Advance Questions for General Bantz J. Craddock, USA
Nominee for Commander, United States European Command and
Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders’ responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In your previous responses to advance questions in connection with your nomination to be Commander, U. S. Southern Command, you expressed your support for full implementation of these reforms and noted that proposals by the Center for Strategic and International Studies for intra-DOD, interagency, and legislative changes could provide a basis for change.

Based on your experience in U. S. Southern Command, do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: As the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, the Joint Interagency Task Force - South (JIATF-South) falls under my purview. JIATF-South is not only a robust joint military organization, it is also a model for combined, interagency cooperation. All four military services work alongside law enforcement agencies, intelligence agencies, and liaisons from 12 foreign nations to defeat the flow of illicit traffic. In today’s environment of limited resources, I believe it would be appropriate to expand and strengthen the Goldwater-Nichols Act to encourage not only joint operations, but also interagency cooperation.

I also believe that the Combatant Commander should play a stronger role in the allocation process—resourcing issues are being studied by the Joint Task Assignment Process development project within DoD. That process should identify recommendations in joint management constructs to improve the Combatant Commander’s influence in the allocation of resources.

In your view, do the rules pertaining to joint officer management and the qualification of officers as joint specialty officers require revision? If so, how?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: There are implementation practices within the department that could be modified, but the law as written is sufficient for military officers. We may need to better identify JSO positions to ensure the right people are in the right positions, and then ensure they receive the training and PME prior to filling those critical billets. Too often, PME is being accomplished after reporting to the Joint Commands. I am also aware that there are proposals under review to credit officers with joint qualifications based on a variety of duty experience associated with joint missions. I think such considerations are an appropriate evolution in how we go about identifying and managing joint officer resources to meet contemporary requirements of joint staffs and task forces.
An additional consideration for revising the law would be to require critical civilian positions to be joint qualified and educated as well. As we move more and more to a civilianized force, reducing the number of military personnel, we must ensure that we continue to have properly qualified personnel in critical billets.

**Duties**

What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, U.S. European Command (EUCOM) and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The Commander of the U.S. European Command is responsible for coordinating and conducting all U.S. military operations and activities across the 92 countries in the European Command Area of Responsibility (AOR) in pursuit of U.S. national military objectives. This AOR includes all of Europe, two-thirds of the African continent, the Middle East, and the Caucasus Region. He is also responsible for the health, welfare and security of the approximately 104,000 service members forward deployed within that AOR. And, he coordinates the efforts of the Service Component Commands assigned to the European Theater.

The NATO Military Command Structure assigns specific roles and duties to SACEUR. These include:

- **Strategic planning:** Identifying and requesting forces for the full range of Alliance missions and contributing to crisis management and effective defense of NATO territory and forces.
- **Operational leadership:** Upon aggression, executes military measures within the capability of the command to preserve or restore the security of NATO nations.
- **Transformation:** Cooperates with the Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SAC-T) on integrating transformation efforts. Contributes to stability throughout Euro Atlantic area for developing contacts and participating in exercises and activities with NATO and Partnership for Peace (PfP) partners.
- **Strategic Analysis:** Conducts strategic level analysis to identify and prioritize type and scale of capability shortfalls. Manages NATO allocated operation and exercises resources to accomplish operational missions as directed by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

The responsibilities of the Commander EUCOM and the SACEUR are complementary. The fact that they have traditionally been vested in one officer affords near-seamless coordination between the U.S. and NATO military command structures.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I have been fortunate to serve in a number of positions that I believe have prepared me for these duties. I have had extensive command experience in the European Theater. I was the Commander of U.S.
Forces for the initial entry operation into Kosovo. I have subsequently commanded the 7th Army Training Command and the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) – the “Big Red One”. In my current capacity as the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, I have been involved with similar Combatant Command issues that include Security Cooperation, the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), interagency cooperation across a range of issues, etc. These assignments have given me an opportunity to hone both operational and diplomatic skills that are critical to the success of any Commander. Having had the opportunity to spend a significant portion of my military career assigned in Europe provides me with a better appreciation for the cultural differences and similarities with our partners and allies in the EUCOM AOR.

Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of the Commander, EUCOM?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Key to my ability to perform the duties of Commander EU COM and SACEUR will be getting around to the countries within the AOR and meeting the Chiefs and Ministers of Defense as well as the U.S. Ambassadors. Gaining an immediate appreciation for their insights and perspectives will be essential. Just as important, I will need to get on the ground and interact with the commanders and forces throughout the theater, particularly those involved in the ongoing operations in Northern Africa, Kosovo, Iraq, Afghanistan and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).

Relationships

Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands. Other sections of law and traditional practice, however, establish important relationships outside the chain of command. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the Commander, EU COM, to the following:

The Secretary of Defense

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The Secretary of Defense exercises authority over the Armed Forces through the EU COM Commander for those forces assigned to the EU COM AOR. The EU COM Commander exercises command authority over assigned forces and is directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of assigned missions and the preparedness of the Command.

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The Deputy Secretary of Defense is delegated full power and authority to act for the Secretary of Defense and to exercise the powers of the Secretary on any and all matters for which the Secretary is authorized to act pursuant to law. The EU COM Commander coordinates and exchanges information with the Deputy Secretary on matters delegated by the Secretary. The Commander directly communicates with the Deputy Secretary on a regular basis.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

GENERAL CRADDOCK: A direct command relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the EU COM Commander does not exist. However, the
EUCOM Commander regularly interacts, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on policy issues relating to NATO, European, Eurasian and African affairs. The Commander directly communicates with the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on a regular basis.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence

GENERAL CRADDOCK: There is not a direct command relationship between the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and the EUCOM Commander. However, the EUCOM Commander regularly interacts with, coordinates and exchanges information with the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence on intelligence related matters.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

GENERAL CRADDOCK: There is not a direct command relationship between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the EUCOM Commander. The EUCOM Commander and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs work together on coordinating international security policy and strategy with responsibility for Africa.

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy

GENERAL CRADDOCK: There is not a direct command relationship between the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy and the EUCOM Commander. The EUCOM Commander and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy work together on developing security cooperation strategies for Europe, Eurasia and NATO.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The Chairman functions under the authority, direction and control of the National Command Authority. The Chairman transmits communications between the National Command Authority and the EUCOM Commander as well as oversees the activities of a Combatant Commander as directed by the Secretary of Defense. As the principal military advisor to the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is a key conduit between the Combatant Commander, Interagency and Service Chiefs.

The EUCOM Commander keeps the Chairman informed on significant issues regarding NATO and the EUCOM AOR. The Commander directly communicates with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a regular basis.

The Secretaries of the Military Departments

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The Secretaries of Military Departments are responsible for administration and support of forces that are assigned or attached to the EUCOM Commander. The Secretaries fulfill their responsibilities by exercising administrative control (ADCON) through the Service Component Commands assigned to EUCOM.
The Chief of Staff of the Army, Chief of Naval Operations, Commandant of the Marine Corps, and Chief of Staff of the Air Force

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The Service Chiefs are responsible for ensuring the organization and readiness of each respective service branch and for advising the President. However, the Service Chiefs do not have operational command authority. The EUCOM Commander must rely upon the each of the Service Chiefs to provide properly equipped and capable forces to accomplish missions in the EUCOM AOR.

The Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation

Both NATO’s Strategic Commanders, SACEUR and Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), carry out roles and missions assigned to them by the North Atlantic Council or in some circumstances by NATO’s Defence Planning Committee. SACEUR and SACT work together to ensure the transformation of NATO’s military capabilities and interoperability that support Allied Command Operations.

The other combatant commanders

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Formal relationships between the EUCOM Commander and the geographic and functional Combatant Commanders derives from command authority established by title 10 USC, section 164. Combatant commanders closely coordinate as necessary to accomplish all assigned missions.

The Secretary of State

There is not a direct command relationship between the Secretary of State and the EUCOM Commander. The EUCOM Commander and the Secretary of State cooperate on the development and implementation of regional and bilateral strategy and policy for Europe, Eurasia, Africa and NATO.

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

There is not a direct command relationship between the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and the EUCOM Commander. The EUCOM Commander and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs work together in developing regional and bilateral policy issues in Africa, Europe, Eurasia, and NATO.

The Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs

There is not a direct command relationship between the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs and the EUCOM Commander. The EUCOM Commander and the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs work together on developing U.S. foreign policy in Europe, Eurasia and NATO.

The U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council

There is not a direct command relationship between the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council and the SHAPE/EUCOM Commander. The U.S. Permanent Representative is one of 26 members of the North Atlantic
Council and provides direction to NATO’s military authorities. The EUCOM Commander works with the U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council to coordinate U.S. military contributions to NATO.

U.S. Chiefs of Mission within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility

GENERAL CRADDOCK: There is not a formal command relationship between the EUCOM Commander and the U.S. Chiefs of Mission for the 92 nations in the EUOCM AOR. In a foreign country, the U.S. Ambassador is responsible to the President for directing, coordinating and supervising all U.S. Government elements in the host nation. The EUCOM Commander coordinates and exchanges information with U.S. Chiefs of Mission regularly on matters of mutual interest, to include military operations and engagement activities. In addition to the regular exchange of information with the U.S. Chiefs of Mission, past EUCOM Commanders have hosted regional conferences. If confirmed, I intend to continue this practice.

Major Challenges

In your view, what are the major challenges and problems you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander, EUCOM, and SACEUR?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I believe the major challenges facing the next Commander, EUCOM and SACEUR can generally be divided into six broad categories: Defense Cooperation in Eastern Europe, Africa, Theater Security Cooperation Reforms, International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) – Afghanistan, NATO Kosovo and NATO Capabilities.

As the focus of European security continues to shift from Central to Eastern Europe, EUCOM strategic plans and activities to address the challenges in Eastern Europe and Eurasia compliment NATO efforts to strengthen new Alliance partner capability in this region. EUCOM efforts to stage U.S. forces in Bulgaria and Romania will focus on mil-to-mil activities that continue to build the military capacities of new NATO Alliance and perspective Alliance countries along with strategic partners in Eastern Europe and Eurasia.

The increasing strategic significance of Africa will continue to pose the greatest security stability challenge in the EUOCM AOR. The large ungoverned area in Africa, HIV/AIDS epidemic, corruption, weak governance, and poverty that exist throughout the continent are challenges that are key factors in the security stability issues that affect every country in Africa.

Today’s theater security cooperation programs provide critical resources to increase the security capacity of countries in need, but inefficient processes and program planning and design restrictions make practical use of our security cooperation programs inefficient. The lack of flexibility to respond to rapidly changing security requirements hampers the Combatant Commanders ability to provide the kind of training and equipping of foreign military forces. Reform of existing theater security cooperation programs is required to streamline our processes so that U.S. national security objectives are met.
The future of NATO out of area operations is tied to the success of NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan. Although the security and stability ISAF mission in Afghanistan will not be a short term or challenge free endeavor, the commitment the Alliance has made exporting security and stability to regions in need is what will allow NATO to continue as the relevant security organization of the future. If NATO’s political or military will is lost in the Afghanistan ISAF mission, the future of NATO out of area operations and thus the NATO Response Force concept will be severely jeopardized.

The Balkan countries have been a challenge for the last several Commanders, EUCOM/SACEURs, and this will not change for the next one. In Kosovo, the upcoming decision on the future status of Kosovo holds several unknowns that will assuredly affect the region. With continued vigilance, this region is on the path to be a NATO success story.

Finally, continuing to improve the standardized capabilities of NATO Alliance militaries will be an ongoing challenge for Alliance nations that grapple with scarce resources to contribute to their security organizations. Resources for modernization and standardization are competing directly with current operational requirements in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, Darfur along with supporting UN peacekeeping operations throughout the region.

If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges and problems?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: In the previously mentioned areas, the key to success will be proactive engagement and clear direction. The next EUCOM/SACEUR must establish clear priorities and provide a strategic vision to guide transformation, foster relationships, and set the conditions for the successful integration of the new NATO member countries. Additionally, constant reassessment of these challenges and coupled with the ability to adjust will be critical enablers as we address evolving security challenges in the EUROM AOR.

NATO Capabilities

This committee has a long history of concern that NATO remain first and foremost a highly capable military organization. Over the years, there have been concerns that NATO member countries do not spend as much as they should on maintaining and modernizing their militaries, and that there has been a considerable gap in capabilities between the United States and many other NATO members. This issue has become an even larger concern as NATO has expanded to include several East and Central European nations.

What is your assessment of the military capabilities of the NATO member states, and of the NATO organization as a whole? In what areas specifically is more improvement needed? In what areas has there been the most progress?

GEN CRADDOCK: The NATO member states are very well trained and equipped. The limiting factor for NATO capability is logistics and transportation, including strategic airlift. Military equipment and capability are the best in the world. Until NATO has the logistics and transportation infrastructure needed to be expeditionary in nature, greater quantities of unmoved equipment will be rendered irrelevant. There has been a great deal of progress in
transforming new member states of NATO into all-volunteer, professional forces.

What is your assessment of the role of Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation in effecting positive change among NATO member nations?

GEN CRADDOCK: The role of Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT) is to effect positive change among NATO member nations forces and capabilities to improve NATO's operational effectiveness. SACEUR and SACT work in cooperation, not competition, to realize effective change across the alliance. I look forward to continuing the relationship that General Jones has developed.

What will you do, if confirmed, to ensure that military capability and interoperability remain top priorities for NATO?

GEN CRADDOCK: Military capability and interoperability are top priorities for NATO, and will continue to be so during my tour. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Kosovo provide "real world" experience to base our future plans. Our ability to work together will be enhanced by these experiences.

NATO Enlargement

NATO has indicated that it does not expect to invite new members to join NATO at the Riga Summit in November 2006, but that it will make clear that the door remains open to new members.

What do you believe the criteria should be for accepting new members into NATO?

GEN CRADDOCK: The criteria for accepting new members is clearly outlined in the Washington Treaty, the Alliance's 1995 Study on NATO Enlargement, and the NATO Membership Action Plan.

Chapter 10 of the Washington Treaty notes that the Alliance, through unanimous agreement, may invite any European State that is in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area.

Beyond that very broad statement, Allied Heads of State and Government, in September 1995, issued the Study on NATO Enlargement, which among many things, noted that any new member, at the time that they join NATO, must commit themselves to very specific things, such as: settling any international disputes by peaceful means; contributing militarily to NATO's collective defense; and maintaining the effectiveness of the Alliance by sharing its roles, risks, responsibilities, costs and benefits.

Finally, in 1999, NATO, building on the principles of that Study, launched a program known as the Membership Action Plan or "MAP", which is specifically designed to assist aspiring countries in their preparations for possible future NATO membership. The MAP lists over 30 separate political, economic, defense, military, financial, security and legal items, which the Alliance expects each NATO aspirant to meet upon accession into the Alliance. These items range from establishing democratic and civilian control of their armed forces and allocating sufficient budget resources for the implementation of
Alliance commitments, to having in place sufficient safeguards and procedures to ensure the security of NATO information and ensuring, to the greatest extent possible, that their domestic legislation is compatible with the legal arrangements and agreements that govern cooperation within NATO.

Is there a limit to how many members NATO can include and still be an effective military organization capable of making decisions and acting in a timely fashion?

GEN CRADDOCK: It would not be appropriate for me to answer the first part of your question since it is a political one, which is best answered by the Allied Heads of State and Government, who collectively must answer it. However, with regard to the second part of your question, I can tell you that the last two rounds of NATO enlargement, which increased the size of the Alliance by ten members over the last seven years, have strengthened the Alliance.

NATO-Russia Council

The NATO-Russia Council was established at the Rome Summit in May 2002. How has the NATO-Russia relationship evolved since that time?

GEN CRADDOCK: NATO-Russia relations have evolved since the Rome Summit and have incrementally increased in terms of the number and complexity of events. These events include exercises, seminars, academic exchanges, and technical conferences. Russian ratification of the NATO Partnership for Peace SOFA remains a necessary next step for additional progress, especially in field exercises.

How do you see this relationship evolving in the future?

GEN CRADDOCK: I anticipate the relationship to continue a deliberate positive trend that reflects the mutual interests of both NATO and Russia.

Does Russia continue to have concerns about further enlargement of NATO and, if so, should NATO take steps to help mitigate Russian concerns?

GEN CRADDOCK: Russia has always been concerned about NATO enlargement, but the track history speaks for itself. The NATO-Russia relationship is non-adversarial and focused on practical interoperability. NATO has always been transparent about the enlargement process, and Russia has many opportunities to stay appraised on the enlargement status. The ongoing relationship with NATO facilitates this.

NATO- European Union

The NATO - European Union (EU) relationship is viewed by some as competitive and by others as complementary.
How would you characterize the NATO-EU relationship today?

GEN CRADDOCK: When discussing the NATO-EU relationship it is important to understand that the United States considers NATO to be the premier security structure in Europe and this drives much of our policy decision-making. We believe the Alliance formalizes and deepens the security and political relationship between North America and European allies and partners. In this respect we believe that NATO is the natural venue for those nations to consult and act together on security matters – a principle that EU Heads of State also affirmed. As you know, the U.S. supports European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) and a close, cooperative relationship between the EU and NATO.

How would you like to see this relationship evolve in the future?

GEN CRADDOCK: To achieve a close, cooperative relationship between NATO and the EU from a military point of view, I believe there are several areas that both organizations can work together to improve. Let me offer some examples:

- Enhanced staff to staff dialogue between the EU Military Staff and NATO’s International Military Staff.
- Full use of Berlin Plus arrangements.
- Wider, more active liaison work, including more frequent briefs to the NATO and EU military committees, by the NATO Permanent Liaison Team to the EU and the EU Liaison Cell to SHAPE.
- More frequent meetings between the NATO Chairman of the Military Committee and the EU Military Committee Chairman.
- Additional informal NATO-EU MILREP off-sites.
- Utilization of Crisis Management Exercise 2007 as the primary mechanism for understanding, demonstrating and enhancing the necessity, possibility and opportunity for cooperation between NATO and the EU, taking full advantage of the lessons learned.
- Expediting establishment of robust ties between the EU Defense Agency (EDA) and the range of comparable NATO structures addressing capabilities development, fully using the Berlin Plus mechanisms, as was agreed in the EDA’s ministerial charter.

What do you believe would be the optimal delineation of responsibilities between NATO and the EU?

GEN CRADDOCK: The U.S. has supported ESDP with the understanding that it will create real additional military capabilities and conduct missions where NATO is not engaged while working in a manner that is cooperative, and not competitive, with NATO. This is the purpose of the Berlin Plus arrangements for consultations and collaboration between the two organizations.

**Afghanistan/ International Security Assistance Force**

On July 31, 2006, the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) assumed responsibility for security in the southern region of Afghanistan. Since that time, NATO forces have had several military engagements with the Taliban, and have sustained casualties.
How confident are you that NATO will be able to sustain its commitment to ISAF given the challenging security situation in Afghanistan?

**GEN CRADDOCK:** The NATO Alliance took a significant step when it decided to conduct military operations in Afghanistan. That it did so reinforces its commitment to the Global War on Terrorism and the NATO’s belief that this effort is central to continued peace and stability in Europe. It was a decision made with deliberation and a significant commitment of resources. Thus far, NATO forces have shown determination and resiliency. The Alliance has given no indication at this point as having any doubt in their decision and I am confident that member nations will stay the course in providing Afghanistan the stability and security it needs to move forward.

When do you believe NATO will be ready to assume responsibility for security in the eastern region of Afghanistan?

**GEN CRADDOCK:** Generals Jones and Abzaid have been in close consultation with respect to the standards and conditions necessary on the ground to affect the transfer of authority (TOA) in the eastern region to International Security Assistance Force (ISAF). This transition effort has progressed as expected and the commanders are confident that the time is near to conduct this transition. Given the strength of ISAF and the strength of the U.S. forces currently serving in Region East and the performance of ISAF forces recently in the Region South, it appears to me that we are approaching the time to conduct TOA. Unity of command is an essential element in military success and fully vesting ISAF with the stability and security responsibilities for all of Afghanistan serves this purpose.

In your view, should EUCOM assume responsibility for all U. S. missions in Afghanistan once NATO has assumed responsibility for the ISAF mission?

**GEN CRADDOCK:** ISAF is organized and manned to accomplish the mission authorized by the Alliance. Within that mandate, the force is well prepared to meet the broad and varied challenges that it will face in Afghanistan. There are other operations that will continue to be conducted in the country that are outside those parameters established for ISAF. The current command relationships take into account these various activities and I believe that these can be conducted in a synchronized and coordinated manner. The various operations also take into account the unique capabilities of both NATO and the United States military forces. After the TOA for Stage 4, nearly 13,000 U.S. personnel will be under the direct command of the Commander, ISAF. The remaining U.S. forces will continue to conduct complementary and coordinated operations in support of the mission to maintain stability and security in Afghanistan.

What challenges do you foresee for NATO when it assumes responsibility for this fourth sector in Afghanistan?

**GEN CRADDOCK:** I think we will see a continuation of what ISAF has encountered in the region. The US has been present in Region East for some time now. We can expect little change from what we are seeing today.

Are you concerned about U. S. troops participating in a NATO-led mission under the control of a non-U.S. general officer? What do you see as the benefits of such participation?
GEN CRADDOCK: No, I am not. My predecessors have all worked to make NATO the pre-eminent military alliance in the world, and I believe their past record stipulates to that great success. In doing so, great effort has been made in standardizing operations and procedures, to ensure all members of the military forces understand the capabilities and limitations of each nation’s contributions. U.S. forces have served with great distinction under commanders of other nations – as have other NATO forces under the command of U.S. leaders. This has been a great strength within the Alliance and I see that this will continue in Afghanistan and in other areas of future NATO operations.

To what extent are national caveats a problem with respect to NATO forces participating in ISAF?

GEN CRADDOCK: Any time a unit, a component, or a single soldier is given the option to default to a national prerogative that may run counter to the assigned mission, that mission is put at risk. While I understand that there are issues that might rise above the military necessity on the ground, it must be understood that any such limitation placed upon an essential resource may well create an irrelevance in that resource’s use to the command. Clearly, this situation has the effect of lessening overall military effectiveness and we in the Alliance should strive to ensure no such limitations are saddled upon a commander. We continue to push for elimination of caveats within the Alliance and we still have room for progress.

Officials are reportedly expecting opium cultivation in Afghanistan to reach record levels this year with a possible 40 percent increase in land under poppy cultivation.

Are you satisfied with the current level of effort to counter the narcotics trade in Afghanistan?

GEN CRADDOCK: Obviously, the rising rate of poppy production in Afghanistan is a troubling issue. Drug trade generates enormous amounts of money that is being funneled back into Afghanistan, providing the resources to both criminal elements and the insurgents to fund their operations. This is a source of funding that only exacerbates the challenges that ISAF, the Afghan government, international aid efforts, and U.S. military forces face in helping to provide stability, security and reconstruction in the nation. Having faced a similar situation as the Commander of the Southern Command, I can assure you that there are no easy answers to this problem, but a comprehensive, coordinated effort that removes the incentives for poppy production, reduces the influence of the criminal element in those poppy production areas, creates alternative income sources for farmers, and ensures that corruption in local and regional governments is eliminated is critical to reversing this trend. I cannot be satisfied with efforts to date that have resulted in the current situation that has an immediate, negative impact on our military operations.

Please provide your assessment of the capabilities and effectiveness of NATO forces in Afghanistan.

GEN CRADDOCK: Not having been on the ground, I cannot give a personal observation or assessment as to either ISAF’s current capabilities or its effectiveness. From what I have read and seen in news reports, this is a
groundbreaking mission for NATO that has many implications for the Alliance and its future. Great effort and commitment has been demonstrated in approving the mission, allocating the required forces, moving them into Afghanistan, and conducting operations to date. During the recent increase in combat operations, ISAF forces have acquitted themselves well in the field as the Alliance moves towards Stage 4 TOA expansion to Region East. All this activity and effort demonstrates a true commitment to this mission.

Lebanon

Recently the Department announced that EUCOM would assume responsibility from CENTCOM as the lead unified command for Joint Task Force-Lebanon.

Is this a change to the Unified Command Plan or a temporary tasking?

GENERAL CRaddock: USEUCOM assuming the mission from USCENTCOM in Lebanon does not change the UCP. The transition of JTF-Lebanon to USEUCOM is a temporary requirement given a specific JOA and missions focused on supporting the US Embassy in Beirut.

What was the rationale for this transfer of responsibility?

GENERAL CRaddock: JS directed the change in OPCON because the military role begin to transition from the non-evacuation operations (NEO) to U.S. Government (USG) support to American Embassy Beirut (AMEMB) for aviation and maritime lift support, as well as providing standby capability for short-notice evacuation of embassy personnel to include a security force to augment existing AMEMB security

What specific missions have been assigned to EUCOM with respect to the current situation in Lebanon?

GENERAL CRaddock: To provide DOD support to SECDEF approved U.S. Government (USG) humanitarian assistance efforts as requested by Department of State (DOS) and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); continue sustainment and security support to American Embassy Beirut (AMEMB); and to be prepared to conduct short notice evacuation of embassy personnel.

Do you anticipate that NATO could assume any formal role relating to the situation in Lebanon?

GENERAL CRaddock: USEUCOM does not anticipate NATO assuming a role in Lebanon. The UN has taken on the role and UNIFIL has the lead. Currently, the UN has begun deploying additional UNIFIL forces to Lebanon.

What role do you anticipate for EUCOM in the disbursement of military assistance, including section 1206 funding, to support the Lebanese armed forces?

GENERAL CRaddock: USEUCOM does not anticipate a role in the disbursement of Military assistance to LAF. This responsibility is retained by USCENTCOM.
NATO/Iraq

NATO has committed to help train and equip the Iraqi security forces to enable Iraq to assume responsibility for its own security.

What is the status of NATO contributions -- both inside Iraq and outside of Iraq -- to training and equipping the Iraqi security forces?

GEN CRADDOCK: Status of NATO contributions inside Iraq: through its NATO Training Mission to Iraq (NTM-I) NATO provided assistance to Iraqi Security Forces through the training and education of Iraqi Security Forces. NTM-I began operations on 20 Feb 05 and have trained over 2000 Iraqi Security Forces to date, including military officers and civilian leadership. This effort includes the establishment of an Iraqi War College, the Iraqi Command and Staff College and the Iraqi Basic Officers Commissioning Course. The NATO Training Equipment Coordination Group (NTECG) has coordinated the delivery of more than 130 million dollars of equipment for the Iraqi Security Forces including tanks, trucks, small arms, ammunition and protective equipment. Through 5 SEP, the NTECG had trained more than 308 Iraqis at NATO institutions and is currently coordinating an additional 225 quotas. Finally, with respect to out of country training offered through NATO, the Allies have provided 96 quotas in their national institutions and the NTECG currently has 69 additional quotas under coordination.

Do you expect NATO’s level of effort in this area to expand, diminish, or stay about the same over the coming months?

GEN CRADDOCK: Contingent on sufficient trust funding to support operations, NATO’s level of effort will expand, to include academic Non Commissioned Officer (NCO training this year. NATO has also received, for the first time, an Iraqi generated statement of requirements requesting NATO assistance for 2007. This proposal was prepared by the Iraqi Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior and requests assistance in both training and education and equipment.

Do you believe that there is more NATO could do to assist in the development of the Iraqi Security Forces?

GEN CRADDOCK: There is more that can be done. NATO is an Alliance of 26 nations with a diversity of approaches and capabilities to offer. For instance, many European nations have very capable paramilitary police forces such as the gendarmerie or the Carabinieri in Italy. These forces are part of the military in many of these nations. NATO is currently exploring expansion of the mission to assist the Iraqi Security Forces in developing a Gendarmerie/Carabinieri capability in order to assist interior security troops.

Defense Cooperation in Eastern Europe

The United States is in the process of building new forward operating locations in Eastern Europe.

Are you satisfied with the current plans, including the proposed locations and activities to be conducted at those locations?
GENERAL CRADDOCK: I am satisfied with current Joint Task Force-East planning efforts. The proposed locations and activities are satisfactory and in keeping with EUCOM's goal of establishing more strategically forward-positioned expeditionary forces. The Forward Operating Sites in Bulgaria and Romania will increase Theater Security Cooperation and bi-lateral training exercise opportunities across the range of military operations with our Global War on Terrorism partner nations. These Theater Security Cooperation events will be synchronized to support our Regional War on Terrorism contingency plans.

If confirmed, would you plan to review these current and proposed arrangements?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Although the current and proposed Defense Cooperation and implementation agreements with Bulgaria and Romania enter into force for ten-year periods, it is my intent to conduct annual reviews to ensure the agreements continue to meet the needs of the United States and European Command.

Kosovo

It appears that agreement could be reached in the near future regarding the final status of Kosovo. Nearly 16,000 NATO troops currently participate in the Kosovo Force (KFOR) that provides security and stabilization assistance in Kosovo.

What do you anticipate will be the role and requirements for KFOR after an agreement on final status for Kosovo has been reached?

GEN CRADDOCK: In the immediate aftermath of the Final Status talks settlement there is a high potential for disaffected parties to generate violence and unrest. In the short term, NATO's role in the immediate aftermath will be to ensure that security and stability are maintained as the conditions of the talks are implemented. As a longer term measure NATO will need to transition to other security actors to include the European Union to ensure that comprehensive approaches to Kosovo civil society are met. What can not happen in the short or the long term is for the international community to disengage from Kosovo until the Kosavars are capable of ensuring their own security and stability. If there was a premature withdrawal it would be an open invitation for disaffected elements or organized criminal elements to move into the environment.

Is NATO prepared in the event that ethnic violence and tension increases in the coming days and months?

GEN CRADDOCK: NATO is very well positioned to respond to civil disturbances and unrest throughout Kosovo. KFOR has recently implemented a Multinational Task Force Concept that requires all maneuver companies in the operating area to be capable of responding to events throughout Kosovo. Additionally, KFOR conducts rehearsal deployments of its operational reserves that deploy during selectively targeted time frames to ensure forces are positioned and ready to respond. It has also developed effective coordination measures with international community police forces. Finally, KFOR has procedures in place to enable quick reinforcement by other international forces in the Balkans.
If there is no agreement on final status this year, what role should NATO play in Kosovo?

GEN CRADDOCK: To begin with, let's keep in mind that agreement is not a precondition to final status talks. It is well within the authority of the United Nations to generate an imposed settlement. If there is no settlement this year, the logical outcome of such an event would be unrest and violence on the part of those Kosovars who are seeking the settlement. KFOR's role would be to ensure that a safe and secure environment is maintained so that efforts can move ahead towards that final settlement. NATO's role is to provide the time and the space for a comprehensive political solution to be reached.

Republic of Turkey

In June 2006, the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) issued a report on Turkey that argued that the United States and Turkey should take steps to repair their strained relations and help ensure that Turkey remains firmly anchored in the west. The recommended steps included a trilateral dialogue on the future of Iraq; a proactive U.S. diplomatic approach to encourage Europe to agree to Turkish accession to the EU; and establishing a high-level U.S.-Turkish commission to provide a structured mechanism for regular interaction across agencies of government, NGOs and the private sector.

Do you believe that Turkey is of enormous strategic importance to the United States and Europe?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Yes. Turkey remains an important strategic partner for the United States and Europe for reasons that made it a viable strategic NATO ally for the last fifty years. It is the crossroad of vital air and sea lanes of communication and directly supports the EUCOM mission of 1) facilitating security cooperation between partner nations and 2) providing consequence management and crisis response throughout the AOR as needed. They provide a stable, moderate and secular Islamic society that is working for accession to the European Union. They are a traditional ally, friendly to the United States, and have been loyal throughout their history. Turkey’s ability to recover economically following a crisis is documented by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). This further indicates Turkey's ability to meet western economic standards. Another critical piece is the positive diplomacy we share and extensive military cooperation that has played a vital role in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom, as well as JTF Lebanon. The United States and Turkey share a common strategic vision. Turkish security is as important to the U.S. as it is to Turkey itself.

Do you agree with the recommendations of the CFR report?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Maintaining and bolstering relations with Turkey is paramount to successful influence in the region. Closely tied with energy partners and engaging in relations with non-traditional nation-states, the importance of improving relations with Turkey is critical for US regional success. The CFR stated the ideology and the generalized goals that would achieve these results. However, EUCOM with interagency assistance would consider putting more concrete tasks to match the goals and objectives outlined in the CFR.
Are there activities you would like to initiate at EUCOM and at NATO to promote stronger US-Turkish and European-Turkish relations?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: We should continue to work with Turkey to improve the capability of the countries of the Caucasus region to secure their own borders while discouraging these countries from using military force to resolve "frozen conflicts." Both Turkey and the US have significant interests in this region and see the Caucasus countries impeding the cross-border movement of trans-national threats while allowing free flow of valuable hydrocarbon assets out of the Caspian basin. Both Turkey and the US have significant security cooperation programs to achieve these goals, and, with continued dialogue, these programs can complement one another. We've done this well in the past in Georgia, and have begun to look at ways to cooperate in Azerbaijan. We have to be careful not to provide capabilities that will upset the military balance or that hurt movement towards resolution of the frozen conflicts, but again that can be done thru good dialogue.

Africa

A January 2006 Council on Foreign Relations report argued that Africa is of increasing strategic importance to the United States and our allies, including Africa’s role in energy security, combating the spread of terrorism, and halting the devastation of HIV/AIDS. EUCOM has been active in addressing security threats in Africa, through efforts such as the Trans-Sahel Counter-Terrorism Initiative (TS/CTI) to combat terrorist networks and deny safe havens throughout the Sahel region.

In your view, what are the most significant security threats in Africa today? What do you foresee as EUCOM’s role in addressing those threats?

GEN Craddock: Foremost among African security threats to US interests is the trans-Sahel’s increasing attraction to terrorist groups; the under-governed region provides a sanctuary for terrorist planning and training to a ready pool of extremists.

Other notable threats to US interests in Africa include the spread of HIV/AIDS, the spillover effects of insecurity in central and eastern Africa, the instability in West Africa that threatens to spread and disrupt hydrocarbon production, and the dramatic growth in the level and nature of Chinese activities throughout Africa.

- HIV/AIDS continues to contribute to social and economic instability. AIDS has surpassed malaria as the leading cause of death in sub-Saharan Africa, and its impact is worsened by the disproportionate toll it takes on their populations. Forty percent of Africans are under the age of 15, and their poverty and lack of economic prospects exacerbates both a growing extremist sentiment and illegal emigration into Europe.

- Fighting and lawlessness in Sudan’s Darfur region and eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo has created the largest humanitarian crisis in decades.
• A rise in both criminal and militant activity in Nigeria’s oil-producing delta region this year has disrupted the country’s oil output by between 500,000 and one million barrels per day. Foreign oil workers, especially Americans and other westerners, are increasingly at risk of being kidnapped for ransom.

• While developed countries will continue to rely on Africa to supply much needed raw materials, other major developing economies of the world will compete with the West’s demand for these resources. For example, China is the world’s leading consumer of copper, steel, cobalt and aluminum, is second only to the US as an importer of African oil, and is investing heavily in these African resource sectors.

Despite these challenges, today, Africa is on a course to slowly move away from its recent history of mass ethnic violence and dictatorial regimes. However, if gradual improvements to security and democracy are unable to keep pace with popular expectations for meeting basic needs, security will again deteriorate. These conditions could provide a fertile environment in which terrorist networks could encroach, emerge, and prosper in coming years.

What do you foresee EUCOM’s Role in addressing those threats?

We see our role as conducting operations which contribute to an environment inhospitable to violent extremists and their ideology. EUCOM is executing Operation Enduring Freedom - Trans Sahara (OEF-TS). OEF-TS is the DoD operation supporting the Department of State TSCTI. It addresses the defeat of violent extremist networks in Trans-Saharan Africa largely through capacity building, information sharing, Strategic Communication/Information Operations, and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC). It provides a long term solution, aimed at both defeating violent extremist networks, and reducing their underlying conditions.

Are there resource or other challenges that EUCOM is facing in effectively executing the TS/CTI or similar initiatives?

GEN Craddock: DOD’s top three GWOT efforts (OIF, OEF-A, OEF-TS) are all currently funded by supplementals. Unless OEF-TS becomes a Program of Record in FY08-13, OEF-TS will continue living through the supplemental venue. I am encouraged that OSD is seeking to find better ways to resource COMCOM initiatives and is using OEF-TS as their business case for this endeavor.

Other challenges for TSCTI/OEF-TS primarily deal with access. Policy restrictions, legal roadblocks, lack of servicemen protections, and differing country team perspectives relating to counter terrorism create challenges that must be overcome.

Darfur

NATO is currently assisting the African Union (AU) in Ethiopia by helping to build the capacity of AU forces that will serve in Darfur, and by providing strategic lift in and out of Darfur for AU forces that are serving there.
Do you anticipate that NATO could be asked to play an expanded role in providing security and stopping the genocide in Darfur?

GEN CRADDOCK: NATO could be asked to play an expanded role, but any such request will have to be carefully weighed against the realities of the current strategic situation. Many NATO Allies have commitments in the Balkans, Lebanon, Afghanistan as well as supporting our efforts in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

Is NATO planning for the possibility of an expanded mission there?

GEN CRADDOCK: NATO is limited in its ability to plan by political decisions reached by the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC has authorized current levels of assistance in strategic movement support and capacity building in support of Africa Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) to be extended. NATO military authorities are prepared to do more in terms of providing training and support to AMIS and NATO is prepared and engaged with the United Nations (UN) to explore ways for NATO to support UN efforts as well. NATO is prepared and ready to do more than it has been asked to do by the African Union (AU). The key to any increased NATO assistance will lie with those who are requesting the assistance.

Unified Command Plan

In 2004, the Department of Defense conducted a review of the Unified Command Plan. While the Department reviewed the command structure in Africa, it did not approve establishing a separate command or realigning the existing command structure. Under the existing command structure, EUCOM, U. S. Central Command (CENTCOM), and U. S. Pacific Command (PACOM) have responsibilities for Africa. Since the establishment of the current command structure, Africa has become more strategically important to the United States. Since 2001, the Department has increased its presence and activities in Africa.

What is your view on the present command structure in Africa?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: As you’ve accurately stated, Africa is split between three Geographic Combatant Commands under the current Unified Command Plan. From a unity of command and unity of effort perspective, a change in US command arrangements in Africa has merit and should be considered. A separate command for Africa would provide better focus and increased synergy in support of US policy and engagement, but it would also require a significant commitment of resources. Establishment of Africa Command as a Geographic Combatant Command is included as an initiative in the UCP 2007 review.

In carrying out your duties, how will you ensure that no seams exist in the operations and activities being carried out in Africa between EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM, as well as with other Federal agencies of the United States operating in the region?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: There will always be seams or boundaries; our challenge is to mitigate the seams through either UCP changes, where it makes sense, or through effective coordination with our respective counterparts both within the Department of Defense, the Interagency, and our Allies and Partners. To
be effective in support of US policy we all have to work as a team. That implies sharing information, participating in planning and coordination forums, establishing supported and supported relationships, and at times establishing a Joint Task Force to operate on the seam, to address a specific problem or task. The key to success in working with the Interagency is not only effective communication and coordination within the Beltway, but also integrating a full spectrum Joint Interagency Coordination Group within the Unified Commands as well.

**Theater Security Cooperation Operation Reforms**

Recent changes in the Security Cooperation Guidance require all Department of Defense components to coordinate their Security Cooperation Guidance implementation strategies, plans, and activities with the relevant geographic combatant commanders.

Based on your experience, what is your view of the extent to which these changes are being implemented? What impact are they having on the development of theater security cooperation programs?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The welcomed changes to the Security Cooperation Guidance are being implemented in a slow but sure way. Since the release of the guidance, many agencies have had to make significant course corrections in how they do business, and EUCOM is no different. The process to improve interaction takes time and I expect our interagency cooperation will improve significantly as we enter the next planning cycle. We believe that the increased interagency cooperation will bring about better synergy and collaboration at many levels, improving the overall coherency of our security cooperation activities.

Do you anticipate that other changes may be necessary? If so, what areas do you believe may need to be addressed?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: While some security cooperation reform measures have been embraced, there still is some work to be done. Specifically, the focus of our efforts should be on three areas: Department of Defense reform, interagency reform, and legislative action. Within the Department of Defense, the GCC still does not have adequate visibility over activities within our AOR nor do we have sufficient influence over service Foreign Military Sales decisions affecting theater security cooperation programs. Within the interagency arena, steps should be taken that allow for true flexibility and interagency cooperation at the regional and GCC levels. The GCC should have greater input into the FMF/IMET process, integration into the budget development process, resource visibility, and an empowered Joint Interagency Coordination Group. Finally, legislative action that supports funding flexibility designed to allow greater logistics support and training for purposes of interoperability, coalition operations, and foreign forces fighting in lieu of U.S. forces must be pursued. The reform requested should enable proactive capacity building, true synchronization of Title 10 and 22 funds, and a systemic multi-year approach to security cooperation budgeting processes.

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the interagency process for developing our theater security cooperation strategy? What, if any, reforms
might be necessary to develop a more effective, integrated approach toward our theater security cooperation programs?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The interagency process has yielded some positive results, but the concept and execution still require significant work to achieve the integration necessary for security cooperation success on a regional and global scale. The EUCOM Joint Interagency Coordination Group has been in place for 4 years, and its efficacy has been limited due to a shortage of appropriate personnel and limited authorities. The representation provided by the interagency is insufficient, in both rank and numbers, to coordinate the myriad of activities conducted in the AOR. The Joint Interagency Coordination Group needs to be staffed and empowered to make decisions for their agencies in theater on strategy and objectives. The GCC should look into a reciprocal arrangement and provide liaison officers in key agencies that have a significant footprint within the AOR.

Inter-Agency Support and Processes

In his 2006 testimony, General Jones noted that due to the modern complexity of the EUCOM theater's security challenges, U. S. efforts require a broad interagency approach and that EUCOM works "to improve interagency coordination across the spectrum of governmental and non-governmental organizations in order to achieve optimal national results." It has been suggested that the methods in place for inter-agency cooperation between, for instance, the Defense and State Departments overseas, are less than optimal. Some have suggested that an overhaul on the pattern of the Goldwater-Nichols Act is needed.

What is your opinion as to the existing inter-agency processes for coordination and support?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Our processes are too cumbersome to deal with in our present day security environment and challenges presented in the 21st century. Our society allows our enemies to understand how we operate and they are exploiting certain limitations to their advantage. An overhaul within DoD’s other agency partners, patterned after Goldwater-Nichols, would be a welcome reform.

What improvements, if any, would you suggest?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The improvements necessary for this type of reform point toward the concept of unity of command. While the United States Government has many tools capable of affecting the various regions, the current efforts are not directed by a single entity since there is no legally binding requirement for agencies to coordinate their activities to create efficiencies and synergy. Coordination towards a collective interagency effort in order to de-conflict departmental or agency priorities should guide any effort to address this issue, one that I believe is overdue for detailed study.

EUCOM and NATO Missile Defense

NATO territory is currently within range of a variety of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles from potentially hostile states. Some NATO
nations (United States, Germany, and Italy) are partners in the Medium Extended Area Defense System (MEADS) that will use some components of the PATRIOT PAC-3 system.

What is your view of the priority of ballistic missile defense in the overall NATO/EUCOM security situation? Where does it fit in relative to other priorities like combating terrorism, cruise missile defense, and providing peacekeeping forces?

GEN CRADDOCK: Rogue states in the Middle East and Southwest Asia possess a current ballistic missile capability that threatens a major portion of Europe. Iran is aggressively expanding the range and sophistication of its ballistic missiles and is pursuing nuclear capabilities that dramatically expand the threat to the entire European region. The deployment of ballistic missile defense assets in Europe would make a significant contribution to the protection of the United States and Europe from a Middle Eastern ballistic missile threat. Ballistic missile defense must remain a priority so that we are postured to counter threats to the United States, deployed forces and allies. Ballistic missile defense is directly linked to the other theater priorities such as deterring/defeating the use of missiles and WMD as a means of terrorism, defending against cruise missiles and protecting peacekeeping forces from these threats.

What role do you see for US and NATO missile defenses in protecting Europe against existing and near-term missile threats? For example, what role do you envision for the Aegis BMD and THAAD systems?

GEN CRADDOCK: United States ballistic missile defense assets are dedicated not only to defense of the U.S. homeland, but also to the defense of deployed forces and allies from the growing ballistic threat from rogue states. Sea-based and mobile assets are integral components of a comprehensive ballistic missile defense system, but cannot defeat the entire range of threats by themselves. Sophisticated sensors are required for early acquisition and target discrimination and ground based interceptors are needed to defeat longer range missiles. U.S. ballistic missile defenses can synergistically integrate with emerging NATO concepts for a missile defense system. U.S. is fully committed to treaties and alliances and the collective defense of Europe.

Do you believe there are sufficient U.S. and allied PATRIOT/PAC-3 capabilities currently available in the EUCOM AOR, or are additional capabilities needed?

GEN CRADDOCK: Joint Staff tasked USSTRATCOM, in coordination with other Combatant Commanders and force providers to develop a worldwide PATRIOT Theater Ballistic Missile Risk and Threat Assessment in order to recommend to SecDef an allocation of ballistic missile defensive capabilities to cover global requirements. It would not be appropriate for USEUCOM to preempt that ongoing process. However, we can say that USEUCOM’s current requirement for one PATRIOT Battalion has been given a relatively high priority thus far and does not appear to be at risk for deployment to another theater. The PATRIOT Battalion stationed in Germany is currently configured with PAC-2. It is scheduled for upgrade to PAC-3 by 2009. The Missile Defense Agency, Joint Staff, Combatant Commanders and force providers are also engaged in a number of assessments intended to develop a comprehensive missile defense acquisition, development and deployment plan. USEUCOM is engaged in this process and is satisfied with its current progress.
Ground-Based Midcourse Defense (GMD) Site in Europe

The Department is requesting funds in FY 2007 to acquire and deploy ten ground-based interceptor missiles at a site to be located in a European country by the end of the decade. This missile defense site is planned to provide protection for the United States and most of Europe against future long-range ballistic missile threats from Iran and other locations.

What is your view on the requirement for such a capability deployed in the EUCOM area of responsibility (AOR)?

GEN CRADDOCK: Rogue states in the Middle East and Southwest Asia possess a current ballistic missile capability that threatens a major portion of Europe. Iran is aggressively expanding the range and sophistication of its ballistic missiles and is pursuing nuclear capabilities that dramatically expand the threat to the entire European region. The deployment of ballistic missile defense assets in Europe would make a significant contribution to the protection of the United States and Europe from a Middle Eastern ballistic missile threat. Sea-based and mobile assets are integral components of a comprehensive ballistic missile defense system, but cannot defeat the entire range of threats by themselves. Sophisticated sensors are required for early acquisition and target discrimination and ground based interceptors are needed to defeat longer range missiles. Ballistic missile defense must remain a priority so that we are postured to counter threats to the United States, deployed forces and allies. It will also stand as a testament of our commitment to the region and attest to the strength of our partnership with our NATO Allies.

What role, if any, should NATO play in the decision to build, operate, or pay for a European GMD site?

GEN CRADDOCK: Discussions with NATO Allies, potential host nations and others are being led by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Related questions can be answered best by OSD. It is our understanding that it is OSD’s intent to keep NATO Allies, potential host nations and other significant international actors informed about its missile defense program and plans, but that the U.S. will not ask other countries to assist in building, operating or paying for the system at this time. Potential host nation(s) may be asked to share in some costs, such as related infrastructure requirements.

What role, if any, will NATO have in developing a concept of operations for the employment of a GMD system located in Europe, and what role would the Commander, EUCOM, play in executing the GMD mission either for the defense of the United States or Europe?

GEN Craddock: These issues are being studied by the Joint Staff, USSTRATCOM, USNORTHCOM, Missile Defense Agency and others. Answers to questions regarding command and control of U.S. ballistic missile defense forces in Europe have not yet been developed, coordinated or approved. We anticipate
that command and control the forces under the operational control of USEUCOM will be compatible and similar to the doctrinal models in use in other AORs. We anticipate that the U.S. will exercise sole command and control of the system for the foreseeable future.

**Combat Training Centers**

The Army’s combat training centers (CTCs) in the United States are heavily utilized in preparing units for rotations to Iraq and Afghanistan. Once the proposed drawdown of U.S. forces from Germany is completed, there is a potential that the Combat Maneuver Training Center in Hohenfels will be under-utilized even as the CTCs in the United States are fully subscribed. The addition of new modular brigades to the Army over the next few years will increase the demand for training rotations at the CTCs.

Do you believe there are ways the training center at Hohenfels can help absorb this increased demand without having to deploy troops from the United States to Germany solely to conduct a training rotation?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The Joint Multinational Training Center at Hohenfels, Germany is a dual mission maneuver CTC that is capable of training the modular brigades in USAREUR and to export this training capable to support units based in. The JMRC can conduct four brigade level training rotations at Hohenfels and support four rotations external to Hohenfels, including CONUS, as part of its Exportable Training Capability, thereby providing additional training support to CONUS based units.

**Acquisition Reform**

Within the past year, several major studies (e.g., the Quadrennial Defense Review 2006; Beyond Goldwater Nichols by the Center for Strategic and International Studies; the Defense Acquisition Performance Assessment (DAPA); and Transformation, a Progress Assessment by the Defense Science Board) have been completed that address the issue of defense acquisition reform. Each of these reports emphasized the need for reduced program risk and greater stability with respect to acquisition procedures.

What concerns, if any, do you have regarding the process the services use to acquire capabilities to support the needs of the combatant commanders?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: While improvements in Department of Defense acquisition processes are continually being made, I believe it is important that the Combatant Commanders have a larger voice in Defense-wide and service specific programs early in the acquisition cycle to ensure the COCOM views / capability requirements are met in a timely manner. The existing defense acquisition process is challenged to rapidly fill hardware and personnel requirements as changes are identified by COCOMs.

The studies mentioned above make numerous recommendations regarding the role of the service acquisition executives and the combatant commanders in improving military acquisition processes and outcomes.
What are your views regarding proposals for the establishment of service acquisition commands that would report to the services' chiefs of staff and acquisition executives?

GENERAL CRADDOCK:

Existing service acquisition commands generally accomplished their missions in generating material solutions to meet existing emerging operational needs. However, defense acquisition processes writ large, still struggle to rapidly produce large capital investments in a timely fashion. In addition, the recent efforts to ensure that joint capabilities are considered over larger acquisition programs need to continue. I am encouraged by the direction the department has taken thus far and the emphasis both from DoD and Congress continue to focus on the issue.

In your judgment, would such proposals improve the acquisition process?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I don’t believe establishing more service acquisition commands, without significantly altering the requirements generation process and existing acquisition rules, will improve the current acquisition process. As stated above, the laws regulating acquisition processes need be streamlined while maintaining effective oversight.

In your view, what improvements should be made to enhance the combatant commanders' role in the acquisition process?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Geographic Combatant Commanders, as the supported commander, should have a larger role in Defense-wide and service specific programs early in the acquisition cycle. This is particularly important as it pertains to resourcing capabilities required to prosecute the Global War on Terrorism and theater security cooperation initiatives.

Quality of Life Programs for Military Families

The top three quality of life issues in the EUCOM AOR include obtaining quality living accommodations; gaining predictable access to health care to include family member dental support; and ensuring dependent education programs provided by the DOD Dependent Schools. In this regard, General Jones has noted that 44% of EUCOM personnel have children and that commanders in the EUCOM region have emphasized their support for and reliance on EUCOM resources to provide crucial morale programs, enhance retention, and foster esprit de corps.

What do you see as the most significant longer term challenges for EUCOM in preserving and enhancing the quality of life for assigned personnel while force redeployments to the United States proceed?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: As we transform, it is essential that we stabilize our base operational support funding to maintain quality of life programs and services comparable to those available stateside. As resources are shifted to support expansion of stateside mission locations, we are challenged in maintaining EUCOM theater programs and services. While expanding our host nation partnerships and creating joint service solutions will help minimize the erosion of services and military family benefits, maintaining stable base
operational support funding in the coming years will ensure a mission-focused, fully supported military family.

If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure the adequacy of support services for military families during the transition to ensure that vital support mechanisms, such as Department of Defense Schools, morale, welfare and recreation services, housing and commissary and exchange continue to serve military personnel?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Providing an optimal quality of life remains essential to maintaining readiness. Listening to the needs of our warfighters and military families is job one in meeting their needs. Each year we ask grassroots representatives to meet with senior leaders and subject matter experts to identify and tackle theater quality of life challenges. Issues that cannot be fixed or supported in theater are forwarded to OSD and Armed Services leaders for the identification of joint strategic pathways leading to improvements. The EUCOM quality of life office, the link between senior leaders, our joint service infrastructure, and theater personnel, will remain the critical pulse point for identifying and resolving quality of life challenges. I will directly champion for support with senior leaders and congressional representatives those issues that cannot be fixed in theater. Listening and responding to the needs of our military family will continue to be one of my top priorities.

Reserve Duty Status in EUCOM

There are currently 32 different duty status categories affecting operational access and benefits for Reservists who drill and otherwise perform duties in the EUCOM AOR.

What is your understanding of the nature of the problems caused by variations in Reserve duty status? What progress, if any, has been made in addressing and resolving this issue?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: The complexity of Reserve duty status categories makes it difficult to access and efficiently utilize reservists. The labyrinth of processes, policies and funding streams results in service members working side-by-side, doing the same work, but getting entirely different pay and benefits. As you can imagine these inequities in pay and benefits causes morale issues within a command. The section in Title 10 regarding reserve duty status categories is a cold war relic. I advocate for OSD and the Congress to work together to completely review and rewrite the sections in Title 10 regarding reserve duty status categories. The objective of this review should be to simplify access.

American Service-Members' Protection Act

The American Service-Members' Protection Act (ASPA) precludes foreign military financing and international military exchange training with countries which have not executed an article 98 bilateral agreement in which they pledge not to extradite serving or former U. S. personnel, officials, or citizens to the International Criminal Court. You previously have testified
that this law affects 11 countries in Latin America and has resulted in lost opportunities in engaging with generations of military officers and noncommissioned officers in nations in the U. S. Southern Command area of responsibility.

What is your understanding of the impact of this law on military-to-military relations in the EUCOM AOR?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: My understanding, based on discussions with General James Jones, is the same affect is occurring in the EUCOM AOR.

If confirmed, would you support modifying ASPA so that military assistance programs would not be prohibited for countries that have not signed Article 98 agreements?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: I have and continue to support ASPA as protection for our servicemembers worldwide. Having said that – I believe there are negative unintended consequences that impact one half of the 92 countries in Europe and Africa through lost opportunities to provide professional military training with military officers and noncommissioned officers. I have and will continue to advocate for a “delinking” of International Military Education and Training (IMET) funding from the ASPA sanction.

Burden Sharing in Europe

The United States is in the process of reducing the number of military personnel stationed in Germany and closing installations, while at the same time increasing troop levels in Italy and Eastern Europe. Both changes have resulted in substantial investments to be made in military construction over the next few years. This committee has historically advocated for prudent management of facility and infrastructure requirements within European Command in the theater. This includes a constant assessment of opportunities to share the financial burden for constructing and maintaining facilities that will support NATO or allied operations, and the receipt of residual value amounts for improvements funded by the U.S. on installations to be returned to the host nation.

What is your assessment of the current effectiveness of burden-sharing arrangements in Europe?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: EUCOM actively seeks NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) funding to share the burden of constructing facilities used by the U.S. to support NATO operations. The US contributes approximately 23 percent annually to the NSIP, a 4 percent decrease in our annual contribution amount from 10 years ago.

In FY06, EUCOM benefited from over 130 million dollars in NATO construction investment at Ramstein, RAF Lakenheath, Rota, Incirlik, and Souda Bay. The US share for this investment was 30 million dollars. Through existing and emerging NATO Capability Packages, the US has the potential of realizing over 350 million dollars in planned NATO construction at Aviano, Ramstein, Rota, Souda Bay, Moron, and Sigonella over the next five years.
Additionally, through the use of NATO pre-financing statements, we are also ensuring that US-funded projects have the future potential to be accepted by NATO under emerging Capability Packages. These statements, although not binding in nature, establish the foundation for future acceptance of US-funded projects by NATO and the mechanisms by which we may recoup our investment.

If confirmed, how will you ensure that the burden-sharing and residual value programs are carried out in a manner that ensures maximum benefit?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: We understand Congressional concerns over burden-sharing, and we will continue to aggressively leverage NSIP investment in facilities and infrastructure the U.S. requires to maintain its commitment to the common defense of our NATO allies.

Our ability to gain residual value from returned facilities is tied to the re-use of those facilities. During closure negotiations, EUCOM coordinated closely with the respective host nation in identifying potential re-use of returned facilities. After concluding negotiations, we will continue to protect US interests by monitoring host nation utilization of returned facilities while remaining vigilant to other potential re-use opportunities.

**Congressional Oversight**

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Yes. I fully recognize and understand the importance of Congressional oversight as it is clearly outlined in the Constitution of the United States.

Do you agree, when asked, to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the Administration in power?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Yes. Although the President is my Commander-in-Chief, and he and the Secretary of Defense constitute my chain of command, I recognize that my oath is to the Constitution. That document clearly divides responsibilities with regard to defense between the Executive and Legislative branches. For both the Administration and the Congress to execute their respective responsibilities appropriately, it is incumbent upon me to be honest and forthright with both while offering my best military advice.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Commander, U. S. EUCOM and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe?
GENERAL CRADDOCK: Yes. That is an inherent part of my responsibilities as outlined above, and I will be happy to appear when called.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

GENERAL CRADDOCK: Yes.