Addendum A: Data Required by NDAA 1994

Sections 517 and 521 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 1994 require the information in this addendum. Section 517 requires a report relating to the implementation of the pilot Program for Active Component Support of the Reserves under Section 414 of the NDAA for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993. Section 521 requires a detailed presentation concerning the Army National Guard, including information relating to the implementation of the Army National Guard Combat Readiness Reform Act of 1992 (Title 11 of Public Law 102-484, and referred in the addendum as 'ANGCRRA'). Section 521 reporting was later amended by Section 704, Fiscal Year 1996 NDAA. Army Reserve information is also presented using Section 521 reporting criteria.

Section 517 (b)(2)(A) . The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared with the promotion rate for other officers considered for promotion from within the promotion zone in the same pay grade and the same competitive category, shown for all officers of the Army.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year 2004 (percent)</th>
<th>AC in the RC*</th>
<th>Army Average**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>38.9</td>
<td>79.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year 2005 (percent)</th>
<th>AC in the RC***</th>
<th>Army Average****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Active component (AC) officers serving in reserve component (RC) assignments at the time of consideration.

**AC officers not serving in RC assignments at the time of consideration.

Section 517 (b)(2)(B) . The promotion rate for officers considered for promotion from below the promotion zone who are serving as active component advisors to units of the Selected Reserve of the Ready Reserve (in accordance with that program) compared in the same manner as specified in subparagraph (A) (the paragraph above).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year 2004 (percent)</th>
<th>AC in the RC***</th>
<th>Army Average****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year 2005 (percent)</th>
<th>AC in the RC***</th>
<th>Army Average****</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Major</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lieutenant Colonel</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Below the zone active component officers serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.

**** Below the zone active component officers not serving in reserve component assignments at the time of consideration.
Section 521(b).

1. The number and percentage of officers with at least two years of active duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.
   a. Army National Guard (ARNG) officers: 19,998 or 54.7 percent.
   b. Army Reserve officers: 7,315 or 21.3 percent.

2. The number and percentage of enlisted personnel with at least two years of active duty before becoming a member of the Army National Guard or the Army Reserve Selected Reserve units.
   a. ARNG enlisted: 117,042 or 39.5 percent.
   b. Army Reserve enlisted: 29,307 or 19.3 percent.

3. The numbers of officers who are graduates of one of the service academies and were released from active duty before the completion of their active duty service obligation, of those officers:
   a. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:
      1. In Fiscal Year 2005, no officers were released to the selective reserve to complete their obligation.
   b. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:
      1. In Fiscal Year 2005, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

4. The number of officers who were commissioned as distinguished Reserve Officers' Training Corps graduates and were released from active duty before the completion of their active duty service obligation and, of those officers:
   a. In Fiscal Year 2005, no distinguished ROTC graduates were released before completing their active duty service obligation.
   b. The number who are serving the remaining period of their active duty service obligation as a member of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 1112(a)(1) of ANGCRRA:
   c. In Fiscal Year 2005, no waivers for distinguished ROTC graduates were granted.
   d. The number for whom waivers were granted by the Secretary under section 1112(a)(2) of ANGCRRA, together with the reason for each waiver:
   e. In Fiscal Year 2005, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

5. The number of officers who are graduates of the ROTC program and who are performing their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with section 1112(b) of ANGCRRA by a combination of (A) two years of active duty, and (B) such additional period of service as is necessary to complete the remainder of such obligation served in the National Guard and, of those officers, the number for whom permission to perform their minimum period of obligated service in accordance with that section was granted during the preceding fiscal year:
   a. In Fiscal Year 2005, four ROTC graduates were released early from their active duty obligation.
      Of this number, four are completing the remainder of their obligation through service in the Army National Guard, and none through service in the Army Reserve.

6. The number of officers for whom recommendations were made during the preceding fiscal year for a unit vacancy promotion to a grade above first lieutenant and, of those recommendations, the number and percentage that were concurred in by an active duty officer under section 1113(a) of ANGCRRA, shown separately for each of the three categories of officers set forth in section 1113(b) of ANGCRRA (Army Reserve data also
reported).

a. 1619 ARNG officers from units were recommended for unit vacancy promotion and promoted.

b. 49 Army Reserve officers from units were recommended for unit vacancy promotion. 24 were favorably considered.

7. The number of waivers during the preceding fiscal year under section 1114(a) of ANGCRRRA of any standard prescribed by the Secretary establishing a military education requirement for noncommissioned officers and the reason for each such waiver.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAIVERS TYPES</th>
<th>BOARDS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SMG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOBILIZED</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRANDFATHERED</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCP</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EQUIVALENT</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. The number and distribution by grade, shown for each State, of personnel in the initial entry training and non-deployability personnel accounting category established under section 1115 of ANGCRRRA for members of the Army National Guard who have not completed the minimum training required for deployment or who are otherwise not available for deployment. (Army Reserve data also reported.)

a. In Fiscal Year 2005, the number of ARNG non-deployable personnel was: 40,005. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) maintains the detailed information.

b. In Fiscal Year 2005, the Army Reserve had approximately 18,749 Soldiers that were considered non-available for deployment for reasons outlined in Army Regulation 220-1, Unit Status Reporting (i.e., pending administrative/legal discharge or separation, medically non-available).

9. The number of members of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, that were discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the National Guard. (Army Reserve data also reported).

a. The number of ARNG Soldiers discharged during the previous fiscal year pursuant to section 11115(c)(1) of ARNGCRRA for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the ARNG is 281 Officers and 13,310 enlisted, which includes all 54 states and territories. The breakdown by each state is maintained by NGB.

b. The number of Army Reserve Soldiers discharged during the previous fiscal year for not completing the minimum training required for deployment within 24 months after entering the Army Reserve is 164 Officers and 1,162 enlisted. Those Soldiers who have not completed the required Initial Entry Training (IET) within the first 24 months are discharged from the Army Reserve under AR 135-178, Separation of Enlisted Personnel.

10. The number of waivers, shown for each State, that were granted by the Secretary during the previous fiscal year under section 1115(c)(2) of ANGCRRRA of the requirement in section 1115(c)(1) of ANGCRRRA described in paragraph (9), together with the reason for each waiver.

a. In Fiscal Year 2005, no waivers were granted by the Secretary of the Army.

11. The number of Army National Guard members, shown for each State, (Army Reserve data also reported) who were screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment and, of those members:
a. Screened during the preceding fiscal year to determine whether they meet minimum physical profile standards required for deployment:
   1. In Fiscal Year 2005, approximately 70,140 ARNG Soldiers underwent a physical. Of these personnel, 4,629, or 6.6 percent, did not meet the minimum physical profile standards required for deployment.
   2. In Fiscal Year 2005, approximately 20,261 Army Reserve Soldiers underwent a retention physical. Of those personnel reviewed, 1,909, or 9.4 percent did not meet the minimum physical profile standards required for deployment.

b. The number and percentage that were transferred pursuant to section 1116 of ANGCRRA to the personnel accounting category described in paragraph (8). (Army Reserve data also reported).
   1. In Fiscal Year 2005, ARNG 10,888 persons were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.
   2. In Fiscal Year 2005, Army Reserve 9,029 persons were transferred from a deployable to a non-deployable status.

12. The number of members, and the percentage total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, who underwent a medical screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
   a. Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title 7, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

13. The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, who underwent a dental screening during the previous fiscal year as provided in section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
   a. Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title 7, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

14. The number of members, and the percentage of the total membership, of the Army National Guard, shown for each State, over the age of 40 who underwent a full physical examination during the previous fiscal year for purposes of section 1117 of ANGCRRA.
   a. Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title 7, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1117 of ANGCRRA.

15. The number of units of the Army National Guard that are scheduled for early deployment in the event of a mobilization and, of those units, the number that are dentally ready for deployment in accordance with section 1118 of ANGCRRA.
   a. Public Law 104-106 (NDAA 1996), Div A, Title 7, Section 704 (b), February 10, 1996, repealed Section 1118 of ANGCRRA.

16. The estimated post-mobilization training time for each Army National Guard combat unit, and a description, displayed in broad categories and by State, of what training would need to be accomplished for Army National Guard combat units in a post-mobilization period for purposes of section 1119 of ANGCRRA.
   a. Estimated time for post mobilization training is reported through the Unit Status Report is classified and is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3, Force Readiness Division.
   b. Information on the type of training required by units during post- mobilization is maintained by the Continental United States Armies (CONUSAs).
   c. Post mobilization training for ARNG Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), Division’s Headquarters, and ARNG support units focuses on theater specific training tailored to each unit's anticipated mission. Units deploying in support of OIF/OEF have focused their training on the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE). Each BCT's combat proficiency is validated at a 21-day capstone Mission Rehearsal Exercise conducted at one of the Combat Training Centers.

17. A description of the measures taken during the preceding fiscal year to comply with the requirement in section 1120 of ANGCRRA to expand the use of simulations, simulators, and advanced training devices and technologies for members and units of the Army National
Guard (Army Reserve data also reported).

a. The ARNG made significant progress in the use of Training Aids, Devices, Simulators, and Simulations (TADSS) during the preceding fiscal year. The ARNG continues to work in coordination with the Training and Doctrine Command’s proponent offices to provide devices that are relevant to the training challenges the ARNG Soldiers are facing both at home station and while forward deployed.

b. To support ARNG transformation and associated modularity requirements, the ARNG fielded the Advanced Bradley Full-Crew Interactive Simulation Trainer (AB-FIST), which provides a full crew simulations trainer for Bradley Battalions of ARNG BCTs. In August 2005, the AB-FIST underwent a rigorous government acceptance test that provides Bradley Platoons with the capability to virtually replicate platoon gunnery requirements. In addition, ARNG is fielding the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer (VCOT). The VCOT provides ARNG units with the capability to train critical combat skills necessary for conducting convoy operations. The VCOT, through the use of geo-specific databases, also provides commanders with a unique and critical mission rehearsal tool. Currently, there are 14 VCOT systems positioned in the ARNG force to train the fundamentals of convoy operations.

c. The ARNG continues to field the Engagement Skills Trainer (EST 2000). This system is the Army’s approved marksmanship training device. EST 2000 is also used to provide unit collective gunnery and tactical training for dismounted Infantry, Special Operations Forces, Scouts, Engineer, Military Police Squads, and Combat Support and Combat Service Support elements. These systems also support units conducting vital homeland defense missions.

d. In addition to the EST 2000 marksmanship trainer, the ARNG is fielding the Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS). The ARNG currently has over 900 systems fielded down to the company level. LMTS is a laser-based training device that replicates the firing of the Soldier’s weapon without live ammunition. Optimally, it is used to reduce the number of live rounds used during initial, remedial, and sustainment training. LMTS is utilized for developing and sustaining marksmanship skills, diagnosing and correcting marksmanship problems, and assessing basic and advanced skills.

e. Through the ARNG Distributed Battle Simulation Program, civilian infrastructure commanders receive assistance from “graybeard” mentors, TADSS facilitators, and Janus Technical Team Exercise Support in the planning, preparation, and execution of simulations-based Battle Staff training that augments the support provided by Training Support XXI Soldiers and greatly enhances unit proficiency and readiness. The Janus Battle Staff simulation will transition to the Army’s approved software solution One Semi-Automated Forces in Fiscal Year 2006. This ARNG training system is being integrated into the Army-wide Battle Command Training Capability, including Army Battle Command Systems training, through Fiscal Year 2008.

b. The Army Reserve continues to focus on integrating simulations, simulators, and TADSS into training plans. Army Reserve units participate in Corps Warfighter and Battle Command Staff Training exercises to enhance training readiness. The Army Reserve remains an active member of the Army’s simulation community by participating in the Live, Virtual, Constructive (LVC) Training Environment Periodic Review and as a member of the LVC Integration Concept Team. The Army Reserve continues to press the U.S. Army Program Executive Office for Simulation, Training, and Instrumentation and the National Simulation Center on the priority for the development of combat support and combat service support functionality within the Army Constructive Training Federation to ensure training capabilities for the entire spectrum. The Army Reserve has also identified the need for increased digital equipment fielding for the Reserve Components. Current and future forces need digital capability to train effectively in the COE and the Joint National Training Capability environment of Army capabilities. The Army Reserve continues to investigate alternative training mechanisms to simulate urban terrain and potential terrorist activities, including the Virtual Emergency Response Training System to replicate the Fort Dix installation, an Army power projection platform. The Army Reserve continues to develop the Simulations Operations functional area assessment to ensure that capabilities exist to support the Department of Defense training transformation goal of integrated live, virtual and constructive training in a joint environment.

18. Summary tables of unit readiness, shown for each State, (Army Reserve data also reported), and drawn from the unit readiness rating system as required by section 1121 of
ANGCRRA, including the personnel readiness rating information and the equipment readiness assessment information required by that section, together with:

a. Explanations of the information are available. Readiness tables are classified. This information is maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.

b. Based on the information shown in the tables, the Secretary’s overall assessment of the deployability of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve), including a discussion of personnel deficiencies and equipment shortfalls in accordance with such section 1121:
   1. Summary tables and overall assessments are classified. Department of the Army, G-3, maintains this information.

19. Summary tables, shown for each State (Army Reserve data also reported), of the results of inspections of units of the Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) by inspectors general or other commissioned officers of the Regular Army under the provisions of section 105 of Title 32, together with explanations of the information shown in the tables, and including display of:

a. The number of such inspections;

b. Identification of the entity conducting each inspection;

c. The number of units inspected; and

d. The overall results of such inspections, including the inspector’s determination for each inspected unit of whether the unit met deployability standards and, for those units not meeting deployability standards, the reasons for such failure and the status of corrective actions.
   1. During Fiscal Year 2005, ARNG state level Inspectors General (IG) conducted extensive inspections throughout the United States. State level IG conducted approximately 604 inspections during the year, visiting 1050 separate units. Because IG inspections focus on findings and recommendations, the units involved in these inspections were not provided with a pass/fail rating. Results of inspections conducted by IG may be requested for release through The Inspector General of the Army.

2. Summary tables depicting CONUSA inspection numbers by state for the ARNG and by Regional Readiness Command for the Army Reserve units are available from FORSCOM.

3. Army Reserve. In Fiscal Year 2005, The U.S. Army Reserve Command conducted 21 Battle Focused Readiness Reviews (BFRRs). The reviews consisted of evaluations of the overall readiness levels within each subordinate command. The BFRR program assisted the U.S. Army Reserve Command in personally evaluating and providing guidance to over 326 brigades and below units. The BFRR allowed each subordinate command to focus on high demand units needing command emphasis. The program continues to enhance unit readiness and increase the Army Reserve ability to support commitments around the world. The Army Reserve conducted more than 400 Initial command Inspections in accordance with Army Regulation 1-201 (Organizational Inspection Program). Additionally, Army Reserve units participated in external evaluations performed to ensure compliance with Title 11, Section 1131, as amended and Title 32 USC, Section 105. “Unit Readiness Validations” focus on a snap-shot of training, personnel, medical, equipment and maintenance readiness measures to provide an external evaluation of the accuracy of Unit Status Reporting, of the efficiency and effectiveness of the unit’s yearly training plan, and of the compatibility with active component forces. “External evaluations during training events” (e.g., Annual Training, Combat Training Center rotations, Overseas Deployment Training) form the basis to evaluate effectiveness of previous training and strengths/weaknesses of the unit. Results of external evaluations are maintained in U.S. Army Forces Command’s (FORSCOM) Training and Evaluation Support System.

20. A listing, for each Army National Guard combat unit (Army Reserve data also reported) of the active duty combat unit (and other units) associated with that Army National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(a) of ANGCRRA, shown by State and to be accompanied, for each such Army National Guard unit (and for the Army Reserve) by: (A) the assessment of the commander of that associated active duty unit of the manpower, equipment, and training resource requirements of that National Guard (and Army Reserve) unit in accordance with section 1131(b)(3) of the ANGCRRA; and (B) the results of the validation by the commander of that associated active duty unit of the
compatibility of that National Guard (or Army Reserve) unit with active duty forces in accordance with section 1131(b)(4) of ANGCRRA.

21. The listing is contained in FORSCOM Regulation 350-4:

   a. Detailed assessments of specific RC units are maintained at the two numbered Armies in the CONUSA and three CONUS-based corps.

   b. For Army National Guard divisions and BCTs:

   1. **Manpower.** Several BCTs have shortages in enlisted personnel and junior officers. Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualification (DMOSQ) is a training challenge because Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) require extensive training, during a limited training window, in schools that are often taught simultaneously. Within the BCTs, Full Time Support (FTS) continues to be a challenge, currently filled at approximately 55 percent of requirements. In ARNG divisions, recent force structure authorization increases are causing short-term shortfalls in fill percentages.

   2. **Equipment.** Shortages of equipment, due to mobilized units and equipment left as Stay Behind Equipment (SBE), have created severe shortages in all States. Since units deploy at near 100 percent equipment fill, the ARNG cross-levels to fill shortages prior to mobilization. The use of SBE by the Army to minimize deploying equipment has somewhat lessened the requirement to cross-level between states, but ARNG units that leave equipment in theater sometimes redeploy without equipment replacements. The severe shortage has negatively impacted Homeland Defense (HLD) and Homeland Security (HLS) capabilities, especially in those states hardest hit by natural disasters such as hurricanes. The worst shortages are in the truck fleets where the majority of the modern vehicles have been left in Iraq and partially replaced by obsolete vehicles that are difficult to maintain. With the HMMWV fleet, where the shortages are in excess of 13,000 vehicles, the Army plans to replace some of this equipment through modular transformation fieldings through Fiscal Year 2011 that will return much of the truck fleets to 70 percent fill. The Army plans to replace some of this equipment through modular transformation fieldings through Fiscal Year 2011 that will return much of the truck fleets to 70 percent fill. Other critical shortages are in night vision devices, SINCGARS radio systems, chemical defense equipment and in command and control communication suites.

   3. **Training.** Adequate training resources in Fiscal Year 2005 enabled BCTs to sustain platoon pre-mobilization training proficiency. Distances to crew-served weapons ranges and the availability of adequate maneuver areas continue to challenge most units.

   c. For ARNG non-BCT units and Army Reserve Expeditionary Forces (AREF) force management model:

   1. **Manpower.** Shortfalls in FTS manning limit operations and training management. DMOSQ can improve through Total Army School System (TASS) transformation. TASS transformation will realign and remission training sites to allow for proportional training capability within TASS based upon MOS density allowing for some increased capacity. The ARNG will now conduct Motor Transport Operator (88M), Military Police (31B) and Military Intelligence (97E/96B) training. Additional MOSs require extensive training and sequential schools require a Soldier's absence from his or her civilian employment for extended periods.

   2. The Army Reserve is continuing to improve its operations and training management by building FTS manning as a result of the Congressionally approved Active Guard/Reserve and Military Technician ramps. However, sustaining DMOSQ is impacted in some cases by limited school spaces that are based on class size and student to instructor ratio (2:1 for some course phases). To address this situation, Army Reserve schools have begun to mobilize qualified Army Reserve instructors to teach only in RC schools. The Army Reserve is also starting to accelerate the conduct of courses and use web-based training whenever feasible. Some MOSs require extensive training, for example 97B, 97E, 25B, 45G, 91W, and 97B, and sequential schools require a Soldier's absence from their civilian employment for extended periods.

   3. **Equipment.** ARNG units have deployed most of the most modern equipment and it has either remained as SBE or is cross-leveled to support the next rotation. Consequently, the ARNG CONUS units do not have the same level of modernization as their active component counterparts. This is especially true with trucks, night vision devices and digitized systems. Both the shortage of equipment and the limited modernized equipment
Historically, due to resourcing restraints, the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) was not equipped to the same modernization level as the active component. This, in some cases, can limit capability and interoperability. The USAR recognizes the Army's challenge in resourcing modernized equipment to the Total Force. Therefore, the USAR has initiated an innovative equipping strategy that maximizes the use of the limited modernized equipment. The strategy places the minimum mission essential equipment for training at the unit level and divides the remaining equipment into centralized individual and collective training sites. USAR units rotate through the training sites based on priority. This plan not only ensures that USAR Soldiers are trained on the most modern equipment, but also maximizes the use of annual training, thus providing a trained and ready force.

5. **Training.** Some Equipment Readiness Code-A (ERC-A) equipment shortages inhibit effective training. Additionally, significant shortages of ERC-B and ERC-C equipment hamper collective training. USAR and ARNG units often have older generation equipment on which to train. Units will require additional training time after mobilization if modernized equipment is provided after mobilization. Limited funds and/or limited days available for training generally preclude some Soldiers from attending either Annual Training or DMOSQ schools. Distance to training areas and facilities further erodes available training time.

b. The results of the validations by the commander are maintained by the Department of the Army, G-3.

c. For ARNG divisions, BCTs, HLD/HLS units, JFHQs, and USAR AREF Packages:
   1. Equipment shortages are the foremost compatibility issue. Replacement equipment if available is often older substitute equipment. Army equipment fieldings of new, reset and cascaded equipment under modular transformation will provide equipment through Fiscal Year 2011 that will resolve much of the compatibility issues for the ARNG.
   2. Lack of Force Modernization equipment fielded to the USAR and ARNG affect compatibility the most. Nonstandard software systems in these units affect both the Standard Installation Division Personnel System and the Unit Level Logistics System. System compatibility between components is often a challenge. Until the reserve component units are modernized and supported at the same level as the AC units, most RC units will not be fully compatible with AC units until after mobilization. Decreased mobilization to deployment and/or employment timelines makes it imperative that RC units be modernized and equipped at the same level as the AC. The National Guard/Reserve Equipment Appropriation (NGREA) funding allows the USAR and the ARNG to procure modernized equipment that the Army does not provide. This will reduce the disparity in AC/RC compatibility, but is not sufficient to bring the components to equal compatibility.
   3. The AREF, which places USAR units into rotational packages over a 5-year period, supports the Army Force Generation Model or ARFORGEN. This model supports predictability of the force and allows the USAR the opportunity to focus training prior to mobilization. In addition, it moves the force away from the traditional concept of Force Support Package units. Priority of effort and resourcing is dependent upon where an individual unit is located within the model at a given time. The model maximizes the use of the limited modernized equipment by dividing the equipment at the unit level, centralized individual and collective training sites. In addition, the USAR relies on the continued support provided by the NGREA and congressional plus-ups. These appropriations supplement the equipment procurement dollars projected by the Army and assist in filling the USAR modernization shortfalls. The USAR priority of equipment modernization is the family of medium tactical vehicles, HMMWVs, trailers, generators, communication systems, material handling equipment, and force protection items.

21. A specification of the active duty personnel assigned to units of the Selected Reserve pursuant to section 414(c) of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (10 U.S.C. 120001), shown (A) by State for the Army National Guard (and the USAR), (B) by rank of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted members assigned, and (C) by unit or other organizational entity of assignment.
As of September 30, 2005, the Army had 4625 AC Soldiers assigned to Title 11 positions. In Fiscal Year 2006, the Army will begin reducing authorizations in accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2005 (PL 108-767, Section 515). The Army G-1 and U.S. Army Human Resources Command carefully manage the authorizations and fill of Title 11 positions.