THE UNITED STATES AND NATO:
TRANSFORMATION AND THE RIGA SUMMIT

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WEDNESDAY, MAY 3, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE AND EMERGING THREATS,
COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:08 p.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. GALLEGLY. I call to order the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats.

Today the Subcommittee on Europe and Emerging Threats is holding a hearing on the United States and NATO. The purpose of today's hearing is to assess the Administration's current policies toward NATO and what the Administration expects the Alliance to accomplish at NATO's upcoming summit in November of this year in Riga, Latvia.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO allies have sought to transform the Alliance into a more flexible and effective military organization to adjust to new security realities and to combat new threats, such as terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

NATO's Prague Summit in 2002 invited seven new nations to join the Alliance and established the Prague Capabilities Commitment to develop military assets and capabilities and the NATO Response Force to operate NATO's transportation.

NATO's Istanbul Summit of 2004 was the first summit of all 26 NATO allies. It continued the Alliance's efforts toward transformation and especially sought to enhance NATO's relationship with its partners and other countries, particularly the countries of the broader Middle East.

In the run-up to the Riga Summit at the end of this year, it is important that we focus on what is most essential for the purposes of continuing transformation of NATO. This means improving its capabilities and operational effectiveness and enhancing its global partnerships so that the Alliance may be able to operate and conduct missions wherever it may be called upon to do so in today's world.

General Jones, the Supreme Allied Commander, recently said that 2006 may be the most important year in the history of NATO. The purpose of this hearing is to consider the implications of that statement and what it means as we prepare for the Riga Summit later this year.
I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses today, and at this point I would yield to my good friend from Florida, the Ranking Member, Mr. Wexler.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you for calling this hearing and thank Mr. Fata and Mr. Volker for being so kind to join with us.

In February I had the privilege of meeting with NATO Secretary Scheffer in Brussels, and I saw firsthand the critical transformation that the Chairman spoke about taking place at NATO with the Alliance now operating in various capacities from security and peacekeeping duties to assisting disaster relief efforts in Europe, Africa and Asia.

In order for NATO to meet the 21st century challenges in far-flung places such as humanitarian operations in Pakistan or assisting the African Union in preventing genocide in Darfur, the transatlantic alliance must undergo, as General Jones stated, its most fundamental physical and philosophical transformation in history.

There is no doubt in my mind that success in Afghanistan is paramount to NATO's successful transformation. This is NATO's most difficult and far reaching operation in its over 57 year history and its first outside of Europe.

It is also essential that the 2002 Prague Capabilities Commitments that were made be fulfilled, including meeting an October 6 deadline for the NATO Response Force to reach full operational capacity. Despite both Europe and America's desire to transform the Alliance, it is essential that NATO members keep their commitments—political, military and financial—and it is important I think to note that only six of the 25 members are spending more than 2 percent of their GDP on defense.

The Riga Summit, as the Chairman pointed out, is an opportunity to further set the agenda and the pace of NATO's evolving transformation. At Riga, the Administration, our Administration, should reemphasize our desire to strengthen our cooperation with NATO and with our European allies, in particular the European Union.

I read Mr. Volker's prepared testimony, and I think your statement essentially saying that our relationship with Europe is not principally about Europe any more, Europe itself, but rather how well we work together with Europe on our global strategy to the contest of ideas of freedom versus fanaticism, I think you hit it exactly on the head. I probably butchered it a little bit, but you hit it right on the head, and I agree with you entirely.

Finally, if I could, Mr. Chairman, I just want to point out one thing that I filed with Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen, which is a congressional resolution which calls for the upgrading of relations between NATO and Israel. As a fellow democracy that faces the real threat of a nuclear Iran, I strongly believe that Israel, with its significant military and counterterrorism experience, can only strengthen NATO's collective defense.

Likewise, I think it is very important that NATO keep the door open for membership for Albania, Croatia and Macedonia, as well as the Ukraine and Georgia, who have stated their ambitions to join the Alliance.
I very much look forward to hearing from these witnesses, and thank you, Mr. Chairman, for calling the hearing.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wexler follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT WEXLER, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF FLORIDA

Chairman Gallegly, thank you for holding today’s hearing. I would also like to thank Mr. Volker and Mr. Fata for testifying before the subcommittee today.

In February, I met with NATO Secretary General Scheffer (Skeffer) in Brussels to express my strong support for NATO’s historic transformation from a cold war military alliance to one capable of addressing the security challenges of the 21st century. I saw first hand the critical transformation taking place at NATO with the alliance operating in various capacities from security and peacekeeping duties to assisting disaster relief efforts in Europe, Africa and Asia.

In order for NATO to meet 21st Century challenges in far-flung places such as humanitarian operations in Pakistan or assisting the Africa Union in preventing genocide in Darfur—the transatlantic alliance must undergo as Supreme Allied Commander General Jones has stated “its most fundamental physical and philosophical transformation in its history.”

There is no doubt in my mind, that success in Afghanistan is paramount to NATO’s successful transformation. This is NATO’s most difficult and far-reaching operation in over fifty-seven years and is the first outside of Europe. It is also essential that the 2002 Prague capabilities commitments are fulfilled including meeting an October 6 deadline for the NATO Response Force to reach full operational capability.

Despite the shared desires of America and Europe to transform the alliance I am concerned that NATO will not be up to task and unable to fulfill and sustain its missions. To this end it is essential that NATO members, especially European countries meet their political, military and financial obligations. Today only six of 25 members are spending more than 2 percent of their GDP on defense.

The Riga summit is an opportunity to further set the agenda and pace of NATO’s evolving transformation. It is critical that the United States play a leading role there in pushing NATO transformation as it has done at Prague in 2002 and Istanbul in 2004.

At Riga the Administration should reemphasize our desire to strengthen cooperation at NATO with our European allies, in particular the European Union. Mr. Volker I share your sentiments that our “relationship with Europe is not principally about Europe itself, but rather how well we work together with Europe on our global strategic agenda—to the contest of ideas, of freedom versus fanaticism.”

As was addressed by NATO Foreign Minister’s in Bulgaria last week, NATO must be an “alliance with global partners. It is critical as NATO’s engages in far reaching operations that we strengthen partnerships with interested democratic and militarily capable countries such as Japan, Australia, New Zealand and South Korea and Israel.

Riga can also serve as catalyst to chart a course of closer NATO cooperation with countries participating in the Mediterranean Dialogue and in particular Israel. In February, I introduced a resolution along with Congresswoman Ros-Lehtinen which states our support for upgrading relations between NATO and Israel. As a fellow democracy that faces the real threat of a nuclear Iran, I strongly believe Israel, which has significant military and counter-terrorism experience can only strengthen NATO’s collective defense.

Finally, NATO must also keep the door open to membership for Albania, Croatia and Macedonia as well Ukraine and Georgia who have stated their ambition to join the Alliance. NATO membership continues to be a strong incitement for non-member countries to further democratize and reform their military and this door must not be closed.

Mr. Chairman, I doubt there is anyone in this room who at the end of the Cold War could have envisioned or anticipated NATO’s growing multi-functional global role. NATO’s current evolution is monumental and hopefully positions the alliance in the strongest possible position to address 21st security challenges.

Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much, Mr. Wexler.

At this point I would like to introduce our witnesses for today’s hearing. Our first witness is Mr. Kurt Volker, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Europe and Eurasian Affairs.
Mr. V OLKER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Representative Wexler. It is a great honor and a privilege to have the opportunity to speak with you today about what President Bush has called our nation’s most important alliance, NATO.

As I begin, let me thank you and all the Members of this Committee for their strong support of NATO over the years. Maintaining this strong and healthy alliance requires sustained support from both the Executive and Legislative Branches of government and so I am grateful for your support for NATO.

I am also delighted to be able to do so with my good friend, Dan Fata, from the Pentagon. We have known each other for nearly 10 years, and I am very pleased that we have the chance to work together now as partners in strengthening NATO as it faces 21st century security challenges.
I do have a written statement, and I would like to ask that it be submitted for the record.

Mr. GALLEGLY. As I stated, without objection both of your statements will be a part of the record of the hearing in their entirety.

Mr. VOLKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to be clear that the Administration strongly supports NATO and is committed to strengthening the Alliance and contributing to NATO operations and believes that NATO is a vital forum for strategic consultation and that when the United States and Europe act together on defense issues, we should do so through NATO.

Mr. Chairman, as you know, NATO was founded on a simple proposition: That by banding together, the North Atlantic allies who had defeated Naziism could best guarantee their security against Soviet Communism by committing to mutual collective defense. It worked. In fact, it more than worked.

NATO played an essential role in ending the Cold War with a victory for freedom, but then NATO stepped in to advance freedom following the collapse of the Soviet Union. By extending its collective defense guarantee to 10 new allies, NATO helped anchor freedom, prosperity and peace for over 100 million people in Central and Eastern Europe who had earlier been stuck behind the Iron Curtain.

Today, NATO is transforming itself to provide for collective defense in new ways—by proactively building security and responding to crises well beyond the North Atlantic area, from Afghanistan, to Darfur, to the Balkans, to the Mediterranean, and even Louisiana.

Until 1995, NATO had never conducted a military operation—only engaged in planning and exercises. Ten years later, in 2005, NATO was running eight military operations simultaneously. So much for the debates in the 1990s about NATO’s relevance.

Let me hasten to add that NATO has not only begun military operations—it has also proven an ability to end them. Two of the humanitarian operations in the last year—in Pakistan and in Louisiana—have been concluded. NATO ran a series of three successful stabilization operations in Macedonia, which have long since ended, and in 2004, NATO ended its SFOR mission Bosnia, passing on international security responsibilities to a new and vital European Union presence.

With that record of success and that active agenda ongoing in NATO, I am profoundly optimistic about NATO’s future. This optimism rests on an assumption that we will continue to work just as hard at strengthening NATO and using it wisely and effectively as we have in the past.

In today’s world of complex, diverse and distant security challenges, NATO needs the strategic consensus, the political will and the military capabilities to address these challenges effectively.

Transformation must continue. Indeed, in a fast-changing world transformation is never complete. We need to adapt constantly. This perspective largely drives our agenda for the NATO summit to be held in Riga, Latvia, this November.

Secretary of State Rice was in Sophia last week at a meeting of the NATO foreign ministers working to build consensus within
NATO for this robust agenda. I would like to highlight just a few aspects today.

First, and in a way most importantly, Secretary Rice engaged her colleagues in serious strategic consultation about the most important challenges our nations face. She did this at NATO itself and also in a relatively new innovation, an informal dinner involving the foreign ministers of all the European Union and NATO nations. They discussed Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Darfur, the Balkans, the Middle East and more. We must constantly work at building a solid, strategic consensus with our democratic transatlantic community, and Secretary Rice is leading that effort.

Second, as part of our agenda leading up to Riga we need to continue to do everything possible to ensure the success of NATO’s ongoing operations. These include Afghanistan and Darfur, the Balkans, training Iraqi security forces and counterterrorism in the Mediterranean.

Third, the Secretary and her colleagues spoke about the future of NATO’s partnerships. NATO’s membership has always been tied to the Euro-Atlantic area, but as NATO has begun to contribute to security in a far broader geographic area, it has begun to build relationships with states in that wider region.

We have had the Partnership for Peace in the Mediterranean dialogue since 1995. In 2004, NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative to reach out to states in the Persian Gulf in parallel with NATO’s growing role in Afghanistan and Iraq.

At Riga we hope to launch a program reaching out to global partners, those democratic nations who are interested and capable of working together and addressing security challenges.

Fourth, looking ahead to Riga, we want to continue the successful process of NATO enlargement. We do not expect any decisions in 2006, but we are already looking ahead to a summit meeting in 2008 where we believe NATO should be prepared to make decisions on whether new invitations should be issued.

Fifth and finally, we need to ensure that NATO has the capabilities to do the jobs that our leaders ask it to do now and in the future, whether that is Afghanistan, Darfur, or contingencies unknown.

I know my colleague, Dan Fata, will address these issues in detail so I will not address the capabilities issue now. Just suffice it to say that while these are military and defense issues, ensuring that NATO has the capabilities it needs is a matter of the highest political importance.

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the privilege of addressing this Committee, and I look forward to addressing your comments and questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Volker follows:]
rity relationships and ensuring its continued strength and effectiveness requires sustained support from both the Executive and Legislative branches of government. So I am deeply grateful for your support.

NATO’S ACHIEVEMENTS

I’d like to begin by saying that I am optimistic about NATO’s future. Over the past dozen or so years, NATO has risen to meet many post-Cold War security challenges, from Bosnia to Afghanistan. NATO has done well, and I have no doubt it will continue to do well. A close assessment of the longer view shows that NATO is moving forward, and is as capable as ever to advance the collective defense and security interests of the Allies.

During the Cold War, when the transatlantic community faced an existential threat, NATO bound us together. By guaranteeing our shared security and defending our values—freedom, democracy, human rights, rule of law, and free markets—NATO helped create the conditions for democracy and prosperity in the Europe we know today. This is the prosperity that today forms the basis of our $2.5 trillion economic and trade relationships. As the Iron Curtain fell, the feared ‘security vacuum’ in Central Europe never appeared because NATO—and the EU—led the way in anchoring those fledgling democracies in our transatlantic community.

These two achievements, winning the Cold War and advancing freedom and security through enlargement in the East, point to a third: NATO has proven itself the most adaptive Alliance in history. Consider our path since the end of the Cold War: In 1994, NATO was an alliance of 16, without partners, having never conducted a military operation. By 2005, NATO had become an alliance of 26, engaged in eight simultaneous operations on four continents with the help of 20 Partners in Eurasia, seven in the Mediterranean, four in the Persian Gulf, and a handful of capable contributors on our periphery.

No longer is NATO a static force defending the Fulda Gap. NATO has transformed from defending our societies and values to advancing security based on our values. A common purpose unites our disparate missions in Afghanistan, Kosovo, Darfur, and Iraq: the promotion of peace and security; the protection of freedom. NATO has become an instrument for assuring our collective defense and advancing peace and security by directing its political and military resources to end conflicts, deter terrorists, provide security in strife-torn areas, and relieve humanitarian suffering far beyond its borders.

Transformation is an ongoing process, and in November, NATO will hold a summit in Riga, Latvia to deepen its capabilities for its current and future operations, and enhance its global reach to meet today’s demands. Whether leading peacekeeping in Afghanistan, training Iraqi military leaders, patrolling the Mediterranean, delivering humanitarian aid to Pakistan and Louisiana, or helping transport African Union troops, NATO is the place where transatlantic democracies gather, consult, forge strategic consensus, and, where necessary, take decisions on joint action. NATO is where leaders turn when they want to get something done in partnership with us, and we must be prepared for this to happen more, not less.

The United States and NATO also want reliable and capable partners in the world and we support the strengthening of the European Union’s security and defense capabilities. It is false logic to believe that EU steps to develop security capabilities must necessarily be steps away from NATO. The EU has already been in 15 operations, including in Bosnia, Darfur, Aceh, the Congo, and elsewhere. We believe that further development of European security and defense capabilities can reinforce NATO’s transformation, and that it is essential that new EU capabilities, for example, in rapidly deployable troops, are compatible and complementary with NATO. We also share the perspective of other Allies, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel who stated in February that NATO should be our primary forum for strategic security dialogue with Europe and that when Europe and America act together on security and defense, we should act through NATO.

THE RIGA SUMMIT

Recognizing the future demands on NATO, at the Riga summit we are proposing that leaders support initiatives that develop new capabilities for common action, to ensure sufficient resources to sustain cooperation, and to engage new partners in our collective defense. For this to occur, the United States must play a leadership role by investing in NATO politically, militarily, and financially.

Operations

Our first priority for Riga is to ensure that NATO succeeds in Afghanistan as it prepares to expand the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the South
and thereafter to the East, at which point NATO will be responsible for security throughout Afghanistan. NATO took over ISAF on August 11, 2003. I note this date because although there were deep differences among Allies over Iraq, there was no disagreement over what needed to be done to secure Afghanistan. And since that time, the Alliance commitment to that mission has only gotten stronger. NATO’s increasing security role will allow a remaining U.S.-led coalition to focus on a counterterrorism mission. As part of this transition, NATO has changed its Operations Plan and strengthened its rules of engagement to meet greater challenges in those regions.

The security situation in Darfur is of great importance to our President and to our country, and we believe NATO should do more to assist the United Nations and African Union, in accordance with the recent UN Security Council Resolution and a request from the UN Secretary General. This is a critical issue and the United States will continue to urge Allies to do everything we can to assist. We continue to support the Kosovo status process. To reach our goals, NATO must remain involved in the security dimensions of the solution, and the United States will be there doing its share in KFOR.

NATO’s Training Mission in Iraq has trained over 1,000 mid- and senior-level officers, and by Riga we want to boost Allied support through progress on the ground that allows us to expand participation and course offerings. The Iraq training mission also highlights NATO’s potential as a security trainer, using its expertise to help nations around the world improve the professionalism and accountability of their armed forces.

Capabilities
These and other challenges require fresh, innovative thinking about collective defense and NATO’s role. In the 21st century, NATO needs far different capabilities than in the past. NATO’s 2005 humanitarian missions on the Louisiana Gulf Coast and Pakistan are unlikely to be its last, and the United States wants NATO to develop the means to be swift and generous when disaster strikes, until more permanent civilian relief efforts can take hold. Whether supplying forces in Afghanistan, transporting African Union troops, or delivering humanitarian assistance, all of these missions underscore the critical capability gap of nearly every NATO operation—strategic airlift. Discussions have begun among Allies on how to collectively address this. Any solution should include the United States and will require creative new approaches, possibly including common funding to ensure that NATO is as effective as possible, and that the financial burdens of NATO operations and needed capabilities are shared equitably.

NATO activated the NATO Response Force (NRF) for the first time after the earthquake in Pakistan. The NRF is scheduled to reach Full Operating Capability in October 2006, as our outstanding SACEUR, General Jim Jones has discussed in his own appearances on the Hill. To succeed, the NRF will need greater resources and support. In the run-up to Riga, we are working with Allies to ensure the necessary commitments are made to the NRF, including training, and funding. Again, U.S. contributions and U.S. leadership will be critical to success.

We are also exploring with Allies other areas for cooperation to bolster NATO capabilities in the types of missions we face. Over the past few years, the United States has had good experiences in working together in Afghanistan with the special operations forces of NATO Allies. These forces have specialized skills that can support peace and stabilization operations, and in advance of Riga, we are developing ideas to build on these cooperative relationships with NATO Allies.

Increasingly leaders call on NATO to assist in post-conflict situations. The reality is that many of these environments remain too hazardous for civilian reconstruction personnel to do the very work that would hasten stabilization—establishing governance, rule of law, and infrastructure. These circumstances mean that the Alliance must plan to provide and support stabilization and reconstruction needs as part of its security operations. The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) model in Afghanistan has yielded valuable lessons in this field, and we will be working with Allies to develop these ideas.

Global Partners
In this century, our security depends on meeting threats at strategic distance with a wide variety of partners. NATO is an Alliance with increasingly global partners—from the Mediterranean to the Pacific—who are committed to many of our strategic goals and want more ways to contribute to NATO’s missions. We and the UK have circulated a proposal at NATO that would allow NATO and partners from all parts of the globe to work together on areas of shared strategic interest. At Riga, we
would like the Alliance to endorse a flexible framework that allows for a range of partnerships with NATO.

I would like to note that our goal is not, nor should it be, to create a global alliance. NATO is and should remain rooted in the transatlantic community, based on our Article Five collective security guarantee, and shared history, culture, and values. Allies have made a solemn treaty commitment to mutual defense, and nothing can replace or weaken that. But this should not exclude NATO from working with others who share our interests and values, and who are ready to contribute to common action well beyond the North Atlantic area.

We are also exploring ways that NATO can support increased security cooperation with its neighbors in the broader Middle East and in Africa through greater access to NATO training and education resources. Working with Italy and Norway, we have initiated these discussions at NATO and with countries in the region.

NATO Enlargement

NATO enlargement has been an historic success, giving us a stronger NATO, even as NATO and EU enlargement have served to solidify freedom and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. Both NATO and EU membership have always been, and remain today, powerful incentives to promote democratic reforms among aspiring members. The process of NATO enlargement is not complete, and NATO's door must remain open. While we do not believe that any of NATO's Membership Action Plan participants—Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia—is ready for membership today, we support consideration of NATO's offering membership invitations in 2008 on the assumption that further, active reform efforts under way will close the gaps that now exist. When they and other NATO aspirants become ready for NATO, NATO must be ready for them.

The same is true of Georgia and Ukraine, where the Rose and the Orange revolutions created significant opportunities for freedom. In Georgia, the new government has embraced the path to political and economic liberty, but its work is not done. We believe that NATO's Intensified Dialogue is the right tool to assist in the new government’s continuing progress, and we are working with Allies toward realizing that goal as soon as possible.

In Ukraine, the March 26 election demonstrated the country's commitment to democracy. The government of Ukraine remains focused on NATO membership, but Parliamentary and domestic support is crucial and we hope and expect that the new cabinet will reiterate its aspirations. If Ukraine is committed, we must give it its chance to meet our standards. At the right time, when warranted by their own performance, the next step would be a Membership Action Plan for both Ukraine and Georgia.

Finally, by Riga, the United States would welcome Serbia and Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina joining Partnership for Peace, provided they meet the conditions for doing so. We will continue to support the Western Balkans as they move closer to the Alliance.

This is a big agenda. It reflects the increased operational tempo at NATO, and the increasing frequency with which our NATO leaders want NATO to tackle a wide range of problems and shape the future of the Alliance. It reflects a core fact which has been true of NATO since the beginning: NATO is the essential venue for strategic dialogue and consultations, and acting on the collective will of the transatlantic democracies. With the important support of the Congress, we will continue working towards a Riga Summit that demonstrates the Alliance's courage and vision to address these challenges.

Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Fata? Is it Fata or Fata?

Mr. Fata. It is Fata, but that is okay. When I am in Europe I just start going with Fata, Fata. I roll with the punches.

Mr. Gallegly. Fata, Fata.

STATEMENT OF MR. DAN FATA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. Fata. Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today about both the Department of Defense objectives and plans for the upcoming NATO summit in Riga later this year.
Our overall objective at Riga will be to focus on NATO’s transformation, advancing the shift of NATO’s capabilities from the Cold War era’s territorial, in-place defense to the new 21st century need for expeditionary operations beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.

To accomplish this we believe the summit should address the transformation of not only the mindset of how our allies think about threats in the post-9/11 era, but also the capabilities allies need in order to participate in NATO operations, as well as to work with global partners.

Our vision for NATO’s future includes the following: NATO remains the premier transatlantic security institution; collective defense remains NATO’s core function, requiring capabilities to meet potential threats to Alliance territory and populations; and that NATO must be able to safeguard our common security interests well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.

To fulfill this vision, NATO has further work to do in transforming to an expeditionary culture that embraces the full range of missions for collective defense, global crisis response and stabilization. NATO needs to develop and employ all the capabilities needed to execute those missions well outside the Alliance area and create the links and mechanisms to cooperate in operations and activities with other international partners, organizations and actors.

The Riga Summit should serve as a catalyst to achieve progress in these areas and provide a milestone for NATO’s continuing transformation. As Secretary Rumsfeld has said, the transformation summit will be a make-or-break moment for NATO, testing whether Alliance members are serious about reforming NATO to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Secretary Rumsfeld has suggested to allied defense ministers several key elements of transformation on which NATO should work. All of these elements are central to NATO’s continued development toward an expeditionary culture and can be considered in three groupings.

First, those elements which consolidate or solidify our ongoing transformation work; second, those that advance the transformation of allied capabilities; and, third, those that broaden the scope of transformation to develop NATO roles and relationships for successful expeditionary operations that are best suited for the 21st century environment.

What I will do is just in the remaining minutes I will run through a few of the initiatives, one from each of these groupings, that we think are very important to the transformation summit.

Under the consolidating basket, we believe the ability to continue to make significant progress and demonstrable achievements in NATO ongoing military operations is key, as well as the achievement of a viable NATO response force which will reach its full operational capability in October of this year. Tagged along with that is the long-term sustainment of the NATO Response Force.

Under the advancing transformation grouping we seek improved, assured access to strategic lift, the development of a framework to make better use of Allied Special Operations Forces and improved capacity to support stabilization and reconstruction efforts.

Finally, the third basket, broadening transformation. We see the establishment of a NATO training program in the Middle East re-
region and the pursuit of closer ties with distant, but kindred, military capable nations within NATO’s overall partnership structure.

Let me just drill down on three of these. With respect to NATO operations, our first job is to consolidate transformation by ensuring the success of NATO’s ongoing missions that embody the essence of allied transformation.

Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer has declared that NATO success in leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan is the Alliance’s number one priority, and we have to agree.

NATO’s ongoing operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, in the Mediterranean Sea and in Darfur represent the real world evidence of allied commitments and progress in Euro-Atlantic security and will feature prominently at the November summit. NATO’s ISAF mission in Afghanistan is the most complex and demanding of all its missions, and much is at stake in its success.

The Riga Summit also presents an ideal venue to advance transformation by shaping NATO to focus more on operations and less on building infrastructure. In many respects our allies have more than enough manpower and forces for military operations, but it is the deployable support and expeditionary enablers that they lack. One of these key enablers is strategic lift.

We are considering ways that the U.S. might provide leadership to secure additional strategic lift capacity for NATO and the allies, whether through a NATO common purchase or NATO participation and a consortium of nations interested in purchasing lift.

Finally, we all think that in 2006 the Alliance should develop closer relationships with nations that are outside the Euro-Atlantic area, but have the same values, security interest and capable forces in common with NATO.

Our goal must be to develop an enhanced partnership with a core group of key U.S. allies who are not in NATO, but want to develop a greater practical relationship with the Alliance. The focus should be on practical cooperation such as military and political exchanges between NATO and the new global partners, opportunities for new partners to send officers to NATO schools and engage in joint planning and participate in NATO exercises.

These are other ideas, while practical cooperation, that will complement the work of transformation within the Alliance. We will want our NATO allies’ best thinking about how to reach beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, and we will want to engage existing partners like-minded, capable and interested in contributing in such outreach.

If the Alliance is able to achieve all these initiatives it will take in significant strides toward making itself a truly expeditionary organization.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to present the Defense Department’s goals and objectives for the upcoming NATO summit in Riga. I would be honored to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fata follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. DAN FATA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, EUROPEAN AND NATO AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

"THE ROAD TO NATO'S RIGA SUMMIT—CONSOLIDATING AND ADVANCING TRANSFORMATION"

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Sub-Committee, thank you for inviting me to testify about the Defense Department objectives and plans for the upcoming NATO Summit in Riga, Latvia, in November 2006.

Our overall objective at Riga will be to focus on NATO's Transformation: advancing the shift of NATO's capabilities from the Cold War-era's territorial in-place defense to the new 21st century need for expeditionary operations and defense beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. To accomplish this, we believe the Summit should address the transformation of not only the mindset in how our Allies think about threats in the post-9/11 era, but also the capabilities Allies need to participate in NATO operations and work with Global Partners.

A VISION FOR NATO'S FUTURE

During the Cold War, the Alliance was focused on its territorial defense; Allies understood the threat they faced and stood shoulder-to-shoulder to deter the enemy, ensuring the enemy knew they it could not achieve an easy or costless victory.

Today, 15 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transatlantic Alliance still faces a common threat which seeks to destroy its way of life and freedoms which it holds so dear. However, today's enemy uses asymmetric means to wage its battles. Moreover, it launches wars from territories outside of the transatlantic area.

While the nature and identity of the threat have changed, NATO, as an institution, has also changed—and it has never been more relevant in addressing the challenges of the day.

Presently, NATO is engaged in eight operations around the world. Until 2001, NATO had never conducted a single operation outside of Europe. Now NATO is operating not only in Kosovo, but in the Mediterranean to protect Allied shipping (Operation Active Endeavor); in Iraq to train senior level military officers (NATO Training Mission—Iraq); in Sudan to airlift African Union troops to Darfur; and in Afghanistan, progressively taking responsibility for more and more of that nation's security (International Security Assistance Force). NATO also undertook emergency relief operations for Hurricane Katrina and, in Pakistan, after the earthquakes. Over forty Allies and partners have been or are involved in these NATO-led operations.

Within the past eight years, NATO has enlarged its ranks to welcome ten new members, each committing to NATO's Article V guarantee to each other's defense and each contributing to defending the transatlantic security space.

However, as we saw seven years ago in Kosovo, and as is plainly evident in Afghanistan today, Allied military capabilities do not always match mission requirements. Too many of the Allies' current capabilities are still tied to static Cold War requirements. While there have been some improvements that have allowed us to operate in Afghanistan, many of NATO's forces are not oriented to operations outside the European theater.

In order for the Alliance to meet the challenges of the 21st century, Allied Members must be willing to make necessary investments, i.e., spend resources and restructure their armed forces, in order to properly modernize and equip them. Allies must also support NATO headquarters reform to end Cold War-era projects that no longer make sense in an Alliance transforming itself to become more expeditionary. Finally, all Allies need to undertake domestic public diplomacy campaigns to explain to their peoples why NATO matters and why investments in national capabilities are needed in order to give NATO the military muscle it needs to meet today's threats.

With this as the foundation, our vision for NATO's future is the following:

- NATO remains the premier transatlantic security institution.
- Collective defense remains the core function, requiring capabilities to meet potential threats not only to Alliance territory and populations, but threats to the safety and security of our interests outside Europe.
- For this, NATO must be prepared to conduct effective crisis management and crisis response beyond Alliance borders and safeguard our common security interests well beyond the Euro-Atlantic region.

To fulfill this vision, NATO has further work to do in transforming to an expeditionary culture that:
Embraces the full mission set for collective defense, global crisis response, and stabilization;
Develops and employs all the capabilities needed to make NATO’s forces more deployable, useable and interoperable; and
Creates the links and mechanisms to cooperate in operations and activities with other international military and political partners, international and non-governmental organizations.

The Riga Summit should serve as a catalyst for progress in these areas and provide a milestone for NATO’s continuing transformation. As SecDef stated in Berlin recently, the transformation summit will be a “make or break” moment for NATO, meaning it will test whether Alliance members are serious about reforming NATO to meet the challenges of the 21st century. In the coming months, preparing the agenda to secure capability commitments from our Allies will be the number one priority for my NATO portfolio.

WHAT DO WE MEAN BY TRANSFORMATION?

We see Transformation at NATO, as in our Department of Defense, as a continuing process of adopting and refining new concepts, doctrines, and technologies to meet emerging and future security challenges. The overarching transformational challenge for the Alliance is to develop a truly expeditionary mindset with the requisite capabilities. We are not there yet—and since there is never a definitive end state to Transformation, it is in a sense a moving target—but we are using this year’s Summit to move forward.

Secretary Rumsfeld has suggested to Allied defense ministers several key elements of transformation on which NATO should work. All of these elements are central to NATO’s continued development toward an expeditionary culture, and can be considered in three groupings:

First, those elements which consolidate or solidify our ongoing transformation work;
Second, those that advance the transformation of Allied capabilities; and
Third, those that broaden the scope of transformation to develop NATO roles and relationships for successful expeditionary operations that are best suited for the 21st century security environment.

CONSOLIDATING TRANSFORMATION

Our first job is to ensure the success of NATO’s ongoing missions and initiatives that embody the essence of Allied transformation: our current Alliance operations, and the NATO Response Force. Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer has declared that NATO success in leading the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan is the Alliance’s number one priority, and we have to agree—with the NRF following close behind. Securing lasting positive results in these two areas are vital to consolidating the transformation that has already taken place across the Alliance, and to providing the catalyst to advance further.

Operations: NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) assists the Afghan government in establishing and maintaining security and creating the conditions for stabilization and reconstruction. Presently, ISAF has this responsibility in the Kabul areas and the northern and western regions of Afghanistan.

By the Riga Summit, we hope to see ISAF expand its operations to include all of Afghanistan. This requires ISAF to expand into southern Afghanistan, a process currently underway. Once it demonstrates success in the South, ISAF will then move forward with its final stage of expansion—eastern Afghanistan.

The NATO Response Force (NRF): The NATO Response Force, the linchpin in NATO’s development of an expeditionary culture and transformation catalyst, was proposed at the Prague Summit in 2002. It became initially operational in 2004 and has contributed to operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Louisiana. It is scheduled to reach full operational capability (FOC) in time for Riga.

Unfortunately, upcoming rotations remain short of critical capabilities. We are working hard to ensure that at the Summit, Heads of State and Government can welcome attainment of an honest FOC after a successful live exercise (LIVEX) in June 2006. The U.S. has consistently pledged to each rotation a foundation of vital capabilities, including key “enablers” that are scarce among Allies, rising over time to about 2,000 personnel. The U.S. has also been the largest contributor toward the
unfilled requirements for FOC that NATO has asked nations for since last summer, and we are considering more of those items that the force list still requires. We are also prepared to add combat forces as our planned reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan allow. From Secretary Rumsfeld on down, we are citing this leadership to Allies as we press them to make further vital force pledges.

For the long term, we are working to see NRF rotations filled with force generation commitments at least three years in advance and urging longer-term NRF force planning to help nations plan and budget NRF contributions well ahead. We are also increasing critical enablers that would benefit the NRF such as strategic air lift and modernizing the way we think about funding operations, including by common-funding transportation costs for short-notice NRF deployments.

An effective NATO expeditionary culture will require improved funding of common capabilities, distant operations, and potential further enlargement. We are working toward some common funding for NRF deployments. We anticipate that this would have a positive effect on force commitments to operations and the NRF.

ADVANCING TRANSFORMATION

In addition to securing the foundations and the operational embodiment of Transformation in NATO, the Riga Summit presents an ideal venue to move NATO and Allies forward in expeditionary capabilities and more modern ways of doing business. Riga itself should be a catalyst for further shifting Alliance roles and mindset from local European operations to expeditionary missions.

Strategic Lift: In many respects our Allies have more than enough manpower and forces for military operations; it is the deployable support and expeditionary enablers that they lack. One of these enablers is fundamental: strategic lift.

Since the Prague Summit in 2002, Allies have made progress in this area. A multinational initiative among several Allies to secure adequate sealift capacity has been a success. Likewise, 16 Allies and Sweden have formed a multinational consortium to contract for on-demand access to Antonov AN–124 airlift. However, NATO and Allies remain too reliant on the U.S. fleet and on workarounds such as NATO AWACS training aircraft. We are considering ways that the U.S. might provide leadership to secure additional strategic airlift capacity for NATO and Allies.

NATO Special Operations Forces: A vital mission set that a NATO summit on Transformation should address is that of Special Operations or Elite forces (that perform e.g. special reconnaissance, military assistance, and direct action).

The value of SOF in modern warfare is greater than ever. Advances in intelligence collection and dissemination, and network based warfare have put a premium on forces that can operate with low visibility and strike decisively. At the same time, the non-conventional nature of modern warfare increases the need for forces which can operate among non-NATO indigenous forces in an uncertain security environment.

SOF are usually a closely held national asset. NATO members have a number of ongoing bilateral and multilateral SOF relationships, but overall SOF direction at the Alliance is hindered by a lack of manning, structure and emphasis. We could benefit, both as an Alliance and as individual members of the Alliance, by creating the means to harmonize these scarce assets.

We are considering ways that NATO might create not a Special Operations Force, but a NATO arrangement that would bring Allied SOF and elite forces together in training and capability development for NATO missions. We welcome the Alliance’s work on developing common Special Operations Forces standards, and look forward to the benefits that will come from enhancing interoperability among SOF forces.

NATO Stabilization and Reconstruction Capabilities: The forces we send on NATO operations must operate across the spectrum of conflict. NATO should not be limited to high-end combat operations, but must also be ready to conduct low intensity conflict, and stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) missions. Stabilization and Reconstruction operations are military operations which require a high degree of interaction with civilians. Indeed, the very success of military forces in stabilization and reconstruction operations depends as much upon success in building or supporting governmental and economic institutions as it does on defeating armed enemies in combat.

Modern warfare requires improved capabilities to cooperate with non-military S&R resources and actors. It also requires the Alliance to develop standards for S&R operations, just as it has for traditional military operations. It is also essential that NATO develop a better framework for planning to support S&R activities objectives and activities as a coherent part of the larger operation. We are working with Allies to determine how best to develop this capability.
Finally, a 2006 Summit should also address NATO's developing need to broaden its transformation, to address the wider security threats and opportunities before us, and leverage NATO's unique international security potential.

**Middle East Training Center:** We are considering how NATO could take on a greater role in international security training. NATO has an established history as an effective provider of security- and defense-related training and education. A modest investment in expanded outreach could return significant results in terms of advancing Alliance security interests in key parts of the world. We can't do everything—but we could start with a training program in a region where there are clear interests and high potential returns, such as the Middle East.

The United States, Norway and Italy have presented to Allies a joint proposal to establish a training center in the Middle East which would train as many as 160 Middle Eastern students a year in subjects such as civil-military relations and defense planning, and budgeting. We also welcome the Secretary General’s recent proposals to examine how NATO could use existing training facilities as well as mobile training teams to provide training to partners in the Middle East and Africa.

**"NATO with Global Partners:"** We also think that in 2006 the Alliance should develop closer relationships with nations that are outside the Euro-Atlantic area but have values, security interests, and capable forces in common with NATO.

Our goal must be to develop an “enhanced partnership” relationship with a core group of key U.S. Allies who are not in NATO but want to develop a greater, practical relationship with the Alliance. The focus should be on practical cooperation. Such cooperation can take many forms: increased exchanges between NATO and the new “Global” Partners, opportunities for new Partners to send officers to NATO schools, joint planning and participation in NATO exercises, Alliance certification of new Partners’ forces, possible participation in pre-decisional operational planning of a NATO mission where a new Partner may well be considering participating, and even complementary, not core, contributions to NRF rotations.

These and other ideas about practical cooperation will complement the work of transformation within the Alliance. We will want our NATO Allies’ best thinking about how to reach out beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. And, we will want to engage existing Partners—like-minded, capable, and interested in contributing—in such outreach and cooperation.

**Enlargement:** The Defense Department is heavily engaged in developing the national defense structures of the current NATO aspirants, Macedonia, Croatia, and Albania. The Department believes in NATO’s “open door” policy and aspirants should join once they have met NATO’s established membership criteria.

**CONCLUSION: SUMMARY OF OBJECTIVES**

To wrap up the continuing transformation agenda that I have just described, I will summarize the 2006 Summit “deliverables” we are pursuing for Riga:

- First, continue to make significant progress and demonstrable achievements in NATO operations.
- Second, achievement of a viable NATO Response Force, including conducting a successful LIVEX, reaching Full Operational Capability, and developing a program for long-term sustainment of the initiative;
- Third, a decision to pursue improved enabling capabilities, particularly strategic lift assets.
- Fourth, development of a framework for Alliance Special Operations Forces;
- Fifth, development of stronger capabilities for Stabilization and Reconstruction;
- Sixth, establishment of a NATO training program in the Middle East region; and
- Finally, pursuit of closer ties with distant but kindred, capable nations—within the overall NATO partnership structure.

If the Alliance is able to achieve all of these initiatives, it will have taken significant strides toward making itself into a truly expeditionary organization. Allies will have shown that they recognize that the changed security environment of the post-9/11 era requires new thinking, resources, and capabilities in order to continue to defend the Euro-Atlantic territory and the shared values of over half a billion people. Allies will have expanded their vision and capacity to protect security and stability well beyond their borders. Allies will have created important ties to global partners for the effective pursuit of our common security agenda. Finally, Allies will
have solidified the foundations of a strong future Alliance that can further expand its membership and the borders of Euro-Atlantic security and prosperity.

Again, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to present the Defense Department’s goals and objectives for the upcoming NATO Summit in Riga. I would be honored to answer any questions you or the Committee may have. Thank you.

Mr. Gallegly. Thank you very much. As you heard, the bells have summoned us to the Floor. We have three votes, so we will stand in recess for a few minutes and appeal to you for your indulgence. We should be back in about 20 minutes.

[Recess.]

Mr. Gallegly. I call this hearing back to order. I know that Members will be getting back here promptly. The vote took a little longer than we expected, so I appreciate your patience.

I will let both of you take a shot at this question because I know this is an issue that has been on the minds of many for some time. Of course, at least Croatia was mentioned in the last round.

Maybe you could both give us an update as to the status of the debate over enlargement and how you evaluate the process of the three following candidate states of Croatia, Macedonia and Albania. Will the summit set a date for the next round of enlargement?

Mr. Volker?

Mr. Volker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This is an issue that both Dan and I have been working on extensively, and we have visited—at least I have visited—Albania, Croatia and Macedonia within the last month, together with our Ambassador to NATO.

We have worked very hard within NATO to build consensus for the idea that we should proceed with further enlargement of NATO. We do not think the job of building a Europe whole, free and at peace has been completed and that there is more yet to do.

We hope that at a summit meeting in 2008, NATO would be in a position to take decisions on whether to issue further invitations for membership. That is something that I think the Riga Summit this November will be in a position to confirm, that indeed as we look ahead to our next meeting in 2008 to take those kind of decisions.

In the meantime, our assessment is that none of the three countries is ready today. If we were to take stock we would not see that any of them are ready today for NATO membership, but we do have time to work with them to strengthen their candidacy and their performance.

We certainly support their aspirations for joining NATO, and we believe that by the time of 2008 we will be in a position where they will be able to present very strong candidacies, and we will do our part to help them and hope that NATO will be able to take decisions at that time.

Mr. Gallegly. Mr. Fata?

Mr. Fata. The Defense Department concurs with that view. From the defense reform and defense modernization aspects, the Adriatic 3, as they are referred to—Croatia, Albania and Macedonia—have made good progress.

We believe there is still a way to go in terms of modernizing their forces, in terms of reducing some of the personnel, the amount of money that is spent on personnel versus some of the operations and other necessities in the defense budget.
We agree going in 2006 that we do not expect invitations to be extended. If the candidates continue to improve and perform well then in 2008 the opportunity for invitations to be extended would be there.

Mr. GALLEGLY. How concerned are you about the various actors, observers, commentators, former government officials and so forth who seek to make NATO more relevant, for example, through increasing humanitarian peacekeeping missions?

Do we risk diluting NATO and making NATO less effective in maintaining its core functions such as Article 5 mission?

Mr. Volker?

Mr. VOLKER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I tend to look at these issues the other way around; that rather instead of saying is NATO relevant by dealing with these issues or not I think we need to look at the issues themselves. What are we doing to help the people in Darfur? What did we do to help the people in Pakistan who suffered the earthquake? How do we help them?

I think that what happens frequently is our leaders look around and say, “Where is there a capacity to provide assistance in some way that is effective?” Oftentimes with a security or a military area they will turn to NATO and say, “What can NATO do?”

As I mentioned, NATO was engaged in eight operations last year. I do not think I would view any single one of them as optional. I think they were all important things for NATO to do. NATO was called upon to do them because NATO had the capacity to do them effectively.

That, as I said, makes NATO relevant, but the point is not NATO’s relevance. The point is that we are able to address these issues as they come up in an effective way.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Fata, do you agree?

Mr. FATA. I do agree with that, Mr. Chairman. I would also say that from our perspective NATO has never been more relevant. The point is that we are able to address these issues as they come up in an effective way.

The Euro-Atlantic space is still faced with a variety of threats, although the threats have changed from the Cold War era to today. They are more asymmetric in nature, threats originating outside the Euro-Atlantic area.

I say this because the importance is that NATO needs to have the capabilities to be able to do a range of missions, everything from the Article 5 mentioned to crisis response to crisis management to assistance such as we saw in Pakistan to the humanitarian operations side.

An argument that sort of there are those out there that say, “Well, NATO needs to do humanitarian operations in order to make itself relevant,” I think is sort of a bad argument. We need to be able to have the broad range of capabilities to do all operations because that is sort of the situation, the security environment in which we are in today.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Have the European allies been receptive to the recent Bush Administration’s efforts to discuss key foreign policy issues like Iran within NATO? Which allies are particularly problematic with respect to this issue?

Mr. Volker?

Mr. VOLKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have made a conscious effort on the part of the Administration to bring the full
range of issues that we are concerned about to NATO and to raise them at the NATO table.

In the last year, each of the assistant secretaries of state for different parts of the world, whether that is Africa or the Near East or Latin America, has been in Brussels, has gone to NATO, has had consultations with our NATO allies there about this set of issues.

Under Secretary of State Nick Burns of course, as you know, who is a former Ambassador to NATO, has done this as well in bringing different issues to the table. Our Ambassador to NATO, Victoria Nuland, has raised Iran with others in NATO discussions. We have not had a formal consultation on Iran as we have on some of these issues to this point.

The reason for that is what we are working very closely with the EU–3 as the lead in negotiating this process with Iran and working toward the U.N. Security Council resolution, so we have a process in place that we are using effectively.

While we would welcome the idea of consultation with NATO on this idea as well, we want to do so in a way that reinforces the effort and is fully supported by our partners in the EU–3 as we deal with this delicate issue.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Before I turn the microphone over to my good friend from Florida, there is one other issue. We will have a second round here. I do not think we are going to have so much participation that we will not have a chance to ask a few more questions.

I would like, Mr. Fata, if you could assess the anti-American sentiment in Turkey. How real is it? What can the United States do to address the problem effectively? Is this a problem that could significantly impact NATO?

Mr. Fata?

Mr. FATA. On this question, sir, as part of my portfolio I spend a lot of time working on the Turkey issue. I have been to Turkey in the past few months. We followed the developments with respect to the release of the book and the release of the movie.

I think you are correct in stating that there is an anti-American sentiment in Turkey. However, it has not affected our relations to any great degree in working with the Government of Turkey itself. Turkey is still a great ally for us. We have had very good discussions with respect to NATO operations in Afghanistan. We continue to work closely with them as we prepare for the Riga Summit.

We have a new Ambassador in Turkey who has taken it as his mission to do more public diplomacy to explain what our relations are, about how the historic relationship between us and that what you see, what your average Turk sees in the movies or reads in a book is not what the United States-Turkish relationship is about.

We recognize that there is that sentiment out there. We are working to address that sentiment, but from the government level both from the ministries that we cooperate with and the Turkish general staff of the military, there is none of that. We are not detecting any of that sentiment.

Its impact on NATO? I do not think the anti-American sentiment will affect how we engage Turkey through the sort of a NATO institution. We have seen no effect to this point.
Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Wexler?

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you very much. If I could just follow the Chairman's question and Mr. Fata's response?

I was in Turkey also fairly recently, and while I would not take exception with anything that you said I think it would be fair to point out, number one, I do not know that there is greater anti-American sentiment in Turkey than there is in other parts of Europe, or at least certain parts of Europe.

But, unlike other parts of Europe, there is one pressing issue from the I think Turkish public opinion point of view which is unique to Turkey, as opposed to the rest of Europe, of which they have in part, at least in my view, a valid point, and that is the PKK and the perception in Turkish public opinion that with the rise in terrorist activity by the PKK in Turkey with deaths that have occurred in Turkey as a result of Kurdish terrorists that the failure of the United States to address the PKK issue in Northern Iraq is a substantive issue that Turkish public opinion differs with in terms of American action on the ground.

I am about to write a letter I think to the State Department. Maybe it should go to the Pentagon as well. I believe there is a new organization different than the PKK that has taken responsibility or has either been implicated in some of these terrorist activities of which the group is not yet listed as a terrorist group. I guess it is the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons splinter group of which we do not yet recognize them as a terrorist group.

I would respectfully suggest if you want to improve American-Turkish relations in terms of public opinion step one would be to recognize the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons group as a terrorist group, which if I understand the facts would be entirely consistent with American policy.

I would just maybe offer that observation. I say that as someone who cares deeply about the American-Turkish relationship. I would also say the Turks have their responsibilities too, and a meeting with Hamas as they did is part and parcel unfortunately to both sides' responsibility from my point of view of addressing terrorist activity at its root and not giving any home whatsoever to any terrorist activity and to be clear in our principles.

I think if we are entirely clear on the PKK and this Kurdistan Freedom Falcons group we would look a lot better in Turkish eyes, and if the Turks for their part were a little clearer on other issues relating to terrorism they would look a little better from our vantage point. Just one person's observation.

If I could ask a question as to Darfur? No one has to convince me of the relevance or the importance of NATO. I think one of the mistakes we have made in the transatlantic relationship on our side of the equation, a most recent event, is that we have not highlighted enough in Washington the degree of cooperation, leadership that our European allies have provided in Afghanistan.

I think it is really not even short of remarkable the degree of cooperation that our European allies have provided to the United States in Afghanistan, the degree of leadership that they have taken up. Turkey would be number one on that list. They I believe have twice led the International Security Forces, have volunteered at every step of the way to lead in Afghanistan.
Having said that, and this is not a slight in any way to NATO, but how is it that we can parade NATO on one hand as doing an extraordinary job in Afghanistan, which it is, and on the other hand we are witnessing the 21st century's first genocide?

I was at NATO, and I witnessed I think our Ambassador's effort and spoke with President Scheffer, spoke with him at the time. He is entirely well intentioned. I do not think we could have both a better ally or a more principled man heading NATO than we do.

I take President Bush at his word in saying that we are about to offer 100 advisors or councils through NATO for the African Union Forces, but how is it that we are sitting upon the world's most significant military alliance, and we seem to be effectively powerless to stop the world's first genocide of this century.

All we are up against are 15,000 to 20,000 Janjaweed fighters, who—this is not Nazi Germany that we are faced with. We are talking about teenage thugs with fairly elementary ammunitions. How do we square the two?

Mr. VOLKER. Congressman, thank you for that question and also your comments on the PKK. I would like to address your question first and then maybe come back to Turkey a bit too.

Mr. WEXLER. Sure.

Mr. VOLKER. I certainly share your outrage over what is happening in Darfur and your sense of frustration that we are not getting out the door more and better and faster. Even more important than that, I think President Bush shares that view, and he has spoken about it publicly.

Where we are in dealing with the issue in Darfur, I want to highlight two things. First off, this is very much an African-led process. The African Union has a view about what kind of external international support it wants and how to do that. We have tried to work very carefully with them so that we are clear that we are offering as much support as they are willing to accept and do so in a way that they are comfortable with.

With many of our European allies there is a sensitivity over colonial heritage, and we have to navigate around that history. That said, we do believe that there is much more that needs to be done, and we have tried to be clear both politically ourselves and also within NATO that NATO ought to be prepared to take its share of the role.

The second point is that last week Secretary Rice was in Sophia for the meeting of NATO foreign ministers, and, as I think you saw with Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer's press statements afterwards, there was a fairly strong view among the NATO allies that they are ready to help and do more in Darfur.

NATO has taken the step of asking the military authority what could be done to assist the African Union Mission (AMIS) in Sudan. This would include things in the area of training, continued airlift, which we already do, command and control, support for the African Union headquarters, intelligence. We are studying the issue of tactical lifts. There are many things that we are looking at how we could provide them.

This is in response in the first instance to a request from the U.N. Secretary General to NATO what could be done. We hope that the meetings that are going on in Abuja right now will result in
an African Union request to say yes, what could NATO do to support this AMIS mission, and we will be able to begin providing some of that support. I share your concern and also your ambition that we do in fact deliver more.

Second, on the issue of the PKK, we again agree with you. We need to be clear. It is a terrorist organization. If they repackage themselves, if there are offshoots that are terrorist organizations, we need to call those what they are as well.

We work very closely with Turkey to identify associated organizations with the PKK and have gone around to other European capitals to identify sources of fundraising, media outlets, part of the PKK network, and urge them to be declared part of the terrorist network and urge them to be closed down.

Concerning Northern Iraq, this is obviously now part of the territory of a sovereign Iraqi Government, and we have worked with the Government of Iraq to raise these issues of PKK terrorists on their territory with the Iraqi Government, and we have taken part in an effort to facilitate the Turkish Government and the Iraqi Government speaking directly with each other, which we have organized in a trilateral fashion.

This was hampered by the lack of a new Iraqi Government following the elections, and we are very hopeful that as a new Iraqi Government now takes office that we will be able to stimulate again this direct contact between the Iraqi Government and the Turkish Government about this PKK terrorist problem.

You mentioned a specific issue of the Falcons group. I do not know the specific answer to that, but I would be pleased to take it and get back to you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. The gentleman from New York, Mr. Engel?

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, last week I came back from a trip to the Balkans, one of many that I have taken during the course of my congressional tenure, and I particularly, as you probably know, have taken a special interest in Kosovo. I have long been a strong supporter for independence for Kosovo and for the first time I really believe that we are on the threshold of that nation gaining its independence.

I also had a Parliamentary exchange, a transatlantic legislators dialogue between our Congress and the European Union, the European Parliament members. I get the feeling that there is an inevitability of independence. In my discussions with Mario Seri and Kiada and Peterson they all are really saying the same thing.

In light of that, and I would expect a decision to be made by the end of the year with independence coming shortly thereafter, can you talk to me about what you see are the plans for the NATO deployment in Kosovo? You know, if Kosovo becomes independent by the end of the year would a NATO force remain, particularly if the Kosovars request it?

Mr. VOLKER. Thank you, Representative Engel. Certainly our view is that NATO should take a lead and is in fact taking a lead in addressing the security arrangements both up until the point of a status settlement and after there is a final status; that we need to have continuity and commitment from NATO to that process and
that the United States should also be a full part of that, so we see continuity through the issue of establishing a final status.

Certainly, in the long term, we would hope that the fact of a final status would diminish the need for reliance on foreign security forces, but we do not see that happening any time soon. We expect to see continuity through this status process.

I would also like to ask my colleague, Dan Fata, if he might like to comment on that from the Pentagon’s perspective.

Mr. Fata. On this question, sir, I think the fact that the status talks are going on requires a NATO presence to be through the talks.

I agree with Mr. Volker that following the talks that there will be a need for a NATO or an international security presence, and I also agree that the mere fact of the talks would have resolved with something, whatever that something is—indeed for Kosovo or what—would lead us to the fact that over the long term the international security presence would be drawn down and replaced with whatever the Kosovar protection force, whatever the national army for Kosovo would be.

I think at this point it would not be too premature to start thinking about what would that future Kosovo force be and how would it be trained and would there be an international training element to it and then what would the international security presence be down the road. Does it remain a NATO force? Does it transition to something else?

I think your question is a good one, but I agree with Mr. Volker that certainly for the time being NATO will need to remain there on the ground if only because NATO is seen as the honest broker. Both sides trust NATO in order to be the honest broker in enforcing stability and peace on the ground and then likely whatever the future status agreement will be.

Mr. Engel. Well, I do not disagree with what either one of you has said. In terms of, Mr. Volker, you had said you think the United States should remain a full part of that, whatever is done, I could not agree more.

I think that if there is one country that is pro-American as you can get it is the people of Kosovo. I might also add the Albanians and Albania as well. There is an instance whereby this is a mainly Muslim country that understands that the United States does not wage war on Muslims, but indeed is an ally, democratic friend throughout the world, be they Muslim, Christian, Jewish, Hindu or anything else. We support people who embrace democracy and who have ideals like.

That is certainly the people of Kosovo, so I believe the United States needs to be completely engaged and involved, and I believe that these people deserve complete independence, not semi-independence or half independence, but it has to be a full independence. I think that they understand that you cannot go from step zero to 10 overnight; that the international community has to continue to be there as well.

Let me ask you both one other question involving the Balkans as well. In 2003, I was the author of a resolution praising the Adriatic Charter, which committed the United States to push for the inte-
Can you give me a prediction as to when those nations individually might join or at least begin the accession process into NATO, and could you tell me how you see each country’s strengths and where each country must improve?

Mr. VOLKER. Thank you very much. I would be pleased to do that.

I had the pleasure of visiting each of those three countries in March of this year together with Ambassador Nuland, our Ambassador to NATO, for the very purpose of your question; to assess where they are in their preparation for joining NATO and also to strengthen our efforts both within the U.S. Government and with the other allies in preparing NATO for the process of further enlargement.

I would say first off that we very much believe that NATO enlargement has been a historic success, that it has been to the benefit of tens of millions of people. It has expanded freedom and democracy and market economy throughout a much wider area of Europe. This process is not over. There is more yet to do, and we are fully behind it.

That said, when we looked around early last year at the beginning of the second term we felt that there was not a lot of momentum behind the issue of further NATO enlargement; that having gotten through the Prague Round of enlargement that there is something of a sigh of relief and a pause.

We felt a duty to say, “No, we are not done. We have more yet to do.” We began to put forward a process of talking about this within NATO to try to discuss with our allies the importance that we feel that NATO enlargement has in furthering the developing in the Balkans and to begin preparing the way for further decisions on NATO enlargement.

We said that we should have a summit meeting this year in November, but our primary purpose there was to focus on transformation and strengthening NATO. We said at the same time that we think NATO ought to have another summit meeting in 2008, and at that time NATO should be prepared to take some decisions on invitations.

These are countries that, as you know, have been in the membership action plan for some time and have really made remarkable progress in all of the areas that we have addressed with them. We have tried to build in that direction, and I think that we have done very well.

At the same time, I would say that there are a lot of challenges for these countries to overcome and that, as in the case of past rounds of enlargement, we are going to work with them very intensively to address issues of political reform, economic reform, anti-corruption, defense reform, popular support for NATO membership, contribution to common security, and a range of other issues that can come up in the enlargement process.

I would say that having visited all three countries, the issue that stands out as a common factor among all three where we would like to see the greatest further progress is in the area of the independent and well-functioning judiciary and in tackling organized
crime and corruption. These stand out as issues that need to be addressed.

Other issues vary country to country with strengths and weaknesses. Macedonia is going to be having an election this year, and we certainly want to work with them to help them ensure that they have the freest and fairest election possible.

Croatia has inherited a very large and heavy military establishment, and we would like to see them go further in the area of defense reform to developing deployable, expeditionary-type military forces.

While Albania, as you mentioned, has very, very high support for the United States and high support for NATO membership, in Croatia public support is lower, in the range of the 30 percentile, so we would like to see public support strengthen because as you decide to bring a country into NATO you want to be sure that that country wants to be a part of NATO and has the public's backing to contribute to NATO operations and collective defense. There are a variety of issues like that, which differ country by country.

We have enough time to work on these. We are in the middle of 2006, the early part of 2006 now. We are talking about a summit meeting about 2 years from now. We are very dedicated to this process, and we believe that over the next 2 years we have a chance to help these countries present the strongest candidacies possible.

Mr. ENGEL. Would you say they are all roughly in the same ballpark? Is there one that needs to be ahead of the other two? As you are pointing out, there are different problems with each country.

Mr. VOLKER. I would say they have different strengths and weaknesses. I think no one can deny that economically, Croatia has had a head start. In terms of political reforms, I think we have seen nothing sort of remarkable turnaround in Macedonia. Public support is a factor I mentioned. It cannot be higher than it is in Albania.

They measure up differently, but I think we have created a process within NATO where we will work with all of the countries to strengthen them as much as possible and hope that we are in a position within NATO that our allies are ready to take decisions in the early part of 2008.

Mr. ENGEL. Let me just say in conclusion, and I thank the Chairman for being indulgent. I agree with you in your assessment of NATO enlargement. I think it has been a historic success.

I was one of the strongest people pushing for NATO enlargement from the get go because I really feel that it is important not only because it is good for the United States, but it is important for us politically to consolidate our political gains frankly.

With the fall of the Soviet Union way back when, it was important I felt that we enlarged NATO to reflect the reality of that particular point in time. I think we have seen since then that we have a more aggressive and more hostile Russia, and some of the countries that are now admitted, mainly the Baltic nations that are now in NATO, if we were just now getting around to the process I think we would find much more opposition from the Russians than we found 5 years ago.
That is why I think historically it is a good thing to push forward and push forward while the realities of the new geopolitical situation are there.

Mr. VOLKER. Thank you.

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you.

The gentleman from New York?

I have made a commitment we would wrap up here by 3:30. I know Rob has a quick question he would like to ask. Before we get there, I would just like to kind of follow up to what Mr. Engel was talking about as it relates to the Balkans.

Maybe Mr. Fata could take a quick shot at this and give me his opinion as to whether NATO is prepared to offer a Partnership for Peace status with Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Mr. FATA. On PFP I would say there is still a full force. Serbia and Montenegro we still have the ICTY issues, the war crimes issues, to work through on that. I do not think from our perspective that PFP can be extended until that is worked through. Also I would say that Bosnia would fall in that same category.

That said, we are constantly, both the Defense Department and the State Department, encouraging the governments, the Bosnian and the Serbian Governments, to move forward in taking the steps that Croatia took in apprehending the war criminals and bringing them to justice.

I would say those are two. For both countries that is the key factor on extending PFP.

Mr. GALLEGLY. One quick question about Croatia. Has the arrest or the situation with General Gotovina—is it Gotovina?

Mr. FATA. Right. It depends on what part of the south you are from, I guess.

In any event, has that changed dramatically, the concern over the war crimes situation in Croatia and whether Croatia was truly cooperating particularly since I think he was caught in the Canary Islands, if I am not mistaken, and he was not in country?

A lot of people had been concerned about the fact that many of the patriots of Croatia looked at him as a national treasure, a national hero, and were protecting him, but that was proven inaccurate I guess by virtue of the fact of where he was captured.

Has that changed dramatically that one big void in the process for Croatia?

Mr. VOLKER. Congressman, thank you. I would say first off we are very pleased that General Gotovina has been apprehended and is now facing justice in the Hague. I think that is very important.

He was captured in the Canary Islands, as you say. He did, however, we believe, still have an extensive support network within Croatia that was helping him to survive at a distance that was helping him to avoid justice, and we think that it was with the assistance of Croatian authorities working together with the international criminal tribunal in the former Yugoslavia that did in fact help bring him to justice, so we do view that as a success.

The chief prosecutor for the criminal tribunal, Carlo del Ponto, said last October that Croatia was in—what was the phrase? I do not want to misspeak. It was in the nature of in full compliance or working together well with the international criminal tribunal.
That was before Gotovina was apprehended, but it was very shortly after that, that he was arrested, and I am sure that her statement was based on a sense of cooperation with the Croatian authorities at that time. Certainly our assessment now is that they have largely addressed this issue.

If I could add, I think there is an important psychological element for a nation beyond the issue of the individual itself. The issue of the individual is important because of specific war crimes that they would have been involved in, but it also says something about the nature of a country that either recognizes the war crimes and offers to cooperate with the international criminal tribunal and brings someone to justice or, conversely, the nature of a country that views someone, despite the crimes they have committed, as a national hero and seeks to protect them in some way.

I think that is the issue that Croatia has grappled with, and it is the issue that we are encouraging Serbia now to grapple with as well, as it deals with its war crimes case.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Getting back to Gotovina, clearly this was a major concern of our own State Department as a giant hole in the process of Croatia’s ascension. It appears now that that hurdle has been pretty well mitigated. Is that a fair assessment with our own Government?

Mr. VOLKER. I think that is a fair assessment.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Mr. Wexler?

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you. I would just inquire of the gentlemen to offer their view in terms of the upgrading of NATO relations beyond Europe.

There has been much discussion regarding NATO relations with Australia, Japan, South Korea and others. There is also obviously through the Mediterranean dialogue a detailed effort regarding, if I understand it correctly, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia and maybe some others.

Zeroing in on Israel, it seems to me as important as the Mediterranean dialogue is, and I want to do nothing other than encourage it for obvious reasons because it is incredibly important, but it seems a bit odd that Israel would be part of a Mediterranean dialogue when its obvious military and counterterrorism capabilities far exceed the other nations in the Mediterranean dialogue and equally, if not more important, Israel’s historic commitment to democracy and rule of law and the values that make up NATO is obviously at a very different stage compared to those other countries.

I was wondering whether you could comment as to where Israel falls in this process in your mind and does the threat that Iran uniquely poses to Israel as compared to these other nations, does that have an impact in your view in terms of the urgency of upgrading NATO relations with Israel?

Mr. VOLKER. Congressman, thank you. We strongly support NATO increasing its engagement and cooperation with Israel. We have, as you said, the Mediterranean dialogue as a framework for NATO’s relationship with seven states in North Africa and the Middle East.

Similarly, we have a framework for countries to the east of NATO, Partnership for Peace, and this includes countries from Sweden on the one hand to Uzbekistan on the other. Similarly, we
also launched in 2004 the Istanbul Cooperative Initiative, which reaches out to countries in the Gulf.

What we have tried to do is to work on the basis of self-selection and self-differentiation. The countries that are more capable of doing more, that are more interested in doing more with NATO, will naturally step forward, and we will naturally step forward to meet them and do as much as we can together.

That is the way I see NATO’s relationship with Israel developing. Israel, as you say, is very capable. It shares democratic values. It has an interest in working together more closely with NATO, and we want to reciprocate with that and see NATO develop that relationship as well.

I would not put Israel as unique in that category in the sense that Jordan, for example, also wants to do that, and we also support Jordan’s ambitions. You mentioned a few others. There are varying degrees of interest and capability and democracy in that region as you know, and we want to work with each one to the greatest extent we can.

I think NATO has never dealt with the issue of enlargement beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. That is, we have had a couple successful rounds, as we were just talking about with Congressman Engel, the Prague Round and the Madrid Round before that, 10 countries joining. We are looking at some others in the Balkans.

The issue of beyond the Euro-Atlantic area has never really been grappled with at NATO, and I do not know when or if or how that will come up, but short of that, working actively to build a more practical and effective mutual relationship between NATO and Israel is something that we very much support.

Mr. WEXLER. Thank you.

Mr. GALLEGLY. Thank you, Rob.

Thank you both for your excellent testimony and also for your patience with our schedule this afternoon. Mr. Fata, thank you. Mr. Volker, thank you.

With that, the Subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:46 p.m. the Subcommittee was adjourned.]