Opening Statement of
The Honorable Henry J. Hyde
Before the Full Committee
Thursday, December 8, 2005

H. Res. 549 is the 9th Resolution of Inquiry requesting intelligence on prewar Iraq considered by this Committee. Issues surrounding prewar intelligence have been studied again and again. Political opponents of President Bush willfully ignore the findings from these bipartisan investigations that have overwhelmingly found that, while the intelligence on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction was often wrong, it was never manipulated or coerced.

Two Congressional select committees on intelligence, the Silberman-Robb Commission, the British House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, and the British Hutton Inquiry all reviewed—in detail—prewar intelligence on Iraq. None found any evidence of Administration officials attempting to coerce, influence or pressure intelligence analysts.

After a twelve-month review, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a report, which ran over 500 pages, and concluded: “The Committee did not find any evidence that Administration officials attempted to coerce, influence or pressure analysts to change their judgments related to Iraq’s weapons of mass destructions capabilities.” This conclusion, as is true of the entire report, was approved by a unanimous, bipartisan vote by the Senate Committee.

The Silberman-Robb Commission a blue-ribbon, bipartisan commission supported by 88 bipartisan professionals and consultants produced an excellent and detailed report on this matter. Its report of several hundred pages concluded:

“After a thorough review, the Commission found no indication that the Intelligence Community distorted the evidence regarding Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. What the intelligence professionals told you about Saddam Hussein’s programs was what they believed. They were simply wrong.”

Finally, we closely examined the possibility that intelligence analysts were pressured by policymakers to change their judgments about Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons programs. The analysts who worked Iraqi’s weapons issues universally agreed that in no instance did political pressure cause them to skew or alter any of their analytical judgments.” (emphasis added)

Senator John McCain, a co-chairman on the Silberman-Robb Commission, concurred with the Commission’s findings:

“I think it’s a lie to say that the President lied to the American people. I sat on the Robb-Silberman Commission. I saw many, many analysts that came before that Committee. I asked every one of them—I said, ‘Were you ever pressured politically or any other way to change your analysis of the situation as you saw?’ Every one of them said ‘No’ . . . [T]o assert that the President intentionally lied to the American people is just wrong.”
In conclusion, I believe that this resolution of inquiry is flawed politically and factually unnecessary. This issue has been studied repeatedly with the same result—the intelligence was flawed but it was not manipulated.

The repeated Resolutions of Inquiry and our continuing to process them cannot change that fact.