Iraqi Force Development and the Challenge of Civil War

The Critical Problems and Failures the US Must Address if Iraqi Forces Are to Do the Job

Anthony H. Cordesman
Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy

March 28, 2007
Anticipate, Learn and Change versus Persist, React and Be Defeated ................................................................. 3
The Need for Comprehensive Action and Strategy ........................................................................................................ 3
The Pace of Iraqi Force Development and the Impact of Civil War ............................................................................. 5
Reacting to American Failures and Self-Inflicted Wounds ............................................................................................... 7
Honestly Addressing the Present State of Iraqi Security Forces .................................................................................... 7
A Crucial Lack of Proper Equipment ............................................................................................................................ 10
Sectarian and Ethnic Problems in the Regular Forces: A Force Never Designed to Fight Civil Conflicts and Civil War ...... 10
Figure One ...................................................................................................................................................................... 13
Ethnic and Sectarian Confidence in the Iraqi Army among Shi’ites, Sunnis, and Kurds .................................................... 13
Figure Two ...................................................................................................................................................................... 14
Ethnic and Sectarian Confidence in the Iraqi Police among Shi’ites, Sunnis, and Kurds .................................................... 14
Popular Perceptions of Iraqi Force Development ........................................................................................................... 15
Figure Three .................................................................................................................................................................... 17
Kinds of Violence Iraqis Reported as occurring Nearby and the Civil-Military Reaction in Early 2007/17 ............................... 17
Real and False Progress in Assuming Leadership in Field Operations ............................................................................. 18
Figure Four ...................................................................................................................................................................... 20
MOD Forces’ Assessed Capabilities ............................................................................................................................... 20
Figure 5 ............................................................................................................................................................................. 22
Iraqi Army and National Police with Lead Responsibility for Counter Insurgency Operations in Their Areas .................. 22
ISF Motivation Problems .................................................................................................................................................. 22
Success and Failure by Force Element ............................................................................................................................ 23
Rushing Force Development In Ways That Can Do As Much Harm as Good .................................................................... 25
Prime Minister Maliki’s New Force Initiative .................................................................................................................. 25
The “Surge” and Plans to Increase Iraqi Forces ................................................................................................................ 27
Pushing Iraqi Force Development at an Unrealistic Pace .................................................................................................... 28
The Challenge of Force Transformation .......................................................................................................................... 28
Iraqi Force Development if Things Go Well ..................................................................................................................... 29
Iraqi Force Development if Things Go Badly ..................................................................................................................... 30
Looking Ahead ................................................................................................................................................................. 31
APPENDIX ONE: IRAQI FORCE DEVELOPMENT – A GRAPHIC SUMMARY ................................................................. 33
Trained and Equipped Manpower for Major Branches of MOD and MOI Forces: July 2005 to March 2007......................... 33
Iraqi Army Battalions in Combat: August 2004-February 2007 ....................................................................................... 34
Iraqi Army Battalions “leading” Counterinsurgency Operations: January 2006-February 2007* ........................................ 37
MOI Manning Levels: August 2005 to February 2007* ................................................................................................. 38
MOI National Police Forces’ Assessed Capabilities ........................................................................................................ 39
Funding Dedicated to the Training and Equipping of the ISF .............................................................................................. 40
Iraqi Security Forces Appropriations* .............................................................................................................................. 41
Iraqi Security Forces Appropriations Through FY 2008* ................................................................................................ 42
Iraq is already in a state of limited civil war, and may well be escalating to the level of a major civil conflict. What began as a small resistance movement centered on loyalists to the Ba’ath and Saddam Hussein has expanded to include neo-Salafi Sunni terrorism, become a broadly based Sunni insurgency, and now a series of broader sectarian and ethnic conflict.

The current combination of Sunni Neo-Salafi extremist insurgency, Sunni Arab versus Shi’ite Arab sectarian conflict, Shi’ite versus Shi’ite power struggles, and Arab versus Kurdish ethnic conflict could easily cause the collapse of the current political structure. In the best case, it could lead to a Shi’ite or Shi’ite-Kurdish dominated government, with strong local centers of power, and an ongoing fight with Iraq’s Sunnis. In the worst case, it could escalate to the break up of the country, far more serious ethnic and sectarian conflict, or violent paralysis. It has already led to widespread ethnic cleansing in urban areas by militias and death squads of all three major ethnic and religious groups.

If Iraq is to avoid a split and full-blown civil war, it must do far more than create effective Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). No such effort can succeed without an integrated strategy to forge a lasting political compromise between its key factions: Arab-Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurd – while protecting other minorities. Political conciliation must also address such critical issues as federalism and the relative powers of the central and regional governments, the role of religion in politics and law, control over petroleum resources and export revenues, the definition of human rights, and a host of other issues.

**Anticipate, Learn and Change versus Persist, React and Be Defeated**

From the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 to the present, the US has failed to implement a realistic or self-critical approach to policies and actions in Iraq. It is unclear that it could have succeeded under the best of circumstance, and one of its most critical failures has been to consistently deny the fact it was pursuing a high-risk effort in nation building and stability operations that could easily fail.

In practice, the US has neither anticipated the problems it had to solve or rapidly learned and adapted to the emerging realities in Iraq. Its national security leadership became a self-inflicted wound, and the US lurched from delayed response to response, always reacting too slowly and in a state of quasi-denial.

The strategy to stabilize Iraq that the US announced in the fall of 2005 was deeply flawed in timing and resources. It was based on a grossly exaggerated estimate of political success, an almost deliberately false exaggeration of the success of the economic aid effort and progress in developing the ISF, inadequate efforts to develop effective governance, and a rule of law, and has not succeeded.

The US plan that began to be implemented in the spring of 2006 to concentrate security efforts on Baghdad, to build up Iraqi security forces, and to “clear, hold and build” did not led to a decrease in violence. Insurgents and militias were able to step up attacks during Ramadan, and the number of attacks and of casualties in Baghdad rose.

**The Need for Comprehensive Action and Strategy**

It is far from clear whether the new approach to the “Battle of Baghdad” announced by President Bush in January, 2007 marks a realistic change or a half-measure that will not stave off failure.
What is clear is that the US cannot secure either Baghdad or Iraq without effective Iraqi security forces.

No strategy that hinges solely on the successful development of the ISF can succeed. Iraq must establish both effective governance and a rule of law; not simply deploy effective military, security, and police forces. Legitimacy does not consist of determining how governments are chosen, but in how well they serve the day-to-day needs of their peoples. Security cannot come through force alone. It must have the checks and balances that can only come when governments and courts are active in the field.

Iraq must also address its economic and demographic challenges if its people are to support its government and reject sectarian and ethnic violence. Iraq cannot achieve stability, however, unless its people have a reasonable degree of both physical and economic security. A nation cannot convert from a corrupt, state-controlled “command kleptocracy” in mid-war. It cannot achieve lasting peace unless it makes such a conversion over time and puts an end to a hopelessly skewed and unfair distribution of income, ends full and partial unemployment levels of 30-60%, and becomes competitive on a regional and global level.

The present reality is that progress in Iraq is still slow or faltering in each of the other areas necessary to make Iraqi force development successful:

- **Politics:** The election in late 2005 effectively divided Iraqis by sect and ethnic group, with only a small minority voting for truly national parties. No clear national party structure has emerged since that time. The Shi’ite parties increasingly demonstrate the rivalry between the three main Shi’ite parties, while seeking to dominate the nation at the expense of the Sunnis. The Kurds reflect more unity but conflicts exist over “independence,” dealing with the PKK, and past tensions between the PUK and KDP. Sunnis are just beginning to acquire a true political identity and the two main Sunni parties are divided and divisive.

- **The Role of the Constitution:** The creation of a new constitution has done nothing to establish consensus and has done much to divide the nation. It leaves more than 50 areas to be clarified, all of which involve potentially divisive debates between sectarian and ethnic groups, and most of which could lead to added tensions over the role of religion in the state.

- **Political conciliation:** Iraq’s leaders still seek national unity and compromise, but talk has not been followed by substance. Prime Minister Maliki’s conciliation plans have not taken hold, and the new government has not shown it can implement such plans or bring Arab Sunnis back into an effective political structure. While Muqtada Sadr has not reacted to the new US strategy by encouraging armed resistance, he appears to be losing control over the more radical parts of the Mahdi Army. Progress in key areas like the revision of the constitution and implementation of an “oil law” has been grindingly slow. ReBa’atification and local elections have not occurred. The status of Kurdish autonomy, and federalism remain unresolved.

- **Governance:** The national government cannot even spend its development budget; much less demonstrate that it now has an effective ministerial structure or the ability to actually govern in many areas. Actual governance continues to default to regional and local authorities and factions, and cannot follow up effectively on Coalition and ISF victories even in Baghdad.

- **Security.** Most Iraqis either lack day-t-day security or depend on local militias and security forces. The Iraqi Army continues to have real-world priority over the development of the Iraqi police, and the much-heralded “year of the police” in 2006 produced little progress at the local level.

- **Legal system and rule of law:** There is no real nation-wide consensus on what legal system to use, courts do not exist in many areas and are corrupt and ineffective in many others. Legal authority, like governance, is devolving down to the local level.
• **Economic Development:** Increases in macroeconomic figures like the total GDP disguise massive problems with corruption, the distribution of income, and employment, particularly in troubled Sunni areas and the poorer parts of Iraq’s major towns and cities. Young men are often forced to choose between the ISF, insurgency, and militias for purely economic reasons. The real-world economy of Sunni areas continues to deteriorate, and investment in even secure Shi’ite areas is limited by the fear of crime and insurgency. Only the Kurdish area is making real progress towards development.

• **Aid:** Iraq has largely spent the flood of US and other aid provided after the fall of Saddam as well as its oil food money. Large portions of this aid have been spent on corruption, outside contractors and imports, security, and projects with poor planning and execution, which now are unsustainable. Iraq will, however, desperately need major future aid to construct and develop if it can achieve political conciliation and security. The US committed $20.8 billion of $20.9 billion in aid funds as of February 13, 2007. It had obligated $20.2 billion, and spent $17.1 billion. The US continues to be unable to properly staff its PRTs or any aspect of its aid effort with adequate numbers of civilian experts, and security and transport are lacking for effective aid operations in many areas.

• **Energy and Oil:** Iraq continued to produce less than 2.5 million barrels of oil per day and exported well under 2 million barrels a day. It was dependent on imported fuel and gasoline for more than 50% of its total needs. No major rehabilitation of Iraq’s oil fields and facilities has taken place. Waterflooding and heavy oil injection continued to be major problems, and the ability to recover oil from producing fields average less than two-thirds of the world average.

Many Iraqis still have hope for the future in spite of these problems, and still have a strong sense of national identity. The pressures that divide Iraqis, however, continue to increase and civil strife and tension continue to grow.

**The Pace of Iraqi Force Development and the Impact of Civil War**

Progress in the development of Iraqi security forces is difficult to gauge because so much US reporting simply cannot be trusted. Rather than provide realistic plans to win a “long war,” US reporting grossly exaggerates progress, ignores or understates real-world problems, and promises unrealistic timelines.

The US Defense Department has stopped releasing detailed unclassified material about Iraqi Army, Police, and Border Enforcement readiness and manning levels, only giving information about how many units are “ready and equipped” and “in the lead.” These are vague, if not meaningless categories – “in the lead” does not indicate the level of independence from US support, and we do not how many “ready and equipped” soldiers quit or deserted the force.

There are very real success, and positive trends in the regular Iraqi Army. Even here, however, US military personnel who train or operate with Iraqi units give mixed anecdotal assessments of their quality. There are numerous stories of abuse, corruption, and mixed loyalties, just as well as of individual courage, commitment, and success.

Some individual units said to be “in the lead” are described as highly capable and politically neutral, while others were blatantly partisan, ineffective, burnt out, tied to local mission and loyalties, or had high desertion rates that effectively disbanded the unit. There seemed to be a consensus among trainers that several years of a continued US security force training effort was vital in order to achieve some semblance of stability in Iraq, but also that it would still take years to succeed with a meaningful political compromise between sects and factions.

Some Iraqis are truly motivated. Most are not, but are asked to fight as if they were truly motivated to support the national government rather than signed up to earn a living and survive. As was the case with the ARVN in Vietnam, their advisors often are not trained and lack the
language skills to monitor pay, equity in promotion, conditions in quarters, food supply, and the other material conditions critical to real world morale and motivation. Many advisors choose to ignore the reality of sectarian and ethnic differences and motivation, do not track why Iraqi personnel actually go on leave, and do not monitor family conditions or attitudes towards military personnel in their home areas.

Serious problems in leadership by inexperienced and/or inadequate Iraqi officers and NCOs are downplayed or ignored. These problems are compounded by a US command ethic whose de facto impact is to seek good news, and not receive bad news, from embeds and the advisory teams.

In many cases, Iraqi combat troops are asked to take on an unfamiliar concept of maintenance and support at the same time. They lack the experience to maintain their weapons and equipment, and lack the in unit capability and outside support to do so, A flood forward and replacement oriented military culture is asked to sustain its equipment as if it were Western or American.

Coupled to ongoing pay problems, corruption, lack of adequate facilities and equipment, lack of proper medical care, lack of proper support for families, and death and disability payments, the end result will often be to the poverty and unemployment of Iraqi young men, and create major effectiveness, desertion, morale and motivation, and future retention problems.

The end result is sometimes to use up unready or over-committed units in spite of adding US embeds and partner units. Men who did not volunteer for demanding combat missions, particularly in complex sectarian or ethnic environments or outside their home areas are being pushed into combat. They often have poor facilities, equipment and weapons that are sharply inferior to their US counterparts, are at least partly excluded from the command and intelligence loops to preserve security. They are treated as second best or unreliable partners.

Widespread Shi’ite militia infiltration continues throughout the ISF, especially in the National Police and regular police force. Militias also intimidate individual members of the security forces to secure their cooperation or at least forestall action against them. Mixed loyalties not only existed at the level of individual policemen or officers, but also inside the relevant ministries.

This situation has grown worse since late 2006. Statements by President Bush and Prime Minister Maliki, and the impact of the US election, seem to have accelerated US scheduling and allied withdrawal, and expanding Iraqi forces, become a political necessity. It seems to be the only way for the US to stay for a significant period, and the only way to make an Iraqi takeover seem credible. Little about Iraqi performance in the field, however, indicates that the army, security forces, and police are “75% complete” as some US spokesmen had claimed in talking about an 18-24 month time period for a full scale shift of responsibility to Iraqi forces. A realistic timeframe is closer to 3 to 5 years.

In short, the number and quality of Iraqi security forces has increased, but critical problems remain in terms of manpower, troop quality, discipline, and equipment, that will take at least three to five more years to solve. Most importantly, the improvement in Iraqi forces has not yet led to increased security, and the current effort cannot be accelerated or surged in ways that allow the US to make a rapid and successful withdrawal of its forces.
Reacting to American Failures and Self-Inflicted Wounds

US politicians and commanders are being forced to rethink their entire course of action for securing the country. President Bush announced a new strategy for Iraq on January 10th, 2007, centering on a short-term “surge” of American troops to Baghdad and Anbar province.

This “surge” strategy, combined with the new “Gated Communities” counterinsurgency operational plan for Baghdad employed by General Petraeus, may bring a temporary drop in violence. However, without a much more intense and realistic ISF development effort, combined with political conciliation among Iraq’s major powers, the “surge” may fail.

The latest strategy, however, focuses so much on Baghdad that even “victory” leaves open the question of what strategy – if any – the US has for dealing with Iraq as a nation or for taking effective action even if its “surge” strategy wins in Baghdad.

More money, manpower, and patience will not be enough to pull Iraq back from the brink without a new and more realistic strategy for shaping and integrating US, allied, and Iraqi efforts. The US mid-term elections are simply a confirmation of this need to make major changes in US policy towards Iraq that has been acknowledged by the replacement of Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld with Robert Gates.

The wrong kind of change, however, can simply make defeat a certainty, increase risk, and help force events to spiral out of control. The demand by some Democrats to pressure the Iraqi government into fostering compromise and conciliation by drawing down troop levels is gathering momentum, but the ISF simply is not ready to take such missions and it is far easier to force Iraq’s leaders to divide along sectarian and ethnic lines that force compromise on a fractured political structure and society. Encouraging federation and separation may well have the same effect.

Setting realistic goals for the ISF development effort means understanding the need to make today’s forces effective before any major expansion, to correct drastic past mistakes in developing the police and rushing Iraqi army forces into the field. More time is needed, not less. Moreover, no form of US military action and Iraqi force development can succeed without Iraqi political success and some major new approach to providing economic aid, helping Iraq develop effective governance, and creating a rule of law and criminal justice system.

The end result is growing tension between three at least partly conflicting imperatives: the wish to draw down US troop levels rather quickly, the need to exert political pressure on the main political players in Iraq, and the need for continuing high force levels to provide security so the slow political process and force training effort can take place. How these conflicting forces will play out remains to be seen.

Honestly Addressing the Present State of Iraqi Security Forces

The effort to create effective Iraqi military, national security and police forces has been marginally more successful than Iraq political and economic efforts, but scarcely the level of success the US planned even at the beginning of 2006. It is also far less successful than the Department of Defense has claimed, and has been presented in recent testimony to Congress. It is never clear whether the problem is “spin,” the search for political advantage, the desire to avoid seeing the US accept defeat, or self-deception. The reality is, however, that virtually nothing the US officially says about Iraqi force development can now be taken at face value, and
the lack of integrity in virtually every aspect of MNF-I reporting on ISF force development has become a tragic disgrace.

The US has reported Iraqi manning levels based on the number of men it has trained and equipped that bear no resemblance to the actual manning levels of men that are still in service. It has claimed that Iraqi units are in the lead that in fact have little or no real operational capability or activity, mixing units that reflect very real mission capability with ones that are failed force elements that should actually be assigned the lowest levels of readiness. It has mixed real transfers of responsibility to effective Iraqi forces with cosmetic, politically motivated transfers to Iraqi commands and units that cannot perform such missions and often are dependent on US armor, artillery, airpower, logistics and service support, and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (IS&R).

While over 320,000 men have been trained and equipped since the fall of Saddam Hussein, a large percentage has since left and deserted, substantial numbers have been killed and wounded, and some 10-20% of those who remain are absent at any given time because they leave to take care of their families and transfer their pay in a country where there is no meaningful banking system. The Iraqi regular forces and National Police may only be about 20-25% short of the totals reported for trained and equipped manpower, but the percentages could be much higher. There certainly are many battalion elements with manning levels well under 50%, and many units with critical shortages of officers and NCOs.

The shortfalls in actual strength versus "trained and equipped" figures for the regular police and Facilities Protection Force are much larger, probably well in excess of 30% of the total of men reported as trained and equipped and possibly on the order of 50% -- although so many phantom men, absentees, and inert but manned units exist that any estimates are difficult to impossible. Many units are clearly so badly manned that they are phantom or hollow forces, but the Department of Defense has reported that there is no accurate way to track the total, and anecdotal data are far less reliable than for the regular forces.

Furthermore, such manpower totals would be highly misleading even if they had some shred of credibility. Some units actually have excess manpower, while others have far more serious shortfalls than the average. Units may have adequate total manpower, but be critically short of officers and/or NCOs. Without a break out of manpower that also shows officers and NCOs on hand, total manning data provides little insight into force capability, the time needed to make Iraqi forces effective or for units to replace US and other MNF-I forces, and it is generally more misleading than useful.

The challenges Iraq faces are further complicated by the fact that all Iraqi forces, including the army, were recruited and equipped to serve locally in limited defensive roles, not act as mobile forces trained and equipped to act as active combat units deployable throughout the country to deal with insurgency and civil conflict. This means the recruiting base must now be changed, new pay and arrangements are needed to create a nationally deployable force, and new equipment and facilities will be need for the deployable units thrust into more serious combat.

The Iraqi MOD forces (Iraqi Army, Air Force, Navy, Special Operations, and Support forces) have performed better than MOI forces, on the whole. Partially in response to this development, the Defense Department announced in 2007 that “Iraqi Ministry of Interior (MoI) forces will be trained and equipped like MoD forces.”
In an effort to better tailor the ISF to fight the insurgency, on October 10, 2006, the Prime Minister approved the implementation of the national counter-terrorism capability concept. This concept is scheduled to reach “Full Operational Capability” by December 2007. According to the DoD, “Full Operational Capability” consists of:

- Development of a national Bureau of Counter-Terrorism, separate from the ministries, that serves as the principal advisor to the prime minister on counterterrorism matters
- Establishment of a coherent, nonsectarian, counter-terrorism “tiering” strategy that determines the level of the terrorist threat, assigns appropriate responsibility for action, and defines approval authority for execution; this strategy was established as part of the overall counter-terrorism concept
- Establishment of a separate major command, equivalent to the ground, air, and naval forces commands, that provides support to the Bureau of Counter-Terrorism in intelligence and targeting areas.

There is a broad recognition that progress in creating effective National Police, regular police, and facilities protection forces falls far short of the required minimum. For all of the variations on “win,” “hold,” and “build,” it is brutally clear that a combination of US, allied, and Iraq Army troops can still “win,” but the various police and security forces are too weak, corrupt, and factional to “hold” and cannot provide the continuing security in even moderate risk areas to allow Iraqi government officials and aid workers to “build.” The Iraqi government and US still have only one-third of the security capabilities they need to implement an effective strategy and these problems are compounded by crime, corruption, a lack of effective courts and the instruments that create a rule of law.

Even the Iraq Army, however, is a weak tool being put under far too much pressure. In all too many cases, the US has rushed Iraqi battalions and force elements into being and then into combat before they are ready, effectively undercutting the Iraqi force development process and sometimes gravely weakening fledgling Iraqi units that are not ready to perform such missions. It often has used US advisors and embedded training teams that also are not ready for their missions. They are supposed to perform, compounding the problems inherent in creating new units.

Other problems come from trying to use force elements built for local defense missions on a national level and in far more demanding forms of counterinsurgency warfare and civil conflict missions than they were recruited for and designed to fight. There are additional problems with corruption, nepotism, creating sufficient junior officers and NCOs, and providing the levels of firepower, mobility, and communications Iraqi forces really need. Hollow units do not learn by being thrust prematurely into combat; they are crippled or wasted.

At the level of officers and NCOs, the options are ultimately political conciliation and compromise, division by sect or ethnicity with a strong risk of creating separate Shi‘ite or Sunni force, or a coup or strong man. The same is true of other ranks in both the regular forces and police. All desperately need an effective pay system and enough income to resist corruption and infiltration? All need family support and adequate means of getting pay to their families. Medical services are critical; so are real-world death and disability benefits. No effort that is not founded on pay and benefits, rather than leadership and motivation, can possibly succeed.

Similarly, it is impossible to treat all Iraqi forces as if they are or can be truly national and could be deployed on a national level. Some units do behave in this manner, and many more can be created over time. The fact is, however, that most Iraqi regulars were recruited for local defense and far less demanding missions. Most police are local, and will be driven by local interest and
political conditions. The local role of militias and various non-“national” security forces cannot be ignored, and must somehow be integrated into the ISF structure or given incentives to disband. No ISF effort can succeed that does not explicitly recognize these realities.

**A Crucial Lack of Proper Equipment**

The MOD has begun to increase its armored forces, but its efforts fall far behind need – a fact made all too clear by the constant increases in the US army and Marine Corps effort to uparmor US forces. These problems have been made worse by mismanagement and corruption.

In June 2005, for example, the MoD ordered 98 BTR-80UP armored personnel carriers (APC) from Poland. The deal was delayed a year, and the first of the vehicles began to arrive in September 2006. Most of the BTR-80UP’s will be delivered in a basic APC configuration. Iraq will also receive some specially modified BTR-80UP’s, including: command vehicles for battalion commander (BTR-80UP-KB), command vehicles for company commander (BTR-80UP-KR), staff vehicles (BTR-80UP-S), armored ambulances (BTR-80UP-A), reconnaissance vehicles (BTR-80UP-R), cargo vehicles (BTR-80UP-T), and armored maintenance/recovery vehicles (BTR-80UP-BREM). 4

Compounding this problem is the extensive corruption endemic in Iraqi government, which has forced Iraq to expand the use of “total package” military procurements. 5 A large $400 million deal to procure Russian helicopters from a Polish contractor in 2004 and 2005 turned out to be corrupt. Many of the helicopters that did arrive were more than 25 years old and not air-worthy. The Iraqi government then renegotiated the deal, to bring in 28 new MI-17 Russian helicopters. The Four MI-17’s that had arrived by February 2007, however, were missing key onboard systems that allowed the helicopters to perform combat missions. They were restricted to training missions in friendly airspace only.

Reports of under-equipped Iraqi soldiers are common. One reporter noted in February 2007, that Iraqi soldiers manning checkpoints in Baghdad wore plastic shower sandals instead of army boots. 6 Iraqi officers have even been accused of selling the very uniforms their men were supposed to be issued.

What may be even more serious -- as the US considers efforts to accelerate Iraqi force development -- is the lack of any clear plan to provide heavier forces, and the honest recognition that the US will almost certainly have to fund this effort initially and for some years to come. If the US wants out of Iraq in a way that produces lasting regional stability, then armor, artillery, mobility, IS&R, close air support, and a large range of support assets must come in. Despite assurances from General Casey that Iraq’s security forces will be equipped by the end of 2007, the Iraqi government is not yet ready to manage such efforts, and Iraq cannot fund them. A long-range strategy, plan, and aid funds are critical. If they exist, they exist in remarkable silence.

**Sectarian and Ethnic Problems in the Regular Forces: A Force Never Designed to Fight Civil Conflicts and Civil War**

Sectarian issues are less serious in the regular military forces under MoD control than in the MOI forces, but still presented a broad set of problems. According to the Director of National Intelligence’s February 2006 report, many elements of the Iraqi security forces remain loyal to sectarian and party interests. 7

Sectarian divisions within the armed forces reflect the fact many units were created along geographic lines. Sunnis, Shi’ites and Kurds mostly served in geographic areas familiar to their
groups. These divisions were even more notable at the battalion level, where battalion commanders tended to command only soldiers of their own sectarian or regional backgrounds.

According to the Brookings Institution's Iraq Index, Sunnis made up less than 10 percent of the existing forces in 2006. Ed O'Connell, a senior analyst with the Rand Corp., said that the Iraqi military was chiefly built along sectarian lines. He added: "There have been recent efforts to recruit the Sunni, but no one wants to die, so that has been largely unsuccessful." 8

Due to greater military experience among Sunnis and Kurds, these groups are over-represented in senior leadership positions. Shi’ites were adequately represented at the battalion level, but less so at higher echelons. The reason was primarily the military experience required for higher levels of command, which a greater number of Sunnis and Kurds had earned in the old regime’s army and the Peshmerga, respectively.

While the nationally recruited divisions are more representative of Iraq’s ethno-religious composition, the even-numbered divisions were originally formed as National Guard units, to be deployed in their respective local regions. These units continued to be more ethnically and religiously representative of their region, not of Iraq as a whole.9

More broadly, the Army has shown little overall willingness to become actively involved halting Iraq’s civil fighting through early 2007, although a few force elements performed well in such missions in Baghdad during the summer and fall of 2006. Like all Iraqi forces, the Army was never recruited, trained, or equipped to fight sectarian and ethnic forces in civil conflict, or intervene in civil war and local civil clashes. If a major civil war does occur, or the country divides along sectarian and ethnic lines, Iraqi regular forces could divide as well. They could fragment even further if the Shi’ite coalition divides, or the Shi’ites and Kurds divide.

A battalion commander with the 1st brigade, 6th Iraqi Army Division, Maj. Hussein al-Qaisi, said government officials often called him when he tried to arrest suspected high-ranking militia leaders, Sunni as well as Shi’ite. Al-Qaisi, stationed in Baghdad, said: “Sometimes they’ll back them up no matter what. We have to let them go.” 10

Iraqis are not alone in detecting mixed loyalties in Shi’ite Iraqi army units. Lt. Col Edward Taylor, embedded with the Iraqi Army’s 6th Division in Baghdad, reported that: “I have to operate under the assumption that within this unit there are people loyal to Jaish al-Mahdi [known in the US as the Mahdi Army]. I have to make that assumption so I have the proper security measures in place to protect my soldiers.” 11

During January 2007 operations in Turki, east of Baghdad, US commanders, fearful of leaks, kept operational details from Iraqi army units until the last minute. Although this measure may have increased operational security, it didn’t allow Iraqi units much time to prepare: “I didn’t have time to organize supplies, vehicles or ammunition for the soldiers” reported one Iraqi company commander.12

There were reports of US soldiers complaining about their Iraqi counterparts as being “among the worst they’ve ever seen” during combined US and Iraqi army operations in Baghdad in the summer and fall of 2006. Their loyalties appeared unclear as they let militiamen pass checkpoints unhindered during raids and allowed barriers and concertina wire meant to bolster defensive positions to be dragged away. Even the notification of the senior officer at the checkpoint by US troops did not help. US military advisor Lt. Col. Greg Watt attributed this behavior to sectarian loyalties:
From my perspective, you can’t make a distinction between Iraq army Shi’ites and the religious militias. You have a lot of soldiers and family members swayed and persuaded by the religious leadership. (...) There’s no doubt in my mind that (an Iraqi division commander in Baghdad) has soldiers who are followers of religious leaders. Are they loyal to the division commander? Yes. But they may be loyal to both.

He added that another problem was violence against Iraqi soldiers when they were off duty, and threats against their families.13

Lt. Col. Avanulas Smiley, a battalion commander in Baghdad, commented on local police acting on tribal or political loyalties:

“I wouldn’t say I find it often, but I suspect it often. You can’t always prove it. And that can cause some frustration on the street with soldiers.”

Another example of the operational effects of sectarian allegiances in the Iraqi Army took place in Baquba in October 2006. The security situation in the religiously mixed city apparently deteriorated when the Fifth Iraqi Army Division staged raids that led to the arrest of 400 people, nearly all Sunni Arabs. (Note that this is an odd-numbered division, which were supposed to be more representative of Iraq’s population than their even-numbered counterparts) Local Sunni leaders believed this showed the division’s bias against Sunnis and that they were singled out while Shi’ite criminals had been ignored. Subsequently, local Sunni and Shi’ite groups put out calls for help, and fighters from the Shi’ite Jaish al-Mahdi militia as well as Sunni groups, including Al Qa’ida elements, moved into the area.14

At the same time, many Shi’ite leaders clearly believed by mid 2006 that the violence in Baghdad was rooted in the Sunni attempt to regain power through violence, and that Shi’ite militias and revenge killings were an inevitable response. These beliefs raise doubts about the loyalties of the Shi’ite dominated ISF. Sunnis, on the other hand, often believed that the Shi’ite-dominated ISF serves only Shi’ite interests. According to one Sunni resident of violence plagued Sunni neighborhood in Baghdad: “People were disgusted and were enraged by the activity of the security forces.”15

As seen in Figures One and Two, the level of confidence in the Iraqi Army varies according to ethnic group. Sunnis had far less confidence in the ISF than Shi’ites or Kurds. This is at least partially due to the widespread perception that the ISF is composed of and sympathetic to the interests of Shi’ites and Kurds.
Figure One

Ethnic and Sectarian Confidence in the Iraqi Army among Shi’ites, Sunnis, and Kurds

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shi’ite</th>
<th>Kurd</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A great deal of confidence in the Army</td>
<td>0.09</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A lot of confidence in the Army</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very much confidence in the Army</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No confidence in the Army</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Figure Two

Ethnic and Sectarian Confidence in the Iraqi Police among Shi’ites, Sunnis, and Kurds

Popular Perceptions of Iraqi Force Development

These sectarian and ethnic divisions also provide an important perspective on Iraqi force development. The US and MNF-I are seeking to develop effective forces. The battle in Iraq, however, is as much one to end civil conflict as it is to defeat the insurgency, and Iraq popular attitudes towards both Iraqi and US forces become very different when they are related to the violence that shapes day-to-day life in Iraq. The MNF-I, US and Iraqi government statistics on violence in Iraq fail to make a serious effort to estimate threats, kidnappings, woundings, intimidation, or sectarian and ethnic crimes. These ‘lower’ forms of violence have become far more common in Iraq than killings, and represent the bulk of the real-world challenge to the ISF.

An ABC News poll conducted in February and March 2007 found that,\(^\text{16}\)

Widespread violence, torn lives, displaced families, emotional damage, collapsing services, an ever-starker sectarian chasm – and a draining away of the underlying optimism that once prevailed. Violence is the cause, its reach vast. Eighty percent of Iraqis report attacks nearby – car bombs, snipers, kidnappings, and armed forces fighting each other or abusing civilians. It’s worst by far in the capital, Baghdad, but by no means confined there. The personal toll is enormous. More than half of Iraqis, 53 percent, have a close friend or relative who’s been hurt or killed in the current violence. One in six says someone in their own household has been harmed. Eighty-six percent worry about a loved one being hurt; two-thirds worry deeply. Huge numbers limit their daily activities to minimize risk. Seven in 10 report multiple signs of traumatic stress.

The poll found that while In 2005, 63 percent of Iraqis said they felt very safe in their neighborhoods in 2005, only 26 percent had said this in early 2007. One in three did not feel safe at all. In Baghdad, home to a fifth of the country’s population, eighty-four percent feel entirely unsafe. Even outside of Baghdad, just 32 percent of Iraqis felt “very safe” where they lived, compared with 60 percent a year and a half ago.\(^\text{17}\)

Nationally, 12 percent of all Iraqis surveyed reported that ethnic cleansing – the forced separation of Sunnis and Shiites – has occurred in their neighborhoods. In mixed-population Baghdad, it’s 31 percent. This is not desired: In rare agreement, 97 percent of Sunni Arabs and Shiites alike oppose the separation of Iraqis on sectarian lines. Nonetheless, one in seven Iraqis overall – rising to a quarter of Sunni Arabs, and more than a third of Baghdad residents – said they themselves have moved homes in the last year to avoid violence or religious persecution.

As security conditions have worsened, so have expectations for future improvement in the conditions of life – an especially troubling result, since hopes for a better future can be the glue that holds a struggling society together. In 2004 and 2005 alike, for example, three-quarters of Iraqis expected improvements in the coming year in their security, schools, availability of jobs, medical care, crime protection, clean water and power supply. Today only about 30 to 45 percent still expect any of these to get any better.

The ABC poll asked about nine kinds of violence that broke the security problems Iraqis and ISF forces faced into far more detail than the Coalition and US have ever publicly reported (car bombs, snipers or crossfire, kidnappings, fighting among opposing groups or abuse of civilians by various armed forces). These results are reflected in Figure Three.

Most Iraqis in Baghdad said at least one of these had occurred nearby; half reported four or more of them. Some 53 percent of Iraqis said a close friend or immediate family member had been hurt in the current violence. That ranged from three in 10 in the
Kurdish provinces to nearly eight in 10 in Baghdad. Even outside Baghdad, 74 percent reported at least one form of violence, and 25 percent reported four or more (34 percent excluding the Kurdish area, which was far more peaceful than the country overall.)

What is equally striking, however, is what Figure Three reveals about Iraqi perceptions of US, Iraqi Army, and police forces. It is clear that with the exception of the people in the Kurdish zone many Iraqis see all of the forces deployed as guilty of unnecessary violence, and this is especially true in Baghdad. The source data for the poll also show a strong correlation between force activity and the perception of unnecessary violence. These same trends emerge when Iraqis are asked what they try to avoid to improve their security. While the US and Iraqi government may focus on force development to defeat the insurgency and control civil violence, Iraqis seem such forces as a major civil-military problem and a serious threat to their daily security.
**Figure Three**

**Kinds of Violence Iraqis Reported as Occurring Nearby and the Civil-Military Reaction in Early 2007**

(In percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Violence Encountered</th>
<th>All</th>
<th>Baghdad</th>
<th>Kurdistan</th>
<th>Rest of Iraq</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kidnappings for ransom</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gov’t/anti-gov’t fighting</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Car bombs, suicide attacks</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Snipers, crossfire</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>*</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectarian fighting</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Perceive Unnecessary Violence by:** (Percent reporting)

| U.S./coalition forces        | 44%  | 59%     | 9%        | 47%          |
| Local militia                | 31%  | 44%     | 2%        | 32%          |
| Iraqi police                 | 24%  | 44%     | 1%        | 22%          |
| Iraqi Army                   | 24%  | 44%     | 0%        | 22%          |
| Any of these                 | 80%  | 100%    | 12%       | 86%          |
| Four or more of these        | 37%  | 70%     | 1%        | 34%          |
| Friend/family member harmed  | 53%  | 77%     | 29%       | 49%          |

**Focus of Efforts to Avoid Violence:** (Percent who try to avoid)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All</th>
<th>Sunni</th>
<th>Shiite</th>
<th>Kurdish</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>U.S./coalition forces</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>95%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passing through checkpoints</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passing by police stations/public buildings</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Markets/crowds</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Travel</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leaving home</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Going to/applying for work</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sending children to school</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Real and False Progress in Assuming Leadership in Field Operations

As the number of Iraqi units has grown, they have played a steadily a larger and more important role in field operations, but with far less real world success and independence than the Department of Defense has claimed in its reports and testimony to Congress. Far too many of such claims have been more cosmetic than real. Many units “in the lead” have demonstrated little or no real mission responsibility or capability, and were extremely dependent on MNF-I command, planning, and support. In practice, they could only act under the leadership of embedded advisors and/or in cooperation with partner units. Moreover, the US ceased to report on the readiness of the units involved in any way that related to their real-world mission readiness and performance. The good were lumped together with the mediocre, bad, and inactive.

The MNF-I’s refusal to tie its reporting to real-world unit effectiveness has led it to report that a total of 5 Iraqi Army divisions, 25 brigades, and 85 battalions and 2 National Police battalions had assumed the lead responsibility for their respective areas of operation by August 7, 2006. By this time the Iraqi Army was said to have a total strength 106 combat battalions. There were eight Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs) at varying levels of capability with another three combat battalions in the process of forming. The SIBs and other enabling units were seen to be critical for improving the overall quality and independence of the Iraqi forces. Given the fact, outside experts were reported that as few as 10 battalions were effective in late November 2006, such reports presented major credibility problems.

Figure Four compares the growth of assessed MOD and MOI National Police force capabilities at the unit level from June 2005 to February, 2007 in terms of units not yet ready, units fighting side by side with Coalition force, and units in the lead with Coalition enablers or fully independent. The problem is that DoD has defined the term “in the lead” as being “with Coalition enablers or fully independent,” and neither shows how many of these units are really “fully independent” or defines this term in ways that have any relation to actual combat units.

In fact, the units counted as “in the lead” in Figure Four range from units that are highly effective to garrison units that are virtually passive and incapable of any kind of meaningful mission on their own. Meaningful readiness data would required unit-by-unit data that contained readiness assessments in several sub-categories (personnel, command and control, training, sustainment/logistics, equipment, leadership) as well as a narrative assessment of key shortfalls and impediments of the unit to assume the lead for operations. They would also estimate the time needed for the unit to assume the lead.

Meaningful combat capability data would also have to be based on actual unit performance in given types of missions, not readiness data or estimates devoid of combat experience. It is one of the odd tragedies of current intelligence and force assessment reporting that it generally is far less meaningful than the World War One era assessments that focused more on unit history in combat than efforts to find directly comparable statistic indicators or assessments by category.

Moreover, “fully independent” is almost meaningless if the units cannot engage in any form of demanding combat operation without support from US airpower, artillery, and or logistics; if they lack the armor to operate in demanding missions; and require emergency back up from Coalition forces if anything goes wrong. Even the best forces cannot use weapons they do not have, or perform missions for which they are not equipped. This is particularly true when Iraqi
forces have very limited IS&R capabilities, which are grossly inferior to those of US forces, and security considerations restrict how much data many “in the lead” units can be given.

These failures to honestly tie claims Iraqi forces are “in the lead” to real-world effectiveness casts doubt on the most critical aspects of public MNF-I and US reporting. In fact, the GAO has listed three key reasons why an accurate assessment of ISF readiness and progress can only come from the unit-by-unit reports: 20

- The usefulness of TRA reports as an instrument to measure combat readiness could have been tested.
- The aggregate data could have been verified.
- Shortfalls in specific areas, such as personnel, equipment, logistics, training, and leadership, could have been identified. 21

The GAO also stated that ultimate goal of continuing to strengthen ISF combat forces and the support units was to eventually eliminate the Iraqi force’s dependence on coalition forces. 22
Figure Four
MOD Forces’ Assessed Capabilities

MOD Forces’ Assessed Capabilities

Adapted from: US Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, March 2007 Report to Congress, p. 26; Note: +/-5% margin of error
Little progress has been made in providing more objective reports. Gen. George Casey reported in mid-October 2006 that six of the 10 Iraqi divisions – 30 of the 36 brigades and almost 90 of the 112 battalions were “in the lead.” He still described the task as training and equipping units, then “putting them in the lead,” to finally make them independent. Roughly the same claims were made in testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee in mid-November.

Virtually all independent media reporting by major media, however, has presented a very different picture of readiness as have many officers returning from Iraq. For example, an LA Times article in early December 2006 described an operation in Baghdad with Iraqi units supposedly “in the lead,” that showed some of the difficulties Iraqi Army units had under the stress of combat. While this evidence is at best anecdotal, it is still significant because the unit in question was Iraq’s 9th Mechanized Division; one of Iraq’s best trained and equipped divisions (mentioned earlier as the unit trained by Lt. Col. Carl D. Grunow). US Army Col. Douglass S. Heckman, recalls how “In August, when we started Operation Together Forward to secure Baghdad, we called on a bunch of units to assist. This division was the only one that moved into the operation. The others balked.”

The problems even this unit had in performing against insurgents in Baghdad did not bode well for the state of Iraqi security forces and suggested that Iraqi force development would take patience. The operation’s objective in Baghdad’s Fadhil neighborhood was to capture 70 high-value targets. In the end, 43 insurgents, including three foreign nationals, were captured, and an estimated 100 killed, with only one Iraqi soldier killed and six wounded, albeit with significant collateral damage.

The course of the 11-hour operation revealed several weaknesses of the 9th mechanized division. After the unit had walked into an ambush and were stopped by a coordinated rocket, grenade, and mortar attack, “fear took over” among the Iraqis, according to Staff Sgt. Michael Baxter. “They refused to move. We were yelling at them to move.” While the Iraqis were supposed to take the lead in the operation, “it started out that way,” Baxter said. “But five minutes into it, we had to take over.”

The LA Times article recounted how

    […] confusion swiftly reigned as insurgents in Fadhil pummeled dismounted Iraqi troops and their American advisors. U.S. radio jammers seeking to hinder communications between insurgents ended up blocking the Iraqi soldiers’ walkie-talkies, forcing them to use unreliable cell phone signals to stay in contact. Voice commands were lost […]

The US advisers witnessed the same lack of weapons discipline Grunow described in his Military Review article: At times, the overwhelmed Iraqi soldiers fired wildly, sweeping their machine-gun barrels across friendly and insurgent targets alike, witnesses said. “I had to throw bullet casings at them to get their attention,” said Sgt. 1st Class Agustín Mendoza, another U.S. trainer who manned a Humvee gut turret during the battle. “They had no weapons discipline.”

[…]

Other reporting casts serious doubt on the value of the kind of reporting provided in the March 2007 Department of Defense Quarterly report. This report provided a map showing that Iraqi Army units were in the lead in counterinsurgency operations in Iraq in every area in Iraq except Al Anbar, roughly half of Baghdad, a Kurdish area, and the Basra area in the far southeast. This
same map also claimed that the Iraqi Army had experienced the following development from May 2006 to February 2007:

**Figure 5**

**Iraqi Army and National Police with Lead Responsibility for Counter Insurgency Operations in Their Areas**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Division HQs</th>
<th>Brigade HQs</th>
<th>Battalions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 06</td>
<td>Feb 07</td>
<td>May 06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqi Army</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data in Figure 5 also show the high level of dependence still placed on the uncertain capabilities of the National Police. The Department of Defense DoD reported that all 27 National Police battalions conducted counter-insurgency operations, and six battalions had the security lead in their areas of responsibility. 203 National Police Transition Teams (10 provincial, 44 District, and 149 Station) support the training of these units. Additionally, 10 Forward Operating Bases (FOBs) were transferred to the Government of Iraq during May through August, bringing the total to 52 of a total 110 FOBs under Iraqi control. Three more FOBs were scheduled to be transferred to Iraq by January 2007.

**ISF Motivation Problems**

Both the force development problems and perceptual problems are further compounded by the ISF’s problems in leadership and unit cohesion. Human beings do not live in the dawn of tomorrow; they live in the noon of today. Most Iraqi officers and NCOs are inevitably caught up in the pressures of Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic differences. Most Iraqi enlisted men volunteer because they need the money, because their dependents are desperately in need of their support. At the level of officers and NCOs, the options are ultimately political conciliation and compromise, division by sect or ethnicity with a strong risk of creating separate Shi’ite or Sunni force, or a coup or strong man. The same is true of other ranks in both the regular forces and police. All desperately need an effective pay system and enough income to resist corruption and infiltration? All need family support and adequate means of getting pay to their families. Medical services are critical; so are real-world death and disability benefits. No effort that is not founded on pay and benefits, rather than leadership and motivation, can possibly succeed.

Similarly, it is impossible to treat all Iraqi forces as if they were truly national and could be deployed on a national level. Some units do behave in this manner, and many more can be created over time. The fact is, however, that most Iraqi regulars were recruited for local defense and far less demanding missions. Most police are local, and will be driven by local interest and political conditions. The local role of militias and various non-“national” security forces cannot be ignored, and must somehow be integrated into the ISF structure or given incentives to disband. No ISF effort can succeed that does not explicitly recognized these realities.
Success and Failure by Force Element

The tendency of US officers and officials to relentlessly exaggerate real successes has deprived the MNF-I and US government of their credibility. No one can trust any aspect of the official reporting on progress in ISF force development or the related progress in economic aid or development. There are no honest metrics, no credible plans, and no credible estimates of time and resources that can be trust among the Congress, the American people, the media, and the result of the world.

This is compounded by a similar effort to exaggerate success at the level of the Iraqi central government. Iraq has a major leadership and unit cohesion problem, most of its ministries are ineffective and/or corrupt, and there often is little or no real central government presence at the regional or local level. Most Iraqis do not see a combination of central government and ISF that can effectively provide security, government services, and the rule of law. Human beings do not live in the dawn of tomorrow; they live in the noon of today. Most Iraqi officers and NCOs are inevitably caught up in the pressures of Iraq’s sectarian and ethnic differences. Most Iraqi enlisted men volunteer because they need the money, because their dependents are desperately in need of their support.

If one looks at the real readiness of the Iraqi defense effort, it may be summarized as follows:

- **Ministry of Defense:** Still very much a work in progress. Poorly organized, divided along sectarian and ethnic lines, poor planning and fiscal control capability, problems with corruption.

- **The regular army, air force, and navy** (132,856 claimed to be operational; real number unknown, but full time active strength probably below 100,000) as of March 3, 2007: Some battalion sized elements of the Army (132,856 men trained and equipped) are emerging as a real force at the infantry battalion level with some light mechanized and armored elements. Real divisions and brigades are beginning to emerge as, although many headquarters, command and control, combat and service support, logistic and intelligence elements are missing or having little capability. The regular Iraqi military still cannot operate without massive MNF-I support, embedded US and other coalition advisory teams, and largely US mechanized infantry, armor, artillery, fixed and rotary wing air support, air mobility, and logistic and service support.

Air Force (929 men) is at best a small cadre of forces with token reconnaissance and air transport capability. Navy (1,135 men) is slowly emerging as capable of carrying out own patrol missions, but is severely limited in operational capability with little real support capability.

The MNF-I reported that as by the end of 2006, 100% of the authorized Iraqi Army battalions had been created, and that force building efforts to train and equip forces now focused on combat support forces. Such reports are misleading to the point of being actively dishonest. There are severe problems in much of the reporting on Iraqi forces, and no clear distinction is made between the number of men who went through the training process and the number still on service. The rising manpower and combat unit totals conceal many critical problems in given elements of the ISF order of battle. Gross numbers grossly exaggerate capability.

Even more serious problems exist with reports that say the regular Iraqi forces are taking the lead, and the MNF-I has been successful in transferring responsibility to Iraqi forces and command. The regular military and some paramilitary National Police units are making real progress – but most units are severely undermanned, have critical problems in officer and NCO quality and leadership, are too lightly equipped and poorly facilitated, and many are Shi’ite or Kurdish dominated.

While progress is occurring in the army, discussions with MNF-I experts indicate that major Manning and equipment shortfalls exist in many battalions and units, and that substantial numbers of combat battalions said to be “in the lead” had less than 60% of their authorized Manning actually present in the unit on a day-to-day basis.
The Department of Defense reported as March, 2007 14 Strategic Infrastructure Battalions, 2 Special Forces battalions, and 103 regular battalions were in combat, but it is unlikely that even one-third of these totals had serious independent warfighting capability and there is no way to assess their willingness to engage as truly national forces in civil conflict.

One respected journalist stated on November 28, 2006, “The Iraqi army has about 134,000 men (trained and equipped), but about half are doing only stationary guard duty...of the half that conduct operations, only about 10 battalions are effective – well under 10,000 men.” If anything like these figures are true, then recent MNF-I claims that, “in mid-October 2006 that six of the 10 Iraqi divisions – 30 of the 36 brigades and almost 90 of the 112 battalions were ‘in the lead.’” border on the absurd.

Iraqi forces will be highly dependent on US and other MNF-I support well into 2008, and probably through 2010. Only a truly radical improvement in political conciliation could reduce this dependence, and the present drift towards added civil conflict could sharply increase it.

- **Ministry of Interior**: Still very much a work in progress and lags behind the MoD in capability. Poorly organized, with elements more loyal to Shi’ite and Kurdish parties than nation. Poor planning and fiscal control capability, serious problems with corruption.

- **The National Police**: Some elements have been properly reorganized and are as effective as regular army units. Most still present problems in terms of both loyalty and effectiveness. Still are some ties to Shi’ite and Kurdish militias. A number of units have critical problems in officer and NCO quality and leadership, are too lightly equipped and poorly facilitated.

- **Other MOI Forces**: Most elements, like the Border Police, are just acquiring proper training and have only light equipment and poor facilities. Some elements are capable in undemanding missions. Most are underpaid, under equipped, badly led, and corrupt. Many are poorly facilitated.

- **The Regular Police**: Underpaid, under equipped, badly led, and corrupt. Many will not fight or act if face a local threat. Desertion and absence rates high. Generally only function where security exists for other reasons, or the police have strong ties to sectarian, ethnic, and tribal forces. Many are poorly facilitated.

The problems in the “trained and equipped police” forces are compounded by large number of locally recruited “police” and security forces loyal to local leaders and sectarian and ethnic factions. Various sectarian and ethnic militias are the real “police” in many areas.

- **Facilities Protection Force, Pipeline Protection Force, and other limited security forces**: Reported to have an authorized level approaching 145,000. Actual day-to-day forces actively performing their mission may be less than half that total. Underpaid, under equipped, badly led, and corrupt. Generally only function where security exists for other reasons, or are tied to sectarian, ethnic, and tribal forces.

The US and MNF-I plans that called for Iraqi regular military forces to allow significant Coalition troop reductions in 2006 have failed. Worse, the effort to develop the Iraqi police and security forces remained badly out of balance with the effort to develop regular forces and still lags more than a year behind the level needed to meet even the most urgent needs. The so-called “year of the police” has barely begun and will at best gather momentum in 2007. Real-world Iraqi dependence on the present scale of US and allied military support and advisory efforts will continue well into 2008 at the earliest and probably to 2010. Major US and allied troop reductions need to be put on hold indefinitely.

Iraqi forces simply are not ready to assume the burden of national defense. Moreover, even if more effective and realistic force development plans are implemented and given the proper resources, they will still fail unless Iraqi military progress is matched by Iraqi political progress.
The only way to avoid this continuing dependence on the US and other outside power without greatly increasing the risk of a major civil war, and collapse of the Iraqi force development effort, is still to reach a level of political conciliation so great as to fundamentally undermine the insurgency and end the drift towards civil war.

**Rushing Force Development In Ways That Can Do As Much Harm as Good**

In all too many cases, the US and Iraqi governments have already rushed Iraqi battalions and force elements into being and then into combat before they are ready, effectively undercutting the Iraqi force development process and sometimes gravely weakening fledgling Iraqi units that are not ready to perform such missions. It often has used US advisors and embedded training teams that also are not ready for them missions they are supposed to perform, compounding the problems inherent in creating new units.

Other problems have resulted from trying to use force elements built for local defense missions on a national level and in far more demanding forms of counterinsurgency warfare and civil conflict missions than they were recruited for and designed to fight. There are additional problems with corruption, nepotism, creating sufficient junior officers and NCOs, and providing the levels of firepower, mobility, and communications Iraqi forces really need. Hollow units do not learn by being thrust prematurely into combat; they are crippled or wasted.

One case study of the precipitous effect of premature handover to less-than-able forces was shown in Haditha in the fall of 2004, when US troops withdrew from the city to retake Fallujah. Michael Gordon, chief military correspondent of the New York Times, also notes the important psychological effects of such premature responsibility shifts on future ISF recruiting:

> What followed was a devastating setback for the American effort to carry out counter-insurgency operations in the violent al-Anbar province. While the Americans were securing Fallujah the Iraqi police in Haditha were accosted by insurgents and executed. The episode left the town without a police force that could check the operations of the insurgents and taught the Iraqis there that the Americans could not be counted on to protect their nascent institutions, whatever their good intentions.

> It also made the task of recruiting a new police force all but impossible. When follow-on marine units were deployed to Haditha their efforts to mount a police recruitment drive failed, forcing the marines to think about seeking police recruits from other parts of the country.³⁹

**Prime Minister Maliki’s New Force Initiative**

These problems can only grow worse under current force expansion plans which continue to try to do too much, too soon to meet the different political priorities of the US and Iraqi governments. The Iraqi government is already committed to expanding the Iraqi Army at what may well be an impractical rate. The 2004 campaign plan, which had elaborated and refined the original strategy for transferring security responsibilities, was revised in April 2006 by MNF-I. In conjunction with the US embassy in Baghdad, a new Joint Campaign Plan was issued with the goal of transferring security responsibility to Iraqi security forces

Both the Iraqi government and MNF-I developed a consensus towards the end of the summer of 2006, however, that the total number of Iraqi Security Forces would have to be increased in order for Iraqis to assume more serious security responsibilities. The ISF numbered some 298,000 as of late August, and was expected to grow to 325,000 by year’s end. However, the Maliki government became committed to raising this number.³⁰
In late August 2006, the MNF-I reported that the Iraqi government was developing a long-term plan to shape the type of armed forces needed 5 to 10 years in the future. Further details of the plan remained classified as of October 2006.

On October 31st, Defense Minister Abdul-Qadir announced at a Baghdad news conference that Iraq would expand the army beyond previously planned limits. He said that this was done in consultation with Gen.’s Dempsey and Casey, but reporters on the scene felt that the effort was really an “initiative undertaken by the PM to increase the size of the Iraqi Military....”

Abdul-Qadir stated on October 31st that that the Prime Minister’s Initiative for the growth of new Iraqi Army units had been approved by the Prime Minister in September. This would expand the Army by eight brigade-equivalents (approximately 18,700 soldiers). Major General Caldwell supplemented this briefing on November 2nd, and the two briefings provide the following description of the Prime Minister’s “long war” plan for transforming Iraqi forces:

- Add additional combat power in the most heavily contested areas of Iraq (Baghdad, Basrah, Diyala, Al Anbar).
- Provide additional units to allow tactical commanders to establish a tactical reserve that can be deployed around the country.
- Provide an additional brigade to the 9th Iraqi Army Division to establish an operational reserve that can be moved around the country. This would be the first unit specifically recruited to act as a mobile force, rather than one designed largely for static local defense. It would begin the transformation of the Iraqi forces to act as a mobile, rather than static force. No details, however, were provided on the pay incentives, changes in equipment, changes in training, and changes in facilities necessary to begin what amounts to a “transformation” of Iraq forces.
- Recruit and train 18,000 men -- in addition to the 18,700 men to create new Iraqi units to provide individual replacements for Iraqi units. The first 10,000 men for this force element were recruited in early October and will be ready in November.
- Provide sufficient redundancy within the Iraqi Army Divisions to allow them to remove units from the battlespace periodically for rearm, refit, and retrain as part of a “long war strategy.” This is essential to allowing units to recover, go back to their home areas, and be retrained and reequipped. The goal is a 10% “overage” in manning. This means recruiting 12,000 more men to act as a pool of recruits to fill in existing Iraqi units by “overmanning” their authorized strength to keep a suitable number of soldiers actually in place in such units.

Iraqi force building continued to have high priority during the summer and fall of 2006. The total cost US financial assistance for Iraqi security grew from $3.24 billion in January 2004 to about $13.7 billion in June 2006. Most of these funds for rebuilding the military and security forces came from US sources although plans called for the new Iraqi government was expected to begin playing a greater role in the budgeting and equipment procurement process.

The Prime Minister’s Initiative called for the following new Iraqi forces and force elements, only some of which had specific unit designations and missions:

- Three (3) Division Headquarters:
- Add 11th Division headquarters, which will split the span of control for battalions in Baghdad between Karkh and Rusafa
- Add two (2) Strategic Infrastructure Division headquarters to improve command and control of the SIBs
- Five (5) Brigade Headquarters and 20 more Battalions
• Add 4th Bde to the 9th IA Div to provide the division to serve as the Operational Reserve for the IA with four total brigades.

• Add 4th Bde to the 5th IA Div, which will allow a brigade for Diyala.

• Add 6th Bde to the 6th IA Div, which will provide three brigades to each IA division in Baghdad.

• Add 4th Bde to the 7th IA Div, which will add a brigade to western Al Anbar province.

• Add 5th Bde to 10th IA Div.

• Add one battalion to the 1st, 2nd, and 4th Bde of the 8th IA Div, which will add a brigade-equivalent to Diwaniya.

• Add one battalion to the 2nd and 3rd Bde of the 10th IA Div, which will add nearly two brigade equivalents to Basrash (with the additional 5th Brigade addition noted above)

• Add one (1) Special Forces Battalion to ISOF

The total estimated cost was $800 million, all to be funded by the Iraqi government. It was not explained where this money would come from, how this requirement was shaped, and where the figure of 18,700 individual replacements came from or whether it would come close to dealing with even the existing manpower shortfalls in the regular army.

*The “Surge” and Plans to Increase Iraqi Forces*

The fact that the fighting has intensified while the US has lost domestic political support for the war is increasing the pressure to rush the development of ISF forces. The US wants out, and Iraq’s Shi’ite-led government wants the largest possible force as soon as possible. Then Defense Secretary Rumsfeld endorsed a proposal on October 31, 2006 to spend at least $1 billion as part of an add-on to the 2007 budget to expand the size of Iraqi security forces beyond the goal of 325,000 and accelerate their training and equipment process. The US had already spent about $10 billion on developing Iraqi forces. Gen. George Casey also recommended expanding Iraqi forces.

In March, 2007, the DoD announced that More than 60,000 ISF personnel were being added in 2007. This expansion includes:

• **Replenishment of 30,000.** MNSTC-I is funding the training and equipping of 30,000 soldiers to replace personnel losses and to increase the manning of combat units to 110% to improve present-for-duty strength. This expansion was 44% complete as of February 2007.

• **Prime Minister’s Army Expansion Initiative.** In consultation with the U.S. Government, the GOI decided to increase the size of the Army by approximately 24,000 soldiers. The additional forces will increase the MOD’s ability to command and control its forces, enhance its operational and tactical flexibility, and allow battle-weary units to be pulled off-line to retrain and refit. This GOI initiative also came with fiscal resources from the MOD budget.

• **Replenishment of National Police Brigades.** The Civilian Police Assistance Transition Team (CPATT) is working to replenish all National Police units with personnel and key pacing items of equipment in support of the Baghdad Security Plan and Phase II training at Numaniyah.

• **Expansion of National Police to 10 Brigades.** The CPATT is supporting the prime minister’s initiative to build a multicomponent (Iraqi Army and National Police) division-sized force to protect the Samarra Shrine reconstruction project. The team is generating a 10th National Police Brigade in support of this effort.
The Prime Minister’s Army Expansion Initiative will add 2 divisions to the Iraqi Army. It will also add 2 division Headquarters, 6 brigade Headquarters, and 24 battalions.37

**Pushing Iraqi Force Development at an Unrealistic Pace**

It is far from clear that such a rate of progress can successfully be rushed forward without doing at least as much harm as good. It is extremely difficult to judge the quality of the Iraqi forces development effort at any level of detail using unclassified data. The Pentagon has reported that it was now using three sets of factors to measure progress in developing Iraqi security forces capabilities and responsibilities:

- The number of trained and equipped forces.
- The number of Iraqi army units and provincial governments that had assumed responsibility for security in specific geographic areas. In August 2006, 115 Iraqi army units had assumed the lead for counterinsurgency operations in specific areas, and one province had assumed security control.
- The capabilities of operational units, as reported in unit-level and aggregate Transition Readiness Assessments (TRA). In August 2006, the General Accounting Office had still not obtained the unit-level TRA reports.38

The resulting assessments remain classified, however, and the Department of Defense no longer reports on even overall force building in terms of Level I-IV readiness. It is hard to avoid the conclusion, however, that the pace of Iraqi force development is partly being dictated by political necessity without due regard to what can really be accomplished and the inevitable loss of life to Iraqi forces that are pushed too hard, too soon.

At best, currently planned efforts will take several more years to be effective. They are also taking place at a time the political demands on Iraqi force development are becoming steadily less realistic, and Iraqi forces continue to be pushed into service before they are ready and with US embedded training teams that often have readiness and qualification problems of their own

**The Challenge of Force Transformation**

Executing a real-world handover and expansion of Iraqi forces requires a major force transformation from a static, local defense force. It means creating largely numbers of nationally deployable forces with different training, pay, equipment, mobility and support, and facilities.

This makes it highly questionable as to whether Iraqi force development can be effective in replacing US and allied forces 12 to 18 months, and that Iraqi forces can credibly expand some 36,000 to 48,000 actual men in place beyond their current size, without Iraqi success in reaching a political compromise that sharply reduces the demands for Iraqi effectiveness and the unity of the Iraqi security forces (ISF) in dealing with insurgents, militias, and death squads.

The challenge is also made more difficult by the fact that threat levels have continued to rise. It is meaningless to keep claiming that the security problems are limited to small areas, and ignore intra-Shi’ite fighting and Arab-Kurdish tensions. For example, General Casey stated in a press conference on October 26th that, “…we are in a tough fight here in the center of the country and in Anbar province. But I think it’s important to remind people that 90 percent of the sectarian violence in Iraq takes place in about a 30-mile radius from the center of Baghdad; and that secondly, 90 percent of all violence takes place in five provinces. This is not a country that is awash in sectarian violence. The situation is hard, but it’s not a country that’s awash in sectarian violence.”
This statement is more than self contradictory, it clashes with previous claims in the Department of Defense quarterly status report in August that 81% of the violence took place in these provinces, and that statement ignored all of the softer forms of sectarian and ethnic “cleansing” and intra-Shi’ite fighting and Arab-Kurdish tensions.

This does not mean that real progress is not being made in ISF force development, and there are many reports of individual Iraqi units carrying out local missions, taking risks, and taking casualties. The fact remains, however, that far too many Iraqi army units are being credited with taking the lead or being effective in the field. Effective units are also being lumped together with units that will not perform their missions, which are tied to sects and factions, and which often have only 50-60% of their manning.

Iraqi Force Development if Things Go Well

Time and resources have been wasted that the US and Iraq did not have. The odds of success are less than even, and may be less than one in four. At best, the development of effective Iraq forces is only one of the steps necessary to bring stability and security, and rollback the forces that can lead Iraqi towards more violent forms of civil war. It is, however, one of the critical elements of success.

There is no way to predict Iraq’s future or the exact role Iraqi forces will play over the coming months and years. All that can be predicated is that the US and Iraq must honestly and systematically address each of the current failures in Iraqi force development identified in this report, and do so at a pace that can produce an effective and meaningful result. At a minimum, this means reconfiguring the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of the Interior (MoI), creating Iraqi regular forces designed to fight serious counterinsurgency battles and end civil fighting on a national level, and giving the Iraqi police the aid and advisory resources necessary to make them effective and far less divided and corrupt.

This will take major new amounts of money and more capable US advisors and embeds. It will take 3-5 years, not 18-24 months – although this does not mean enough success to allow major US and allied troop withdrawals cannot come far earlier. In any case, the rate of the ISF’s process or failure will depend at least a much on Iraqi political compromise and conciliation. If that succeeds, much of the pressure on ISF development will ease; if it fails, ISF development will fail regardless.

If things go well, Iraqi forces will steadily improve with time and play a critical role in bring the level of security Iraq needs to make political compromise and conciliation work.

Iraqi forces will largely replace Coalition and other foreign forces, at most seeking aid and limited assistance. Iraq’s military will shift its mission from counterinsurgency to defense of the nation against foreign enemies, Iraq’s National Police will defend the nation’s internal security interests and not those of given ethnic and sectarian groups, deal with counterterrorism rather than counterinsurgency, and focus on crime and corruption. Iraq’s other police and security forces will act like the police and security forces of other nations, focusing on crime, local security issues, and providing border security against smuggling and low-level infiltration.

Things can only go well, however, if Iraq can create a working compromise between its sects and ethnic groups, and if US and other outside powers will have the patience and will to support Iraq as it develops into such a state for at least two to three more years of active fighting. Iraq will
also need massive additional economic aid to help Iraq unify and develop. Major assistance and advisory programs will be in place until at least 2010, and probably 2015.

**Iraqi Force Development if Things Go Badly**

The present odds of such success are less than even. In fact, Iraq is more likely to have one of three far less positive futures:

- **Years of turmoil: No side truly wins.** The nation does not devolve into all out civil war or open forms of division or separation. The result will be an agonizing extension of the status quo in which real political conciliation fail and every new compromise will be the source of new tensions and fighting. Warring sectarian and ethnic groups struggle for local control and dominance, dividing the country internally by city and governorate. The Iraqi people lose faith and hope, struggling only to survive. The military, National Police, regular police and other instruments of government become an awkward mix of sectarian and ethnic enclaves and struggles for power and control. The economy will splinter, with a few secure ethnic and sectarian enclaves, but largely dominated by internal tension, insecurity and crime.

The US and other outside powers keep some form of presence in Iraq and seek to maintain a partial state of order, but every effort to produce lasting solutions and true national unity will collapse.

- **Internal separation, ethnic cleansing, and the façade of unity:** Civil conflict lead to the de facto separation of the nation into Arab Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurdish enclaves on either a regional or local basis. The nation maintains the appearance of unity, but the reality is a level of soft and hard ethnic cleansing that divides most governorates on sectarian and ethnic lines, and most cities into sectarian and ethnic neighborhoods. Most governorates and major cities are dominated by Shi’ite or Kurdish control. An impoverished Sunni enclave will exist in the West, continuing to present at least low-level security challenges. Every “national” decision will be an awkward and unstable compromise. Compromises over key issues like development and modernizing Iraq’s energy industry and infrastructure are sectarian and ethnic nightmares with Shi’ite, Sunni, and Kurd all seeking their own advantage and that of their respective enclaves.

The Iraqi people are forced into clear sectarian and ethnic divisions, each tending to aid the extremist elements in each group. The military, National Police, regular police and other instruments of government are divided into clearly defined sectarian and ethnic enclaves. The US and other outside powers withdraw all or virtually all forces, and reduce aid to token levels. Iraq becomes the scene of constant outside struggles for influence between Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Sunni states.

- **Outright division with at least continuing sectarian and ethnic fighting:** The central government diminishes to total impotence and/or collapses under the pressure of civil conflict. The softer forms of sectarian and ethnic cleansing that take place in the previous scenario are replaced by vicious fighting for control of given governorates and cities, mass killings, mass forced relocations and migrations, and the ruthless control of remaining minorities.

Iraq has openly split into three parts, dominated by Shi’ite and Kurdish control in most areas, Shi’ite domination of the central government and most of the country, or a Shi’ite-Kurdish federation of convenience whose reality are the same. An impoverished Sunni enclave exist in the West, struggling to survive, continuing to present at least low-level security challenges and dependent on outside aid from Sunni states. Economic development and efforts to modernize Iraq’s energy industry and infrastructure are divided on sectarian and ethnic lines, with the possible exception of pipelines and some limited infrastructure that crosses Shi’ite, Sunni, and Kurdish zones. Export capabilities, ports, and water will all be continuing sources of contention.

The Iraqi people will be forced into clear sectarian and ethnic divisions, each tending to aid the extremist elements in each group. The military, National Police, regular police and other instruments of government will divide along clearly defined and possibly warring sectarian and ethnic lines. The economy steadily declines if it does not implode. The US and other outside powers withdraw all or virtually all forces, and
reduce aid to token levels. Iraq becomes the “sick man” of the Gulf, and the scene of constant outside struggles for influence between Turkey, Iran, and the Arab Sunni states.

Looking Ahead

There is no way to summarize Iraqi force development in simple terms, particularly because so much depends in the near term on whether Iraqi efforts at political conciliation, effective governance, and a government presence in the field, do or do not succeed. The ISF development effort cannot succeed without major progress in all of these areas, any more than they can succeed without the creation of effective Iraqi forces and Iraqi popular belief that MNF-I forces will leave as soon as possible and Iraq will be truly sovereign.

If Iraq is to avoid split-up and full-blown civil war, it must do far more than create effective Security Forces. No such effort can succeed without an integrated strategy to forge a lasting political compromise between its key factions: Arab-Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, and Kurd – while protecting other minorities. Political conciliation must also address such critical issues as federalism and the relative powers of the central and regional governments, the role of religion in politics and law, control over petroleum resources and export revenues, the definition of human rights, and a host of other issues. Security cannot come through force alone. The creation of a strong and capable ISF may even do more harm than good if it is used to further narrow, Sectarian goals.

This means that the most important developments in making Iraqi forces effective have nothing to do with the forces themselves, or the nature of the US support and advisory effort. They are rather the ability to create levels of political compromise and conciliation that deprive the insurgency and Iraq’s civil conflicts of their popular base. This means actually implementing:

- An oil law and technical annexes that assure all major Iraqi factions of an equitable share of today’s oil revenues and the future development of Iraq’s oil and gas resources.
- Giving the Sunnis real participation in the national government at every level, and creating ministries and government structures that fairly mix Arab Shi’ite, Arab Sunni, Kurd, and other minorities.
- ReBa’athification and giving a clean slate or amnesty to all who served under the Ba’ath not guilty of violent crimes.
- Amending the constitution to create a structure that protects the rights of all Iraqis, and which creates viable compromises, or clearly defers or omits, areas of critical sectarian and ethnic division.
- As part of this, working out an approach to federation that will avoid civil conflict.
- Creating and implementing local election laws, particularly at the provincial level.
- Disbanding or assimilating militias, or creating retraining centers and funding programs to deal with members.

At the same time, US, allied, and Iraqi government policy can only succeed if it recognizes that there is no near term prospect that Iraqi force development will allow major reductions in MNF-I forces without serious risk, and that ISF force development can only succeed if the MNF-I provides active combat support well into 2008 and major advisory and aid support through 2010. The January 2007 NIE on Iraq stated, without
reservation, that a rapid withdrawal of US forces in the next 12-18 months “almost certainly would lead to a significant increase in the scale and scope of sectarian conflict in Iraq.”39 Every element of ISF development still requires years of effort and support, and any successful policy towards Iraq that offers serious hope of avoiding massive increases in sectarian and ethnic violence, and continued insurgency, requires an honest recognition of this fact.

The US can only do more harm to Iraqi force development if it continues to exaggerate Iraqi capability, attempts to expand Iraqi forces even more quickly, and transfers responsibility before Iraqi forces can do the job. As in Afghanistan, the US can only win in Iraq if it is willing to fight a "long war." Rushing Iraqi forces in, and American forces out, is a strategy where "exit" is given far higher priority than success. It may provide a cosmetic rationale to disguise failure and defeat, but not prevent it.

To put it bluntly, this means that US government and Department of Defense must stop exaggerating about the true nature of Iraqi readiness and the Iraqi force development. As this report describes in detail, there are many very real successes in ISF development. The nearly meaningless metrics of success the US has adopted, however, can easily lead the US to choose the wrong options in Iraq, continue to fail to provide adequate resources, and encourage US and allied withdrawals because of political decisions made for the wrong reasons. Like all elements of strategy, Iraqi force development needs to be based on honesty and realism, not "spin," false claims, and political expediency.
APPENDIX ONE: IRAQI FORCE DEVELOPMENT – A GRAPHIC SUMMARY

Trained and Equipped Manpower for Major Branches of MOD and MOI Forces:
July 2005 to March 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch</th>
<th>July 05</th>
<th>Jan 06</th>
<th>July 06</th>
<th>Dec 06</th>
<th>March 07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>78200</td>
<td>104400</td>
<td>113200</td>
<td>132700</td>
<td>132856</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1100</td>
<td>1135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>929</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOD</td>
<td>79100*</td>
<td>105700*</td>
<td>115000*</td>
<td>134700*</td>
<td>134920*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Police/Highway</td>
<td>64100</td>
<td>77500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regular Police</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Forces</td>
<td>30700</td>
<td>40500</td>
<td>23400</td>
<td>28900</td>
<td>28600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOI</td>
<td>94800*</td>
<td>118000*</td>
<td>161100*</td>
<td>188300*</td>
<td>188260*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAND TOTAL</td>
<td>173900*</td>
<td>235700*</td>
<td>275100*</td>
<td>323000*</td>
<td>323100*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: These figures only show the number of men trained and equipped and have nothing to do with the manpower and equipment actually in active service in the unit.

-- Unauthorized absence personnel are said not to be included in MOI figures, and to be included in MOD figures, but the reality is that the MOD figures do not reflect actual manning and are all shown as approximate.

-- Army numbers include Special Operations Forces and Support Forces.

-- Does not include various Facilities Protection Forces, which had an authorized strength of some 144,000 men working in 27 ministries on March 5, 2007.

Source: US State Department

NOTE: Army Battalions Includes special operations battalions but does not include combat support and combat service support units.

Data as of November 13, 2006

Source: Adapted from: US Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, March 2007 Report to Congress, p.25; Note: +/-5% margin of error
* Includes MOD and National Police units; data includes only those ISF independent operations that are reported to the Coalition
Data as of March 2, 2007.
Iraqi Army Battalions “leading” Counterinsurgency Operations: January 2006-February 2007*

* Note: The DoD defines a unit as “in the lead” “once it has been thoroughly assessed and has demonstrated that it is capable of planning and executing combat operations.”

** Note: Figures +/- 5%

MOI Manning Levels: August 2005 to February 2007*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Aug. 05</th>
<th>Nov. 05</th>
<th>Feb. 06</th>
<th>6-May</th>
<th>Aug. 06</th>
<th>Nov. 06</th>
<th>Feb. 07</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>64,100</td>
<td>74,800</td>
<td>82,400</td>
<td>97,300</td>
<td>112,400</td>
<td>128,008</td>
<td>135,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other MOI Forces**</td>
<td>31,300</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>38,000</td>
<td>41,400</td>
<td>23,400</td>
<td>28,428</td>
<td>28,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Police</td>
<td>24,300</td>
<td>24,400</td>
<td>24,400</td>
<td>24,400</td>
<td>24,400</td>
<td>24,400</td>
<td>24,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total MOI Forces</td>
<td>95,400</td>
<td>110,800</td>
<td>120,400</td>
<td>138,700</td>
<td>160,100</td>
<td>180,836</td>
<td>188,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: * Does not include Facilities Protection Service

** “Other MOI Forces” includes Border Protection forces, Dignitary Protection Forces. The National Police were taken from these forces to form a separate force.

MOI National Police Forces’ Assessed Capabilities

Data as of November 13, 2006
Note: +/- 5% margin of error.
Funding Dedicated to the Training and Equipping of the ISF

*Funding through FY2004 was allocated to the State Department. Afterwards, all funding was allocated through the Defense Department.

**Includes both FY2006 Title IX bridge funds and the FY2006 Supplemental request.

### Iraqi Security Forces Appropriations*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$ in Billions</th>
<th>Title IX**</th>
<th>Supplemental</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Title IX***</th>
<th>Supplemental</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi National Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastr ucture</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and Transport</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>183%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>500%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>125%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi National Police</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastr ucture</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-40%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and Transport</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>200%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>200%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Iraq Sec Forces</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Numbers may not add due to rounding

**Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)

***Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL-109-298)

## Iraqi Security Forces Appropriations Through FY 2008*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi National Army</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and Transportation</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>1.1.</td>
<td>-35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>-92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>-64%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Iraqi National Police</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equipment and Transportation</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainment</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>-56%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Related Activities</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Iraq Security Forces</strong></td>
<td><strong>3.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>-64%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: numbers may not add due to rounding

Title IX, FY 2006 Defense Appropriations Act (PL 109-148)
Title IX, FY 2007 Defense Appropriations Act (PL-109-298)
5 *US Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, November 2006 Report to Congress*, p.31
10 Rick Jervis and Jim Michaels, “U.S. Forces Caught In Crossfire On Streets Of ‘Capital of Death’,” USA Toda, October 23, p.1