE LEVELS OF SUPPORT**

When tailoring a support force for a particular plan or crisis response, logisticians must consider that regardless of the size of the supported force, support will move through the
logistics system to produce the sustainment needed. The three levels of logistical support—strategic, operational, and tactical—correlate to the three levels of war (see Figure 3-1).

**Strategic Logistics**

The strategic logistics system supports the attainment of broad goals and objectives established by the NCA in national security policies. The strategic—national and theater—level encompasses those political, economic, informational, and military measures that contribute to the strategic theater campaign plan and includes all actions involved in providing logistical support to a theater in the various operational areas. Among those actions are:

- Industrial base mobilization.
- Installation base support.
- Consumer logistics.
- Acquisition, preparation, maintenance, equipment, movement, medical treatment, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel.
- Intratheater strategic concentration.
- Stockpiling.
- Acquisition or construction of facilities.
- Acquisition of services.
- Host nation support.

The strategic logistics system includes special activities under DA control and the NICPs; national maintenance points (NMPs); depots, arsenals, data banks, plants, and factories associated with USAMC activities.

The strategic agencies—General Services Administration (GSA), DLA, Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), US Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM), and USAMC—receive and fill all requisitions from both forward-presence and CONUS-based deploying forces. Forward-
presence and force projection forces’ requisitions receive priority. GSA, DLA, DMA, USAMC, and US TRANSCOM review anticipated supply requirements and initiate action—increase production lines, obtain additional vendors, begin industrial base expansion and expansion of maintenance programs—to prevent forecasted shortages. See Appendix A for discussion of the national industrial base. Strategic functions are performed in CONUS, the theater base, in the JRA of the COMMZ, or are coordinated through the LSE in the COMMZ.

The strategic/operational bond of logistics in a forward-presence, force-projection strategy is at the theater level. Through the use of the LSE, this bond is seamless, with military contractors and deployed civilian employees providing support within, as well as outside, the theater of war and theater of operations. Strategically, centralized management and distribution of personnel and materiel and decentralized execution at the operational and tactical levels optimize the logistics flow.

USAMC strategic organization actions are coordinated through the LSE deployed in theater. The LSE provides limited strategic-level or other directed logistics support in the theater of operations on an interim basis. The LSE is the forward element of the national logistics base. When deployed into a theater of operations, the LSE provides limited, depot-level logistics support on an interim basis. Early deployment of the LSE will ensure a positive link from the deploying units to the national support system and may be required to fill gaps in the logistics force infrastructure or projected selected elements of the national/industrial base in the theater. The size of the LSE is determined by the missions assigned to it. The initial deployment will be for logistics assistance along with the other logistics personnel assigned to major units. The LSE does not replace capabilities provided by TOE organizations in the force structure.

Operational-Level CSS

Operational-level CSS supports the CINC’s plan in either a mature or immature theater. The theater of war base and the theater of operations forward operating bases provide strategic and operational CSS to the tactical CSS bases. Operational CSS links strategic logistics to tactical CSS on the battlefield, ensuring success at the tactical level.

Operational and tactical CSS differ by the longer planning and preparation time required to support extended operations. Operational support attempts to balance current consumption with the needs of subsequent major operations. Operational logisticians focus on establishing and maintaining LOC and sustaining the force in the theater of operations consistent with the CINC’s strategic logistics priorities. They also focus on reception of forces and the onward movement of units and personnel; planning, coordinating, managing, and directing the positioning of supply, maintenance, and field service activities; managing theater reserves; creating transportation networks and providing movement assets; and providing HSS and other support required to permit units to accomplish their mission.

At the operational level, the distinction between operations and support begins to erode. Synonymous with operations at this level of planning, support becomes a significant undertaking of the ASCC and his staff. Army commanders at the operational level must be prepared to operate in unified, joint, or multinational, and, frequently, interagency operations, for example, support of counterdrug operations.

The CINC, based on METT-T, develops an organization capable of executing CSS tasks and then directs the integration of CSS to most effectively support the campaign plan. ARFORs, previously referred to as echelons above corps (EAC), conduct operational-level responsibilities; however, tactical (corps and below) units may be required to fill this role when they are operating at the operational level of war. When this occurs, the tactical ARFORs must be augmented when they are assigned operational-level missions. Information systems enhance the process and provide in-transit and total asset visibility, allowing commanders to know the location of resources. Commanders at the operational level must establish and/or coordinate support
functions to allow tactical commanders to focus their attention on tactical-level operations rather than operational-level support activities.

**Tactical CSS**

Tactical CSS includes activities necessary to support military operations and activities that precede and follow them. The tactical logistician focuses on acquiring and providing to the using unit support required to win the tactical battles in the CZ. He continually assesses inbound operational support as well as any joint, multinational, HNS, or coalition support provided. At this level, the essential functions of supply, maintenance, transportation, technical assistance, personnel service support (PSS), and health and field services are delivered to soldiers to permit them to accomplish their particular mission. Tactical improvisation as a sustainment imperative solves the problem only if anticipated at the strategic and operational levels.

The three levels of logistics must blend together, creating a seamless system of support. The continuation of a seamless system makes the debarkation line between the levels less visible as organizations and functions interweave within each one. Figure 3-2 depicts this system.

**SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

Successful logistics must be both effective and efficient. Five characteristics—anticipation, integration, continuity responsiveness, and improvisation—facilitate effective, efficient CSS operations. Commanders and logisticians who integrate logistics concepts and operations with strategic, operational, and tactical plans must anticipate requirements. CSS operations and systems must be responsive to the commander, providing continuous support to forward-deployed forces. Finally, logisticians must improvise to expedite needed actions. These characteristics, introduced in FM 100-5, are amplified in FM 100-10.

In order to accomplish successful logistical support operations, the logistician must
continually plan for the transition from peacetime to war. Normally, CSS organizations that function in a peacetime environment are ready to quickly, smoothly, and efficiently transition to war. Without anticipatory and effective transition planning and execution, a theater cannot be sustained during war.

Sustainment is providing and maintaining the force and equipment required to accomplish national objectives. Establishing a sustainment base requires determining what is required to enable a force to achieve those objectives in a specified period of time. Generally, the logistician uses the theater CINC’s estimate of the time required for the operation to form a stockage objective. He then calculates the total logistics support required based on time, environment, type of force, and the number of troops in theater.

The initial, austere stages of contingency operations will influence the size and composition of CSS capabilities and organizations deployed. The composition of strategic lift dictates that only essential CSS capabilities be deployed early based on requirements determined during logistics preparation of the theater (LPT). The focus of early deploying CSS elements is port opening, theater reception, and theater onward movement. Even as lift catches up with demand, planners must be careful to limit the size of the entire force to that required to conduct operations. To contend with this reality, logisticians will conduct split-based operations using forward-deployed capability-based teams. Recent experience and technological advances in communications and automation have shown that some military functions do not have to be done entirely in theater. These operations are characterized by doing in the theater only selected critical tasks of the function. Split-based operations depend upon communications between the deployed module and the stay-behind elements.

The potential for the application of split-based operations to CSS functions is unlimited. Materiel management is an example. Only those personnel and equipment required to make critical management decisions on the spot need to be deployed. The remainder of the MMC can accomplish its tasks from another location so long as communications between the two elements are assured. TAV and in-transit visibility (ITV) of supplies are also required.

Support for Power Projection Operations

CSS for power projection operations is guided by the following:

• Making maximum use of all available local, HN, and regional resources; limiting supplies to essentials.
• Concentrating maintenance efforts on returning major items of equipment to service.
• Structuring follow-on forces to ensure operational CSS capability.
• Relying initially on strategic airlift for rapid resupply.
• Surface-transporting outsized equipment, armored units, and bulk supplies when possible.
• Remembering that availability of CSS capability is as important in the initial stages of deployment as in later stages.
• Fixing as far forward as capability and time permit.
• Ensuring maximum coordination with other services and DLA to minimize duplication.
• Quickly establishing priorities for materiel that will be moved via air lines of communication (ALOC).

All Army installations play a unique role by serving as power projection platforms for a largely CONUS-based army. Some launch and recover the operating force while others launch and recover the supporting and sustaining materiel, individual replacements, communications, or technology that permit the operating units to successfully carry out force projection missions. Installations must be organized to support their power projection responsibilities through training, deployment, and follow-on support. As installation missions evolve, some new programs are emerging that are designed to enhance the quality of life and improve customer services. These programs are resource multipliers and will continue to be
implemented as resources decrease and the total force is downsized. See FM 100-22 for further information.

HNS is theater- and situation-dependent. Available support depends on the geographical area, prior agreements, the friendliness of nations in the area, and the nations’ willingness and ability to provide it. In some potential theaters of operation, agreements may exist between the US and the HN; in others, no nation maybe friendly to the United States, in which case no HNS will be available—at least, not initially.

Support for Force Projection Operations

The uncertainty of where the army may conduct force projection operations makes planning more difficult than that for an established theater. However, CSS must be adequate and responsive to support the deployed force. Planning efforts must concentrate on determining required capabilities and functions and deploying forces to perform those functions. Initially, support may be austere. Theater airlift and maximum use of other air transport techniques for resupply must be planned. FM 1-100 and FM 55-10 provide detailed discussions of army logistics air transport operations.

Army pre-positioned afloat (APA), designated Army War Reserve-3 (AWR-3) APA, provides the combatant CINC with deployment flexibility and increased capability to respond rapidly to a crisis or contingency with a credible force. APA provides a forward deployed source of equipment, materiel, and sustainment aboard APA ships to support contingency operations. The APA ships are configured to equip combat, CS, and CSS units with unit-configured sets and sustainment stocks. The ships are loaded with critical weapons, equipment, and supplies common to all theaters. APA operations, which contribute mobility and flexibility to the force projection strategy, are discussed in detail in FM 100-17-1.

LOTS operations—the loading and unloading of ships without the benefit of fixed port facilities—may play a key role in initial and resupply operations, particularly for outsized cargo. FM 55-50 and FM 55-60 provide detailed discussions of LOTS and water terminal operations. A requirement may also exist for the development of expedient facilities to handle roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO), break-bulk (BB), and container ships. Joint Pub 4-01.7; FM 55-10, and FM 55-60 provide detailed information on container operations, movement, and handling in the theater of operations.

Support for a Joint Task Force

CSS provided to the deployed force and other elements of a JTF will initially be austere. CSS functions that cannot be initially performed in the theater of operations will be accomplished in an intermediate support base (ISB), afloat, in a lodgment area, or at CONUS installations. Operational CSS organizational structures will be established when the span of control or size of the augmentation force exceeds the capability of the deployed force’s CSS capability. The functional elements of operational CSS elements must deploy during the initial stages of deployment to provide interface with strategic levels. As the theater matures, capability exists under the building-block concept to expand the CSS base.

A military force is only as combat-capable as the effectiveness of the CSS it receives. Unless otherwise directed or when CSS is otherwise provided for by agreements with other services, national agencies, or allies, each service is responsible for the CSS of its own forces. However, when deployed for major operations, the services may become interdependent. The CINC may designate a service, usually the dominant user, to provide common logistics functions for the entire theater. The army component of a joint force will normally be required to provide logistics support to other service components, and it may be tasked to provide specified support to allied commands or to the HN. This may be necessary to ensure effective execution of approved operations plans (OPLANS); effectiveness and economy of operations; and prevention and duplication of facilities and overlapping functions among services.

The army, for example, may have the responsibility of providing Class I (Subsistence), Class III (POL), Class V
(Ammunition), and Class VIII (Medical). During Operation Desert Shield, when common-item support responsibilities exceeded the providing services’ capabilities, the CINC directed the support be provided totally or partially by another service, by contracting, or by obtaining HNS. HNS helped the army by providing assistance in Class I and Class III.

Support to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF)

The Army special operations theater support element (ASOTSE) plans and coordinates logistics support and sustainment for ARSOF and, when directed, other services and allied SOF. The SOTSE has no organic support infrastructure; however, under some circumstances, CS and CSS elements may be assigned or attached to the SOTSE to support and sustain theater ARSOF. See Chapter 5, FM 100-25, for more information on the SOTSE.

ARSOF Logistics Options. An integral part of the Army service component command, ARSOF depend on the theater logistics system to sustain their operations. In logistically immature theaters, ARSOF units may depend on other services. In developed theaters, the senior logistics headquarters sustains them from the theater sustainment base. ARSOF typically operate from austere bases in undeveloped theaters and on the flanks of developed theaters where no sustainment base exists. They must be prepared to provide their own support for short periods until a support base is established. ARSOF logistical capabilities vary from one organization to another. Each type of ARSOF unit depends on the theater logistics system for a different mix of direct support (DS), general support (GS), and, in some cases, even unit-level support. ARSOF planners must apply their logistics knowledge during the planning process to meet specific ARSOF needs. Logistics planners should consider support from other services, as ARSOF rarely operates in other than a joint environment. The theater logistics system makes materiel and services available at the logistics unit’s operating base. The SOTSE commander should arrange habitual support relationships between the ARSOF and the Army logistics elements providing its support on an area or unit basis.

Special Operations Support Battalion (Airborne). Logistics support to ARSOF improves dramatically with the attachment of a SO support battalion element to a SOTSE. This unit organization is a unique CSS unit designed to provide dedicated DS-level logistical support with enhanced operations security (OPSEC) to ARSOF when conventional CSS is unavailable or inappropriate. Its design is optimized for supporting ARSOF contingency operations. The unit can deploy rapidly and with low signature to support ARSOF operating from a remote or undeveloped base. There it can provide the mission-essential DS-level support normally provided to ARSOF by the direct support units (DSUs) of the supporting CSS element. It also provides interface with the general support unit (GSUs) of the senior logistics headquarters.

Nonstandard (ASOTSE) Support. ARSOF may use SO-peculiar and/or low-density items of standard and nonstandard configuration. ARSOF deal directly with the ASOTSE for SO-peculiar logistics that may be beyond ASCC logistics capabilities. These needs normally involve the resupply and maintenance of foreign, nonstandard, interagency, and SO-peculiar materiel. The SO theater support element (SOTSE) logistics planners make every effort to reduce this type of off-line support to ARSOF through their knowledge of ARSOF and anticipation of selected requirements. The method most commonly employed to anticipate requirements is thorough ARSOF unit planning. The ARSOF unit determines its statement of requirements (SOR) as it analyzes a type mission. The SOR is validated through operations channels but coordinated with the logistics planners’ channels for feasibility. Requirements not feasible must be identified early so that alternatives can be developed. The SO support battalion can provide nonstandard (SO-peculiar) support based on its unique capabilities.
Foreign Nation Support. HNS is the preferred means to meet unresourced logistics needs within acceptable risk limits. It can include almost every aspect of logistics. The SOTSE has the capability to interface with numerous foreign nation agencies able to provide SO-peculiar support in the theater.

Support to MOOTW

The United States promotes the self-development of nations through the engagement of US resources and assistance. The military, and particularly the Army, performs roles in these types of operations. The primary focus of the Army is warfighting, yet its role in MOOTW is critical. The Army is often required, in its role as a strategic force, to support, protect, and further US interests at home and abroad in a variety of ways other than war. The Army conducts MOOTW as part of a joint force and often in conjunction with multinational government agencies. MOOTW may include support to US, state, and local governments, nation assistance, disaster relief, security, and advisory assistance, technical assistance, countering drugs, antiterrorism, arms control, support to domestic civil authority, and peacekeeping operations.

Supporting MOOTW has special requirements and places special demands on the logistics system. The combatant commander must tailor CSS based on theater needs. In some cases, CSS units may be the majority of the units involved in the operation. CSS tailored for this environment should be versatile enough to expand or contract quickly as the situation dictates. These operations are normally undertaken to avert crisis after a disaster response operation or in support of diplomatic initiatives. Regardless of the level of support provided, it should not overwhelm indigenous forces or cause them to become dependent on US largesse. Support to MOOTW must be integrated with and complement HN or local resources and activities. For information on support of MOOTW, see FM 100-19 and FM 100-23.

Reconstitution

Reconstitution is an extraordinary action used to restore units to a desired level of combat effectiveness commensurate with mission requirements and available resources. No resources exist solely to perform reconstitution. Reconstitution planning and execution are proactive. During concept development, reconstitution must be an integral part of the process. Units with roles in the process train in advance to perform reconstitution tasks. Planners must consider the impact on reconstitution operations of operations in environments of weapons of mass destruction. Decontamination of NBC-contaminated units requires extensive logistics support. Planners at all levels of command should anticipate reconstitution. It is a total process whose major elements are reorganization, assessment, and regeneration.

Reorganization

Reorganization is a shift of resources within a degraded unit to restore its combat effectiveness. Immediate or deliberate, it may include such measures as—

• Providing thorough equipment decontamination support as required.
• Cross-leveling equipment and personnel.
• Matching operational weapons systems with crews.
• Forming composite units from two or more attrited elements to form a single mission-capable unit.

Assessment

Assessment measures a unit’s capability to perform its mission. Commanders assess their units before, during, and after operations. Once it is determined that a unit is no longer mission-capable, even after reorganization, the unit’s mission must be changed or removed from combat. A more thorough evaluation is then conducted to determine regeneration needs.

Regeneration

Regeneration, or rebuilding a unit, requires a large-scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies. Because of the intensive nature of regeneration, it occurs at a regeneration site after the unit disengages.

Reconstitution requires command decisions at the JTF level and extensive coordination between the corps and the operational-level
CSS units involved. Since regeneration requires large numbers of personnel and equipment, commanders must balance these needs against those in other commands.

The senior logistics headquarters, based on direction received from the senior MMC in theater, will be deeply involved in replacing equipment and supplies. Depending on the type of unit being reconstituted, any of the functional or area commands maybe required to provide personnel and equipment as directed by the AS CC. For more details on reconstitution, see FM 100-9.