Defense Reforms

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and the Special Operations reforms have strengthened the warfighting readiness of our Armed Forces. They have enhanced civilian control and the chain of command by clearly delineating the combatant commanders' responsibilities and authorities and the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These reforms have also vastly improved cooperation between the services and the combatant commanders in the strategic planning process, in the development of requirements, in joint training and education, and in the execution of military operations.

Do you see the need for modifications of any Goldwater-Nichols Act provisions based on your experience in the Department of Defense?

ANSWER:

The Goldwater-Nichols Act has made a profound and positive change within the operation of the Department of Defense. While I believe that the framework established by Goldwater Nichols has significantly improved inter-service and joint relationships and responsibilities, the Department, working with the Congress, should continually assess the law in light of improving capabilities, evolving threats and changing organizational dynamics.

If so, what areas do you believe might be appropriate to address in these modifications?

ANSWER:

This milestone legislation is now 20 years old and has served our nation well. If confirmed, I would like to consider with the Congress whether the Act should be revised to better address the requirements of the combatant commanders and the needs and challenges faced by the services in today’s security environment. I also would like to assess whether the law could be modified to more effectively allocate roles and responsibilities among the Joint Staff, the Military Departments and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. For example, the Department has encountered questions about the proper division of responsibility between the Army and CENTCOM for investigating allegations of misconduct arising in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is critical that the Department is optimally organized to meet the challenges of a dynamic security environment.
Duties

Section 3015 of title 10, United States Code, states the Under Secretary of the Army shall perform such duties and exercise such powers as the Secretary of the Army may prescribe.

Assuming you are confirmed, what duties and powers do you expect to be assigned?

ANSWER:

The Under Secretary of the Army is the Secretary's senior civilian advisor on the effective and efficient functioning of the Army. The Under Secretary carries out those responsibilities and functions specifically delegated by the Secretary. The Secretary has not discussed his plans with me in this regard. The Under’s responsibilities also require him, from time to time, to issue guidance and direction to the Army Staff.

What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualifies you to perform these duties?

ANSWER:

I believe that my experience -- including serving as a four-term member of the U.S. Congress, representing the Twelfth Congressional District of Texas, in the private sector, and most recently as Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense -- has provided me with the knowledge and insight necessary to contribute in a meaningful way to the Army’s ability to address the challenges it faces today. I served on the House Armed Services Committee during my tenure in the Congress and worked with DoD on a wide range of policy and acquisition matters. My service in the House gave me a profound understanding and appreciation of the important role in national defense matters conferred on the Congress by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution. My work in the private sector has given me experience in the governance of a large organization that I believe will be valuable in discharging the management responsibilities of the Under Secretary of the Army. My work with the DoD, including serving as Acting Secretary of the Air Force, has enhanced my knowledge and understanding of the unique demands on today’s military. Should I be confirmed, I look forward to serving the Nation during this era of change and transformation. If confirmed, I pledge my best effort every day to be worthy of the trust placed in me and to uphold the proud tradition of selfless service that characterizes the United States Army.

Do you believe that there are actions you need to take to enhance your ability to perform the duties of the Under Secretary of the Army?
ANSWER:

If I am confirmed, I will work to further my understanding and knowledge of the Army, its people, the resources necessary to sustain and transform it and the challenges it faces. I will take advantage of the many educational programs available to senior Army officials and draw on the wealth of knowledge and experience available from dedicated professionals, civilian and military, in DoD and throughout the Army family - Active, Guard and Reserve, active and retired. I will seek advice and counsel from the many and diverse stakeholders dedicated to the success of the Army, including Members and staff of the Congress.

Relationships

If confirmed, what would your working relationship be with:

The Secretary of the Army.

ANSWER:

If confirmed, my relationship with the Secretary of the Army would be close, direct, and supportive. Within the Department of the Army, my responsibilities would also involve communicating the Army Staff’s plans to the Secretary of the Army and supervising the implementation of the Secretary’s decisions through the Army. In this capacity, my actions would be subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Army.

The Chief of Staff of the Army.

ANSWER:

The Chief of Staff of the Army is the Secretary’s principal military adviser. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Chief of Staff to supervise the implementation of the Secretary’s decisions through the Army Staff and Army commands and agencies. In this capacity, my actions would be subject to the authority, direction and control of the Secretary of the Army. I anticipate working closely and in concert with the Chief of Staff.

The Assistant Secretaries of the Army.

ANSWER:

The Assistant Secretaries of the Army set the strategic direction by formulating and overseeing policies and programs within their functional areas of responsibilities, consistent with statutes and the objectives of the Secretary of the Army. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain close, professional relationships with each of the Assistant Secretaries and seek to foster an environment of cooperative teamwork as we work together on the day-to-day management and long-range planning needs of the Army.
The General Counsel of the Army.

ANSWER:

The General Counsel is the chief legal officer of the Department of the Army. His duties include providing legal and policy advice to all members of the Army as well as determining the position of the Army on any legal question or procedure. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain a close and professional relationship with the General Counsel.

The Vice Chief of Staff of the Army.

ANSWER:

If confirmed, I will cooperate fully with the Vice Chief of Staff to further the Secretary of the Army’s policies and to advance the interests of the Army. I will establish a close and professional relationship with the Vice Chief of Staff and communicate directly and openly with him on matters involving the Department of the Army.

The Judge Advocate General of the Army.

ANSWER:

The Judge Advocate General plays a significant role in providing legal advice to the Secretary and Under Secretary of the Army and Department of Army officers, particularly concerning matters of military justice. If confirmed, I will establish and maintain an appropriate and professional relationship with The Judge Advocate General of the Army. This relationship would be grounded in direct and open communication. I will seek his counsel on the important legal issues confronting the Army.

Major Challenges

In your view, what are the major challenges that will face the Under Secretary of the Army?

ANSWER:

As the senior civilian advisor to the Secretary, the Under Secretary will work in support of the Secretary in his duties. Conducting a global war against an asymmetric enemy while simultaneously planning and executing broad strategic transformation efforts presents unprecedented challenges. In my view, the Army’s major challenge is to meet the nation’s global land power requirements and sustain its strategic balance while fighting the Global War on Terror, synchronizing transformational initiatives, executing Base Realignment and Closure activities, and implementing the Integrated Global Presence Basing Strategy. Force protection should also be an Army top priority as it faces an evolving enemy. Initiating comprehensive Army-wide business transformation will improve overall efficiency and reorient available
resources better to support the Army’s warfighting capabilities and meet current and future threats. Other major challenges facing the Army are to sustain the All-Volunteer Force and to provide the best possible training and equipment for all of its Soldiers. Force protection in irregular warfare poses challenges that require constant attention from senior leadership. The Army must push to develop the techniques, tactics and procedures to enhance force protection, push research in relevant technology and continue to improve body and vehicle armor.

Assuming you are confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these challenges?

ANSWER:

Providing ready, relevant land power to meet global commitments now and in the future will require resourcing the Army’s requirements for resetting and restructuring the Army to achieve a proper balance of capabilities in all Components. It will be necessary to obtain adequate funding to achieve critical recruiting and retention goals needed to sustain the All Volunteer Force and grow its operational forces. The Army must work relentlessly to improve force protection.

Housing and other Army initiatives to provide predictability and stability for Soldiers and their families in both the Active and Reserve Components are critical to this effort. The Army must develop training to shape military and civilian leaders to lead in the complex and uncertain 21st century security environment. The Army must continue to support efforts that speed state-of-the-art force protection systems and weapons to its Soldiers in the field.

The Army must be funded to execute a synchronized plan to achieve a new global basing posture, implement stationing decisions, execute Base Realignment and Closure decisions, and advance the Modular Force initiative. Adopting management reforms and best business practices are necessary to achieve targeted efficiencies and secure the financial resources needed for operational needs and Army initiatives. Force protection must remain a top priority of the civilian Army leadership with the Secretary and the Under continuing to push the system to make improvements.

Reserve and National Guard Deployments

Deployments completed since the attacks of 9/11 of the Army National Guard and Army Reserve have significantly depleted the number of soldiers available for involuntary mobilization under the Department's policy limiting involuntary recalls of Reserve personnel to 24 cumulative months.

How should the Army's reserve component forces best be managed to provide essential support for operational deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq?
The Army National Guard and the Army reserve are critical to the success of the Nation in fighting and winning the Global War on Terrorism. Given the demand of the Global War on Terror, the use of the Army National Guard and Army reserve will continue to be necessary. To best manage and meet requirements, the Army is instituting the Army Force Generation Model (ARFORGEN), a rotational system to supply Army units to meet the demands of the National Security objectives. This system enables predictable, rotational deployments for Soldiers on a six year cycle for Army National Guard and Reserve units. The Army must also move toward making the reserve components more capable to respond to missions in the homeland and abroad. The Army is committed to fully man, train and equip the Guard units with $21 billion in funding over the POM to address equipment shortfalls. Additionally, the President is committed to funding the National Guard at current manning levels and up to the Congressional authorization of 350,000 as the National Guard continues recruiting. To ensure that the Army and Air National Guard are prepared, the President's budget more than doubles the funding for equipment and modernization over the next five years. If I am confirmed, I would fully support the President and the Department's commitments in this critical area.

What is your understanding of the Army's plans to avoid excessive demands on personnel and units in low density, high demand specialties whose skills are found primarily in the reserve, such as civil affairs, military policy, and logistics?

I understand that the Army plans to rebalance the force and move the Guard toward more high demand skill sets as it transitions six combat brigades into Combat Support, Combat Service Support, and Engineering missions. The Army anticipates that the rebalance will generate more high demand forces to meet requirements. In conjunction with the implementation of the Army Force Generation Model, a larger pool of critical capabilities is available in a predictable manner, providing the necessary trained and ready units to meet requirements.

**Recruiting and Retention**

The Army’s active-duty recruiting goal for FY06 is 80,000. The Army has achieved its monthly recruiting goals so far this fiscal year, but the first quarter has only produced about 11,000 new soldiers. Retention in FY05 exceeded the Army’s goal, but signs in early FY06 have shown some weakening of retention behavior, particularly among soldiers completing their first term of service.

What is your assessment of the Army’s ability to reach its active-duty recruiting goal by component in FY06?
ANSWER:

Although the current recruiting environment remains challenging, the Army is optimistic about achieving Active and Reserve Component goals for Fiscal Year 2006. Mission accomplishment in 06 and follow on years requires greater recruiter productivity, incentives and other resources necessary to meet these goals, effective communication of the Army message to the nation’s youth and influencers, and continued Congressional support. Congressional support was evident in the recent passage of the Fiscal Year 2006 National Defense Authorization Act which provided the crucial foundation for this year’s recruiting efforts. The Active component has achieved its recruiting goals for the last 8 months, the Guard the last 5 months, with only the Army Reserve component falling short of its goals.

If the Army is able to achieve its recruiting goal of 80,000 recruits, will the Army meet its authorized end strength for FY06 of 512,400 soldiers?

What are the FY07 recruiting goals by component?

ANSWER:

I have been informed that the Army’s projected active duty end strength for Fiscal Year 2006 is 500,334 Soldiers. As of the end of January 2006, counting active army, mobilized guard and reserve, active duty special work, and retiree recalls, the Army strength was approximately 574,000 Soldiers. The Army’s current recruiting goals for Fiscal Year 2007 are: 80,000 for the Regular Army; 36,500 for the U.S. Army Reserve; and 70,000 for the Army National Guard.

What is your assessment of the impact of multiple deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq having on retention, particularly among young enlisted and officer personnel after their initial obligated service has been completed?

ANSWER:

The Army has not seen a negative impact on the retention of enlisted Soldiers who have served in deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. It is my understanding that the 3rd Infantry Division recently returned from its second deployment to Iraq and achieved 166% of their year-to-date initial term retention mission. The 4th Infantry Division and 101st Airborne Division are currently on their second deployment to Iraq and have accomplished 114% and 109% of their year-to-date initial term retention mission, respectively. As of 31 Jan 06, the Army has achieved 109% of its year-to-date initial term retention mission and 107% of its overall year-to-date retention mission. Recent results are satisfactory, but this matter requires constant attention. It is a barometer of the health of the Army and must be watched, analyzed in whole and in subsets, and understood.

Women in Combat

Section 541 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 requires the Secretary of Defense to report to Congress not later than March 31, 2006, on
his review of the current and future implementation of the policy regarding assignment of women in combat. In conducting the review, the Secretary of Defense must examine Army unit modularization efforts and associated personnel assignment policies to ensure their compliance with the Department of Defense policy on women in combat that has been in effect since 1994.

What lessons have been learned about the feasibility of current policies regarding women in combat from Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom.

ANSWER:

The Department no longer confronts the prospects of a Cold War linear battlefield. The irregular warfare and nonlinear battlefield of today’s conflicts raises questions about the application of the policy regarding the assignment of women in combat regions. Women make up about 14% of the Active Army, 23% of the Army Reserve, and 13% of the Army National Guard. Approximately 10% of the forces deployed in support of the Global War on Terrorism are women Soldiers. Today, almost 14,000 women Soldiers are serving in Iraq and Afghanistan. Forty-seven women Soldiers have made the ultimate sacrifice in support of the Global War on Terrorism. Women Soldiers have been killed in action, have suffered wounds from hostile action, and have been held captive by our enemies. The study requested by Congress and underway at DOD will help the Department understand the implications for and feasibility of current policies regarding women in combat.

How do you anticipate you will participate in the review of the policy required by section 541?

ANSWER:

The Office of the Secretary of Defense has undertaken to complete the comprehensive review requested by this Committee and Congress. The Army will support OSD to complete this review. This issue poses complex and critical issues for the Department. If confirmed, I will look to the Secretary for guidance with regard to any role he asks me to undertake in this matter. It is an important study and will inform Department and Congressional review of this critical matter. The Army and the Congress must work together closely if this matter is to be addressed properly.

Missile Defense

In December 2002, President Bush announced the deployment of an initial set of missile defense capabilities, including ground-based interceptors, sea-based interceptors, and additional Patriot PAC-3 units.

In your view, is the Army fielding Patriot PAC-3 missiles in sufficient numbers to meet the threat posed by short range ballistic missiles?
ANSWER:

I do not have sufficient background in this highly technical area to offer an informed opinion on this matter. The Army has advised me that the Combined Acquisition Program strategy has allocated sufficient numbers of PAC-3 missiles to defeat the short range ballistic missile threat. If confirmed, I will study this further.

**Do you support continued development of the multi-national Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) as a follow-on to the Patriot system, and what is the Army’s time frame for fielding of this important capability?**

ANSWER:

I do not have sufficient background in this highly technical area to offer an informed opinion on this program. From the information I have received thus far, the direction the Department has taken in the development of the Medium Extended Air Defense System appears reasonable. On July 1, 2004, the Defense Acquisition Board approved Milestone B for all three increments of the PATRIOT/MEADS Combined Aggregate Program with a MEADS First Unit Equipped date by Fiscal Year 2015. If confirmed, I will study this further.

**What is your understanding of when the Department plans to authorize the transfer of the ground-based midcourse defense (GMD) system from the Missile Defense Agency to the Army?**

ANSWER:

I understand that the transfer of the GMD System will be governed by the BMDS Transfer Plan that currently is in staffing between the Missile Defense Agency and the Military Departments. Transfer will be based on technical maturity and demonstrated military utility.

**Do you believe the fielding of ground-based interceptors, which began in 2004, is keeping pace with the long-range ballistic missile threat to the United States?**

ANSWER:

I do not have sufficient background in this matter to offer an informed opinion. I have been advised by the Army that the pace of missile fielding is consistent with intended defensive capability. If confirmed, I will look into this further.

**The Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC) has been developing laser concepts for application on the battlefield. What are the Army’s plans with respect to fielding laser weapons capable of defending against rockets and tactical missiles?**
ANSWER:

The SMDC Solid-State Laser (SSL) Science and Technology (S&T) program goal is to develop a SSL demonstrator of at least 100 kW by 2013. The Army intent is to begin the weapon system development process to employ this rapidly emerging SSL technology as soon as it reaches the required maturity level. The Army's current weapon system development goal for fielding a Multi-mission Directed Energy Weapon System (MDEWS) interim capability is 2014, and to attain the MDEWS objective weapon system capability by 2020. These future weapon systems are envisioned to counter the rocket/artillery/mortar (RAM), MANPADS, and other tactical missile threats.

TRICARE Fee Increases for Military Retirees

Press reports indicate that the Department of Defense will recommend significant increases in TRICARE costs for certain beneficiaries, including higher enrollment fees for military retirees and their families.

What is your understanding of the Department's proposals for changes in TRICARE fees for retired soldiers, and, if they are implemented, what do you see as the likely impact of these changes on the Department of the Army?

ANSWER:

I understand that the President’s Budget is proposing a new fee structure for retirees under 65 that will increase enrollment fees for TRICARE Prime, and assess new enrollment fees and increased deductibles for Standard coverage. I understand that the proposed rebalancing of cost contributions is intended to slow the rate of increase in healthcare costs and compensate for the increases in covered benefits. Currently, 8% of the total DoD budget is spent on healthcare, with a projection of 12% in 2015. This proposal will have no impact on active duty personnel and minimal to no impact on TRICARE for Life beneficiaries.

What is your personal view of the justification for increases in TRICARE enrollment fees for retirees and are there alternatives to such increases you would recommend if confirmed?

ANSWER:

The DoD faces the problem of escalating health care costs shared by everyone in the United States. I do not understand all the implications of the proposal, but the provision in the President’s budget appears to me to be a reasonable approach to an undeniable problem. This year’s budget and authorization process will not be the final word on this matter. If confirmed, I would work with DoD officials and the Congress, learn from the experience in the private sector and other governmental entities, and seek creative solutions to this challenge. There are few issues more difficult to address, both substantively and politically. In my opinion, the
Department of Defense must partner with the Congress and tackle this problem. The path we are on is unaffordable in the long run.

**Sexual Assault Prevention and Response**

The Department of the Army is in the process of implementing changes in policy and procedures aimed at preventing and responding appropriately to incidents of sexual assault.

What is your view of the appropriate role for senior military and civilian leaders in the Department of the Army in overseeing the effectiveness of implementation of new policies relating to sexual assault?

ANSWER:

The Army has initiated the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program. Support for this program must come from the top and address both the subtle and blatant factors that contribute to the persistence of this problem. Senior leaders in the Department must communicate by word and deed a zero tolerance policy of sexual harassment and must become personally involved in sexual assault prevention programs if they are to succeed in attacking this problem. Sexual assault is a national problem and the most under-reported crime in America. The military should provide a model for the nation in addressing this issue. While at the Air Force, I worked on this issue and, if confirmed, would consider it a high priority. If confirmed, I will work with the Army leadership to ensure that Army leaders at all levels understand their responsibility to support fully the implementation of this critical program.

What is your view of the confidential reporting options made available to victims of sexual assault as part of the revised policy?

ANSWER:

I support affording victims of sexual assault the confidential reporting options to ensure first and foremost that victims receive the help and care they need as quickly as possible.

**United States Military Academy**

Complaints of sexual assault and harassment at the U. S. Air Force Academy in 2003 demonstrated, among other things, the importance of focused, informed oversight by service civilian and military senior leaders of conditions for female cadets and midshipmen. The Service Academy 2005 Sexual Harassment and Assault Survey completed by the Defense Manpower Data Center in December 2005 found that even with the implementation of corrective measures, sexual assault and harassment continue to be factors negatively affecting female cadets at the military academies and that the highest reported rates by cadets came from the U. S. Military Academy.
What actions would you expect to take, if confirmed, to address the problems of sexual assault and sexual harassment at the U. S. Military Academy and with respect to the Army’s programs in this regard?

ANSWER:

Senior Army leaders must communicate clearly and consistently that sexual harassment will not be tolerated and ensure that leaders at the U. S. Military Academy understand the gravity of this matter. If confirmed, I will work to ensure that the Superintendent of the U. S. Military Academy has the resources and support necessary to advance the Army’s commitment to attacking this problem. The Academy must improve support for victims, together with preventive education and awareness efforts. The Academy must continue to evaluate and shape its culture to create an environment in which the cadets understand that sexual harassment is antithetical to everything the Army stands for and will not be tolerated. If confirmed, I will support the Academy’s progress toward these goals.

National Security Personnel System (NSPS)


What is your assessment of the high priority skill needs within the Army's civilian workforce, and, if confirmed, how would you anticipate employing the new authorities of NSPS to achieve a more effective civilian workforce?

ANSWER:

NSPS is a key pillar in the Department of Defense’s transformation plans and is essential to creating an environment in which the Total Force (military personnel, civilian employees, and contractors) thinks and operates as one cohesive unit. While retaining the core values of the civil service and merit principles, NSPS allows employees to be paid and rewarded based on performance, innovation, and results. Army civilians must complement and support the military around the world in every time zone, every day. If confirmed, I will seek to leverage authorities within NSPS to promote a performance culture in which the performance and contributions of the civilian workforce are more fully recognized and rewarded. NSPS will allow the Army to be more competitive in setting salaries and afford it the ability to adjust salaries based on various factors, including labor market conditions, performance, and changes in duties. The Army will use the flexibilities provided in NSPS to attract and retain skilled, talented, and motivated people. NSPS will provide greater opportunities for Army civilians by easing the administrative burden routinely required by the current system and providing incentives for managers to turn to them first to accomplish certain vital tasks. This will free Army Soldiers to focus on matters unique to the military.
With respect to the Army's Senior Executive Service, what recommendations, if any, do you have to improve professional development and overall management of the Army's senior civilian executives?

ANSWER:

I understand that the Army recently centralized the day-to-day management of its senior executives into a new office that reports directly to the Secretary of the Army. This new organization contains a separate branch dedicated exclusively to the on-going professional development of its civilian executives. It is the Army’s intent to develop these executives in a manner similar to that in which they have historically developed their General Officers. This includes implementing a systematic and progressive assignment pattern leading to positions of greater responsibility. Such a program also includes periodic educational experiences to complement such an assignment plan.

Support for Army Families in the Rebasing Initiative

Plans for the relocation of numerous Army units under the Department's rebasing initiative will present significant challenges to CONUS installations and their surrounding local communities in order to ensure adequate resources, including housing and schools, are made available.

What is your understanding of the steps being taken by the Army to ensure the successful implementation of rebasing for both soldiers and receiving communities?

ANSWER:

Full and open communication between military officials and state and community leaders is the key to successfully implementing rebasing for soldiers. At locations impacted by rebasing, installation and garrison commanders must work closely with state officials, mayors, city managers, county commissioners and school officials to ensure that adequate schools, housing, and child care services are being planned to support an increased military population. The Army must form an effective partnership with all stakeholders to make this a success for Soldiers and their families.

What actions will you take, if confirmed, to ensure that the challenges associated with rebasing are met?

ANSWER:

I do not know what my responsibilities would be in this area if I am confirmed. Realizing that rebasing must be resourced and executed over time, the Army has developed a detailed plan that prioritizes the movement and relocation of operational units, schools and headquarters. It is necessary that senior Army leadership work with Congress to ensure that the rebasing initiatives
are adequately funded and supported. I believe that my experience in working in the political arena could be valuable in this effort.

Interservice Transfers

At the same time that the Army and Marine Corps are working harder than ever to achieve recruiting goals, the Navy and the Air Force are planning for significant reductions in military personnel. Under section 641 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, an inter-service bonus for transfer of $2500 was authorized. Additional incentives may be necessary, however, to encourage "blue to green" transfers in order to retain sailors and airmen with valuable military training, skills, and experience.

What is your assessment of the adequacy of existing incentives for inter-service transfers?

ANSWER:

This program has not achieved its goals so far and should be re-evaluated to determine what it will take to make it a success. It is in our national defense interest to promote inter-service transfers. The Services must work together to make this program a success. Financial incentives alone may not be sufficient to make it succeed. Force shaping tools should be designed to support the effort. This size of the bonus should be reconsidered as, after taxes, it essentially covers only the cost of new uniforms and other expenses related to the transfer. If confirmed, subject to the direction of the Secretary, I will work with Department leadership and the Congress to identify and establish programs to attract quality personnel from the other services.

If confirmed, and given your experience as Acting Secretary of the Air Force, what steps would you take to enhance the number of "blue to green" inter-service transfers?

ANSWER:

The program has not worked up to expectations so far. I believe the Army needs additional research to better understand the program’s shortcomings and the lack of attractiveness of the inter-service transfer option. My experience at the Air Force leads me to believe that there are issues that must be better understood if the program is to succeed and that will not be addressed solely by financial incentives.

Quadrennial Defense Review

The 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) is the first major review of defense strategy, policies, and force structure since the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Do you think the review adequately positions the Army to face the future threats to our national security?

ANSWER:

The 2006 QDR provides a sound strategic game plan to guide the Army in meeting the challenges it faces in today’s national security environment. The 2006 QDR also recognizes the unique needs of the long global war in which the Army is engaged, including the need to rebalance active and reserve capabilities, expand capacity of both multipurpose and special operations forces, and transform the Army reserves from the strategic reserve of the Cold War era to an operational force trained and equipped to meet current and future challenges. To ensure Army forces are prepared for anticipated challenges, the QDR endorses robust and continuous modernization, including accelerating the spin-outs of advanced capabilities from its Future Combat Systems into the Army modular force.

Aside from validating the ongoing Army transformation to modularity, are there other structural changes you would suggest resulting from the QDR review?

ANSWER:

Structurally, I think the Army's organizational transformation is sound, including fully manning, equipping and training its reserves as an operational force.

Do you see the Army’s roles and missions transforming along with the move to modularity?

ANSWER:

The Army's roles and missions continue to expand. In large measure, the Nation's ground forces – multipurpose and special operations, Army and Marine Corps, active and reserve – are the principal deterrence force for the challenges the Army will face in the early decades of the 21st Century. The roles and missions of the reserve component is a priority of the Guard and Reserve Commission established by Congress. Future planning for the Reserve component can be enhanced by the Commission’s findings.

What are your views regarding the QDR recommendation to increase the role of the combatant commanders in the budget and acquisition process?

ANSWER:

It is my opinion that the budget and acquisition process would benefit from better input from the Combatant Commands in identifying operational needs that influence Departmental priorities; however, the Department must be careful to properly balance short term and long term needs. Near term needs must not be allowed to crowd out necessary long term
investments. Military Departments must continue to serve as the developers, integrators, and providers of decisive and interdependent joint capabilities, supporting the needs and priorities of the Combatant Commands.

**Army Force Structure and End Strength**

The Army, pursuant to the 2005 QDR, has modified its plan to increase the number of combat brigades in the active and reserve components. The Army will increase the active component force structure to 42 combat brigades and will increase the Army National Guard force structure to 28 combat brigades. This action represents a reduction from previous planning of one active component combat brigade and six Army National Guard Brigades.

What are your views regarding the QDR recommendation to reduce the number of Army and Army National Guard combat brigades?

**ANSWER:**

As a result of detailed analysis and the application of the professional judgment of senior leaders across the Department in the context of the 2006 QDR, the Army will continue to expand the capabilities and capacity of Army forces to meet the demands of the National Defense Strategy. The Army is growing capacity and building readily available combat and support forces that are fully manned, equipped, and trained. The rebalanced force will be more relevant and ready for the needs at home and abroad, today and tomorrow. The decision to change the planned 43rd active component brigade to Special Forces is a reasonable response to the challenges facing our nation. The Army’s plan to fully man, train and equip the Guard will provide enhanced CONUS and OCONUS capability in the Reserve component. The transition of 6 combat brigades to Engineering, Combat Service and Combat Service Support will provide resources better suited to the homeland and the national defense needs of our nation.

Do you believe that the QDR has sufficiently taken into consideration the Army National Guard’s state mission, especially homeland security and disaster relief?

**ANSWER:**

Yes, the rebalanced force will significantly increase the forces and capabilities readily available for State missions, and will provide a broader set of capabilities of increased applicability to homeland security and disaster relief operations. The Army is committed to ending the "haves and have nots" paradigm of the past. The ongoing transformation is creating, in all components, combat and support forces that are fully manned, equipped and trained, posturing its reserves as a ready and relevant operational force.

The Army has asserted that 43 active component combat brigades and the 34 Army National Guard combat brigades would ensure the Army could maintain a 17 brigade force deployed with active component brigades having two years between
rotations and the Army National Guard combat brigades having 5 years between rotations.

How will fewer combat brigades impact on the anticipated “dwell” time in the U.S. between rotations?

ANSWER:

The current projected force pool will sustain operational commitments over the long term without compromising the “dwell” time goals of 6:1 and 3:1. The Army Force Generation model (ARFORGEN) was developed to support sustained operations, as well as additional contingencies, and to help manage unit rotations. ARFORGEN will help reduce stress on the force by using a reset-train-deploy cycle that allows units to anticipate deployment timelines.

Despite the continuing pace of operational deployments, the Army does not intend to seek permanent increases to its active-duty end strength as part of its overall plan to increase the number of combat brigades that can be operationally deployed.

What is your view of the active-duty end strength necessary to support worldwide Army operational deployments, including Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom?

ANSWER:

It appears to me that there is general agreement on the need to increase the size of the pool of soldiers available for world-wide deployments. Some experts advocate a permanent strength increase. The Army leadership has developed a plan to accomplish this goal with a temporary increase in end strength and transformation of all three components of the Army to increase the number of high demand soldiers and assets. Included in this plan is the increase in the size of the Operational Force from 315,000 to 355,000 and reduction of the size of the Institutional Force. The plan appears sound to me. It will require careful execution and sustained support and funding to be successful. The Army has been evaluating force requirements within the End Strength Plan outlined by the Secretary of the Army in August 2005. Under the Secretary’s End Strength Plan, the Army is building an expeditionary, campaign quality force, capable of meeting a broad and complex array of challenges, while ensuring its forces remain the preeminent land power and ultimate instrument of national resolve. Key to this plan is the President’s approval of the 30,000 temporary end strength increase above the 482,400 program that allows the operational force to undergo transformation while at the same time deploying to meet force commitments. The effort has focused on the completion of modular transformation, aligning the force to QDR and BRAC, incorporating institutional force restructuring, to include business practice initiatives, addressing risk in combat support and combat service support structures and continuing the refinement of Active Army and Reserve Component balance. The Active Army will revert to a 482,400 force in the later years of the POM.
What is your assessment of the impact on individual state National Guard mission capability of the proposed cut in the Army National Guard force structure and end strength by 17,000 soldiers?

ANSWER:

The Army leadership has committed to the Congress to fund the National Guard at its actual troop strength level. This commitment was confirmed by the President Bush in his remarks on February 9. The Army will fund to whatever that level the Guard is able to recruit, up to the statutory limit of 350,000. The Army’s plan to train and equip all National Guard brigades and invest $21 billion over the FYDP will enhance the ability of the National Guard to respond to state and national defense missions. This will also enhance mission capabilities and provide skills better suited to mission requirements. The plan builds up to 28 BCTs and retains 78 supporting brigades, for a total of 106. Importantly, this includes the transition of 6 Guard combat brigades to support and engineering brigades, increasing the number of currently high demand low density assets and personnel. The National Guard plays a central role in Homeland Security, while simultaneously supporting operational deployments. The Army could not perform full-spectrum operations without the contributions of the Army Guard and Army Reserve. For example, last year the Army National Guard had ten BCTs and a Division Headquarters serving in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans for at least a portion of the year. Despite that overseas commitment, the National Guard was still capable of responding with 42,000 Soldiers in seven days to support Hurricane Katrina relief operations, with tens of thousands more National Guard and Army Reserve Soldiers available as needed. The Army is committed to balancing its capabilities within and across the Active, Guard and Reserve components. The work that the Army is doing will increase the quality and effectiveness of its fighting force and create a more capable force across all components. The Army is also increasing its capacity to ensure that the right capabilities are available to support current global operations, prevail in the war on terrorism, and respond to expanded homeland defense requirements by broadening the options available to civil authorities. This effort is essential to having the kinds of current and future capabilities and forces needed across the Army for sustaining the war-fight and support to civil authorities.

Based on the current demands on the Army Reserve and existing policies pertaining to involuntary mobilization, what is your view of the justification of proposed cuts in the Army Reserve force structure and end strength from 205,000 to about 188,000?

ANSWER:

The Army is working to balance force capabilities within and across the Active, Guard and Reserve to develop a total force with greater capabilities and greater accessibility. This rebalancing is designed to create a larger operational Army and should improve readiness and reduce the impact on Reserve Component structure. It is my understanding that the Army is budgeted to go to a 200,000 end strength, and that the Army Reserve will retain 58 supporting brigades.
Based on the current demands on the Army National Guard and existing policies pertaining to involuntary mobilization, what is your view of the justification of proposed cuts in the Army National Guard force structure and end strength from 350,000 to 333,000?

ANSWER:

President Bush and the Army leadership have made the commitment to fund the ARNG to the level it can recruit - up to its Congressionally mandated end strength of 350,000. Within this end strength, the ARNG will retain 28 combat BCTs and 78 supporting brigades.

What is your opinion about the plan to reduce the total number of active and reserve brigade combat teams from a total of 77 to 70? Will this provide an adequate basis for the frequency of rotations planned while still ensuring adequate assurance for successful recruiting, retention, and training?

ANSWER:

The Army is restructuring to form a rotational pool of 70 BCTs and 211 supporting brigades of various types among the three components. This effort will increase the quality and effectiveness of the fighting force and create a more capable force across all components. This work also increases Army capacity to ensure that the right capabilities are available to support current global operations, prevail in the war on terrorism, and respond to expanded homeland defense requirements by broadening the options available to civil authorities.

What is your understanding of the overall number of personnel the Army seeks to move from the "institutional Army" to the operational Army and how many soldier billets have already been moved?

ANSWER:

The Military/Civilian conversion plan is a key component of the overall Army End Strength Plan. The Army plan optimizes the Operational Force, that portion of the Army that deploys to meet world-wide requirements, at 355,000, a growth of nearly 40,000 spaces over the Fiscal Year 2004 total. A two phase approach to reduce the Institutional Army through Military to Civilian Conversion is being executed. The Phase I (FY05-09) plan to convert 13,000 Military positions to civilian fills are currently underway. Phase II (FY08-11) proposes to convert an additional 14,000 Military to Civilian positions and is under review by Major Commands. Through FY06 the Army will have converted 9,644 active Military positions to civilian positions.

What are the means the Army plans to use to accomplish these moves?
ANSWER:

I am advised that the Army intends to accomplish this with military to civilian conversion, business process changes, and divestiture of functions.

How does the Army propose to accomplish the functions the military billets being transferred were intended to perform?

ANSWER:

I am advised that the Army intends to accomplish this with military to civilian conversion, business process changes, and divestiture of functions.

**Quadrennial Defense Review "Execution Roadmaps"**

The Department has announced that it will initiate eight follow-on assessments, or "2005 QDR Execution Roadmaps," following completion of the QDR with the objective of continuing to examine a wide range of key issues, including such topics as DOD Institutional Reform and Governance, Irregular Warfare, Joint Command and Control, and Strategic Communications. You have been designated to lead an assessment of "Authorities," i.e., the need for legislative and regulatory change to ensure operational effectiveness in the face of new threats.

What do you consider to be the most significant recommendations of the QDR relating to necessary changes in existing law and regulations?

and

What legislative and regulatory areas, in general, do you anticipate your group will explore?

ANSWER:

The tasking of the Authorities group is to seek inter-agency and Congressional approval of the legislative proposals endorsed by the QDR. The senior leadership of the Department endorsed the proposals as key to advancing the goals of the QDR. The initiatives are top legislative priorities of the Department. The group is not tasked to consider or develop additional initiatives. The proposals are:

**Building Partner Capacity**

- Creation of Presidential Security Investment Fund
- Exception to Legislative Restrictions on IMET
- Expansion of COCOM’s Initiative Fund
- Extension of CERP-Plus Authority to Every SSTR Operation
Increase of Funding Cap on Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Program
Homeland Defense

- Expansion of WMD-CST Operations Across US/Canada/Mexico Borders

Human Capital Strategy

- Creation of Operational Reserve Force (15% SELRES)
- Expansion of Presidential Reserve Call-Up from 270 to 365 days
- Expansion of Presidential Reserve Call-Up to include response to natural disaster
- Creation of Force Shaping Options for USAF and USN

Medical Transformation

- Expansion of bonuses for Pre-Trained Specialists’ Recruitment
- Increase Unspecified Minor MILCON and O&M Construction
- Healthcare Rates

Based on your experience in both the legislative branch and in the Department of Defense, what areas are in need of change?

ANSWER:

The Department would be well served by more interagency collaboration, and early and continuous consultation between DoD and our Nation's Congress. Congress should consider expanding both the Defense and State Departments' authorities to train and equip foreign security forces. The Department should institutionalize authorities from Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FREEDOM to conduct humanitarian assistance and stability operations. Additionally, increasing opportunities similar to International Military Education and Training (IMET) can assist in shaping relations and developing future partners.

Acquisition Program Reform

At an Air Force Association conference in Washington, DC, in September 2005, you outlined what you viewed as the "root causes of poor program execution" within the Air Force. You indicated that these included: unstable and expanding requirements; a lack of test community buy-in; inadequate systems engineering; unstable and unpredictable funding levels; and faulty cost estimates for new weapon systems."
Do you believe that these conditions are problems for the Department of the Army?

**ANSWER:**

Yes, all of the Services face these challenges. Stability of programs is essential to delivering needed capability to the warfighter in a timely manner. This includes the requirements process, the budgeting and funding process, and testing -- as well as what the Department thinks of as “traditional acquisition.” Without the stability and integration of these aspects, root causes of poor program execution will not be adequately addressed.

If confirmed, what role, if any, would you expect to play in the oversight of the Army's acquisition programs?

**ANSWER:**

The Secretary has not informed me of his plans for my role in the acquisition process. Reform of major acquisition programs is a priority in the Secretary of the Army's Business Transformation Initiatives. His goal is to streamline or eliminate redundant operations to free financial and human resources to redirect to core warfighting missions. If confirmed, I would enthusiastically support the Secretary’s initiative.

**Detainees**

If confirmed, what do you see as your role, if any, with respect to issues pertaining to detainees?

**ANSWER:**

The Secretary has not told me of his plans for my involvement in detainee matters. The Army is the DoD Executive Agent for administering detainee operations policy. The Secretary of the Army should continue to coordinate with OSD, the Combatant Commands and Joint Staff, and with other Services to broaden its capability to source and sustain short-term and long-term detainee operations in support of the Global War on Terrorism. I have worked in this area since May, 2004. I believe I could offer relevant experience in this area if asked to by the Secretary.

In addition to corrective actions taken by the Army to correct detention and interrogation policies, what are the leadership lessons the Army learned from incidents involving abuse of detainees, and, in your view, how should these lessons be incorporated into the professional military education of Army officers?

**ANSWER:**

In post 9/11 operations, the Department of Defense experienced a paradigm shift in detainee operations from the Cold War model -- in which DoD detained a disciplined, uniformed Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) population -- to the current environment in which DoD detains a
complex set of enemy combatants, characterized by high-risk insurgents and terrorists. The Department is adapting to meet these challenges. The Army should continue to leverage the lessons learned in over a dozen strategic detainee assessment and investigative reports. Army leaders must ensure that the Army completes and effectively implements the programmed adjustments to its current doctrine, organizations, training, leadership and education. These adjustments will better enable Army leaders to anticipate, plan, prepare, and execute detainee and detainee interrogation operations.

**Domestic Surveillance**

Policies relating to domestic surveillance currently are a matter of intense interest currently as a result of Presidential directives to the National Security Agency following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The activities of Army intelligence components which affect United States persons are governed by Executive Order 12333, DoD Directive 5240-1 (DOD Intelligence Activities), and Army Regulation 381-10 (U.S. Army Intelligence Activities).

What is your understanding of how the Department of the Army oversees the implementation of its intelligence oversight program?

**ANSWER:**

The Army employs a number of mechanisms to ensure effective oversight of intelligence activities at all levels of staff and command. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 is responsible for formulating the Army's Intelligence Oversight policy and maintaining its currency and compliance with the laws of the United States. Army policy on intelligence oversight requires that intelligence oversight officers be appointed in all Army organizations with an intelligence mission. The Army General Counsel exercises oversight of Army intelligence activities on behalf of the Secretary of the Army, especially as pertains to the legality and propriety of such. The Inspector General (TIG) of the Army has a cadre of personnel with intelligence expertise who conduct inspections worldwide of Army intelligence organizations for the purpose of ensuring compliance with intelligence oversight directives. The TIG is also responsible for receiving and coordinating reports of questionable intelligence activity in the Army. The Army has mandated annual training on intelligence oversight in all intelligence organizations. The Commander, Intelligence and Security Command, employs staff legal officers at all levels of command to oversee intelligence operation, ensuring legality and propriety.

How does the civilian leadership of the Department maintain effective oversight to ensure compliance?

**ANSWER:**

The principal mechanism for ensuring compliance with intelligence oversight policy in the Army is the intelligence chain of command, which maintains oversight of intelligence activities through the use of intelligence oversight and staff legal officers embedded in their
organizations. In addition, all intelligence personnel, supervisors, and commanders in the Army are required to be familiar with Army policies and to ensure that their intelligence activities are compliant. The Deputy Chief of Staff, G-2 exercises oversight through his staff, which is responsible for ensuring that he is knowledgeable of significant intelligence activities in the Army. Additionally, the Department of the Army Inspector General conducts periodic inspections of intelligence unit oversight programs and processes.

Military Role in Domestic Emergencies

The shortfalls in the emergency response to Hurricane Katrina along the Gulf Coast have resulted in debate about the appropriate role of the Department of Defense and the Armed Forces in responding to domestic emergencies.

In your view, should the Army have a more expansive role in responding to natural disasters?

ANSWER:

The Administration and the Congress are engaged in a comprehensive review of our nation’s preparedness for domestic disasters in the light of the Katrina response. Until that review is complete, I want to reserve judgment on the question of an expanded Army role. As far as Army capability, the Army plan to invest $21B over five years in the Guard and transitioning 6 Guard combat brigades to Engineering, Combat Service and Combat Service Support will enhance the Guard’s ability to respond to domestic incidents. The Department of Defense’s primary missions are to protect the United States, prevent conflict and surprise attacks, and prevail in war.

What is your assessment of the Army National Guard’s ability to meet its state contingency and homeland defense missions, given its operational commitments overseas, current equipment shortfalls, and proposed reductions in force structure and budget?

ANSWER:

The Army National Guard has proven itself capable of meeting its homeland defense mission while providing vital support to international operations, even with the heavy demands placed on it following Hurricane Katrina last year. The Guard has been stretched in responding to the demands placed upon it since 9-11, but it has met all of the challenges it has been asked to undertake. As the President recently acknowledged, “Across the world and on every front, the men and women of the Guard are serving with courage and determination, and they're bringing us to victory in the global war on terror.” The Army's 5-year plan will further enhance the Guard's ability to meet domestic and international obligations. The Army plans to fully man, train and equip all Guard units and invest $21 Billion in equipping the Guard over the next five years. By converting 6 combat brigades to Engineering, Combat Support and Combat Service Support, and increasing the availability of high demand assets and skills, the Guard's ability to
respond to domestic and international contingencies will be strengthened. The plan to institute a 1 out of 6-year deployment maximum will provide predictability and stability for members of the Guard, their families and their employers. I am confident that the Army's plan for the Guard will improve its ability and continue its record of service so vital to security of the country and peace in the world.

**Aerial Common Sensor**

On 2 August 2004, the U.S. Army awarded a $879 million system design and development contract for the Aerial Common Sensor (ACS). ACS was intended to serve as the next-generation airborne intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and target identification system. Furthermore, ACS was designed to replace current aircraft including, the Army’s Guardrail Common Sensor, the Airborne Reconnaissance Low aircraft, and the Navy’s fleet of E-P3 aircraft. The ACS program was terminated on 12 January 2006.

What is your assessment of the Army’s ability to meet the near-term signals intelligence needs given a current shortage of Guardrail Common Sensor systems?

ANSWER:

The Guardrail Common Sensor fleet has been in heavy demand since 9/11, providing the tactical maneuver commander with actionable signals intelligence in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The fleet will remain in high demand for the foreseeable future. I understand that the Army is modernizing the system’s core capabilities, based on feedback from commanders, better to support the warfighter. Additionally, the Army is modernizing the Airborne Reconnaissance-Low fleet with a modern signals intelligence payload to help prosecute high priority targets in Iraq and relieve demands on the Guardrail fleet.

In your opinion should the Army, and its initial ACS partner, the Navy, continue to collaborate to find a joint service solution to meet the needs of the ISR gap particularly since some Navy EP-3s have already reached retirement age?

ANSWER:

I do not have the knowledge to offer an informed opinion on the value of continued collaboration. I understand that the Army and Navy are in the process of completing the Joint ISR study that was directed by OSD as a result of the ACS contract termination. The study, which will be completed sometime this summer, will help inform the Services’ discussions on the best path forward regarding ACS.
Support for Wounded Soldiers

Wounded soldiers from Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom deserve the highest priority from the Army for support services, healing and recuperation, rehabilitation, evaluation for return to duty, successful transition from active duty if required, and continuing support beyond retirement or discharge.

What is your assessment of the effectiveness of Army programs now in place to care for the wounded, including the Wounded Warrior Program, and programs for soldiers in a medical hold status?

ANSWER:

The U.S. Army Wounded Warrior Program (AW2) is an outstanding program and has been effective, but the Army must always strive to improve services in this critical area. This outreach-driven program provides severely-wounded Soldiers and their families with a system of advocacy and personal support from the time of initial casualty notification to return to military service or to the civilian sector. If confirmed, I will be committed to ensuring that injured Soldiers receive the best care possible and receive support to address their needs and issues throughout the recovery process and beyond. I will continually assess the effectiveness of this program and would like to work with Congress and the private sector to develop innovative programs tailored to the long-term needs of our severely wounded Soldiers.

How does the Army provide follow-on assistance to wounded personnel who have separated from active service? How effective are those programs?

ANSWER:

I understand that AW2 Soldier Family Management Specialists initiate and maintain contact with Veterans Affairs (VA) personnel providing VA services to Soldiers while they are on Active Duty and through their transition to veteran status. The AW2 and the VA have forged a strong relationship to provide comprehensive assistance to wounded Army personnel. The Army assigns a VA Liaison in the VA Seamless Transition Office to allow the AW2 to ensure wounded Soldiers receive optimal and timely services and to close potential gaps that may arise in the transition process. Based on the information I have received thus far, the Army is doing a good job in providing necessary follow on assistance to wounded personnel; however, as stated above, I would like to see DoD (all Services), VA and Congress continue to explore innovative approaches to this challenge.

If confirmed, are there additional strategies and resources that you would pursue to increase the Army's support for wounded soldiers, and to monitor their progress in returning to civilian life?
ANSWER:

If confirmed, I would work with Department leaders, Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) and the Congress to continue to seek innovative approaches to this critical challenge. To properly monitor progress of its wounded Soldiers, the Army must continue to develop and implement a decision support and Soldier tracking system. The Department must also continue strategies that will result in health care advances and promote rehabilitation research for its severely injured Soldiers with traumatic injuries. Private industry should be engaged in pursuing strategies for expanded employment opportunities.

Joint Acquisition Programs

What are your views regarding joint acquisition programs, such as the Joint Tactical Radio System and the Joint Strike Fighter?

ANSWER:

There are great efficiencies to be gained by joint programs as opposed to individual Service procurements. Joint programs have the advantages of: economies of scale, reduction in Service spares inventories, and Service sharing of training costs. However, the critical start-point for a joint program is a "joint" requirement. Without a solid joint requirement, it is doubtful that a joint acquisition program will be cost effective.

The JTRS program has been plagued with problems. The management of the program was not established with a clearly defined chain of command and decision making mechanism. The Army, as executive agent, attempted to manage the JTRS program, but different Service desires, lack of discipline in requirements growth, and the complexity of the program, hampered those efforts. Earlier this year, the Department changed the management structure by establishing a Joint Program Executive Office with the requisite authority to manage the program. I believe this to have been a positive change that will accelerate the development and fielding of the JTRS program.

Do you see utility in encouraging the services to conduct more joint development, especially in the area of helicopters and unmanned systems?

ANSWER:

Yes, I believe a joint development approach has utility for helicopters and unmanned systems and for all types of systems used by multiple Services. A successful joint program demands that the Services develop a well defined joint requirement as a starting point and vigilant oversight and discipline thereafter.

If so, what enforcement mechanisms would you recommend to implement more joint program acquisition?
ANSWER:

I have not received sufficient information on the scope of the problems and the challenges confronting joint programs acquisition to make fully informed recommendations. If confirmed, I will, pursuant to the Secretary’s guidance, work with Army Department acquisition leadership to address this area.

Morale, Welfare and Recreation

Morale, welfare, and recreation (MWR) programs are critical to enhancement of military life for members and their families, and must be relevant and attractive to all eligible users, including active-duty and reserve personnel and retirees.

What are the challenges in sustaining Army MWR programs that you foresee, and, if confirmed, what improvements would you seek to achieve?

ANSWER:

I agree that high quality and affordable MWR programs are critical in providing the quality of life that Soldiers, their families and retirees deserve. This must be a priority for all the Services and must be properly funded. The challenge is for Garrison Commanders to provide quality programs and effectively compete for and manage resources to maintain viability of Army MWR programs. If confirmed, I will seek to ensure that MWR programs meet the Army’s standards for service delivery and satisfy Soldiers’ priorities and needs.

Soldiers’ Post-Deployment Health Concerns

The health-related problems experienced after Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm led to the Department, at Congressional direction, undertaking extensive efforts to establish a comprehensive health database on deployed forces based on pre- and post-deployment health surveys.

If confirmed, what actions would you expect to take to ensure that the Army uses available data on the health of returning soldiers to ensure that appropriate treatment is available and that all signs of deployment-related illnesses or potential illnesses are identified?

ANSWER:

It is critical that all the Services have in place an effective system to identify deployment-related illnesses as quickly as possible, evaluate and address the adequacy of available behavioral health support services, and address any shortfalls. In an effort to ensure early identification and treatment of emerging deployment-related conditions, the Army has implemented the Post-Deployment Health Reassessment Program. Under this program, Soldiers will be evaluated 90-180 days post-deployment in an effort to identify health concerns.
Requirements and Planning Processes

For the last several years, the Department of Army has relied on supplemental and reprogrammed funds to help pay for ongoing operations in the Global War on Terrorism and for Army modularity. Funding for expected ongoing operations and planned Army modernization efforts are not yet part of the Army’s annual requirements and planning process.

What changes in the Army's planning process do you view as necessary to mitigate the need for supplemental funding and extensive reprogramming requests?

ANSWER:

Recent years' supplemental funding and reprogramming requests were to support the sustained level of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan, evolving operational and security requirements, and repair or replacement of the equipment used in those conflicts. Such wartime needs are immediate in nature, unpredictable, and difficult to incorporate in budgets planned a year in advance of their execution. If confirmed, I will work to identify and incorporate better planning tools, recognizing however, that annual budgeting will never accurately anticipate nor fully incorporate the costs of war and obviate the need for supplemental funding.

As rising personnel and operations and maintenance costs expend an increasing portion of the Army's budget authority, and as competing demands for federal dollars increase in the future years, the Army will have to address the challenges of modernization and transformation with fewer and fewer resources.

What changes would you recommend to the way the Army prioritizes resources to maintain the momentum of Army transformation, while at the same time reducing future force protection shortfalls?

ANSWER:

While I cannot speak to the criteria currently used in Army prioritization, the QDR sets the course for future capabilities and defense forces. The transformation to Army Modular Force structure and continued investments in force protection will be key elements of the Army's role in achieving that force. I believe the roadmap for change in the QDR should provide the overall framework for Army resource priorities. From that will follow sustained transformation momentum and enhanced force protection. I expect budgets will continue to be a struggle in years ahead. The Army must work closely with the Congress to insure that the mission critical needs are funded.

Relationships with Congress

Effective coordination and consultation between the Department and the Congressional defense committees – especially with regard to force structure issues –
continues to be a challenge. Having served four terms in the House of Representatives, as a Special Assistant to Secretary Rumsfeld, and as Acting Secretary of the Air Force, you have extensive knowledge and experience about the manner in which effective legislative and executive branch relationships should be conducted.

If confirmed, what proposals or suggestions for the Department of the Army, if any, would you expect to make?

ANSWER:

If confirmed, one of my highest priorities would be to work with the Secretary of the Army to enhance the Army’s coordination and communication with Congress, Members, and staff. Given my background, I understand the constitutional role of the Congress in national defense matters and the need for effective, prompt, and accurate communication with the Congress. Effective and trusted working relationships with Congress are critical to the success of every Army endeavor.

Future Cargo Aircraft

What is your view of the proper roles and missions for the Army and Air Force in supplying front line troops?

ANSWER:

When it comes to Intra Theater Air Lift, specifically at the strategic and operational levels, no one in the world can match the U.S. Air Force’s ability to deliver personnel, supplies, equipment, or outsized cargo rapidly across strategic distances. Within a theater of operations, it is necessary that the Army maintain an organic rotary and fixed wing capability to meet the Army’s need to transport personnel and mission critical materiel within a theater of operations.

Army Modularity Infrastructure

The Army used emergency authorities in 2004 to procure and install temporary facilities to support modularity units preparing for deployments in support of the Global War on Terrorism. The cost of installing these temporary facilities will exceed $1.4 billion in combined military construction, procurement, and operations and maintenance funds, resulting in hundreds of trailers at each of ten locations around the country to house and provide work areas for over 40,000 Army personnel for an undetermined amount of time.

If confirmed, what plans would you propose to address the Army’s requirement to provide adequate, permanent living quarters and work facilities for personnel affected by the Army’s transformation initiatives?
ANSWER:

The Army provided temporary facilities over the last two years because permanent Army Modular Force basing decisions were not made until BRAC decisions were approved. The Fiscal Year 2007 budget requests funding to start providing adequate, permanent facilities at U.S. installations impacted by Army Modular Force transformation initiatives. Soldiers and their families are the foundation of the Army and they must have the quality housing they deserve. If confirmed, I will work to ensure budgets provide sufficient funding to give all personnel and their family’s quality living and working conditions.

In your opinion, what policy and guidance should be implemented in order to ensure that the relocation of forces into temporary facilities does not detrimentally affect morale and the quality of life afforded Army personnel and their families?

ANSWER:

Where interim facilities are being used, the Army must continue to ensure that they are quality structures, while at the same time programming and budgeting for permanent facilities. Local commanders must carefully monitor living conditions and the impact on morale and be prepared to address any problems that occur. Senior Army leadership should be prepared to support commanders in their efforts to address concerns. “You recruit the Soldier, you retain the family.”

Housing and Barracks Privatization

In recent years, the Department of Defense and the Congress have taken significant steps to improve family housing. However, it will take many more years and a significant amount of funding to adequately meet the Department’s housing needs. The housing privatization program was created as an alternative way to speed the improvement of military family housing and relieve base commanders of the burden of managing their family housing.

What are your views regarding the privatization of family housing?

ANSWER:

I strongly support using the authorities provided by the Congress in 1996 to privatize military family housing. The program continues to demonstrate success in leveraging appropriated funds and housing assets to improve the quality of family housing quickly and economically. As of 1 February 2006, the Army has privatized family housing at 27 locations -- over 64,000 homes. At these 27 locations, the scope of work during the initial development period is estimated to be $8.4 billion, of which the Army contributed $562 million in direct support. Although most projects are in the early stages of initial development, the Army has constructed over 4,700 new homes and renovated 6,600 more. I expect the program will continue to show success in improving the quality of life for Soldiers and their families.
What are your views regarding the privatization of unaccompanied barracks?

ANSWER:

In light of the successes in family housing privatization, the Army should examine the potential costs and benefits for privatizing unaccompanied personnel housing (including barracks, and single senior noncommissioned officer and officer housing). However, any decision regarding replacing current barracks with privatized apartments must consider: standardization, impact on warrior ethos and unit cohesion, access of non-military personnel, and costs.

If confirmed, how would you recommend that the Army use privatization as a means to address the Army’s unaccompanied housing requirements?

ANSWER:

Further study is required before committing to a large scale program. The Army is reviewing some smaller scale projects for possible implementation in the near future.

In addition to MILCON and privatization, do you believe a change in existing unaccompanied housing policy to permit more unaccompanied personnel to reside off base is needed?

ANSWER:

I am not sufficiently familiar with this issue to ascertain whether policy changes are required at this time. In 2005, the Army began allowing unaccompanied personnel in the grade of E-6 to receive basic allowance for housing and reside off-post. (Personnel in the grade of E-7 and above already were allowed to receive BAH and reside off-post.) Garrison Commanders may authorize unaccompanied junior enlisted Soldiers to reside off-post when space is not available on post. I believe that the Army should continue to review its policies to ensure that all soldiers are adequately housed.

Oversight of the Army Corps of Engineers

In the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has assumed a key role in the development and supervision of repairs to our critical infrastructure in the region, in particular, the levee system in New Orleans, Louisiana.

If confirmed, what role do you expect to have in the oversight of activities conducted by the Corps of Engineers?

ANSWER:

Under current Army guidance, the Under Secretary of the Army exercises oversight responsibility for Army Civil Works functions. If confirmed, barring a change in guidance, I
would provide this oversight through the Assistant Secretary for Civil Works who is responsible for supervision of the Army Civil Works program, the Corps of Engineers' reimbursable activities in support of other non-Department of Defense agencies, and the Corps international activities other than those directly in support of U.S. forces overseas. If I am confirmed, I would expect to serve as an advisor to the Secretary of the Army on all matters related to these programs that may come to the Secretary's attention.

**Base Closures and Realignments**

The 2005 Defense Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) has concluded and the military services are in the process of developing business plans for the implementation of BRAC decisions.

**What do you see as the responsibilities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?**

**ANSWER:**

The Army is responsible for executing both the Army’s BRAC recommendations and a portion of the joint cross service group recommendations, as assigned by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics). For this part of the BRAC recommendations, the Army is developing implementation plans and budget justification materials, and will execute the program in accordance with those plans and the BRAC appropriations.

**What do you see as the priorities of the Department of the Army in implementing BRAC decisions?**

**ANSWER:**

I understand that the Army, faced with the Iraq/Afghanistan deployments, the Army plans to invest the bulk of the BRAC funding for Fiscal Year 2006 and 2007 in the movement of the tactical Army units that are in rotation schedule for deployment to support modularity and the return of overseas forces. The Army also plans to invest in the movement of two schools that train Soldiers and the movement of associated headquarters and administrative organizations. While completing these three priorities, the Army will construct 125 Armed Forces Reserve Centers over the six year implementation period.

**When will the Army have the BRAC implementation plans completed?**

**ANSWER:**

The Army has developed implementation plans and these plans become the basis for the initial BRAC budget justification material for Fiscal Year 2006-2011. This budget document was submitted to OSD and is currently in review with the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) and the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment).
When will the Congress be able to review this plan?

ANSWER:

It is my understanding that DoD will release the Army’s volume of the BRAC budget justification materials along with the other component’s budget justification materials as part of the Fiscal Year 2007 President’s budget detail. It is also my understanding that the Army does not yet have a release date.

The DOD installation closure process resulting from BRAC decisions has historically included close cooperation with the affected local community in order to allow these communities an active role in the reuse of property. In rare cases, the goals of the local community may not be compatible with proposals considered by the Department of Defense. For example, the recent closure of the Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington D.C. will present opportunities for both the local community and the federal government to re-use the land based on potentially competing plans.

If confirmed, what goals and policies would you propose to assist affected communities with economic development, revitalization, and re-use planning of property received as a result of the BRAC process?

ANSWER:

As a Member of Congress, I represented a community that had an Air Force base closed in the 1991 BRAC. I worked extensively on the re-use plan for the facility. If confirmed, and with the guidance of the Secretary, I will work closely with the Office of Economic Adjustment, the Local Redevelopment Authorities, the Governors, and other appropriate State and Local officials to accelerate the property disposal process whenever possible. The Army has completed the initial phase of Federal screening and is in the process of evaluating applications and notifying local communities of the Federal interest in the Army BRAC properties. This process will be complete with the determination of surplus decisions. From there the Local Redevelopment Authorities must submit redevelopment plans that will be folded into the Army property disposal process.

What lessons did the Army learn during the BRAC process that you would recommend be included in future BRAC legislation?

ANSWER:

I believe the Army is generally satisfied with the current BRAC authorities, and, if confirmed, I look forward to working with the Congress to execute BRAC 2005.
Contractors on the Battlefield

More and more of the Department’s maintenance and support functions are outsourced. These “contractor logistics support” agreements have resulted in the deployment and employment of civilian contractors in combat areas.

What problems have emerged for the Department as a result of increased numbers of contractors on the battlefield?

ANSWER:

The Department has identified several focus areas, including knowing the exact location of contractor personnel who are deployed with the armed forces; force protection issues and arming of civilians; delineating Command/Control responsibilities over contractor personnel with contract language; and providing life support for deployed contractors which have proven to be problematic. The Army has developed doctrine and policy to address accountability and force protection for contractor personnel. The Army is working to improve housing, dining facilities and other life support to deployed contractor personnel. If confirmed, I would work to ensure that the Army policies and procedures effectively address these areas.

What is the status of the Department’s initiative to review over 300,000 military billets to determine the feasibility of shifting various functions into the civil service and private sector for potential outsourcing?

ANSWER:

The 300,000 military billets are Department-wide. I understand that the Army’s goal is to grow the Operational Army from 315,000 to 355,000 Soldiers by 2013. The Army plans to rely on Military to Civilian conversions and business transformation to accomplish this change. Through FY 06, the Army will have converted 9,644 active military positions and realigned these positions to the operating forces.

Investment in Weapon Systems Acquisition

The investment budget for weapon systems has grown substantially over the past few years to $150 billion per year. An increasing share of this investment is being tied up in “mega systems” like Joint Strike Fighter, Future Combat Systems, and Missile Defense Agency.

How can we sustain this growth at the same time we are covering the increasing costs of operations, Army modularity, and asset recapitalization?

ANSWER:

The DoD cannot sustain the rate of increase and cost overruns in major defense systems that it
has experienced over the last decade. Acquisition reform is necessary and should be a top priority of the Department and Congress. I understand that the Army is attempting to mitigate cost growth first by using evolutionary development strategies. The Army plans to reduce costs through standardization, economies of scale, equipment standardization, requirement discipline and common unit designs. More needs to be done DoD-wide. If confirmed, I would seek to work with the Congress in this critical area.

**How can the budget absorb this kind of cost growth in mega systems?**

**ANSWER:**

The Army has terminated numerous programs and reinvested the proceeds into FCS and into technologies that could be quickly fielded to current forces. The Army has leveraged technologies developed in these terminated systems into the development of FCS systems such as the Non-Line-of-Sight-Cannon. If confirmed, I will continue to leverage resources by examining how the Army could use equipment jointly and multiplying its capabilities through joint networks, such as the Single Integrated Air Picture. I also would seek the reduction of costs in all areas of operations through business transformation initiatives. In my opinion, this must be a high priority for the Department and for the Congress if progress is to be made in this critical area.

**Force Protection Programs**

**Over the past several years, the Army, with the assistance of the Congress, has spent billions of dollars on force protection measures (e.g., Interceptor Body Armor, up-armored high mobility multipurpose vehicles, counter-improvised explosive device measures) primarily using supplemental appropriations.**

**If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Army continues to support and fund force protection programs, even in the absence of supplemental appropriations provisions?**

**ANSWER:**

If confirmed, I would share the view held by Army leadership and place the highest priority on force protection measures in developing the Army budget and support OSD and the other Services in this area. In the area of force protection, the war drove dramatic changes to respond to an adaptive enemy. The Army has worked diligently to provide the best and tested force protection equipment in the world to Soldiers, but can never be satisfied and must be relentless in its efforts to do better. Supplemental funding has been required to support the costs associated with quantities, technology, and tactics required to quickly respond to the changes. The effort has received strong support and leadership from Congress, with over $5B in funding for Up-Armored HMMWVs and Armor Kits, for over $2B in body armor, and millions of dollars for other efforts. While the loss of one Soldier is too many, these programs are showing dramatic results in protecting Soldiers. For the longer term, the Army is integrating force
protection initiatives into the Army at large. Force protection is a broader issue than adequate funding and fielding improved equipment. It requires innovative research and development, evolving training, refinement of tactics, and changes in doctrine to adapt to an adaptive enemy. If confirmed, I am committed to continuing a proactive and aggressive approach to this area.

**Technology Transition**

The Department's efforts to quickly transition technologies to the warfighter have yielded important results in the last few years. Challenges remain in institutionalizing the transition of new technologies into existing programs of record and major weapons systems and platforms.

**What challenges to transition do you see within the Army?**

**ANSWER:**

In fighting the current war on terrorism, the Army has had significant success in fielding improved technology to its Soldiers and the other Services as part of the Joint Forces. These include Force Protection technologies, such as the Warlock family of Improvised Explosive Devices countermeasures and the Soldiers’ Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts. Rapid technology transition challenges are not unique to the Army. The major challenges are technical complexity and maturity, programmatic timing and stable resources. Fielding new technologies has inherent risks. The Army’s strategy is to maintain its S&T investments to mature technology sufficiently for rapid transition into its acquisition programs based on operational needs and the flexibility within Programs of Record to accept new technology.

**If confirmed, how would you ensure that technologies are rapidly transitioned from the laboratory into the hands of the warfighter?**

**ANSWER:**

If confirmed, I will work with the Secretary and the Chief of Staff to improve the Army’s acquisition processes to reduce cycle time for technology transition into useful capability. The Army, with the help of the Congress, has embraced the concept of Spiral Technology Development and has applied that to its largest Program of Record, the Future Combat System. If I am confirmed, I will work to overcome obstacles or inefficiencies and ensure the Army seizes opportunities to insert technology into the Current Force to meet operational needs and improve capability.

**What steps would you take to enhance the effectiveness of technology transition efforts?**
ANSWER:

If confirmed, I will work with the Army Acquisition and its warfighting requirements professionals to ensure that we identify improvements to warfighting systems capabilities that are offered by new technologies. The decisions to transition these technologies must be based on operational needs. The Army is enhancing technology transition efforts by increasing its use of Technology Transition Agreements between the S&T developers and the FCS Program Manager. These agreements between the technology community and the acquisition PM clearly define the technology “products” relevant to the program and when they are available.

**Officer Promotion Selection Boards**

**Under section 506 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, the services must provide substantiated adverse information to promotion selection boards for officers in the grades of O7 and above.**

*What problems, if any, do you foresee in the Army's ability to implement this requirement?*

ANSWER:

At this time, I am informed that the Army does not anticipate problems implementing this requirement. The Army has a system for providing adverse information to General Officer Selection Boards. In the event an officer is selected and adverse information is discovered or substantiated after the board adjourns, the Army has a post-board review process. This process, if necessary, could require the convening of a Promotion Review Board to determine if the adverse information is grounds for changing a board’s recommendation.

OSD is preparing guidance for the Services concerning the implementation of this provision and the Army is awaiting specific guidance on any revisions the Army might need to make to its current processes.

*If confirmed, what guidance would you provide to promotion selection board members about the manner in which such adverse information should be considered?*

ANSWER:

When considering the impact of substantiated adverse information on an officer being considered for promotion, board members must make a determination that the qualifications and potential of that officer outweigh the qualifications and potential of the next officer on the Order of Merit List who was not tentatively recommended for promotion. In applying this standard, board members must keep in mind that the selection of an officer for promotion to (or within) the general officer ranks should be based on the highest standard that exists. The substantiated information must be
considered as part of an officer’s overall record and performance of duty, and should be weighed to determine how it may reflect on an officer’s judgment, integrity, or other qualities necessary to demonstrate potential to perform at a higher grade. Ultimately, board members must endeavor to recommend officers who have consistently demonstrated the highest standards of integrity, personal responsibility, and professional ethics. Board members must be convinced that the selection of an officer with substantiated adverse information is in the Army’s best interest. It is their discretion to recommend for promotion a clearly deserving officer despite substantiated adverse information.

**Investment in Infrastructure**

Witnesses appearing before the Committee in recent years have testified that the military services under-invest in their facilities compared to private industry standards. Decades of under-investment in installations has led to increasing backlogs of facility maintenance needs, substandard living and working conditions, and has made it harder for the Services to take advantage of new technologies that could increase productivity.

Do you believe the Department of the Army is investing enough in its infrastructure? Please explain.

**ANSWER:**

Despite the current operations tempo, the Army is making steady progress in reducing the backlog of restoration and modernization with current levels of military construction funding. However, unless the Army is able to maintain these investments through a steady and predictable infusion of sustainment dollars, gains will erode. The Army continues to focus on its most critical needs and balance resources against competing requirements, i.e., quality of life, equipping and resetting the force, military pay, medical care, enlistment/reenlistment incentives. Facilities are a high priority but compete for scarce resources.

**Body Armor**

Since combat operations began in Afghanistan in 2001, there has been a need to improve individual protection for our service members on the battlefield. As requirements emerge, the Army has responded in several ways, e.g., by speeding up production of the new Interceptor Body Armor (IBA) to replace the older, less capable, Kevlar body armor for everyone in the combat zone, not just the ground combat units. Most recently, as a result of a study done for the Marine Corps, by the Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP), the Army is in the process of buying side plates to improve the overall effectiveness of the IBA.

Do you believe the Army’s programs to protect its soldiers adequately address the requirements for its personnel in combat zones, and if confirmed, what, if anything, would you do to accelerate the program?
ANSWER:

Soldier protection is the highest priority at all levels within the Department and, if I am confirmed, will be my top priority. The Army continually receives input from Commanders in the field and rapidly provides solutions to the battlefield Commander. As new technologies emerge, the Army must continue to work aggressively with industry to develop, test, produce and rapidly field the best possible equipment for its Soldiers. Body and vehicle armor is only part of the answer. The Department must continue its focus on counter-IED technology and improving operations. The enemy constantly changes its tactics to exploit seams. Techniques, tactics and procedures must constantly evolve to meet the changing threat. If confirmed, I will, pursuant to the Secretary’s guidance, work with Army leadership in support of these efforts.

**Equipment Reset**

The ongoing requirements of the Global War on Terror have significantly increased usage rates on the services equipment. As a result, we know there will be a requirement to “reset” the force once combat operations wind down. However, given the ongoing nature of both the war in Iraq, and the larger war on terror, we need to ensure that our force remains ready to respond to whatever contingencies are required.

Do you think that the Army’s equipment reset program meets the requirements of the Global War on Terror, as well as the requirements for changing to a modular force?

ANSWER:

The Army’s budget provides a reset program that meets the equipment requirements for the Global War on Terror as well as the requirements for changing to a modular force. The Army is committed to ensure that Soldiers have what they need to fight and win the Global War on Terror. The Army's primary supporting effort is transforming to a more agile and lethal force--modularity. The purpose of the total Army’s (Active and Reserve) reset program is to restore unit equipment used in the Global War on Terror to full operational capability. Reset, together with the procurement of new equipment, and the Army's Force Generation Management Model (ARFORGEN), meets the Army's equipment needs for both missions. In order for the Army to continue resourcing its equipment requirements for the Global War on Terror and transition to Modularity, it is essential that the Army work with Congress to gain its on-going support.

**Special Operations Civil Affairs Unit**

What is your view on whether all Civil Affairs (CA) units should remain within the Special Operations Command? Please explain.

ANSWER:

In accordance with the QDR 2005 directive, all US Army Reserve Civil Affairs (CA) and
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) Forces will transfer from the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) to the US Army Reserve Command (USARC). USSOCOM will retain the proponentcy function for all Army CA and PSYOP capabilities and thereby remain connected to the USAR CA and PSYOP for qualification training, doctrine development, and force structure design. In close coordination, USSOCOM, USARC, and the US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) are analyzing the requirements and developing the execution plan for this action. USSOCOM will provide the plan to OSD Programs, Analysis and Evaluation by March 30, 2006.

**With the goal of maintaining skills and enhancing professional advancement of CA personnel, what advantages and disadvantages do you see in integrating reserve and active component units and personnel?**

**ANSWER:**

It has been explained to me that the advantages of integration for active and reserve forces outweigh the disadvantages. Army Modularity and the ARFORGEN model formally link AC and USAR capabilities and doctrine. The proponentcy and responsibility for all CA and PSYOP is in the active Army under USSOCOM. This ensures a common baseline standard for qualification, doctrine and force structure. Integrating the AC and USAR Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations capabilities operationally has been shown to be beneficial to both components as they each bring complimentary capabilities to the supported force and receive the benefit of learning from the strengths of the other. Integrating these CA and PSYOP capabilities enhances the overall capability available to the Regional Combatant Commander to address Civil-Military issues from the tactical to the strategic, National Policy, level.

**Stability Operations**

**What do you view as the highest priorities for the Army in implementing the recently issued DOD Directive 3000.05, "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations"?**

**ANSWER:**

I believe that the Department should work toward building strong International and Interagency partnership capabilities to enhance Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Operations. Continued support for existing proven programs, such as IMET, Foreign Military Training, Security Assistance and Cooperation should continue. The Services should also focus on improving planning, information sharing, increasing language and cultural awareness training and education.
**Congressional Oversight**

In order to exercise its legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress are able to receive testimony, briefings, and other communications of information.

Do you agree, if confirmed for this high position, to appear before this Committee and other appropriate committees of the Congress?

**ANSWER:** Yes.

Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear before this Committee, or designated members of this Committee, and provide information, subject to appropriate and necessary security protection, with respect to your responsibilities as the Under Secretary of the Army?

**ANSWER:** Yes.

Do you agree to ensure that testimony, briefings and other communications of information are provided to this Committee and its staff and other appropriate Committees?

**ANSWER:** Yes.