STATEMENT OF

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COMMANDER

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

BEFORE THE HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

This is my third opportunity to appear before you as Commander of United States Strategic Command. As such, let me first thank you for the time, attentiveness and professionalism of your staffs as we have worked through some of the difficult challenges we face. The men and women of Strategic Command have performed superbly over the last year, demonstrating honor and dedication through long hours and deployments. We continued to transform our organization and capabilities over the past year, to better deal with traditional, irregular, catastrophic and disruptive contingencies. As the national security environment continues to shift, we see other challenges on the horizon. We seek to adapt to the shifting national security environment by refining and fielding a "New Triad" of capabilities. Today I will outline how we intend to address the challenges we face and ask for your assistance.

CONTINUING TRANSFORMATION

When we met a year ago, we talked of progress toward transforming Strategic Command in the midst of conflict. We spoke of new functionally aligned organizations designed to improve our operational speed and progress toward a New Triad of capabilities. Finally, we attached particular importance to the threat posed by non-state actors, the need to tailor deterrence and focus on effects rather than kinetic solutions.

One year later, our functional components for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), network warfare, global network operations, information operations, integrated missile defense and combating weapons of mass destruction are each at or nearing full operational capability. In light of disturbing trends in the space domain, we further refined our components by splitting Joint Functional Component Command - Space and Global Strike into two individual
components, focusing on global strike and integration, and space operations. These functional components are also progressing rapidly and producing significantly enhanced operational results. This year the Joint Information Operations Warfare Command (JIOWC) completed the stand up of four joint centers to facilitate the planning and execution of Information Operations. The Joint OPSEC Support Center, Joint Mission Support Center, Joint Electronic Warfare Center and Joint Strategic Communications Support Center were established to improve Information Operations throughout the Combatant Commands. We made progress in restructuring our legacy nuclear deterrent force in compliance with the Moscow Treaty. On the less positive side, we have debated, but made little gain in, filling a gap in our prompt global strike capability.

**CONFRONTING TRADITIONAL, IRREGULAR, CATASTROPHIC AND DISRUPTIVE THREATS**

The 21st Century opened with a violent attack on American soil reminiscent of our experience more than six decades ago at Pearl Harbor. Unlike Pearl Harbor, the attack of 2001 was unique in one important way; military combatants were not involved. Civilians and the image of America were the targets of calculating and fanatical terrorists. Unlike the past, attribution for this attack would not be credited to a single state or alliance of states. Rather, it would be attributed to non-state actors who were empowered by their ability to operate and leverage technology in a flattened world and were not deterred by the military tools with which we deterred others for the last 50 years.

As a world power, America's conventional and nuclear military capabilities remain second-to-none in deterring traditional threats, but our adversaries are predictably positioning themselves to avoid our strengths and exploit our vulnerabilities. Moreover, we live in a world in which traditional nation-states and alliances are asymmetrically
challenged by adversaries who are unconstrained by geographic boundaries or internationally shared societal and legal norms.

We are therefore preparing for immediate, potential and unexpected contingencies driven by these diverse adversaries who threaten America and its deployed forces, friends and Allies. These adversaries are pursuing the means for sudden and catastrophic strikes using WMD-armed ballistic missiles, or with little or no warning using WMD delivered by irregular means. They can also execute disruptive attacks in milliseconds using readily available, web-enabled communications and technologies from computers located anywhere on the globe.

**SHIFTING NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGE**

While we continue to focus on the need to deter non-state actors through effects-based operations and remain vigilant with regard to those nations that possess large inventories of nuclear weapons, recent events in Iran, Lebanon, North Korea and China, if unchecked, foreshadow future critical challenges.

Daily cyberspace intrusions into civil, military, and commercially networked systems; the nuclear aspirations of Iran and North Korea, in open disregard of broad international opinion; the firing of rockets and cruise missiles from Lebanon and Gaza into Israel by Hezbollah and Hamas; the unannounced and irresponsible launch of North Korean missiles in the vicinity of Japan; and China's controversial launch of an anti-satellite missile, which has subsequently endangered routine use of space, demonstrate the range of challenges facing America.

Today, we live in an Information Age where communication through cyberspace has forever changed and flattened our world. Free and open use of cyberspace has become an essential tool of the global economy and connects people throughout the world to each other. In fact, most Americans can no longer imagine a world without instant communications and
the freedom to access goods, services, and information at will. However, not unlike the targets of pirates or train robbers of the past, America is under widespread attack in cyberspace. Our freedom to use cyberspace is threatened by the actions of criminals, terrorists, and nations alike. Each seeks their own form of unique advantage, be it financial, political, or military, but together they threaten our freedom to embrace the opportunity offered by a globally connected and flattened world. The magnitude of cost, in terms of real dollars dedicated to defensive measures, lost intellectual capital and fraud cannot be overestimated, making these attacks a matter of great national interest. Unlike the air, land and sea domains, we lack dominance in cyberspace and could grow increasingly vulnerable if we do not fundamentally change how we view this battle-space.

Ballistic missile proliferation is a concern to free nations and will continue to pose a challenge to national security around the world. Introduction of nuclear weapons to the situation, particularly in the hands of regime leaders who openly seek to threaten or coerce their neighbors, presents an untenable threat to U.S. national security interests. It is clear that we must exhaust all possible diplomatic and economic avenues to solve the problem, but in the end, the DoD could be called upon to deter, reduce, or eliminate a critical threat to the security of America, its forces, friends, and Allies.

America’s defense strategy relies upon layers of capability that offer policy-makers maximum political-military flexibility. The first layer is our emergent missile defense system. This system, when mature, will not be an impenetrable shield, but it will reduce the likelihood of successful attack. Successful tests have thus far demonstrated our ability to overcome technical challenges and we have gained international credibility, but more work remains as we turn our attention to defense of
Europe and regional threats in Southwest Asia. Our second layer of defense is offensive strike – defeat the threat. Policy-makers will first seek to employ forward deployed general-purpose forces, normally available in 3-5 days, given sufficient warning and range. Some conventional global strike forces are capable of reducing or eliminating threats within 1-2 days, but if the threat is sudden or fleeting our only existing prompt global strike capability employs nuclear ballistic missile systems. While America possesses dominant conventional capabilities second-to-none, we lack the capability to respond promptly to globally dispersed or fleeting threats without resorting to nuclear weapons. As good as they are, we simply cannot be everywhere with our general-purpose conventional forces and use of a nuclear weapon system in prompt response may be no choice at all.

Intentional interference with space-based intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation and communication satellites, while not routine, now occurs with some regularity. America's ever increasing appetite for space-based technical solutions for global positioning, communications, and weather among others, if not properly managed could become our Sword of Damocles – we must not become trapped in this vulnerable position. Space is now a contested domain where, without adjustments to our strategy, we may not be able to count on unfettered access to space-based systems should others persist in their course of developing counter-space weapons. Strategic Command believes that if we are to ensure our freedom to operate peacefully in space, we must rely upon a balanced acquisition strategy that employs a mix of some highly specialized space-based systems and other less elegant but more responsive space-based systems, and a global system of distributed terrestrial networks to help avoid this undesirable trap and properly mitigate the risk we currently face.
The diverse challenges facing America necessitate a mature strategy that reaches well beyond the blunt, cost-imposition approach of Cold War planners. This strategy must be equally adept at denying the benefits our adversaries might seek to gain and encouraging restraint even in conflict. We understand well that policy-makers will consider a range of options including diplomatic, military and economic. The Department of Defense will in turn consider options spanning offense and defense, kinetic and non-kinetic, conventional and nuclear, as appropriate to the political-military context. Strategic Command has multiple roles to play in peacetime and conflict, not the least of which is providing sufficient intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance upon which decision makers will act. We must ensure U.S. freedom of operation in space and cyberspace, connectivity sufficient to exercise global command and control, integrated missile defense, and upon order, provide kinetic or non-kinetic global strike. Central to this strategy is the New Triad, which remains the foundation for our strategic approach to global deterrence.

The New Triad is comprised of integrated offensive and defensive capabilities enabled by persistent global command and control (C2), robust planning and intelligence, and a responsive defense infrastructure. The New Triad, when mature, will provide improved agility and flexibility in dealing with a wider range of contingencies. Our goals are to avoid undesirable competition, discourage proliferation, assure allies and deter aggression, particularly from WMD-armed adversaries, by maintaining sufficient strategic margin and flexibility vis-à-vis our competitors.

While the vision of the New Triad concept is sound and we have made progress, the shift in the global environment threatens to outpace the implementation timeline. Our ability to seamlessly integrate defensive
and offensive capabilities requires the more mature set of capabilities we are working toward. The remainder of this statement will outline the important roles of our various mission areas and highlight those needs we see as essential to meeting our goals.

**INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE (ISR)**

Our Joint Functional Component Command - ISR has achieved full operational capability and begun adjusting our transactional model. Our current ISR capabilities and allocation processes were designed to focus on nation-states possessing traditional military capabilities and supporting infrastructure. Today we face adversaries who avoid our strengths and seek to attack through non-traditional means. Our ISR enterprise, designed to confront the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, is not optimized for either collection against, or analysis of, these new adversaries. Our initial assessment reveals that although we have increased the volume of collection, disparate sensor and requirement management procedures have resulted in redundant collections and system-wide inefficiencies, further stressing an over-burdened ISR enterprise. These inefficiencies inundate our analytical teams with volumes of data, rather than providing the right information at the right time. As a Department, we effectively meet less than one third of our Combatant Commanders' war-fighter information needs through these outdated systems. At the same time, the National Reconnaissance Office manages collection of national-level intelligence requirements for the Director of National Intelligence. We have invested significant energy in strengthening this partnership with the National Reconnaissance Office in an effort to streamline and better integrate collection management.

Our objective is to optimize use of the Department’s ISR resources by eliminating requirements and collection redundancy, streamlining the process to deploy ISR assets, and conducting genuine assessment of those
operations. Our goal is an efficient global ISR enterprise, focused on achieving persistent collection capabilities against legacy and emerging threats through enhanced global sensor management of U.S. and coalition capabilities. We seek your support to improve our global situational awareness, and analytical capability to model and simulate the system of collection systems, spanning national, DoD, and coalition collection. Enhanced situational awareness and modeling and simulation capabilities will advance our ability to more effectively employ the assets we possess and move us closer to fully exploiting the data we collect.

**INTEGRATED MISSILE DEFENSE**

Because the threat posed by the proliferation of ballistic missile technology and cruise missiles is serious, a credible missile defense capability is now an essential element of America's national security strategy. Even at this early stage of maturation, missile defense systems influence our adversaries' perception of the economic and political cost they must incur to pursue ballistic missile technologies. While missile defense as a defensive shield is important, its value as a dissuasive force or deterrent is proving far greater.

Our integrated ballistic missile defense program had an excellent year. Within a 90-day period we successfully intercepted ballistic missiles at low and high altitudes; in mid-course and terminal phases; and, in endo- and exo-atmospheric environments. We increased the numbers of our AEGIS tracking and engagement ships, GBIs in Alaska, and gained confidence through testing and deployment of the Forward-Based X-Band-Transportable (FBX-T) and Sea-Based X-Band (SBX) radars to Japan and Alaska respectively. At the same time, Sentinel radars and Avenger Air Defense systems participated in a combined NORTHCOM-NORAD training exercise in July 2006 to test our ability to rapidly deploy sensors and joint air defense systems to defend key assets against cruise missile attack.
The July 4th, 2006, North Korean missile launches spurred a limited operational activation of the Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and, as a result, helped us streamline our plans, tactics and procedures. We learned that the BMDS, procedures, and personnel performed well, and demonstrated a credible operational missile defense capability for homeland defense. An initial investment by NATO in construction of a BMD command and control system along with growing interest by countries throughout the world in hosting both radar and interceptor bases are testaments to this credibility. Japan has accelerated and expanded its cooperation program with the United States for ballistic missile defense, and South Korea recently committed to developing short-range ballistic missile defenses. We expect discussion of forward deployment of radars and interceptors in Europe to continue with our Allies as attention on the emerging threat in Southwest Asia grows.

As we move forward in the next year, more work remains. We must integrate air and cruise missile defenses with our growing ballistic missile defense system. Continued progress also requires further research, development, test and evaluation of individual components and end-to-end testing to validate sensor and shooter integration. Partnering with the Missile Defense Agency and the other DoD Service Components, we expect to further evolve the BMDS by adding new elements to the integrated sensor network. These elements will include cruise missile defense capabilities and extant intelligence collection sensors that will contribute to our situational awareness and overall integrated missile defense capability. In addition, the first two Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) satellites will be placed on orbit to demonstrate our ability to protect avenues of approach that can’t be protected by other means. We also plan to increase the effectiveness of our system by improving target discrimination capability through
integration of advanced algorithms in the Forward-Based X-Band-Transportable and Sea-Based X-Band radars.

**INFORMATION OPERATIONS**

We made progress in growing Information Operations Capabilities into core military competencies. We will continue to develop these and related Strategic Communications planning capabilities to ensure that all Joint Force Commanders gain and maintain the information advantage over our adversaries throughout the entire spectrum of regional and trans-regional engagement. As our capability centers, specifically for Electronic Warfare and Strategic Communications planning support, reach maturity, we will be able to provide trans-regional planning and integration support and strategic effects assessments responsive to the demands of the new Triad.

**CYBERSPACE OPERATIONS**

Earlier in this statement we noted that attacks in cyberspace are a matter of great national interest. Cyberspace has emerged as a war-fighting domain not unlike land, sea, and air, and we are engaged in a less visible, but none-the-less critical battle against sophisticated cyberspace attacks. We are engaging these cyberspace attacks offshore, as they seek to probe military, civil, and commercial systems, and consistent with principles of self defense, defend the DoD portion of the Global Information Grid (GIG) at home.

The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace describes cyberspace as the nervous system of our country and as such, essential to our economy and national security. It describes a role for all federal departments and agencies, state and local government, private companies and organizations, and individual Americans in improving cyber-security. The National Security Strategy to Secure Cyberspace lays out a framework that seeks to deter our adversaries and assure our freedom of action in cyberspace.
Fundamental to this approach is the integration of cyberspace capabilities across the full range of military operations.

Strategic Command is charged with planning and directing cyber defense within DoD and conducting cyber attack in support of assigned missions. To date, our time and resources have focused more on network defenses to include firewalls, anti-virus protection, and vulnerability scanning. While generally effective against unsophisticated hackers, these measures are marginally effective against sophisticated adversaries. History teaches us that a purely defensive posture poses significant risks; the “Maginot Line” model of terminal defense will ultimately fail without a more aggressive offshore strategy, one that more effectively layers and integrates our cyber capabilities. If we apply the principles of warfare to the cyber domain, as we do to sea, air, and land, we realize the defense of the nation is better served by capabilities enabling us to take the fight to our adversaries, when necessary to deter actions detrimental to our interests. Our adversaries seek to operate from behind technical, legal, and international screens as they execute their costly attacks. If we are to take the fight to our adversaries, we will need Congress’ help to find solutions to penetrate these screens.

**SPACE OPERATIONS**

Freedom of action in space is as important to the United States as freedom to operate in the air and sea. In order to increase knowledge, discovery, economic prosperity, and enhance the national security, the United States must have robust, effective, and efficient space-based capabilities. The United States considers space systems to have the right to pass through and peacefully operate in space without interference, not unlike that of transit through international waters. Consistent with this principle, the United States views purposeful interference with its space systems as an infringement on its rights, and furthermore considers space
capabilities, including the ground and space segments and supporting links, as vital to its national interests. Recent events make it clear others may not share these values. Platforms costing billions of dollars to replace and the lives of astronauts from many nations are now at risk from debris left by China's recent ill-advised anti-satellite test.

Historically, space situational awareness (SSA) was focused on the cataloging, tracking, and monitoring of objects in space via the space surveillance network. Today it is clear we must have better space detection, characterization, and assessment tools. We require capabilities that enable rapid threat identification and attribution, facilitate a defensible architecture and provide fundamental shifts in space awareness. To this end, Strategic Command has created the Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) to ensure a more focused global command and control of our space operations and systems. We are in the process of co-locating and consolidating the Space Control Center and the JSpOC at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California.

We have provided, through the Secretary of Defense, a recommended plan for the establishment of an Operationally Responsive Space Office. The overall goals are to strengthen the nation's space leadership and ensure that space capabilities are available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives. Our recommended guidelines were to increase and strengthen interagency partnerships to ensure a focused and dedicated unity of effort. Interagency partnerships provide opportunities to jointly identify desired effects, capabilities, and strategies. Departments and agencies will capitalize on opportunities for dynamic partnerships - whether through collaboration, information sharing, alignment or integration. To minimize the threat to our space capabilities now and in the future, we need continued support of programs that enhance our space situational
awareness, space protection capabilities, and satellite operations in order to preserve unfettered, reliable and secure access to space.

**GLOBAL STRIKE**

The devastating attack in September 2001 made it clear that we must engage our enemies offshore, or suffer further damage at home. To do so, we require a robust mix of capabilities tailored to a wider range of potential adversaries and spectrum of challenges than yesterday. The DoD has aggressively pursued this wider range of capabilities over the last decade by pursuing a highly effective mix of advanced conventional systems designed to take the fight to our adversaries with sufficient precision to enhance the credibility of our warnings and effectiveness of our strikes.

However, while the DoD deploys and when necessary employs these expeditionary forces around the globe, it is unlikely we can or will have forces in every place we need them at the crucial moment when we have an opportunity to deter or respond to an attack, be it conventional or otherwise. A timely response will be possible using these conventional forces if they are properly equipped and positioned in near proximity to the emerging threat. If our forces can’t be in position to respond rapidly, it is prudent to have the ability to defeat attacks or eliminate high value or fleeting targets at global ranges rather than suffering the consequences of an attack. We have a prompt delivery capability on alert today, but it is configured with nuclear weapons, which limits the options available to our decision-makers and may reduce the credibility of our deterrence.

The capability we lack is the means to deliver prompt, precise, conventional kinetic effects at inter-continental ranges. Several analytical efforts are underway or have been completed to assess mid-term options. For example, Air Force Space Command is developing a promising concept for a CONUS-launched conventional strike missile (CSM), which
capitalizes on the maneuverability and precision-to-prompt-effects offered by maneuvering flight technology to produce effects at global distances. Army Space and Missile Defense Command is actively working thermal protection and management solutions that can be effectively used across the range of potential advanced PGS solutions.

Unfortunately, the threat we face is more virulent and arrived at our shores earlier than expected. Because the threat has outpaced our search for solutions, we have examined many plausible alternatives and believe a near-term solution to deploy a precision global strike missile within two years of funding is essential to adequately defend the nation offshore. This near-term capability should be part of a larger strategy to explore, test and field other land, sea, or air-launched alternatives to produce effective mid (2013-2020) and long-term (2020 and beyond) solutions.

**COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)**

For more than half a century we lived in a world in which the few major powers possessing nuclear weapons walked a cautious path of mutual deterrence. For years we have encouraged those nations retaining chemical and biological weapons to disavow them as the major powers did long ago. To its credit, Libya has raised its profile within the international community by divesting itself of weapons of mass destruction that did not and could not guarantee its security; it is too soon to know for North Korea.

Strategic Command's role is to integrate and synchronize DoD efforts in support of national efforts to combat WMD, on a global scale. Strategic Command is therefore actively engaged with the national laboratories, the Director of National Intelligence, National Counter-Proliferation Center, National Nuclear Security Administration, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Department of Homeland Security, Regional Combatant Commanders and others to better coordinate, integrate and synchronize our collective
response to the threat. We provide support to Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) initiatives, the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). We recently completed a WMD Elimination Concept of Operations, and will soon activate a Joint Elimination Coordination Element (JECE) to serve as the core of a Joint Task Force – Elimination (JTF-E), should such a force be required.

We ask for your continued support in helping us build on the successes realized through programs like the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative. Resources that enable us to scale the attributes of existing programs to a global level, will provide global combating WMD capabilities by building global partnerships, using a global perspective, with the tools and metrics to judge value, and allow individual or regional WMD interdiction and elimination by host nation-state process owners. This process focuses on enabling "nation self help," where empowered nations are stakeholders and active participants in the fight to interdict and eliminate the threat of WMD. By participating with these nations, our actions reinforce their status as a sovereign state, elevate their standing, reinforce their status, and are a positive step forward for America as our partners develop and possess resident counterproliferation capabilities, providing advanced threat reduction and attribution forward from our shores while demonstrating a consolidated front to the threat.

**NATIONAL COMMAND AND COORDINATION CAPABILITY**

The world is fundamentally more complex than it was when our current point-to-point nuclear command and control system was developed more than 50 years ago. This single-purpose aging command and control system, while adequate to meet our nuclear mission, is not adequate to meet our broader national objectives. As we seek to sustain the essential core nuclear command and control system, we see an opportunity to transform this 1950s Cold War capability into a government-wide national communications
capability. To do so, we must take advantage of modern networked architectures.

At the outset, our strategy was two-fold, first to sustain our legacy nuclear command and control system and second to expand its capability to address a broader scope of military challenges. These investments would better integrate all elements of national power and increase our ability to quickly respond across a broader spectrum of military threats. However, our national experience in Hurricane Katrina made it clear that America needed more and we expanded the scope of our effort to improve the Nation’s ability to support civil authorities following disasters or other domestic events. The President has subsequently provided guidance to develop a robust, enduring, secure, survivable National Command and Coordination Capability that integrates our legacy nuclear command and control functions into a net-centric National Command and Coordination Capability. In support of these objectives, we have developed partnerships with the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, and Director of National Intelligence.

The goal is to create a National Command and Coordination Capability (NCCC) that not only meets national command and control requirements, but can become the versatile and stable backbone of a nationally distributed network to meet other important homeland security requirements. Through an integrated and adaptive approach, NCCC will enable a responsive, universally collaborative and virtual environment for all users. We are well on the way to realizing this vision. Actions to date include modernizing our airborne components, distributing our ground components, and increasing network capacity.

SAFETY, SECURITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE NUCLEAR STOCKPILE

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Department of Defense share responsibility for the safety, security, reliability, and
effectiveness of the nation's nuclear warhead stockpile and for the quality and responsiveness of the enterprise necessary to sustain it. During the last decade, our Nation invested in increasing our scientific understanding and extending the life of weapons designed and produced during the Cold War. To date, these efforts have successfully ensured the reliability of our weapons without the need to conduct nuclear tests. While this strategy has served the nation well, we recognize the current path of indefinitely relying on legacy nuclear designs refurbished through a series of life extension programs entails accepting significant future risks and potentially large costs, to reliability/performance, safety, security, and responsiveness points of view. For this reason, we support a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program as the best path forward to improve nuclear weapon safety, security, and reliability and advance our goal of the lowest possible stockpile levels consistent with national security.

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review described a need for a responsive production infrastructure, capable of responding to a strategic surprise, as part of its comprehensive nuclear strategy. The combination of the RRW program and responsive infrastructure investment are key elements of our overall strategy to further reduce our nuclear warhead stockpile to the lowest level consistent with national security requirements and move the Nation from an inventory-based to a capability-based risk management strategy. As the comprehensive strategy for the nuclear enterprise matures, the RRW program will replace extant nuclear warheads with increasingly modular and interoperable warheads that are safer, more secure, and highly reliable, as one element of a broader strategy to reduce our reliance upon nuclear warheads and more aggressively reduce our non-deployed stockpile. RRW designs will incorporate a broad suite of enhanced safety and security features that cannot be attained through the
life extension process. Modularity and interoperability remain top warfighter priorities for the RRW concept. These attributes will significantly increase the operational flexibility and responsiveness of the nuclear weapons stockpile and improve our ability to introduce new technologies and respond to technological and/or geopolitical surprise. We ask for your continued support of the RRW program as an integral part of the nation's comprehensive strategy to meet national security requirements and encourage Congress to continue investing in the transformation of our aging nuclear infrastructure; it is a key element in the sustainment of a credible nuclear deterrent for the 21st Century.

CONCLUSION

United States Strategic Command is engaged in a wide-ranging campaign to provide support to all elements of the Department of Defense, assure our Allies, dissuade undesirable competition, deter our adversaries, and if called upon to defend our nation and defeat our enemies. We take this role very seriously and today present you with carefully thought out recommendations. Once again, thank you for your time, insight, and attentiveness to our views.