U.S. POLICY TOWARD PAKISTAN

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THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
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The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Gary L. Ackerman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The committee will come to order. Pakistan has long presented the United States with one of our most difficult foreign policy challenges. The issues that dominate this bilateral relationship range from terrorism and nuclear proliferation to democratic reform to respect for basic human rights and religious freedom.

Since 9/11, though, terrorism and the fight against it has come to dominate the relationship and frames any conversation we may have about all of the other issues. It is obvious that we need Pakistan's help in finding al-Qaeda and the Taliban, and they have provided some of that help, but their inability or unwillingness to control their own territory along the Afghan border continues to raise the perennial question about Pakistan: Is their uneven effort against terrorists a question of political will or simply one of capabilities?

For almost 6 years, the administration has suggested, and the Congress has largely agreed, that it was a lack of capability that was holding Pakistan back from greater cooperation, and, to that end, the United States has provided billions of dollars in military and economic assistance and agreed to the sale of sophisticated fighter aircraft. There does not seem to be any problem in Pakistan that cannot be cured with a little more United States assistance.

So, 2 weeks ago, the administration asked Congress for an additional $110 million for economic assistance in the federally administered tribal areas and another $71.5 million in military assistance to equip the Frontier Corps to try to stop the Taliban and al-Qaeda from crossing freely back and forth, and to keep them from enjoying something they desperately need: Sanctuary.

The question before the Congress is not whether we should stop the Taliban and al-Qaeda from using Pakistan as a sanctuary. The question is whether the money we have provided to date has produced the result that we want and need. I do not believe that it has. In fact, I believe that the Government of Pakistan will use the
threat of terrorists to extract as much money as they possibly can and we have proven willing time and time again to oblige.

It is long past time for the Congress to add benchmarks on aid to Pakistan to ensure that progress against terrorism and toward restoring democracy is actually made and that we stop responding to every crisis in Pakistan with the refrain of “more money.” The Government of Pakistan may lack certain capabilities, but we are naive to think that this is the only problem.

Pakistan, long ago, made a strategic decision to help us with al-Qaeda but also to turn a blind eye toward the Taliban in the belief that their former allies will once again prove useful to them in their regional maneuvering against India and Iran.

What other conclusion could one draw when our own military commanders testify that it is “generally accepted” that Taliban leaders operate openly in Quetta, one of Pakistan’s largest cities? Indeed, the showboat arrest of the former Taliban defense Minister, Mullah Obaidullah, in Quetta, during Vice President Cheney’s visit reinforces the conclusion that Pakistan could act against the Taliban, if they were only willing.

Even if you believe that Pakistan is doing all that it can to assist us in the War on Terror, the evidence shows that this is not enough, and it is harming United States interests in Afghanistan and undermining the Afghan efforts to establish a stable, secure, and democratic government.

But uneven effort against terrorism is not the only place where Pakistan’s cooperation has fallen short. There are still grave concerns about the nature and extent of the “nuclear Wal-Mart” run by A.Q. Khan. To date, no agent or investigator of the United States has had any direct access to him.

We have only purported information from Khan passed to us by the Government of Pakistan, a government which, in one breath, places him under house arrest and, in the next, celebrates him as a national hero. Meanwhile, we are left to wonder whether Dr. Khan’s former associates have been arrested or if they decided it was time for a career change, or merely changed aliases.

Rioting this past weekend in the streets of Lahore over President Musharraf’s decision to remove the chief justice of the Supreme Court for as yet unspecified reasons highlights the fact that the return of Pakistan to democracy is an issue that has slipped in emphasis, if not in actual importance.

For 6 years now, the Congress has authorized the President to waive the provision of law which would ordinarily cut off assistance to a military government after a coup. In return for that waiver and $3.5 billion, we have seen very little in the way of progress back toward democracy. Elections are scheduled for later this year or early next year, but if past is prologue, these elections will be no freer nor fairer than any others. Those candidates who might actually be able to mount a significant political challenge to President Musharraf will either be undercut or barred outright from participating, clearing the field only for a challenge from Islamist candidates and setting before the voters the false choice of Musharraf or militants in control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The choice is obvious but not appetizing and clearly one that we should be working to change.
What we truly need in Pakistan is someone else to talk to. The administration seems content to only speak with President Musharraf and portrays him as the indispensable man. The truth is, for our goals to be achieved in Pakistan, there should be more than one phone number there to dial.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ackerman follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GARY L. ACKERMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Pakistan has long presented the United States with one of our most difficult foreign policy challenges. The issues that dominate this bi-lateral relationship range from terrorism and nuclear proliferation, to democratic reform, to respect for basic human rights and religious freedom. Since 9/11 though, terrorism, and the fight against it, has come to dominate the relationship and frames any conversation we may have about all of the other issues. It is obvious that we need Pakistan's help in fighting al Qaeda and the Taliban. And they have provided some of that help. But there is a willingness or unwillingness along the Afghan border continues to raise the perennial question about Pakistan: is their uneven effort against terrorists a question of political will or simply one of capabilities.

For almost 6 years, the Administration has suggested, and the Congress has largely agreed, that it was a lack of capability that was holding Pakistan back from greater cooperation. And to that end, the United States has provided billions of dollars in military and economic assistance and agreed to the sale of sophisticated fighter aircraft. There doesn't seem to be any problem in Pakistan that can't be cured with a little more U.S. assistance. So two weeks ago, the Administration asked Congress for an additional $110 million for economic assistance in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and another $71.5 million in military assistance to equip the Frontier Corps to try and stop Taliban and al Qaeda from crossing freely back and forth, and to keep them from enjoying something they desperately need: sanctuary.

The question before the Congress is not whether we should stop the Taliban and al Qaeda from using Pakistan as a sanctuary, the question is whether all the money we've provided to date has produced the result we want and need. I don't believe that it has. In fact, I believe that the government of Pakistan will use the threat of terrorists to extract as much from us as they possibly can and we have proven willing time and again to oblige. It is long past time for the Congress to add benchmarks on aid to Pakistan to ensure that progress against terrorism and towards restoring democracy is actually made and that we stop responding to every crisis in Pakistan with the refrain of more money. The government of Pakistan, may lack certain capabilities, but we are naive to think that this is the only problem. Pakistan long ago made a strategic decision to help us with al Qaeda but also to turn a blind eye towards the Taliban in the belief that their former allies will once again prove useful to them in their regional maneuvering against India and Iran. What other conclusion could one draw when our own military commanders testify that it is "generally accepted" that Taliban leaders operate openly in Quetta, one of Pakistan's largest cities? Indeed the showboat arrest of the former Taliban Defense Minister Mullah Obaidullah, in Quetta, during Vice President Cheney's visit reinforces the conclusion that Pakistan could act against the Taliban, if they were only willing. Even if you believe that Pakistan is doing all it can to assist us in the war on terror, the evidence shows that it is not enough, and it is harming U.S. interests in Afghanistan and undermining Afghan efforts to establish a stable, secure and democratic government.

But uneven effort against terrorism is not the only place where Pakistan's cooperation has fallen short. There are still grave concerns about the nature and extent of the "nuclear Walmart" run by A.Q. Khan. To date no agent or investigator of the United States has had any direct access to him. We have only the purported information from Khan passed to us by the Government of Pakistan, a government which in one breath places him under house arrest and in the next celebrates him as a national hero. Meanwhile, we are left to wonder whether Dr. Khan's former associates have been arrested, or if they decided it was time for a career change or merely changed aliases.

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has authorized the President to waive the provision of law which would ordinarily cut off assistance to a military government after a coup. In return for that waiver and $3.5 billion, we have seen very little in the way of progress back toward democracy. Elections are scheduled for later this year or early next year, but if past is prologue, these elections will be no freer and no fairer than any others. Those candidates who might actually be able to mount a significant political challenge to President Musharraf will either be undercut or barred outright from participating, clearing the field for only a challenge from Islamist candidates and setting before the voters the false choice of Musharraf or militants in control of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The choice is obvious, but not appetizing and clearly one we should be working to change.

What we truly need in Pakistan is someone else to talk to. The Administration seems content to only speak with President Musharraf and portrays him as the indispensable man. The truth is, for our goals to be achieved in Pakistan there should be more than one phone number there to dial.

Mr. ACKERMAN. To help us sort through this ticket of issues, we have a distinguished panel of experts, but before we turn to them, I would like to recognize the acting ranking member, Mr. Chabot, for any opening comments that he may wish to make.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am giving this opening statement on behalf of Mike Pence, the ranking member of this committee, who is unable to be here today.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for calling this very important hearing and welcome to our witnesses here this morning.

Mr. Chairman, there is hardly a more pivotal country in the War on Terror than Pakistan. President Pervez Musharraf has been an important ally in that war and our shared efforts for the last 5½ years or so. Many of the specifics may never be disclosed, but it is important that Pakistan has allowed, for example, overflight rights and supply route access and equipment offloading ability, among other support, and that they have been particularly helpful in this war.

Our efforts in Afghanistan and in routing the Taliban would not have as effectively been achievable without Pakistan. I hope that President Musharraf will remain steadfast and unflagging in his efforts to combat terrorists who threaten the stability of his government, as well as our safety. President Musharraf must forge strong ties with Afghanistan, in mutual accord, to rid the area of terrorists.

Mr. Chairman, I support the administration’s three-pronged effort regarding these two particularly dangerous areas. Number one, no cross-border, insurgent traffic; number two, no Talibanization; and, number three, no rival, competing government.

Mr. Chairman, I also share the concern voiced about President Musharraf’s recent dismissal of the country’s top judge. While this may not violate their Constitution, at first blush, this certainly does not appear reform-minded.
It is an encouraging sign that President Musharraf has said that elections due this year will be held on time, and he has continued to allow protests while ruling out imposing an emergency order.

Mr. Chairman, I hope we will not let the perfect become the enemy of the good. President Musharraf is an imperfect leader. We all may take issue with some of his internal decisions. Further, we must continue to have a joint, cooperative effort in defeating some of the world's most dangerous terrorists in the most forbidding areas in Pakistan, particularly up in the Northwest Territory. His success directly affects our success and the security of this nation.

Mr. Chairman, finally, I thank you again for calling this important hearing, and I think we all look forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses here this morning, and I yield back my time.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me add my voice to the appreciation to the chairman and ranking member for this hearing and also to the witnesses. I embrace the concept that it is important that all borders around Pakistan are controlled, and we certainly need to be a partner in these efforts, and, particularly, as it relates to the War on Terror.

Certainly, there is no doubt that, over the last decade, we have had the opportunity to open up the doors and the lines of communication with Pakistan, particularly in the last administration, President Clinton's visit and, most recently, with the visit of President George Bush.

I believe that, in spite of the imperfection of the actions of the Pakistan Government, we do have mutual goals and aspirations, and if you talk to the people of Pakistan, you will find that there are levels of democracy, they want to have a thriving economy, and they desire to see opportunities for their young people, as we would want it to be.

Therefore, the United States has a clear interest in Pakistan. It has a clear interest in the resolution of the India, Kashmir, and Pakistan ongoing conflict, and I might make note of the fact that President Musharraf has recently said, with respect to Kashmir, that “he is for self-governance, falling between autonomy and independence, and the leaders of India are open to this new position.”

However, it is clear that we must be concerned about gender discrimination, religious freedom, economic viability, and nuclear proliferation. These are issues for debate and question. And certainly we should be concerned about the removal of the top jurist of Pakistan and any invasion in the rights of a free press.

But I think that, in spite of the challenges that we face, the doors of engagement must be opened, the United States must continue to press Pakistan to climb to its higher lengths and therefore seek opportunities for communication, collaboration, and improvement. The ongoing war against terror needs Pakistan. The idea of democracy is needed by the people of Pakistan.

So I think it is important that as we look toward mutual goals, we continue to work with President Musharraf, who has indicated his interest in on-time elections in 2007, and certainly develop the opportunity for engagement to occur amongst the Parliament, the activists, religious leaders, and others who are supporters and
encouragers of Pakistan’s growth as a new and emerging democracy. It is possible. We should continue the engagement, continue to fight in the war against terror, and continue to fight for a peaceful and thriving Pakistan that will benefit not only the United States but the people of Pakistan.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. Mr. Scott?

Mr. Scott. Mr. Chairman, let me just thank you for holding this hearing, and I look forward to the testimony from the witnesses.

Pakistan is very, very important to the future of our foreign policy. As a matter of fact, it is certainly the key centerpiece of our future, especially as we combat the terrorists. What is, of course, of the maximum import is the border situation that has to be more effectively controlled and contained, from several respects.

I visited Pakistan last year and met with the leadership there. They are wonderful people, but we have some serious, serious problems of fanaticism. It is certainly where everybody says—our CIA, all of the intelligence, the people of Pakistan, President Karzai—everybody says Osama bin Laden is on that border and is located on the Pakistani side.

There is a question of safe haven. How real is that? We need to get an understanding. Perhaps you can illuminate some information for us on that.

The other aspect of the border is that there is growing evidence that its use, in terms of transporting terrorist support mechanisms, chemicals, drugs, financial transactions—that border of Afghanistan and Pakistan, again, is the key to moving ahead in an effective manner on the War on Terror.

So it is a very important hearing. Pakistan is extremely important, and I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for pulling this hearing together, and I look forward to hearing from our witnesses.

Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. There being no further members wishing to speak, we will move on to today’s panel of exceptionally distinguished witnesses.

Dr. Husain Haqqani is director of the Center for International Relations and a professor at Boston University. He is the co-chair of the Hudson Institute's Project on the Future of the Muslim World, as well as the editor of the journal, Current Trends in Islamic Ideology. Dr. Haqqani has served as adviser to three Pakistani prime ministers and as Pakistan’s Ambassador to Sri Lanka.

Next, we will hear from Dr. Marvin G. Weinbaum, who is a professor emeritus of political science at the University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign, and served as analyst for Pakistan and Afghanistan at the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1999 to 2003. He is currently a scholar in residence at the Middle East Institute in Washington.

Ms. Lisa Curtis is a senior research fellow on South Asia at the Heritage Foundation, focusing on America’s economic security and political relationships with South Asia. Before joining Heritage, she worked on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee as a professional staff member handling the South Asia portfolio for Senator Lugar, the former chairman of the committee. From 2001 to 2003, she served as senior adviser at the State Department’s South Asia
Bureau, where she advised the assistant secretary for South Asia on Pakistan-India relations.

Without objections, the full statements of all of our witnesses will be made a part of the permanent written record, and you may proceed in any way you wish. We will begin with Dr. Haqqani.

STATEMENT OF MR. HUSAIN HAQQANI, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Mr. HAQQANI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am grateful to this subcommittee for inviting me to testify about two countries, the relations between two countries, that I love very much, Pakistan, the country of my birth, and the United States, where I now live and teach.

Close relations between Pakistan and the United States are in the interests of both nations, but the relationship between the two countries must be nuanced beyond the exchange of aid and policy concessions that has categorized their interaction over the last 60 years. It should not be subject to cycles of massive aid followed by threats of sanctions and then application of sanctions.

There is a pattern in United States-Pakistan relations, and I have elaborated that in my written testimony. Each period of close United States-Pakistan ties began with great hopes and ended up in tremendous disappointment for both sides. It seems that we are headed for that same pattern once again.

Since 9/11, the focus has been on relations with General Pervez Musharraf. Most discussion in Washington sees General Musharraf, rather than the Pakistani nation, as the linchpin of American foreign policy in the region.

Most of the money that has gone toward Pakistan in terms of aid has gone toward foreign military financing and economic support funds, basically, an amount of $10 billion, very little of which has flown in ways that are visible to the people of Pakistan as altering their daily lives.

Just for comparison, let me point out that the actual and budgeted USAID figures for 2001 to 2007 reflect $1.2 billion in foreign military funding; $1.9 billion in economic-support funds; only $111.7 million for child survival and health; and a token $64 million for democracy promotion, $16 million of which is allocated for the Election Commission of Pakistan, as if the Election Commission of Pakistan is the instrument for bringing democracy to Pakistan.

General Musharraf’s regime has been given a virtual carte blanche on human rights violations and his failure to allow the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. When General Musharraf fired the Supreme Court chief justice, prompting massive demonstrations, the State Department’s comments called for “restraint on all sides,” and then the Department spokesman, in my opinion, insulted the people of Pakistan by saying that General Musharraf was “acting in the best interests of Pakistan and the Pakistani people.”

This personalization of relations between the world’s sole superpower and a nuclear-armed nation of 150 million people is not the best way forward for either. It does not even fulfill the short-term
purpose of securing Pakistan's cooperation in the Global War against Terrorism.

The outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, Mr. Ryan Crocker, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee recently that the problems Pakistan is having are not problems of will in fighting terrorism; they are problems of capacity. There are many, including myself, who have documented that there is a longstanding relationship between Pakistan’s military and Islamist militants, but even if we accept the official view that it is only a matter of capacity, then the focus here should be on what is that lack of capacity rather than just the idea of continuing to build Pakistan's military capability.

Just to give you another example, Vice President Cheney visited Pakistan recently, and during the week he was there, there were seven suicide bombings in Pakistan. The same week, Pakistan tested its latest, long-range, nuclear-capable missile. The Hatf VI ballistic missile, launched from an undisclosed location, is said to have a range of 2,000 kilometers, which is 1,245 miles, and has the capability to hit all major cities in India, according to Pakistan's military.

Now, on the one hand, there is this tremendous ability to externally project power; on the other hand, there is a limited ability to control terrorism and to control violence at home.

A compilation of published figures of terrorism-related casualties indicates that 1,471 people were killed in Pakistan during 2006, up from 648 terrorism-related fatalities in the preceding year. It means that the U.S. assistance that went to build capacity did not build capacity because terrorism actually increased rather than decreasing as a result of the capacity-building efforts. Of these, 608 people killed in 2006 were civilians, 325 were security personnel, and 538 were said to be terrorists.

Previously, security force losses were a relatively low 81. So it is not just the Pakistani military whose capability is increasing with American assistance. The terrorists are also obviously adding to their capacity and capability, and that is a problem that needs to be addressed.

To be able to tackle extremism, a government needs legitimacy. General Musharraf's government lacks that legitimacy. He has focused on technical legality rather than legitimacy that derives from public approval. General Musharraf continues not to deal fairly with the two major political parties of Pakistan, the Pakistan People's Party, led by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and the faction of the Muslim League, led by former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif.

This increases his political isolation, compounds his legitimacy problems, and pushes him to seek adjustments with Islamists, most of whom are favorably disposed to the Taliban and al-Qaeda.

The PPP and PML remain the country's largest mainstream political parties, and both have the capacity to mobilize popular support for the state's action against terrorists, if that decision is made to take that action. Instead of courting their leaders, Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif, General Musharraf has attempted to divide the two parties. U.S. diplomats have directly or indirectly supported General Musharraf's domestic policies by hinting that Mr. Sharif and
Ms. Bhutto should make way for others within their parties, refusing to acknowledge that doing so amounts to endorsing the Pakistan military's right to determine who can or cannot lead the country's political parties.

Here, let me just add a word. There is a general perception that Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif have lost support in Pakistan because of allegations of massive corruption against them. Even in the last election, Ms. Bhutto's political party, the PPP, emerged as the single-largest vote getter in the country.

So while there are definitely charges that need to be dealt with, the military's intervention in politics has not discredited Ms. Bhutto or her party, which continues to be the single-largest vote getter in the country, and as for Mr. Nawaz Sharif's party, of course, it was split by General Musharraf, and that is the only way that he managed to keep Mr. Sharif's vote tally a little low.

The important thing is corruption needs to be tackled in Pakistan but not by military intervention.

Let me summarize, Mr. Chairman, by saying that the United States needs to pay attention to three dimensions. First, the fact that General Musharraf alone cannot bring terrorism under control, and this policy of personalization should end; second, the democratization would make Pakistan's generals accountable and, therefore, at least make it clear whether Pakistan's military is supportive of, or generally commitment to, opposing the Islamist militants; and, third, attention also needs to be paid to Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan and India, without paying attention to which, we cannot tackle the problem of Pakistan being a source of terrorism, as well as a potential ally in fighting it. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Haqqani follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. HUSAIN HAQQANI, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BOSTON UNIVERSITY

Mr. Chairman,

I am grateful to you and the members of this Subcommittee for inviting me to appear before you today. As a Pakistani now living in the United States, I consider it an honor to testify before this Subcommittee and share my views, formed over a lifetime of love for Pakistan and affection for the United States, on the subject of U.S.-Pakistan relations.

At the outset, let me begin by saying that close relations between Pakistan and the United States are in the interest of both nations. The United States needs the friendship of a stable and democratic Pakistan in its struggle against global extremism and terrorism. Pakistan would benefit enormously from alliance with the world's sole superpower and first democracy. But the relationship between the two countries must be nuanced beyond the exchange of aid and policy concessions that has characterized their interaction over the last sixty years.

Pakistan has been an ally of the United States during the cold war, in the war of resistance against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and currently in the global war against terror. Each period of close U.S.-Pakistan ties began with great hopes and ended up in tremendous disappointment for both sides. The U.S. provided large amounts of aid and showered praise on Pakistan's military rulers during the phase of strategic cooperation, only to turn off the flow of aid when circumstances changed. Pakistan's military rulers failed to keep their own end of the bargain in most cases and failed to tell the Pakistani people the truth about why the quid pro quo came to an end, leading ordinary Pakistanis to hate the United States notwithstanding the significant amounts of economic and military aid previously disbursed.

During the Eisenhower administration, Pakistan was referred to as "the most allied ally of America in Asia." But then, during much of the 1990s, Pakistan ended up as "America's most sanctioned ally when Congress imposed sanctions over a
range of issues ranging from acquisition of nuclear weapons to human rights violations and lack of democracy.

Since 9/11, the focus of U.S. policy towards Pakistan has been a replay of previous periods of engagement. Once again, large amounts of U.S. economic and military assistance, and covert aid, are flowing into Pakistan because the country's military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, gave up support for the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and chose to become an American ally. The policy has had some benefits. Pakistani support was crucial in the U.S. effort to oust the Taliban from Kabul and most senior Al-Qaeda figures now in U.S. custody were also arrested and handed over by Pakistan's security services. But Pakistan plays a contradictory role in the struggle against global Islamist terrorism—it is considered both part of the solution and part of the problem.

Most discussion in Washington sees General Musharraf rather than the Pakistani nation as the linchpin of American policy in the region. Actual and budgeted amounts of U.S. aid for Pakistan during the period 2001–2008 total $5.174 billions. It is estimated that an additional $100 million are given each month as reimbursement for Pakistan's costs in Operation Enduring Freedom and the Global War on Terror. There are no publicly available estimates for covert transfers of funds to Pakistan's army and intelligence services.

In addition to lavish praise, generous economic and military assistance and the status of a major non-NATO ally, General Musharraf's regime has been given a virtual carte blanche on human rights violations and his failure to allow the restoration of democracy in Pakistan. Let me give a recent example of the U.S. government's attitude towards General Musharraf.

A few days ago, the Pakistani ruler fired the Supreme Court Chief Justice, leading to massive demonstrations against which police used rubber bullets and tear gas. When independent television stations, allowed amid U.S. diplomatic praise by Musharraf over the last five years as a sign of his commitment to pluralism, refused to stop visual coverage of the anti-Government demonstrations, police attacked and smashed the studios of the country's most-watched TV channel. The State Department's comments called for "restraint on all sides" and department spokesman Sean McCormack insisted that Musharraf was "acting in the best interests of Pakistan and the Pakistani people."

This personalization of relations between the world's sole superpower and a nuclear-armed nation of 150-million people is not the best way forward for either. It does not fulfil even the short-term purpose of securing Pakistan's cooperation in the global war against terrorism. Pakistan continues to be a major center for Islamist militancy, the legacy of the country's projection of itself as an Islamic ideological state and a bastion of religion-based opposition to communism during the cold war.

Radical Islamists who came from all over the world to fight against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan went on to become allies of Pakistan's military intelligence apparatus, which used them to fight Indian control over the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir as well as to expand Pakistan's influence in Afghanistan. Musharraf's efforts, under U.S. pressure, to contain the Islamist radicals have consistently fallen short, leading to a resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan and a revitalization of Al-Qaeda in the rugged region constituting the Pakistan-Afghan border.

Most American analysts have been focused since 9/11 on Musharraf's ability to remain in power and keep up the juggling act between alliance with the United States and controlling various domestic constituencies, including the Pakistani military and Islamist militants.

Musharraf says that he is a leader dedicated to changing Pakistan's course from being an Islamic ideological state to a moderate Muslim country. But the imbalance between Pakistan's perceived external importance and proven internal weakness raises fundamental questions about the dysfunction of the Pakistani state. Careful examination indicates that Musharraf's eclectic policies are aimed less at changing Pakistan's direction and more part of an effort to salvage a critical policy paradigm adopted by Pakistan's military-led oligarchy since the country's early days.

That Musharraf will be able to retain power as long as the United States and the Pakistani military continue to support him is not in doubt. Barring unforeseen events, such as assassination or incapacitation by natural causes, or an unanticipated massive popular uprising that shifts the military allegiances, Musharraf seems able to provide indefinitely over a weakening Pakistani state. But there is more to Pakistan than Musharraf and sooner or later U.S. policy makers will have to turn their attention to the state of the Pakistani state.
Afghanistan, Pakistan and the Tribal Areas

In the years since 9/11, Musharraf’s critics have attributed his failure in rooting out Al-Qaeda and the Taliban to a deliberate policy decision. Musharraf has time and again made a distinction between anti-US terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaeda, who need to be eliminated or fought, and local Islamist insurgents (whether Afghan, Pakistani or Kashmiri) who can be engaged in dialogue. India and Afghanistan have both repeatedly accused Pakistan of continuing to support terrorists targeting the two neighbors with whom Pakistan has had disputes since emerging as an independent country from the 1947 partition of British India.

As violence spiraled in Kabul and the Afghan countryside at the end of 2006, Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai stepped up his criticism of Pakistan’s role in supporting a resurgent Taliban. “Pakistan hopes to make slaves out of us, but we will not surrender,” Karzai declared in a statement that marked the end of quiet diplomacy between two American allies and the beginning of more public condemnation of Pakistan by Afghanistan.

Under U.S. pressure, Pakistan has intermittently applied military force against pro-Taliban and pro-Al-Qaeda Pashtun tribesmen living along the Afghan border. But the tribesmen managed to inflict heavy casualties on the Pakistan military and in the end the government agreed to a ceasefire under a deal that restored the tribes’ autonomy in return for a commitment that they would not provide sanctuary to enemies of Pakistan. The deal would have been fine if it had helped in rooting out the Taliban or Al-Qaeda but instead it simply perpetuated their influence in parts of the federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).

Musharraf’s deals with the tribal leaders have proven ineffective in ending militancy and terrorism. The Taliban stepped up their attacks inside Afghanistan and suicide bombings in Pakistan reached an all-time high within the first two months of 2007. Several press reports based on leaks by American and British intelligence sources spoke of Al-Qaeda’s reorganization in Pakistan and tacit Pakistani backing for the Taliban.

The outgoing U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, Ryan Crocker, attempted to resolve the apparent contradiction between Washington’s publicly stated view of Musharraf as a critical U.S. ally in the war against terrorism and the persistent intelligence that terrorists operate and train in Pakistan with relative impunity. “Pakistan has been fighting terrorists for several years and its commitment to counterterrorism remains firm,” Mr. Crocker told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the hearing on his nomination as U.S. ambassador to Iraq. The challenge faced by Pakistan in coming to terms with Taliban fighters along its border with Afghanistan, he explained, lies in a lack of capacity.

Internal Weakness While Pursuing External Strength

In the last week of February 2007, Vice President Dick Cheney made a surprise visit to Islamabad. During his meeting with Musharraf, Cheney conveyed U.S. concerns about the Taliban’s resurgence and asked for closer cooperation between the Karzai and Musharraf governments. Cheney pressed Musharraf to do more in the war against terrorism while acknowledging that Musharraf has “been closely allied with us going after al Qaeda.” There was no public sign of U.S. support for, and dependence on Musharraf, waning.

If Vice President Cheney needed any reminder of the threat posed by the Taliban, it came in the form of a suicide bombing at the Bagram Military Air Base near Kabul soon after Cheney’s arrival there from Pakistan.

The week preceding Vice President Cheney’s trip was especially bloody in Pakistan, too. The country was the target of seven suicide attacks within one week, some in relatively quiet parts of the country’s heartland. Seventeen people, including a senior civil judge, were killed and 30 wounded in a powerful suicide bombing at the District Courts in the southwestern city of Quetta; Two children were killed and three security force personnel were seriously injured in two separate landmine explosions in Balochistan province, bordering Afghanistan; Sixty-seven people were killed and over 50 wounded in a fire caused by a bomb on two coaches of the India-Pakistan Samjhota (reconciliation) Express train; A woman cabinet minister was killed in central Punjab province by a religious fanatic who disapproved of her going unveiled; Several hundred female students from an Islamic seminary in the center of Islamabad continued their month-long sit-in at a public library, threatening a campaign of suicide bombings to protest curriculum reforms proposed by the government for Pakistan’s Islamic seminaries (madrasas).

The events of just that one week should be enough to highlight the increasing impotence of Pakistan’s state machinery in the face of growing violence and internal conflict. A compilation of published figures of terrorism-related casualties indicates that 1471 people were killed in Pakistan during 2006, up from 648 terrorism-related
fatalities in the preceding year. Of these, 608 were civilians, 325 security personnel and 538 terrorists. In 2005, 430 civilians and 137 terrorists were reported killed but the number of security forces losses were a relatively low 81.

Amid widespread lawlessness and the emboldening of terrorist groups, Pakistan successfully tested the latest version of its long-range nuclear-capable missile, also within the fateful February 2007 week preceding Vice President Cheney’s Islamabad visit. The Hatf VI (Shaheen II) ballistic missile, launched from an undisclosed location, is said to have a range of 2,000 kilometers (1,245 miles) and has the capability to hit major cities in India, according to Pakistan’s military. Clearly, Pakistan’s supposed ability to externally project its power is not matched with the strength of an effective state at home. In the process of building extensive military capabilities, Pakistan’s successive rulers have allowed the degradation of essential internal attributes of statehood.

An important attribute of a state is its ability to maintain monopoly, or at least the preponderance, of public coercion. The proliferation of insurgents, militias, Mafiosi and ordinary criminality reflect the state’s weakness in this key area. There are too many non-state actors in Pakistan—ranging from religious vigilantes to criminals—who possess coercive power in varying degrees. In some instances, such as the case of the madrasa students’ sit-in at the Islamabad library, the threat of non-state coercion in the form of suicide bombings weakens the state machinery’s ability to deal with the challenge to its authority.

Fake Elections

2007 is an election year in Pakistan but Musharraf has decided not to risk his position and power at a free poll. He will be “elected” president by the parliament and provincial legislatures that were elected in the tainted 2002 elections just as their term enters its last days. Some observers see Musharraf’s decision as reflecting his total hold on power in Pakistan. But Musharraf is consolidating his own position at the risk of further eroding the power and credibility of a state apparatus already in decline.

The Pakistani constitution envisions a parliamentary system of government, with directly elected legislatures at the federal and provincial levels. The President, under the constitution, is head of state and the symbol of the unity of the federation. He is, therefore, elected by an electoral college comprised of the National Assembly, the Senate and the four provincial assemblies. Under the constitutional scheme, the president derives his mandate from the mandate given by the people to their elected representatives.

The four presidents elected under the constitution since its adoption in 1973 (Chaudhry Fazal Elahi, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Farooq Leghari and Rafiq Tarar) were elected by newly elected assemblies at the beginning of their five year terms. Musharraf, on the other hand, is seeking election from assemblies whose own flawed mandate is about to come to an end. Such technical legality is not a substitute for legitimacy. Opposition political parties, notably the secular Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and the faction of the conservative Pakistan Muslim League (PML) led by Nawaz Sharif are already questioning Musharraf’s legitimacy more vehemently.

Sharif, who was prime minister at the time of Musharraf’s 1999 military coup, and Bhutto have buried their differences and joined forces in an Alliance for the Restoration of Democracy (ARD). Although both leaders are in exile at the moment, the prospect of their return to Pakistan to lead anti-Musharraf protests adds another dimension to the potential for instability in the country. Musharraf could arrest them or return them into exile but the Pakistani opposition would almost certainly be energized by the homecoming of the two politicians who led Pakistan through its weak democratic phase in the decade preceding Musharraf’s military takeover. Musharraf accuses Bhutto and Sharif of corruption but the charges, previously believed widely, have lost their significance because of the government’s failure in obtaining a conviction against the two leaders in a court of law.

The PPP and PML remain the country’s largest mainstream political parties and both have the capacity to mobilize popular support for the state’s action against terrorists. Instead of courting their leaders, Musharraf has attempted to divide the two parties. U.S. diplomats have directly or indirectly supported Musharraf’s domestic policies by hinting that Sharif and Bhutto should make way for others within their parties, refusing to acknowledge that doing so amounts to endorsing the Pakistani military’s right to determine who can or cannot lead the country’s political parties.

As of now Musharraf is “president” because he decreed himself so as a result of the rigged referendum held before the legislative elections of 2002, which were deemed by international observers and the U.S. State department as “flawed.” Then, too, Musharraf did not seek election under the terms of the constitution and gave
himself a waiver from the constitutional bar on employees of the state (a concept that includes serving military officers) holding elective office. Musharraf’s term of office, if it can be called that given that he secured the position by fiat and not by election, ends on November 16, 2007. Musharraf’s maneuver, to secure election from the outgoing legislatures, is an attempt to ensure that he remains president without having to seek election from new legislatures elected by the people.

Such quasi-legal maneuvers, aided by notions such as the doctrine of necessity and the concept of a military coup being its own legal justification, have been used by Pakistan’s military rulers since the country’s first coup in 1958 to legitimate their rule. If history is any guide, Pakistan’s coup makers have always become politically weaker after manipulating themselves into a second term.

Pakistan’s next parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held by the end of 2007, are unlikely to transform the country into a democracy or return it to civilian rule. Musharraf has made it clear that he intends to continue running the country, combining the offices of army chief and president in his own person. Musharraf has persisted in rejecting opposition demands that he transform into a civilian leader by seeking election under the constitution after retiring from the army. He has gone so far as to say, “At the end of the day I am a soldier and I love to wear the uniform. It is part of me, my second skin.”

Given Pakistan’s position as a critical ally in the global war against terrorism, neither the United States nor other Western nations are likely to apply serious pressure for political reform. Pakistan has not still been able to evolve into a democracy 59 years after being carved out of British India essentially because many of the country’s leaders, including Musharraf, have assumed that the army has the rightful authority to run Pakistan. If there is a common thread running through Pakistan’s checkered history, it is the army’s perception of itself as the country’s only viable institution and its deep-rooted suspicion of civilian political processes.

The United States is viewed by most Pakistanis as being firmly behind the army. The three periods of significant flow of U.S. aid to Pakistan have all coincided with military rule in Pakistan. According to figures provided by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) between 1954 and 2002, the U.S. provided a total of $12.6 billion in economic and military aid to Pakistan. Of these $9.19 billion were given during 24 years of military rule while only $3.4 billion were provided to civilian regimes covering 19 years. On average, US aid to Pakistan amounted to $382.9 million for each year of military rule compared with only $178.9 per annum under civilian leadership for the period until 2002. The largesse towards the Musharraf regime almost doubles the average figure of annual aid under military rule.

The Islamist Surge

The international community pays little attention to Musharraf’s legitimacy problems and the democratic politicians’ sniping at his heels. The U.S. and its allies are concerned more about the rising influence of Pakistan’s Islamists, who made their strongest showing in a general election during the 2002 parliamentary polls. The Islamists secured only 11.1 percent of the popular vote but carried 20 percent of the seats in the lower house of parliament. Since then, they have pressed for Taliban-style Islamization in the Northwest Frontier Province bordering Afghanistan, where they control the provincial administration. The Islamists’ political success, made possible by restrictions on Bhutto and Sharif, flies in the face of Musharraf’s repeated pronouncements to re-assure the world of his intention to radically alter Pakistan’s policy direction, away from the recent Islamist and Jihadi past.

In a major policy speech on January 12, 2002, Musharraf had announced measures to limit the influence of Islamic militants at home, including those previously described by him as ‘Kashmiri freedom fighters’. “No organizations will be able to carry out terrorism on the pretext of Kashmir,” he had declared. “Whoever is involved with such acts in the future will be dealt with strongly whether they come from inside or outside the country.”

But Musharraf’s government has continued to make a distinction between ‘terrorists’ (a term applied to members of Al-Qaeda members, mainly of foreign origin) and ‘freedom fighters’ (the officially preferred label in Pakistan for Kashmiri militants). Authorities have remained tolerant of remnants of Afghanistan’s Taliban regime, hoping to use them in resuscitating Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan in case the U.S.-installed Karzai regime falters.

This duality in Pakistani policy is a structural problem, rooted in history and a consistent State policy. It is not just the inadvertent outcome of decisions by some governments (beginning with that of General Ziaul Haq in 1977), as is widely believed. Pakistan’s leaders have played upon religious sentiment as an instrument of strengthening Pakistan’s identity since the country’s inception. As any Pakistani
elementary school student knows, Pakistan is an 'ideological state' and its ideology is Islam.

Under ostensibly pro-western rulers, Islam has been the rallying cry against perceived Indian threats. Such rulers have attempted to 'manage' militant Islamism, trying to calibrate it so that it serves its nation-building function without destabilizing internal politics or relations with western countries. General Ziaul Haq went farther than others in 'Islamizing' Pakistan's legal and educational system but his policy of Islamization was the extension of a consistent State ideology, not an aberration.

Islamist groups have been sponsored and supported by the State machinery at different times to influence domestic politics and support the military's political dominance. In the South Asian region, the Islamists have been allies in the Pakistan military's efforts to seek strategic depth in Afghanistan and to put pressure on India for negotiations over the future of Kashmir. As is sometimes the case, relations between ideologically motivated clients and their State patrons are not always smooth, which explains the incomplete control of Pakistan's generals over the Islamists in the post 9/11 phase. The alliance between the mosque and the military in Pakistan was forged over time, and its character has changed with the twists and turns of Pakistani history.

Pakistan's state institutions, notably national security institutions such as the military and the intelligence services, have played a leading role in building Pakistani national identity on the basis of religion since Pakistan's emergence as an independent country in August 1947. This political commitment to an 'ideological state' gradually evolved into a strategic commitment to the Jihadi ideology, especially during and after the Bangladesh war of 1971. Then, the Pakistani military used Islamist idiom and the help of Islamist groups to keep elected secular leaders supported by the majority Bengali-speaking population out of power. Bengali rebellion and brutal suppression of the Bengalis by the military followed.

In the 1971 war the country was bifurcated with the birth of an independent Bangladesh. In the original country's western wing, the effort to create national cohesion between Pakistan's disparate ethnic and linguistic groups through religion took on greater significance and its manifestations became more militant. Religious groups, both armed and unarmed, have become gradually more powerful as a result of this alliance between the mosque and the military. Radical and violent manifestations of Islamist ideology, which sometimes appear to threaten Pakistan's stability, are in some ways a State project gone wrong.

Cooperation for a Price

Pakistan's alliance with the United States has been an important part of the Pakistani ruling elite's strategy for building the Pakistani state. If Islam was the cement that would unite the disparate ethnic and linguistic groups within Pakistan, the United States was seen as the source of funding for a country that inherited only 17 percent of British India's revenue sources in 1947. The U.S.-Pakistan alliance was initiated when Pakistan's first indigenous military commander, General Ayub Khan visited Washington in 1953 and sought a "deal whereby Pakistan could—for the right price serve as the West's eastern anchor in an Asian alliance structure."

Pakistan joined U.S.-sponsored treaty organizations beginning in 1954 and the alliance flourished further once Ayub Khan took over as President in a military coup in 1958. General Musharraf, too, has followed Ayub Khan in seeking the right price for cooperation in the war against terrorism after September 11, 2001. While Pakistani rulers have bargained well for military and economic assistance since the 1950s, the U.S. has generally had to be modest in its ambitions about what it could hope to achieve. Pakistan's real or projected limitations and compulsions have repeatedly been cited during the execution stage of deals based on a quid pro quo, limiting the fulfillment of American expectations.

Secretary of State John Foster Dulles signed on Ayub Khan as an ally because he wanted to create a "northern tier of containment" with bases in countries immediately to the South of the Soviet Union. Pakistan got the aid it sought but Dulles never got the large-scale military bases he wanted in Pakistan. He had to be content with listening posts and a secret facility for U-2 reconnaissance planes flying over the Soviet Union.

Similarly, during the 1980s, General Ziaul Haq secured aid in return for the CIA operating out of Pakistan in arming and funding the Mujahideen bleeding Soviet forces in Afghanistan. But he did not keep his promises to the Reagan administration about limiting Pakistan's nuclear program and went on to assert that by helping the U.S., Pakistan had "earned the right to have a regime in Afghanistan to our liking." Instead of ending involvement with arming Mujahideen once the Soviets
left Afghanistan in 1988, as the U.S. desired, Pakistan played an active role in the Afghan civil war that ensued.

Ayub Khan, Ziaul Haq and their military successors gave U.S. policy makers some of what they sought but, at the same time, backed out of some of their commitments. It appears that the latest U.S. attempt to buy influence and policy concessions from a Pakistani military ruler are headed in a similar direction. Whether it is a divergence of interests and lack of commitment on Musharraf’s part, as his critics assert, or a lack of capacity to root out the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, as Ambassador Crocker explains, Pakistan is unlikely to fulfill Washington’s expectations in the war against terrorism. In the process, Pakistan’s own internal crises can be expected to aggravate.

An analysis of Pakistan’s 60-year history shows that it is the military’s desire to dominate the political system and define Pakistan’s national security priorities that has been the most significant though by no means the only factor in encouraging an Islamic ideological model for Pakistan.

Pakistan’s military has historically been willing to adjust its priorities to fit within the parameters of immediate U.S. global concerns. The purpose has been to ensure the flow of military and economic aid from the United States, which Pakistan considers necessary for its struggle for survival and its competition with India. Pakistan’s relations with the U.S. have been part of the Pakistani military’s policy tripod that emphasizes Islam as a national unifier, rivalry with India as the principal objective of the state’s foreign policy, and an alliance with the United States as a means to defray the costs of Pakistan’s massive military expenditures.

An important component of Pakistan’s state ideology is fear and hatred of India, which is also the justification for Pakistan’s continuous efforts to militarily equal India including the development of nuclear weapons. On each occasion that Pakistan’s path has diverged from the one jointly charted with the United States, competition with India has been one of the factors. Containing Indian influence is one of the justifications given within Pakistan for tolerating the Taliban and Islamist militants continue to be seen by some members of the Pakistani ruling elite as an unconventional counterweight to India’s preponderant power.

Pakistan’s rulers have traditionally attempted to “manage” militant Islamism, trying to calibrate it so that it serves the state’s nation-building function without destabilizing internal politics or relations with Western countries. The alliance between mosque and military in Pakistan helps maintain, and sometimes exaggerates, the psycho-political fears about national identity and security that help both, the Islamists and the generals, in their exercise of political power.

The past patterns of U.S. economic and military assistance have allowed Pakistan’s military leaders to believe that they can compete with India as long as they can make themselves useful to the United States. U.S. assistance should be calibrated to transform Pakistan from a military-dominated state to a democratic one instead of being the source of the delusions of grandeur of Pakistan’s unaccountable generals.

State Of Decline

In an effort to become an ideological state guided by a praetorian military, Pakistan has ended up accentuating its dysfunction, especially during the last two decades. Support for the Pakistani military by the United States makes it difficult for Pakistan’s weak secular civil society to assert itself and weaken Pakistan away from the rhetoric of Islamist ideology towards issues of real concern for Pakistan’s citizens.

The disproportionate focus of the Pakistani state since Pakistan’s independence in 1947 on ideology, military capability, and external alliances has weakened Pakistan internally. The country’s institutions—ranging from schools and universities to the judiciary—are in a state of general decline. The economy’s stuttering growth is dependent largely on the level of concessional flows of external resources.

Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP) stands at about $85 billion in absolute terms and $300 billion in purchasing power parity (PPP), making Pakistan’s economy the smallest of any country that has tested nuclear weapons thus far. Pakistan suffers from massive urban unemployment, rural underemployment, illiteracy, and low per capita income: one-third of the population lives below the poverty line and another 21 percent subsists just above it.

Soon after independence, 16.4 percent of Pakistan’s population was literate, compared with 18.3 percent of India’s significantly larger population. By 2003, while India had managed to attain a literacy rate of 65.3 percent, Pakistan’s stood at only about 35 percent. Today, Pakistan allocates less than 2 percent of its GDP for education and ranks close to the bottom among 87 developing countries in the amount allotted to primary schools. Its low literacy rate and inadequate investment in edu-
cation has led to a decline in Pakistan's technological base, which in turn hampers the country's economic modernization.

With a population growing at an annual rate of 2.7 percent, the state of public health care and other social services in Pakistan is also in decline. Meanwhile, Pakistan spends a greater proportion of its GDP on defense and is still unable to match the conventional forces of India, which outspends Pakistan 3 to 1 while allocating a smaller percentage of its burgeoning GDP to military spending.

As a result, Pakistan is far from developing a consistent system form of government, with persisting political polarization along three major, intersecting fault lines: between civilians and the military, among different ethnic and provincial groups, and between Islamists and secularists.

America's alliance with Pakistan, or rather with the Pakistani military, is almost always based on some immediate concern and lacks a long-term view. This pattern of partnership has had three significant consequences for Pakistan.

First, because the U.S. military sees Pakistan in the context of its Middle East strategy, Pakistan has become more oriented toward the Middle East even though it is geographically and historically a part of South Asia.

Second, the intermittent flow of U.S. military and economic assistance has encouraged Pakistan's military leaders to over-estimate their power potential. This, in turn, has contributed to their reluctance to accept normal relations with India even after learning through repeated misadventures that Pakistan can, at best, hold India to a draw in military conflict and cannot defeat it. Even now, the bulk of U.S. aid is going towards military equipment, especially the acquisition by Pakistan of additional F–16 fighter planes, sidewinder missiles and P–3 Orion aircraft.

Third, the ability to secure military and economic aid by fitting into the current paradigm of American policy has made Pakistan a rentier state, albeit one that lives off the rents for its strategic location.

These policies have, however, served to encourage extremist Islamism in Pakistan, which in the last few years has been the source of threats to both U.S. interests and global security. It is also the greatest threat to Pakistan's own long-term viability and national cohesion. The U.S. can perhaps deal better with Pakistan in the long-term by using American influence to reshape the Pakistani military's ideologically limited view of Pakistan's national interest.

Conclusion

Normalization of relations between India and Pakistan and Pakistan's return to democracy is most likely the key to the withdrawal of the military from the political arena as well as to Pakistan's long term stability. Pakistan's minority Islamists would lose credibility and legitimacy if democratic institutions operate successfully and are dominated, through free and fair elections, by secularists and moderates.

Instead of thinking only in terms of the extremes of showering Pakistan, mainly its military, with aid or of cutting that aid off, U.S. policy makers should look at the totality of the picture in Pakistan. A policy of nuanced engagement, in which U.S. officials frankly share their concerns with Pakistan's rulers and the people is far better than the current policy of portraying one individual—General Musharraf—and one institution—the Pakistan army—as America's best bet.

It is my view that the U.S. Congress, as well as the Executive Branch, should take measures that demonstrate convincingly an international interest in Pakistan's return to democracy with full participation of all major representative political personalities and parties. These measures could include funding for full monitoring of the forthcoming elections and a willingness of the executive branch to openly comment on Musharraf's refusal to abide by democratic norms.

Mr. Ackerman. Thank you very much. Next, we will hear from Dr. Weinbaum.

STATEMENT OF MARVIN G. WEINBAUM, PH.D., SCHOLAR IN RESIDENCE, PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

Mr. Weinbaum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members. There are some serious strains in our strategic partnership with Pakistan. Both countries, I believe, operate with misperceptions and retain unrealistic expectations; yet we know that forging a more cooperative relationship here is critical to our efforts, not only in securing Afghanistan against this mounting insurgency and also con-
fronting global terrorism that emanates from this region, but also at stake is our ability to ensure that nuclear proliferation does not occur and that a major conflict does not take place in the subcontinent and that Pakistan can realize a stable, democratic government.

We should take note, I believe, that Pakistan’s intelligence services have been cooperative. They have helped in apprehending leading al-Qaeda and Taliban figures, the latter less so. There are still Pakistani troops in the border areas, and they have made sacrifices.

But I suggest to you that, on balance, the contribution that Pakistan has made to the region’s counterterrorism efforts have been inconsistent, incomplete, and, yes, at times, insincere. Our policy has been confusing. We lavish praise on President Musharraf for his cooperation on terrorism while, at the same time, press him hard to act more aggressively.

There is much to commend what President Musharraf has done in this period, aligning with our strategic aims, and his expressed wish for a moderate Islamic state. But there is impatience here and rightly so, that Pakistan’s efforts seem to be selectively coercive against the Afghan insurgents and his own domestic extremists.

I also want to point out, though, that I think we must take note of the fact that the government has lost control of the border areas. Our visibility to deliver in those border areas is today quite limited, especially in the three most contentious provinces and in Northern Balochistan. What I am arguing here is that unwarranted praise of President Musharraf as well as ill-considered demands of him do not serve our partnership.

How, then, can we create greater cooperation and build a trusting, stable relationship? Expressions of appreciation, as I am suggesting here, do no good. They only reinforce the popular view in Pakistan that he basically serves American interests. Also, I must say here that economic sanctions, as such, are counterproductive. They merely succeed in confirming for most Pakistanis, even our friends there, that the United States is an unreliable partner.

We have tried sanctions, and we have suffered because of it. Better results, I think, would occur were we to alter the strategic thinking of Pakistan’s leaders and, at the same time, give them the political capacity—I repeat, political capacity—and the confidence needed to confront militant Islamic radicalism.

Now, I think there are three tasks that we have before us immediately. First, we must do more to convince Pakistan’s strategic planners that the international coalition, the United States leading it, has a long-term commitment to a regional presence. Let me say in that regard, we will not again abandon Pakistan, the region, Afghanistan, and that Pakistan should put away its Pashtun proxy card that it is holding in reserve for the time that it believes the United States and the international community will tire and that the government of Hamed Karzai will disintegrate.

Secondly, we must dispel what is the consensus view in Pakistan that the partnership is one sided, favoring the United States—and that is the view—but even more important than that, this partnership is in the favor of President Musharraf and the Army and not the people of Pakistan.
There are a number of things that Pakistan rightly complains of here, or at least makes the case for our not recognizing its energy needs; its trade problems, particularly with regard to textiles; investment policy—we have got to reach an agreement on that; the influence of India in Afghanistan; and also help with the Composite Dialogue. Let me mention also because Professor Haqqani has mentioned it, that the people of Pakistan, as such, do not experience the benefits of this partnership, which is overwhelmingly for military and budget support.

Thirdly, we should make a far greater effort to convince Musharraf that his professed desire for enlightened moderation cannot be realized without reconfiguring his political constituency. Now, that means, I think, the following: He has got to be able to take the risks associated with harnessing the popular forces in Afghanistan—and they are there—that are basically moderate, against extremism.

He cannot succeed with the party that he has at the moment, cobbled together, based on bribes and intimidation. He needs a more inclusive constituency that co-ops progressive political alignments that he has heretofore demonized and tried to cripple.

I want to conclude my remarks, sir, by saying that if Pakistan fails to make progress in resolving its civilian and military strains, if it continues to compromise, as it has, with forces of intolerance and radicalism, and if it ignores political and economic grievances, as I believe it has, we could find ourselves without a partner for realizing our objectives.

A more reliable partnership calls for us to be clear, consistent, and realistic in demands while, at the same time, also addressing Pakistan's legitimate concerns and complaints. As it is, our strategic partnership with Pakistan is fragile. It rests too heavily on the political survival of one man and military rule facing formidable domestic challenges and declining legitimacy. It needs to be based on broad institutional and public supports that could better ensure the continuity of this partnership.

And then, let me say, finally, that it would, indeed, be tragic if, in seeking to win Musharraf and his military, we lost Pakistan and the vital contribution that it can make to global and United States security. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weinbaum follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARVIN G. WEINBAUM, PH.D., SCHOLAR IN RESIDENCE, PUBLIC POLICY CENTER, THE MIDDLE EAST INSTITUTE

THE UNITED STATES AND PAKISTAN: TOWARD STRENGTHENING A TROUBLED PARTNERSHIP

The U.S.’s strategic partnership with Pakistan is in a troubled state. Neither country is at ease with the current relationship. Both operate with misperceptions and retain unrealistic expectations. Mutual suspicions have increased among senior officials, as have negative public images in both countries. Yet forging a more cooperative relationship is timely and critical to efforts by the U.S. to secure Afghanistan against a mounting insurgency and confront global terrorist threats from the region. Also at stake is our ability to ensure against nuclear proliferation and major conflict on the subcontinent, and to promote a stable democratic Pakistan.

Recent strains in relations grow from evidence that Al Qaeda has managed to reconstitute an organizational presence in the border areas with Afghanistan and that the Afghan Taliban plan a massive spring offensive. Many hold the Islamabad government accountable for failure to check Taliban recruitment, training and financing. With the signing of the North Waziristan agreement, there are fears that con-
trol over this tribal agency and elsewhere along the Afghan border has been ceded to extremist elements supporting the insurgency.

At the same time, Pakistan’s intelligence services are known to have cooperated closely with the U.S., notably in apprehending several major Al-Qaeda and Taliban figures. The Islamabad government also points to the many thousand Pakistani troops still present in the border areas and the heavy sacrifices incurred in military operations that began in 2003. Pakistan’s in fact limited success in counter insurgency is usually explained in terms of insufficient capacity. Yet its contributions to the region’s counter-terrorism efforts also seem inconsistent, incomplete, and at times, insincere.

Our policy has been similarly confusing: lavishing praise on President Pervez Musharraf for his cooperation on terrorism while also pressing him to act more aggressively. We regularly commend Musharraf for publicly aligning his country with our strategic aims, for his appeals for Islamic moderation, and for his conciliatory overtures toward India. Our continuing military and economic assistance serves as reward for cooperation. Any criticisms are carefully balanced with favorable comments so as to avoid undermining Musharraf, especially with his own military. Increasingly, however, there is impatience with what appears to be Pakistan’s very selective coercion against Afghan insurgents and domestic extremists. Both unwarranted praise of Musharraf and ill-considered demands could threaten the future of the partnership.

The difficulty with our approach is its failure to recognize what Musharraf can in fact deliver and why. It does not appreciate how facts on the ground in the critical border areas, domestic political constraints, and Pakistan’s traditional strategic concerns have affected the level of cooperation. We need to acknowledge that the Islamabad government has effectively lost control over three tribal agencies and northern Balochistan. They are largely no-go areas for the Pakistani military. Islamabad’s three-year policy of militarization in Waziristan was a dismal failure. A humiliated army, not well trained, equipped, or motivated for counter-insurgency, grew frustrated.

At the same time, a disaffected public turned against a war on the frontier that it believed pitted Pakistani against Pakistani at the behest of the U.S. The army’s negotiated disengagement last year has resulted in a state within a state under the sway of radical clerics and young militants known for their sympathy for the Afghan insurgents. Agreements with supposed traditional leaders are mostly a charade as those sympathetic toward the government have been intimidated or killed by the militant extremists. The agreement in North Waziristan was only made to appear to be signed by traditional leaders. While the army has lived up to its part of the agreement or more accurately its sell out, the Taliban have observed very little of their end of the bargain.

For policy makers in Islamabad to undertake a more concerted effort to close training camps, apprehend militant leaders, and minimize cross-border activity will also entail curbing those jihadi groups—many created pre-9/11 as surrogate arms of the Pakistan military for struggles in Kashmir and Afghanistan—that give aid and comfort to the Afghan insurgents. Several are associated with religious parties and are popular for their social welfare activities. Aside from those extremists engaged in sectarian killing, Musharraf and his army are also loath to put these groups out of business as long as they believe that U.S. and international forces will eventually tire of the fight in Afghanistan. When that occurs, they believe that the jihadi groups together with their Pashtun clients will insure Pakistan a Pashtun-based sphere of influence in a disintegrating Afghanistan.

A More Promising Approach

How then can the U.S. win greater cooperation and also build a more trusting, sustainable relationship? Expressions of appreciation for Musharraf’s assistance do little good and, in fact, mostly re-enforce the popular view that he basically serves American interests. Sometimes even saying nothing on a controversial issue can be read in Pakistan as signaling our approval if not our instigation of government policy. Also counterproductive are threats of economic sanctions such have come from this Congress. They merely succeed in confirming for most Pakistanis—even our friends—that the U.S. is an unreliable partner. We tried sanctions against Pakistan over its nuclear program in the 1990s and lost vital links to its military and intelligence services. In fact, even though sanctions any time soon seem unlikely, judging from the reactions in Pakistan, the damage to American credibility has already been done. We would have better results if we devoted more of our efforts to identifying policies that would change some of the strategic thinking of Pakistan’s leaders, and give them the political confidence needed to confront militant Islamic radicalism.
An American policy should at a minimum assume three tasks: First, the U.S. must do more to convince Pakistan's strategic planners that the international coalition has a long-term commitment to a regional presence. Second, we must dispel the near consensus view among Pakistanis that the American partnership is not with them so much as with Musharraf and the army. And third, we should make a far greater effort to convince Musharraf that his professed desire for “enlightened moderation” for his country cannot be realized without reconfiguring his political constituency.

Pakistan requires assurance that history will not be repeated, that the U.S. will not abandon it on realizing its major objectives in the region. The U.S. is still perceived as having forsaken its ally in the war with Bangladesh in 1971, and as losing interest in the region after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989. Above all, the U.S. and its NATO allies must leave no doubt of their determination to defeat the Afghan insurgency and willingness to remain long enough to build the Afghan security force necessary to secure the country’s long term defenses. Nor can there be any question that the international community is committed to the extended investment that will be necessary to build Afghan state institutions and the economy. Only the demonstration of an international determination to prevail can force Pakistan leaders to rethink their strategy of retaining a Pashtun proxy card in the event of a failed Afghan state. However, Islamabad should be assured that Afghanistan will not be used by India to mount activities aimed at destabilizing or dismembering Pakistan. More positively, the U.S. must do more to end the blame game between Kabul and Islamabad mainly by promoting further mediation that allays mutual suspicions and begins to remove the border issue from contention.

The general view in Pakistan is that the benefits of the partnership with the U.S. have been one-sided. Popular backing of Musharraf’s decision to desert the Taliban in late 2001 was widely interpreted as earning Pakistan handsome rewards from the U.S. But Washington’s offer of nuclear cooperation with India and its denial to Pakistan are seen as testimony that the U.S. has cast its lot economically and strategically with India. Washington meanwhile appears anxious to thwart Pakistan’s attempts to address its serious energy requirements. Further sore points are the failure to reach an investment agreement with Pakistan, and Washington’s refusal to amend U.S. textile policies. Pakistan also feels that the U.S. could encourage New Delhi to show greater flexibility in India’s on-going composite dialogue with Pakistan.

The estimated $10 billion in aid has gone overwhelmingly for military and for budgetary support, and is barely noticed by Pakistan’s public. The strategic partnership that now exists between the U.S. and Pakistan must be affirmed not just through continuing programs aimed at security and regime stability but in long-term and convincing contributions to uplifting Pakistan’s society. As the U.S. response to the 2005 earthquake suggests, aid to the public health sector can have an immediate and favorable—if only short lived—impact on public attitudes. Additionally, a stronger commitment in the U.S. aid program nationwide for education at the primary and secondary levels is overdue. Most of the support is earmarked for the contentious tribal areas where these and other development projects are primarily intended to win political loyalties away from the Pakistani branch of the Taliban.

Changing the public’s image of American foreign policy is obviously more difficult. Without doubt, wide opposition to our military interventions and allies in the Middle East contribute to our dismally low popular standing in Pakistan. That these sentiments also include the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan is likely because we have indiscriminately labeled all insurgencies and use of violence in the region as part of the war on terrorism. Thus most Pakistanis have come to see international involvement in Afghanistan including the fight in the borderlands as a war against Islam, and thus not their war. Musharraf obviously finds it difficult to move decisively against the Taliban when it is widely believed that he is acting on the behest of the Americans.

**Altering the Political Landscape**

Any hope for a more vigorous effort by Pakistan against domestic extremism will take a significant change in Pakistan’s domestic political landscape. Musharraf cannot be expected to take the risks involved in greater cooperation with the U.S. or, for that matter, realize the aspirations of most Pakistanis with his jerrybuilt political party and contingent loyalties of his generals. He cannot succeed with a party, ambitious only for the perks of office, cobbled together by defectors brought onboard by bribes and intimidation. He must move quickly to build a more inclusive constituency that co-opts progressive political elements that he has demonized and tried to cripple. Another five years in the political wilderness may very well destroy
the remaining political mainstream. It may not be too late to promote a new contract among the major political parties that could shape a more authentic democratic political culture. By failing to give up his uniform Musharraf has passed up opportunities to invest Pakistan’s civilian presidency with greater moral and constitutional authority.

We should not be afraid of Pakistan’s opening its political system. Despite the dismal performance of elected governments during the decade prior to 1999, those politically aware in Pakistan still generally aspire to democracy. Even the military often feels obliged to honor some democratic norms. Polls and election results continue to show that Pakistan’s public prefers political moderates. The country’s religious parties, many with jihadi or sectarian offshoots, have traditionally fared poorly in competition with the secular parties. Whatever successes the religious parties achieved in the last national election for the National Assembly and provincial assemblies could not have been achieved without the military’s manipulation of the process. But by continuing to marginalize or buy off political moderates, Musharraf may succeed in leaving the religious parties as the default choice for those displeased with military rule.

Our official position is that democracy in Pakistan is “a home grown affair,” and that it is up the Pakistanis to decide on their system of governance and democracy. But the U.S. has too much at stake to act indifferently. Washington refrained from cautioning or criticizing Musharraf when he claimed the presidency through a fraudulent referendum, arbitrarily enhanced his constitutional powers, pre-cooked national elections, and then reneged on a pledge to take off his uniform. We have indicated our preference for free and fair elections but have never set a very high bar for compliance. Our recent overly cautious reaction to the suspension of the country’s chief justice is another example of how the U.S. regularly manages to reinforce the perception among Pakistanis of double standards and preference for military-ascendant governments.

Musharraf may continue to remain at Pakistan’s helm through expedient alliances and electoral manipulation. But 2007 could be a critical election year. Musharraf may feel the need to ensure a parliamentary majority by aligning his party loyalists with one of the jihadi-supporting, pro-Taliban religious parties. Should he also refuse to doff his uniform, insist that he be elected by a lame duck parliament, and his supporters too transparently pre-cook the election results, the credibility of the political process and his legitimacy could be seriously challenged, if not in the courts then in the streets. The implications of this outcome for the U.S. are certain to be far reaching.

Conclusion

Cooperation on counter-terrorism and, in particular, targeting high-value Al-Qaeda leaders, has trumped all other American demands on Pakistan. But Washington’s confidence in Musharraf, designed to strengthen his resolve, has, in effect, given the president a pass on satisfying us on the issues of democracy, nuclear proliferation, and extremism. Strengthening our partnership through new resources for the military and measures intended to bolster Musharraf domestically will not serve our interests if it appears that the U.S. is also in lock step with a leadership that is presiding over a country beset with increasing corruption and lawlessness. If Pakistan fails to make progress in resolving its civilian-military strains, compromises with forces of intolerance and radicalism, and ignores popular economic and political grievances, we could find ourselves without a partner for realizing any of our objectives or the greater interests in the region.

While the U.S. cannot tell Pakistan how to fashion its political system, it does have leverage that it has been reluctant to use or has employed in counter-productive ways. A more reliable partnership calls for the U.S. to be clear, consistent, and realistic in its demands while also addressing Pakistan’s legitimate concerns and complaints. With these policies Pakistan’s leaders may be more willing to accept the reasonable risks associated with harnessing popular forces against extremism. Very probably most Pakistanis would welcome greater American activism that stood up for democratic principles and interventions unambiguously designed to help the country to overcome its socioeconomic deficits.

As it is, our strategic partnership with Pakistan is fragile. It rests too heavily on the political survival of one man and a military rule facing formidable domestic challenges and declining legitimacy. As a consequence, the relationship lacks the kind of broad institutional and public supports that could better insure its continuity. In our preoccupation with counter-insurgency, we have allowed Musharraf to appear indispensable to U.S. interests. Indeed, any change at the top would bring uncertainty and is unlikely to produce a leader able to offer greater cooperation. But
if Musharraf's presidency loses its credibility, the military will judge him a liability and soon replace him.

While the U.S. will not exercise much influence over the outcome, a new leadership will remain mindful of American stakes in the region. The military has no desire to lose the material benefits of the relationship or chance pushing the U.S. toward a close strategic alignment with India. One possibility is that the military might, as in 1988, step back to allow somewhat wider berth to an elected civilian government. However, for a functional democracy and a productive partnership with the U.S., the Pakistan military must finally conclude that it serves the country best as its constitutional guardians and not rulers. For the present, it would indeed be tragic if, in seeking to win over Musharraf and his military, we lost Pakistan.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much. Ms. Curtis.

STATEMENT OF MS. LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIA STUDIES CENTER, HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Ms. CURTIS. Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. It is an honor to testify before this subcommittee on such an important and timely topic. I will briefly summarize my written statement and ask that my full statement be included in the hearing record.

Encouraging Pakistan on a course of stability and prosperity that emphasizes development and freedom for its own people and peace with its neighbors is one of the most important tasks before United States policymakers. Achieving this goal will not only benefit the 1.5 billion people in South Asia, but it will also help ensure America's own safety by uprooting terrorist ideology and lessening chances of future terrorist attacks.

The recent release of the confessions of September 11th mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, remind us of the crucial role Pakistan is playing in fighting the Global War against Terrorism. On March 3, 2003, Pakistani security forces arrested Khalid Sheikh Mohammed in an early morning raid on a house in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. We will never know how many more innocent lives might have been lost without Pakistan's help in tracking and successfully capturing this brutal terrorist.

Press reports indicate that Pakistan has also recently arrested Taliban leader Mullah Obaidullah Akhund. If true, the arrest would mark a watershed in Islamabad's efforts in the overall War on Terrorism. Akhund would be the most senior Taliban leader ever apprehended by Islamabad, and his arrest would signal that Taliban is no longer safe in Pakistan.

The arrest would also help improve Pakistan-Afghanistan ties, which have deteriorated significantly over the last year. Lastly, it would help dispel doubts in the United States about Pakistan's commitment to denying sanctuary to Taliban fighters.

One of the primary areas on which the United States will need to focus its counterterrorism efforts over the next several years will be Pakistan's tribal borderlands. This region has developed into one of the most dangerous terrorist safe havens in the world today. The Taliban, many of whom fled to the region following the United States invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, continue to launch attacks from the area against coalition forces.

Compounding the problem is the emergence in the region of Pashtun extremists, sometimes referred to as the “new” or “Pakistani” Taliban. These elements also seek to implement Taliban-style rule in parts of Pakistan. The largely ungoverned border
areas also provide a hospitable environment for al-Qaeda elements, which are apparently regrouping in the region.

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and his military commanders have taken steps against terrorists in the border areas and have suffered severe losses in doing so. Over 700 of their soldiers have fallen to the enemy. Even so, there remain legitimate questions about the overall commitment of the Pakistan Government to controlling the myriad extremist groups that exist on its soil. There are concerns that Pakistani military and intelligence officials continue to have links with Taliban and Kashmiri militant leaders, who, in turn, have links to al-Qaeda.

Although Pakistan has cut official ties to the Taliban and reined in infiltration of militants crossing the line of control from Pakistan into Indian-held Kashmir, the government could do more to shut down these groups completely. The government should close down all militant and terrorist training camps and restrict the movement and activities of key terrorist leaders.

To understand the complex links among the various terrorist groups in Pakistan, consider the kidnapping and slaying of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in January 2002. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed has confessed to murdering Daniel Pearl, but members of the Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based terrorist group that focuses on fighting in Kashmir, kidnapped Pearl initially. Pakistan officially banned the Jaish-e-Mohammed in 2002 but never formally charged its leader, Masood Azhar, with a crime. The group has its roots in the Afghan war against the Soviets, and its cadres trained at Taliban camps in the late 1990s.

The links among these terrorist groups, and the Pakistan Government’s reluctance to crack down forcefully on some of them, has emboldened them in their attacks against both Western targets and South Asian targets and allowed themselves to enmesh deeper into Pakistani society.

Islamabad needs to adopt an uncompromising policy toward all terrorist and militant groups operating on its territory; otherwise, the country risks facing a permanent state of instability on both its western and eastern borders, as well as increasing international isolation for what could be perceived as tacit support for terrorist attacks against the West.

The Pakistani military conducted operations in the tribal zones from early 2004 through the fall of 2006 that did help keep Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders in disarray and on the run. At the same time, however, these operations resulted in the loss of hundreds of Pakistani soldiers, a disruption of the traditional tribal form of governance in the areas, alienation of the local population, and flagging support among the broader Pakistani populace, who viewed them as increasingly detrimental to Pakistan’s own security interests.

For these reasons, President Musharraf, last September, announced a peace deal with tribal leaders in North Waziristan. The pact called for an end to offensive Pakistani military operations in exchange for the tribal rulers’ cooperation in restricting Taliban and al-Qaeda activities. Many observers, including myself, were skeptical that the peace agreement would achieve the desired result of decreasing cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. Six months later, the verdict is in, and United States officials now
admit openly that the agreement has failed to stem the problem and may, in fact, have strengthened al-Qaeda and Taliban in the region.

There is an urgent need for close cooperation between the United States and Pakistan to carry out targeted intelligence and military operations in these areas. Such operations will keep terrorist plotters on the run and without the space, resources, and communications ability to conduct further attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan, within Pakistan itself, and against Western targets.

Economic assistance is an important part of stabilizing these areas over the medium to long term. The Bush administration understands this and has recently pledged to spend $750 million over 5 years on economic development, education, and health projects in the tribal areas. Congress should approve this new aid program and carefully monitor its implementation.

However, economic development alone will not be enough to thwart the aims of the terrorists. There is a nexus of extremists in the tribal areas who share similar, pan-Islamic, anti-West goals and who will remain a threat to the civilized world, no matter how much aid we provide to the region.

Although President Musharraf has been a strong ally in the War on Terrorism, there are some costs for the United States in focusing its policy solely on supporting Musharraf, especially if he chooses to alienate the secular, moderate political forces in Pakistan in order to tighten his own grip on power.

Mr. ACKERMAN. If you would begin to summarize, please.

Ms. CURTIS. This has become increasingly clear over the past week as we watched the Pakistani public's reaction to the Musharraf government’s suspension of Supreme Court Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry.

So, in conclusion, I believe the best way to encourage Pakistan on a path of moderation and stability is to nudge the country toward a paradigm shift in its approach to its own security. This shift would include prioritization of economic and democratic development and the pursuit of better relations with neighboring countries, Afghanistan and India.

Pursuing these kinds of diplomatic initiatives will take time and patience, which should eventually help to change the dynamics in Pakistan that have undermined stability in the region for so long and contributed to the global terrorism problem over the last decade.

That concludes my remarks. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Curtis follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MS. LISA CURTIS, SENIOR RESEARCH FELLOW, ASIA STUDIES CENTER, HERITAGE FOUNDATION

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today. It is an honor to testify before this Subcommittee on one
of the most critical foreign policy challenges facing our country today: ensuring Pakistan sets itself on a course of stability and prosperity that emphasizes development and freedom for its own people and peace with its neighbors. Achieving this goal will not only benefit the 1.5 billion people in the South Asia region, but it will also help ensure America’s own safety by uprooting terrorist ideology and lessening the chances of future terrorist attacks against the West.

**The Battle Against Extremism and Terrorism**

The recent release of the confessions of the September 11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed remind us of the crucial role Pakistan is playing in fighting the war against terrorism. On March 3, 2003, Pakistani security forces arrested Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and two accomplices in an early morning raid on a house in Rawalpindi, Pakistan. We will never know how many more lives might have been lost without the Pakistani security forces’ help in tracking and successfully capturing this brutal terrorist four years ago. Americans are safer today because of Pakistani assistance in this operation as well as others that have netted key al-Qaeda operatives like Ramzi Bin al-Shib, Abu Zubaida, and Abu Faraj al-Libby, to name a few.

Numerous press accounts indicate that Pakistan security agencies arrested Taliban leader Mullah Obaidullah Akhund at the end of last month. If true, Akhund would be the most senior Taliban leader ever arrested by the Pakistanis and would mark a watershed in Islamabad’s efforts in the overall war on terrorism. Arresting such a key leader of the Taliban movement would send a strong signal that the Taliban is no longer safe in Pakistan and would help to improve Pakistan-Afghanistan ties, which have deteriorated significantly over the last year due to the upsurge in violence in Afghanistan. Lastly, such an arrest would help dispel doubts in the U.S. about Pakistan’s commitment to denying sanctuary to Taliban fighters.

One of the primary areas on which the U.S. will need to focus its counterterrorism efforts over the next several years will be Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which consist of seven semi-autonomous tribal agencies along the border with Afghanistan. These tribal borderlands constitute one of the most dangerous terrorist safe havens in the world today. Taliban members, many of whom fled to the tribal agencies following the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001, now launch attacks from the area against coalition forces in Afghanistan. Compounding the problem is the emergence in the region of Pashtun extremists (sometimes referred to as the “new” or “Pakistani” Taliban, who seek to implement Taliban-style rule in parts of Pakistan. The Pashtun-dominated, and largely ungoverned, border areas also provide a hospitable environment for al-Qaeda elements, and there are growing indications that al-Qaeda has re-grouped and re-trenched in this region.

Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf and his military commanders have taken effective steps against terrorists in the border areas and have suffered severe losses: Over 500 of their soldiers have fallen to the enemy since 2004. Terrorists targeted a Pakistan Army base in the Northwest Frontier Province just last November, killing over 40 Pakistani soldiers. The bombing appears to have been in retaliation for a missed strike against a terrorist hideout along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border several days prior. A recent spate of attacks, including a suicide bombing in Peshawar that killed a dozen police officers on January 27, a suicide attack at the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad on January 26, and a bomb attack on a Pakistani military convoy on January 22 demonstrate that Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorism.

Even so, there remain legitimate questions about the willingness and/or ability of the Pakistan government to control the myriad extremist groups that exist on its soil. There appear to be continuing links among lower-level Pakistani military and intelligence officials with Taliban and Kashmiri militant leaders, who in turn have links to al-Qaeda. Pakistan supported the Taliban throughout the 1990s with the strategic aim of denying India, as well as Iran and the Central Asian countries, a strong foothold in Afghanistan and ensuring a friendly regime in Kabul that would refrain from making territorial claims on Pakistan’s Pashtun areas along the Pak-
The Pakistan government has cut official ties to the Taliban and reined in infiltration of militants crossing the Line of Control from Pakistan into Indian-held Kashmir. However, Pakistan has refused to shut down training camps or to detain key terrorist leaders for longer than a few weeks at a time.

To understand the complex links among the various terrorist groups in Pakistan, consider the kidnapping and slaying of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl in January 2002. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed has confessed to murdering Daniel Pearl but members of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JEM), a Pakistan-based terrorist group that focuses on fighting in Kashmir, kidnapped Pearl initially. Pakistan officially banned the JEM in 2002, but never formally charged its leader, Masood Azhar, with a crime. Indian security forces had captured Azhar in Kashmir in the early 1990s but were forced to release him in 1999 during a hostage swap to free 155 passengers on a hijacked Indian plane that flew to Kandahar, Afghanistan, where the Taliban facilitated the hostage takers. In January 2000, Azhar surfaced in Karachi, Pakistan, where he was met with a hero’s welcome by thousands of supporters. The JEM has roots in the Afghan war against the Soviets, and its cadres trained at Taliban camps in the late 1990s. The JEM (then called the Harakat-ul-Mujahideen) reportedly suffered several casualties during U.S. strikes on terrorist training camps in Afghanistan in 1998 in retaliation for al-Qaeda bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa.

The links among these various terrorist groups and the Pakistan security agencies’ ambivalent attitude toward them has emboldened these groups in their attacks against both Western and South Asian targets and allowed them to enmesh themselves deeper into Pakistani society.

Islamabad needs to adopt an uncompromising policy toward all terrorist and militant groups operating on its territory. Otherwise, the country risks facing a permanent state of instability on both its western and eastern borders and increasing international isolation for what could be perceived as official tacit support for terrorist attacks against the West. Reports of links between those involved in the foiled London airliner bomb plot in mid-August and Pakistani terrorist groups that traditionally operate in Jammu and Kashmir further demonstrate the dangers of not cracking down forcefully on all terrorist and militant groups in Pakistan. It is only through a comprehensive, integrated policy that seeks to fully root out anti-West terrorist ideology that Pakistan will achieve the objectives President Musharraf laid out so eloquently in a June 1, 2004 Washington Post op-ed. In that article, President Musharraf called on the Muslim world to reject militancy and extremism and to adopt a path of socioeconomic uplift.

Developments in Pakistan’s FATA over the last five years provide a stark example of the challenges of combating extremism and terrorism in Pakistan. The Pakistani military conducted operations in the tribal zones from early 2004 through the fall of 2006 that helped keep Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders in disarray and on the run. At the same time, the Pakistani military operations helped to counter the enemy; however, they also resulted in the loss of hundreds of Pakistani soldiers; a disruption of the traditional tribal form of governance in the semi-autonomous areas; alienation of the local population; and flagging support among the broader Pakistani population who viewed them as increasingly detrimental to Pakistan’s own security interests.

For these reasons, President Musharraf last September announced a “peace deal” with tribal leaders in North Waziristan that called for an end to offensive Pakistani military operations in exchange for the tribal rulers’ cooperation in restricting Taliban and al-Qaeda activities. Many observers, including myself, were skeptical that the peace agreement would achieve the desired result of decreasing cross-border attacks into Afghanistan. Last October, I wrote that “the next several months will be crucial in determining whether Musharraf’s Waziristan deal would advance U.S. interests by denying safe haven to terrorists or enhance Taliban and al-Qaeda influence in the region, making it easier for terrorists to plot, organize, and train.” Six months later, the verdict is in and U.S. officials now admit openly that the agreement has failed to stem the problem and has, in fact, strengthened al-Qaeda and Taliban in the region.

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An earlier peace agreement in the Shakhai Valley of South Waziristan made between the Pakistan military and Pakistani Pashtun militant leader Nek Mohammed in April 2004 also failed to accomplish Pakistan government objectives. In that agreement, Nek Mohammed had apparently agreed to lay down his arms and register foreign militants in the area. The deal, however, broke down almost immediately, with Mohammed denying he had agreed to hand over al-Qaeda and Taliban militants and killing tribal elders who had helped to broker the deal. A missile strike killed Mohammed and several of his supporters in June 2004.67

There is an urgent need for close cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan to carry out targeted intelligence and military operations in these areas to keep terrorist plotters on the run and without the space, resources, and communications ability to conduct further attacks against coalition forces in Afghanistan, within Pakistan itself, and against Western targets.

The Pakistani leadership argues that military operations alone will not help tame the Tribal Areas. The Musharraf government realizes the peace deal has not been fully effective, but also is not ready to resume military operations. Instead the Pakistani government supports a combination of initiatives involving extending the government writ in the semi-autonomous areas, infusing economic and development assistance in the region, scrutinizing the borders more closely, and repatriating the two million Afghan refugees that now reside in Pakistani camps. Pakistani officials note that the unfavorable situation in the tribal belt has developed over a span of 25 years, and therefore is not easily reversible.

Economic assistance is an important part of stabilizing these areas over the medium- to long-term. The Bush Administration also understands this and has recently pledged to spend $750 million over five years on economic development, education, and health projects in the region. Another $75 million will go toward helping to modernize Pakistan’s frontier corps. This new assistance supplements the $3.2 billion five-year military and economic assistance package already extended by the United States. Congress should approve this new aid program and carefully monitor its implementation to ensure it is accomplishing the desired objectives. Given the security situation in these areas, this will be no easy task.

However, economic development alone will not be enough to thwart the aims of the terrorists whose training and planning are underway now to undermine Afghan stability and to continue murdering innocents throughout the world. There is a nexus of extremists in the Tribal Areas who share similar pan-Islamic, anti-West goals and who will remain a threat to the civilized world no matter how much aid we provide to the region. The U.S. will need to maintain diplomatic pressure on the Pakistan government to deal effectively with these terrorists, since continuing sympathy for the Taliban among some parts of the Pakistan security establishment will pose obstacles for President Musharraf.

Pakistan’s Uncertain Political Future

Pakistan’s political future has become increasingly uncertain in the last week with the decision by the Musharraf government to dismiss Supreme Court Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. Lawyers across the country and the general population have protested the government action and accused the Musharraf government of stifling media coverage of their public demonstrations. President Musharraf publicly apologized to the major Pakistani television outlets for raids on their offices that he claims he did not order. The confrontation between the Musharraf government and the lawyers represents the growing divide between the military and civilian leaders. Pakistani lawyers and the political opposition insist the government’s move is an attempt to get rid of a judge who is known for his independence and willingness to challenge the government in several high-profile cases.

Washington’s reaction to the recent political developments in Pakistan has been relatively muted, with calls for restraint by all sides, reflecting its desire to maintain stability in the country.

Although President Musharraf has been a stalwart ally in the war on terrorism, there are some costs for the U.S. in focusing its policy solely on supporting Musharraf, especially if he chooses to alienate the secular, moderate political forces in Pakistan in order to tighten his own grip on power. There is a need for the U.S. to extend contacts and visibility with a variety of civilian leaders in Pakistan.

Promoting a more open and transparent political process in Pakistan will help to curb the influence of extremist groups over the longer term. Before the 2002 elec-

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tions, religious parties that backed the Taliban traditionally received less than 8 percent of the popular vote and had been marginalized in the 1988, 1990, 1993, and 1997 national elections. In the 2002 elections, however, the religious parties performed well in the areas bordering Afghanistan and increased their total vote share to about 11 percent, partly because of changes in election rules that favored them over the secular parties and partly because of anti-American sentiment in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border provinces. The secular Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which is led in exile by former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, grabbed about 25 percent of the popular vote in the 2002 elections.

The full participation of the main secular democratic parties, including the PPP and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz), in the upcoming elections would provide more political choices to Pakistani voters and instill greater confidence in Pakistan's democratic process. Charges of corruption leveled against Benazir Bhutto and her husband have tainted her personal reputation, but the PPP as a party continues to attract individuals who support secular-based policies. The PPP recently led efforts in the Pakistani parliament to repeal the controversial Hudood ordinances that discriminate against women. The Musharraf government supported this legislation and facilitated the parliament’s passage of the Women’s Protection Bill in November 2006. The action demonstrates the possibilities for bringing progressive change to Pakistani society when the Musharraf government works in concert with the mainstream secular parties.

The Pakistan military’s pervasive involvement in civilian affairs has stifled the development of civil society and the establishment of democratic institutions. Pakistan has been ruled by the military for over half of its existence. Even during periods of civilian rule, the military has wielded tremendous power over decision-making. Although the military is unlikely to submit fully to a civilian government in the near term, Washington should set benchmarks that begin to restrict the military’s role in Pakistani politics. U.S. officials should also convey a consistent public message that calls for free, fair, and transparent elections in 2007 and 2008 and emphasizes the importance of democracy as a way to lessen the influence of extremist forces. The U.S. should also discourage further changes in the election rules or other government manipulations of the electoral process.

Improving U.S. Image Through Assistance Programs

Carefully targeted U.S. aid programs can help to counter anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and limit the influence of radicals who use hatred of the U.S. to mobilize political support. A visible U.S. aid presence in the country will reassure the Pakistani population that Washington is committed to average Pakistanis, not just to the military leadership. U.S. assistance programs that focus on building institutions and promoting human rights and democracy and that target the health and education sectors would show that the U.S. is committed to Pakistan’s success as a stable and prosperous country and deflect extremists’ arguments that Washington is investing only in exploiting Pakistan for its own purposes. Washington must work to overcome the suspicions of Pakistanis who remember when the U.S. abruptly cut off its large-scale aid program because of Pakistan’s nuclear program in the early 1990s.

For this reason I have argued against conditioning aid to Pakistan through U.S. legislation. Most U.S. policymakers acknowledge that cutting our assistance to Pakistan in the early 1990s was a mistake because it cost the U.S. valuable leverage and stoked strong anti-U.S. sentiment that still exists in the country. Public debate on limiting U.S. assistance to Pakistan could actually weaken Musharraf’s hand in convincing his military commanders that the U.S. is a reliable partner. Pressuring the Pakistan government is best done out of the public eye. President Musharraf already contends with public opposition to his support for U.S. counterterrorism goals in the region and conditioning aid through legislation would awaken memories of 1990 and weaken Pakistani public support for pursuing relations with the U.S.

Regrettably, security concerns have forced the U.S. to limit the size and scope of its assistance projects in the country. Less than 10 percent of U.S. total assistance to Pakistan since 9/11 has gone toward development and humanitarian aid. Most U.S. economic assistance to Pakistan over the past five years has been in the form of budgetary support and debt relief, which has helped Pakistan’s macroeconomic

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indicators but has limited the direct impact of U.S. aid on the broader Pakistani population’s attitudes toward America.11

U.S. assistance to Afghanistan also impacts our relations with Pakistan. The U.S. must demonstrate to the Pakistan security establishment that it will stay committed to Afghanistan until the Taliban is fully defeated and the country stabilized. The Bush Administration has requested $11.8 billion for 2007—2008, representing a significant increase in our assistance to Afghanistan. The U.S. also will reportedly increase troop levels, perhaps by 7,000. These are welcome steps that will hearten the Afghans and help dry up local support for the Taliban in Afghanistan as well as reinforce to Pakistan that we are committed to stabilizing and securing their Western neighbor.

Pakistan’s Relations with India

Given that Pakistani security policy revolves around its historical animosity with India, especially over Kashmir, it is important for the U.S. to continue to encourage the positive movement in the Indo-Pakistani dialogue process. President Musharraf has taken bold steps to encourage the peace initiative, most recently in December when he proposed a four-point plan for the resolution of Kashmir. President Musharraf declared in an Indian television interview that Pakistan would give up its claim to Kashmir if India agreed to a four-part solution that involves keeping the current boundaries intact and making the Line of Control (LOC) that divides Kashmir irrelevant, demilitarizing both sides of the LOC, developing a plan for self-governance of Kashmir, and instituting a mechanism for India and Pakistan to jointly supervise the region. Musharraf’s plan closely mirrored statements by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh calling for making the LOC “irrelevant” and for a “joint mechanism” between the two parts of Kashmir, indicating that the gap in rhetoric between the two sides is narrowing.

The peace process is still highly vulnerable to further terrorist attacks. The Mumbai bombings on July 11, 2006, which killed nearly 200 people, led India to cancel foreign secretary-level talks with Pakistan that had been scheduled for later that month. In a remarkable demonstration of Indian commitment to the peace process, however, Indian Prime Minister Singh agreed to meet with Pakistani President Musharraf two months later and to implement a “joint mechanism on terrorism,” despite ongoing Indian investigations into the possible involvement of a Pakistan-based terrorist group in the bombings.

Demilitarization of Kashmir will be difficult to implement until Islamabad makes a firm commitment to end support for all militant violence in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian officials acknowledge that infiltration of militants across the LOC has declined considerably over the past couple of years, but they also note that the infrastructure supporting terrorism still exists in Pakistan. A cease-fire between the Indian and Pakistani militaries along the LOC since 2003 has facilitated the development of confidence-building measures like the Muzaffarabad-Srinagar bus service. However, continuing militant violence on the Indian side of the LOC makes it unrealistic for India to consider a large-scale troop pullout from the Kashmir Valley.

Conclusion

In order to ensure that Pakistan sets itself on a path of moderation and stability, the U.S. needs to find ways to use its diplomatic leverage with Pakistan more effectively. Though Pakistan has arrested and handed over al-Qaeda suspects to the U.S., it has not made a clean break with Taliban and other extremists that it believes may one day again serve its national security interests.

The U.S. should nudge Pakistan toward a paradigm shift in its approach to its own security by encouraging Pakistan to prioritize economic and democratic development and the pursuit of better relations with neighboring countries, namely Afghanistan and India. Washington should clearly convey U.S. expectations that Islamabad develop an equally uncompromising policy toward all groups involved in terrorism in the region and beyond. This means that Pakistan must shut down training facilities associated with international terrorist incidents, including institutions run by the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba in Muridke and the Jaish-e-Mohammed in Bahawalpur. While encouraging such a crackdown, Washington also should acknowledge Pakistan’s interest in seeing substantive movement on India-Pakistan talks on Kashmir. In this context, Washington should encourage New Delhi to take additional confidence-building measures on Kashmir and to involve the Kashmiris in a peace process that addresses human rights concerns and political grievances.

The U.S. should also encourage economic integration among Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India so that each has a vested interest in overall stability in the region. Washington should vigorously pursue trade, development, and investment initiatives that mutually benefit all three countries. Congress can play an important role in this effort when it examines legislation the Bush Administration plans to present later this year to implement Reconstruction Opportunity Zones along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The U.S. should also actively encourage trade between Pakistan and India and consider initiatives that would bring Indians and Pakistanis together in cooperative efforts to reconstruct and rehabilitate Afghanistan. Greater economic interdependence and integration among the three countries will contribute to stability in the region as each country begins to view good relations with its neighbors as benefiting its own economy. Implementing the South Asia Free Trade Area would further this process.

Finally, Washington should demonstrate its interest in a strong and stable Pakistan and its commitment to maintaining a long-lasting and broad-based relationship with Islamabad. This should include upgrading dialogue on a variety of issues that go beyond countering terrorism, maintaining robust economic and military assistance programs, as well as keeping the U.S. promise of providing Pakistan with F–16 fighter jets.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the panel very much for their presentations. We will proceed now to questions, of which I have a few.

Mr. Haqqani, you stated that the State Department had insulted the Pakistani people when it said that it was urging restraint on all sides and that the dismissal of the chief justice of the court was within the constitution. I can understand that sentiment.

When we look at a country whose national leaders, just about fully 50 percent of which have come to power by coup, by assassination, or by mystery, the other half being elected. It does cause some long-term concerns when you have especially a current leader who came to power by dismissing the former duly-elected prime minister to outer space, suspending and removing and rewriting the constitution, dismissing the Supreme Court, suspending the legislature, one would naturally have suspicions.

On the other hand, I think Musharraf is given some credit for eliminating corruption, to some degree, and I do not know that we understand the full reasons, if there are any—the suspicion with that history is that there might not be any—reasons for dismissing the chief justice of the court under the newly written constitution, and people practicing democracy would have some concern naturally about all of that power residing in one individual.

But we do not know the full reasons yet, and the reasons might have been legitimate. The process, although legitimate, might be questionable, and the history certainly troublesome. Do you think that we should wait until we see what has happened, and perhaps, even with that horrific history of dismissing democracy, perhaps there were, in this case, legitimate reasons?

Mr. HAQQANI. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me clarify that the words I said were an insult were as follows, and they were, “General Musharraf was acting in the best interests of Pakistan and the Pakistani people.” I think that that was not a judgment that a State Department official should have made about protests in the streets. If the Pakistani people do not deem General Musharraf as acting in Pakistan’s interests, it is not appropriate for the State Department to say that. It is an unnecessary endorsement of General Musharraf’s actions.

I share your concerns and those of all Pakistanis about corruption. Corruption is endemic in the Third World. General Musharraf
initially took some steps in eradicating corruption, but apparently now corruption is back in full swing. The way to deal with corruption, of course, as someone who believes rule of law, is by strengthening the rule of law, not by dispensing with constitutional procedures and niceties.

So that is why I have a moral objection to the very concept of a military coup in the name of eliminating corruption because the coup in itself is a corrupt act because it dispenses with the constitution.

As far as the charges against the chief justice are concerned, they have not been made public. If there had been substantive charges, I think, for the sake of transparency they should have been made public. More important, General Musharraf appointed this gentleman as the chief justice of Pakistan less than 2 years ago. So one would hope that before appointing a chief justice, you would conduct some due diligence. If he was somebody who was prone to misconduct and corruption, then he should not have been appointed.

Mr. ACKERMAN. I understand that. We have the same concern about Federal prosecutors. But all of that being said, it is possible, which is the point that I am making, that there was information, despite the lack of transparency to the general public, that perhaps there was good reason to do this, and perhaps the State Department made that statement in an attempt, although I understand your concern that these things tend to backfire, an attempt to diminish the prospects of the demonstrations in the street becoming more than demonstrations, which would not necessarily be in the interest of the safety and security concerns.

Mr. HAQQANI. I am willing to concede that there might be a possibility that the State Department generally thought——

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would agree with you that I would like to see the whole process different and do not agree with the process. I have a strong objection to the lack of transparency and the concentration of power in one person.

Anybody else care to comment briefly on this?

Mr. WEINBAUM. Mr. Chairman, I think we all have suspicions as to why this action took place, and it has to do, of course, with the election of the President and the legality of that.

I think our best information is that this was something that has been in the works for some time. This was not out of pique. This was based on the actions of the chief justice in the last few months.

I must say here that it strikes me that it is rather typical of the military in their thinking, and that is there is an objective; if we can do it, let us do it, without considering the political consequences. This was an amazing act, given the fact that it is hard to imagine that there would not have been the political repercussions that there are, and I think we have to conclude that whatever the result of this, and very likely the President will survive this, it has diminished his stature.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Evidently, the chief justice serves at the pleasure of the President.

Mr. HAQQANI. No, sir, he does not, but evidently he does.

Mr. ACKERMAN. That is the point.
Mr. HAQQANI. And, Mr. Chairman, if I may add, the constitutional procedure that the President has invoked is a constitutional procedure that applies to judges, but the constitution is silent as to the chief justice. So the whole procedure may actually come in for review because never was it contemplated that the President, at any time, would consider the chief justice of Pakistan as being corrupt or liable to allegations of misconduct.

Ms. CURTIS. Mr. Chairman, if I might add a point.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes, Ms. Curtis.

Ms. CURTIS. I cannot comment on the legitimacy of the charges against the Supreme Court justice. However, I think what we should take away from what we have seen over the last week is we see a hunger for democracy in Pakistan. We see the civilian society who wants to preserve the democratic institutions in the country, and they have made this clear.

So I think this is something that should inform our policy as we move forward. We have to recognize that there is this deep interest in preserving and strengthening the democratic institutions in Pakistan.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let me say, I could not agree more with that, and the question that arises from that very succinct, clear statement is: How do we do that? How do we encourage democratic institutions and the thirst or the hunger, if you will, for them on behalf of those people in Pakistan, which I would presume to be large numbers of people? We have dumped billions of dollars—I use that colorful word deliberately—and have not gotten too much bang for the buck, and I think, Dr. Weinbaum, you pointed out that the money that we have spent is not appreciated in the street because of how we have allocated and the purposes thereto.

Where should we be allocating this money so that it gets to the people, and the street understands, because the more money we give to the government, it seems that the government does not necessarily allow it to trickle down and takes the credit in the use of that money themselves, and the people do not benefit directly. Grateful, I am sure, is the wrong word, but appreciative of the fact that they do have people in the United States—our Government, our country, all of us—who wish them well and want them to succeed. But how should we allocate the money so that it gets there?

Mr. WEINBAUM. May I? You know, there was a very interesting moment that took place in October 2005. There was an earthquake. The United States moved quickly to aid the people of the earthquake region with very great effect. I was in Pakistan at the time, and others have reported this. The extent to which the Pakistani people came out and changed their attitude toward the United States was rather remarkable, given the low state of feeling toward the United States, confidence in the United States.

It was a very interesting moment. I think it was important—I know it was important—because, in our efforts, what we showed there was we were there for the people of Pakistan. We were there to help people in a way that was not going to benefit the Pakistani military or necessarily benefit the President, and, in fact, by comparison, they did not come out very well.

I think that was very important in showing this, and, using that as an example, I personally believe that rather than the fraction
that we are spending now on education and public health, we should stress public health, because I think that is the major way to go. Public health has immediate impact. It is felt at every level of society. Education is important, but it is a long-term proposition.

And then, finally, let me say, about this $750 million that we have just allocated over a 5-year period for development in the FATA, in the frontier area. Of course what it has always needed has been development. But realize how that plays in Pakistan. We have just given half as much money for development as we have allocated for all of Pakistan in our major aid package. What that means is, yes, we gave $750 million because the FATA is in our interests, and that is the message we do not want to send.

I have one last thought here, and that is we also have to recognize how closely the people in Pakistan follow our words, and I think this is what Professor Haqqani is trying to get through. Sometimes when we try to be balanced, when we try to be even handed, the message that is picked up in Pakistan is that it is a green light from the United States. Among the conspiracy theorists, not only is it a green light; we probably instigated it.

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. I just wanted to emphasize Dr. Weinbaum’s last point, in that, yes, assistance is important, but our statements are also very important and the perception of where our support lies. So I think it is very important, as we are in the run up to the 2007 elections, that we state very clearly and often that we support free, fair, transparent elections. We should also strongly discourage the manipulation of election rules that might be tried.

If you look back at 2002, despite the fact that we knew there were some manipulations of the process, we were very quiet about that. I think the policy of the State Department was not to jeopardize Musharraf’s position. This was shortly after 9/11, a year later. But I think the time has come where we need to be clear that we do support democracy in Pakistan, and we need to take a more principal position on this issue.

Mr. HAQQANI. I endorse the views of Ms. Curtis and Dr. Weinbaum on the question of more allocation for education and health care and also a careful attention to the words that I used in dealing with Pakistan, at least the public statements, but let me also say that there is a big picture here as well. United States aid to Pakistan has always been greater under military rule than it has been under civilian rule, and in my written testimony I have pointed out that, between 1954 and 2002, Pakistan received $382 million per year for each year it was under military rule and only $178 million per year for each year that it was under civilian rule.

So there has been a perception that our weight is always behind the military. Even now, if you look at what we have allocated the funds for, it is not what essentially is for building the capacity of the civilian government. It is building the Pakistani military’s capability in its ongoing competition with India. For example, I do not think F–16 aircraft and Harpoon missiles are going to be used against al-Qaeda, Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, because I do not think al-Qaeda still has an air force.

So those are not things that are going to go there, but they still keep going there, so that is one part.
Second, I think we also need to recognize that however flawed they might be—if General Musharraf is flawed, Pakistan's political leadership is also flawed, but somehow, when we come to judging the political leadership, we judge the more harshly. There is a tendency on the part of the U.S. Government to not give too much attention to Pakistan's political leadership, and I think that needs to change, and one specific recommendation I would make to Congress is to consider allocating some money for an independent observation of the forthcoming elections.

There is no money for that, and I think that needs to be provided. Instead of giving all of the money that is a democracy promotion to the Musharraf government, it should be given to some independent organizations for actually monitoring the elections.

And last, but not least, I think the recognition of the reality on ground, the fact that General Musharraf is a military person in uniform who took part in a military coup, I think, recognizing that reality, however important he might be and however close an ally he might be, that, in itself, is a major development instead of just pretending that Pakistan is moving toward democracy under him. I think pretense always causes more problems than recognition of reality.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. I would note that, in the current CR, that there is money for independent election monitoring. But your suggestion is very important because that money should be made available now.

I would also just comment that I agree, especially when it comes to foreign policy, we need not be even handed and, in many cases, should not be. But on domestic politics, we are going to be even handed. Mr. Chabot?

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before I get into my questions, just a brief comment, since we have gotten so extensively into foreign-assistance and foreign-aid issues, I am reminded of a political cartoon that I saw a few years back that showed a person in another country who had a bag of grain and had an American flag on there, and he is looking at it, and the caption underneath is his statement, saying something along the lines of, “Those Americans think of everything: Food and a flag to burn.” And that has sort of, unfortunately, been what has happened far too often, is the aid that we have used oftentimes has not got the goodwill that you would hope that that aid would have brought to those particular countries.

My first question, and I would welcome a response from all of the members, if possible, relative to the importance of democracy that you have all indicated in your statements and the fact that there is too much personalization with respect to President Musharraf, do you believe that a hoped-for or so-called “secular center” is possible or likely to emerge if elections were held, and they were truly free elections? Dr. Haqqani, if you would like to go first.

Mr. HAQQANI. I have the figures from the 2002 elections, which was the last time Pakistanis went to vote. The Islamist Alliance secured 11.2 percent of the total votes cast. The Pakistani People’s Party, led by Ms. Bhutto, got 28.4 percent of the vote. The GUP Party that General Musharraf had floated, or had usurped from the Pakistan Assembly, the faction, got 26 percent.
So between the two of them, plus the 12.8 percent votes that were secured by the Pakistan Assembly, led by Mr. Nawaz Sharif, I think the Islamists are in a minority. The problem is that in a situation of quasi-legitimacy of the government, no one really knows who has how much support.

If you have a free and fair election, I think the Pakistan Assembly and the PPP between them, the center right and the center left will hold the line. This is not the Palestinian Territories. There is an option. The problem, however, will come 5 or 10 years down the road. If this option is not exercised right now, then we will come to the same point that Egypt is at today, or the Palestinian Territories are at, where the choice is only between the Islamists because, while Ms. Bhutto and Mr. Sharif are in exile, and they are losing support because they do not have access to their people. If they were able to campaign, they would be able to get more support.

But the Islamists, on the other hand, have a free hand. They can organize in the mosques. They can reach the people. None of their leaders have been put in prison. And then their militant fringe gives them muscle that then cows down secular individuals who might want to join the political process later.

So the answer to your question is, right now, there is a secular, democratic center available, which may not be available 5 to 10 years down the road when the only choice will actually be between the military and the militants, and I think we need to preempt that. Thank you.

Mr. Chabot. Thank you. Dr. Weinbaum?

Mr. Weinbaum. Yes. I subscribe to what Professor Haqqani is saying, certainly, and to note that if the two mainstream parties do not compete in this election, if they have to sit out in the political wilderness, we may not have anything but that empty space in the middle, and when people turn against the military, it will be toward the Islamic parties that they turn.

Let me say, though, I have my concerns. Obviously, the track record of the democratic parties is not a strong one. Now, we will never know whether the entire answer is not simply that because of the fact that the military was always in the wings and that there were areas in which the civilian parties could not go and, indeed, they were some of the most important areas. And a further point that has to be made that whereas the military does not make all of the decisions, no decisions are made—even when it seems that civilians are in control—that are to the detriment of the military. The military is there for everything.

What we need in this country, I think, more than anything else, is continuity. It is not going to happen overnight. We have got to develop a political culture in Pakistan that has not been allowed to mature simply because, as we know, no Pakistani Government has ever transferred authority. It is quite amazing, over this period of time, that there has never been but one government that ever finished out its term of office, and then it only lasted a few months. So this is what we are facing.

There is missing here the confidence in democracy, and many of the Pakistani people have themselves lost their confidence in democracy. We have got to quickly restore this, or, as Professor
Haqqani suggests, we may find that a people, such as the Pakistanis, who understand democracy perhaps better than any other people in the Islamic world, because of where they are located geographically, because of their heritage, they understand it, and I think we have to give that a chance, to do everything we can to encourage that. I believe we have leverage here, and we have not used that leverage.

Mr. CHABOT. Ms. Curtis?

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. I think people often forget that there was democracy in Pakistan throughout the 1990s, democratically elected governments. Was it perfect? No, probably not, but, again, I would say we do not want to throw out the good for the perfect and that it is a process, in terms of developing democracy in Pakistan, but we certainly do not want to put ourselves back. We, at least, want to keep trying to move forward.

So I agree that this election year is critical in what happens with the mainstream secular parties: The PPP and the PML Nawaz faction. Those parties themselves are going to have to figure out about their leadership. I do not think we should be trying to influence who the leaders of those parties are or make any efforts in that regard, but we should at least take a very principled position in supporting a free and fair election, allowing the democratic process, and not holding back in that regard.

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Mr. Chair, do I have time for another question?

Mr. ACKERMAN. You have all of the time you need.

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. I will just ask one more question, being fair with the other panel members that are here. I think we all agree that Musharraf's agreement with the Northwest Territories was a very bad one and has worked very badly. What I am wondering is, do you see any evidence that President Musharraf, there is any willingness there to revisit this issue and anything that he can or should do, at this point, to go back and undo that horrible agreement?

Ms. Curtis, do you want to go first on this?

Ms. CURTIS. I am sorry. You are talking about the Supreme Court justice——

Mr. CHABOT. No, no, not the justice. Basically, the agreement with the tribal leaders to back off and let them deal with the Taliban and al-Qaeda elements up there, which they have clearly not done, and, I think, just the reverse of what the President indicated might happen—when I say “President,” I mean President Musharraf—just the opposite of what he said would probably happen has happened.

Ms. CURTIS. Sir, I have expounded on this issue in my written statement, and I think the peace agreement that was made is fraught with major difficulties. I think it was made more out of political imperatives rather than any solid plan to actually deny sanctuary to the terrorist elements there. I think we have seen that outcome recently, that it has not worked.

The problem is it seems the Musharraf government does not know how to proceed. There were a lot of military losses. As I indicated, there is not support from the broader Pakistani population
on this issue, and waning support within the Pakistan military itself.

So they are in a bit of a bind, and that is why I think the United States should be working closely with Pakistan, and I think the steps to commit more assistance to these areas is correct.

There has to be an economic-assistance element, but, at the same time, it is clear that the United States is going to have to keep pressure on the Pakistani Government to take those targeted military operations which will be necessary to eliminate elements that are never going to change their terrorist policies.

Mr. CHABOT. Dr. Weinbaum, if perhaps you and Dr. Haqqani, if you could keep your answers relatively brief so we can get to the other members. Thank you.

Mr. WEINBAUM. This was a capitulation to reality. The militarization of the frontier not only did not succeed, but it backfired. It created a stronger Pakistani Taliban. It has, in effect, created a state within a state.

I think that we are going to have to, in order to see any progress here—I see none in the very immediate future—that in order to see this—what I am arguing in my paper and here in my testimony—is that he has to have the political capacity. At the moment, he does not have the support in his own party, and among others in the political spectrum here, which he could, indeed, I think, engender. He does not have it, and until he has it, he is not going to be able to help himself and help us.

Mr. HAQQANI. My very quick response is that if the peace agreement isolated al-Qaeda and led to their surrender, it would have been a success, but the peace agreement, in fact, ended up allowing the tribal leaders to keep the status quo, and that is why it was a failure.

Now, what needs to be done, of course, is for the Pakistan Government to try and work out an agreement whereby the tribes help in pursing al-Qaeda rather than protecting them, and two things need to be done. One, on the Afghan side, I think a lot of weaponry and people keep on floating in the tribal areas from the Afghan side, so an effort needs to be made there. The Afghan Government needs to improve its capacity.

The coalition forces in Afghanistan need to operate more effectively, and the Pakistan Government has to understand that the weapons that are flowing from the rest of the country into the tribal areas to enhance the tribal population's capacity to inflict harm on the Pakistan army is to its disadvantage, and that needs to be done.

So negotiations with your own people are always a good idea, but they should be with the purpose of isolating and leading to the surrender of al-Qaeda, not to providing them a safe haven, which is what has happened in the present instance.

Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A good hearing this morning.

Almost 2 years ago, I spent about 3 days in Pakistan and had a pretty good conversation with President Musharraf and was up in the Hyber Pass in Northwest Territories and met with tribal leaders in Peshwar.
Your discussion about the President’s current, either unwillingness or inability—it sounds to me, based upon your general comments, there is a consensus of inability because of his own challenges within—to deal with al-Qaeda. The issue of the location of the Taliban in Quetta; do you believe the headquarters is, in fact, there, and do we know where the headquarters is located for Taliban, and why have we not taken action?

Mr. Weinbaum. I believe we should certainly distinguish, though, between the campaign against al-Qaeda and the campaign against the Taliban, both the Pakistani Taliban and the Afghan Taliban. Against al-Qaeda, we are talking about foreigners, and there has been a much more vigorous effort there. But in the failure to control this area, this has created new space in which al-Qaeda has been able to reestablish itself.

I believe we know where they are located. As far as the insurgency into Afghanistan, that is in northern Balochistan. It is a no-go area for the Pakistan military, and I think that is the reality here.

What I am suggesting also now, and what my colleagues here are suggesting, is that there are at least three provinces in which we can honestly say that the government, although it has troops there, is unable to deploy those troops in a way which would make any impact, either on the growth of this Taliban entity and also to be able to halt the very, I think, consequential infiltration that is feeding the insurgency in Afghanistan.

Mr. Costa. Well, in relationship to that, the Vice President recently visited Pakistan, and there were a lot of reports as to the message that the Vice President gave to President Musharraf that, in fact, they be more aggressive in their support of our efforts with counterterrorism. Do you believe that was the message, and how do you think that was received?

Mr. Weinbaum. I believe that is the kind of message, I think, that has no impact because we have to talk about what, in fact, he can deliver. It is fine to press him to do more. That has been our mantra ever since we started this, “do more,” but I am arguing here, the way things now are on the ground in the FATA, there is not much more he can do. Yes, marginally, he can. We have got to ask him to do what he can do, and we have got to help him to do what he cannot do.

Mr. Costa. Please, Ms. Curtis.

Ms. Curtis. Okay. Thank you, sir. If we are talking about Quetta, I would point, again, to the reports of the arrest on February 26th of perhaps six Taliban leaders, including Mullah Akhund, which would be a major, positive step. So I think there certainly are indications that Taliban leadership was in this Quetta area.

Now, what we hear from the Pakistanis is that it is difficult to tell, you know, who is a Taliban and who is not. There are a lot of refugees from Afghanistan, which certainly one can see, but I would argue that we need to think, then, about getting at the infrastructure of the Taliban, getting at the capabilities that they have to attack coalition forces in Afghanistan, and that means getting at the leadership, which, as you mentioned, seems to be residing in the Quetta area, not only in Quetta.
Also, obviously, there are leaders in Afghanistan as well, and also the training camps, and whether they be in Balochistan or in the FATA, these seem to be the critical areas that we should be focusing on with Pakistan.

Mr. COSTA. But it is not happening.

Ms. CURTIS. Well, like I said, I think we do have some initial signals that perhaps the Pakistani Government is clamping down more on the Taliban than we have seen heretofore, but we need to remain on top of the issue and continue to press on this.

Mr. HAQQANI. My very quick response is that Quetta is not part of the tribal areas. It is a big city, a core headquarters. So if the Taliban are present there, and, of course, I am not privy to intelligence, but I do see media reports, and the Taliban do occasionally give media interviews from the City of Quetta, which means that they are there. Some people have been arrested, as Ms. Curtis pointed out, from Quettas, so they were there, and that is why they were arrested there.

The question is, if the arrests in Quetta are a sign of more to come, then that is a positive, but if they are just a token gesture, then that is a negative. The writ of the Federal Government cannot run in a provincial capital with a big garrison and a core headquarters, then we have very big problems, much bigger than we understand.

But if the reason why the Taliban have not been detained, or action has not been taken, is because the government has felt that that was a lesser priority. I hope that that will change as the U.S. Government informs the Pakistanis of what the priority ought to be.

Mr. COSTA. Yes. I want to move over to other questions. One speaks of the common shoe raised with regard to helping Musharraf and helping Pakistan, especially what you describe, or seemed to describe, as this window of opportunity in the next 5 or 10 years.

While we were there, the Ambassador had lunch with a number of members of the opposition parties in the Parliament, a very interesting conversation as to their take on Musharraf. He talked about his efforts to focus on the madrassahs an enlightened moderation, he termed it, President Musharraf.

I concur with your issue on F-16’s, and certainly the humanitarian aid we did was important, but how do we really focus on that educated group of Pakistanis who are yearning for democracy, in a better sense, in this time? I mean, we are not making that effort, are we?

Mr. HAQQANI. No, sir, we are not, and there is a reason for it. The last time we had democratic government, the political parties were not really up to the mark, but then there are people in this country who would say the same about political parties, too.

The tendency has been to over judge the political class of Pakistan. I am not saying they are perfect. Of course, they are imperfect, and there has been a tendency to totally ignore them. For example, Ms. Bhutto, Mr. Sharif; none of them have had any hearing in Washington for a long time, nor have their party leaders.

As far as General Musharraf’s mantra of enlightened moderation is concerned, it is very important that “enlightened moderation” is
a phrase in English that he chose, not an Urdu phrase, and there is no equivalent. So it is something that is more oriented toward Washington than it is toward Karachi, Quetta, and Islamabad.

Last, but not least, I think that there is a role for domestic politics in the War against Terrorism because that is where the support comes. Because General Musharraf has alienated Pakistan's middle class and Pakistan's liberal political class, he has ended up having to cut deals with Pakistan's Islamists. They are his mainstay in Parliament in certain ways, and that creates problems for him. Even if he wanted to fulfill his promises to the U.S. 100 percent, he has elements within the political process that run contrary to that objective, and that is the real problem.

Mr. WEINBAUM. If I may, sir, I do not think we have 5 or 10 years. I think we are looking at a rather critical time, especially this year. Many of the constitutional issues that are critical for the future of Pakistan are going to be decided this year.

Let me say, though, since you brought up the War on Terrorism, our greatest problem is that the people of Pakistan do not see the conflict—the fighting that is going on, the efforts that have been going on in the border areas—as their war. They see it as Pakistan's effort on behalf of the United States. That cannot serve us, and why is that the case? We are partly responsible.

We have portrayed the war in Afghanistan and its effects on the other side of the border as part of this great war against global terrorism. We have conflated Lebanon, Palestine, and, of course, Iraq with Afghanistan.

Mr. COSTA. And the Iraqis do not see it that way.

Mr. WEINBAUM. The Iraqis do not see it that way. By doing that, what we have done is, for the overwhelming number of Pakistani people, to have them envision that the war is against Islam. We needed desperately to disengage Afghanistan from Iraq. That should have been, from the beginning—of course, we are not talking about what we should have done here—and has got to continue to be our effort.

Mr. COSTA. Last question: What is your view of the status of A.Q. Khan, and do you believe that the international network that he has been a part of that has, I think, been responsible for much of the nuclear spread of technologies, do you think that network has been dismantled?

Ms. CURTIS. If I might address the other question, I think you raised the F–16's. In my view, the State Department and Defense Department know that the F–16's are not going to be used against al-Qaeda.

There is really a different purpose behind that transfer, and it has more to do with proving to the Pakistanis that the United States is interested in a long-term relationship. This gets into the baggage of the United States-Pakistan relationship and the cutoff of aid in 1990 because of Pakistan's nuclear program. So I think there is a lot tied up there, in terms of the symbolic importance of the transfer. Let us face it. We are asking the Pakistan Government to take difficult steps, steps that they might not always see as in their interest.
I think part of Pakistani establishment realizes it is, but I am not sure that all of the Pakistani establishment always sees that. So those F-16’s are important for that purpose.

On A.Q. Khan, it is important, I think, obviously, for the U.S. to have access in these debriefings, and given the widespread impact of his activities——

Mr. COSTA. But do you believe his international network has been dismantled?

Ms. CURTIS. My understanding, based on what I know, the Pakistanis have been cooperative with both the IAEA and the United States in terms of taking down the network, but I must confess, I do not have access to all——

Mr. COSTA. Dr. Weinbaum?

Mr. WEINBAUM. Sir,—

Mr. ACKERMAN. I would ask the witnesses to try to keep their—and you have all been terrific, by the way—this is an excellent, excellent panel, and we are getting a lot of very helpful information, but we are going to have to start consolidating it.

Mr. WEINBAUM. We will never know what took place, and even what is out there now, because we have not had the kind of access to A.Q. Khan, and that is for a very simple reason, that he is a national hero in Pakistan, and, for political reasons, Pervez Musharraf cannot give us more here. We have given him a pass on this, and I think that this has been very, very unfortunate.

Mr. HAQQANI. So whether the network has been disbanded or not is, of course, for United States intelligence to determine, but let me just say that the very fact that an individual can engaged or undertake such large-scale nuclear proliferation just tells us what I have been saying in my testimony about the capacity of the Pakistani state. I think that the state of the state of Pakistan needs a little more attention. This is just one of the many things that points to how many dangers lurk in the shadows within Pakistan.

Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. You have been most generous with the time. Thank you.

Mr. ACKERMAN. The committee might note that the Chair has great reluctance to either run the timer or use the gavel, in the belief that it is very helpful to members not just to ask questions and let the time pass but to try to elicit as much information, and I think this format is good, but we are going to have to do this process, especially when we have a lot more members, to try to discipline ourselves and then figure out if we want to do it all in one round or two rounds. Mr. Wilson?

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I do appreciate your giving of time. I have actually enjoyed the questions from my colleagues. Thank you all for being here today, and, in particular, Dr. Weinbaum, I appreciate your referencing America’s efforts during the earthquake relief. I had the extraordinary opportunity of visiting in the Musafarabad region. I went out, and I visited with the displaced earthquake victims, and I was so impressed by the organization of the Pakistani military.

The briefings we had were world class. The care and concern for the people who were there, the providing of the basic necessities, education. It was the first time many of those children from isolated mountain hamlets had ever really had a school. It was just
so impressive. I was very pleased. And I was also pleased at the American military role.

In fact, I was meeting with American troops, and one very bright-looking U.S. Marine came up to me, and, with a big smile on his face, he said, “I am here because of you.” And I thought, My goodness, I am not sure this is good. But he explained to me that, as a Marine at Paris Island in South Carolina that I represent, that our office, and I remembered it, expedited his citizenship.

So it really was a phenomenal experience to be there with a Pakistani-American U.S. Marine and to see the efforts. I understood that the favorite toy, at this particular time, of children in Pakistan was the Chinook helicopter, as a symbol of America’s thoughtfulness and generosity. Indeed, it was heartfelt at the time and still is, from the American people to the people of Pakistan.

I have another interest, and that is I am co-chair of the India Caucus. In the capacity as co-chair of the India Caucus, I have, sadly, had a number of people trying to goad me into making anti-Pakistani statements. I have always responded very quickly that it is really in India’s interest that there be a stable, progressive, economically growing Pakistan, not continue conflict of any kind.

So my question for all of you is, beginning with Ms. Curtis, how can America help promote the friendship and the developing relationship between India and Pakistan?

Ms. Curtis. Yes. Thank you, sir. I also had the opportunity to attend the International Donors Conference shortly after the terrible earthquake in Pakistan and saw some of the same positive feelings toward Americans that we had not seen in a long time in Pakistan. So, clearly, our aid had an impact.

I guess what I would say is we need to find ways to emulate that response. Obviously, that was a humanitarian disaster, but I think what I found is that we need to have more programmed assistance, that is, assistance that touches the grassroots of society, which would require more U.S. aid officials on the ground, which, of course, is difficult because of the security issues. But I think we need to start working toward that.

Most of our assistance has been directly to the government. That is not just military assistance; that is also the economic component, the approximately $300 million to $350 million per year that has gone, I think, $200 million per year directly to the government, in terms of budgetary support, which has helped with Pakistan’s macro-economic indicators, but it has not demonstrated to the Pakistani people themselves that America is interested in your prosperity, your development.

So I think, to the extent that we can begin programming more of that assistance, and, obviously, your subcommittee would have a crucial role in looking at those assistance programs. So my recommendation would be to encourage the State Department to program more of the economic assistance.

Mr. Wilson. Through USAID?

Ms. Curtis. Yes.

Mr. Wilson. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. Weinbaum. Sir, I have said a number of things here about President Musharraf which have perhaps not been that complimentary, but I would compliment him, I think, on the initiatives that
he has taken with regard to the Composite Dialogue. I think he has
sketched out a number of areas which I believe are negotiable. I
have been disappointed in New Delhi here because I think, know-
ing where they have got Pakistan on this, they have shown no indi-
cation here that they are interested in pursuing some of those pos-
sible avenues of negotiations.

I would like to think that maybe we can play a role here. Our
influence in New Delhi is much greater than it was. We have got
to be careful how we exercise it, but I really think that this is
something that can be built upon, and here is a role, I think, where
we cannot expect to mediate this. We know that, but we can use
our good offices, I think, even more than we have, and it is so im-
portant that we do so because if we can get that settled, it may
very well give the Pakistan military a freer hand and a greater in-
terest in moving against extremism in the rest of the country.

Mr. HAQQANI. I would agree with Dr. Weinbaum on the question
of continued India-Pakistan dialogue. I think that the one thing
that the United States does not need to do, and should not do, is
to give the impression to the Pakistani military that the United
States can be a constant source of strength for the Pakistani mili-
tary in an unending competition with India. I think what is impor-
tant is to make it clear that relations with India and Pakistan are
not a zero-sum game and that it is in Pakistan's interests, as well
as India's interests, to resolve their differences and move toward
the regional cooperation.

A similar attitude is also needed toward Afghanistan. Unfortu-
nately, there has been a decline in relationships between Afghani-
stan and Pakistan, and I think that needs to be worked upon, just
as the India-Pakistan Composite Dialogue is moving forward. How-
ever, given the history, we should not expect immediate results,
and I compliment you, sir, for not paying heed to those who want
you to make anti-Pakistan statements because it is important for
the United States to be a friend of both India and Pakistan, and,
of course, I would add, of Afghanistan to that.

Mr. WILSON. My final question: All of us are extraordinarily im-
pressed by the desocialization of India, which is resulting in one of
the fastest-growing economies on earth. It is something that is
amazing to me that there are now 300 million middle-class Indians,
which exceeds the number of people who live in the United States.
What a great market for us. What a great ally, a stable democracy
in India. What is the status of economic reforms, or the economic
growth, of Pakistan?

Mr. HAQQANI. Pakistan has also had a desocialization, and Paki-
stan's economy has also been doing reasonably well, partly because
of the external flow of resources that have heightened in the last
2 years.

The problem remains political stability. Investors remain shy of
investing in a country where there are so many issues—there are
suicide bombings on an almost daily basis—and where the internal
political issues and questions of rule of law have not yet been set-
tled. That said, the Pakistani people are a hard-working people.
The potential for economic progress in Pakistan is as much as that
in India, not, of course, on the same scale, but Pakistan has to re-
solve its internal political issues, as well as the regional questions of violence and terrorism.

Mr. Weinbaum. Let me add to that that Pakistan, if you look at the macro-economic indicators, has done very well. The growth indications are there. The problem is that, for the average urban Pakistani, he has not felt the benefit of that. He experiences inflation.

There is a structural problem in Pakistan. What is up here [pointing up]—and a lot of that is through land speculation and other nonproductive kinds of investment—is unable to come down to the base of society because of there being no available transfer payments in the system, no Social Security, nobody pays income taxes, no health service, and no unemployment insurance. That is really why we have got here, I think, a malapportionment here that Pakistan has got to overcome.

Ms. Curtis. I think it is important to remember that, before 9/11, many were talking about Pakistan becoming a failed state. The economy was in shambles. But after 9/11, and through United States efforts to help with debt relief and other assistance, Pakistan's economy stabilized.

I want to reiterate what Dr. Weinbaum has said about the major problems in Pakistan is it is largely still a feudal society, and there is no collection of taxes, so this is a problem.

On the up side, I think, in terms of human capital, you have got the same resources in Pakistan that you do in India and some of the main reasons that those have not been exploited as fully as maybe they could be are because of the ongoing security concerns, the terrorist issue, as well as the political instability.

So until Pakistan can secure itself and take care of these problems, you are not going to have the kind of foreign direct investment that would be possible were they to overcome the security concerns.

Mr. Wilson. Well, thank you very much, and one personal note. My dad served in the 14th Air Force during World War II, and he arrived in theater at Karachi in March 1943. I grew up hearing from him, understanding that the people of India and Pakistan are very entrepreneurial. Thank you very much.

Mr. Ackerman. I thank the distinguished gentleman Chair of the India Caucus, a retread twice over. Well, I was a retread, too. And now the distinguished Chair of the Pakistan Caucus, Cheryl Jackson Lee.

Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the distinguished chairman and, again, the ranking member, and the witnesses that are here before us.

The good news is that I believe in the importance of the relationship between India and Pakistan and the importance of the region, South Asia, and join my colleagues in membership of the India Caucus. I had the privilege of serving as the co-chair of the Pakistan Caucus with my colleague, Mr. Burton.

So I think that we have a moment in history to be constructive, and I might just indicate that I would like to at least acknowledge that we do have a different picture after 9/11, and I think it is important to note that Pakistan has captured or killed over 600 al-Qaeda cadres, including senior leaders; that it has captured a num-
ber of senior leaders of that organization; that it has played a key role in uncovering what I think was a vital terrorist, or could have been an enormously tough terrorist act, and that is the plot to use liquid bombs to blow up airliners just as recently as August 2006. And certainly you have already mentioned the capture of one of the leaders during the Cheney visit.

Putting that aside, but recognizing it, I think we have an opportunity to be constructive. I would like to join my colleagues in drafting a letter that indicates, Professor, that we need to have independent election observers. You are absolutely right.

I think what is important to note is that the Pakistani people have had previously, and there are certainly activists who were there, a history of democracy. I would like to proclaim, as we proceed in trying to be constructive, to encourage Pakistani-Americans to become more engaged in this journey that we are taking to do some of the things that we have heard here today.

I would like to have a principled relationship between the United States and Pakistan. I do find fault in the removal of the chief justice and, as well, the attack and police actions against the media. I think it should be noted that President Musharraf went to the TV station and apologized.

Frankly, I think it is important to energize, as I would think, similarly, in Iran, as opposed to attacking Iran, the middle class or the activists, if you will, the intelligentsia to begin promoting their thought, and they should be protected.

So I am going to raise a number of questions, and we have had some discussions about Pakistan moving toward providing some connectedness to monies that we receive to the actual people of Pakistan, and I would offer to say that I was in Pakistan as well during the hurricane. A number of us went over. We went into the camps, and there was an unbelievable response to Americans. The Black Hawks became flying birds, and the soldiers welcomed by those who had suffered from the earthquake. Excuse me if I said hurricane. I come from Houston—the earthquake.

And so we can move the country toward what I hear we are discussing here, but we cannot move it by turning off the lights and shutting the door. Musharraf happens to be the head of government now. This engagement between the United States, I believe, was not even cemented until President Clinton, and my good friend and chairman, joined that trip when we went in 2000 and then talked to then-General Musharraf.

So we have come a long way, but there are difficulties that we have to face. I would like to ask Ms. Curtis, in the backdrop of Dr. Kahn’s existence, and that always comes up as a point of contention, how can we counter that, and what would we suggest to Pakistan to give comfort to critics that Professor Khan is not still active and energized, passing secrets on despite his house arrest.

I have got a number of questions, so I know that I must move, but would you please just be pointed in your answer?

Ms. CURTIS. I think this is a sensitive issue for Pakistan. I think, if there is cooperation between the United States and Pakistan, it is risky for this to be too public for Pakistan.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Do you mean the solutions to be too public or the discussions?
Ms. CURTIS. Yes, the discussions between the United States and Pakistan about its nuclear program, and perhaps if there is any cooperation from the United States in stabilizing its nuclear assets, as well as the discussions on the A.Q. Khan issue; these are all very sensitive issues for Pakistan, and that is what makes it so difficult.

In my opinion, it would be useful if there could ideally be some kind of cooperative threat-reduction program between Pakistan and the United States, but this, again, is extremely sensitive in Pakistan itself, but this would be something that would obviously demonstrate here in the United States. Pakistan's good-faith efforts to be a good steward of its nuclear programs.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. So what we should do, then, is to encourage the State Department and/or Defense Department relevant persons to, whether it is sensitive or not, begin such discussions. That speaks to, I believe, a balanced policy, and I would think that Pakistan should welcome it.

So I do not mind it being sensitive and not public. I would totally agree with you. But I do think critics raise a value issue, what is happening, because we always hear that he is more than alive and well but active. So I would suggest that that would be something that we could recommend, that we have such discussions.

I want to move to Professor Weinbaum because, again, let us be constructive. A darkened Pakistan, lights out, does not help this country or the South Asia region. Now, I would ask the question, is it not valuable that President Musharraf and the prime minister of India have at least been able to have some valuable discussions, one on Kashmir, and I do not really want to go into Kashmir—that is a very extensive discussion, but two agreements that I think should be worth noting: One, it could have been a volatile action after that horrible, horrific train incident, the “Friendship Train,” but the two leaders got together and had a reasonable response.

Secondarily, they had a reasonable response a couple of days later on some nuclear cooperation.

Professor Weinbaum, give us your instruction, in the backdrop of at least those positive notes, and I would welcome your comments to say that is positive, on how we can get to the people of Pakistan. You are absolutely right.

Is it in reordering our authorization language so that we build up the health dollars, the education dollars? And I know you must be aware of the minister of education, who was trying to put in place an alternative to the madrassah schools, and do we need to boost those limited actions?

Let us hear some action items that we might engage. You have said some of them, but how do we engage that constructive pathway?

Mr. WEINBAUM. Perhaps you did hear that I commended the President for the way in which he has put on the table some new ideas on Kashmir. What I think you are talking about here is the fact that there has been progress.

The very fact that these terrorist incidents have not taken them back to square one is a measure of the fact that neither of them want to go to where they were in 2001 and 2002, when they were on the verge of conceivably even a nuclear exchange.
That was a wonderful lesson, unfortunately, a scary one, but a wonderful lesson on how close it could be, even though both sides were not looking for a major war, how easy it was to have gone over that line. I saw that firsthand, and, I must admit, I and my colleagues were scared. We were not sure it was going to end up well.

As far as the assistance there, a lot of this is perception. It is not that we are not spending, and it is not that we cannot reallocate, but we have to be able to convey to the people of Pakistan that we care about them, that, again, we are not just serving our own interests there, that we are especially interested—I mentioned public health. I think this is an area which we have largely neglected, and this should be the major focus of our aid.

Let me say, as far as schooling is concerned, the problem is not really so much the madrassahs. We have made too much of that issue. The emphasis should be here on primary and secondary education. If you look at what Pakistan is doing now, it is putting an enormous amount of money into university education. I saw this firsthand just a few weeks ago, and, I must admit, I was shocked at the money that is being put into higher education when the need is so great across the board here in education at the lower levels.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Quickly, then, what are you telling us? That we need to have language or diplomacy that suggests that the monies that we have already given be put into those areas? What is the action item, that you direct it legislatively, or that you dialogue with them for the monies already received?

Mr. WEINBAUM. Part of it, of course, is what is in the legislation, but, again, I think we have all addressed this, the fact that there is an imbalance here that has to be adjusted between what are the needs of a society—which is hurting. It has got the lowest socio-economic indicators of any country in the region. We will leave out Afghanistan here.

But this is what we have got to not only address but, by our willingness to take stands—yes, in support of democracy—in recognition of the fact that everything is not going all that well in Pakistan and that they need help in rebuilding as well their socio-economic infrastructure. I think this is what we want to do.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. My last question, Mr. Haqqani, and I appreciate the professor—I am just trying to pinpoint—does that mean we write legislation, or does that mean that we engage in diplomacy on how we—and I believe in suggesting or telling or interacting with the people of Pakistan—as I have said, Pakistanis and the Americans as well—to get actively engaged.

But I would just say, the question would be, as we direct our attention to building democracy and trying to help the people, do we legislatively do it, or do we tell them, “You have got the money. Redirect it”? And then would you also answer the question, how do we help the opposition or the activists be engaged in democracy? We have opposition here in the United States. We have the majority and minority parties, and we hope that they are fully engaged. Most people think we are, probably somewhat too much. But how do we do that, because we want to end this, or, at least, I would like to be
instructed, on how do we preserve the value of what we have and then build on what you are instructing us to do?

Mr. HAQQANI. If I may begin by saying, using your own metaphor, no one is suggesting that we turn off the light and shut the door on Pakistan. I think that would be absolutely the wrong policy. However, changing the bulbs might help.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Good.

Mr. HAQQANI. You spoke about meeting General Musharraf in 2000. He was general then, and he is general now. I think it would help if he stopped being general and just became President, and I think dialogue is the key.

The problem with legislation, and I am not saying that, of course, this is the legislative branch of government, so legislation is what this branch does, but sometimes legislation can actually tie down the process of dialogue. So if it can be done by dialogue, so much the better, but if it has to come to legislation, it may have to come to that.

But I would say that reprioritizing the dialogue—I think, for example, the last 4 or 5 years have been too much praising General Musharraf rather than sharing opinions with him, and I think the time has come to start sharing opinions with him and telling him that your social allocation is wrong. Less than 2 percent of GDP being spent on education in a country in which a sizable part of the population is of school-going age is wrong. If the country does not have all school-aged children in school, there is a problem there. Having nuclear weapons is not a substitute for having a literate population.

So those things have to form part of the dialogue, and last, but not least, I think that these economic-support funds, these large checks, I think it would be correct, Ms. Curtis’s suggestion that instead of giving the large checks, there should be program aid which should be specific: This is for education. This is for health care.

On the political side, I think that the difference in your analogy about the minority and the majority party here is that the minority party can, after an election, become the majority party. And in Pakistan, the problem of democracy has been that the military wants to have a veto over deciding who should get elected, and I think it is time to say that that is not acceptable, that if the people vote people who are not necessarily the smartest or the best in the eyes of certain people, whether they be in Washington or in Islamabad, that is what democracy is.

We need to engage with them to strengthen the activists and the opposition political parties. I think, in the future, what needs to be done is for all U.S. Government engagement with Pakistan to recognize the reality of Pakistan and to give due weight to the voices of opposition. I think we have marginalized them in our dialogue. It is all about General Musharraf. There is more to Pakistan than General Musharraf.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Ms. Curtis, did you want to answer?

Ms. CURTIS. Yes. I think a robust oversight process on the Pakistan assistance program will make it clear whether legislation is actually required to get the State Department to program more assistance.
I would just point out, in 2002, our assistance to Pakistan’s education sector was about $25 million. By late 2004, that number increased to, I think, $67 million, and I think it continues to go up. But I think that can be credited largely toward congressional oversight. So I think it makes a big difference in whether or not legislation is the way, whether or not it is visits by yourself, your staff, to the region, constant consultations with USAID. I think it becomes clear, once you start that process, what is necessary.

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank all of you. This has been an entirely helpful process, and I thank the chairman for the beginning of the oversight. Let us continue. I really think we can find a success story in Pakistan for the people of Pakistan, and I hope you all will continue to participate with us on that, and I look forward to being a partner in affirming the value of Pakistan and its people but also working for the improvement of Pakistan on behalf of its people. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Mr. Sherman.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Legislation is a blunt instrument. I would prefer to have a State Department pushing Pakistan in the right direction, but when you have to wage foreign policy with the President you have, not the President you wish you had, we may have to use some blunt instruments.

Money is fungible, and I am concerned that, even if we program money for education, that will just allow Musharraf to take money out and it could be subject to corruption.

One idea I have floated before this committee often, that I could perhaps get your comments on, is the United States paying for the printing of textbooks that reflect reasonable values. I do not know if we are going to translate, you know, “Heather Has Two Mommies” into Urdu and see if the Pakistani Government will distribute it. Perhaps you could comment. In many Third World countries, parents have to pay for textbooks, or textbooks are unavailable. Could we do a lot for the education of Pakistan by paying for the printing of primary school textbooks?

Mr. WEINBAUM. If I may respond to this, I think we have to acknowledge, to begin with, that Pakistani textbooks are very strange and very unfortunate in the values that they communicate, particularly references to India, Hindus. These are very serious deficiencies in books, so there is no question. But we, at the same time, have to be cautious here. Any suggestion that the United States is, in any way, influencing the message to Pakistani children sends all kinds of red flags in the air.

In general, our support to education has got to be indirect because there are people out there—the same people who think vaccinations sterilize children—who are all too quick to see this as a plot by the Americans to corrupt the Islamic mind.

Mr. SHERMAN. There is this possibility that even if the money that we give for education reaches the people, what reaches them is anti-Hindu textbooks. I would hope that we would be able to not necessarily put our own values in these textbooks but at least take bigotry out of them.

Mr. WEINBAUM. You know, it may not matter because the way in which it is perceived is that we have had a hand in this, so, ob-
viously, we must be gaining as a result of this. The fact that we are doing it in furthering education may not get across.

I am not disagreeing, sir. I am just saying that we have got to be very sensitive about this issue.

Mr. HAQQANI. If I may comment at this point, I think there are Pakistani civil society organizations, nongovernmental organizations, Pakistani social activists who have themselves been working on finding out those elements of the textbooks in Pakistan that create prejudice, bigotry, hatred, and violence or condone violence. I think that there is a case to be made for support for those organizations.

So instead of textbooks being produced here and stuff like that, I think what needs to be done is viable, nongovernmental partners need to be found in Pakistan who already exist, and they need to be our partners rather than just the Government of Pakistan.

Mr. SHERMAN. Obviously, our support for such organizations, if robust, could antagonize Musharraf, but putting that aside, your colleague, Dr. Weinbaum, says, God, if we get anywhere near those textbooks, the textbooks will be tainted. Will these civil society organizations be tainted? Will their vaccinations be thought to cause sterility if they are getting money from the United States? If you were running one of these organizations, would you take the money from the U.S. if people had to know that you had taken money from the U.S.?

Mr. HAQQANI. I think the people would take the money from the U.S., and as long as they are bona fide, authentic, rooted-in-the-people organizations, they will also be able to make a case against the allegations. After all, there is debate in society, and I do not think the United States should be ashamed of people who support its values or share its values.

I think those people can also fend for themselves. I can assure you very much that if I was running such an organization and took money from you, I would also be able to make the argument that I am doing it for the benefit of the Pakistani people.

Mr. SHERMAN. So you earmark 10 or 20 percent of the money you get from us for a propaganda campaign to defend yourself from taking the money from us.

Mr. HAQQANI. I would probably take a salary cut to be able to pay for the propaganda.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. Ambassador, I enjoyed your opening statement, your written opening statement. I wish that I could have been here for the oral version. I like your sentence, that “Pakistan’s perceived external importance, juxtaposed with its proven internal weakness, certainly gives us some problems.”

Now, there is, in this town, a Musharraf cult. It paints Musharraf as if he is really Rudy Giuliani in disguise. He wants to do everything possible to protect America from these Islamic extremists. He is trapped, on the one hand, by those in the Frontier Provinces, by the ISI, and as long as we give him F–16’s every now and then, he claims that he is doing everything he possibly can to protect America from Islamic extremists.

Is there more he can do, and what should we be prodding him to do, and does he lose power if he does it? After all, he has to run
a country in which the people honestly believe that vaccinations cause sterility. Dr. Weinbaum and also Ambassador Haqqani.

Mr. WEINBAUM. Yes, Sir, we have tried to get across, I think, this morning that there is more that he could do, that much of this could be done, not so much through badgering him or expecting what he cannot do, but things that he has to do for himself to create the kind of political constituency in Pakistan that would enable him to, in effect, measure up to his own convictions, if those are his convictions.

I think that is what we are talking about here, as much as anything, the fact that his words ring correctly for us. We know where he has gotten these words: Moderation, enlightenment. They do not mean anything, though——

Mr. SHERMAN. Does he ever speak those words in Urdu or only in English?

Mr. WEINBAUM. I will not go into it now, but I know the origin of how those two words came together. They did not come from his own pocket, and he liked it when he heard it, and he has adopted them, and that is fine.

Mr. SHERMAN. I have got limited time. Ambassador, is Musharraf, in his heart, really Rudy Giuliani and just doing the best with a bad situation?

Mr. HAQQANI. I have never met Mayor Giuliani. General Musharraf, I have met only once. So, therefore, I cannot really tell, and I do not have the insight of those who can look in the eye and know what is in the heart of people.

Let me just say that, so far, he has taken some steps that show that his heart is in the right place in terms of moderation, but his biggest problem is he comes from an institution that has baggage, and he does not want to change the power structure, whereas this is all about changing the power structure in Pakistan. He can do more, but I think the cult here obstructs his ability to understand his own limitations because each time he comes here and then goes on everything from the “John Stewart Daily Show” to receptions at the White House, he goes back thinking of himself as Superman. He is not.

Personalizing international relations has its pitfalls. We learned that with the Shah. We learned that with Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, and I just do not want that lesson to be learned once again with General Musharraf of Pakistan. There is too much at stake here.

Mr. WEINBAUM. Sir, if I could just add that he has become increasingly enamored with the idea that he is indispensable to Pakistan, and because of our encouragement in part, we have watched him progress from someone who was open to ideas to someone who today is fairly closed to new ideas.

Mr. SHERMAN. If I can reclaim my time here for a second, it sounds like he wants to retain power—I doubt if that is going to change—and his power base is uni-dimensional; it is the military. He has not developed the backing of either of the secular political parties. So as long as he has the sole power base of the military, he has to live within that constituency, and in that constituency he is one of the pro-American generals in the Pakistani army. So if we
are going to have a Pakistan dominated by the military, Musharraf is about the best we are going to get.

The question, then, is, do we further our cause by providing economic aid to organizations which are legal in Pakistan, but are the political opposition and the social, secular, and civil society opposition to Musharraf? Ambassador?

Mr. HAQQANI. I think that the most important thing we have to recognize is that Musharraf's ability to control the Pakistani military depends on his ability to deliver American dollars to the Pakistani military, and, therefore, there is leverage, and that leverage can be used to the advantage of advancing United States policy, as well as advancing Pakistan’s own longer-term interests. I think that is where the need is for congressional oversight at the moment.

Mr. SHERMAN. So we ought to be providing a few less planes unless we get a little bit more crackdown in the furtherance of our efforts against the Taliban and Osama bin Laden.

Ms. C URTIS. I think U.S. policy could be characterized as one of risk averse. Clearly, President Musharraf has a strong vision for Pakistan, and he has enunciated that, but, clearly, also there is hunger for democracy in Pakistan. We are seeing that in the last week with the action against the Supreme Court justice and the reaction from the lawyers and the public. This is something that I think U.S. policymakers are going to have to take into account.

So the U.S. has not really pushed the envelope in terms of encouraging Musharraf to work with the political parties. We have not yet taken that step, and perhaps that is something that we need to consider.

Mr. SHERMAN. On the other hand, we do not really have an alternative unless the Pakistani Government is dominated by Musharraf. If we do not pull him in the right direction with military aid, then we get a Musharraf who, instead of courting our aid, courts the more extremist sources of support in his own country.

Ms. C URTIS. I think there is a broad understanding within the Pakistan military that does go beyond Musharraf of the importance of a strong United States-Pakistan relationship. There are historical ties there. The Pakistan military is a professional organization with a lot of exposure to the West. So I think that we need to have a greater understanding of that fact.

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I wonder if the chairman will let me ask one more question.

Mr. ACKERMAN. Yes.

Mr. SHERMAN. Okay. Obviously, Pakistan and the whole South Asian subcontinent would benefit from a solution to Kashmir. Have people put forward reasonable alternatives that just might be accepted, both in New Delhi and in Islamabad? I ask all three witnesses: Is there a formula out there for solving this problem?

Ms. C URTIS. Sir, I think it is of great significance that President Musharraf made his four-point proposals in December, which included making the LOC irrelevant, having some kind of joint mechanism between India and Pakistan regarding Kashmir, and saying that Pakistan would be willing to give up its territorial claim on Kashmir if some sort of self-governance was granted to the territory.
These statements closely mirror earlier statements by Prime Minister Singh made in March 2006, virtually saying, also supporting making the LOC irrelevant and talking about some kind of joint mechanisms. So I think the leadership in both Pakistan and India is starting to sing the same tune, if I might, on the Kashmir issue, which is very encouraging.

That said, there are still extremist elements in both countries that have very, shall I say, nationalistic views on the issue, and these are some of the obstacles that both President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh are going to face. But I think we can say that the leadership itself is clearly committed to moving forward on this issue, and the U.S. Government should do everything it can to encourage them forward.

Mr. Sherman. Thank you.

Mr. Ackerman. This has been a great panel. I want to ask a question that is worthy of great discussion that I would like less than a one-word answer to from each of you, and that means I am going to reduce it to a number even instead of a word. On a scale of zero to 10, how concerned are you that if we push Musharraf too far in the right direction, that we may push him out or get the wrong result? Mr. Haqqani?

Mr. Haqqani. Three.

Mr. Ackerman. Three. Dr. Weinbaum. I know we brutalized your name several times.

Mr. Weinbaum. Five. That is an unequivocal——

Ms. Curtis. Seven.

Mr. Ackerman. That is the most disagreement we have heard from the panel all day.

Let me thank the——

Mr. Chabot. Mr. Chairman, I wish you had asked that question at the beginning of this panel. It probably would have informed us greatly about what we would be hearing this afternoon. We could have skipped a lot of it. No, the testimony was great.

Mr. Ackerman. Thank you. The Chair will note, to the credit of the witnesses and the members of the subcommittee, that there are approximately three and a half pages of single-spaced, typewritten questions prepared by the staff that they thought were the key questions that we should ask. The discussion, I think, was so stimulating that nobody on the subcommittee even used one of those questions.

The Chair did not use the lights or the gavel. No members spoke for less than 11 minutes, no more than 13. It is usually limited to five. And I think that we have gotten a great deal out of this hearing due to the quality of the testimony from our experts, and we thank you very much.

In listening to both the questions, the answers, the testimony, I think it important that we have a hearing on the street. This would include not just Pakistan but other areas with which we deal where we give a lot of thought followed by a lot of money followed by a lot of people who do not like us any better, understand us any more, and further question our sincerity, and not accomplish what we are trying to get accomplished. I think that that deserves some thought by the subcommittee and the Congress.
So I just announced that so members could start thinking about that and what we might like to see in that panel.

With many thanks to the expert witnesses, this committee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]