STATEMENT BY

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COMMANDER

UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND

BEFORE THE STRATEGIC FORCES SUBCOMMITTEE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON GLOBAL STRIKE PLANS AND PROGRAMS

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for this opportunity to review USSTRATCOM’S progress during the past year and to present our plan for the future. I will discuss the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) role in validating and updating our transformational approach, and request your continued support for specific actions necessary to ensure our strategic capabilities are correctly postured to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. 2006 is a year of unprecedented change. Our ultimate goals are driving the pace of change: building strategic advantage, ensuring the security of the American people and strengthening the community of free nations.

ADAPTING TO THE NEW ENVIRONMENT – TRANSFORMING WHILE WE FIGHT

One year ago, we spoke of global interdependence and its impact on how we organize, plan and operate. We emphasized developing strong links between U.S. strategic objectives and regional operations, as our adversaries were employing asymmetric means to strike well beyond the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. We also spoke of STRATCOM’S new mission assignments and the steps we had undertaken to transform our command into an agile 21st Century organization capable of deterring our adversaries and bringing the full range of global strike, defensive, command and control (C2), and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to bear against them if necessary. We outlined an enormous transformational effort that had to be accomplished in the context of an ongoing global conflict with active combat operations and without the luxury of an operational pause.
Throughout the last year, the men and women of USSTRATCOM have engaged in that global conflict, often employing means not visible either to the average American or to our adversaries. They met this day-to-day challenge with professionalism and commitment while they were also restructuring our organization to focus our efforts, conserve our resources, and streamline support to other combatant commanders around the world. I come to you today gratified by the progress these fine men and women have made and energized to complete the task before us.

**USSTRATCOM TRANSFORMATION VECTORS**

The Department of Defense budget you enacted for 2006 enabled a string of organizational and operational successes along all of our transformation vectors.

*We changed the way we are organized and operate.* We implemented, and by the end of 2006 will refine, the redistributed and functionally aligned command structure described last year. This new structure is already paying off in terms of decentralized operational employment and increased operational speed. Our efforts resulted in:

- A flattened, streamlined and focused headquarters staff charged with maintaining command and control of the nation’s nuclear forces, providing strategic guidance and advocacy for essential mission capabilities, and conducting integrated and synchronized strategic-level planning necessary for mission accomplishment in all mission areas.
- Four interdependent Joint Functional Component Commands (JFCCs): Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR);
Network-Warfare (NW); Integrated Missile Defense (IMD) and Space and Global Strike (S&GS). Day-to-day operational planning and execution of specialized global capabilities now reside at the component level, where commanders are able to maintain focus on their primary mission and not be distracted by staff support activities.

- Integrated Information Operations (IO) support through the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC). The JIOC is the focal point for all operational and tactical IO planning support to DoD users around the globe.

- Improved security for DoD information systems through the aggressive efforts of Joint Task Force - Global Network Operations (JTF-GNO). JTF-GNO instituted stringent use controls and trained system users to reduce vulnerabilities.

- A collaborative, Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), to deliver select DoD space capability to U.S., Allied, and other national users. When fully operational, JSpOC will provide the full range of DoD space capabilities.

- A new USSTRATCOM Center for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (SCC-WMD) and a new Global Innovation and Strategy Center (GISC) that recently completed their formative processes, joining the fight with specialized technical skills and solutions to unique mission challenges.

By making this unique organizational transformation we also strengthened our operational relationships with the Defense Intelligence Agency, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, Defense Information Systems Agency and National Security Agency in order to leverage the tremendous resources and capabilities resident in these
organizations. Now we effectively bridge many artificial barriers to communications and information sharing, and bring enhanced combat power to the regional combatant commanders.

We made progress in our drive toward a New Triad of capabilities. The New Triad is comprised of offensive and defensive capabilities enabled by persistent global command and control (C2), intelligence, an agile planning system, and a responsive defense infrastructure. The New Triad provides improved flexibility in dealing with a wider range of contingencies, while reducing our dependence on nuclear weapons, in order to assure our allies, dissuade competitors, and deter those who plan to harm us, particularly with WMD.

Efforts to improve conventional global strike capability focused on generating effects without being hindered by factors of time, distance, basing rights, over-flight considerations or undue risk to American servicemen and servicewomen. Recently the Department:

- Bolstered the number of Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) in the inventory, providing all weather, precision strike in a smaller weapon footprint.
- Fielded Tactical Tomahawk (TACTCOM) and the Joint Air to Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM), providing strike weapons that operate from ranges outside enemy point defenses.

During the past year non-kinetic capabilities became an increasingly important tool to deny our adversaries the opportunity to communicate easily or to manipulate information in ways that further their efforts to undermine stability around the world. We seek better non-kinetic capabilities to improve our freedom of action at the lowest level of
conflict; to enhance deterrence; and support the sustained ability to use our networks while denying the adversary a similar capability. In this area we:

- Expanded development of the applicable tactics, techniques, and procedures to support use of information and networks - cyberspace - as an environment for integrated exploitation, offensive, and defensive operations.
- Improved integration of non-kinetic effects into operational planning, on a limited basis, in support of forces involved in the Global War on Terrorism.

The President has committed the United States to **sustaining a credible nuclear deterrence capability** with the lowest possible number of nuclear weapons consistent with national security. USSTRATCOM’S task is to ensure our nuclear force remains ready to meet any contingency while the nuclear stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable as we prudently achieve the thresholds specified in the Moscow Treaty. To this end we:

- Sustained a safe and reliable nuclear stockpile in cooperation with the national laboratories and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).
- Took steps to improve the security and safety of the deployed nuclear force.
- Retired the last Peacekeeper Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) from service.
- Reduced the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads on the Minuteman III ICBM force.
• Transferred the final ballistic missile submarine scheduled for reconfiguration to carry conventionally armed cruise missiles.

We continued pursuit of both active and passive defenses as a means of deterring our adversaries by demonstrating our ability to deny their attempts to coerce or harm the United States. During 2006 we will:

• Conduct additional tests of a Standard Missile 3 (SM3), which is designed to engage mid and short range ballistic missiles early in flight.

• Conduct tests of a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile, which is designed to engage mid to short-range ballistic missiles late in flight.

• Increase the number of emplaced Ground Based Interceptors in Alaska and California. Ground Based Interceptors are designed to engage long-range ballistic missiles in the midcourse of their flight. We plan on an interceptor demonstration this spring and up to two more interceptor tests by the end of 2006.

• Refine our missile engagement tracking capability by deploying sea-based and forward-based X-Band radars to operational locations in the Pacific region, where, by the end of 2006, they will join a global network of radars.

• Upgrade the Command, Control, Battle Management, and Communications System (C2BMC) to extend situational awareness capability to Pacific Command and European Command by the end of 2006.

• Promote expanded interagency support and participation in the
Proliferation Security Initiative to further global efforts to combat the spread of WMD.

At the heart of the New Triad are the key enablers of command and control, intelligence, and planning. Through these enablers, and our broad array of space capability, we create the agility to respond to a wide range of global challenges. During 2006 we will:

- Evolve the renovated USSTRATCOM Global Operations Center to enhance collaboration among all geographically distributed STRATCOM elements – defining the first step toward a Global C2 capability for all New Triad forces.
- Complete preparations for opening the first node in a network of ground entry points designed to serve a nationally distributed ground, air and sea network capable of providing the diverse connectivity requirements of the New Triad and DoD support to a broader national command capability using all elements of national power.
- Codify the output of the department-wide process review designed to modify historically inefficient ISR force apportionment practices to globally manage low-density, high-demand ISR assets such as unmanned aerial vehicles and reconnaissance aircraft.
- Extrapolate the results of an exercise in which we demonstrated the ability to achieve persistence through the combination/integration of different intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) phenomenology, to better fulfill combatant commander’s intelligence requirements.
• Capitalize on the longer dwell time of unmanned and unattended sensors to produce greater persistence in Global War on Terrorism operations.

• Initiate a pilot program to determine essential global strike command and control services with an explicit objective of delivering a distributed, collaborative product. The pilot program will take advantage of the Department’s Data Strategy, which calls for visible, accessible and understandable data, and uses Services Oriented Architectures (SOA) to promote flexibility and agility.

• Initiate efforts to transition from a limited space surveillance architecture to a more fully integrated terrestrial and space-based approach to situational awareness.

**A NATION AT WAR – CONTINUING TO TRANSFORM**

When I came before you last year, it was clear the pace of change and nature of the threats and challenges to our nation were growing rapidly. It was also clear that Strategic Command’s legacy systems and organizational relationships were not suitable for meeting emerging challenges the nation now faces. Our intent, this year, was to address nuclear issues in the QDR in order to rationalize them in the context of our overall capabilities. It is against this backdrop that we entered the dialog of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

USSTRATCOM presented new ideas and concepts, which were widely debated during the course of review proceedings. We entered this review believing the New Triad concept was sound in principle, but that the pace of attaining the new construct was lagging the national need. With this in mind we focused on four objectives:
• Determine which elements of our considerable nuclear force structure are essential to future stability and which might be retired in favor of more redundant and credible conventional or non-kinetic capabilities called for by the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review and 2005 Strategic Capabilities Assessment.

• Determine the next steps needed to fulfill our commitment to an integrated missile defense capable of defending the U.S., its deployed forces, friends, and allies.

• Identify key enablers within the domains of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; communications, space, and collaborative planning that could rapidly improve our agility and responsiveness.

• Identify structural barriers to effective integration and synchronization of DoD efforts to combat weapons of mass destruction.

The QDR served to remind us of two very important factors: first, that the United States is a nation engaged in a long war; and second, that our enemies in this long war seek weapons of mass destruction and will likely attempt to use them in their conflict with free people everywhere. Importantly, the QDR validated the need to adjust the U.S. global military force posture by moving away from a static defense in obsolete Cold War garrisons. While the review described many areas in which we must shift emphasis, we believe three are of particular importance to shaping our command and its approach to the future:

• From nation-state threats - to decentralized networked threats from non-state enemies.
• From “one size fits all” deterrence – to tailored deterrence for rogue powers, terrorist networks, and near-peer competitors.

• From a focus on kinetics – to a focus on effects.

We have taken the QDR’s imperative for change as validation of our desire to accelerate transformation in many areas. While we believe progress has been made, more can be done in selected areas to improve USSTRATCOM’s posture and preparedness to respond to a wider range of traditional, irregular, disruptive, or catastrophic challenges.

Beginning in 2007 we will take steps to:

Improve USSTRATCOM’s nuclear deterrence posture. Key initiatives include:

• Reduce the number of deployed Minuteman III ballistic missiles in order to provide assets to meet essential flight test needs and ensure the viability of the Minuteman force. This will better balance our legacy nuclear capabilities while preserving our ability to reconstitute additional forces in response to strategic surprise.

• Study the requirement for a Minuteman III replacement. We believe this is an essential step toward ensuring our future national security needs.

• Study the requirement for nuclear-armed cruise missiles and look at alternative methods of storing these Cold War era weapons. We believe that this study will provide valuable input in support of developing an effective long term strategy to maintain the nuclear stockpile.
Develop a wider range of conventional deterrent weapons. USSTRATCOM championed the need for a prompt, precise conventional global strike capability, to bridge the gap between prompt nuclear weapons and less timely, but precise, conventional weapons. Key initiatives include:

- Deploy an initial precision-guided conventional Trident Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile capability within 2 years. The speed and range advantage of a conventional Trident missile increases decision time and provides an alternative to nuclear weapon use against fleeting, high value targets. The conventional Trident missile would be particularly useful in deterring or defeating those who seek to coerce or threaten the U.S. with WMD.

- Develop a new land-based, penetrating long-range strike capability to be fielded by 2018.

- Study alternative options for delivering prompt, precise conventional warheads using advanced technologies such as hypersonic vehicles from land, air, or the sea.

Develop non-kinetic capabilities to expand the range of effects we can generate against certain targets. Without question we are on the verge of a major technology shift to the Network Age. We see an environment in which digital internet communication is more pervasive, reliable, efficient, cheap, and rapid - even with the enormous increase in volume, variety, and velocity of data. Key initiatives include:

- Develop capabilities that promote the freedom of action we enjoy in other mediums like, maritime and air.
• Develop the doctrine, organization, training, maintenance, logistics, personnel and facilities to defend our nation in this domain.

• Enhance measures to improve information assurance and network security.

*Improve integrated defenses* against short, intermediate, and intercontinental range ballistic and cruise missiles, and develop complementary *capabilities to combat weapons of mass destruction*. Key initiatives include:

• Develop and mature integrated air and missile defenses that deter attacks, demonstrating the ability to deny an adversary’s objectives.

• Integrate defensive systems among our international partners in ways that promote assurance against attack.

• Expand the Army's 20th Support Command’s capabilities, to enable it to serve as a Joint Task Force capable of rapid deployment in support of WMD elimination.

• Improve and expand U.S. forces’ capabilities to locate, track and tag shipments of WMD.

• Expand our advanced technical render safe capacity and implement measures to increase associated speed of response.

*Improve our nuclear infrastructure.* USSTRATCOM recognizes the importance of an efficient and more responsive nuclear weapons infrastructure to the Department’s strategy of tailored deterrence. We believe this is the essential element needed to ensure our weapons are safe, secure, and reliable, to ensure we can respond to both
technological and political surprise, and to reduce our current stockpile of nuclear warheads.

In May 2005, the Nuclear Weapons Council commissioned an 18-month study, to determine the feasibility of replacing some W76 warheads with a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) and to examine the potential for using RRW in lieu of the W78 warhead. This U.S. Navy led study will include Air Force and Interagency participants and should issue a final report in November 2006. We believe this study will be a useful tool in addressing some of the concerns raised by the Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities, dated January 2006. The key initiative is to:

- Determine the feasibility of replacing existing warheads with a Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW).

Develop a more coherent global command and control capability and a network-enabled architecture that moves information to the user, rather than moving the user to the information. The New Triad needs a robust, resilient global C2 system that builds on our legacy nuclear C2 system and serves as the basis of a critical national-level capability suitable for use in emergencies range from terrorist attacks to natural disasters. Key initiatives include:

- Transition the USSTRATCOM Mobile Consolidated Command Center, providing a survivable and enduring nuclear command and control capability, to a new network of distributed ground-based communications nodes; establishing a gateway to a robust multi-functional global command and control capability.
• Retire four National Airborne Operations Center (NAOC) and upgrade the TACAMO command and control aircraft, to sustain a survivable airborne link to strategic nuclear forces and broaden our ability to support full functionality of the New Triad.

Transition intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance activities from a legacy approach, directed largely at monitoring nation states in two theaters, to a true global enterprise tailored to meet regional needs. Key initiatives include:

• Implement a new global intelligence approach focused on achieving persistent collection capabilities against legacy and emerging threats, with our U.S. Government and Allied partners, and improved synergy with the Intelligence Community.

• Increase investment in unmanned aerial vehicles to provide greater dwell capabilities in the effort to identify and track mobile targets globally.

Improve space capabilities. The space mission area creates a decisive strategic advantage for our national security, empowering critical economic as well as defense related activities. Our dependence on space capabilities, coupled with recent significant advances in space operations demonstrated by others, establishes a true imperative to protect our space assets and our freedom of action in space. USSTRATCOM understands the need to stay at least one technology generation ahead of any foreign or commercial space power. We must improve space situational awareness and protection, and ensure unfettered, reliable, and secure access to space. Key initiatives
include:

- Improve responsive space access, satellite operations, and other space enabling capabilities such as the space professional cadre.
- Integrate air and space capabilities to deliver combined effects.
- Realign resources to sustain existing space surveillance capabilities.

USSTRATCOM REQUESTS YOUR SUPPORT TO MEET THE CHALLENGES WE FACE

Over the next five years, we must fully transform while remaining engaged in a conflict in which our enemies will use any and all means to achieve their objectives. We believe a more aggressive transformation schedule than envisioned five years ago is essential to maintain the strategic advantage needed to deter or defeat those who would do us harm. If we do not accelerate this transition, we will face these adversaries, who attack through asymmetric means, with the blunt weapons of last resort that won the Cold War. That alone will not preserve our future national security. In particular we are requesting your support in the following areas:

**Prompt, Precision Conventional Global Strike.** Tailored deterrence requires a more complete range of capabilities to address the wide spectrum of challenges that confront us today. While the Department employs expeditionary forces around the globe, it is unlikely we will have forces in every place we need them at the crucial moment when we have an opportunity to stop a WMD-armed threat far from our shores. The United States has the capability to engage with high quality conventional forces
around the world, given days or perhaps weeks to respond. But if our
general-purpose forces are not in a position to respond rapidly, the need
to defeat attacks against the United States may require USSTRATCOM to
interdict fleeting targets at global range. We have the delivery
capability on alert today, but configured only with nuclear weapons. This
choice is not credible against many of the extremist adversaries we will
face.

We recommend proceeding with development of the responsive,
conventional global strike alternative offered by the Conventional Trident
Modification (CTM). The President’s budget request includes funds for the
modification of a number of submarine based Trident Missiles to deliver
conventional warheads with precision over thousands of miles in tens of
minutes.

**Global Command and Control (GC2).** We are now faced with the task
of recapitalizing our aging, Nuclear Command and Control (NC2) network,
which is a matter of prime importance. Capitalizing on advances in
technology, we envision a transition from the single-purpose, stove-
piped NC2 network that served us during the Cold War, to a multi-
functional, distributed, survivable, and expandable Global Command and
Control capability, leveraging the assets and resources of the Global
Information Grid and serving the needs of our joint war-fighters.

With your support for the President’s budget request, we can
deliver a resilient air, land, and maritime GC2 capability that will
tie together all elements of New Triad power. Fully developed, the GC2
will enable collaboration between, and among, DoD and other government
agencies and partners, providing the core of a National Command
Capability to meet the broadening array of potential challenges we face
as a nation. A true National Command Capability will only be effective with federally mandated standards for data tagging to facilitate enhanced information sharing.

**Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW).** Finally, if we are to break the cycle of maintaining and refurbishing large numbers of Cold War-era nuclear warheads to guard against uncertainty, we request your support to ensure a safe, secure, reliable nuclear stockpile, and in the process transform the nuclear weapons enterprise. Discussions over the past year within the Executive Branch and Congress have increased understanding of the role for nuclear weapons in our current environment, and the value of a responsive defense infrastructure. USSTRATCOM supports the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) as the key to transforming our aging Cold War nuclear weapons stockpile. RRW will enhance our long-term confidence in the stockpile and reduce the need to retain high numbers of hedge weapons while exercising the people, science, technology base and facilities required for sustaining the nuclear weapons enterprise.

Maintaining the current stockpile of Cold War era weapons is a challenge. If directed, we believe the time is right; the risk is manageable; and the opportunity is at hand to choose weapons that will best serve our future and allow us to further reduce our overall stockpile size, in order to transition to and maintain a smaller but safer, more secure, and more reliable nuclear weapon arsenal.

**USSTRATCOM TRANSFORMATIONAL VECTORS BUILDING STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE**

USSTRATCOM plays an important role in leading national efforts to send an unambiguous message to our adversaries and friends alike - we
will do whatever it takes, for as long as it takes, to ensure the forces of freedom possess a lasting strategic advantage against those who would deny citizens of America and the world the security to govern their own future. We will continue to be aggressive and resourceful in offering our best advice in the pursuit of capabilities needed to meet our national security requirements. With your help we can assure our allies, dissuade unhealthy competition, deter coercive or damaging acts, and above all else, defend our citizens and defeat our enemies. Thank you for your continued support.